Hello there. I'm Marianne Talbot, the director of studies for philosophy at Oxford University's Department of Continuing Education.
We're about to start a six week course called Critical Reasoning for Beginners.
And we're going to go through looking at how to recognise an argument. What arguments are the different types of arguments?
That's deduction and induction. And we'll be looking at how to set out arguments, logic, books style, how to analyse them.
Then we'll be looking at how to evaluate them.
And finally, we'll look at fallacies, which are arguments that look like good arguments, but which are bad arguments.
OK, so we're going to start off on the first week with how to recognise arguments and what the nature of an argument is.
Right. Okay, let's get started. You're all here to do critical reasoning.
Okay. Why? Why? Why do you want to do critical reasoning? Company.
You tell me what what you want stateful. What do you think you can't do now that you want to be able to do this course sharp.
My sense of argumentation. Scholten, your sense of argumentation. Is there anyone you want to argue with in particular of your wife?
Yeah, it won't work. You know, you've been married to somehow.
These are just two terms before, but particularly political arguments and debate.
Right. Okay.
So now that I don't hear someone detect the flaws in other people's arguments, you ought to be able to detect the flaws in other people's arguments.
Okay. What about your own arguments? Know that, too.
Because that's very important. These are one of the things I talk about today is something called the principle of charity.
And you'll see where. Well, that's what I say.
I don't want to get lost. That's a valid point.
So to actually be able to have conviction, what I'm saying, if I believe that someone was intellectual and eloquent, beat me down.
Right. Okay. And one of one thing that will help. I mean, it won't do the trick completely because, of course, that confidence has to come from you,
but it will help to feel that you know where you are in arguments. So I called for the fact that I read the Thomas more and a half, actually.
That's how I came to philosophy. Funny enough to say something like that, I did an open university course.
I was a mature student, not very mature, 26. And I thought it was an open university course.
They did logic in those days, formal symbolic logic. And I tried to do this logic and I found it so difficult, really, really difficult.
And I sat up all night and still trying to do it.
And in the morning I realised that I've had such a much nicer night,
much better night than I've had with all sorts of other things you might stay up all night to do.
I really enjoyed it. And that's what got me into philosophy in the first place.
I came out it's very nice of school at 50 and I came on here eventually.
Eventually I took quite a long time, but I had never lost my love of philosophy.
I've never lost my love of learning. And that's all down to philosophy, this confidence.
You have an argument because if you can learn how to argue properly, you can.
Nothing is hidden from you.
In principle, it's always possible to to tease out the arguments and to evaluate the arguments and to take yourself that step further.
And so I hope that after this series of six lectures, of course,
you're not going to go away knowing all about logic and knowing all about how to reason properly.
But I hope what I'll have done by that time is giving you more confidence and giving you a feeling for the fun it can be so that you'll
go away and start looking yourself and not be very happy to pass on to reading or give some other ideas of how you might do that.
Right. Okay. Let me tell you about Monty Python. I'm sure some of you know about it.
But what it is, is it's called the argument clinic.
And one man, I've got to say, goes in and says John Cleese sitting there and he says, is this the place for arguments or something like that?
Jodie says, whatever it is or not.
Well, no, you. Yes, I have. No, you haven't. Yes, I have.
And this goes on this is almost arguing you're contradicting me.
And jumbly says, no, no, you are not. Yes, you are.
And so it goes on then presses a bell. That's the end of the session.
So that wasn't five minutes. Yes, it was. Yes, it was.
I'm not someone who says two things. And so on. And that was supposed to be an amusing introduction.
But what I wanted to move on to is the idea that John Cleese had it wrong.
Of course I can. It isn't a set of contradictions. It isn't a set of just you say one thing and I say another that doesn't get us anywhere.
Part of the point of argument is to move this on from where we are to somewhere a bit further.
Just imagine if the only way we could find out about the world was through our senses.
If we could see one thing and form one belief, but not take that belief and move on to it to another belief.
So you could say that that's blue and the carpet's blue, but you couldn't say when two things are the same colour.
They match, therefore, that the chair and the carpet match.
Do you see whatever the argument takes us from where we are to to where we want to be or sometimes where we don't want to be?
We'll never get very far without argument. Yes.
If I didn't. Well, thank you so much.
It's great. I know.
I mean, we're awash with technicians here. Okay, so let's have a look at the definition of an argument.
An argument is a set of sentences. And I put sentences there after you wouldn't believe it, spending half an hour wondering whether short statements,
propositions, little expressions of statements or something.
But I'm pretty sentences anyone who wants to quarrel with that's most welcome to do so.
A set of sentences such that one of them was being said to be true and the others are being offered as reasons for believing the truth of the first.
Okay, that's all there is to an argument.
I put others with the S in brackets here because of course we might say that one thing is true on the basis of just one other sentence.
So here's my argument. It's Friday. Always wears jeans on a Friday.
So Marijan will be wearing jeans today. Okay. That's a set of sentences.
That is, as a matter of fact, an argument. OK, what what are the sentences?
Tell me what the sentences are. This is an easy question. So a lot of you into a false sense of security.
That's right. Right. It's Friday. That's one sentence. OK.
It's I've got Komaroff tricks up on straight onto the sentence.
But that doesn't matter. It is. Friday is a sentence. Okay. Next one I told you is easy.
Money always wears jeans on a Friday. That's right. So next one area.
I thought you were in jeans today. OK. Those are the sentences that make up the argument.
Exactly. So. Now, here's a bit of tech technology terminology for you.
Technology focus cells.
A conclusion is the sentence being said to be true and the premises are the sentences being offered as reasons for believing the other one.
OK. Remember, that might be just one. That might be just one premise. That doesn't need to be, too.
That could be 20 premises. But what makes something a premise and what makes something a conclusion is the role that they're playing in the argument,
the function that they're performing. So here's the argument again.
What's the conclusion of the argument? That's right.
Yeah, that's the conclusion, because that's the one we're saying is true.
And what are the premises? That's right.
So there are two premises to this argument and one conclusion. OK, very simple stuff.
So there's the conclusion that read Mind will be wearing jeans today on the premises in green.
It's very important to distinguish arguments from sets of sentences.
Let's see how to do that, because an argument is a set of sentences. But it's more than that.
There's more to an argument than the set of sentences. Question is, how do you feel about questions?
Because I wanted to ask about this one. Does it matter which they. I'm very happy to take questions.
If I think they're going to go on too long,
I'll shut you up and put you into the question time or if I think it's complicated or something, but otherwise I plan to go on.
Well, the question then is presumably the sentence as a premise depends on another,
because it's Friday and you know, the Marianne in that particular argument.
Yes, that's good question. Let's go back to it. I actually I'm very happy for you to ask questions, because if you do,
it might be a clarification, a clarification question like that one, which is quite useful.
And if you look at that, let's get to that one.
If you take out that premise, you might still have an argument.
You say it's Friday. So, Marianne, we'll be wearing jeans today.
But what have you done? You've left the implication that you you're making.
Right. That's right. You've left a suppressed premise, haven't you, because that wouldn't be a good argument.
It would still be an argument, actually, because you'd still be giving one sentence as a reason to believe another one.
But it wouldn't be it wouldn't be an argument that could possibly be convincing.
Were it not for that. So we often leave premises suppressed in an argument.
But usually when because of the context or because of something that we can assume, we assume that the person knows the other one.
So if we all knew if you knew that every time.
Well, that every Friday I wear jeans, if you will, knew that that would be an argument without the second premise.
So thank you for that. People people didn't have that assumption. Is that what would be termed the non sequitur?
Yes. Yes. Well done. We'll say something more about what those actors.
Not today, probably, but later. Of course, you could actually say those news on Friday.
She was wearing jeans today. You leave out then?
That's right. Yes, you can.
You can. I mean, that would be a different argument, but it would be an argument.
Yes. And you can change the rules, say Jean Edwards, Edwards, your falls.
Right? Well, move, move.
That would be a false argument. Hold that one. We'll come back to that in a minute.
You'll see. What does it say about that? I just want to note that.
OK. I'm going to move on because. Yes, you can make an argument out of it.
Well, let me just move on and show you exactly what I mean to say that.
OK. It's important to take just arguments from sets of sentences since the sentences that are not arguments
might either have no relation a tool between them or they may have between over any relation.
Other than that characterising an argument, for example, a set of sentences might be consistent,
i.e. such that they could all be true together without being an argument.
Do you see what I mean? Or they could be related by all referring to.
What's your name? Mike. Mike. They could be related in that way without being in argument.
Do you see what I mean? Lots of different ways.
Sets of sentences can be related, but the relation in order to be one an argument, it's got to what is it?
So isn't it true? Good.
In order to make an argument has got to be one sentence. That's that you're putting forward as being true.
And the other sentences or sentence is a reason for believing that thing.
That's the relation that characterises an argument. Nothing else.
Here's two sets of sentences. That isn't an argument. The sea is salt.
Melbourne's in Australia, but it's very easy to make it an argument.
The sea is salt. Therefore, Melbourne's in Australia. Now, you think I've made that an argument or not?
No. Why not? A false. It's a whole saga.
No, that particular one. I think you'll see why I'm saying this.
It's a wash. It's newsworthy. There's no link between us.
So you think that my putting therefore in. Doesn't make it an argument?
Okay. Let me tell you a little story. Okay. We're we're doing a panel show.
Okay. We've got to find out things and find out on things and then come back and we'll win a huge prise.
Now, we're particularly ignorant contestants here.
We don't know whether the sea salt. We don't know about the Melbourne's in Australia.
But we do know that if one of these census is true, so is the other.
Okay. That's all we know. We know. We know if one of these sentences is true, says the other.
So now we've got to find out whether whether either of these census is this true.
So half is half of us run off to see whether the seats sold.
Now, the Hoffs run off to find out from the Melton's in Australia and the Melbourne's in Australia.
Sorry to see Assault's ones come back first. They say the sea salt.
Melbourne, Melbourne's in Australia. Hey, is that an argument? Let me know.
That's pretty good argument, isn't it? What I'm doing there is it's I'm giving a reason, I'm saying Melbourne isn't in Australia is true on site,
and I'm giving a reason for believing it, namely the truth of the seas being sold.
Fair enough. This is an argument. And what's what city.
OK. It was an argument before I gave you context, actually, because arguing is something that we do with sentences.
OK. It's we do them because of all sorts of things to do with our background.
What we've just found out, our desires, our hopes off is our intentions.
Things like that. Arguing is something we do and we can do it in any way.
This is why the idea of artificial intelligence, which was talked about a great deal a few years ago, is getting, frankly, nowhere.
And the reason it's getting nowhere is human beings can see the relevance.
Once the context is provided that a computer so far can't see, I mean, fingers crossed that we will be able to deal with this one.
But the fact is that the minutes I think in a context, you can see the argument is, can't you?
Some of you. Not. Is this just context or is it an implicit sentence that the fact that we have explicitly said both must be true if one is true?
You're right. You're absolutely right. That, in fact, you might say that a lot of you could say there's a suppressed premise in there,
which is that if the sea is salt, then Melbourne is in Australia. That and I've given that by giving the context, if you like.
So if we were game contestants in that situation, I wouldn't have to give that suppressed premise because we would all know it.
But again, well done. So I think that's the point at the backrest premises.
The same context. No, no, no. It provides in the context.
I enabled us to see the suppressed premise, if you like.
Because just at the moment, there's no suppressed fairness that we can see.
I mean, we don't see why that's an argument you want tonight. It was an argument because you can't see the relevance between the two.
What I did was make one relevant to the other. And in doing so, I provided you with the premise that that was suppressed.
So there's a suppressed premise, which is a sentence because the premises are always sentences.
And that's what I provided by providing the context. I'm struggling with that because that's all right.
That's happened in Australia, not because the sea salt, but because this is true.
I know this is a very interesting. Okay. Very interesting question.
What's your confusing? I apologise.
Is causation and entailment the premises, the premises, the premises of an argument do not cause the conclusion to be true.
OK, if that's the premise and that's a premise. Do you think that what's caused me to wear jeans today is these two things?
Not necessarily. I mean, it might be or it might be that actually I wear jeans on a Friday because to commemorate the first pair of jeans
that my mom ever bought me or something that I can't think of a good reason for my healthy hideaways jeans.
I might wear jeans every day. Yes, exactly. So. So the fact that A and B together entails C doesn't mean that A and B cause C, OK.
And when you say that the C is salt doesn't cause Melbourne to be in Australia, you're quite right.
But say that the sea salt, therefore Melbourne in Australia isn't implying causation of any kind.
OK. What do you do. Oh you ignore them.
What. Again, that's a very good question. I'm glad you asked that. Let's go some sea salt on this.
Well, actually, you could do it with a Marijan one as well, because there are lots of people called Marianne off of me in the world.
All it means is if Marianne is there anywhere else called Marianne in this room.
All right. Put up your hand if you're called John. This is the second time this has happened to me.
Okay. There are no jobs in this room. Let's just make your mind.
Is there anyone else called Mike? Mike to Mike's in this room.
If I have a say. If I say Mike is tall. Okay. That's ambiguous, isn't it?
It has two meanings. I could be referring to that, Michael. That Mike. One of you may be short.
In which case be falls of love and true the other. But what I've actually got here is two sentences.
How complicated I'm going to get here. There's a type of sentence.
I have no penance. Believe it or not, it's another thing that fell off the list.
Would you mind? You can't see this.
Yes, you can imagine it. Okay. Mike is told is what it says.
Now, if I could, I could get Mike. Let's put John this tool there.
Now, if I put John his tool up there, that has no meaning, doesn't it,
in the context of this room, in the sense that there's nobody to whom John refers as we know.
OK, but I could use that sentence, John, as a tool to say something inside in the same way.
Here is a sentence time that could be used to say things.
And I could use this type of sentence to say Mike his tool, or I could use the same sentence to say Mike his tool.
But those are two different tokens of the same type of sentence.
See what I mean? So just does that's one token of the type chair.
And that's another one. And this is one token of the type human being.
And that's another one. Mike, his tool is one token of that type of sentence.
And Mike, his tool is another token of that type of sense.
So actually, if you have to Melbourne's, you can have two arguments that that could be a good idea.
The B C is salt. Therefore, Melbourne, which is in the Northern Territory, is in Australia or Melbourne, which is in.
Thank you. Victoria is in Australia for autism or.
Well, no, not in Derbyshire because that would falsify that one wouldn't it, unless there's a Darbyshire in Australia against it.
Yeah. Is false existing existing facts.
And I'm going to hold over that question and I'm going to take it together with with your claim that the argument is false.
Okay. And I'll come back to it shortly. Okay.
So arguing is something that we do with sentences.
We could any sentences could form part of an argument. There's no such thing as a.
Sentenced, that couldn't be part of an argument. What makes it an argument is the fact that we are making an argument,
claim we're putting forward one sentence and we're offering the other sentences as reasons to believe that sentence.
So you cannot recognise arguments by recognising the sentences that are in arguments.
You've got to recognise the relation between the sentences. OK.
Let's have a look at these. Which of these sentences are arguments? Right.
Who thinks that this is an argument? OK.
No one else. OK. Why do you think that's an argument he's making the assumption the storm broke
the clouds in the sky and the storm broke because the clouds formed the back.
Does that make it an argument? Because.
That we had, because it's very difficult, because distinguish causes and reasons for something, OK?
There can be a causal relation between two events. So a causal relation between two events.
And that can be a rational relation between two sentences or two beliefs.
OK. And we tend to use because the both of these types of relation, that these are causes and these are reasons.
And you were making that up and you shouldn't be worried about making this area because it is a very, very common one.
You were thinking of the causal relation as a rational relation. But it's not, is it?
OK, so that's not an argument because always saying is that actually three events happened, don't we?
Firstly, clouds formed, that sky blackens, then the storm broke.
And there may be a causal relation between them, but we're not saying that these two are reason for believing the other always with me.
This one is this no argument. Put your head down, you think? Yes. Yes.
OK. Which is a conclusion based on the premises.
That's right. Manchester's North Whatsit. Edinburgh's North Boxwood.
Sorry, think North Manchester. Edinburgh is north of Oxford is the conclusion.
Okay, so this one is since Manchester is north Watson, Edinburgh is North Manchester, Edinburgh is north of Oxford as it grows north of Oxford.
Is the conclusion. The other two of the premises. That's definitely an argument.
Okay. Which is float because which is a bead of wood and wood floats.
Is that an argument or not? Put your hands up if you think it is an argument. That's an argument.
You're quite right. What's the conclusion? Which is float.
Okay. And then the premises are. Which floats.
That's right. Notice that the conclusion is that the front here doesn't make any difference, does it?
Because what makes the sentence a conclusion falls from the dormitory.
No, because it might not follow from the other two premises. It might be a bad argument.
What makes something a conclusion? Because no one does that in a sentence.
Well, I ceramicist if you saying if you wanted to prevent an argument, but it wouldn't have done what somebody would say is true.
It's the one you're saying is true. That's right. You'll see. You'll say this is true because of the others.
Whether because as a rational. Because those are causal. Because.
Okay, let me tell you again, the only thing that makes a sentence, a conclusion or a premise is the role that it's playing in the argument.
Okay. If it's playing the role of being the the sentence for which you're arguing, then it's a conclusion.
And if it's playing the role of a sentence for which the story which you're offering is a reason for believing the other one, then it's a premise.
Okay. That's the only thing that makes sense. It's a premise or a conclusion. That's not true.
Well, we'll come to truth in a minute. Two. Truth is, you're quite right to think the truth is very important, but not just yet.
Notice in study that there's no there's no reason why a sentence that is playing the role
of a conclusion in one argument can't play the role of a premise in another argument.
Do you see what I mean?
That's why it's very important that what makes them of premise or a conclusion is the function of playing the role they're playing.
Not anything intrinsic to the sentence. Music is intrinsic to the sentence.
You'd have a sentence that could only be a conclusion. Which would be rather odd, wouldn't it?
I'm not sure there are some that I might think of, one that I call off the top of mind.
So. So what makes a sentence? A conclusion is that you are arguing for it.
What makes it a premise is that you are using it to argue for something else.
Okay. Is this an argument? Hands up. If you think it is Keeping Them Honest, it's an more difficult one, isn't it?
If it were a conclusion which would prefer if it were an argument, which would be the conclusion, think this is an answer.
Okay. So then the premise would be Jesse James left town and Jesse James took his gang with him so we could say Jesse James left town.
Jesse James took his gang with him. Therefore, things have been a lot quieter.
That doesn't imply. My family doesn't have that Jesse James and his gang.
We can make anything out of it. Yes. I don't think that's an argument myself.
I think it's just a concatenation of sentences.
I several sentences strung together as it might.
There might be a problem. In fact, there probably is a causal relationship, too.
Isn't that why things quieter? Because Jesse James left town and taken notes, taken his gang with him as well.
It's not just an explanation. Oh, no explanations, reasons and causes.
Now, you're really getting into the interesting stuff. Explanations can be both causal and rational, can't they?
So I can give an explanation of your behaviour that's rational.
All I can get an explanation of your behaviour. That's corseted. So what's your name?
Paul. Paul. Okay, so the reason Paul did that was whatever.
Or Paul did that because. What's your name?
Jenny. Jenny pushed him. You. Just push it.
Pull over. Okay. All Paul fell over because he was trying to make the children laugh.
Juicy ones. A rational explanation. And the other's a causal explanation.
Causes reasons and explanations are intimately tied together.
We'll talk about probably quite often in these sessions. But the important thing is that it might be that not all causes are reasons.
It may be those are all reasons of causes. But it's not the case that all causes or reasons because some causes are non rational.
They have no reasons involved in them at all. Anyway, this is getting complicated and you don't need to worry about this.
The important thing is that a set of sentences is only an argument if you're putting
one forward is true and putting the others forward as reasons for believing the one.
That's what an argument is. So if a set of sentences doesn't have that relation between them, it isn't an argument.
Not a reason why the Thomas cause increased. So it may be just a coincidence.
Yes. You may not be saying there's even a causal relationship here.
You know, actually, since Jessie Davis left after his gang with him,
things have been a lot quieter because it's not been necessary to do this stuff or the other.
Yes. But you could very easily set back on testimony that wasn't.
Well, as I said, you know, supply context in which anything is an argument.
So that's true. Yeah. Is a set of sentences different subjective or objective?
So is it a matter of opinion? Well, is it.
I mean, if we go back to I mean, you can answer this question yourself. If we go back to that one, is it a matter of opinion that that's an argument?
Or did I somehow make it an argument?
I mean, did I make it appear to be an argument or did I make it an argument may have made it appear to be an argument by making its arguments.
Yes. And therefore, it became an argument or rather, you started to see that it was an argument.
Is that right? So objective and subjective.
When I used to teach undergraduates, I used to say that I wouldn't let me use those words until their third year because they're very difficult words.
And the reason they're very different, difficult words is because there are objective facts about subjective things.
If you think of the subject of state as the state of the subject,
state happiness or something like that, then there are objective facts about such states.
I mean, either you are happy. No, you're not. That's a bad example, actually.
Happiness anyway. See what I mean? I guess I will reject an argument because I say OK.
I don't think it's not. What do you mean?
It's not about avoiding a word? That's. I was just going to make that distinction.
Okay. Two questions you might ask. That isn't an argument or that isn't a good argument.
Clearly, you can make a distinction that claim whether the person making it.
That's an interesting one. If you mind, I'd leave that on one side because I'll think about what I think about that.
I'm not sure of a feeling you say, yes, it is,
but then you'd have to provide the context which would make it clear to the other person that it's an argument.
OK, let's move on, because we we're sorry for your thoughts. John, please.
Please. What did he say? Oh, that's not an argument.
Indeed, he did say that. That's right. That's not an argument. And what he meant by that is that's just a contradiction.
You have just two sentences, one which contradicts the other.
That's not an argument. And that's an argument against. But it's not arguing against the truth.
This is this is the argument gets the truth of that same argument. Oh, clarity of thought.
It's wonderful. All right. Let's move on. OK.
There are often words that suggest the successive sentences as an argument.
When we looked at these and we saw that you so wanted to because in there,
because that would have convinced you it was an argument, should it have done?
No, not necessarily, because it does sometimes inflame an argument, but not always.
Okay. Where's the argument word in this one.
Okay, what about that one. So yeah.
OK, can you give me any more if ah if that is a difficult one.
The answer is. Well I tell I'll talk about that in a minute.
I will put it on one side because you've got to see this Greenbush between implication and entitlements.
But we'll do that in a minute. Hence is a good one.
Yeah. Even given that then. Yeah.
Then there's another one that's a bit iffy actually. Therefore is very definitely an argument word.
Yeah. And since that is that there are words that we consequently.
Yeah. OK, let's leave that. So.
So firstly we've, we've said what an argument is and we've said how to distinguish an argument from a set of sentences.
But we've also got to distinguish an argument from an assertion, just a straightforward assertion.
Okay. An argument is a set of sentences, just one of which is being asserted.
Okay. And this session is a single sentence, possibly a complex sentence.
It might be Marans wearing jeans. And it's Friday. So that's one sentence.
Conjoined with a sentence conjunction the. And that's being expressed in at its esoteric or.
So which of these sentences are or could be assertions.
Number one, only number one. Exactly, so I say it could be because, of course, it could be said, I could say the room is hot.
That's Australian intonation. That makes it a question. Do you see what I mean?
So so I could ask the question in the form of words that would usually be used for Asatru.
So, again, remember, that language is something we use and we can use it in all sorts of different ways.
But this is a this sentence has interrogative force, doesn't it, is the root cause.
And this has imperative force turn the heat up. That's one is being used as authority, not the others.
Some assertions and this will pick up the point you were making there. Looks very like arguments.
If it's snowing, the mail will be late. Okay, so you might think that this is an argument because it's an if then sentence.
Why isn't that an argument? Can anyone tell me story?
Well done. Yes, it is its assertion that certain markets may not always be true.
Okay. You say brother it good. Okay.
All we asserting it is snowing. No.
Always searching the mail will be late. No. Always assessing.
If it snowed, the mail will be late. Yes. So there's only one sentence there isn't there.
It happens to be complex. It's a it's a sentence.
That's the sub centennial. Parts are themselves intentional.
But it's not an argument because it doesn't satisfy the description, does it?
It doesn't satisfy the the claim that there must be a sentence that's being put forward is true and
other sentences that have been put forward to support the claim that that one sentence is true.
So that's an entail. Sorry, that's an implication.
Not an entailment. Okay. So that it's no implies mail will be late.
It doesn't entail that the mail won't be late. Questions like the.
What does make it ungrammatical, actually? Therefore, it is snowing, the mail will be late.
Sorry. No thanks. Was the other way that. That would make it an argument because the therefore signals entailment, then kind of signal entailment.
But it doesn't automatically. But therefore, we're going to say something very rash.
They therefore always does. And I may be right about that. OK.
So we need to distinguish things like that from arguments and now we get on to the bit that's been worrying around the central room here.
OK. Think about assertions. Is the like the true or false? OK.
Now, this is an interesting thing. There are only two sorts of things that can be true or false in this world.
One of them is beliefs. Beliefs are either true or false.
And the other is the sentences that we use to express beliefs.
OK. So if I believe that the chair is blue, I can express that belief in the sentence.
The chair is blue and both the belief and the sentence used to express it can be either true or false.
Are you with me? Can you think of anything else that can be true or false?
No. Facts are what make sentences true or false.
They are not themselves true or false. They just exist or don't exist.
So the fact that that chair is blue makes true the sentence.
That chair is blue. It would make her hair long.
When you say that, you say. What about that fact or that sentence?
So that sentence. Well, that's not true or false, isn't it?
I mean, if you. I mean.
Let me just point out some ambiguity. What's your name? Piana said.
What about. What did you say? Harrumphs Blonde hair is blonde.
If I put it like that, I'm talking about the fact onsite. Whereas if I took it to that, I'm now talking about the sentence.
Right. If I take those out again, that's not the sort of thing can be that can be true,
because the fact that someone's hair is blonde, that her hair is long makes true the senses.
Her hair is blonde with me. Difficult stuff.
Philosophy, isn't it? But but the really nice thing is that if you persevere with logic, you two will be able to do things like this.
You know, these distinctions are there to be made. Do you just need the clarity of thought to be able to make them as facts?
I just always true facts aren't true at all.
Facts of what makes sentence's true facts either facts, if you like, and combinations of things or events or things or properties and events.
So if you think it's something like her hair is blonde, that's a fact.
OK. Her hair is being blonde. Her jacket's being green.
Is a green. Yeah. I think it might say whether that's a fact or not.
We're not really sure it's a story that is a fact of the matter, which is the story.
I definitely believe that Diane is Jacobins reading.
These are facts which either exist or not. I mean, some people might say that that's not a fact, that Diana's jacket is great.
The sentence that expresses that, the belief that that's a fact is false.
Sorry I lost myself in the beginning of that sentence.
The sentence in my report, which is based in fact, in that sense, that sentence refers to a fact, if you like,
even that which is relevant in that context, simply argue that the question was, oh, I see it referred to a potential factor.
Putative fact. Yes, that's right. Yes, of course. I know.
That's a thank you. That's a very good point to make, because if I say something false.
What makes it false? It's a fact. But. But it's not the fact.
So if I say that Charles Black. The fact of the chairs not being black is what makes that juice.
It gets difficult, as you can see. But the thing to remember is this.
There are three different levels that we very important.
You have to keep separate in thinking clearly.
And of course, all critical reasoning involves clarity of thought that these levels are the level of language.
Fault. And the thing I always call reality.
But that's that's wrong because, of course, language and thoughts are real.
So. So that's completely wrong. But I keep using it that way.
So if I put down Red Oak and I put quotes around so that you make it clear, make it clear that today is a word.
OK, it's a linguistic item. Then there's the concept red, OK.
It's when I think that is read. OK, I'm using the concept read.
And then there's redness, the property. So these three things are quite different from each other, aren't they?
So if I say this is has the property of being red.
OK. I'm talking about this. And if I'm thinking about this pen as being red, then I'm exercising my concept of red.
And if I see this hand is red, then I'm using the word red notice in French.
It would be a different word, wouldn't it? But the same concept on the same property.
So there's an arbitrary element in language. Isn't that the other two?
So what's the French then? I think.
I'm glad I use red. Not something else. I'm sorry.
Could you speak of the red? I mean, he made my people.
Is that this is metaphysics one day one.
They can't be true.
It's all true. Go to different people.
Right. Okay. That's what you're talking about here in terms of facts and truths and so on.
Okay. What you're suggesting is that what I see is Red Mike might see as green or something else.
Okay. So what we're saying is, why isn't anyone wearing red? Will somebody please come next time wearing red?
Maybe it makes it much easier. There's legate that we here in the middle there.
So when I look at stuff like what's your name? Hildegard.
Right. Okay. When I look at Hildegard Structured ICP, I see it looks like that might look at it.
It looks different. Okay. It appears differently to mine. So if I would say that jacket is pink.
Of course, Mike would also say it's pink. Okay.
The pink is different for Mike. This is for me. That's what your.
Where are you. That's what you say. Okay, take it. Let's put it red, because then you can use those colours.
It's not like you're going to say. Something like that isn't it.
Yeah. Shall we not get into that. Isn't that a fact.
And then. Well let's let's make a very important distinction between epistemology and metaphysics here.
There's one question which is, is something a fact?
And there's another question. Do we know it's a fact? Okay, so let's talk about it is pink as a fact.
OK. Rather than do we know it's a fact?
Valenstein showed us. There's actually the question. Could we see it differently?
Is actually a normal question. The answer is if.
Oh, no. This is getting too complicated. It's going to take us too far away from.
I'm sorry. I don't want to tease you with this, but I've just realised what I was about to get into trying to clarify what you mean by definition.
For me, a belief is untruthful. I mean, I didn't believe some of you can just believe that.
How could you do that? I don't. Oh, right.
Okay. You're using beliefs in a word, in a way that lots of people do.
So actually, I'm very glad you brought this up. People think of beliefs as things that you can't prove.
So you have either before you have knowledge. Well, that's not how we use the word belief in philosophy.
A belief is something you postulate an explanation of someone's behaviour or it's something you put forward as true or as false.
And it's certainly not the case that there's something you can't prove. I mean, there are many beliefs that we can prove.
I mean, just his.
I believe that two plus two is four. And I dare that you.
Wouldn't want me to even attempt to prove that, because you believe it, too.
Is that reasonable? Okay, so here's a belief that we can.
That we believe is conclusive. True.
So so we do what we believe to be religious belief or something like that.
Look, this is what is it? If we give back to this, let's use chair concepts of chess and chair.
Yes, sir. The chair is something I can draw.
OK. I can't draw the concept of a chair. I can only entertain it.
And I can say Chair has five letters. See what I mean?
OK. Chairs exist. Now, that's a fact which I didn't think about.
Do chairs exist? Barclays said the chairs didn't exist.
Accepters perception's in my mind. And of course, I can then talk about what I'm thinking about.
So the fact that chairs exist. If indeed it isn't, that is something we can think about and talk about.
Do you see the distinction? You may not feel confident in using it at the moment, but that's just a matter of practise.
It's if we confuse these three levels,
we will not think clearly because you might end up thinking like a concept chair has five letters or concepts that have any lessons, actually.
Or you might think chairs have five letters. Well, actually, chairs don't have any lessons.
It doesn't make sense. The thing the chairs are being mean is see what I mean?
Keep these. So going back to this one. If I said this junk is loud.
What would you think? This jug is loud. I would wonder if intervenor in a different context.
Well, I need to be perfectly reasonable for you to beat it. I think that's because actually that doesn't make any sense.
That sentence does it, because jugs of the sort of thing that can be loud.
Okay. But it's just not. It would have to be metaphorical. I'd have to be being poetic or something like that, or I would just not.
I would be displaying my misunderstandings were loud or the misunderstanding of the words John.
Is that right? Yeah. When you say that argument is false, you display the fact that you don't understand either.
The words are the arguments or false. There's arguments can't be true or false.
Arguments can only be good or bad. They can be valid or invalid.
They can't be true or false.
And that's because it's the only things that are true or false or beliefs or sentences the sentences that express beliefs.
Now, in general, everyday talk, we do talk about arguments being true or false.
You know, everybody does that. But if you want to learn how to reason, if you want to learn how to think clearly about arguments,
you must stop doing that because arguments can't be false.
What is it for a belief to be false? If I if I talk.
What if I suppose Mike is tall? OK.
What is it for that belief to be false. Small the.
But the thing is, I mean by Mike to not be in the in the class of things, that's a tool.
Is that right. And arguments are six of sentences.
You can't evaluate them in that way. Can you say, though, that there's a form of argument that is the truth, reserving all arguments,
truth preserving or these all good arguments in truth, preserving, because the truth of the premises is preserved in the truth of the conclusion.
So it's silly to say that's not true. And we'll talk about that later on.
I'll say it's true, but we're not saying it's true. We say it's truth. Preserving knowledge is a different thing entirely.
OK. Do we understand this?
This is crucially important because to understand what truth is, is to see that it is predicated only of sentences and beliefs, not of arguments.
And to understand what an argument is, is to see that it can't be true or false.
I think you can see that with the argument about the wood and the witches. And you can see what that it can't be that it was a valid organ.
Right. Why doesn't that differentiated from from truth?
The truth is only contained in that argument. Nobody would say that a witch is made of wood unless you wanted to store.
But in terms of the way your argument is constructed. Reasonable as well.
Yeah. I'm not sure how to unpack what you're saying here, except to say that that's a.
Oh, yes. Not no. That was an argument.
It's an argument because we're saying that that is true and we're offering his reasons for believing it's truth.
The truth of that and the truth of that.
OK. So the argument itself is a good one.
And you use the word valid to, well, get on to valid at some point next week has a bit.
So that's that's the argument itself.
Can't be true or false. But the sentences that constitute the arguments can, of course, be either true or false.
So if the sentences are false, does it make up?
Well, that that's a very important number. Come to that later. So there's that sentence actually contain three assertions.
It contains three sentences, each of which could be used as an assertion.
In order for a sense of severe recession, it's got to be asserted. And I'm not really asserting this.
I'm just talking about it. But yeah, so we have three potential assertions, each of which is either true or false.
And together they make up the arguments because two are being offered as reasons for believing the truth of the other.
Right. OK. A good argument. This is coming on to your point now, A, that a good argument must have at least two characteristics.
Actually, it needs many more than two characteristics. But there are two that we're really interested in.
These are the two. The conclusion was follow from the premises.
Okay. And the premises must all be true. Okay.
If both those things are true, you've got a good argument.
If one of these things if the conclusion doesn't follow, then even if the premises are true,
you haven't got a convincing argument or if the premise is not true.
And even though the conclusion follows that you haven't got a good argument in that way because the premise is false.
But having said that, we're interested only in argument in this session.
We're not actually interested in the truth of the premises at all.
We're interested only in the whether the arguments follow from sorry, whether a conclusion follows from the premises.
So as logicians generally, and we're not in the business of going out in the world to see where the premises are true or false,
we're only in the business of seeing whether the relation between the premises and
the conclusion is such that they are the conclusion follows from the premises.
And as we'll see next week, there are loads of different ways in which conclusions can follow from premises.
But so I would often talk about an arguments being good, even though the premises.
I mean, let's take this one. Okay.
That's a good argument or not. Yeah. Yeah, it's good in the logicians sense, isn't it?
I mean, actually the premises are all false. Saldate, they're both false.
There are only two premises of this argument that they are false. It's not Friday, it's Monday.
And Marijan always wears jeans on Fridays also false.
No, let's take it from me. So that's not a good argument from the point of view of the premises.
But as far as a magician is concerned, that is a good argument because the conclusion follows from the premises.
Okay. So if we were actually using that argument to say anything, we'd want the premises to be true as well.
But as we're just talking about the arguments in order to say what is a good argument, what isn't a good argument, that will do.
If that is if that's a conclusive argument. If the premises of true there, the conclusion would have to be true.
So it's a very good argument. So let's look in the premises.
No, because if the premises of the true here, the conclusion would have to be true, wouldn't it?
Well, which is something. Well, but not Matthew died for a variety.
Well, then it wouldn't be true that mine was worth Judeans.
Or I would say mine always wore jeans on a Friday. Maybe.
OK. What do you mean? I don't I'm not sure.
Did people wear jeans at all? What is true is that the facts is true.
If if this actually you're asking a huge philosophical question there.
But let me just say, yes, this is a fact that makes this sentence true.
That it's true. Oh, Co.
I said that. That's awful. But then why do you say you can't always say that you always wear jeans on Friday.
Oil. Well, I finally settled by Friday, as he put it, right?
You say. You always were. This is your the hyperbolic.
We're going to be looking at next week, which is to be inducted,
arguments that inductive arguments always take this further than we can actually go by claiming something like swans are always white.
Marion always wears jeans on the Friday. But but you can still say that fun.
We are not going to get into knowledge. The philosophy of non-violence is definitely not on this curriculum.
Okay, going back to what I was saying that.
OK, so you understand the difference between the truth of the premiss and the conclusions following from the the premises,
that that's the important thing. And it's because what makes an argument good is that the conclusion follows from the premises
that you've got to distinguish the goodness of an argument from the truth of the premises.
Truth, just because truth is a good thing and validity says is a good thing, doesn't make them the same thing.
That's the important thing. We mustn't just take validity as a sort of general probe word.
And in the same way, truth isn't just a general probe word.
OK. Let's look at these arguments. OK. One of them is good. One of them is bad.
Don't call out, but just have a look at them yourselves and decide which is the good one and which is the bad one.
Who's decided? All right, time.
OK. Who's decided, OK, that's a good argument.
Yes. Yes, that's a good argument. Well done. Yes.
Absolute. That needs councillor's class. No, you're absolutely right.
This is a deductive argument. It gives us absolute certainty in the following sense if these premises.
And I'll read out the premises if it's Monday. The lecture will finish at three thirty.
It is Monday. Therefore, the lecture will finish at three thirty.
If these premises are both true, this conclusion would have to be true, wouldn't it?
It couldn't be false. If those two premises are both true.
So the truth of the premises is preserved in the truth of the conclusion that you couldn't have those two premises.
True, that conclusion not. So if you believe those two premises, rationally speaking, you must believe that conclusion.
Okay, that's what it is to be a rational animal.
And if instead I say you're wasting your time with these lectures, if you knew that, of course, that's nonsense because you're all rational animals.
You have to be rational animals.
And you wouldn't be here if you were because you sold off the leaflets or whatever you saw and you thought, that sounds interesting.
I would like to go to that lecture. That lecture starts at two o'clock on Monday the other day.
This is at the moment. Therefore, I will go to that lecture hall.
Did you not? You had loads of reasons.
So we're talking theoretical arguments here, but of course, actually arguments the most proactive, practical thing in the world.
Your piece of practical reasoning led you here. So each one of you is rational.
What we're doing in these lectures is learning how to explicate all capacity for reason.
Okay. You know, whether a conclusion follows from premises or not.
That's why when you argue in the past with your sons, daughters, wives or whoever, you know,
whether you've what you're hearing is a good argument or not, you can there's something wrong with that argument.
You say, as you read the leader in the newspapers, you see the person on television or something like that,
something that's out of your intuitions or your rational intuitions are telling you what you need to know.
But what you're doing in these courses is learning how to make explicit your intuitions, what what your intuitions are telling you.
OK. So your intuitions tell you quite categorically that that's a good idea.
That's part of what's wrong with this one. That's is good for me.
At the same time, an area that is not specific. Yes.
Okay. Everything I heard there is is is good. The fact is that.
OK. Let me ask you a question. Could it be the case that these two premises are true and yet this conclusion falls?
OK. Can anyone give me a counterexample to this argument?
Let me read them out again. The people who can't hear. If it's Monday, the lecture will finish at three thirty.
The lecture will finish at three thirty. Therefore, it's Monday.
OK. Can anyone give me a counterexample to that argument?
A situation in which both those premises are true and that conclusion is false.
The election on Tuesday. Assuming this is true. Good.
Well done. Oh, Wednesday, Thursday. Friday. Exactly. This says if it's Monday, intellectual finish at three thirty.
This merely says the lecturer will finish at three thirty. It could be Monday, but it might not be OK.
So there is a situation in which both these premises are true and this conclusion is false.
Therefore, this is a bad argument. It's an invalid argument.
It's actually an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent figures.
Do you see that the act, the let the lectures, the arguments about whether they are.
They look very similar, but of course they're not because this one's taken the antecedent as the second premise and this one seeking the consequence.
Thus the second premise. And we'll be learning a lot more about fallacies later on in the course.
But that's it for today. Next week, we're going to look at the all the different sorts of argument.
They the arguments. They're all on how to distinguish them from each other.
And then we're going to get on to learning how to set them out properly and how to evaluate them.
OK, we've got courtroom now for four questions. If you haven't got a car path.
No, that's easy. You can try three Heysel.
Might be. But I doubt it. Who is this?
Barkley falls and turns in the. And what did decision?
He didn't think a chair is a new concept. It was Bishop Berkeley, George Berkeley, who lived.
I don't know where he lived. I'm sorry, I didn't remember dates. And he believes that our only reason for believing that something exists is because
we can either see it now or that we could see it under some other circumstances.
So if I claim. Okay.
What makes it true that this left turn exists so we can sit here?
It. We can touch it. All sorts of things. What's more, we also believe that were we to come back tonight at midnight and nobody had moved us.
And so on, all other things being equal, it would still be here. OK.
So there we have an appeal to actual perceptions. Okay.
We can see it now and we've got an appeal to counter factual perceptions.
If we came at 12 o'clock, we would be able to see it.
And Berkeley says, you give me a reason for thinking that anything exists that doesn't depend upon actual or counterfactual perceptions.
Sorry. Let me rephrase that.
You will not be able to give me a reason for thinking that anything exists that doesn't appeal to one or other of those two.
Therefore, if you if something is unconceivable, then you have no reason to think it exists.
Concepts, we experience concepts all the time, and we can we have to exist.
You wouldn't be thinking of a concept is a constituent of a thought.
So as long as you think you think, then you will think in concepts.
And we have reason for thinking concepts exist. Sorry.
Is that the same sort of thing as furphy collapsing in the middle of some forest somewhere here?
Yes. I mean, the fact is, if you were in the forest, you would hear it.
Yes, you might, because Rayburn's is. In other words, you're happy that it would make a noise.
No fuss. I mean, your reason for thinking that noise exists is that you would hear it if you were there.
Said that's a counterfactual perception that you were basing that on.
I mean, what Bulkley is very important. And he's a fascinating philosopher, actually.
He thinks that physical objects are made up of ideas of ours.
This is one of the first idealists. And he doesn't mean that you can put your hand through this because it's an idea.
He just means that my idea of this lectern is an idea made up of part of solidity.
The idea that if I do that, I won't be able to push any further. That's a perception notice.
That's a perception. It's a bundle of perceptions as well.
We only have second-order accounts of everything.
Now, what would I do? So what we see is actually the result of.
It in the brain. This is something that's. Computer that gets translated in seven seconds away.
So there's a kind of, I think, sense data, perhaps so said that we never see the object directly.
We just see the surface. The comments are from, you know, somebody playing on screen.
But there are two ways of thinking about census data. One way is now very old fashioned.
We don't see and that's the way the Russell and Picking started people at that thought, which is that we never see the thing itself.
We only ever see it an idea in our mind. So why would you think that answer?
Because you can never be sure that. I mean, are you really sure that I'm here?
I mean, your reasons for being for believing that I'm here, as you can see me here being sold but couldn't live with you.
Exactly as it is now. And yes, it not to be true that I'm here and I'm all for it.
When you say no. Have you never had a lucid dream? Was it?
You said. Oh, you said. I'm sorry. You said so.
So you don't think that you could have an experience as if I were here doing what I'm doing and yet I'm not here?
You'll probably have to lose tonight. The dream to sincerely Jamie would be one.
But here's another one.
I mean, what makes you what do you think at the moment is that you will have a perceptions as of me and what's causing those perceptions is me.
And what's more, your perceptions are a good guide to what I'm like.
But look. If we talk about the causal relation, if we think that A must cause B or sorry A causes B, we have to know about both A and B, don't we?
We have to see that they're constantly conjoin. They correlated something like that.
We can't. So we've got to be standing here, if you like, to see that they can be correlated.
But if you will think you'll be as a chair and a is your idea of a chair.
And you can't get outside your ideas. And here is where you stand with respect to your perceptions, isn't it?
How can you get outside your perceptions to see what causes them?
You see what I mean, because you've got. In a dream?
Yeah, well, we don't talk about dreams. We talk about it. But with something as objective fact, we have.
These are called change. Movement.
Yes. Let me ask the question again. If we're talking about your idea of a chair, two ideas of the chair concepts to chancel and chairs.
Can you get outside your idea of a chair in order to see that it's caused by a chair?
Now, if it can be put, it mean exactly as it is now. Here I am.
I'm looking at this challenge commission hearing the council's things.
And yes, it's possible that I might be asleep. And that being the chair here, even if I'm asleep, I might want to say something like,
well, I must have experienced a chair before in order to be able to do this.
I could say, well, why should I think in the first place that there is something that's causing my perceptions?
All I've got is my perceptions. I can't get outside my perceptions to adopt this perspective on them.
Can I?
Sir, are you saying you can create the idea of a chair in your mind without actually having seen so maybe it'll be creative and maybe an evil demon.
What I'm giving you is the Cartesian thought experiment and the idea being that if you push what you know to the final degree,
you'll see that actually you're the only reason you believe in the physical universe and things outside yourself,
and that includes your own body is because you assume that your perceptions are caused by something outside yourself, outside your mind,
and that your mind is a good guide to the nature of these things, that if you question both those perceptions, you're left with nothing.
Because what makes you think that there's something outside causing your perceptions?
If all you can see is the perceptions themselves,
rather of the causal relation between your perceptions and whatever's causing them, we can see it this way in critical reasoning.
I know. What is your reaction, control?
What's your damage? If you do something, if the object doesn't do it.
That's right. But all you talk about is one experience after another.
I'll you. I mean, there are some perceptions of mind that obey my will.
And there are other perceptions.
Mind that doomed that chair doesn't to be my will stop that particular perception doesn't have been my well, whereas others do.
I think that I've introduced the Cartesian thought experiment with too little time to convince you.
I mean, you can go away and read the first. Meditation is very easy to read.
It's actually it doesn't take much longer to read them to use against.
Barclays, Barclays, I did. I mean,
the Cartesian thought experiments completely revolutionised philosophy because it
breathalysed revolutionised all belief that we could claim to have knowledge.
Barclay attempted to get over that because if we. Okay, here's the world and here's our mind.
And here's the evil Zimbelman. If Descartes has shown that once this is in place and you see, that could be exactly as it is,
whatever this is like, you need to say something about our knowledge of the external world.
And what Barclays doing is he's remaking the world in the mind.
So if there is nothing more to a physical object than a set of perceptions.
And this the only thing of which we can have knowledge is all perceptions. Then there's no reason why we can't have knowledge of physical objects.
If they are perceptions. So Barclay was trying to show that we do have knowledge despite the Cartesian thought experiment.
Anyway, there is no way we can rely to know more about what has come to another set of lectures.
I see there is time for one more question. If anyone would like to read this one, but this lady has told us many people on the media.
No matter what you do, you know what they're doing.
Well, they're all God's on the. They wouldn't be reading this the short introduction to logic.
This is very interesting. And that's very easy to read. Very short.
So I'll have a go at that. The Hacket book is the only initial on the leaflet, the ones I never read.
OK, well, if you look outside, they'll find you'll find the leaflets a little thing and you should find reading this not just in the book.
Okay. I'm sorry.
Get there. Yes, I know it sounds pretty.
It's very irritating, isn't it? You can get it on Amazon. You get it right.
Yeah, it's it's the reason it's irritating is it's a very good looking for if you can't find the lines and let me know.
You can't try. I can't.
Mistake's by that. Sorry. It's on the business. OK.
I think we'll stop that. Thank you. See you next week.