Good afternoon and welcome, everybody. It's a great pleasure to introduce our friend Peter Bergen, who is for the few who a few who do not know him.
Peter is a lecturer in Oriental Studies at Maskin College.
His research focuses on the period of the British mandate for Palestine with particular interest in maximalist revisionist Zionism.
His first book, The Making of the Israeli Far Right Baqi Me and Zionist Ideology, published earlier this year,
focussed on the ideological and political genesis of one of the major leaders of pro fascist far right Zionism in the 1920s and 30s.
Because growing research from which his lecture today is derived examines British archival
sources to study the reasons for Britain's withdrawal from its Palestine Palestine mandate.
And the title is given to his talk, his guns and Moses Jewish and British resistance during the mandate for Palestine.
Maybe before we begin, I must say that the title is that a bit too suggestive for us, too for many of us to resist suggesting alternatives.
So if we could keep it for the Czechs to offer your alternative pop music references.
Peter, thank you for coming. Lovely to have you on the stage.
Ya'akov. Thank you very much for the invitation as always. And it's really fun to be here.
And since you talked about the Guns and Roses reference, I just might inform you all in kind of I think we're all a bit fed up.
I assumed, as I say in Yiddish at this stage of the term.
So what I've done to try and keep everybody a little bit interested is embedded nine Guns N Roses references into the lecture.
And just see if you can get them all. You should be giving this lecture and not me.
So I'm gonna give a few minutes of context and then I'm going to go to the actual lecture itself.
So the paper now examines the period from February 1944 when Menachem Begin in the Gun declared a revolt against British rule.
And I'll speak about that in a second. Explain what that means. Two April 1947,
when Britain appealed to the United Nations to be released from the mandate for Palestine in order
to try to show the true extent of Jewish anti British insurgency in the final year of the mandate.
But first, the context. So in April 1939,
in reaction to three years of Arab rebellion in Palestine and in the wake of an
unsuccessful conference in February 1939 that had hoped to resolve the issue,
the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald authored a white paper that spelled out future British policy in the region.
It foresaw, and I quote, the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine state, possibly of a federal nature.
End of quote, in treaty with Britain, of course, who would ensure its commercial and political durability?
Not a big surprise, right? A transition period would precede this during which Britain would continue to act as the mandatory power again,
not a surprise, and thus remain responsible for governance.
The intention was for Arabs and Jews to participate equally in the governance of the country.
Most damning of all for the Jews, at least, was the paper's limitation of immigration.
Over the next five years to ten thousand per year,
with a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem of twenty five thousand refugees,
as soon as the High Commissioner could ensure that conditions were adequate for their absorption.
After the five year period, there would be no further Jewish immigration unless sanctioned by the Palestinian Arabs.
Furthermore, and I quote, His Majesty's government was determined to cheque illegal immigration against which,
again, further preventive measures were being adopted and would be strictly enforced.
Now, if we consider that by April 1939, half of Germany's Jewish population, over 300000 refugees, had already left the country in country.
Britain's proposed contribution of twenty five thousand was a rather meagre one indeed.
Likewise, MacDonald's assertion that now I hope the slide works. Yes.
No. Next slide. Hold on. Hold on.
I'm stuck. Sinister. Yeah. Hang on.
It's because I've got something else. Shooting up. Good old.
Good old. All right. Here we go. There we go. Technology.
No, not yet. Oh, yes. OK. Yes. Likewise, McDonnell's assertion that Britain was satisfied that I quote,
when the immigration over five years, which is now contemplated, has taken place.
His Majesty's government will have no further obligation to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish national home.
That's kind of left out when we talk about the white paper many times. Right. So in a way, Britain kind of did a bit of smoke and mirrors.
Now, we've already established Jewish National Home.
So I would say this again in consideration of what was going on in Europe for European Jews at the time.
This is kind of a rather hollow statement now.
The Irgun, the revisionist underground resistance group under the various commands of David Rosio Ya'akov Meridor,
had from March 1937 already begun a limited campaign of attacks on Arabs, which peaked between April and August 1938.
It was. Wants to the Arab rebellion that had begun in 1936 and was ongoing. On twenty seventh of February, nineteen thirty nine.
And as a protest against the London conference in which it was felt that the British were making undue concessions to the Arabs.
Right. So they convened a conference in London in February.
Thirty nine of which the white paper was a product that they are going in protest of.
This carried out a series of major bomb attacks in Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, until of Eve, in which 33 Arabs were killed.
And it stepped up its game, really once the details of the paper, the white paper, were finalised.
So from May to August, nineteen thirty nine, already, the airgun oversaw 15 attacks that killed 71 Arabs and two British policemen.
However, with Britain's and France's declaration of war against Germany on the 3rd of September,
anti British violence that erupted in protest of the white paper ceased.
The author of the white paper, Malcolm McDonald, who incidentally was not a member of Chamberlain's war cabinet,
afterwards reported to the cabinet on the 19th of October.
That, and I quote, The Jews had given their support unconditionally and violence had stopped.
And this was to remain the case until the beginning of 1944.
Now, in December 1943, Menachem Begin became the de facto commander of the good in Palestine.
Bragan would, of course, go on to become prime minister of Israel 1977, but not yet.
Now, once he was in places that you're going, commander, the airgun under Bagan resumed its crusade of anti British insurgency.
In spite of the group's modest resources and Britain's ongoing campaign against Nazi Germany,
now with bacon in the good Lockton resources they made up for with vision, commitment.
Perhaps a bit of delusion and certainly no small sense of desperation.
Indeed, on the 1st of February 1944, just oops, sorry.
Just two months after into Bacons commandeers ship, the Irgun declared a revolt against the British government in Palestine.
And on that same day,
the group undertook a poster campaign to the issues addressed to the Hebrew nation in Zion and in particular the Hebrew youth Hebrew youth.
It demanded a bunch of things rule over Eretz Israel, National Hebrew Army, etc.
You can read that yourselves while I continue to talk about other things. Now, after the Allied victory in May 1945,
Winston Churchill supper suffered a surprise defeat in a national election that saw his deputy prime minister and leader of the Labour Party,
Klemens Atley, become prime minister. On the twenty sixth of July, he was only, by the way, the second Labour politician to hold the post.
Now the app. The government proposed no change to the white paper in spite of what they had said at their conference earlier that year.
The Labour conference and the Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin,
rather notably believed that there should be no special treatment to Europe's Jewish refugees.
In other words, German and German Jewish refugees were all the same.
He saw no reason why Jewish displaced persons should be treated as a special body as such.
Nor why they could not be repatriated in their original home nations.
So the gloves were now office. We say, or especially in the issue of.
On the 10th of October, nineteen forty five, just after the end of the war, a group of armed Jews attacked the athlete immigration camp.
This was the notable event because it marked the first synchronised operation between the Haganah, the Irgun and the left.
Those were the three kind of paramilitary groups that were operating in Israel.
So the hugging up was kind of under the main issue of leadership,
that your gun was really a revisionist underground paramilitary group, the lackey as well.
But they were much more to the right of even the good another, although they were much smaller and they're certainly more ruthless.
The Stern Gang is lucky. It's always known, also known as here.
The group's commanders had been negotiating since August with the aim of uniting the three issues parliament,
military groups and coordinating their various campaigns of anti British resistance.
The Jewish Agency, of which the huggin not represented the military wing took overall responsibility for the three groups cooperation,
which would last until August nineteen forty six. The main impetus for the association was the eventual realisation on the part of the
Jewish Agency of the Atley government's refusal to discontinue the white paper policy.
So it upheld it. In October, the four representatives signed an agreement to operate as the Hebrew Resistance Movement
with the athletes operation as it just talked about their first joint manoeuvre.
On the 13th of November, Ernest Bevin, who thought that Britain should give up its influence in the Middle East and under increasing pressure,
especially from President Truman, to allow one hundred thousand European Jewish refugees into Palestine,
formed the Anglo American Committee of Increase for Palestine.
In so doing, he hoped to bring America into the administrative fold of the Palestine mandate.
And as one of the Anglo American Kimmich Committee members noted, Richard Crossman upon arrival in Jerusalem,
which at this point was certainly no paradise city, he said Palestine is an armed camp.
We saw signs of this. Almost as soon as we crossed the frontier and we we became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere each day.
Many buildings have barbed wire and other defences. We ourselves were closely guarded by armed police and often escorted by armoured cars.
It is obvious that very considerable military forces and large numbers of police are kept in Palestine.
The police are armed. They are conspicuous everywhere and throughout the country there obsessed.
There are substantially built police barracks. This is a nineteen forty six.
So they could have said. Welcome to the jungle. Right, OK.
So that's the context. Now I'm going to begin kind of talk proper, if that makes any sense.
On the 14th of May 1948, British soldiers lowered their flag for the last time in Palestine.
The last high commissioner, Sir Allan Cunningham, had broadcast his final message to Palestine, to the country's Arab,
Jewish and British communities all divided and now at war with each other in all but name over the Palestine Broadcasting Service today before.
With no small degree of occasion, Cunningham declared, and I quote, Tomorrow at midnight,
the final page of history of the British mandate in Palestine is turned on the morrow.
A new chapter opens and Palestine's history goes on.
It is not my wish at this period of the British departure to turn back the pages and look at the past.
It would be easy. In doing so to say sometimes here we did right and no doubt at other times that we did wrong.
For in this complex botter of the government of Palestine, the way ahead has not always been clear and the feature has often been obscure.
In this respect, we are more than content to accept the judgement of history. Rather,
I would wish to say only if it if it so be that by our going we bring eventual
good to the peoples of Palestine that none of us will carvell at our departure.
The end of this quote. Now, a few hours ahead of midnight on 14th of May, David Ben-Gurion,
the leader of the issue of would read aloud the Zionist declaration of establishment of the state of Israel,
unilateral declaration which notably did not define the borders of the new state.
Now, in so doing, Ben-Gurion,
would power pour petrol over the flames of an already out of control conflagration between Palestine's Arab and Jewish populations?
And their conflict continues to this day with no immediate hope for resolution.
Now, while Cunningham was certainly correct in his wish that I just talked about, to not turn back the paper, the pages and look at the past.
The historian cannot and this historian cannot by definition, avoid such a duty.
And indeed, Cottingham himself recognised the necessity of such action.
Only two months later, when he gave an address at Chatham House in London on the 22nd of July entitled Palestine The Last Days of the Mandate.
Now, back in the relative quietude of England and estranged from the chaos of Palestine, Cunningham could recount more candidly that it had taken him,
and I quote,
only a day or two in Palestine to come face to face with the difficulties inherent in the dual obligation imposed by the Balfour Declaration.
End of quote. By the time that Cunningham had assumed the high commissionership, and I quote again,
Jewish terrorism was rapidly increasing and widespread sabotage had been carried out with the hugging.
In addition to the murders of the airgun. So I may add the Stern Group.
That's Cunningham. End of quote. And to further complicate matters, he says this is another quote,
propaganda by American Jubouri was getting an increasing hold on the minds and the pockets.
Interesting choice of words of the Americans, while the Arabs, although physically quiescent, were nonetheless vocally violent and bitter.
Cunningham's immediate task then was, and I quote, to quiet in the country to enable the Anglo American Committee to sit now to this end.
Cunningham noted that Jewish immigration is always was the key to the situation and didn't.
In this respect. Cunningham's hands had been tied to the quotas imposed by the 1939 white paper
on one hand and by other necessary corollary from the Jewish perspective,
at least, illegal immigration to Palestine. On the other, however, Cunningham marked with French frustration and I quote,
The place to stop illegal illegal immigration was in the countries from which these wretched people sailed illegally in leaky and unserviceable boats,
crowded like cockroaches. But at no time did we get the cooperation from those countries which we had the right to expect.
The spectacle of a world refusing themselves to make permanent provision for any of the unhappy people,
yet allowing their laws to be broken with the result of furthering even more,
the unrest in Palestine was yet another sign of the instability from which we were all suffering.
End of quote. Now, equally frustrating for Cunningham was the fact that right up to the very end of the mandate, and I quote again,
all decisions on policy when there were any decisions had to be made outside
Palestine while we had to deal continually with the reactions to them inside
the territory and which had created a singularly difficult situation for the
administration and clearly during Cunningham's tenure as high commissioner,
or at least the weight of these reactions upon the British administration had come
from Britain's from Palestine's Jewish community and in the most impossible form.
Cunningham explained to his audience that Chatham House and I quote, To deal with the terrorists,
however, was an entirely different problem than dealing with hugging up.
So dealing with you are good and lucky was different than dealing with Organon. I continue to quote these were true underground movements,
which had learnt much and indeed had recruited members from the underground movements which had achieved success in Europe during the war.
Their murderous attacks were of the tip and run variety carried out after much reconnaissance and preparation.
After them, the perpetrators sank back into the population under whose cover they were dispersed.
Here was no formulation for the soldiers to attack. But furtive individuals probably widely separated and unknown to each other.
And the only sure method of stamping out this evil was in cooperation with the local population.
End of quote. Such cooperation, however, had not been forthcoming.
Although Cunningham claimed that his police and military had rather more success than was popularly supposed in combating Jewish terrorism,
he nonetheless recorded that and I quote neither from the Jewish Agency nor from the Jewish people.
Did we get the cooperation we required, end of quote.
Thus, British forces had continually been forced to fight a losing battle and one which had only intensified as time went on.
Indeed, he noted pointedly that the final stages were perhaps for the British in Palestine, the most trying time in the history of the mandate.
Now, after the U.N. vote on the twenty ninth of November, which resulted in Resolution one eight one to partition Palestine,
and once it became clear, and I quote, that the Arabs and Jews would undoubtedly become engaged in force.
End of quote. The British set a date for the departure. As such.
Cunningham continued. And I quote, the government of Palestine.
Therefore, during those final few months was committed to do nothing, which could be construed as as the enforcement of partition.
In fact, to remain neutral between the two hotly contesting sides in the event.
Practically everything the administration had to do was construed as either helping or preventing partition and
the anomalous situation which we were thus placed greatly added to our difficulties in maintaining impartiality.
End of quote. Cunningham further noted that he had suggested, and I quote, some six months before May 15th, 1948,
that a five man U.N. partition commission should send an advance party of its secretariat to Palestine to take over essential services.
As far as it could before the British left, end of quote. In point of fact, and I'm quoting against it, only four members of the U.N.,
the UN secretariat were sent and they were not authorised to take over anything.
Consensus, frustration in this speech.
The British administration that's departed on the 15th of money with no replacement administration in place, and I quote,
The British were blamed for not having handed over to anyone, whereas in point of fact, there was nobody to whom to hand over.
End of quote, as he explained. Sorry to keep quoting butt heads.
It's interesting stuff. The British in Palestine who had for many years tried to do their best for the country,
would be the last people who would want to see the country sink into chaos. And during the last six months of the UN, during the last six months,
the UN Partition Commission was kept fully informed as to the steps steps necessary to prevent this end of quote.
But sink into chaos, it had Jewish terrorism against the British governance in Palestine, against British governments.
Governance in Palestine and it's called committed partner.
Legal immigration had both continued relentlessly and indeed had increased in intensity during the last six months of the mandate.
And this while a civil war now also waged between Palestine's Jewish and Arab populations.
Illegal immigration, which had started with Hitler's chancellorship in 1933,
began in earnest in the wake of the nineteen thirty nine white paper now rather pointedly in that year alone.
Nineteen thirty nine. Seventeen thousand out of a total of twenty seven thousand immigrants,
a staggering sixty three percent to Palestine were legal by comparison during the six years of war in the Jews hour of greatest need.
Just over a third as many people were approximately seventy seven thousand two hundred managed to set sail for Palestine in the whole six years,
and in the vast majority and the vast majority of these refugees were either deported back to once they came or interned in militias.
That is, of course, those boats that weren't bombed either perversely by the Haganah, such as the PATRICA or by the Soviets such as the Stroma,
Mick, Mick, Mick FUTA, or shipwrecks such as the Salvador, there were the whole bunch of immigration boats.
It just didn't make it from the end of the war in Europe until the day when the United Nations issued resolution one eight one.
So in other words, from April 1945 to December nineteen forty seven, over forty four thousand illegal immigrants.
The vast majority of the refugees from countries that had been occupied by the Nazis sailed for Palestine.
Most of their ships were intercepted by the British and diverted to either Haifa
or from the 12th of August nineteen forty six to detainment camps in Cyprus.
Now, the last straw in this respect for both British nerves and more importantly,
Britain's perception in the eyes of the international community came with the mandatory
administration's mishandling of the SS Exodus immigrant ship on the 18th of July,
1947. On that day, as it approached Palestinian waters, British officials boarded the ship,
which was carrying four thousand five hundred and fifteen passengers.
And in the ensuing focus, one crewman and two passengers died from British inflicted wounds.
British officials told the ship to Haifa Harbour and with members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine watching.
They were there on their own, their fact finding mission.
It put its refugee, put the refugees onto three British ships, which were then deported back to France.
Upon arrival in the French harbour of Port to book near Marseilles,
the three ships passengers refused to alight and the French government refused to coerce them to get off the ship.
In the end, the British government sent the ships to Hamburg and their British crew forced them to finally disembark there.
The refugees, the majority of whom had been former concentration camp inmates, now perversely returned to Germany,
where they were housed in German displaced person camps, many of which were former concentration camps and which were staffed by Germans.
Now,
perhaps no other event in what was now a sea of bad public relations disasters for the British administration did more to turn world opinion decidedly
in favour of the plight of European Jewish displaced persons who clearly wanted to emigrate to Palestine and against the British government,
which would apparently go to such inhumane lengths to prevent their entry.
There. Indeed, its response to the clear need once Hitler became chancellor for an increase in Jewish emigration
and its further response to the consequential phenomenon of Jewish illegal immigration,
which was it should be remembered.
A direct effect of the stringent immigration quotas that the 1939 white paper had determined was the one area where the
British government really seemed to misjudge its policy and actions during the administration of the Palestine mandate.
Now hand in hand with Britain's dogged adherence to the white paper,
immigration quotas and subsequent Jewish illegal immigration came the campaign of Jewish anti British resistance that in the eyes of its perpetrators,
at least where it was its necessary corollary.
An examination of Jewish outrages as the British term for these activities that the various underground groups,
the Huggett now that are going to the levy committed against the British mandatory
government from the 1st of February 1944 to the twenty ninth of November,
nineteen forty seven that November rain, in other words,
from Bagan and the goods declaration of revolt against the British in Palestine in February 1st,
44 to the day that the United Nations passed Resolution one eight. So twenty ninth of November.
Forty seven yield some rather chilling results. I'm going to break this trajectory down into two further periods.
First, from the 1st of February, nineteen forty four until the end of April, nineteen forty seven.
So in other words, from vegan's declaration of revolt into the British requested that the U.N. place,
the Palestine question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, second regular session.
And that it further convene a special session to prepare the assembly as such.
And the second period of many period from the 1st of May to the twenty ninth of November, nineteen forty seven.
In other words, from the first U.N. special session on Palestine until the U.N. passed Resolution 181.
It's a bit confusing. Don't worry, I'm British. Put up the slides in a minute.
Now, before I do, I just want mention I'm deeply in debt it to my to to to my colleague, my Riccio's assistant,
Jack Edmands, who compiled a list of all of these Jewish and British terrorist outrages that I'd photographed.
I'd photograph thousands of telegrams and reports between Cunningham and the
secretary of state and put them into an Excel spreadsheet and then a calendar,
which is rather chilling to look at, I'd say.
And let me just hold. OK. I'd like to maybe before I begin the presentation of some of this data.
State three caveats. That are important for the subsequent presentation first.
Some disparities were, in fact, will invariably have crept in over time between British contemporary reports of the incidents
from which the data I'm going to talk about comes and their subsequent historical investigation.
It's really impossible to achieve complete accuracy with the details,
and thus they should not be understood to always represent the final word or the final number in the matter.
But rather British contemporary reaction to the recurrences. Indeed, such actually accuracy from my study is of secondary importance.
The intention, rather, is to give to give the listener or the reader an idea of the magnitude and nature of the attacks and not to catalogue them.
Although this is a defect which eventually transpired, the second, whether a duplicate reports I have used,
the more cautious figures I've always gone for the lower figures and more importantly, I've not tried to interpolate reports.
So, for example, if a telegram, a report states bomb explosions in Tel Aviv, in Haifa,
I count these as only two incidents, although it's clear that more than one bomb went off.
And if the report states, and I quote, British and Jewish police shot at in Haifa,
I count this is only one incident since no further more exact numbers are recorded.
Likewise, reports such that this such as well, railway bridges blown out, which happens throughout the course of one evening and the 15th of July.
I'm going to get it wrong anyway. Are counted as only one incident, in spite of the fact that it's clear that more than one bridge was blown out.
Certainly a horrible experience for anyone travelling on a night train whose axles must have rose metres into the air upon detonation.
In any case, what I'm trying to say is the figures that I'm going to quote to you now are all conservative.
Conservative estimates. Finally, all incidents in this compilation are what I would call serious terrorist incidents,
shootings, bombings, mine, explosions, abductions, bank heist.
In other words, what was a force majeure? Right. They do not take into consideration instances of day to day petty crime.
OK. So here we go. Fasten your seatbelts. So between the 1st of February 1944 and the 30th of April 1947,
the British Administration of Palestine record reported a total of two hundred and fifty three terrorist outrages
all carried out by Jewish underground perrottet military forces and all directed towards British infrastructure.
Notably, however, and you'll see here, there were no instances of Jewish anti British terror at all from November.
Where am I? There we are. November forty four until May nineteen forty five. So the final six months of the war.
But with Hitler's suicide, the Nazi surrender and the allied victory in Europe began again and in earnest.
Indeed, most of the reported incidents that I just talked about occurred between May forty five in April.
Forty seven, right.
Upwards of two hundred and fourteen and approximately seven hundred fifty days or one outrage, one report of an outrage every three and a half days.
The vast majority of these outrages were due to bombs or mine explosions.
The Jewish groups directed at trains, train stations, police stations, bridges,
armoured cars and other military targets, British contemporary reports, sources report.
Over one hundred and forty five such incidents. The next most frequent types of outrage reported were direct attacks on personnel,
shootings, stabbings and assassinations of which there were 47 recorded incidents.
Similar a number, but no less harrowing with the 13 reports of kidnapping and from the twenty sixth of December,
nineteen forty six onwards floggings of British soldiers and police.
Finally, bank heists and plunder, especially of British weapons caches,
of which there are 17 reports made up the remainder of Jewish outrage as reported from the beginning of Bacon's revolt.
Until Britain referred the Palestine mandate to the U.N. in April 1947,
a total of three hundred and fifty nine people were killed and a further six hundred and fifty one injured during this first period.
The big numbers, again, the bulk of these injuries were sustained in attacks that actually occurred after the war between May 1945 and April.
Nineteen forty seven. Thus, within less than two years of the war's end.
Three hundred and twenty four people were killed. An average of one every two days.
And six hundred and forty.
An average of just one person just under one person per day, had been injured in Palestine as a result of Jewish anti British terrorism.
And ninety one of these people who were all killed in one day, the day of July, July 15th, I'm sorry, I always get the date wrong.
Forty six the day that King David Hotel was bombed. Just give me an idea of of just one month.
This is the month before the King David Hotel bombing. I don't know how well you can read this, but I could put my glasses on for this.
You know, you get on on June 4th, train blown up in Haifa, the next day, explosion at the railway station,
the seventh attack on Jerusalem clinic, one wounded on the 10th attack on passenger trains.
Trains blown up next to explosions and houses in Tel Aviv. Soldiers out in Tel Aviv.
Bombs thrown off roofs of the old city, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Indeed.
All of these things would only get worse as nineteen forty seven were on.
And in the months that paralleled the United Nations Special Committee of Palestine and the General Assembly deliberations,
which resulted in the U.N. Resolution 181, which recommended the partition of Palestine.
So in other words, from the first to May 1st of May to the twenty ninth of November,
or approximately two hundred and forty days witnessed no fewer than where am I?
So one hundred and seventy three terrorist outrages.
One every one and one third days, as in the first period that I've talked about before,
bombings and mind detonations form the bulk of these incidents over eighty four in total or one every three days.
There were a further forty six reports of shootings or other personal attacks.
Eight kidnappings in. We're sorry.
Sorry. There we are. Eight bank heists or hold-ups and four reports of arsons.
These kidnappings, by the way, the eight kidnappings included those of two soldiers named Pace and Martin,
who were kidnapped by the good and whose bodies were eventually found hanging from two trees.
When soldiers went to cut them down, they discovered all too late that the bodies had been booby trapped and exploded.
Notably, British officials also recorded the first incidences of Arab attacks on Jews, which they put it only 10,
which killed eight and wounded 20 compared to a comparatively inconsequential number,
but one that is certainly important for indicating how intolerable the situation of
continued terrorist violence had now also become for Palestine's Arab citizens,
even if they, for the most part, had not been the direct target of such aggression.
Certainly post white paper. So in total, during this final harrowing period of British of Britain's active administration of the mandate,
upwards one hundred of one hundred and thirty four people were killed and 450, 58 injured as a result of Jewish anti British terrorism.
And the total for the whole period that I've just talked about under for the first of February, nineteen forty four to December,
nineteen forty five, forty seven adds up to more than four hundred and fifty six reported incidents of one in 56 reports of bombings,
mine explosions, shootings, stabbings, kidnappings, grand larceny and arson, which killed approximately five hundred predominantly British,
but also Jewish and Arab soldiers, policemen, civil servants and civilians and injured over 1100 more.
Now, by comparison,
the whole period of the IRS terrorist attacks in London from the provisional Irish Republican Army's 1st operation on the 8th of March,
nineteen seventy three until the Good Friday Peace Agreement on the 10th of April, nineteen ninety eight.
So over twenty five years,
there were fewer than 300 reported incidents in which approximately eight hundred and fifty people were injured and fewer than 50 killed.
And this in a city of almost seven million inhabitants.
The campaign of Jewish anti British resistance in Palestine, which spanned less than four years,
but which caused significantly more injuries and 10 times as many deaths than the
IRA campaign in London to a population that was less than one third as large.
Towers in comparison. Think about that.
It's amazing. During the nineteen forty seven Commons debates on Palestine, which I discuss elsewhere in the research.
Winston Churchill repeatedly referred to the one hundred thousand British soldiers stationed in Palestine.
He wanted to get them home. The one hundred thousand was what was there is perhaps thus sobering to note that
during the height of the British Army's campaign in Northern Ireland in 1974,
and for a population that had just over one point five million inhabitants, was only slightly smaller than Palestine's.
The total troop strength was fewer than 26000 soldiers.
A quarter of that deployed in Palestine.
Thus, it's clear I would be beyond all reasonable doubt, the Jewish anti British terrorism was not only effective,
but was alongside the protracted campaign of Jewish illegal immigration and the loss of face the British.
Britain suffered, as a result,
the single greatest deterrent to the British Palestinian administration and had a direct bearing on Britain's continual inability to
effect a solution for Palestine as per its mandatory obligations and thus its eventual referral of the Palestine mandate to the UN.
In April 1947.
Throughout the examination of thousands, I would say tens of thousands of pages of official British documents, meeting minutes, cabinet discussions,
comments and Lords debates, confidential annexes, telegrams, letters, et cetera,
that range from the beginning of nineteen forty four until the end of nineteen forty seven.
The issues of Jewish illegal immigration and above all, Jewish anti British terrorism absolutely dominate throughout.
Now, while there were certainly other major contributing factors to Britain's eventual decision to go to the U.N.,
not least the frustration of decades of future policy and decision and the inability to strike a viable modus operandi for executing the mandate,
and especially from nineteen forty five complications, when the international community, most notably the noted states,
the dual phenomena of illegal immigration and anti British resistance prevented the
British government both at home and in Palestine from reaching any effective decision.
Visa V a feature durable solution there.
Indeed, the sceptic might need only imagine a counterfactual situation that would see a four year campaign of terrorism in London,
even with its current population of over eight point five million people.
That would involve over 450 individual operations and result in the deaths of over 500 people, an injury to twice as many again.
To understand how harrowing, harrowingly desperate the degree and magnitude of the situation must have been for the
inhabitants of Palestine during the years nineteen forty four to nineteen forty seven.
And, of course, fighting only increased once. Resolution 181 had been passed, but it took on a somewhat different form, more accurately,
that it a civil war between Arab and Jew, which was discussed in many other works.
But the British had, by Cunningham's own admission, which I which I talked about earlier, ceased to administer the mandate during the last six months,
which is not to say that anti British violence stopped,
but merely that it was now part of a much greater conflict, one that sadly continues to this day.
Now, one wonders how much of this conflict could have been avoided had Britain managed
its mandate for Palestine more effectively and indeed more altruistically, Zionist groups welcomed with jubilation.
Lord Balfour, a letter to Arthur Balfours Balfour letter to Lord Rothschild in 1917.
And such jubilation only increased when His Majesty's government was granted the
execution and administration of the mandate at the San Remo conference in April 1929.
And again when the League of Nations formally approved it in July 1922.
Yet by nineteen thirty nine, feelings of jubilation and to those of despair, betrayal and indeed rage.
Throughout the 1930s, the Zionist and Jewish groups in Europe,
America and Palestine endeavoured to get as many Jews as possible out of the Nazi occupied lands and bring them,
for the most part, to Palestine that the bitter British had.
Mandatory administration did little to relax. Quota restrictions during this period is well documented, and I discuss it elsewhere in the research.
Yet, in spite of such obstacles, a significant portion of European Jews, including almost half of German Jewry,
did manage to escape, and many found their way to Palestine either legally or illegally.
But with the McMichael 1939 White Paper, which I talked about at the beginning, and which, as you saw,
as a violation of the terms of the mandate that Britain had accepted relations between
Palestine's Jewish community and the British mandatory government were damaged irreparably.
And the Irgun and eventually also the Stern Group in the height of the Haganah began their campaigns of anti British action.
The resultant macabre tripartite symbiosis between the mandatory government's dogged adherence to the white paper,
the need for further immigration, be it legal or legal, which it caused, and a. and end sorry at Jewish anti British terrorism,
which sought to push through a more immediate solution for the Jews in Palestine in every way destroyed British infrastructure,
equipment, lives, morale and not least support for the Zionist project.
Even ultimately in those figures such as Churchill, who had been historically its most ardent supporters to British patients, had simply run out.
A note on the nature of British policy and rule themselves is necessary.
And again, this is kind of a short summary, but I feel the need to address it at times, and most notably, once the Atley government had taken over.
It would appear that both the Palestine administration and certainly much more often its colleagues in Whitehall ruled with with a sense,
with a sense of what might be described only as improvised chaos.
And indeed, that's the working title I've got for this book, Improvised Chaos.
One need only to consider the appointments of various committees and commissions, both in Palestine itself,
but also in Britain and eventually also America,
which issued various responses to the situation there and made various recommendations for its solution,
but which all ultimately could not confront the naked truth that was inherent in all of their various missions,
that Britain had created an impossible task for itself in accepting the Palestine mandate.
Indeed, with regard to policy indecision, I would say and the continual appointment of every new committees to report on reports of reports in
which almost all you always came up with recommendations that had been rehashed from the predecessors,
the British government seemed more often than not to be locked in a game of tug of war with itself.
Perhaps the most the single most important contributed contributor to this phenomenon was the even greater phenomenon of British self-interest.
And it's noteworthy indeed to see that the same motivation of self-interest and the
resultant indecision and ineptitude that it spawned continually informed or misinformed,
I would say British policy in Palestine from the period of World War One to 15th of May 1948,
when Britain retreated from Palestine with, on the surface at least, great pomp and dignity,
but certainly internally a sense of overwhelming failure made even better by the huge loss of life and
indeed face that the British is it the crumbling empire had suffered in the final years of the mandate.
And I don't cry. Perhaps things might have gone different differently had Ernest Bevin not been foreign secretary in the wake of the Second World War.
And I've talked about Bevan elektro just a couple of weeks ago.
And I won't go into too much detail here, but I would just say that he stands out as perhaps one of the most curious and very enough,
very often aggravating figures of the act.
The administration is dogged refusal to understand the plight of European Jewish displaced persons and continued resistance to the
question of the immediate emigration of 100000 displaced persons to Palestine in spite of great pressure first from Truman in the US,
but eventually also the international community, especially in the wake of the exodus of Blair,
indicates an inability or an unwillingness to place personal ideology below any
sort of practical and political to say nothing of humanitarian utilitarianism.
So no matter what one's political or personal position might be on these events that I've talked about.
I suppose if if we put ourselves in a in the heads of the hugging of the lackey in the end that you're good,
we might not be able to accept what would happen. We might be able understand what did happen.
I think that's I'm trying to say. Nonetheless, I gather here now we're in the study itself.
I make no no attempt to advocate or excuse terrorism, neither historically nor in the present day,
but seek merely to understand what drove the British to all but flee from the Palestine mandate.
1948. Like a dog with its tail between its legs and notably having burned all but only the
most official of documents that it housed in its various administrative centres that.
While on one hand, recognising the Jewish anti British terrorism was a key catalyst in Britain's eventual decision to give up the mandate.
It is nonetheless incumbent upon me to draw a difference between, say, you're gun Haganah and Lecky tactics, if only superficially.
I would say that they are good. And the Haganah always directed their attacks towards the British mandatory infrastructure
and in the case of the good official representatives of the administration. That's not to say that there wasn't civilian collateral damage.
But but. But but the attacks were always directed towards British administration.
Now, not so the Stern Gang, who were much more indiscriminate in every way.
They had a real appetite for destruction, these guys. And while it.
Let me just tell you, I think to skip over this pit.
I just want to say that kind of my role or my attention writing this book, as is the intention of most historians, is to explain and not excuse this.
Right. And that that's what I want to roundoff this section by saying.
And so we left. Concluded Cunningham at his Chatham House address.
He continued, and I quote, It is a melancholy business presiding over such an occasion.
But I sincerely trust that we left with dignity using all our efforts to the last for the good of Palestine.
For three years we had been ruling for yes. For three years we had been ruling Palestine without a policy.
Amid turbulence, vilification, assassination and kidnapping,
that the British should have been able to stand the strain for so long without a goal
to aim at was due to the superlative quality of the civil service whose integrity,
impartiality and courage went beyond praise, the standard of which could have been reached by no other nation.
End of quote. Now, Cunningham's words are notable for the poignancy and indeed honesty examination of his
correspondence demonstrated over and over again how truly he embodied the spirit of noblesse oblige.
His unwavering comments to and support of his staff and his documents is matched only
by his frustration with the various groups that put them into situations of existence.
Existential threat. And indeed, by Whitehall,
the administration that was content to prevent to prevaricate on its Palestine policy over and over again and to their detriment.
Cunningham's claim that the level of such exemplary action could have been, and I quote,
reached by no other nation lacks perhaps the Khairullah Ravelli requisite observation
that I would say no other nation could perhaps have so mismanaged the Palestine mandate.
Indeed, it was a source of constant of a constant sense of, I would say,
cynical irony to me to observe Britain's mishandling of the Brexit vote and subsequent
negotiations throughout the whole period in which I researched and wrote this book.
The fact that such similar devices continued to be employed by British politicians almost a century apart,
the unwillingness to commit to apparently any proposed new plan that might drive policy forward,
the need to play one's cards close to one's chest in the name of never once, never giving one's game away.
And in the hope of gaining much more. By so doing. The desire to have one's cake and eat it, too.
And not least the overriding need to preserve British interests, which informed all of these,
suggest that the British long day of political improvised chaos is more strategy than it is happenstance.
Cunningham concluded. I quote, Out of all the somewhat unhappy experiences of the last days,
one thought at least can give us satisfaction not only in Palestine but in India, in the United States, Soviet Russia and elsewhere.
Our rule in Palestine has too often been held up as an exploitation of dependent peoples, as an instrument of imperial policy.
There can no longer be any doubt in the eyes of the world as to the true nature of the problem.
A bitter contacts between Jews and Arabs, each fearing domination by the other in which the mandatory powers standing between has been
continually denounced first by one community and then by the other showing favour to the other side.
The true problem is now clear, and so history will judge it.
I'm sure all of us who have had to work in Palestine during the term of the mandate are, well, content to accept that judgement.
End of quote. Well, indeed. History has proven Cunningham correct in this final observation nonetheless.
And over 70 years of Palestinian Israeli conflict notwithstanding,
we should not forget the rather instrumental role that Britain played both in the creation of a Jewish
national homeland in Palestine and in the perpetuation of a conflict that continues to this day.
Thank you. Thank you.
Thank you, Peter, for a fascinating talk. The question and answer tab is open for questions.
And what would you have a question for my tutor? The exercise would be that I will read the questions and you answer them.
And to our audience, if you do not want your name to be mentioned and to ask the question anonymously, just no displeased.
So the first question formatted to do Parfit, what do you think the British,
in fact, could have done to bring the mandate to a harmonious conclusion to draw?
Thanks for the question. Where I would say not have taken it up in the first place.
I think that if it was so fraught with with double dealing, I can't think of a better word to say that right.
To say right now he's right now. But really, it was clear from the beginning.
I remember one of the very first files I looked at at at at the beginning when I was researching.
This is something like the first or second week into the mandate.
Kemba, who was writing it, it was kind of artificial kind of thing, saying there's no way we're going to be able to do this.
But this is from like 19, 19, 20. So so I think in a way, I don't think there's anything they could have done, quite honestly.
I think perhaps that they imposed partition and imposed it and thought about it sooner.
But but, you know, by 1947, they had had the mandate for almost 30 years.
They'd been certainly occupying the country for 30 years. So I think in a way, by that stage was almost nothing they could have done.
There would have been harmonious. It would have been kind of similar to India, Pakistan, you know.
But but it still would have been probably better than what's happening now.
Thank you, Peter. We have two questions, one from an anonymous Canadian data from Danielle,
who are basically the same questioning or asking you for some clarification on the terminology you use terms like terror and terrorism.
Danielle is writing. Where are they use what other terms were deployed to describe the frequent violence?
So this is the terminology of the reports from Danielle. Right question. And they are asking actually for your terminology.
What do you call terrorism? If you could maybe it's not how I define it.
It's about how they define it themselves. I'm using the terms that they themselves define or they themselves use to define what they're doing.
Both the size of let's say that they are good. And the Lactaid themselves. I've said I probably huggin.
I wouldn't call it that. They would call it, you know. But I also use the term that the British use.
So so I mean, if you if you listen to what I was saying, quoting cutting him, he uses the words terrorism over and over again.
So I think what I'm trying to do is understand how the British is trying to decrypt.
What I'm trying to do is put myself in the heads of the British and try to understand what they understood,
how they received information, how they processed information and how they reacted to it.
If they could count this as terrorism, that that's how that's how I'm going to call it not what I call it is what they call it.
And also, I would I would say someone who is that kind of you know, my whole research focuses on that, say, revisionist anti British resistance.
I mean, these groups call themselves terrorist groups and proudly so. I mean, we you know, we kind of shudder from from this word in 2000, whatever.
You were 20, 20 here. But they are quite, quite proud to call themselves.
The whole point of why do I say terrorism, by the way, and here is maybe forget about what the Brits say,
but why did the groups themselves call themselves terrorists? Because as Cunningham alludes to in his discussion, they did not make themselves known.
So whenever they undertook an action, they went in very secretly. They they did.
The whole terror was people did not know who was the terrorists when they would strike or how they would strike.
That was the point. That was absolutely a goal. And that's why it's called terrorism.
And not just I mean, I say anti British resistance a lot, but it was more than not the intention was to terrorise.
And there's no getting away from that. So there's no point in mincing words or and that's that's that's how they themselves define themselves.
That's also how the British saw them. So as it as kind of a responsible story and I think I like to say, you know,
who doesn't have a trouble troubles so much confronting this kind of language. I think we should we should use the language they use.
Peter, a sign of the huge interest that you talk is creating is the number of questions we have.
I'm already have. I already have to apologise. I don't think we'll have a chance to cover all of them.
Hopefully we will. But let's try and move a little bit faster.
Marcus is asking, in your opinion, did Ben-Gurion give tacit approval to the actions of the good and me in order to advance the exit of the British?
I'm assuming he must have given the Haganah approval.
Right. So, Marcus. Yes. Tacit approval.
Absolutely. There is an there is an account in Richard Crossman, his diary, if I'm not mistaken,
who is one of the members, the Anglo American Committee, where they visited Ben Gurion.
It's de Beaucaire. And they they mentioned that, you know, when they were leaving, they had to leave Under Armour with armoured cars and everything.
And Bériot, Ben-Gurion, Winkelmann said, don't worry. We've spoken to that. You won't be terrorised tonight.
I think with a wink in his eye. I mean, they were very complicit in all of this, without a doubt.
OK. Thank you. Just a technical note. I've asked if I can unmuted attendees.
I'm afraid not. I don't know if he's aware. That's the live event format that teams allow us.
So the net question in line is from Anonymous.
Many Syrians would agree that the mandate nurtured and supported design is to build up in Palestine in terms of institution building,
economical resources and security structures.
To what extent were British officials in the 40s conscious of the fact that we created this monster, quote unquote?
OK. So. So I don't want to correct perhaps one thing. Many historians would agree that the mandate nurtured and supported.
Yes. That design and that was there. That was the mandate. The mandate was to was to build up and nurture Zionist a Zionist settlement of Falak.
I mean, it's kind of older version of our understanding of the word say. So that that was the international community, by the way, sanctioned this.
The British Mandate for Palestine is a legal document issued by the League of Nations.
So so absolutely. That was that that was their mandate.
They were mandated to do this. But yes, I would agree.
I think British officials in the 40s and even before that were conscious of the fact that they didn't if they created a monster,
but we took on a role that we could not we could not fulfil. I think that's probably the more accurate way of saying it.
Daniel Scharf is. King thanking you and asking, did your last sentence say something about continuing responsibility?
If so, what is it? What is. No, no, no, no. Not so much that.
But I think if we forget in the discussion between you, it kind of does it.
The Palestinian Israeli conflict.
We forget about the role of the British of Britain as a mandatory power in in in you know, in not finding not leaving with a with a solution in place.
And then that's perpetuating what's going on to this day. Not, you know, not actively still.
But certainly it wasn't just a question of the two communities not being able to get along.
I mean, the fact was that the power that the country that took over the mandate and said we're going to,
you know, affect this with the terms of this mandate, did not do so.
So a question about technique me, which I also had in mind.
So can you say something a little bit about flagging, flogging, this flogging you said, right?
Yeah, like whipping. Whipping. Yeah, yeah. Yeah.
The the question says that this is a very unusual method as it must have been done in private, not in public.
What was its intention and its effect affectless it since and also.
Yeah. OK. So it was done to terrorise. Absolutely.
It was done to scare it. If you promise that the whatever out of the soldiers because that, you know,
it wasn't just a question that they could be, let's say, abducted or taken, they would be taken and whipped.
And so I I'm not mistaken, and I don't don't quote me a hundred percent on this.
I think it was both privately and not publicly, publicly, but that that was done in a public place, you know, and.
But I have to I would have to I'd want to cheque that, too, before I say that with complete certainty.
But some pushback on that. Terrorism is a term, again, your historical fact.
It is like the British colonisers.
If the British colonisers call it terrorism and you use the term terrorism, then you are legitimating a colonial interpretation of history.
I mean, I know you've brought out a very important point is that the terror, the people who did it themselves call themselves terrorists.
So I think that I've explained that already. Yeah. All right, Roman, vato.
Hi, Roman. Is that Roma? How would you compare the Zionist campaign against the British to the IRA rebellion of 36
to 39 in terms of their influence and the British decision to retreat from Palestine?
Roman, it's a great question. You're absolutely right. I mean, there was an absolute parallel here.
And the and the irony, of course, is that the airgun and the lucky and that led to the hugging, not learnt from the Arab rebellion.
I mean, they'll Arab rebellion was directed against the British, not against the Jews. And so it's that there's absolutely parallel.
I think that I guess where it went differently is that after 1939, this resulted in a white paper that was meant to kind of smooth over.
So I'm getting e-mails at the centre, went to smooth over the whole world.
And really, it's floating. Everything's exploded. They went to smooth over and kind of quashed the Arab rebellion.
But in a way that was kind of amenable to both groups. By the by so 10 years later, that was impossible, I think.
And so you're right. Roland is a really great comparison. And thanks for bringing it up, because I should have mentioned it.
Joe Bergen is asking, first of all, thanking you for a fascinating talk. She's very.
So she's looking forward to reading your book, given the size of the post Second World War displaced Jewish population and the seeming
inevitability that the Balfour Declaration would have to be delivered against.
In that context, why do you think the British politicians could not see this for themselves?
There is only so much that self-interest can be accepted for something that caused so much death and harm.
Yeah, I agree, Joe. That's a good question. I think the point is, of course, that the British didn't look far ahead into any of this.
That's the point. So that the Balfour Declaration, they thought, oh, yeah, maybe we'll get a couple hundred thousand Jews and you know, it.
Perception is was different on every side. So did the Zionists think, great, we run with this, we're going to have a state now,
whereas the British were thinking, OK, we're going to we're going to you know,
we're going to play chess, you know, with with two peoples and and kind of stay in the middle and trying to control the whole thing.
And you see, I mean, when I talked about British self-interest, I wasn't just being a bit flippant.
I mean, if you see the cabinet, not cabinet minister, there's a there's a there were minutes trying to remember.
Exactly. Anyway, the point is they had kind of representatives from all of the Middle Eastern,
you know, the Egypt office, the Iraq, the meeting together at the end of the war.
And they were talking, you know, like they were still this amazing empire.
They'd just taken out a three billion or three trillion dollar loan from America because they couldn't survive the empire.
You know, if you think about what was going on in India and Pakistan, the empire was really crumbling.
And and it is astounding to me that you would get these kind of old, you know,
generals or, you know, guys talking about, you know, we must preserve British interests.
They literally say these, you know, say it in as many words. We have what's most most important for us is British self-interest.
And they wanted to maintain a hold in Palestine, Israel, whatever.
Even after there was some sort of solution from the UN.
This is why they delayed even Ernest Bevin delayed so long in going to the U.N. because he didn't want to let go of the control.
Queensland is asking many historians would agree that the mandate nurtured and
supported design is build up in Palestine in terms of institution buildings,
economical resources. Oh, yeah. Yeah. All right.
So that was too good. So an anonymous question.
We historians cannot simply claim that we used the terms that circus act was used.
Oh, that's it. Going back to those that were responsible for the language we use,
I guess we'll take it as a as a just as a note and continue because it is Apsley still stand behind my use of the word terrorism.
I mean, I don't really know why we would. What's the point of going around.
And I question it. Yeah. OK, Mark Sullivan is asking again.
Thank you for quoting Sir Alan Cunningham's speech to the R, double A. in July 1948, which is never quoted in individual stories.
How do you findings about Sir Alan Cunningham's role and approach compared with those of Matthew Guilani,
who started Cunningham's time as high commissioner? He concluded that Cunninghams, in effect,
allowed the petition to emerge by not cooperating with the U.N. petition commission and
allowing the Jewish state to form itself in shadow and Transjordan to move into the West Bank.
She also grabbed the Javins book on Pusha starting page 58, which confirms obvious.
But I mean, I again, I mean, I read Multis book.
I've got it. It's my focus was completely different. So, I mean, I'm not more interested in what drove the British out.
So really, my story ends in April 1947, which is why I, I split up the data from from because April forty seven,
it was when Britain makes the decision to go to the United Nations.
So from that point, the point of the of the anti British resistance to terrorism, whatever you want to call it, was made.
Right. That's what that was the catalyst for Britain to decide, OK, we can't do this anymore.
The last the last six or eight months of that were just kind of in this purgatory, for lack of a better word,
you know, of them waiting to find out what would happen with the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.
But once the United Nations Special Committee in Palestine was was engaged, Britain really had no role except to sit and wait.
So that's why I really stop. It's kind of a strange thing to say, but I'm not I mean, I'm interested, obviously.
But but but what really happened or what the real movers and shakers for this whole period.
It all occurred before April until April 47 and not afterwards, although the violence was much more in between.
But that violence was just it was one issue. There was the British British had made their decision.
I'm looking at this whole story from the point of view. The British, why they decided to leave.
James Sunderland is asking, how has your research so far been greeted by researchers and scholars,
especially in Israel, given the prevailing academic opinion,
for example, by such people as good only Segev and Hoffman,
that the goon left and the Ghana had little effect on the British decision to add the mandate?
And have you encountered any pushback against your argument by such scholars?
Maybe I can also add to this. Can you say something to the effect of.
How would I call them success stories of those Urbani's organisations and how would they accept your terminologies of terrorist and so forth?
All right. So you said there, James. Good question. The answer is they don't know yet because I so I presented this about a year ago at a conference,
this cessation of European Association of Israel Studies. But the research has only been written up since March.
We've got covered. It's out being peer reviewed at the moment. And that's all I'm wanting to say about that.
So at the moment, nobody has had the chance to to kind of hear unless they've come to this this talk or, you know, the talk last year.
I would say this and it's a Ya'akov I think I understand you're trying to say there's
still a massive division between what we might call right and left in Israel.
And and certainly a lot of the reason for what I do is to get to, you know,
to perhaps portray a more accurate representation of what really happened without taking a political side.
I do find it so. So what am I trying to say?
I don't think you could speak to anybody who who's, you know, I hate to use the terms right and left and stuff as well in the first one.
I find it quite problematic. But anyone who, as I say, supports the Ergin position itself.
Who would have problems saying that they were to the point of the Erkan themselves to to be a terrorist organisation?
So again, we're going. It's circular argument because it's not. It's you know, it's.
Yeah. Anyway, I don't think I'm going to I'm going to step on your toes one more time and asking you about fascism.
How comfortable are the inheritors of those people with you using fascist and pro fascist to describe those actors who are.
Well, you know, you cover any previous. No, I've never used the term fascist or pro fascist to describe anyone who didn't describe themselves as such.
Right. And again, this is you know, this is an intellectual terminal illness.
It's not. There's no emotion involved when I use these terms.
I mean, you know, I'm trying to understand it.
I'm trying to analyse it as a story. And I'm not trying to advocate it.
I'm not trying to step on it. I'm trying to explain.
And then I think the reader then Armbrust or the listener, armed with such information, can make up her own mind.
Eric did write the question. So far, the narrative has been Palestine centric.
Have you found evidence of the Jewish revolt impacting British assets in other places in the Middle East,
for example, the Foreign Office was terrified of the prospect of Zionist attack on the other than refinery.
Right. But again, my point in writing this research was to understand why the British left a mandate for power.
Well, not even why they left, why they went to the UN and then why they left.
Right. So, yes, I mean, yes, sir. There's you know, there's there's the there's the Moine Association.
There's Count Bernadotte assassination, which took place outside of Palestine.
But an oh, my battery is running low. Hang on. I didn't turn on the PowerPoint.
OK, we're good. Oh, my God. This country. Another British thing I can't deal with.
You know, it is it's putting on the power points anyway.
So it's a good question, but it's outside of the scope of what I'm trying to do, research.
I can tell you, you know, in spite of the fact that I you know, I photographed probably by 15000 documents for this and looked at them all.
But there's only so much you can write into a work that's already went on to be one hundred pages longer than it was supposed to be.
And it's close to six hundred pages or 700 pages, I can't remember now. So it's that's the problem is knowing which included which to stop it.
But yes, they're Apsley as Erica. Yeah, there absolutely is is evidence of all of this.
But it wasn't the point of my my my research.
Peter, this excitement surrounding the question and answer was just a great sign of how interesting and exciting and invigorating your research is,
and I guess we all will join in in congratulating you on the talk and wishing
for the fast publication of the book so we can also celebrate the publication.
I'm just gonna close by reading Mark Sullivan's comment that Olivia Shakoor like to call
me Nothing Big in the Terrorist as late as 1967 and is referencing Ivy Rice's book,
Debriding and the Dowry. I think there's much so much more to discuss, but we obviously cannot thank you again for doing this.
And thank you all for attending the talk. So, yeah, I'm just gonna say thank you for actually for idea.
I'm just copying the copy and paste work, so I'm gonna make an announcement. I'm going to.
There we go. Those are all the Guns N Roses references that went into that.
I can see this. I put it up later. There you go. Now we see the PowerPoint right now.
Okay. I didn't. Oh, really? Okay. So I don't know. I put it into the chart.
The Q and A. Oh, okay. Okay.
So anyway, guys, thanks very much. Ya'akov, as always, you.