Afternoon and welcome, everybody. It's lovely to see you, at least as attendees.
I don't see your faces. Welcome to our first ever virtual Israel Study Seminar and the first seminar of this new and different Michaelmas term.
The nature of teams life events is such that we cannot see the faces of all the attendees or participants.
And I have to apologise for this, but this is part of the package of allowing everybody to just join, on the other hand.
We do have the option to have a conversation through the Q&A.
So if you look probably to the right of your screen, there is an option to post questions.
And after each presentation, you will be able to write your questions.
And I will be moderating this in a way.
And I guess I have to ask you to bear with us as we are learning together how to how to utilise this to it.
It is with immense pleasure.
And while some sadness that I don't that I'm not able to do it in person, really face to face or at least for us to maths that.
But real, genuine, ultimate pleasure to present to you the speaker, Professor Sandy Kedar.
Professor Cadeau teaches law at the Haifa University's law school.
His research focuses on legal geography, legal history, law and society and land regimes instead of killer societies.
And so we only into Israel. He served as the president of the Israeli Law and Society Association.
He is the co-ordinator of the Legal Geography Sciarra End of the Law and Society Association.
And he is a man. He is a member of the International Committee of this association.
He is the co-founder in 2003 and director of the Association for Distributive Justice, an Israeli NGO addressing these issues.
I must also note maybe on a more personal note, that the first time I met Sandy was some 20 years ago.
So when a small group of people organised as there is roughly Democratic Rainbow was
celebrating a legal victory of what is usually known today as the article code,
a landmark decision by the Israeli court regarding the distribution of state help blends.
Sandy was a main person or the main person to oversee the litigation on the rainbow's side.
And he is credited, duly credited, amongst many other things, also with this landmark decision or victory.
The title of Professor Cadeaux stock today is that of his recently published book,
Emptied Lens Lands Legal Geography of the Bedouin Rights in the Negev.
And now I Should. Bring to life, Sandy.
Thank you. My life.
You answer, you know, I don't know. Well, hi.
So everybody sees me now because I see you. It's okay with the.
Yes, sir. Okay. So. Hello.
Yeah, I must say that I would have preferred to be with you in Oxford instead of sitting in my room in my home.
But I think it's part of our age and time. I hope it won't last too long.
So really, I wanted to thank Oxford University and they the Centre for Global and Area Studies and particularly CO that I know,
as he said for many, many years.
And what I would like to do is to talk for about a 40 minutes, something like that, to present some issues that we touch upon.
A in my co-authored a book, Empty Lance, which I published with a legal a scholar, a mother and a political geographer, and it all went to hell.
So now I will try to share my presentation with you.
I hope it works. Can you see a ago? I can't hear you.
Now, wait. Yes. We are seeing you and the presentation alongside it.
OK. So what I would like to do in the lecture is first to say a few things about my involvement in the issue of the between a land rights,
then move to give a bit of very short background at the situation of the Bedouins in the Negev, then give a short overview of the book,
then in the land dispute between Israel and the Bedouins of the Negev and focus on what we term the dead Negev doctrine, or in short, the Andes,
which we argue is a major legal and geographical doctrine that enables Israel to
claim or to argue that Bedouins here are trespassers on their historical land.
If you aren't, and I will also give offer some critique of the dead negative Edwards.
So when we talk about a a Bedouins and recognise there between settlements,
I should say that there are about a quarter of a million Bedouins in the area of the Negev after that.
I will show you also some maps and that the Bedouins historically have been organised as
many tribes or indigenous people in the region of origin into what we call confederations,
which are groupings of different tribes.
And then they are, in their turn, divided into tribes and subtribes and so on.
So it's a very tribal or indigenous system of social organisation.
I could talk about it later, but it's not the subject of the book or the presentation and half of the Bedouins that are living in the Negev.
About half leaving. What is is what is recognised. A titling is unrecognised or a legal settlement.
That's very important. So as some Bedouins are saying, the minute I'm born, I'm illegal.
Because though a many of them are living there and their parents for generations.
But even though they are considered as trespassing on what is defined as a state land, and not only they don't receive any rights,
but they also don't receive even basic system, a basic services, including, for example, shelters or a schools where they leave.
They have to a commute, some sometimes very far away to go to school.
In many cases, they don't have medical services in their space for Israel.
They don't have electricity.
They don't have running water because the state considered it as state land and says that it will not allow these people to receive these services.
I say sincere. It's not your land and you built without permit.
You are trespassing on this land. And there is also I mean, the waves.
But there is. Quite an intensive process of state destruction of dwellings.
By and large, you can say that on average, many more houses, a dwelling,
I want to say dwelling or houses, but it's done time also shops and stuff like that.
The destructed by the state, by Israel. And there are many more that destruction's in Bedouin dwellings than in the occupied territories.
Just to give you of Palestinian house, I'm talking about Palestinian houses.
Not about the outposts of Jewish outposts. And talking about Palestinian and Palestinian dwellings in all days is a based on a
formalised system of settlement of title that is based on a British import and imported.
And they adhere to a legislated system which is called the tolerance system of land settlement,
which is kind of geographical legal system that defines who owns certain area.
And it's a very formal, quasi judicial system in which Israel is arguing that practically all the Negev is state land.
Now, just to give you an idea. So this is, if you want to photos that it unrecognised village near Bayle Sheva.
It's very standout if you want to general processes of what some scholars call
the illegal cities or shanty towns that they're spread around major cities,
particularly in the in the south. And because the land is.
Not recognise Israel, it is in the process of house demolition.
Over and over, for example, the village of Eilat McCabe, which is on the record.
That village has been destroyed over and over and over by the state, and the Bedouins are clinging to their dwellings.
And so now, just to say a a.
Just a. A, to present my involvement.
So I am, first of all, an academic scholar, but I am in a position no, my view is that academic scholars can be also a intellectual Ongar as a person.
So I believe that sometime you should use your knowledge in order to struggle over social issues.
We could talk about it a bit in the QCA about the connexion between academic work in academic truth and being involved in a specific struggle.
It's not easy, but I think I'd be happy to open this issue because I think it's interesting.
But so I would say that I am involved.
I was involved in a case that reached the Israeli Supreme Court, a Lukumi case, which we cover also in the book.
And I'm somehow also involved in another case now of in a Lulla Cabe,
where Bedwin Sheth is in and out of jail for trespassing over the land of what he claims to be.
Are you his tribal land? So.
So this is this is a beginning. So I look to the book.
So this is the book. And the picture of the book is actually a demolition of a dwelling in our cube and some nice doves over it.
And what I would like to do in the nest next to bark is to present shortly the book.
How it is structured. And I would like to talk to a focus on the fact that it is a very interdisciplinary book.
I see myself or I work within, I would say, several fields generally.
I studied history and law. So I made a nice studied legal history.
I did my doctora doctoral dissertation with Professor Morton Horvitz with a very famous legal historian at Harvard.
And I slowly became involved in a general field of law in society and also more and more in legal geography.
My co-author, Armida Mother, who is also a lawyer, became did his speech d on Automan Legal History.
You also studied Ottoman Turkish.
So you can read the documents and part of its work was to go to the archives in Istanbul and Uncle LA and study the issue.
And our third Orta is when you time Luis APPL, a political geographer, but also a planner.
So I think that what we can say is that the book also reflect the relatively wide range of the three authors.
It's not very easy because we write differently. We come from different disciplines.
So we had many, many versions of the book. But I think that it's worthwhile if you try to tackle with a very complex issue.
I think it's very difficult to be able to master it from only one disciplinary perspective,
because while we're talking about is very intertwined itself.
So. The book goes like that.
We begin with the setting of the book, we gave no general overview of several stories of the land dispute between the Bedouins and the state.
Several examples. For example, we talk about the fact that during Irae operation, one of the last operation in Gaza,
one of the only Israeli victims, was a Bedouin in an unrecognised village that was hit by a Hamas.
And we discovered I mean, it was discovered that Iron Dome does not work in unrecognised villages because it's not on the maps.
So they are not protecting it.
Oh, at least that was the official story or a presentation of the Israeli state to the Supreme Court when it dealt with it.
So being unrecognised is extremely.
I mean, we introduced the reader to the life and death issue of being unrecognised.
And for example, when Israel Israeli authorities are planning Route six, which is the major north south route,
they just planet on unrecognised villages because they are not on the map.
So they don't take account of it, just drive through it.
So we talk about several issues and give examples.
And mainly the book is also structured again.
We we take. We have our main character, who is Norway.
Look me with a Bedouin. Now, he's in his mid 70s.
Was BNA actually educated in a kibbutz? And, uh, but he's part of fair.
They'll be driveby and he's struggling over the land rights and the.
The book weaves his attempt to overcome or try to gain what he he really believes
in these early system or try in the legal system and tries to get his rights.
And we go with him from the lower courts up to the Supreme Court.
But we give us a general overview. So this is the introduction.
Then we gave it a few scholarly and legal frameworks.
We explain a bit. What are the Bedouin Arabs? And also, you know what I was talking about.
Good for duration tribes. It's quite complicated and is in many cases with indigenous people.
We use legal geography and we work within the framework of settler, colonial and indigenous.
Indigenous. Yes, persay dispossession. We also use the term of Noch Russy that they own if to fail has coined.
So this is generally this kind of setting the scholarly and legal frameworks.
Then we move to a critical and legal history of what we call the dead Negev doctrine.
And what we do here is we divided it into three major period.
One is the late Ottoman period.
So we tried to explain. What were the laws in force during the Ottoman period?
And it's not always very easy to discover and what law was enforced and what not,
but it's very important to understand the role of the legal setting of the Ottoman period, because as I will show later, the Israeli state,
one of the important claims of the Israeli state is that it is not dispossessing the Bedouins and it is not changing the law because what it is
doing is implementing the law that was in force before the establishment of Israel and specifically and even more during the late Ottoman period.
So we'll say claim. What do you want from us? We are just protecting what was defined as state land under the Ottomans who are even Muslim.
So it's not that the Zionist state is doing anything to dispossess Bedouin.
But on the contrary. So the first I mean, chapter two shows that there is a need to petition of the Ottoman legislation is very problematic.
So I want to stress that as a legal scholar, I am not a formalised legal scholar.
I think that in most cases, law does not speak for itself.
You have to go through interpretation and you have to understand the context.
So you cannot just look at the words and decide that this is it.
So one of the arguments is that Israel in every junction is opting for the most detrimental interpretation of the laws to the Bedouins.
OK. So it's not that you can first of all, some of the laws, it's not even, you know,
a clear if they were enforce or not, whether they're published, whether they were at any hour.
What is important is that the major legislation, which which is the Ottoman land code from 1858,
remains the major bone of contention of actually both the Bedouins and the Palestinian,
or a major bone of contention between Bedouins and also Palestinians in occupied territory.
More than 150 years after it was enacted and more than, I don't know, decades after it was.
I know a Newald in Turkey on entitlements or it has its does not exist in Turkey,
but it still is a major law in force here in the area, in the in the in Israel and in Palestine.
If you aren't. And so it's very important to understand it.
So we did a lot of work on that.
Then we move to the British mandate period, which also proceeded Israel, and we analyse the changes introduced by the British, amongst others.
As I said before, the settlement of title system and also a.
Yeah. If you dock, I don't hear you. I see you moving, but I don't know.
I don't hear you. I don't. Oh, boy. No, no, I'm listening very attentively because, you know.
OK. And that so there are some issues like it changes a lot.
The British introduced they make some amendments to the Automan and a relevant legislation on something called the Mel Watt.
It's a kind of flattened land type that is relies on.
So we analyse that and we go over the cases from the up from the British mandate period and analyse them and
show what was going on in the law by the courts that they ruled in Palestine during the British mandate.
And then the last part of this chapter, we review and analyse the constructions, what we call the dead Negev doctrine that we'll explain.
But essentially, our understanding is that it is a very similar to the doctrine of terra nullius that was, for example,
used in Australia or empty land is doctrine that the land is empty and therefore nobody had rights on the land.
So this is based on analysis of committees and governmental committees and legal cases and so on,
that we show the construction of this doctrine and we continue until today or until a few years ago.
Then after we established this pillar, which we had, the PLO would say of the legal history, we move to the legal geography of the Negev.
And here we have two majors. Chapter one, a look as the question of.
They stoical geography of the Negev. One of the arguments which is also very common for settler colonial discourse and also for it,
and how many of you are knowledgeable of legal doctrine.
But, for example, the view of John Locke, of who has a right to the land, a person who ties labour,
the theory of labour of John Locke, which is very prominent in issues of property.
So the idea is that Bedouins where nomads, they did not cultivate the land.
They had no no connexion to the land. So they didn't have any right.
If even if they were there, they were just passing through.
Just like, you know, Aborigines in Australia or Native Americans in North Africa and so on.
So we analyse it and actually show based on a lot of documents that Bedouins had quite a lot of agriculture.
For example, they were a major exporter as of, say, barley to a beer industry in Europe, in England.
Then they actually and then in other places, you know, so.
And so we show that the construction of the Bedouins is a not a tiling.
The land is just incorrect. It's all, of course, debated and the debate continues.
But. And then the next step, a chapter,
Chapter six goes and looks at the question of their concept of territory and settlements because according to Israeli understanding.
Bedouins were nomads. So not only they did not cultivate their land, but they don't have any attachment.
And they were and the symbol is the tent. And we show that Bedouins had in the period, at least since the 19th century.
But even before that, the pattern that is called Sami nomadism, which is very different.
And they were moving but from regular or permanent places.
So that the winter and summer place. But sometimes they return to the same poles of their tents.
And everybody knew very well who owns what and where.
So we show that the idea of the Bedouins roaming all over, I don't know.
All over the Middle East is just incorrect historically. And yet it also has an importance.
Then at the next. Chapter or part looks in international comparative, an Israeli perspective.
And we look at the question whether Bedouins are indigenous or not.
And this is important because. Well, first of all,
it's very important because when we talk about indigenous Israelis in Israelis are immediately terrified that if the Bedouins are indigenous,
what does it mean that we, the Israeli Jews,
are a I at least think that more than one group can be indigenous to the land because people can construct.
Because I think that all these things are constructed identities. Anyhow, I think that it's not an objective thing.
So anyhow, we can talk about it. Well, so did not agree. Bumped up the authors about all the details.
But it's also very important legally, because if we are correct,
as we show in Chapter seven, that the Bedouin fit their structure of being indigenous.
And when you compare it to other groups, not only in European settler colonial places, but also in Africa, in Asia.
OK. Indigenous group in Asia and Africa. And we like.
There is no agreed upon definition of indigenous people. But there are characteristics.
And we argue that based on the characteristics that we suggest,
Bedouins are not less indigenous than other groups that are perceived as indigenous by other indigenous groups.
And if we are correct in what we say in Chapter seven.
And I think we are, then I just say that not only Israelis are unhappy with the definition of Bedouins as indigenous,
but also many Palestinian Arabs in Palestine nonperson.
A Palestinian Israeli Arabs say we are all indigenous in other Palestine.
So there it's it's a very interesting debate. We can talk about it.
But at least my position is that the Bedouins are indigenous.
According to the definition, they they got the international law characterisation.
I mean, there is a difference between anthropology, sociology and so on.
I think that when you look at the legal discourse, the international law discourse, then they feed their characterisation.
And that is important because in Chapter eight, we argue that.
The Beddawi the international law currently since the UN Declaration of Indigenous People of 2008.
Seven. What we could think, 2007 forgood, at least.
This declaration became what we call amongst legal scholars, customary international law.
Part of it and customary international law is and norms that states must comply to.
I mean, it's compelling the states and their countries unless they legislate directly against it.
And there is no Israeli legislation against it.
And according to the Israeli system, the internal legally Eastham system, Israel is obliged to follow customary international law doesn't do it.
I mean, it's different in the occupied territories, but in Israel proper, Israel formally is obliged and compelled to abide by it.
And therefore, if we are right, Israel, including the Israeli Supreme Court, are not following international law.
So it has at least the argument is very important that since anyhow,
the next ay ay in last part is contested futures in which we look at state solutions,
processes and proposal, how to solve that issue, not through a legal system, but kind of other alternative ways.
And also what we call seeking planning solution.
Oh, and if I had my co-author was heading a long term project of trying to use Israeli planning principles on Bedwin unrecognised settlements.
They went and made a lot of workshops with Bedouins and they reached the conclusion that about 90, 90 percent,
99 percent of the cases, or 90 percent, more than 90 percent of the cases, if you apply the Israeli planning system.
On the bed weeks, including things similar to keyboard, would too much of the same to a private, to a individual ranchers and so on.
And you allocate the land not on the basis of ethnicity, but on the basis of citizenship.
Practically all Bedouins could be settlements.
What we call unrecognised settlements could be recognised where they are.
And we conclude in the conclusion, the conclusion is based on two parts.
The first part is.
A review of the Israeli Supreme Court case in a big case which was delivered right when we were writing the book and rejected all the arguments.
What we told you here. Essentially, these eight currently the decision was written by the current president of the Supreme Court.
I. But she'd then she wasn't a president, but essentially she rejected all of argument.
And we put a. Unallied, her decision also in a criticise it and then conclude, I mean, there is a part about future and so on.
So this is if you aren't there a structure of the book and what.
But it how long do give me ten. Fifteen. I don't hear I think about ten more minutes would be.
Yeah. OK. So what do I do now is I just give you were talking.
Can you see also my my cursor or or just. Yes.
Because you're cursed too. Okay. So the area of the unrecognised villages is about here today.
Mostly. I mean, this is the Negev. Before that, the Bedouins were mostly in a northern part of the Negev, but there were also Bedouins in the south.
This is if you want it's part of the appendixes affair, our book and the maps.
So this is where most every point here is the location of the Bedouins.
This is the land claims.
Again, most of the land claims that the Bedouins has filed.
This is just a photo for destruction's going on in the Negev.
And what I want to do in the next few minutes is just to give you an overview of the dead Negev doctrine and then a bit of criticism.
And you stop me and it probably will not have time to say everything. So you stop me whenever you feel like.
So when we talk about the dead Negev doctrine,
what I say is that Israel created a legal doctrine that for Citilink facilitates a settlement and land nationalisation,
which is called a dead negative doctrine. And it's a logic resembles that of the terra nullius.
But we have seen a lot of distortions in the dead Neka doctrine and essentially in each legal,
historical, geographical and discretion point, there is a choice made.
And this is important. I said I'm not deformities. There is a choice to the detriment of the Bedouin.
So in all that is incremental. So in the end, in it, in each dot point, they lose.
In the end, they lose almost all cases. So what I want to stress is that often indigenous dispossession entails also denial.
We all like to think about ourselves as good people or most of us.
And they are a dead negative.
Doug Darwin is a spatial legal justice figure story doctrine, which is very good because it dispossesses, while simultaneously didn't matter,
denying that his position because say we're not taking anything from you because it's belonging to the state and it's based on intertwined,
often ambiguous historical, legal and geographical claims and procedural and evidentiary legal tools which we contest throughout the book.
One of key moves was declared VCAT classification of the entire Negev region as dead or not.
What land, which this term derives from Muslim tradition and later appears in the Ottoman land God and also in British mandate legislation.
We devote a lot of time to it. But because of fair time limit, I will not get into it now.
And. That dead Negev doctrine is constantly where varying between norms and facts, substance and procedure, law.
History and geography and its inherent skills.
And theirs is an important channel by which each.
A, it's a Germanic powers fought. And what is important is that it all the time the choice is presented as a constraint.
But we distilled and refuted. Eight core DeAnda components, and now I'll tried to run on on them.
Eight. And in that. So the first one is that Israel claims legal continuity with an scrupulous application of Ottoman and British landlords,
particularly the settlement of title legislation in those regulating Milwaukie and merely land.
But we show lack of continuity with Ottoman and British mandate law and practises.
This is the first part of the book. Then Israel claims lack of organised functioning and prop up the land system within the Bedouins.
But we show that there was it in existence and persistent of an elaborate, consistent and well functioning indigenous, a tribal land system.
I continue. A previous regime never recognised, so goes Israel.
Bedwin legal autonomy or customary law.
But what we show is that there was a lack of effective Ottoman rule in the region until at the very least 19 01 when Bill Sheva was established.
And there was legal and a autonomy granted to the Bedouins by the autobahns and by the British mandate trollers.
We also showed that there was an extensive, extensive sale of Bedouin land to Jewish and Arab purchasers during Lut late
Automan in particular British times and in its successful title registration,
which confirmed the Bedouins traditional land system and the position of previous government.
But they did not own the land. Israel argues that the Bedouin also failed to register the land deal a specific date.
I will not get into it now, but I'll give you some examples of recognition, recognition by previous regime.
So, for example, the Ottoman blocked the land from four building Be'er Sheva by from the Bedouins.
So if they did if they thought it did not belong to the Bedouin, they would not have bought it.
Churchill, the secretary of state, it appeared.
They wrote that he reaffirms the assurances already given in Be'er Sheva by the high commissioner to the
chair that the special rights and custom of the Bedouin tribes of Be'er Sheva will not be interfered with.
In a letter to Ben Go on, the British Mandate wrote that they regard the land as belonging to Bedouin tribes.
I will not get into it because of the time that was regular acquisition of land from Bedouin and by Jews,
and it was registered by the Ottoman and British authorities. Actually, my great.
Mushes Wilonsky was buying land from Dave Edwards, the author Mushes Wilonsky, and it's a high quantity.
I'm running because I'm running out of time, so. And we can see, for example, a map.
Actually, all the Jewish settlements were that were established before 1948 were built on bedwin of land, both from the Bedouins.
I continue the argument goes that until at least 1921, Bedouins did not cultivate regularly, didn't give land.
But we show that there was a Pathet pervasive cultivation and also the argument that there were nomadic, lacking permanent settlements.
But we show that.
There were semi nomadic and not nomadic, for example, here, for example, we have a map which is based on aerial photos of made by the British.
Of all that tents in the Negev. And we analyse it and we show that it's based on a settlement pattern that is very logical and not just spread out.
As I said. So we show it and then we can show, for example, reports.
This is by the Palestine Land Development Company, a very important Jewish company,
reports on land cultivation and a ownership of land, as they perceived it by a.
In this case, it's Arabic Kabbani, which is the name for Lucumi Tribe.
I continue. I have two more and then I finish the Bedouins, the argument goes, are not indigenous.
Grieb a group, but we show we show that they're they fit the characterisation of indigenous people in international law.
Israel argues that the legal burden to establish the right, the right gets all these stipulations.
That is one, two, seven.
All the legal, almost illegal border burden is on the Bedouin, which is almost impossible because you look at the case in Israel,
a common Bedouin tribe, or burzan a claimant and ask for recognition.
And Israel says you have to show that you cultivated these specific do knowm of land, this specific tract of land.
In eight before 1858, sometimes. And how can you do it?
There is no aerial photos when we bring some. When they bring some description by people that we're moving in the area.
For example, people that wear. Searching for the Bible traces, I know all these kind of people that we're running around or even spies and so on,
the court said it's not accurate enough.
I mean, somebody is describing that you walked three hours south west of I don't know what, but how do we know it is your truck?
And when they describe that they encounter something, it's not good enough.
So in a way, I wish it's very clear that this is in a way, a game.
I mean, they get it. The game is very important in legitimation legitimation and say you can try to prove your you failed to prove you fail to prove.
That means you are a trespasser on state land and we protect the state land.
On the other hand, in international, regional and national norms,
they increasingly grant land and territorial rights to indigenous community and also adopt
procedural and evidence rules to be more conquerors with indigenous dorms and practises.
For example, the Canadian Supreme Court recently said, well, you cannot demand an indigenous group to act as if he was 200 years ago,
acting according to our system of laws with a lawyer cancelling them how to register the land.
It's just impossible. But Israel continues.
So I will stop here and I will probably try to stop the sheer.
Screen all you can do it, I. Thank you, Sandy.
I think I have the control over this. This is fascinating. So much.
I'm behind that bet I. You're under it now.
I think people see me for a second before you are back for questions and answers I need to make.
Just one clarification to ask questions. I think that people are doing this already.
You can post your question. And I have somehow the censorship role of choosing which to publish in which not to publish.
Obviously, I will publish all that are not crazy, I guess.
And I think the best would be for us, Sandy, for me to read the questions, just for the record.
This is people asking that necessarily my own questions.
And you let's take them one by one so you can choose which to answer.
So let me just put you on an.
I'm publishing the questions right now. So the first question I think all can see, if you open the questions that answer tab, you can see the.
Thank you, sir. I'd like to see it if I just read it aloud then.
So the question is only before and disappeared. I don't know why it's under published now.
If you go on to published, you can see them. So this is from an anonymous anonymous attendee who writes, The Palestinians are indigenous.
What are they? Are they doing or not? Modern international law is colonial legal system that structurally discriminates against non-state groups.
And like any like any legal system, its application is a matter of power.
So Israel refers. Refers to or relies on international law when it serves its interests.
On the other hand, Israel relies on international law to claim that its colonial state is legitimate.
On the other hand, Israel consistently claims that international laws should not apply to its act because of one or another excuse.
So the question is, do you believe that the national law can influence the Israeli court decisions?
OK. So it's an excellent question. I don't know why I don't see the previous question, but I've seen it before.
And then he disappeared. But anyhow, I know if it will be easier, because I.
I mean, now I have a sign saying no new questions anyhow. Do you think the public's questions, though, if you ever published the.
Why on the Q&A, does it published anyhow?
I don't see it, but I will answer anyhow. So the questions is.
Is based on several sub quish, it's the first one is the question whether Palestinians are an indigenous people.
I mean, it's not a question, it's a statement, but it's a statement that we discussed amongst the authors.
And actually now I'm writing an article which is a speech, this of mine.
And she's in the Palestinian Israeli Palestinian office.
Palestinian citizens of Israel. And we agreed not to agree.
So we my view is the following. There is a difference.
Indigenous is actually, of course, a Western creation. It's a Western term.
Nobody was born. Indigenous people were born. I don't know, Maori and they and a Cherokee and so on.
So nobody was born as indigenous, indigenous as a creation and Western creation.
It's comes from French and deejayed. And it was used Derrell, in a derogatory way.
And then after that, in a very interesting way indigenous people use this term is to empower them.
So I did hear is it in our chapter about indigenous people?
There is an analysis of the term. And what I want to stress is the following.
In different disciplines, there are different definition. Now, I think that and by the way, neither are and no Armon do agree with me.
OK. So we didn't put it in the book. We have a discussion. I think.
That Beduins feet. The characteristic of indigenous people in a different way, that, let's say somebody in Ramallah fits this definition.
Now my. My, my, my, my understanding is that following Bedouins are indigenous.
Also, Arab citizens of Israel, the ultra Palestinians, there are many other things like I'm also many other things on the other hand.
In the international law definition, I don't think the Palestinians fit the narrow characterisation of indigenous people,
but they fit a much more powerful definition, which is there are people, they are a nation.
They have a right to their own state. I mean, so it's more powerful.
I mean, to be indigenous is weaker than to be a nation or state a or a people are.
And, for example, indigenous don't have a right to the people that don't have the right to their own country's own state.
So. And I think that Palestinians are indigenous to the land,
but are not indigenous people according to the narrow definition of what is indigenous in international.
So they just might. But the answer to the first part of the question, the second is whether I mean, we chose as scholars that work with the Bedouins.
And also, some of the Bedwin chose this definition because in a specific context of Israel.
It can help their land claims. It can assist do land claims.
It's not not in other context. It can be detrimental, but but in this context.
We think that they can have some kind of. Benefits from being defined as indigenous,
particularly in the sense that it moves the debate away only from internal Israeli courts to a more international arena.
Now, unfortunately, unlike, for example, what happens in Africa and in the Americas,
where there are regional international courts, Israel is not subject to such courts.
But in the general discussion, there is a benefit to that.
So I don't think and of course,
Israel is not abiding by international law in many other places and many other countries are not abiding by international law.
But isn't it is a discourse. I think that it has benefits, especially when you don't have clearcut property rights.
I hope I answered this question. Thank you.
I will read the next question. This is from Makeda asking the US here.
This is the thank you for a very interesting talk. Alexander, what is the status of Beduins land claim against the state of Israel now?
So the status is the following.
They last important case was the Lockerbie case, which was ruled about four or five years ago.
It reached the Supreme Court, as I said, and then it was even reached a further hearing,
which is another Statler's and further hearing by the president and president of the Israeli Supreme Court was denied.
So. Many of the arguments that where.
Made by day a look be. Were dismissed by the Israeli Supreme Court, however.
I am now somehow involved in another case.
I mean, we could talk about the problem with a local big case, but it began.
Lawyers that were not really. Extremely.
I don't know how to say it. I will stop here and in the middle of the case.
We got involved and convinced I was not involved.
Guess from the beginning we got involved. Oh, and if the Fed has an expert opinion, then what?
I was there in a sabbatical and I returned to Israel and got involved.
And we convinced Norway, look, B two, that we might it might be a good idea to change his lawyers.
And then he changed it into one of the best, a lawyer in Israel on these issues.
Michaelides filed was a work a lot in the occupied territories, but it was too late for introducing some of the evidence.
I mean, there were a lot of mistakes made in the procedure.
So now the other case is started from the beginning with me, Hertzfeld.
So we think that we might. We might.
I'm not sure. I know it's very good anywhere we might make some gains, but in general,
I would say that the land claims they lost 100 percent of their land claims so far in Israeli courts.
So. Yeah, a couple of technical questions and there were maybe suggestions, so first of all,
the that who appeared as anonymous to ask the questions is noting that they were not meant to be anonymous, but they are sent anonymously.
This is how Life Teams event works.
So I can just suggest if you want your name to be mentioned, I think it would be great to see who's asking what specific that we are.
You know, we're 20 people or now. But it's a large enough group to know each other, not well enough to know each other.
You can just write your name before the question and we'll know who's asking and I'll present you.
You can, of course, remain anonymous. Another question is, if you can move, if you can change to zoom.
Not this term. So many different elements playing here.
I know this is a pain.
Also, I can tell you for myself, but it was between the financial and the legal that the university is asking us to do this or I'm sorry.
Ordering us to do it this way. And I think I'm picking my fights selectively right now.
So moving on to the third question, which was also actually on my list of issues to.
Bring to discussion. It has to do with their Beduins involvement in the Israeli army.
The question again from Anonymous, who probably didn't mean to be anonymous. How do you explain the very powerful involvement of bedlam in the IDF?
In view of the terrible treatment of them, the Bedouin in the Israeli by the Israeli public and the legal system that you have so clearly outlined?
So. It's also a very good question, and I would say that the involvement is not very strong.
I mean, not every bed. I mean, the bed Beduins that are serving in days where the army are a minority of the Beddawi.
I mean.
Now, you have to understand a bit the history of the Beduins, I will say a few words about the history of what happened after, before and after 1948.
So there is a debate about how many Bedouins were there before 1948 in the Negev.
We estimate that something between 80, 200000 Bedouins.
Israel thinks that it it it'll be a less. But it's not vey important for your question.
What is important is to know that most Bedouins during the war moved away from the fighting forces during the war in the Negev,
and the borders were not very clear. And then some of them moved, let's say, to Sinai or to to Jordan and so on.
And then after 1948, there was a committee established during actually immediately during the war, after the war to decide.
Who could return or remain in Israel of the Bedouins?
And the committee that was headed, I think, by Yigal alone was the commander of this southern front.
And so some very high ranking. Officers, not only an army,
but officials also decided that what they called the friendly Beduins will be allowed to remain friendly Bedouins where Beduins,
for example, that sold land to Jews before 1948.
We're doing that. We're helping the IDF during or dagga now during the war, for example, as spies and stuff like that.
Also, Beduins, that we're neutrals in subsets. So out of this many, many Beduins that existed lived in the area before 1948.
They remain. I mean, it's a change until the late 50s.
But there remained about twelve to fifteen thousand Bedouins in the Negev and there
where the friendly Bedouins and the many of them received weapons from the Israeli army.
And we're helping the Israeli army to keep the borders against the other Bedouins
because Israel also used internal strife and so on and paid them and so on.
So they began it. And I would also say that the Bedouins were not.
A lot of them were very different. Their identity was not Palestinian.
A lot of them, not all of them, but a lot of them have their internal Bedouin identity, their tribal identity.
Many of them, not all of them, but some of them at least were not connected to, let's say, the Palestinian strife or at least those that remained.
And so a Israel allow them to volunteer, it was not a draught that allowed them to volunteer to the IDF, to the Israeli Defence Forces.
And it's also you have to understand that their occupation, their work.
I mean, possibilities are not very big. We're not very big.
So one of the things they could do is go and serve in the police, in the army and and so on.
But in their last years, there is also a strong change within the Bedouin population and the Islamic movement is getting stronger.
And also so there is also a decrease in their military service that will end in the following.
Still, there are a lot of people that are serving officers.
For example, I once took I was teaching a course in in society to a master in four Israeli judges, and I took them to our Dan recording's villages.
And then came a Bedouin who said, look, on my left hand, this is my arm, me losing my.
I just came back from serving in the reserve duty. And on the right side, it's the demolition order.
And, you know, so. So this is also happening.
I hear. I hear that guy. Yeah. This is my fault.
I'm sorry I opened my microphone a bit too early. OK. So this is my my answer.
Yes. Send it out. Several more very interesting questions.
May I just ask you. I want to get to all of them. So if you're just, you know, answer them in an unsatisfactory, quick manner.
OK. So these are questions for people who are probably within the organisations that we should we see their names.
Joe Bergin asks well, says thank you for an excellent brief.
Did the Bedouin of the Negev have a coherent political identity to make it to me to
make this case that you have very clearly explained today formally for themselves?
Do these really lawmakers? If not, how will the issue be addressed effectively?
Well, you know, again, I'll be short.
They don't have I mean, they see I mean, no, they don't have a coherent identity.
I think, Nate, nobody of us has a green, coherent identity.
I don't believe in coherence in identities, any help. And I think that the Bedouins are not different.
For example, there is a fascinating movement of Bedouin feminist activists, which is amazing.
For example, a Bedouin woman or a struggling against polygamy on one side in there.
And they're against their dispossession of Bedouin and the other side in their demoralisation of woman and trying to go over,
for example, tribal strife. And they're a key on marketings and stuff like that.
So, of course, we now go here and I don't believe in coherence anyhow.
I mean, full coherence.
But does some organisation of the Bedouins, for example, there is an organisation which is called the Regional Council of UNrecognised Villages,
which represent all the unrecognised villages and are pretty sophisticated.
They use also the help of professionals, for example, the work that oh,
and if the Fed did on planning was done with NGOs and with the regional council.
So an. Now, politicians, us and are intellectuals, so.
And now going sending a representative to the U.N. and so on.
So but of course, say like many other things.
There is also a policy of fair divide and rule by these very state that are, you know, things going on underneath.
For example, people that receive land.
And it's not clear how, you know,
days where tries to buy some cooperation from leaders and they will give you access to water or electricity or I don't know what.
But it's also very, very typical to politics of indigenous groups and the relationship with state.
So this is the short answer. But now we are muted.
Thank you.
A short question that is probably deserving much more attention than we can give it in, you know, in whatever time we left is from Richard Kaplan.
What is the legal. The Israeli public reaction to the murder in question?
Again, Israeli public is general, but. And, you know, there are many different voices.
It's interesting. I mean. It's the Bedouins are.
I mean, Israel tries to concentrate the Bedouins in townships, but it's not it's not very successful.
They destroy houses they are building. You know, there are a lot of people there. So.
Even. I've thought a part of the officials, the authorities are understanding that there should be some kind of accommodation.
There, for example,
some mayors of their Jewish cities in the region that are working with the Bedouins because they understand that they have common interests also.
There are some activists that work with the Bedouins, but by and large, there is a group.
Right wing or groups are very much against it.
For example, the NGO called Daily Gavin, which is also actually knockabout territory, is very active against them.
People like Smoots, each in the right, a Edenic.
You mean our party is really anti Beduins? Every even attempt of the state to make concession is seen as a selling.
Did the land to the Bedouins and they opening the corridor between Gaza and the West Bank.
If an Arab corridor moving from and threatening to the state.
So it's it's it's very varied.
But I would say most of the most of the public is just doesn't care a lot.
At least if you don't live in the Negev and you don't. I would say, you know, there are also.
And a lot of problems going on, you know, there is some criminality going on amongst some of the Bedouins.
You know, it's when you look you were born as illegal.
You know, some of them might. Again, it's complicated. So. So and.
When you have no core or not, you know, there is, for example,
that there was a very high rate of Karar nine out the largest recognise between village, a downtown city actually already.
And of course, the Bedouins are working in Balser line, working in the in the region.
So. So, you know, it's not that they leave it like that, that the distance is very small.
It's not that we're not talking about Alaska. You know.
Period. At least someone's question actually relates to the first question you touched upon slightly where you can expand,
the question is what civil society organisations are involved in decision.
Maybe you can name them on behalf of the Beduins. You also mentioned those who work against them.
And the question continues.
Do you think there is another domain which would be more helpful and successful added than the court system to advance the Bedouin case?
OK, so there are quite a few ideals. As I said, the original Council of Fed, I'd recognised villagers.
There is something called phone Dukey home was Jewish, Arab, some organisation of Yunker Bedouins like St. Divine.
Others, they are just co-chairs of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel is working with them.
Sometimes a dollar. And there is even though there is a bunch of fat and mules working with them and a bunch of NGO is working against them.
Also activist or. That are not in angels' or publications and so on.
So now about the alternative. I think actually that the court system is not it is not the right place for for solving.
I was in favour of mediation, but there was an attempt.
But then there is it happens often in Israel. Is that. When a new minister is nominated, they move to another system.
So Sheetrit was the minister responsible for the Beduins about 15 years ago and cheque the possibility of having a mediation even brought a group.
A lot as it had experienced a fair negotiation between state and the Native American tribes in the US.
And they did a pilot and it seemed to have some kind of potential.
But then they moved it to another body.
See, I think that actually I think that that my view is that what can be very successful is a combination of several means.
First of all, is what they call or the Palestine call, the summit, the clinging to the land.
You know, it's very difficult. Each demolition of each house, you have to bring hundreds of policemen and other people.
And it's costly and it's done.
It's problematic. And then you build that and then you'd say you did it, demolish four or five houses.
But now it's not very difficult to build them again. So they clinked.
You know, if Israel also is somehow limited it, it's what it wants to do it it will do.
I mean, if you want to win the Bedouins, really, you have to put Domina in in a camp,
you know, even that it will not be ever very happy to close them there.
So the sue mood, I think, is very effective. The fact that they cling to the land and also there is some effectiveness in international discourse.
So my view. And also some kind of cooperation with a Jewish when you see balladeers and locals and so on.
So Israel has been at trying to oust the Bedouins, Rahmat what they see as its own land for.
At least since the last 20 years.
And it has not been very successful. So that's yeah, yeah, I guess it's a lesson in UN political action.
Maybe the last question from the Q&A and I would maybe allow myself one closing question.
The question is for my handleable friend who is writing.
Thank you very much for the talk I did is quoting you.
The legal burden to establish the rights against this stipulations rests solely on the Bedouin.
And if your quote. Can you elaborate on this more and how they can get past this obstacle that imposed on them?
Is there any chance that they will prove their ownership in the Israeli court system?
Secondly, activism versus academia, what you mentioned maybe earlier in the opening.
This is a fascinating topic. How can you draw the line were to be involved in the cases as an activist and intellectual,
engaged, intellectual and not and not interfere with your work as a scholar.
Nowadays, we need those voices in academia in order to engage with the changes we are hoping for.
Thank you. OK. Thank you very much.
So first question is about the burden of proof. I understand how you can overcome it.
Yeah. So. Israel.
I mean, I've written about it for many years already. This is a great system of legitimation because you don't say you then have a right.
But what you say is you make the procedures and the burden of proof very, very difficult.
So, again, we did not invent it. It happened in many settler colonial system.
You say you just have to prove or you have a certain amount of day to file a complaint or a two to claim a claim.
And you know that.
Because of internal dynamics, because of problem, of bringing the the the the the proof and did evidence, you cannot do it in 30 days or a year then.
So. And then the cases ended.
You know, I've I've done some comparative work on what happened with the Cardinals in a southern United States when it was conquered by you.
Bye bye. The United States, you know, Mexico with conquered and they tried to claim their rights to the land,
actually, that were Mexican origin, who came from Spain or whatever.
But they where many of them were not natives, but they were their enemy anyhow.
So. So usually, I mean, it's Israel establish certain rules which says that when you argue against.
The claim of its state of the state on land shoes.
The burden is on you. Now, as I said.
It's almost ending the discourse. It's it's a mechanism that legitimating it.
Now, what can you do? You can struggle about it. You can show it.
You can show that it's it's like saying that you don't have a right.
And in other countries, they start to understand that this is this is not justice.
This is ridiculous. So what can we do?
You have to struggle. About activism and and academia.
So. I think that there are several models of academics.
There is a model that a scientist does not talk to the viruses.
OK? You don't you don't befriend with viruses and so on.
If you want to do research, I.
I don't believe in it. I mean, for myself, I think that we are a privileged group.
And my view as the social role of academics of myself, I don't say it's the only model is that I am a very few in a privileged position.
I can do what I want. I can research what I want.
I can say I have tenure and I can produce knowledge that is autonomous, unlike what happens with people that work for the state or for the market.
So we have a privileged position of producing knowledge. Now, I think that people would say that they are objective, often not.
I just think the best they think they are objective, but they come with their pretty preconditions.
Now, what I do and of course, in my field, if you work and give counselling to reach people or reach companies, that's fine.
Or if you do volunteer work for Beduins, then you are not objective, you know.
And I do. It is a on a volunteer basis. So.
But my position is the following. I see academic knowledge as a group endeavour and not as a private endeavour.
Now, what we do in this book, for example, we knew there is another group of scholars like what is working with the state.
We write about it in the book, you know, of the politics of academia and so on.
And it's very similar to things that happened in Australia in the Mabu case, which is a very important case about Aboriginal land rights.
So when we wrote the book, I knew that every footnote, as I say, every sentence and every footnote will be checked.
And I made sure that on every footnote, not on the I checked, but independently,
two research assistants checked what I was writing because I knew that it will be under much more scrutiny than regular work.
And indeed, since the book was published and before that with published articles, that there was a lot of criticism so far,
I think I must say I'm very happy that they did not find anything that we lied or wasn't correct.
But this is the way I see it. I mean, I see knowledge, academic knowledge as a working out of discourse and debate.
And you refute something and you continue. And I put my prejudice upfront or my position upfront.
I also don't do that when I teach. I say this is where I do.
This is where I come. And you let a student have to be critical specifically about his position.
Well, when I do it, that's the best.
I think it did. Thank.
Thank you so much. Um, exercise self-control and, uh, avoid asking all those questions that I have for you.
Maybe we'll keep it for a more personal session. Unfortunately, I can invite you not to have tea together.
I want to thank you so much for this fascinating dog. Thank you also for the attendees.
I'm sorry we cannot see you and we cannot hang around for the small dog.
Maybe that's the most crucial element missing from those virtual forums that we don't have now.
The chance to mingle together and to ask question. I am allowing myself to speak in this.
And his name, if you want to ask more than I did in reading your work, maybe you can reach out to him immediately, directly write to him.
And I'm sure he'd be happy to continue the conversation. Please note that our Israel study seminar is now going bi weekly.
And next week we're dedicating that same spot for a different see, similar serious reconsidering early Jewish nationalism.
Where you Wollar from a source will be the speaker you have the details for with on all relevant websites.
Thank you so much for attending. Thank you, Sandy, for making yourself available in these hard times.
And and good luck with your work. Thank you very much.