1 00:00:00,440 --> 00:00:05,950 Of the loss of war. So thank you all for being here. It's really an honour and a great pleasure. 2 00:00:05,950 --> 00:00:16,970 And so let me just share their presentation that that I prepared for today. 3 00:00:16,970 --> 00:00:32,740 OK. So I'm going to start with something that may be a bit unexpected for a presentation on a book of the history if ideas around the loss of work. 4 00:00:32,740 --> 00:00:35,280 But I want to start with drones, 5 00:00:35,280 --> 00:00:42,430 just to give you a sense of the contemporary perplexities that have motivated my study of the literal history of the loss of war. 6 00:00:42,430 --> 00:00:47,900 And this is a quote from President Obama's famous speech in 2000. 7 00:00:47,900 --> 00:00:58,600 Let me just make things a little bit here. President Obama speech introducing his drone and counterterror policy in 2003. 8 00:00:58,600 --> 00:01:02,880 I'm just gonna read a passage from that speech. 9 00:01:02,880 --> 00:01:10,740 President Obama said under domestic law and international law, the United States is at war with al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associated forces. 10 00:01:10,740 --> 00:01:16,710 We are at war with an organisation that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them. 11 00:01:16,710 --> 00:01:21,810 So this is a just war, a war waged proportionally, last resort, self-defence. 12 00:01:21,810 --> 00:01:28,770 So I just want to underline here the importance up for Obama to claim that these this war 13 00:01:28,770 --> 00:01:34,200 was consistent with international law and was consistent also with principles of just war. 14 00:01:34,200 --> 00:01:39,270 Proportionality, necessity, last resort. As we all know, 15 00:01:39,270 --> 00:01:47,460 these drone warfare has extended and expanded in the war to many areas in ways that look very 16 00:01:47,460 --> 00:01:57,030 different from what we would understand as hostilities or as a battle in any sort of standard or. 17 00:01:57,030 --> 00:02:03,000 I think Mattick understanding of war, drone warfare looks very different and it's been extending. 18 00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:09,450 There has been drone attacks in military in the context of military operations or alleged military operation by the U.S. Also, 19 00:02:09,450 --> 00:02:17,760 the U.K. threatened France, Russia, Turkey in many places of the world, including Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Gaza. 20 00:02:17,760 --> 00:02:23,970 There are websites dedicated to counting the deaths that have been caused by these attacks. 21 00:02:23,970 --> 00:02:34,290 There have been tens of thousands of civilian casualties. And the question here is so that the states using these these technologies, 22 00:02:34,290 --> 00:02:43,570 these tactics have been defending them as being necessary and proportional and consistent with the norms of humanitarian law. 23 00:02:43,570 --> 00:02:54,480 The the the urgency of targeting, of killing those those individuals is such that the collateral damage is is proportional 24 00:02:54,480 --> 00:02:59,400 and is admissible within the norms and the principles of humanitarian law. 25 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:04,760 But these way of understanding or framing these attacks have been challenge notably. 26 00:03:04,760 --> 00:03:08,710 But but the former UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, 27 00:03:08,710 --> 00:03:15,210 the PINTU in 2013 publish a well-known report arguing that these attacks should not 28 00:03:15,210 --> 00:03:21,840 be seen as part of a war so not actions within or in the context of hostilities, 29 00:03:21,840 --> 00:03:28,780 but rather as extrajudicial killings because they should be seen within the framework of human rights law. 30 00:03:28,780 --> 00:03:38,640 So that the perplexity here is that depending on the legal framework that you use to account for or describe these actions, 31 00:03:38,640 --> 00:03:45,650 you may see the consequences either as murder, killing by state authorities, 32 00:03:45,650 --> 00:03:52,770 by public authority, or ask legitimate use of force to tear or stop threats, 33 00:03:52,770 --> 00:04:03,420 imminent threats with some collateral damage that can be absorbed or justified or by the proportionality rule of fight. 34 00:04:03,420 --> 00:04:13,410 So this is a decent, similar uses of force frame as part of a war or in a context of hostilities, 35 00:04:13,410 --> 00:04:20,010 gives or motivates a set off of more general questions. 36 00:04:20,010 --> 00:04:27,030 So the first and most direct one is why would framing an action as undertaken in a context of hostilities, 37 00:04:27,030 --> 00:04:32,700 why would that make more permissible the use of more destructive force than is allowed in peacetime? 38 00:04:32,700 --> 00:04:41,820 Why would the frame change what what we take to be permissible military action or permissible force? 39 00:04:41,820 --> 00:04:49,740 And also related to these? Why should states on all these states have the right to participate directly hostilities? 40 00:04:49,740 --> 00:04:57,780 And this is the phrase that you've seen additional protocol and additional protocol to the one to the Geneva Conventions, Article 43 two. 41 00:04:57,780 --> 00:05:05,350 And this is also a question very close to the work that ELAC has been doing, the people associated with you look at elsewhere, 42 00:05:05,350 --> 00:05:11,000 or why should even aggressive states have such right to participate in still at these wisch? 43 00:05:11,000 --> 00:05:21,730 Shouldn't we deem their use of lethal force murder rather than legitimate military action or participation in hostilities? 44 00:05:21,730 --> 00:05:27,370 Now, what was I doing, the book is not really try to answer these questions, 45 00:05:27,370 --> 00:05:35,490 but rather try to understand how we got there, how we ended up having these questions on this perplexities. 46 00:05:35,490 --> 00:05:41,110 And one way to describe the work that I do in the book is to look at the construction, 47 00:05:41,110 --> 00:05:48,450 historical construction of very specific juridical normative language on the use of force. 48 00:05:48,450 --> 00:05:57,010 And specifically, I'm really interested in the articulation and systematic defence of concepts such as hostilities, 49 00:05:57,010 --> 00:06:03,290 belligerent power, combat and civilian direct participation, military advantage, amongst others. 50 00:06:03,290 --> 00:06:09,310 And the way I do these, the way I do this investigation into the making of the language of the loss of war 51 00:06:09,310 --> 00:06:15,640 is through a study of the history of political and legal international thought. 52 00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:21,460 And my understanding here is off of these theories as generating concepts that 53 00:06:21,460 --> 00:06:27,220 constitute UNCOMFY or public action and repertoire of legitimation on the use of force. 54 00:06:27,220 --> 00:06:30,790 So I've read this theory says in a way, ideologies of state, 55 00:06:30,790 --> 00:06:39,510 force of ways to to justify but also constrain and limit the use of force by sovereign states. 56 00:06:39,510 --> 00:06:45,100 And keep in mind, very sort of at the centre of my my reading of these sources, 57 00:06:45,100 --> 00:06:53,050 how these theories contribute to the articulation of normative language, of associated practise, of public legitimisation. 58 00:06:53,050 --> 00:07:02,080 So one, perhaps the most important criterion that I use for selecting the sources that I use that I study in the book is how influential, 59 00:07:02,080 --> 00:07:06,430 actually influential they were historically, politically, legally. 60 00:07:06,430 --> 00:07:12,670 And all the sources that I use were hugely influential, meaning their books were edited multiple times, 61 00:07:12,670 --> 00:07:26,010 translated into multiple languages, cited use not not only by other lawyers, but public actors, statesmen, military men, etc. 62 00:07:26,010 --> 00:07:36,880 So that that's part of my interest in these very influential sources is is the fact that they were so important in constituting these languages. 63 00:07:36,880 --> 00:07:44,380 Now you take the book to make three main contributions. The first and most obvious one is to the history and theory of the loss of war. 64 00:07:44,380 --> 00:07:51,250 And here specifically, I make assumptions mission to the as it were prior history of the loss of war, 65 00:07:51,250 --> 00:07:57,520 because I goes way back, way before the classification. And at the end of the 19th century, 66 00:07:57,520 --> 00:08:01,300 there's been a great deal of interest in the history and the history of international 67 00:08:01,300 --> 00:08:05,500 law is room for for international law on particular of the loss of war. 68 00:08:05,500 --> 00:08:13,800 In the last decade or so. But most of that work on the loss of war has stopped at the end of the 19th century. 69 00:08:13,800 --> 00:08:20,140 And with the idea that the modern loss of war really begin with a codification airforce that took place there. 70 00:08:20,140 --> 00:08:26,700 But what I show in the book is actually I go back to the end of the 16th century already causing delays, 71 00:08:26,700 --> 00:08:31,830 a very important figure in this history of the initial figures. 72 00:08:31,830 --> 00:08:40,090 And what I show is that there is this whole construction of languages and understandings of war. 73 00:08:40,090 --> 00:08:47,170 Way before the codification efforts and in fact, those that the prehistory, that background, 74 00:08:47,170 --> 00:08:54,850 the theoretical background was crucial for the codification because it provided that they share understanding of diplomats, 75 00:08:54,850 --> 00:08:58,570 military men and juries that participated in that codification. 76 00:08:58,570 --> 00:09:03,940 In particular, the way the laws and customs of war were understood in the Leitman were very, 77 00:09:03,940 --> 00:09:13,840 very important element in inheritance issues, if you will, for those late 19th century instruments. 78 00:09:13,840 --> 00:09:18,690 The second contribution, I think, could be two critical international legal studies. 79 00:09:18,690 --> 00:09:29,110 And hear what one of the of the payoffs of doing this historical work is to denaturalised and to historic sites, conceded concepts of the loss of war. 80 00:09:29,110 --> 00:09:34,210 And I'm very interested in doing that, that the work of of of looking afresh, 81 00:09:34,210 --> 00:09:41,020 as we're seeing with with the perspective of history, seeing the present differently. 82 00:09:41,020 --> 00:09:47,100 And that's a work that that one can do through theory and through history. 83 00:09:47,100 --> 00:09:55,120 And in particular, something that I was very interested in is in recovering and conveying a sense of the ambivalence and the moral dilemmas 84 00:09:55,120 --> 00:10:02,380 that many of these theories face when they were articulating the language of the loss of war were Groschen in particular, 85 00:10:02,380 --> 00:10:12,190 was very ambivalent, very poor. And when he introduced some crucial concepts, then Leitman thinkers, not as much, but they also had their misgivings. 86 00:10:12,190 --> 00:10:21,320 And the late 19th century humanitarians very much so. So one of the lessons, if you will, of this of this historical study is. 87 00:10:21,320 --> 00:10:28,810 Or one of the pay offs, again, or benefits is is to allow us to reset the legitimating power of the loss of work today, 88 00:10:28,810 --> 00:10:35,680 to look at the loss of work differently and to understand better their origins under their present structure. 89 00:10:35,680 --> 00:10:41,750 And finally, my field is international studies. So I also do I also contribute to international. 90 00:10:41,750 --> 00:10:46,980 Why your theory specifically to do two? 91 00:10:46,980 --> 00:10:49,620 To a better understanding of the role of concepts, 92 00:10:49,620 --> 00:10:55,740 ideas and norms in state practises of security and violence, security and violence have traditionally, 93 00:10:55,740 --> 00:10:57,240 traditionally not so much anymore, 94 00:10:57,240 --> 00:11:03,840 but traditionally where the subject of this so-called realist school in our yard theory that so much is constructed is, 95 00:11:03,840 --> 00:11:09,170 well, I'm contributing, as many others have been doing over the past fifteen years, 96 00:11:09,170 --> 00:11:17,310 to showing how important ideas, concepts and norms are also for our idea of security and the use of force. 97 00:11:17,310 --> 00:11:24,220 So let me now give you sort of an overall map of it, of the. 98 00:11:24,220 --> 00:11:28,740 Of the history that I cover in the book. 99 00:11:28,740 --> 00:11:35,030 So I mentioned that before I begin with these with the Spanish scholasticism. 100 00:11:35,030 --> 00:11:42,100 This is the late 16th century and beginning of the of the 17th century with Cisco SWATters. 101 00:11:42,100 --> 00:11:50,720 But I look at Spanish scholasticism really to better understand the contribution of Hoover. 102 00:11:50,720 --> 00:11:59,890 I'm here. My my my claim is that the grocer's has been a incredibly important intellectual figure in the history of the loss of war. 103 00:11:59,890 --> 00:12:04,910 And I focus on I'll tell a little bit more about this shortly. 104 00:12:04,910 --> 00:12:08,310 I focus on honour distinction that Russia's introducing his great book, 105 00:12:08,310 --> 00:12:13,790 figuratively parkis between what he called just war on ice and what he called Sulan War. 106 00:12:13,790 --> 00:12:20,180 So Belgium used to on the one hand, which he took really quite directly from the Scholastic's and then Sollom War, 107 00:12:20,180 --> 00:12:25,090 Belgium SOLEMNIS, which is he's his own term. 108 00:12:25,090 --> 00:12:28,010 And I would say a novel concept that he introduced. 109 00:12:28,010 --> 00:12:36,830 But it's also indebted to a tradition of thought that came from the stuff as students of Roman law, including Genteelly. 110 00:12:36,830 --> 00:12:42,620 But but my claim is that this concept of somewhere really easily creates that is the sea. 111 00:12:42,620 --> 00:12:47,400 That's where off of what later became the modern loss of war. 112 00:12:47,400 --> 00:12:55,810 And then how he proceeded. The book is By One Century Jumps US is where I Jump From Overgrow shows early modernity to the Enlightenment. 113 00:12:55,810 --> 00:13:00,410 I'm here. My main characters are Christian Woolton, an unimaginable I. 114 00:13:00,410 --> 00:13:04,190 And the key concept that they that they propose an elaborate. 115 00:13:04,190 --> 00:13:10,070 It is the concept of regular war, which is a descendant in a way of the concept of Sullom war. 116 00:13:10,070 --> 00:13:15,750 It has differences, important differences, but their lineage can be traced very clearly. 117 00:13:15,750 --> 00:13:21,960 There is a clear continuity. And finally, I make another jump to the 19th century and hear Francis levers, 118 00:13:21,960 --> 00:13:29,600 a very crucial figure for me because I showed that lever to these enlightenment ideas of regular wars to the 19th century 119 00:13:29,600 --> 00:13:36,800 quite directly in the famous lever code that Abraham Lincoln commissioned for for the Union side in the American Civil War. 120 00:13:36,800 --> 00:13:46,040 But then in the 19th century, the other hugely important event is the emergence of humanitarianism on this particular day. 121 00:13:46,040 --> 00:13:56,030 To really call adaptation of humanitarian humanitarian movements and the impulse to to to turn that impulse into codified law. 122 00:13:56,030 --> 00:14:02,210 So I reconstruct at the end of the book this convergence in a way or clash, rather, 123 00:14:02,210 --> 00:14:08,900 between the tradition of regular award that comes from early modernity and this humanitarian movement 124 00:14:08,900 --> 00:14:17,570 that it's more proper of the 19th century and that its intention with many of the basic tenets of regret. 125 00:14:17,570 --> 00:14:26,090 Now, what I want to do with the rest of the time that I have is to just focus on three 126 00:14:26,090 --> 00:14:32,090 moments of these of these longer history that that I that I'm telling the book. 127 00:14:32,090 --> 00:14:38,000 The first is just to tell you a bit more about this distinction engrosses between solemn and just war, 128 00:14:38,000 --> 00:14:43,820 then tell you a little bit about how Woolton but they all thought about their use in Bailleau, 129 00:14:43,820 --> 00:14:50,720 in regular wars, and in particular why they felt that regular wars would be limited on strain. 130 00:14:50,720 --> 00:14:55,400 And finally, I want to tell you a little bit about the clash or the tensions, 131 00:14:55,400 --> 00:15:04,350 tensions that were produced when humanitarians tried to influence this tradition of regular work that was coming from the INLIKE. 132 00:15:04,350 --> 00:15:17,140 I also want to show give you a sense of how these intellectual history ends in the positive instruments of the late Mantid centres. 133 00:15:17,140 --> 00:15:26,920 Sort of to give you a sense of how these histories of how these ideas in history became or were turning to these instruments. 134 00:15:26,920 --> 00:15:33,950 So let me begin then with brochures. I don't think Russia needs an introduction here and I won't be giving. 135 00:15:33,950 --> 00:15:40,130 But but I just want to emphasise two. Two. 136 00:15:40,130 --> 00:15:47,040 I don't know. Episode of historical episodes that were hugely important for Brochure's when he was writing the Rebellion Parkis. 137 00:15:47,040 --> 00:15:53,820 His book was published in 16 25. 138 00:15:53,820 --> 00:16:01,990 And the failure of each party to maintain sort of the beginning of the modern system of sovereign states and also the Dutch East India Company, 139 00:16:01,990 --> 00:16:09,030 and this is the projection of Dutch economic and military power globally away from Europe to the open seas. 140 00:16:09,030 --> 00:16:17,490 And beyond that, the idea of Sollom War and the distinction between just war and sullen war is very much, 141 00:16:17,490 --> 00:16:25,890 I would say, a reflection of these two events or these two story called facts. 142 00:16:25,890 --> 00:16:32,970 So let me give you a sense of the distinction between just war and Sulan war first and then just tell you 143 00:16:32,970 --> 00:16:39,630 why Russia's thought it was important to introduce the concept of something for the concept of just war. 144 00:16:39,630 --> 00:16:46,980 It's it may be familiar to those of you who have studied a little bit of the ethics, contemporary ethics of war. 145 00:16:46,980 --> 00:16:57,110 This is what what Russia's stook, largely from the Spanish Scholastic's from the ideological vision of extending from plainness. 146 00:16:57,110 --> 00:16:58,890 And there are some basic principles here. 147 00:16:58,890 --> 00:17:07,370 So a war is just only if it's wage in response to a violation of right or injuries or there has to be a just cause of war and that just goes off. 148 00:17:07,370 --> 00:17:12,150 War is a violation of right. When there is a violation of right. 149 00:17:12,150 --> 00:17:19,440 That injure side becomes a judge. And he is the judge of the enduring sight of the delinquent side. 150 00:17:19,440 --> 00:17:25,080 So there isn't just war necessarily an inequality between the belligerent parties. 151 00:17:25,080 --> 00:17:33,390 One is the judge on that. The war is a form of law enforcement and the other is delinquent and has to be 152 00:17:33,390 --> 00:17:39,930 disciplined or are putting the right not only force that is necessary to do that, 153 00:17:39,930 --> 00:17:48,940 to repair the injury that was made is lawful. So there is a limiting principle here of necessity which is drawn from principles of corrective justice. 154 00:17:48,940 --> 00:17:57,420 So a just war is governed by principles of corrective justice and in particular those who are guilty of rights violations, 155 00:17:57,420 --> 00:18:04,470 not just war, may or even should be punished. And Russia's has long chopped or some punishment, usually bakkies. 156 00:18:04,470 --> 00:18:10,290 So punishment is a very important element in a just war, not, by contrast, a solemn war. 157 00:18:10,290 --> 00:18:14,670 If a just war must have just cost. Russia says, a in war. 158 00:18:14,670 --> 00:18:25,090 The beginning of a solemn war is is made in virtue of a formal declaration of war by a sovereign against another sovereign. 159 00:18:25,090 --> 00:18:28,770 And Russia says at some point that it's desirable that these formal declarations 160 00:18:28,770 --> 00:18:34,410 contain the reasons why the war is waged so that they are reason declaration. 161 00:18:34,410 --> 00:18:35,700 But that's not necessary. 162 00:18:35,700 --> 00:18:43,860 So basically, a formal declaration is a speech act in virtue of which a sovereign declares war against another and creates a state of war. 163 00:18:43,860 --> 00:18:49,770 So Russia said of war declaration, they just say, I hereby declare war against ex. 164 00:18:49,770 --> 00:18:53,190 It's a power of the sovereign to do so. 165 00:18:53,190 --> 00:19:00,260 Now, warring sovereigns are equal before what Russia is called the external nations, and then I won't get into the details. 166 00:19:00,260 --> 00:19:07,050 So what if external Loy's? But there is a formal bidgee beleaguer and equality before the law of nations. 167 00:19:07,050 --> 00:19:13,290 So no inequality's judge on delinquent, but equality of enemy. 168 00:19:13,290 --> 00:19:21,750 This is perhaps the most polemical and really heart wrenching element of Russia's doctrine of Sullom war. 169 00:19:21,750 --> 00:19:27,240 There are virtually no restrictions in the law of nations on the use of force of Russia says in solemn words. 170 00:19:27,240 --> 00:19:32,940 There is an unlimited right to kill. Killing discriminators indiscriminately all subjects of the enemy state. 171 00:19:32,940 --> 00:19:39,850 There is a right to enslavers, the right to conquer, and all sorts of really extreme, outrageous permissions. 172 00:19:39,850 --> 00:19:45,990 The use of. He made promises. 173 00:19:45,990 --> 00:19:51,060 There isn't much room for punishment. And also because the states are equal. 174 00:19:51,060 --> 00:19:55,590 There is no authority to punish. And I would just like to mention that. 175 00:19:55,590 --> 00:20:08,410 Well, that one of the few restrictions that that the norm so far for Limbaugh for half is the provision of poison on undercover assassins. 176 00:20:08,410 --> 00:20:12,750 And Brush has said that's because we need to protect the person of the king of the monarch. 177 00:20:12,750 --> 00:20:22,880 The head of state has to be protected. And so this tactic, these tactics of of of undercover posing, these attacks have to be prohibited. 178 00:20:22,880 --> 00:20:28,260 Then not so now. Russia said just for the principles of just war apply in the state of nature. 179 00:20:28,260 --> 00:20:32,310 So, for example, the Dutch East India Company, when it goes to the open seas, 180 00:20:32,310 --> 00:20:39,000 are to set up colonies, has to govern their use of force by the principles of a just war. 181 00:20:39,000 --> 00:20:44,820 So Limbaugh regulates war and the aftermath of war amongst sovereigns and only a month. 182 00:20:44,820 --> 00:20:47,580 So that's sort of the basic layer. 183 00:20:47,580 --> 00:20:55,260 Now, let me give you a sense of why Brochure's thought that it was important to introduce the concept of Solum War vet. 184 00:20:55,260 --> 00:21:03,180 So for those of you who have read some some brochures, you will know that it's it's not easy to do record stroke his argument. 185 00:21:03,180 --> 00:21:07,170 He's not a very systematic or well-organised writer. 186 00:21:07,170 --> 00:21:14,520 It's it's it's tried hard to follow. But if you if you invest enough time and effort, 187 00:21:14,520 --> 00:21:22,230 you will realise that the arguments in favour of a solemn war of different aspects of the Limbaugh have the same form. 188 00:21:22,230 --> 00:21:26,590 And it's the form that they are. They're all lesser evil arguments. 189 00:21:26,590 --> 00:21:33,090 And I would I would summarise this argument in the following way, corrected Justice Galvan's just words. 190 00:21:33,090 --> 00:21:38,820 And it's good that it does. So it's in principle if it's the only way to go well. 191 00:21:38,820 --> 00:21:44,760 But the problem is that in practise, corrective justice will give occasion for many, many. 192 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:48,390 So it's the source of many, many possible conflicts. 193 00:21:48,390 --> 00:21:55,870 We have to expect disagreements on disputes over justice in general and amongst sovereigns in particular. 194 00:21:55,870 --> 00:22:02,550 So in the interests of limiting the number of conflicts and also the lethality and their spread, 195 00:22:02,550 --> 00:22:11,850 we have to accept the non-stop Sollom War and give up on their aspirations to govern a war by corrective justice on these bases. 196 00:22:11,850 --> 00:22:16,830 Russia's defended things such as the principle of policy that these have the right of conquest. 197 00:22:16,830 --> 00:22:25,890 And this is the principle that says at the end of war, we have to recognise as rightful that state of affairs, the outcome of the war. 198 00:22:25,890 --> 00:22:30,270 So basically in war might has to be allowed to make. 199 00:22:30,270 --> 00:22:36,360 Right. The power of the parties, the outcome of the clash of forces has to be recognised as rightful. 200 00:22:36,360 --> 00:22:40,810 At the end of war, he also defended the right to enslave. 201 00:22:40,810 --> 00:22:46,980 And you may be familiar with these if you've read the first chapters of George Crusoe's on the social contract, 202 00:22:46,980 --> 00:22:54,230 because those chapters are precisely an attack against Grosz's defence of the Raichlen Slainte War, wrote. 203 00:22:54,230 --> 00:22:59,310 Rousseau was, of course, indignant that Russia dared to propose to defend this right. 204 00:22:59,310 --> 00:23:06,530 But Russia's argument was that if we don't recognise the right of belligerence to enslave their enemies, they will just kill them. 205 00:23:06,530 --> 00:23:16,380 And we should prefer life over death. And if that means recognising the right to enslavement, then we should recognise that. 206 00:23:16,380 --> 00:23:20,800 He also defended the validity of these treaties, which are signed under threat. 207 00:23:20,800 --> 00:23:25,200 If you follow principles of Roman law, contracts should not be recognised. 208 00:23:25,200 --> 00:23:30,660 When one of the parties was forced to sign duress, rest should invalidate a contract. 209 00:23:30,660 --> 00:23:35,310 Not so in the case of peace treaties. Under argument here is if you allow that to happen, 210 00:23:35,310 --> 00:23:43,380 then you would essentially dissolve the institution of peace treaties and you would not have a very important instrument to end a war. 211 00:23:43,380 --> 00:23:49,620 And it's very important to be to have the ability to end wars because, again, we need to contain the lethality. 212 00:23:49,620 --> 00:23:53,130 We need to contain their spread. And there's a similar argument. 213 00:23:53,130 --> 00:23:59,950 The beginning of the idea of neutrality is here in the embodied in the doctrine of Sollom War. 214 00:23:59,950 --> 00:24:09,690 And basically here that the difficulty, the challenge for Russia's was if you defend the possibility that states declare their neutrality, 215 00:24:09,690 --> 00:24:20,160 then you are allowing them to abstain from taking sides, which means that they are not obligated to take the side of justice. 216 00:24:20,160 --> 00:24:26,280 So that's sort of in a nutshell, the argument for why we need the concept of Sollom War. 217 00:24:26,280 --> 00:24:30,840 Let me now just to conclude this this this little section on Russia's give you 218 00:24:30,840 --> 00:24:38,040 a sense of why only sovereign states should be allowed to fight Sulan war. 219 00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:43,880 In principle, all these arguments, the lesser evil arguments, etc, may apply to private parties as well. 220 00:24:43,880 --> 00:24:49,010 Argument doesn't seem to depend on the status of the parties, but Brochure's says no. 221 00:24:49,010 --> 00:24:56,300 States are different and we should limit these or treat us privileged privileges. 222 00:24:56,300 --> 00:25:00,760 These these very permissive norms because states are different. 223 00:25:00,760 --> 00:25:04,250 And in particular, he makes an argument that states are not us, 224 00:25:04,250 --> 00:25:10,100 are different from bunch of pirates and Bragan, which are, I guess, sort of standard contrast here. 225 00:25:10,100 --> 00:25:17,670 And they're different because they administer justice and they are oriented by justice, he argues, even if they sometimes act in unjustly. 226 00:25:17,670 --> 00:25:19,970 Particularly when they wage an unjust war. 227 00:25:19,970 --> 00:25:29,130 So we need to give states the benefit of the doubt, because by nature, by constitution, they are oriented towards justice. 228 00:25:29,130 --> 00:25:37,850 Related to this, he says they are trustworthy because they form a special community of obligation in virtue of which they can be lawful enemies. 229 00:25:37,850 --> 00:25:44,520 Here he is drawing directly from our buddy Genteelly, in contrast to pirates or criminals. 230 00:25:44,520 --> 00:25:50,920 So there is a certain expectation that they will that they will observe a faith, 231 00:25:50,920 --> 00:25:58,290 that we will keep a pact and they will restrain themselves, that they won't avail themselves to the phone towers of Sultan. 232 00:25:58,290 --> 00:26:04,290 And finally, an argument that that way anticipate some of the arguments that one can find in hopes 233 00:26:04,290 --> 00:26:08,700 it is desirable that only sovereigns decide on administered the power of coercion, 234 00:26:08,700 --> 00:26:17,250 the power of this war. In a way, one can read brochure's this theory of Sullom war ask spelling out the implications 235 00:26:17,250 --> 00:26:21,600 of the principle of sovereignty to relations with all their sovereigns, 236 00:26:21,600 --> 00:26:31,380 to sort of the external Xterra like mention of the principle of the monopoly of the power of coercion by the sovereign. 237 00:26:31,380 --> 00:26:35,880 If we could second guess sovereign decisions on the use of force, 238 00:26:35,880 --> 00:26:44,670 if we could criticise them on the basis of external standards of corrective justice, then the whole idea of order of social order. 239 00:26:44,670 --> 00:26:48,960 On the basis of a sovereign would be put it put into question. 240 00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:59,730 So it's very risky to do that. So we have to give that the sovereign decision on the on the on the necessity of war, almost an absolute character. 241 00:26:59,730 --> 00:27:08,280 We have to recognise that. So while in principle, in terms of justice, just war and corrective justice are superior to solin war, 242 00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:12,870 in many ways, regrettably, I regret is palpable. 243 00:27:12,870 --> 00:27:17,460 When Brochure's was spelling out the doctrine of fear of solin war. 244 00:27:17,460 --> 00:27:22,530 In practise, the rules of Sollom War hostages have to be recognised. 245 00:27:22,530 --> 00:27:28,500 So let me now jump one century ahead to the Enlightenment on the theory of just war here. 246 00:27:28,500 --> 00:27:33,520 My two main theories, as I said, Paul, you are Wolf, on un-American about there. 247 00:27:33,520 --> 00:27:40,920 Others are somewhat complicated relationship between the two. But they all said that his interest was just to popularise, Wolf, his writings. 248 00:27:40,920 --> 00:27:45,780 But in fact, he made some some original contributions. 249 00:27:45,780 --> 00:27:53,040 He also opposed, Wolf, in some respects. There's been some debate in the in the literature on how much or to what extent. 250 00:27:53,040 --> 00:28:00,950 But there was really just following on on popularising, Wolf, but so that they can certainly be being treated as a part, 251 00:28:00,950 --> 00:28:06,230 taking the same project of articulating principles and ideals of regular war. 252 00:28:06,230 --> 00:28:08,940 And I'm here I, I included two images. 253 00:28:08,940 --> 00:28:17,930 These are from depictions of the Seven Years War at the mid 80s, mid 18th century, the First World War in history, according to many. 254 00:28:17,930 --> 00:28:25,830 And if you look at the upper right hand side, you will see this much of a very orderly, well organised Piech battle. 255 00:28:25,830 --> 00:28:35,390 There are the uniforms on both sides. They are contained. They are fighting each other within a very narrow area. 256 00:28:35,390 --> 00:28:42,240 They are fighting directly. But if you look carefully behind those those regular soldiers, you'll see some bushes. 257 00:28:42,240 --> 00:28:45,310 And behind the bushes, you see some irregular forces. 258 00:28:45,310 --> 00:28:52,230 There are some American Indians there shooting from behind the bushes, hiding and shooting at the regular forces. 259 00:28:52,230 --> 00:29:01,620 So that just encapsulates a very important tension off of this idea for a ground war, which is the temptation, the actual reality of state. 260 00:29:01,620 --> 00:29:10,950 Resorting to irregulars to gain tactical advantage on the image of the lower right hand is a siege of a port in Nova Scotia. 261 00:29:10,950 --> 00:29:15,510 And you see siege warfare and the blockade of force was a very important tactic of war. 262 00:29:15,510 --> 00:29:25,500 And you see the orderliness Sunday under the regularity. Again, that's very much part of one of the aspirations of this idea of regular war. 263 00:29:25,500 --> 00:29:33,960 So, again, just let me give you a sense of the continuities and contrast between ferocious and solemn war on life and regular war. 264 00:29:33,960 --> 00:29:42,320 So if in Sollom Wars are fought for brochure's, a formal declaration didn't have to contain any reasons. 265 00:29:42,320 --> 00:29:50,190 But they'll emphasise that sovereigns have to justify publicly their wars in their form of public war manifesto. 266 00:29:50,190 --> 00:29:59,430 So they had to explain to all fellow sovereigns and to public opinion already why they're waging war, why they keep that stuff to be justified. 267 00:29:59,430 --> 00:30:03,990 This is something that both sides in a war could do that often both sides, you know, war did before. 268 00:30:03,990 --> 00:30:07,560 This is very much an exercise in legitimation a day. 269 00:30:07,560 --> 00:30:14,550 They didn't exclude the fact that both sides could issue valid reasons or plausible reasons for waging war. 270 00:30:14,550 --> 00:30:20,970 But the important fact here is that reasons, public reasons are a requirement, a legal requirement. 271 00:30:20,970 --> 00:30:28,440 Recent declarations are the beginning of a very rough war. There is legal equality and big caveat, this idea that. 272 00:30:28,440 --> 00:30:33,090 Only they're equal only before the external law of nations, which ferocious made. 273 00:30:33,090 --> 00:30:37,100 Pretty much gone. There is legal equality of sovereign. 274 00:30:37,100 --> 00:30:41,130 There is sovereign equality on as far as an implication of that. 275 00:30:41,130 --> 00:30:49,650 There is beleaguer and equality. And remember Woolton, but those were the ones who coined that famous phrase that that I was a dwarf is as much a man 276 00:30:49,650 --> 00:30:54,360 as a giant of something that I think as a smaller state is as much a state as a giant state. 277 00:30:54,360 --> 00:31:00,930 So that's very much at the centre of this idea of regret. There are no restrictions in solemn wars. 278 00:31:00,930 --> 00:31:04,590 The ideals of limited war are at the centre of regular war. 279 00:31:04,590 --> 00:31:11,850 And I'll tell you about that show. And finally, Solin war excludes punishment in Tullamore. 280 00:31:11,850 --> 00:31:19,740 Punishment exclude. It's already in regular wars. There is an account of punishment and reprisals for violations of the loss of regular war. 281 00:31:19,740 --> 00:31:25,140 So there is something like punishment for war crimes, if you will. Of course, I didn't use that language. 282 00:31:25,140 --> 00:31:34,560 But there's already something of that sort. So let me give you a sense of the use in their loan programme war and why. 283 00:31:34,560 --> 00:31:39,790 Why these enlightenment thinkers thought that regular work could be limited. 284 00:31:39,790 --> 00:31:47,570 And just to give you a sense of what they are, how they understood limitation is that war should happen ideally. 285 00:31:47,570 --> 00:31:55,080 And this is, again, an idea. War should take place only amongst regular forces or amongst designated combatants. 286 00:31:55,080 --> 00:32:01,450 And these are designated by your sovereign noncombat and should be left out of hostilities as much as possible. 287 00:32:01,450 --> 00:32:07,080 And of course, the similarities between this ideal and the principle of distinction in contemporary threshold. 288 00:32:07,080 --> 00:32:11,910 Right. Or law is very, very clear. Of course, they are different, 289 00:32:11,910 --> 00:32:20,820 but that there is already a sense here that we have to separate and we have to we should keep hostilities only within certain designated parts, 290 00:32:20,820 --> 00:32:28,620 not behind these halva behind it, but rather the aspiration of making this ideal reality. 291 00:32:28,620 --> 00:32:33,990 There is a notion of enlightened reason of state. And the notion is that all states, 292 00:32:33,990 --> 00:32:43,130 sovereign states have and will understand to have a general interest in pursuing an economy of violence and in containing the destructiveness of war. 293 00:32:43,130 --> 00:32:47,580 And in particular, for example, combatant or the combat cannot be attacked. 294 00:32:47,580 --> 00:32:52,540 If a combatant no longer poses a threat, it cannot be a legitimate target. 295 00:32:52,540 --> 00:33:01,200 And there is, together with this whole regulation of how the recent arson war in particular combatants were no longer able to fight. 296 00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:07,900 It's again, all in the spirit of containing and limiting the use of violence to active combat. 297 00:33:07,900 --> 00:33:17,280 There is also, along with these long passages and discussions of the regulation of contributions by persons of the you of sieges. 298 00:33:17,280 --> 00:33:21,720 How should sieges be carried? How this should be ended. 299 00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:27,690 The rights of the besieging power over this siege town. 300 00:33:27,690 --> 00:33:31,920 Regulations on bomb beings, on neutrality, amongst many others. 301 00:33:31,920 --> 00:33:40,710 One way to describe this is how you describe it. These these these principles of limited work is as Maxime's of good state practising 302 00:33:40,710 --> 00:33:47,880 demonstration of the destructiveness of war or even a political economy of violence, 303 00:33:47,880 --> 00:33:52,980 not the problem. And these enlightenment theories where sensitive to these. 304 00:33:52,980 --> 00:33:57,240 But they were quite optimistic that limitation could be a pain. 305 00:33:57,240 --> 00:34:03,400 But there is a problem here. The problem is that there are conflicting interests in the states or in general, long term. 306 00:34:03,400 --> 00:34:10,050 The states may want to contain the destructiveness of war, but in particular for each war, unsure shorter short term, 307 00:34:10,050 --> 00:34:17,370 given the immediate objective of winning the war, they would like to use any means available to defeat the enemy. 308 00:34:17,370 --> 00:34:23,850 And the tension between these two coffees creates sharp conflicts, multiple sharp conflicts in the practise of regular war. 309 00:34:23,850 --> 00:34:34,710 One I alluded to already is the use of regular. The temptation to commission or to just allow regular us to fight to to supplement regular forces. 310 00:34:34,710 --> 00:34:40,320 What would happen or what happened actually in practise when irregulars entered the scene? 311 00:34:40,320 --> 00:34:45,270 Was there a possibility of spirals of violence that the law could not contain? 312 00:34:45,270 --> 00:34:52,690 So there's always the spectre of unlimited violence when irregular square use violations of neutrality. 313 00:34:52,690 --> 00:35:04,350 Likewise, could lead to conflicts between powers that claim neutrality and powers that abused or violated the rules of neutrality 314 00:35:04,350 --> 00:35:10,800 so that they capture legitimate cargo that that went to their enemies and so upset the neutral on the enemy. 315 00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:14,850 There are all sorts of possible conflicts here and also the use of reprisals was 316 00:35:14,850 --> 00:35:19,650 problematic because one side alleged that he was using force as a reprisal, 317 00:35:19,650 --> 00:35:26,130 which is a lawful force used to discipline the enemy in reaction to a violation of the law. 318 00:35:26,130 --> 00:35:32,620 The enemy would say, I didn't violate the. The larger reprisal is actually a violation of law against which I'm going to use reprisal. 319 00:35:32,620 --> 00:35:40,490 These are called contra reprisals. The thing is, these spirals, these reprisal on contra reprisals could spiral out of control. 320 00:35:40,490 --> 00:35:53,380 Andre, also, again, limitations. Nonetheless, these Leitman thinkers thought that ideals of limited war were important, that they should be pursued. 321 00:35:53,380 --> 00:36:00,160 They were fragile, but they should be pursued. And their task, as they soil, as they conceive of themselves, 322 00:36:00,160 --> 00:36:12,570 was to remind statesmen and political unmilitary in either of their long term interest in containing the violence of war. 323 00:36:12,570 --> 00:36:18,360 Finally, let me jump one one one century ahead. The late bill to the 19th century. 324 00:36:18,360 --> 00:36:26,320 And so I mention Francis Lever is a very important figure here in containing or bringing into the 19th century these ideals and principles. 325 00:36:26,320 --> 00:36:32,370 Herberger were also very important is your handcar Casper Bloodily, who was a very prominent, 326 00:36:32,370 --> 00:36:38,790 perhaps the most prominent Prussian jurist at the time, co-founder of this de la Renta national. 327 00:36:38,790 --> 00:36:43,400 He translated, France is the levers of the levers go to German. 328 00:36:43,400 --> 00:36:49,200 And that became a Prussian code that was used by the Prussian army. 329 00:36:49,200 --> 00:36:53,910 So these two are very important. And also very important is Gustaf Moneer, who you can see here. 330 00:36:53,910 --> 00:36:59,970 And these are in these little a much depicting the founders of the ICRC. 331 00:36:59,970 --> 00:37:04,020 So Gustave Moneer was a lawyer amongst those those founders, 332 00:37:04,020 --> 00:37:09,060 also a co-founder of the Institute of International and a very interesting thinker of of 333 00:37:09,060 --> 00:37:14,370 of the challenges of introducing humanitarian constraints on on on the practises of war. 334 00:37:14,370 --> 00:37:22,060 And this is a picture of one of the first missions of the of the International Red Cross of rescuing wounded combatants from the battlefield. 335 00:37:22,060 --> 00:37:29,280 And I think these will soon set ahead of itself. Again, late, late 19th century. 336 00:37:29,280 --> 00:37:32,940 I'm here before telling you a little bit about the dilemmas that these humanitarians face. 337 00:37:32,940 --> 00:37:36,870 I want to show you how these this intellectual history, as it were, 338 00:37:36,870 --> 00:37:42,480 landed in incertain is positive instruments and codified instruments of the laws of war. 339 00:37:42,480 --> 00:37:47,310 Well, leever, it's livres a really interesting figure because he's a philosopher. 340 00:37:47,310 --> 00:37:50,960 He's a thinker. But he's also a qualifier, an unbeliever called. 341 00:37:50,960 --> 00:38:02,070 These are very unique and again, interesting texts because it summarises a great deal of what appears of great land in a book like Battelle's. 342 00:38:02,070 --> 00:38:05,730 And it's done, Asare. It's supposed to be used as a pocket book. 343 00:38:05,730 --> 00:38:10,050 It has to be carried into battlefields. It has to be. 344 00:38:10,050 --> 00:38:14,820 It's a very practical instrument. And it was a hugely influential instrument. 345 00:38:14,820 --> 00:38:19,650 But in addition to Lieber code, there is that Paris Declaration of 1866, 346 00:38:19,650 --> 00:38:23,850 which regulates neutrality and follow a great deal of the principles and the 347 00:38:23,850 --> 00:38:28,910 ideas of neutrality that came all the way back from brochure's actually dissent. 348 00:38:28,910 --> 00:38:36,200 The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which contains very succeed and powerful formulation of the limited war ideal, 349 00:38:36,200 --> 00:38:42,330 the idea that war should be undertaken only between state forces and non-combatants should be left out. 350 00:38:42,330 --> 00:38:48,420 It also prohibits the use of of certain weapons of expanding bullets. 351 00:38:48,420 --> 00:38:55,740 And the idea here is that superfluous injuries should be prohibited in war and superfluous 352 00:38:55,740 --> 00:39:01,620 here can be understood and I think should be understood as violating the economy of violence. 353 00:39:01,620 --> 00:39:11,460 One should keep in mind when fighting war. If if violence is unnecessary, if it doesn't contribute, it's not necessary for the pursuit of a war aim. 354 00:39:11,460 --> 00:39:21,510 It should be prohibited. Again, I thought an economy should be kept that the only force necessary, superfluous force should not be used. 355 00:39:21,510 --> 00:39:30,480 The Brussels declaration is also perhaps I would say that the main interests of this of 356 00:39:30,480 --> 00:39:36,270 this instrument is that is the first one that that includes both principles and ideas, 357 00:39:36,270 --> 00:39:43,620 norms really that come from this regular work tradition and humanitarian principles, principles of rescue, of relief, of suffering. 358 00:39:43,620 --> 00:39:52,940 It was never ratified, but it's a very important instrument in particular because it was important to to forge for the draughters of the oxer manual. 359 00:39:52,940 --> 00:40:00,450 And because the Brussels declaration on the Ulster manual, on all the other instruments that we see in the upper hand of the screen, 360 00:40:00,450 --> 00:40:05,520 were almost directly taken and included in The Hague Convention, 361 00:40:05,520 --> 00:40:08,730 which are the first huge qualifications of the laws of war, 362 00:40:08,730 --> 00:40:13,710 according to many of the beginning of the modern loss of work for these these you can 363 00:40:13,710 --> 00:40:19,120 trace you can you can almost see them being integrated into The Hague Conventions. 364 00:40:19,120 --> 00:40:27,120 And on the other side, on the humanitarian side of action in the 19th century, we have the Geneva Convention of 1864. 365 00:40:27,120 --> 00:40:31,290 And this is really a different thing. This is a very different creature. 366 00:40:31,290 --> 00:40:36,690 Amongst other things, because it uses the concept of neutrality in a very novel way. 367 00:40:36,690 --> 00:40:42,210 So neutrality in the regular war tradition, it was only a status that states could claim. 368 00:40:42,210 --> 00:40:49,590 And it was very much about keeping yourself agnostic on outside of a foreign conflict. 369 00:40:49,590 --> 00:40:53,940 What the draughters of this Geneva Convention on one year ICRC were were very important 370 00:40:53,940 --> 00:40:59,910 and influential here is to extend the status of neutrality to humanitarian organisations. 371 00:40:59,910 --> 00:41:04,210 And in doing that, they really completely changed the sense of neutrality. 372 00:41:04,210 --> 00:41:11,970 And if they did that, in order to give a certain important standing to use quirked. 373 00:41:11,970 --> 00:41:17,670 Where the concept of neutrality to allow for rescue missions in battlefields. 374 00:41:17,670 --> 00:41:24,090 It was it didn't work. Well, the Geneva Convention was later revised. It was very problematic in the Franco Prussian war. 375 00:41:24,090 --> 00:41:30,740 But I would just put it here because he was it was part of this all other sort of very 376 00:41:30,740 --> 00:41:38,340 potent force that was coming into the codification efforts of the late 19th century. 377 00:41:38,340 --> 00:41:46,630 Now, let me give you a sense of two dilemmas that these people in the late 19th century were facing. 378 00:41:46,630 --> 00:41:54,510 The first was medical that day dilemma around codification was very much a life or death for the members of the discipline that ran through. 379 00:41:54,510 --> 00:42:03,760 That's your novel. And the dilemma here is it's about whether they should codify existing laws and customs of war as they were practised, 380 00:42:03,760 --> 00:42:09,410 as they existed, or whether they should rather codify norms that advance the progress of humanity. 381 00:42:09,410 --> 00:42:19,510 And here remember, I imagine all of you have read, Mark, because Kenya are gentle, civilising, that the gentle serializer, they are the idea. 382 00:42:19,510 --> 00:42:25,990 Here are the troubling here for it, for these lawyers is Jurisich of the sea to the range of nationalities that they took themselves to be, 383 00:42:25,990 --> 00:42:31,210 to have the mission, to be gentle, civilised or so humanity. They have advance progress. 384 00:42:31,210 --> 00:42:39,670 They have to be progressive forces if they just register the status quo of the bid, just compile the actual practises of state. 385 00:42:39,670 --> 00:42:44,350 They would be failing in that mission. But then, on the other hand, this is the problem. 386 00:42:44,350 --> 00:42:51,670 They became too progressive. If they were to have on guard, as it were, then the states would be indifferent or even hostile to their enterprise. 387 00:42:51,670 --> 00:42:54,710 So they had to strike these this really tricky balance. 388 00:42:54,710 --> 00:43:02,130 And again, it's sort of something like apology and utopia here between being two adventurers and being too conservative. 389 00:43:02,130 --> 00:43:09,980 And you could read their read reader, their polemic in there. Have you the point of rational about, well, how are we going to do these? 390 00:43:09,980 --> 00:43:17,950 Are we gonna be unhappy sell-outs? Or are we are we going to be a real legalizers on a second related dilemma? 391 00:43:17,950 --> 00:43:21,760 Is is what I call the humanity in the book, The Humanitarians Dilemma. 392 00:43:21,760 --> 00:43:28,090 And here's the quote that the problem is that if they advance their project of humanising war in the way they wanted to, 393 00:43:28,090 --> 00:43:32,670 they may end up legitimising war and giving sanction to reason of state. 394 00:43:32,670 --> 00:43:38,130 That, on the other hand, if they are too critical of reason of state, as they may feel inclined to be, 395 00:43:38,130 --> 00:43:46,870 and if they condemn the savagery of war as they they sure would, then they will have neither axes nor influence over the conduct of hostilities. 396 00:43:46,870 --> 00:43:51,370 And so they won't be able to to do the work of relieving suffering. 397 00:43:51,370 --> 00:43:56,900 So there's a similar sort of tricky balance that that that that that they had to attain. 398 00:43:56,900 --> 00:44:02,800 And just let me conclude give you a sense of Gustaaf one year solution or how 399 00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:07,540 he tried to quell his moral conscience when when faced with this dilemma, 400 00:44:07,540 --> 00:44:16,870 there's a really surprising argument in Bunyah that that that says that humanitarianism is actually a form of undercover pacifism or crypto pacifism. 401 00:44:16,870 --> 00:44:26,530 And the idea that Moneer had the faith that money had was that as humanitarian sentiments progressively made their way into battlefields, 402 00:44:26,530 --> 00:44:34,570 as they entered the hearts of soldiers, they would slowly erode the practise of war from the inside, as it were. 403 00:44:34,570 --> 00:44:44,260 Form on Monday was inconceivable that once humanitarian sentiments were communicated or ignited in soldiers hearts, they would pursue war. 404 00:44:44,260 --> 00:44:48,250 Nonetheless, they would continue to pursue war. 405 00:44:48,250 --> 00:44:55,150 Of course, that the other hand here is whether rather this humanitarian something would not rather facilitate, 406 00:44:55,150 --> 00:44:59,380 legitimise and prolong war by making it appear more humane. 407 00:44:59,380 --> 00:45:02,870 And this is something that someone has has really nice. 408 00:45:02,870 --> 00:45:07,540 I it's a very prominent element in his forthcoming book on humaine war. 409 00:45:07,540 --> 00:45:14,210 Well, one year I was aware that this that this risk existed, but he thought that he was too unlikely. 410 00:45:14,210 --> 00:45:20,560 He had too much faith on the power of money, time and sentiment to really contemplate these this other possibility. 411 00:45:20,560 --> 00:45:23,950 Well, with what we have is actually something closer, I would say, 412 00:45:23,950 --> 00:45:32,710 to the second we have the two opposed principles that the humanity principle did not end up eroding the military necessity principle, 413 00:45:32,710 --> 00:45:39,550 but rather they coexist in this uneasy, really structural, deep tension in the modern loss of war. 414 00:45:39,550 --> 00:45:46,780 And there is a risk here that I think my book tries to to to highlight and to to illuminate, 415 00:45:46,780 --> 00:45:52,830 which is that the high visibility of the humanity side here may or may end up hiding. 416 00:45:52,830 --> 00:45:58,180 They're still very active and very preponderant role of recent off-stage in the conduct of war. 417 00:45:58,180 --> 00:46:06,310 I think reasonable of is very much alive, if under different name and on these different guises in the loss of war today. 418 00:46:06,310 --> 00:46:12,960 So humanity may not allow us to see that as much as we may want to see it. 419 00:46:12,960 --> 00:46:21,180 Now, let me conclude with two thoughts about sort of the contemporary of some contemporary to contemporary implications of this work that I do, 420 00:46:21,180 --> 00:46:26,470 this historical work that I've done. 421 00:46:26,470 --> 00:46:37,700 The first has to do with how these all inherited conceptualisations that we have are now being used in radically different contexts of violence. 422 00:46:37,700 --> 00:46:40,430 And of course, strong warfare is one of those. 423 00:46:40,430 --> 00:46:46,280 But I would say more broadly, the contemporary prevalence of non international armed conflicts is something to worry, 424 00:46:46,280 --> 00:46:54,380 because these are governed by rules that were crafted for and by states, and that presupposed an idea of sovereignty. 425 00:46:54,380 --> 00:46:59,180 That is not really existence in that kind of conflict. 426 00:46:59,180 --> 00:47:06,350 Amongst other things, there is a higher symmetry amongst the parties. There is little chance of reciprocity or opportunity for reciprocal reciprocity. 427 00:47:06,350 --> 00:47:13,620 So the question here is wens limitations. How can we limit these wars or how can we expect these wars to be limited? 428 00:47:13,620 --> 00:47:15,170 And the second is, 429 00:47:15,170 --> 00:47:21,890 I would say there are some structural limitations to the idea of convergence of the regimes of humanitarian law and human rights law. 430 00:47:21,890 --> 00:47:31,200 And by structural here, I mean, there are certain. Conceptual, deeply ingrained, 431 00:47:31,200 --> 00:47:37,410 constitutive conceptual limitations on how much these two sorry to regimes can 432 00:47:37,410 --> 00:47:45,450 converge or can can become one single humanity law regime to use the Delta term. 433 00:47:45,450 --> 00:47:53,280 The humanist humanisation of humanitarian law. This is Judge Taylor moron's expression through the concurrent application of human rights law 434 00:47:53,280 --> 00:48:01,960 during hostilities has of restriction or limitation in what I would call a hard core pakora, 435 00:48:01,960 --> 00:48:07,220 the loss of war that is reflected or expressing terms such as hostilities. 436 00:48:07,220 --> 00:48:16,080 The normative wave of military advantage, which is a way of expressing the principle of reason of state disability necessity amongst others. 437 00:48:16,080 --> 00:48:21,840 So these are, I would say, again, structural limitations to convergence that we need to keep in mind, 438 00:48:21,840 --> 00:48:26,520 and that I think that historical study of the making of the loss of war, 439 00:48:26,520 --> 00:48:32,950 intellectual makumbe the loss of work give us a very clear sense of how deeply ingrained these concepts are. 440 00:48:32,950 --> 00:48:40,881 And with this I conclude. Thanks very much. Sorry, I just realised that I spent too much time, but thank you for your for your attention.