Of the loss of war. So thank you all for being here. It's really an honour and a great pleasure.
And so let me just share their presentation that that I prepared for today.
OK. So I'm going to start with something that may be a bit unexpected for a presentation on a book of the history if ideas around the loss of work.
But I want to start with drones,
just to give you a sense of the contemporary perplexities that have motivated my study of the literal history of the loss of war.
And this is a quote from President Obama's famous speech in 2000.
Let me just make things a little bit here. President Obama speech introducing his drone and counterterror policy in 2003.
I'm just gonna read a passage from that speech.
President Obama said under domestic law and international law, the United States is at war with al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associated forces.
We are at war with an organisation that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them.
So this is a just war, a war waged proportionally, last resort, self-defence.
So I just want to underline here the importance up for Obama to claim that these this war
was consistent with international law and was consistent also with principles of just war.
Proportionality, necessity, last resort. As we all know,
these drone warfare has extended and expanded in the war to many areas in ways that look very
different from what we would understand as hostilities or as a battle in any sort of standard or.
I think Mattick understanding of war, drone warfare looks very different and it's been extending.
There has been drone attacks in military in the context of military operations or alleged military operation by the U.S. Also,
the U.K. threatened France, Russia, Turkey in many places of the world, including Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Gaza.
There are websites dedicated to counting the deaths that have been caused by these attacks.
There have been tens of thousands of civilian casualties. And the question here is so that the states using these these technologies,
these tactics have been defending them as being necessary and proportional and consistent with the norms of humanitarian law.
The the the urgency of targeting, of killing those those individuals is such that the collateral damage is is proportional
and is admissible within the norms and the principles of humanitarian law.
But these way of understanding or framing these attacks have been challenge notably.
But but the former UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings,
the PINTU in 2013 publish a well-known report arguing that these attacks should not
be seen as part of a war so not actions within or in the context of hostilities,
but rather as extrajudicial killings because they should be seen within the framework of human rights law.
So that the perplexity here is that depending on the legal framework that you use to account for or describe these actions,
you may see the consequences either as murder, killing by state authorities,
by public authority, or ask legitimate use of force to tear or stop threats,
imminent threats with some collateral damage that can be absorbed or justified or by the proportionality rule of fight.
So this is a decent, similar uses of force frame as part of a war or in a context of hostilities,
gives or motivates a set off of more general questions.
So the first and most direct one is why would framing an action as undertaken in a context of hostilities,
why would that make more permissible the use of more destructive force than is allowed in peacetime?
Why would the frame change what what we take to be permissible military action or permissible force?
And also related to these? Why should states on all these states have the right to participate directly hostilities?
And this is the phrase that you've seen additional protocol and additional protocol to the one to the Geneva Conventions, Article 43 two.
And this is also a question very close to the work that ELAC has been doing, the people associated with you look at elsewhere,
or why should even aggressive states have such right to participate in still at these wisch?
Shouldn't we deem their use of lethal force murder rather than legitimate military action or participation in hostilities?
Now, what was I doing, the book is not really try to answer these questions,
but rather try to understand how we got there, how we ended up having these questions on this perplexities.
And one way to describe the work that I do in the book is to look at the construction,
historical construction of very specific juridical normative language on the use of force.
And specifically, I'm really interested in the articulation and systematic defence of concepts such as hostilities,
belligerent power, combat and civilian direct participation, military advantage, amongst others.
And the way I do these, the way I do this investigation into the making of the language of the loss of war
is through a study of the history of political and legal international thought.
And my understanding here is off of these theories as generating concepts that
constitute UNCOMFY or public action and repertoire of legitimation on the use of force.
So I've read this theory says in a way, ideologies of state,
force of ways to to justify but also constrain and limit the use of force by sovereign states.
And keep in mind, very sort of at the centre of my my reading of these sources,
how these theories contribute to the articulation of normative language, of associated practise, of public legitimisation.
So one, perhaps the most important criterion that I use for selecting the sources that I use that I study in the book is how influential,
actually influential they were historically, politically, legally.
And all the sources that I use were hugely influential, meaning their books were edited multiple times,
translated into multiple languages, cited use not not only by other lawyers, but public actors, statesmen, military men, etc.
So that that's part of my interest in these very influential sources is is the fact that they were so important in constituting these languages.
Now you take the book to make three main contributions. The first and most obvious one is to the history and theory of the loss of war.
And here specifically, I make assumptions mission to the as it were prior history of the loss of war,
because I goes way back, way before the classification. And at the end of the 19th century,
there's been a great deal of interest in the history and the history of international
law is room for for international law on particular of the loss of war.
In the last decade or so. But most of that work on the loss of war has stopped at the end of the 19th century.
And with the idea that the modern loss of war really begin with a codification airforce that took place there.
But what I show in the book is actually I go back to the end of the 16th century already causing delays,
a very important figure in this history of the initial figures.
And what I show is that there is this whole construction of languages and understandings of war.
Way before the codification efforts and in fact, those that the prehistory, that background,
the theoretical background was crucial for the codification because it provided that they share understanding of diplomats,
military men and juries that participated in that codification.
In particular, the way the laws and customs of war were understood in the Leitman were very,
very important element in inheritance issues, if you will, for those late 19th century instruments.
The second contribution, I think, could be two critical international legal studies.
And hear what one of the of the payoffs of doing this historical work is to denaturalised and to historic sites, conceded concepts of the loss of war.
And I'm very interested in doing that, that the work of of of looking afresh,
as we're seeing with with the perspective of history, seeing the present differently.
And that's a work that that one can do through theory and through history.
And in particular, something that I was very interested in is in recovering and conveying a sense of the ambivalence and the moral dilemmas
that many of these theories face when they were articulating the language of the loss of war were Groschen in particular,
was very ambivalent, very poor. And when he introduced some crucial concepts, then Leitman thinkers, not as much, but they also had their misgivings.
And the late 19th century humanitarians very much so. So one of the lessons, if you will, of this of this historical study is.
Or one of the pay offs, again, or benefits is is to allow us to reset the legitimating power of the loss of work today,
to look at the loss of work differently and to understand better their origins under their present structure.
And finally, my field is international studies. So I also do I also contribute to international.
Why your theory specifically to do two?
To a better understanding of the role of concepts,
ideas and norms in state practises of security and violence, security and violence have traditionally,
traditionally not so much anymore,
but traditionally where the subject of this so-called realist school in our yard theory that so much is constructed is,
well, I'm contributing, as many others have been doing over the past fifteen years,
to showing how important ideas, concepts and norms are also for our idea of security and the use of force.
So let me now give you sort of an overall map of it, of the.
Of the history that I cover in the book.
So I mentioned that before I begin with these with the Spanish scholasticism.
This is the late 16th century and beginning of the of the 17th century with Cisco SWATters.
But I look at Spanish scholasticism really to better understand the contribution of Hoover.
I'm here. My my my claim is that the grocer's has been a incredibly important intellectual figure in the history of the loss of war.
And I focus on I'll tell a little bit more about this shortly.
I focus on honour distinction that Russia's introducing his great book,
figuratively parkis between what he called just war on ice and what he called Sulan War.
So Belgium used to on the one hand, which he took really quite directly from the Scholastic's and then Sollom War,
Belgium SOLEMNIS, which is he's his own term.
And I would say a novel concept that he introduced.
But it's also indebted to a tradition of thought that came from the stuff as students of Roman law, including Genteelly.
But but my claim is that this concept of somewhere really easily creates that is the sea.
That's where off of what later became the modern loss of war.
And then how he proceeded. The book is By One Century Jumps US is where I Jump From Overgrow shows early modernity to the Enlightenment.
I'm here. My main characters are Christian Woolton, an unimaginable I.
And the key concept that they that they propose an elaborate.
It is the concept of regular war, which is a descendant in a way of the concept of Sullom war.
It has differences, important differences, but their lineage can be traced very clearly.
There is a clear continuity. And finally, I make another jump to the 19th century and hear Francis levers,
a very crucial figure for me because I showed that lever to these enlightenment ideas of regular wars to the 19th century
quite directly in the famous lever code that Abraham Lincoln commissioned for for the Union side in the American Civil War.
But then in the 19th century, the other hugely important event is the emergence of humanitarianism on this particular day.
To really call adaptation of humanitarian humanitarian movements and the impulse to to to turn that impulse into codified law.
So I reconstruct at the end of the book this convergence in a way or clash, rather,
between the tradition of regular award that comes from early modernity and this humanitarian movement
that it's more proper of the 19th century and that its intention with many of the basic tenets of regret.
Now, what I want to do with the rest of the time that I have is to just focus on three
moments of these of these longer history that that I that I'm telling the book.
The first is just to tell you a bit more about this distinction engrosses between solemn and just war,
then tell you a little bit about how Woolton but they all thought about their use in Bailleau,
in regular wars, and in particular why they felt that regular wars would be limited on strain.
And finally, I want to tell you a little bit about the clash or the tensions,
tensions that were produced when humanitarians tried to influence this tradition of regular work that was coming from the INLIKE.
I also want to show give you a sense of how these intellectual history ends in the positive instruments of the late Mantid centres.
Sort of to give you a sense of how these histories of how these ideas in history became or were turning to these instruments.
So let me begin then with brochures. I don't think Russia needs an introduction here and I won't be giving.
But but I just want to emphasise two. Two.
I don't know. Episode of historical episodes that were hugely important for Brochure's when he was writing the Rebellion Parkis.
His book was published in 16 25.
And the failure of each party to maintain sort of the beginning of the modern system of sovereign states and also the Dutch East India Company,
and this is the projection of Dutch economic and military power globally away from Europe to the open seas.
And beyond that, the idea of Sollom War and the distinction between just war and sullen war is very much,
I would say, a reflection of these two events or these two story called facts.
So let me give you a sense of the distinction between just war and Sulan war first and then just tell you
why Russia's thought it was important to introduce the concept of something for the concept of just war.
It's it may be familiar to those of you who have studied a little bit of the ethics, contemporary ethics of war.
This is what what Russia's stook, largely from the Spanish Scholastic's from the ideological vision of extending from plainness.
And there are some basic principles here.
So a war is just only if it's wage in response to a violation of right or injuries or there has to be a just cause of war and that just goes off.
War is a violation of right. When there is a violation of right.
That injure side becomes a judge. And he is the judge of the enduring sight of the delinquent side.
So there isn't just war necessarily an inequality between the belligerent parties.
One is the judge on that. The war is a form of law enforcement and the other is delinquent and has to be
disciplined or are putting the right not only force that is necessary to do that,
to repair the injury that was made is lawful. So there is a limiting principle here of necessity which is drawn from principles of corrective justice.
So a just war is governed by principles of corrective justice and in particular those who are guilty of rights violations,
not just war, may or even should be punished. And Russia's has long chopped or some punishment, usually bakkies.
So punishment is a very important element in a just war, not, by contrast, a solemn war.
If a just war must have just cost. Russia says, a in war.
The beginning of a solemn war is is made in virtue of a formal declaration of war by a sovereign against another sovereign.
And Russia says at some point that it's desirable that these formal declarations
contain the reasons why the war is waged so that they are reason declaration.
But that's not necessary.
So basically, a formal declaration is a speech act in virtue of which a sovereign declares war against another and creates a state of war.
So Russia said of war declaration, they just say, I hereby declare war against ex.
It's a power of the sovereign to do so.
Now, warring sovereigns are equal before what Russia is called the external nations, and then I won't get into the details.
So what if external Loy's? But there is a formal bidgee beleaguer and equality before the law of nations.
So no inequality's judge on delinquent, but equality of enemy.
This is perhaps the most polemical and really heart wrenching element of Russia's doctrine of Sullom war.
There are virtually no restrictions in the law of nations on the use of force of Russia says in solemn words.
There is an unlimited right to kill. Killing discriminators indiscriminately all subjects of the enemy state.
There is a right to enslavers, the right to conquer, and all sorts of really extreme, outrageous permissions.
The use of. He made promises.
There isn't much room for punishment. And also because the states are equal.
There is no authority to punish. And I would just like to mention that.
Well, that one of the few restrictions that that the norm so far for Limbaugh for half is the provision of poison on undercover assassins.
And Brush has said that's because we need to protect the person of the king of the monarch.
The head of state has to be protected. And so this tactic, these tactics of of of undercover posing, these attacks have to be prohibited.
Then not so now. Russia said just for the principles of just war apply in the state of nature.
So, for example, the Dutch East India Company, when it goes to the open seas,
are to set up colonies, has to govern their use of force by the principles of a just war.
So Limbaugh regulates war and the aftermath of war amongst sovereigns and only a month.
So that's sort of the basic layer.
Now, let me give you a sense of why Brochure's thought that it was important to introduce the concept of Solum War vet.
So for those of you who have read some some brochures, you will know that it's it's not easy to do record stroke his argument.
He's not a very systematic or well-organised writer.
It's it's it's tried hard to follow. But if you if you invest enough time and effort,
you will realise that the arguments in favour of a solemn war of different aspects of the Limbaugh have the same form.
And it's the form that they are. They're all lesser evil arguments.
And I would I would summarise this argument in the following way, corrected Justice Galvan's just words.
And it's good that it does. So it's in principle if it's the only way to go well.
But the problem is that in practise, corrective justice will give occasion for many, many.
So it's the source of many, many possible conflicts.
We have to expect disagreements on disputes over justice in general and amongst sovereigns in particular.
So in the interests of limiting the number of conflicts and also the lethality and their spread,
we have to accept the non-stop Sollom War and give up on their aspirations to govern a war by corrective justice on these bases.
Russia's defended things such as the principle of policy that these have the right of conquest.
And this is the principle that says at the end of war, we have to recognise as rightful that state of affairs, the outcome of the war.
So basically in war might has to be allowed to make.
Right. The power of the parties, the outcome of the clash of forces has to be recognised as rightful.
At the end of war, he also defended the right to enslave.
And you may be familiar with these if you've read the first chapters of George Crusoe's on the social contract,
because those chapters are precisely an attack against Grosz's defence of the Raichlen Slainte War, wrote.
Rousseau was, of course, indignant that Russia dared to propose to defend this right.
But Russia's argument was that if we don't recognise the right of belligerence to enslave their enemies, they will just kill them.
And we should prefer life over death. And if that means recognising the right to enslavement, then we should recognise that.
He also defended the validity of these treaties, which are signed under threat.
If you follow principles of Roman law, contracts should not be recognised.
When one of the parties was forced to sign duress, rest should invalidate a contract.
Not so in the case of peace treaties. Under argument here is if you allow that to happen,
then you would essentially dissolve the institution of peace treaties and you would not have a very important instrument to end a war.
And it's very important to be to have the ability to end wars because, again, we need to contain the lethality.
We need to contain their spread. And there's a similar argument.
The beginning of the idea of neutrality is here in the embodied in the doctrine of Sollom War.
And basically here that the difficulty, the challenge for Russia's was if you defend the possibility that states declare their neutrality,
then you are allowing them to abstain from taking sides, which means that they are not obligated to take the side of justice.
So that's sort of in a nutshell, the argument for why we need the concept of Sollom War.
Let me now just to conclude this this this little section on Russia's give you
a sense of why only sovereign states should be allowed to fight Sulan war.
In principle, all these arguments, the lesser evil arguments, etc, may apply to private parties as well.
Argument doesn't seem to depend on the status of the parties, but Brochure's says no.
States are different and we should limit these or treat us privileged privileges.
These these very permissive norms because states are different.
And in particular, he makes an argument that states are not us,
are different from bunch of pirates and Bragan, which are, I guess, sort of standard contrast here.
And they're different because they administer justice and they are oriented by justice, he argues, even if they sometimes act in unjustly.
Particularly when they wage an unjust war.
So we need to give states the benefit of the doubt, because by nature, by constitution, they are oriented towards justice.
Related to this, he says they are trustworthy because they form a special community of obligation in virtue of which they can be lawful enemies.
Here he is drawing directly from our buddy Genteelly, in contrast to pirates or criminals.
So there is a certain expectation that they will that they will observe a faith,
that we will keep a pact and they will restrain themselves, that they won't avail themselves to the phone towers of Sultan.
And finally, an argument that that way anticipate some of the arguments that one can find in hopes
it is desirable that only sovereigns decide on administered the power of coercion,
the power of this war. In a way, one can read brochure's this theory of Sullom war ask spelling out the implications
of the principle of sovereignty to relations with all their sovereigns,
to sort of the external Xterra like mention of the principle of the monopoly of the power of coercion by the sovereign.
If we could second guess sovereign decisions on the use of force,
if we could criticise them on the basis of external standards of corrective justice, then the whole idea of order of social order.
On the basis of a sovereign would be put it put into question.
So it's very risky to do that. So we have to give that the sovereign decision on the on the on the necessity of war, almost an absolute character.
We have to recognise that. So while in principle, in terms of justice, just war and corrective justice are superior to solin war,
in many ways, regrettably, I regret is palpable.
When Brochure's was spelling out the doctrine of fear of solin war.
In practise, the rules of Sollom War hostages have to be recognised.
So let me now jump one century ahead to the Enlightenment on the theory of just war here.
My two main theories, as I said, Paul, you are Wolf, on un-American about there.
Others are somewhat complicated relationship between the two. But they all said that his interest was just to popularise, Wolf, his writings.
But in fact, he made some some original contributions.
He also opposed, Wolf, in some respects. There's been some debate in the in the literature on how much or to what extent.
But there was really just following on on popularising, Wolf, but so that they can certainly be being treated as a part,
taking the same project of articulating principles and ideals of regular war.
And I'm here I, I included two images.
These are from depictions of the Seven Years War at the mid 80s, mid 18th century, the First World War in history, according to many.
And if you look at the upper right hand side, you will see this much of a very orderly, well organised Piech battle.
There are the uniforms on both sides. They are contained. They are fighting each other within a very narrow area.
They are fighting directly. But if you look carefully behind those those regular soldiers, you'll see some bushes.
And behind the bushes, you see some irregular forces.
There are some American Indians there shooting from behind the bushes, hiding and shooting at the regular forces.
So that just encapsulates a very important tension off of this idea for a ground war, which is the temptation, the actual reality of state.
Resorting to irregulars to gain tactical advantage on the image of the lower right hand is a siege of a port in Nova Scotia.
And you see siege warfare and the blockade of force was a very important tactic of war.
And you see the orderliness Sunday under the regularity. Again, that's very much part of one of the aspirations of this idea of regular war.
So, again, just let me give you a sense of the continuities and contrast between ferocious and solemn war on life and regular war.
So if in Sollom Wars are fought for brochure's, a formal declaration didn't have to contain any reasons.
But they'll emphasise that sovereigns have to justify publicly their wars in their form of public war manifesto.
So they had to explain to all fellow sovereigns and to public opinion already why they're waging war, why they keep that stuff to be justified.
This is something that both sides in a war could do that often both sides, you know, war did before.
This is very much an exercise in legitimation a day.
They didn't exclude the fact that both sides could issue valid reasons or plausible reasons for waging war.
But the important fact here is that reasons, public reasons are a requirement, a legal requirement.
Recent declarations are the beginning of a very rough war. There is legal equality and big caveat, this idea that.
Only they're equal only before the external law of nations, which ferocious made.
Pretty much gone. There is legal equality of sovereign.
There is sovereign equality on as far as an implication of that.
There is beleaguer and equality. And remember Woolton, but those were the ones who coined that famous phrase that that I was a dwarf is as much a man
as a giant of something that I think as a smaller state is as much a state as a giant state.
So that's very much at the centre of this idea of regret. There are no restrictions in solemn wars.
The ideals of limited war are at the centre of regular war.
And I'll tell you about that show. And finally, Solin war excludes punishment in Tullamore.
Punishment exclude. It's already in regular wars. There is an account of punishment and reprisals for violations of the loss of regular war.
So there is something like punishment for war crimes, if you will. Of course, I didn't use that language.
But there's already something of that sort. So let me give you a sense of the use in their loan programme war and why.
Why these enlightenment thinkers thought that regular work could be limited.
And just to give you a sense of what they are, how they understood limitation is that war should happen ideally.
And this is, again, an idea. War should take place only amongst regular forces or amongst designated combatants.
And these are designated by your sovereign noncombat and should be left out of hostilities as much as possible.
And of course, the similarities between this ideal and the principle of distinction in contemporary threshold.
Right. Or law is very, very clear. Of course, they are different,
but that there is already a sense here that we have to separate and we have to we should keep hostilities only within certain designated parts,
not behind these halva behind it, but rather the aspiration of making this ideal reality.
There is a notion of enlightened reason of state. And the notion is that all states,
sovereign states have and will understand to have a general interest in pursuing an economy of violence and in containing the destructiveness of war.
And in particular, for example, combatant or the combat cannot be attacked.
If a combatant no longer poses a threat, it cannot be a legitimate target.
And there is, together with this whole regulation of how the recent arson war in particular combatants were no longer able to fight.
It's again, all in the spirit of containing and limiting the use of violence to active combat.
There is also, along with these long passages and discussions of the regulation of contributions by persons of the you of sieges.
How should sieges be carried? How this should be ended.
The rights of the besieging power over this siege town.
Regulations on bomb beings, on neutrality, amongst many others.
One way to describe this is how you describe it. These these these principles of limited work is as Maxime's of good state practising
demonstration of the destructiveness of war or even a political economy of violence,
not the problem. And these enlightenment theories where sensitive to these.
But they were quite optimistic that limitation could be a pain.
But there is a problem here. The problem is that there are conflicting interests in the states or in general, long term.
The states may want to contain the destructiveness of war, but in particular for each war, unsure shorter short term,
given the immediate objective of winning the war, they would like to use any means available to defeat the enemy.
And the tension between these two coffees creates sharp conflicts, multiple sharp conflicts in the practise of regular war.
One I alluded to already is the use of regular. The temptation to commission or to just allow regular us to fight to to supplement regular forces.
What would happen or what happened actually in practise when irregulars entered the scene?
Was there a possibility of spirals of violence that the law could not contain?
So there's always the spectre of unlimited violence when irregular square use violations of neutrality.
Likewise, could lead to conflicts between powers that claim neutrality and powers that abused or violated the rules of neutrality
so that they capture legitimate cargo that that went to their enemies and so upset the neutral on the enemy.
There are all sorts of possible conflicts here and also the use of reprisals was
problematic because one side alleged that he was using force as a reprisal,
which is a lawful force used to discipline the enemy in reaction to a violation of the law.
The enemy would say, I didn't violate the. The larger reprisal is actually a violation of law against which I'm going to use reprisal.
These are called contra reprisals. The thing is, these spirals, these reprisal on contra reprisals could spiral out of control.
Andre, also, again, limitations. Nonetheless, these Leitman thinkers thought that ideals of limited war were important, that they should be pursued.
They were fragile, but they should be pursued. And their task, as they soil, as they conceive of themselves,
was to remind statesmen and political unmilitary in either of their long term interest in containing the violence of war.
Finally, let me jump one one one century ahead. The late bill to the 19th century.
And so I mention Francis Lever is a very important figure here in containing or bringing into the 19th century these ideals and principles.
Herberger were also very important is your handcar Casper Bloodily, who was a very prominent,
perhaps the most prominent Prussian jurist at the time, co-founder of this de la Renta national.
He translated, France is the levers of the levers go to German.
And that became a Prussian code that was used by the Prussian army.
So these two are very important. And also very important is Gustaf Moneer, who you can see here.
And these are in these little a much depicting the founders of the ICRC.
So Gustave Moneer was a lawyer amongst those those founders,
also a co-founder of the Institute of International and a very interesting thinker of of
of the challenges of introducing humanitarian constraints on on on the practises of war.
And this is a picture of one of the first missions of the of the International Red Cross of rescuing wounded combatants from the battlefield.
And I think these will soon set ahead of itself. Again, late, late 19th century.
I'm here before telling you a little bit about the dilemmas that these humanitarians face.
I want to show you how these this intellectual history, as it were,
landed in incertain is positive instruments and codified instruments of the laws of war.
Well, leever, it's livres a really interesting figure because he's a philosopher.
He's a thinker. But he's also a qualifier, an unbeliever called.
These are very unique and again, interesting texts because it summarises a great deal of what appears of great land in a book like Battelle's.
And it's done, Asare. It's supposed to be used as a pocket book.
It has to be carried into battlefields. It has to be.
It's a very practical instrument. And it was a hugely influential instrument.
But in addition to Lieber code, there is that Paris Declaration of 1866,
which regulates neutrality and follow a great deal of the principles and the
ideas of neutrality that came all the way back from brochure's actually dissent.
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which contains very succeed and powerful formulation of the limited war ideal,
the idea that war should be undertaken only between state forces and non-combatants should be left out.
It also prohibits the use of of certain weapons of expanding bullets.
And the idea here is that superfluous injuries should be prohibited in war and superfluous
here can be understood and I think should be understood as violating the economy of violence.
One should keep in mind when fighting war. If if violence is unnecessary, if it doesn't contribute, it's not necessary for the pursuit of a war aim.
It should be prohibited. Again, I thought an economy should be kept that the only force necessary, superfluous force should not be used.
The Brussels declaration is also perhaps I would say that the main interests of this of
this instrument is that is the first one that that includes both principles and ideas,
norms really that come from this regular work tradition and humanitarian principles, principles of rescue, of relief, of suffering.
It was never ratified, but it's a very important instrument in particular because it was important to to forge for the draughters of the oxer manual.
And because the Brussels declaration on the Ulster manual, on all the other instruments that we see in the upper hand of the screen,
were almost directly taken and included in The Hague Convention,
which are the first huge qualifications of the laws of war,
according to many of the beginning of the modern loss of work for these these you can
trace you can you can almost see them being integrated into The Hague Conventions.
And on the other side, on the humanitarian side of action in the 19th century, we have the Geneva Convention of 1864.
And this is really a different thing. This is a very different creature.
Amongst other things, because it uses the concept of neutrality in a very novel way.
So neutrality in the regular war tradition, it was only a status that states could claim.
And it was very much about keeping yourself agnostic on outside of a foreign conflict.
What the draughters of this Geneva Convention on one year ICRC were were very important
and influential here is to extend the status of neutrality to humanitarian organisations.
And in doing that, they really completely changed the sense of neutrality.
And if they did that, in order to give a certain important standing to use quirked.
Where the concept of neutrality to allow for rescue missions in battlefields.
It was it didn't work. Well, the Geneva Convention was later revised. It was very problematic in the Franco Prussian war.
But I would just put it here because he was it was part of this all other sort of very
potent force that was coming into the codification efforts of the late 19th century.
Now, let me give you a sense of two dilemmas that these people in the late 19th century were facing.
The first was medical that day dilemma around codification was very much a life or death for the members of the discipline that ran through.
That's your novel. And the dilemma here is it's about whether they should codify existing laws and customs of war as they were practised,
as they existed, or whether they should rather codify norms that advance the progress of humanity.
And here remember, I imagine all of you have read, Mark, because Kenya are gentle, civilising, that the gentle serializer, they are the idea.
Here are the troubling here for it, for these lawyers is Jurisich of the sea to the range of nationalities that they took themselves to be,
to have the mission, to be gentle, civilised or so humanity. They have advance progress.
They have to be progressive forces if they just register the status quo of the bid, just compile the actual practises of state.
They would be failing in that mission. But then, on the other hand, this is the problem.
They became too progressive. If they were to have on guard, as it were, then the states would be indifferent or even hostile to their enterprise.
So they had to strike these this really tricky balance.
And again, it's sort of something like apology and utopia here between being two adventurers and being too conservative.
And you could read their read reader, their polemic in there. Have you the point of rational about, well, how are we going to do these?
Are we gonna be unhappy sell-outs? Or are we are we going to be a real legalizers on a second related dilemma?
Is is what I call the humanity in the book, The Humanitarians Dilemma.
And here's the quote that the problem is that if they advance their project of humanising war in the way they wanted to,
they may end up legitimising war and giving sanction to reason of state.
That, on the other hand, if they are too critical of reason of state, as they may feel inclined to be,
and if they condemn the savagery of war as they they sure would, then they will have neither axes nor influence over the conduct of hostilities.
And so they won't be able to to do the work of relieving suffering.
So there's a similar sort of tricky balance that that that that that they had to attain.
And just let me conclude give you a sense of Gustaaf one year solution or how
he tried to quell his moral conscience when when faced with this dilemma,
there's a really surprising argument in Bunyah that that that says that humanitarianism is actually a form of undercover pacifism or crypto pacifism.
And the idea that Moneer had the faith that money had was that as humanitarian sentiments progressively made their way into battlefields,
as they entered the hearts of soldiers, they would slowly erode the practise of war from the inside, as it were.
Form on Monday was inconceivable that once humanitarian sentiments were communicated or ignited in soldiers hearts, they would pursue war.
Nonetheless, they would continue to pursue war.
Of course, that the other hand here is whether rather this humanitarian something would not rather facilitate,
legitimise and prolong war by making it appear more humane.
And this is something that someone has has really nice.
I it's a very prominent element in his forthcoming book on humaine war.
Well, one year I was aware that this that this risk existed, but he thought that he was too unlikely.
He had too much faith on the power of money, time and sentiment to really contemplate these this other possibility.
Well, with what we have is actually something closer, I would say,
to the second we have the two opposed principles that the humanity principle did not end up eroding the military necessity principle,
but rather they coexist in this uneasy, really structural, deep tension in the modern loss of war.
And there is a risk here that I think my book tries to to to highlight and to to illuminate,
which is that the high visibility of the humanity side here may or may end up hiding.
They're still very active and very preponderant role of recent off-stage in the conduct of war.
I think reasonable of is very much alive, if under different name and on these different guises in the loss of war today.
So humanity may not allow us to see that as much as we may want to see it.
Now, let me conclude with two thoughts about sort of the contemporary of some contemporary to contemporary implications of this work that I do,
this historical work that I've done.
The first has to do with how these all inherited conceptualisations that we have are now being used in radically different contexts of violence.
And of course, strong warfare is one of those.
But I would say more broadly, the contemporary prevalence of non international armed conflicts is something to worry,
because these are governed by rules that were crafted for and by states, and that presupposed an idea of sovereignty.
That is not really existence in that kind of conflict.
Amongst other things, there is a higher symmetry amongst the parties. There is little chance of reciprocity or opportunity for reciprocal reciprocity.
So the question here is wens limitations. How can we limit these wars or how can we expect these wars to be limited?
And the second is,
I would say there are some structural limitations to the idea of convergence of the regimes of humanitarian law and human rights law.
And by structural here, I mean, there are certain. Conceptual, deeply ingrained,
constitutive conceptual limitations on how much these two sorry to regimes can
converge or can can become one single humanity law regime to use the Delta term.
The humanist humanisation of humanitarian law. This is Judge Taylor moron's expression through the concurrent application of human rights law
during hostilities has of restriction or limitation in what I would call a hard core pakora,
the loss of war that is reflected or expressing terms such as hostilities.
The normative wave of military advantage, which is a way of expressing the principle of reason of state disability necessity amongst others.
So these are, I would say, again, structural limitations to convergence that we need to keep in mind,
and that I think that historical study of the making of the loss of war,
intellectual makumbe the loss of work give us a very clear sense of how deeply ingrained these concepts are.
And with this I conclude. Thanks very much. Sorry, I just realised that I spent too much time, but thank you for your for your attention.