Heike Schroeder  ...did go to Copenhagen, so I apologise for that. But I hope that we will have an interesting panel debate here today. It is on Copenhagen, COP15, what happened and what next. Now, this event is co-organised by the Environmental Change Institute, the Oxford Centre for Tropical Forests and the Tyndall Centre on Climate Change Research.

And I have here a very distinguished panel. I’ll start introducing those from the right. As you see on Skype, we have Diana Liverman with us. She’s the former ECI director, currently professor of Environment - I was going to get this right - Geography and Development at the University of Arizona and also a visiting professor with the geography department.

Because of the Skype situation and because this is something we haven’t tried before we need to use microphones to make sure that Diana can hear us. And I hope that we’ll be able to hear Diana as well, we’ll find out in a minute.

Okay, so next on my right, we have Yadvinder Malhi who’s professor of Ecosystem Science here at the School of Geography and the Environment and he’s also the director of the Oxford Centre for Tropical Forests.

Next on my right we have Mark Lynas who is a writer and is probably well known to you all for his book Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet, which also won the prestigious Royal Society Prize for Science Books. And he is currently a visiting research associate with the School of Geography.

And then on my left I have James Painter who is a BBC journalist and currently based at the Reuters Institute for the study of journalism here in Oxford.

Now, all our panellists were at COP15 in a number of capacities. So we have both people from the University of Oxford but also from the delegation of the Gabon and the delegation of the Maldives here with us, as well as James being with the BBC but also in a number of capacities at the [ [ ?? 0:02:27] ].

So just to start off I’ll give you just a quick overview of what happened and where we are now, and then I’ll do a first round of commentaries from the panel.

So COP15 took place in December 7th to 18th. It’s usually a two-week period the COPs meet for. The COP itself, standing for the Conference of the Parties, is the main decision-making body of
Copenhagen COP 15: What happened and What next?

the UNFCCC, which stands for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was adopted in 1992.

In 1997 the Kyoto protocol was ratified which was a protocol that would give a little bit more teeth to the Framework Convention. And what was decided was that in regular periods a new agreement would be negotiated to reach what’s called the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention, which is to try to keep the climate system at a stable level.

Two years ago, at the Bali COP, it was decided that there would be a two-year process to negotiate a new protocol. Now, this didn’t quite happen for a number of reasons and I hope that we will understand these reasons a little better at the end of this discussion, that a new protocol would be ratified now, this didn’t happen.

What we got instead is the Copenhagen Accord which is a document that was never actually formally adopted by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties. It’s a document that in some way may have made progress on a number of issues but it’s an informal document, so for now the process will continue.

So I want to now ask Diana what she thinks about COP15, whether she thinks that it was a success or failure and why.

Diana Liverman Okay, hello everybody. Can you hear me?

All Yes.

Diana Liverman Okay. Well, this is an experiment, this is no carbon participation. I should say that I actually haven’t fully left Oxford. I still have a part-time affiliation with Oxford University and I will be there in person at some points, but I’m hoping that I can also participate in activities as an avatar, as I am at the moment.

So in terms of Heike question about whether Copenhagen was a success or a failure, I actually did a couple of media interviews during the Copenhagen meeting where I was relentlessly optimistic. But by the end of the last Saturday I think my optimism had been punctured and I can say now that, overall, Copenhagen was a failure, but that’s not to say there’s not some signs of life there. Although there were no binding decisions I think there were some important things that happened there.

First of all, the amount of money that was put on the table - which was 10 billion a year for the next three years and then a, sort of, rather vague promise of 100 billion a year by 2020 for the response to climate change - I mean, that is serious money and for a number of smaller countries that money really could make a difference. And we can come back to whether it’s really additional money and whether people are going to come up with it, perhaps, in the discussion.

The problem with the money being on the table was they didn’t get to the point where they could really sort how it would be allocated, you know, how much is for mitigation, how much for adaptation; who would actually get it. There’s a lot of, sort of, governance issues that haven’t been sorted out.

The other reason why I think Copenhagen failed was the diversion into the Copenhagen Accord which was, in a way, completely outside the UNFCCC process. That could’ve been done at the G20 meeting, it really wasn’t part of the UNFCCC process and that was the part of the reason things fell apart towards the end, was that it stopped being a UN process.

The other diversion that, I think, did create a problem in the first week was the push by some NGOs and the number countries to renegotiate the temperature target to 1.5 degrees. I mean, I think there are good reasons for doing that, but bringing that up at that COP, sort of, diverted a lot of energy and created some anger really early on that I think created some problems.
Now, one interesting thing is right now, over the next week, Brazil and China and India - the basic countries - are going to meet, talk about their response to Copenhagen and that’s where I see a little bit of optimism. I think that the discussion that’s happened since about the role of China that Mark contributed to may mean that we do get something out of this meeting of the - if you think of the large developing countries. So I think we may get some interesting commitments there.

I would the other thing that was good that happened at Copenhagen was the number of countries that did come, willing to make binding commitments. Now, there were a lot that didn’t, which is why we don’t have a binding agreement, but if you look at the commitments that were made by countries like Brazil and Mexico and South Africa and Indonesia, this is a completely new era where these countries are putting commitments on the table. Partly in the expectation of financing, but that made for a very different negotiation.

And I think the other thing that was interesting about Copenhagen, and I’m not sure if it was a good thing or a bad thing, was the very large presence of civil society. Some people feel like that completely got in the way but it was an incredible mobilisation.

And then the final thing I saw as successful in Copenhagen was that agriculture, which is something that I’m very concerned about, came to the table for the first time. They saw how successful the forest lobby had been, which is an alliance of private sector NGOs, scientists and governments, in getting themselves to be part of the climate deal, and one of the things that happened in Copenhagen was the really powerful agricultural interests and countries came together for the first time, I think, to think very seriously about the role of agriculture and food systems, both in adaptation and mitigation.

So a failure but some signs of hope. And, personally, my focus now, because of where I’m located and because of where I do my research, is that the next negotiations are going to be in Mexico City. And the Mexican Government is trying very hard to figure out how to make it more of a success and how to get some binding commitments there.

The final comments I’d make was that I was, together with Heike, leading the Oxford delegation in Copenhagen and we actually held a dinner for alumni of the masters programmes at Oxford. And it was really amazing how many of our alumni were there working for their governments, working for NGOs, so that, sort of, was a point of mine as well. I was really proud to see the number of our former students and our current students who were so seriously involved in what was happening.

So that’s my initial statement.

Heike Schroeder Thank you, Diana.

Okay, I’ll pass on the microphone to Yadvinder for his comments.

Yadvinder Malhi Thank you, Heike. I think, like Diana, I started off spending much of my time in Copenhagen being an optimist. And part of that optimism came from the sheer enthusiasm, the vitality of so many people - from NGOs through to heads of state - there talking the same language, with the same agenda. And so there was, even in the negative points in those two weeks there was a lot of positive energy.

But at the end, I have to say that I was deeply disappointed with the outcome and was almost traumatised for several days afterwards. I think several of us were. And partially for me, it was just, sort of, seeing global geopolitics exposed at its rawest level amidst all the aspirations that the world had.

I’m a relative newcomer to following the COP processes; I went to Bali and to this one. So perhaps it’s useful for many of you here to just briefly describe how it works. When all your news is filtered through BBC news reports, it’s almost hard to see what’s going on there.

(Laughter)
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Male 1 It’s extremely easy to see (laughter).

Yadvinder Malhi Lucid, yes. And so what happens is that I went in there as Oxford University but also as an advisor to the delegation of Gabon which also meant that I could stay in till the end and so I could actually follow the negotiations through to the end. And so what happens is, after the initial plenaries, groups are delegated to break off into groups of around - meetings of around 30-40 people to tackle the specific negotiating tasks.

So I was following the forests, the reduced omissions from deforestation negotiations, but other ones go on, on adaptation, on international financial architecture, aspects of the curator protocol as well.

And the ideal scenario, by about the Thursday of the second week, those negotiators come back with nice text with only a few little - most things agreed and a few key things that are then pushed up towards ministers or heads of states for the big deals that need to be cut about overall financial architecture; overall commitments. But then the details have been worked out - the nitty-gritty has been worked out underneath.

That first process was moving at a very slow rate and you could now debate to what extent that is almost built into a system that requires agreement by 192 countries. And there were several stage of walkout, of mistrust between the G77 and the rich world in particular, which also lost several days. By Thursday, most of those negotiations were nowhere near at an adequate enough advanced stage to be ready to be pushed up to ministers.

The forest one that I was involved in actually did seem to be, almost, the golden child there in terms of actually had moved as far as it could move before needing higher level agreements to come in on overall ambition and overall financing.

And in the second stages ministers and heads of state then come in and cut the big deals. And that process also failed and Mark will probably have insights into some of those things that happened on the final Friday and why that process also failed - made progress in some things, particularly the finance, as Diana mentioned, but failed to cut a big deal that was adequate enough and strong enough to even be a non-binding strong Copenhagen agreement.

So having said that, there’s an overall pessimism, there was clear progress within that and one thing is the degree of commitment from countries and from states within countries - states within Brazil, some of the African countries as well - so the sheer level of energy around it seemed to have moved up to a higher level.

It’s hard to see that you can reverse that or dispel that. I think the degree of awareness of the issue and engagement of the issue was far higher than it was a year ago. And then there’s the intangibles around that; the various new deals being cut, the new bilateral agreements between countries, other things that are happening around in that venue as well.

The other specific area of progress was the forest deal. The text is almost there with that and that’s going to be some sort of deal around reduced emissions from REDD+. So it’s going to be reduced emissions from slowing down deforestation rates in high deforestation countries, also some finance going to low deforestation countries so that the deforestation won’t leak into those low deforestation countries. The basic architecture of that seems to be in place. The safeguards are also written into the draft text, in terms of protecting indigenous people’s rights and local community rights, protecting biodiversity aspects of that, so particular sectors like that have made progress.

What they’re waiting for is the overall architecture in terms of finance and targets into which those sectors can fit. And one thing that we can perhaps discuss later is whether all of that needs to happen within this UN architecture or whether moving to approaches that are based on sectors that can move forward may be another way to go forward.
So there were areas of progress and there was incremental progress. However, the climate negotiations, to me, are not like the world trade negotiations or various other UN negotiations, where you can afford to have incremental progress and kick things to next year and the year after.

And so at the end of it I stand pessimistic and I think that holding warming below two degrees is increasingly becoming a fiction. Not only because of the delays in the negotiation process but also the inevitable inertia in implementing anything that is agreed. So there was a lot of talk about pushing towards one-and-a-half degrees which I think even two degrees is becoming an increasingly unlikely target to be achieved in reality.

So the final question that perhaps we’ll discuss later is to Mike. The question to him is how much moves forward within the UN process and how much can move forward, with the assistance and in cooperation with the UN process, how much change can be materialised in parallel to the UN process?

Mark Lynas  Thanks.

The thing you have to realise about these COP negotiations is just how intense it is and you’ll be able to speak to this - everyone who was there will be able to speak to this. It’s emotionally very intense; it’s physically very testing. You really have to have incredible powers of endurance to deal with the lack of sleep that you get. I think, on average, for an eleven-day period I probably slept three to four hours a night and for the last two nights I didn’t sleep at all; Ed Miliband didn’t sleep for three nights; his head of delegation didn’t sleep for four.

And so it really is a very difficult context within which to actually do any kind of serious decision-making or deal-making. So, you know, how much you can endure that kind of pressure is absolutely at the centre of this.

The other thing I noticed was how nothing is what it seemed; it’s a bit like being in a hall of mirrors. When somebody stands up and speaks they don’t mean what they say. They may well be speaking on behalf of somebody else with a hidden agenda that you didn’t previously know about. And it takes a very long time to figure out what these hidden agendas may be and, of course, you can never be absolutely certain because the person who’s telling you also has a hidden agenda.

And so you end up coming to your own conclusions about these kinds of things but they’re open to challenge because nothing is - you know, it’s very different for the world of science where you can have references and you can go and check things up. It’s the exact opposite of this: everything is smoke and mirrors; everything is done by word of mouth which really matters.

And it took me a week of sitting in these, sort of, open meetings with the KP track and the LCA track and all these things - I won’t explain what they all are - but that is the way the open negotiations take place between the delegations of the different countries and you have to be a lawyer to understand anything that’s going on there. There’s no point in just being an ordinary person. And so I was there, sitting behind the Maldives flag, going "What on earth’s going on?" but luckily we had a couple of lawyers who we could call on as well.

But it took me until that, sort of, final Thursday to realise that that was a complete charade and nothing that was agree in those open meetings would actually have any impact at all on the final deal that was done. And finding out what that deal was likely to look like became my next, sort of, challenge really and trying to make sure that the Maldives, who I was working with as an advisor to the President, had a role within that.

Now, just to rewind the clock a little bit, I’ve been involved with the Maldives Government since March 2009 where we thought it would be a good idea for the whole country to go carbon neutral. And so this was announced by the President at the premier of The Age of Stupid film, if any of
you saw that, and then I sort of felt, well, I’m a bit committed to this now because I’ve, sort of, helped them develop this.

So we had to develop a plan for carbon neutrality and then I got - then I had to go on the delegation and one thing led to another. And so I found myself there in most of the major meetings, sitting behind the President and included in the final Friday night, where I was with the President in the heads of state meeting, which actually thrashed out the final deal. Now, the text that came into that deal, I think, had been pre-agreed by the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, so the basic countries.

So it’s important to understand from the outset that the Copenhagen Accord is primarily a product of the major developing countries. This is not a deal, whatever the NGO’s like to say, this is a not a deal that was stitched together by the rich world. And the weakness of the Accord in fact primarily represents the interests of the big developing countries who brought it together.

And I think it was the gradual realisation that this was a very different situation from previous COPs that I’ve been to. I mean, I was in Bali, I was in - right the way back to 2000 - in the Hague and then it was very much a, sort of, battle between the industrialised countries, you know, the US in particular, Australia - the umbrella group - who were the powerful bad guys at that point. That divide doesn’t exist anymore. The Australians and the US and the Brits and most of the European countries seem to be the good guys. They want to take strong targets and they want to see a serious outcome and they want future binding deals and so on and so forth.

So you’ve got to look somewhere else for where these blockages are occurring and it took me a long time to figure out where that was. And the truth about it, actually, is very unpalatable to a lot of people who’ve been involved in the process for a long time because the game has changed. The blocking does not come from the big, rich countries anymore.

It’s absolutely fair to say that they haven’t delivered their side of the Kyoto bargain; they didn’t make the kinds of cuts that they were meant to make - particularly the Americans, of course. But starting from where we are now, solving climate change is going to require major action from the big, developing countries, so the very big, rapidly emerging powers. China and India in particular are in the lead of that.

And this was the huge, huge issue at Copenhagen: would the developing countries move on taking their own mitigation actions? Now, there is a, sort of, window for doing this which is called Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions NAMAs, which was one of the things which was agreed at Bali. But actually getting some of these big countries to agree to any of these things was really the main issue here.

And this was what I was so struck and appalled by when I was in this heads of state meeting, was that the main numbers which we had been calling for as part of the AOSIS of the small island states for our survival and 1.5 degrees was key to that, as was 350, but in order to achieve any of these kinds of temperature targets you have to have a peaking year and you have to have a global emissions cut by a certain time. And those key numbers were taken out by China and also taken out by India.

Now, this realisation - well, the fact - this process that I actually saw - I mean, Kevin Rudd, the Prime Minister of Australia was clearly furious, Angela Merkel was banging the table saying "Why can’t we do this?" And what that was about was the Chinese insistence that annexed one target, so the rich country targets should also be taken out of the agreement. And this is the absolute clincher for me when any NGOs or any campaigners say to me "You know, you have to keep the blame on rich countries." I said "Well, why, in that case, was it the Chinese Government which insisted that rich country targets were taken out of the deal? You have to explain that and if you can’t explain that then you need to develop a new analysis, I think.”

And so it’s that story, which I saw taking place and which was the background of all of this, of course, when it came to the plenary and it was then attacked by developing countries, like Bolivia.
Professor Diana Liverman, Professor Yadvinder Malhi, Mark Lynas and James Painter

and Cuba who’ve been too weak, the point was that it was the big developing countries who were
supposed to be in the alliance with the small developing countries who had made it weak in the
first place, and this is what I mean about the smoking mirrors.

Of course, if you’d just been observing this as a member of the public you wouldn’t have had any
idea that all of this stuff was going on in the background. And it’s absolutely critically important
to try and understand why the Copenhagen Accord was (a) so weak and (b) almost rejected by the
public plenary and just noted rather than formally adopted as a decision.

And, of course, what this means for the future is that the EU was completely sidelined, the EU
was more or less irrelevant, the Americans were having rings run around them and the whole
conference really stood or fell with what the big basic - these basic countries, primarily India and
China, wanted to see happen. So we’re in an entirely new game here, I think, where the rich
countries do not have the absolute say so on what happens in the future with the climate change
negotiations. It very much depends on what the big developing country emitters want to do as we
go forward.

And, of course, this is what’s most important for the climate change outcome for world, because
pretty much all of the future emissions rises are going to be in the developing world; industrialised
countries have probably peaked and will probably continue to decline from this point on. So
whether we get to 2 degrees or 1.5 or 5 degrees really depends on what the Chinese and the other
big developing country emitters agree to do. So that’s where the politics is moving and that’s
where the big game has shifted towards.

And I’m really strong calling on NGOs and campaigners and other observers to try and realise
this, to try and do some of the number and to stop just saying “Obama should’ve done more,” and
all the rest of it. this stuff that you’ve been hearing for 10 years - 20 years, actually try and realise
that the geopolitics has changed very radically here and that we need a different kind of strategy
to put pressure on different actors as a result.

Thank you very much.

Heike Schroeder Thank you.

James Painter Well, I was there in three capacities actually. The first, I was helping some black
American journalists trying to orient their coverage. Secondly, I was there as the Reuters Institute
because we’re going to do a study on media coverage at Copenhagen. And the third, I was there
as part of the BBC team, writing for the BBC Americas website, specifically on REDD and other
things of interest to Latin America, but also blogging about what the role of Latin America, and
particularly Brazil on this; where Bolivia is.

But I was party to a lot of the BBC discussions about what we thought was going on at the time,
so I was in a very, very privileged position. I thought, rather than analyse whether it was a success
of failure, I’ll very briefly make three or four points seen through the prism of the media, because
I do think the way the media reported it does actually throw light on what Mark was saying about
this shift in geopolitics and how these conferences now work.

Before I do this, I would just say one very positive thing in my aspect - in my view - is that there
were 5,000 journalists there - 5,000. Now, in my understanding, that was - apart from sporting
events and possibly the inauguration of Obama - the biggest turnout for any international event
anywhere in the world. Now, I remember walking Yadvinder down this huge hanger and looking
just at the number of journalists.

And I think the key - one of the really interesting things about that was the number of journalists
from precisely the big developing countries that now see this as a hugely important issue to cover.
So there was something like 300 journalists from China, Brazil and India alone and there were
many, many more journalists from developing countries, particularly if you compare it with Bali. I think the killer statistic was something like under 10% of the journalists were from developing countries. I would be very surprised if it wasn’t much bigger than that.

And on balance, even though many of those journalists might have been reporting about that it was a partial failure or total failure, I think the fact that there was so much more coverage on climate change is a very positive development.

But three quick points about the media: I think what people haven’t mentioned so far is Obama and I personally think that this might be - you could spin this as a success, if what Obama got out of this political accord will help him get some sort of cap and trade legislation through the US Senate.

I think what was really interesting, from the media point of view, was that Obama’s presence at Copenhagen was very strongly played to a US domestic TV audience. You know, there were great hopes that he would make this plenary speech, inspiring everybody to come to the new deal. What did he do within two or three minutes but criticise China? That played extremely well with a US domestic audience.

Remember that the first thing that most delegates, let along journalists, knew about this political accord was through, first of all, a Whitehouse leak and then a press conference given by Obama at peak time for a US domestic audience in which he was quite clearly able to present this political accord as something like a success. I think his exact words were "Unprecedented breakthrough."

Now, to the non-initiated, playing to a US TV audience - and remember that most people in the US still get their information from the TV, despite the advance of the Internet - this was a very skilful media management on the part of the Obama administration. And it was extraordinary when we were covering it that at the very time there were Whitehouse leaks talking about this political accord, BBC journalists were receiving texts from Miliband aides saying "No deal imminent."

In other words, the EU and even the UN process and most delegate, most journalists, did not know what was going on, on this political accord, which is extraordinary. And yet I think the Whitehouse press core were the first to be able to question Obama about it. And certainly some of my colleagues at the BBC felt that they gave him a very easy ride. So in a 24-hour news culture, to an uninitiated audience, Obama, I think, was able to present it as something of a success.

Now, you could argue that’s extremely helpful to Obama. Remember Kyoto lost in the senate 95-0. Why did it lose? Mainly because of objections that Brazil and India weren’t onboard. They are onboard now and I think Obama was able to present it as something like a success - point number one.

Point number two: if you’re there and covering it as a journalist, exactly what Mark was saying about China, China is incredibly difficult to cover. They won’t talk to you; they’re very loathed to give off the record or on the record briefings. Even the Chinese journalist who was sitting next to me was pulling his hair out because no-one was talking about what China was doing.

And I think that means that there’s very little scrutiny of what the role that China played in those negotiations and it was left to Mark’s analysis of what China did. I don’t think that was anywhere else in the Western media. And so you needed actually to be there because it was very difficult for journalists to get that sort of analysis of information.

The third aspect I would just stress is that one of the faults, I think, of the media very often is that they lump the group of 77 plus China together. It’s treated as a homogenous block when it was quite clear, by the end, that there were very, very important differences. Bolivia and Venezuela and Sudan got a huge amount of publicity, and if you read some of the media coverage I think you would jump to the conclusion that everyone from the group of 77 - the developing countries - was against the deal.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but in those last sessions an awful lot of developing countries, including who Mark was representing - the Maldives - including Ethiopia, including several other countries, were begging - or begging may be too strong a word - but were certainly arguing very strongly in favour of the political accord to be agreed. Correct me if I’m wrong.

Mark Lynas  Uh-huh.

James Painter  And yet, a lot of the press coverage - quoting Sudan, quoting Chavez who got a lot of publicity, quoting Evo Morales - you got the impression that this was total rejection of the deal.

The final point which I would make, which I think is of interest to this audience, is how much publicity did the science get, particularly at the end? Of course, from a journalistic point of view, no-one’s going to - you know, this sort of messy denouement that geopolitics was absolutely fascinating and, of course, journalists are going to pick up on that, but I would say three things that slightly surprised me: there were three quite important pieces of science that came out in the second week.

I think the first was the leaked document from the UNFCCC itself, saying that with the commitment from industrialised countries we were still committed to a three degree rise. That just seemed to be an extremely important piece of information, but because of the geopolitics and the interest of the last minute negotiations, that virtually got lost.

In the last week, the World Meteorological Organisation announced that the naughties was the hottest decade ever on record. I don’t think there was any coverage of that at all.

And finally, I think it was the same in the final week, the EPA and United States announced that they would start putting into practice controls over emissions because they’d proved that Co2 was unhealthy and the Senate are going to vote on that very soon. That got lost as well. In other words, I’m afraid that the science gets lost. How many people actually, of the Western media or main media organisations, turned to scientists for reactions at the end of those messy negotiations? I think very few. And I think it’s a great shame that that’s what happens, that the science gets lost.

So those are my three or four points.

Heike Schroeder  Thank you.

I’d like to open it up now to the audience and I’d like to take three or four questions and then turn back to the panel. So if I can get any show of hands, one, two, three, four and that’s it. And we’ll do another round.

Juan Arelondo  Hi, my name is Juan I was a member of the Mexican delegation to the process and I would like to ask a question to the panel.

What about the role of the Danish government throughout the whole process, during the whole view, because they didn’t help at all.

(Laughter)

Heike Schroeder  Thank you and thanks for being short too.

Male 2  Mark, I have a deep respect for your understanding of the process, but I’m quite bemused at your analysis. You’re trying to invite us to shift blame to China and you fail to recognise the fact that in the run up to Copenhagen, China and G77 have been consistently making the point that they are by the US and the developed countries to break the firewall by failing to recognise the categorisation, that was subsistent in the Kyoto protocol, was actually alienating the developing countries and was going to ultimately result in the lack of trust that would kill the Copenhagen process.

http://rss.oucs.ox.ac.uk/ouce/eci-audio/rss20.xml
You fail to engage with the fact that EU could only promise 20% and 30% if other people came onboard and that the totality of all the pledges by the developed countries, were far beyond what science was calling for the developed countries to do.

You haven’t engaged with the fact that even though the numbers that you’ve mentioned was put on table there was no corresponding finance until the last moment to actually show or demonstrate to developing countries that the developed countries were keen to make a deal.

The text that was submitted by America a few days before Copenhagen was saying “We are ready to provide finance as adequate in appendix 1.” You go over to appendix 1: this was a completely blank document.

Now, you fail also to recognise that during the run up to Copenhagen, the developed countries started talking less about technology transfer, which they said they would do, which is documented in the Kyoto protocol, and started talking about the facilitation of technology transfer. And I can go on and on and on flagrant breaches of trust by developed countries actually alienated China and the developing countries. And here you are trying to invite us to shift the blame to China. I’m not in Chinese delegation, but I think your analysis is very, very inadequate.

And that takes me to the point that Diana and Yadvinder was making. I think, again, I am bemused that you people went there with such a level of optimism. How could you be optimists when America clearly had a 10% target by 2020 - by year 2025? We all understand that Kyoto didn’t fly because America wasn’t onboard and that Obama was more or less a prisoner, a hostage, to his parliament. And that unless the US makes a commensurate pledge that there was no deal that was ever coming out of Copenhagen.

And as we move onto Mexico: no amount of goodwill from the basic countries - China included - can bring a deal if America is not onboard. And America cannot come onboard as the negatives that go ahead of that. And the legislation is very, very weak. I think we should focus on the core issue rather than trying to shift blame to China.

Thank you.

Heike Schroeder  Introduce yourself, please.

Male 3 My name is candidate in national relations and I also had the privilege of serving on the India delegation at Copenhagen, though the views that I express are entirely personal and my own.

(Laughter)

Male 3 Like the gentleman from Mexico, again, I would reiterate the fact that no mention has been made of the Danish presidency and also agree quite completely by the remarks that were made beforehand by the last questioner.

I had two questions for Mark - one a substantive question and the second a more procedural question. On the substantive question, again, I quite fail to see the merit of the argument if you seek to push the blame for the failure at Copenhagen on China alone, because I think a lot of people who attended the conference would give alternate explanations for the failure of the conference and I think it’s important for an audience like this to understand that there are alternate explanations out there.

One possible explanation could be that during the course of the conference itself, it became very clear by the beginning of the second week that the parties, especially from annexe 1, particularly the groups, where not negotiating in good favour at all. I mean, essentially no promise was being made either on the KP tracks or on the LCA track because people were not willing to make any progress.
The whole motivation was "Let’s keep the ball still on these two tracks; let’s wait till the top guys arrive and let’s try and stitch up a deal which can be presented at that level automatically, independent of the UN process." So I think some of the motivations behind was led to that final night, and who were the actual movers behind it, certainly needs to be in greater depth through a broader lens. I’m not saying that your analysis is entirely incorrect or there is no merit to it at all, my only point is that there are other lenses through which the Copenhagen process needs to be looked at.

On the process side of it I just had a more, sort of, question to ask of you from a journalistic point of view. I mean, I read your article in the Guardian, it was a very interesting piece and I was just wondering that you were there as part of the Maldivian delegation, it was a very interesting piece and I was just wondering that you were there as part of the Maldivian delegation, clearly that gave you privileged access to that. Just before writing the article itself, did you have to go through a process of clearance, a process of vetting, before you could do that, because, I mean, you have written stuff in the article that other people may disagree with but might not have the luxury to express their disagreement in the way that you have.

Thank you.

Male 4 Can I?

Heike Schroeder Yes, last one, briefly.

Zuber Amadam Hi, my name is [Zuber Amadam 0:41:32], journalist for [?? 0:41:35].

What I hear from the panel - I see that it’s not just in this panel, it’s in the media, it’s otherwise a - it is a concerted effort to go ahead on climate negotiations from where we stand now and not go back to the Kyoto. The problem with [?? 0:41:59] is that - well, pragmatically, obviously, we want to do something about it, obviously, otherwise it’s going to affect all of us, but doesn’t it seem that the USA was reluctant to identify the Kyoto protocol in the Senate and whatever the reasons - whatever their domestic politics is - what if China keeps doing that, their emissions peak, and what then if India keeps doing that, their emissions peak?

So shouldn’t we be paying some attention to the fact that if developing countries, especially USA, have been damaging the environment for so long there has to be something that they pay back to take the emissions down, rather than their emissions having already peaked and they come down slowly and slowly, and then they shift the blame on China, say they are the biggest emitters now, where the fact is that, per capita, USA is far ahead of any other country.

Heike Schroeder Great, thank you, very good questions. Because most of them were addressed to you, Mark, I’ll start with you.

(Laughter)

Mark Lynas Can I address them in the order that I remember them, which is reverse order?

First of all, I want to say it’s wonderful that so many people - in fact everyone who’s spoken - was there, as far as I can tell, and this is really interesting, because I think the, kind of, post mortem process is really only just beginning and my own contribution to that was just that: sort of an initial first stab at trying to understand what we’d all just witnessed.

In response to the gentleman who just spoke, I’m not at all sure I accept the relevance of per capita equity as an argument for how you go about mitigating climate change and I’ll tell you why: I work with the Maldives, the Maldives is the least developed country, its per capita emissions are very low and yet it’s going for 100% mitigation. It says it’ll be carbon neutral by 2020, so its per capita emissions go from very low to zero. That is not taking the argument that its per capita emissions should increase and we should all converge to the higher level and then decline downwards which is what the conventional approach is.
In fact, the Indian Government says it won’t increase its per capita emissions past those of industrialised countries, but that still means they’re going to shoot up and up and up for many more decades, and I think that’s crucial for understanding the actual climate change outcome. So I challenge this whole idea of equity in terms of carbon emissions because, after all, as the Maldives President himself has said “It’s not carbon we want, it’s development; it’s not oil we want, it’s transport; it’s not coal we want, it’s electricity,” and I think that’s crucial.

If you believe that there are alternative technologies to provide the services that carbon currently provides then you don’t need to have equality in per capita emissions and you don’t need to worry so much about the future emissions rights based on historical responsibility. Historical responsibility is an argument for adaptation financing, in my view, only. In the sense that if you create damage and you create a mess then you have a responsibility to pay compensation and that could be done through the courts. But it doesn’t mean to say that someone else can then go and create another mess in future. Two wrongs don’t make a right.

To the gentleman from the Indian delegation, your absolutely right to raise the process point about why I wrote that piece and whether I should have done. And I went through many days of struggle, both with myself and talking to other people, about whether I should do that because it was an immense breach of confidence. And I recognise that and I don’t see it as a piece of journalism at all. I wasn’t there as a journalist; I was there as a delegate for the Maldives and as an advisor to the President.

I didn’t - in the end I felt this story had to be told and I realised that I was probably the only person in the room who could tell it and that was what was so important. I felt I knew something different from what the conventional reporting was and I felt I was probably the only person with any kind of independence, because no head of state can tell it. Ed Miliband did his best in a piece in the Guardian a few days earlier than mine, where he did a lot of - saying China played a very important role here, but that was just seen as self-serving, you know, it’s just some government minister blaming another government, you know, there was no sense of - there was no reason for him to be believed.

And, of course, everyone else there was constrained by diplomatic protocol, as is right. I mean, this was not an open meeting; you’re not there as members of the press. But all that said, I spoke to the Foreign Minister of the Maldives and I said "Look, I’m thinking of doing this." And he said "Well, if you must do this, then do it, but don’t identify yourself as a member of the delegation," but that actually didn’t make it very difficult because I’ve written plenty of pieces saying I was on the delegation. So they basically gave me - I didn’t run my copy past them, that was the main thing, so this was not Maldives policy; this was my own independent perspective.

The Chinese were very upset with the Maldives; the Foreign Minister has since been to visit; they’ve called in the Ambassador to speak to the President. So, you know, there was a lot of political result to this, as I expected. I submitted my resignation to the President of the Maldives, if he chose to accept it, given what I’d done, but I carry the responsibility for that personally; the responsibility does not lie with the Maldives.

The previous point you made, and this addresses the gentleman there, and I’ll try and wind up here, is that there’s a big divide now in the developing countries, as James was saying, between those members of the G77 who are prepared to look seriously at mitigation. And the Maldives, of course, is in the forefront of that: if we’re going to carbon neutrality in 10 years you can’t get much more serious about mitigation than that.

And there was a meeting in the Maldives in November of least developed countries who are thinking of going carbon neutral. Very vulnerable countries including Bangladesh, Kenya, Tanzania, Vietnam all looking at - and there was a declaration which they produced all looking at the carbon neutral path, so greening their economies. And, of course, this is a huge whim because these poorer countries haven’t put in high carbon infrastructure; they never need do so.
But, you know, you need to get the financing, you need to get the investment to allow a low carbon development path to happen from the outset rather than banging on for ages about equity and per capita emissions and stuff which means that, supposedly, they’re meant to build lots of coal-fired power stations and then presumably close them down in 20 years. It doesn’t make any sense economically or politically.

I think one of the big divides there was between the, sort of, conventional G77 analysis, which is all about blaming the first world and refusing to do anything, and those developing countries who are really looking positively, putting the past behind them and saying “Right, let’s go for a low carbon development path and let’s do that because it’s in the interests not only of the climate but it’s also in the interest of our own peoples.”

James Painter I haven’t really got anything to add but I do think it’s really important that Mark’s analysis - even though, obviously, there are lots of reasons why there wasn’t a stronger accord - I don’t remember reading anywhere else an insider account of actually what China’s role was and I don’t see any argument for not getting that out there. There was nothing - do correct me if I’m wrong - in any of the main media organisations about what China’s role was in this.

And I do think, even from a journalistic point of view, the reluctance of NGOs - who are very good, very well organised at these conferences - to blame China or India in any respect is something that does have to be looked at and doesn’t get reported. Even where you don’t accept the analysis that China was totally the main reason why it failed, that story must get out.

Yadvinder Malhi I think the point that was made earlier that what happened at Copenhagen is symptomatic of a shift of global power and the rise of countries like Brazil, China, India and the influence that they have. And so this vision of the G77 or the developing world and their equity issues as a unanimous block is also an outdated view of those issues. The issues around China or India’s rights directly conflicts with Malta’s interests for right to exist in 50 years or 100 years time.

And so I think, in terms of atmospheric science, the arguments around equity of rights to the atmosphere is the language of the 20th century which isn’t appropriate for the 21st century’s greatest problem. And I think there has to be equity in aspirations and development but how much can we [??? 0:50:52] that from equity in rights to pollute the atmosphere. And development and carbon dioxide emissions don’t necessarily have to be on parallel tracks. So I understand with the equity - we also, sort of, want to talk the language of equity, but I think in terms of atmospheric science it’s a very dangerous language to talk.

Just a very brief comment on the Danish role, just as you mentioned that, and you have as much experience and more on this than I do. I think it’s fair to say that the conference wasn’t as well run internally, in terms of its internal dynamic, as well as the visible external part of that. And I think the Danes tripped up on perhaps not being able to fully manipulate - fully engage in an open way with these global issues. Hopefully Mexico will do a lot better next year.

(Laughter)

Heike Schroeder Thanks.

And Diana?

Diana Liverman I’ll just make a couple of comments. The first is about the US role. I mean, I just don’t think anybody should’ve expected Obama to come to Copenhagen with more than the commitment that he made in advance of the 17%, which we know is a pretty pathetic cut compared to the 1990 US emissions.

But I think that part of the problem here is that the media, to some extent, and the NGOs are focussing on commitments to climate change expressed as binding percentage cuts. I think
that going forward we’re just going to have to be a little bit broader about what we take as a commitment to mitigation because, whether it’s China or the US, I think we’re much more likely to get real reductions from other actions that they take. Both China and the US, I think we may have more hope in their investments in technology and R and D for getting real reductions.

Our challenge as researchers is to start adding up what’s going on elsewhere, whether it’s the EPA regulating Co2 in the US or Steve Chu making massive investments in energy R and D, we need to, sort of, be a little more encompassing about what we’re looking for in terms of reductions. And we may need to change the focus to that because China has made some serious commitments in other areas other than a binding commitment.

I do things that things are looking pretty dodgy for US legislation at the moment for a lot of reasons, but one of the things to look at is the difference between what’s going on in Congress and the Senate and the attempt in the executive branch to use executive decisions to implement greenhouse gas reductions. And there’s a lot going on there, it’s not just the EPA, it’s also been, sort of, going on in USDA and transportation. I think Obama is doing what he can to cut emissions but the US political process is a complete disaster.

And I think there were a lot of problems with the Danish Government. I don’t think it’s just their level of disorganisation. I think they did, in a sense, somewhat betray the whole UNFCCC process by supporting the sort of texts that were developed by various small groups of countries. And they contributed to the sense that the process of UNFCCC was being betrayed and that happened very early in the first week with the leaked Danish text. So I do place some fault on the Danish Government and you can see they were in some disarray. I understand there were disagreements within the Danish delegation.

Heike Schroeder Thank you.

I’ll take another three questions and can I just remind you to introduce yourselves and be relatively brief. That would be great.

Okay, I’ve got the lady in the purple, I’ve got you in the grey and then you in the black.

L C Jackson: My name is Lagipoiva Cherelle Jackson and I’m from a Pacific Island that is sinking. I was a journalist at Copenhagen; I was covering on behalf of the Pacific Island countries. There were six of us to represent all the islands in the region, which is not significant at all. But when I first got there I just wanted to add onto James’ reflections on the experience of the media. When I arrived in Copenhagen, first of all, was freezing, being from a 27 degree environment and noticed after a week that there was 45,000 people that came to the conference from all over the world. As an islander, I felt it was very ironic, it was very strange, that you dare to make a deal about climate change and yet you flew on planes and cars and trains that could dent the ozone and could send us further down the ocean. But I guess that’s - I felt a bit disheartened in the first week as a result of that. And also, just as an insider’s perspective into Pacific Island participation, it’s a junket for Pacific Islanders.

Those government representatives that go there every single year go to one hour of the meeting, cash in their per diems and then go shopping. You know, that’s - a lot of them do that and they dress really nicely to the conferences - for the press conferences - and don’t really do much. So I wonder what’s there as an accountable mechanism to ensure that these government’s actually participate after.

Heike Schroeder Please be short.

Female 1 I’ve got a very short question. My name’s Ellen [[Ogley 0:57:18]] and I’m an environmental consultant.

We haven’t talked very much about where too from here which was, sort of, the second part, I thought, of this hour. So I’d love anyone’s thoughts on that.
Heike Schroeder  Thanks, we’ll end with that.

Okay, last question.

Female 2  A lot has been said on China’s role in the negotiations but, I mean, I would like to know what role that India play in the whole scheme of things, because India did have the opportunity to play a positive role but somehow it just didn’t materialise and so what role did India play and what role did the issue of technology transfers play in the failure of the talks?

Heike Schroeder  Okay, thank you.

To round up I’d like to give the panellists a chance to answer these questions, but also to maybe just leave us with one sound byte of what they think is the main issue at stake and what it is that we really need to think more about in moving forward. Is it the process that is at fault or is there something else that we need to change? And I’d like to start with Diana this time.

Diana Liverman  Okay. Well, just to be brief, when I think about what to focus on, I think I’m focusing on two things and multiple strategies.

One is what is the best strategy to decarbonise the world’s energy infrastructure and how can we make that the focus of what needs to happen going forward? And some of the comments Mark made about opportunities for countries to develop on a low carbon path are absolutely critical.

The second issue is on adaptation. I think that there is a great need to push that substantial amount of funds that go for adaptation and we’ve got to figure out a fair way to allocate those funds both between countries and within countries. And I think that that’s an enormous challenge to make that happen appropriately.

So I’ll just leave it there.

Heike Schroeder  Thank you.

Yadvinder?

Yadvinder Malhi  For conference watchers the next date to watch for is January the 31st when all the parties to the Copenhagen Accord will fill in the annex of that accord with their targets. And it will be interesting to see whether that is simply what is there before Copenhagen or whether there is substantial movement and negotiation in advance of that. And that will, sort of, give a first indication of how quickly things are moving beyond Copenhagen in the direction of Mexico.

And the Copenhagen Accord itself is quite an extraordinary thing. It’s something that the UN process takes note of. It isn’t on UN-headed paper at the insistence of the Bolivian delegation. It opens the way, in some ways, for some processes to start happening in that level outside of the UN process and it’ll be interesting to see whether that gets absorbed back into the UN process or whether it starts taking on a life of its own as this large accord.

Separate from that, I do increasingly wonder whether there’s some structure that can move forward in some sectors. If the forest deal is ready, why does it have to wait for every other part of the deal before it can be implemented. We’re waiting and forests are being lost while we’re waiting for other parts of the deal to fall in place. And can things move forward sector by sector even if the overarching - as it is going for a complete overarching entity that agrees on every aspect of it, the really - the fastest, the most efficient way to move forward.

So no real answers but they’re some of the questions that are in my mind. And, sort of, seeing how the process develops in the next few months, how the debate develops on those, will be interesting.

Mark Lynas  Thanks.

I think what campaign you should focus on and what we should all focus on as well, if we can, is ensuring that the rich countries continue to decarbonise as rapidly as possible and that we keep
pressure on them to do this. So I’m not at all suggesting that we should suddenly shift all blame to India and China and forget about what happens in the US or anywhere else at all.

Quite the reverse, because the more that we mitigate in richer countries the more that then we will have delivered the side of the bargain that was originally promised which was that developed countries should take the lead. And that, in turn, will raise more pressure on the big, emerging emitters to also do serious mitigation in years to come.

So there’s no - I don’t think we can have a, kind of, mutually assured destruction approach here. Unfortunately, this is the game the EU has played, of course - they’ve really made a mess of this - because they went to the negotiations saying "Right, we’ll do 20% at the outset, we’ll go 20% below 1990 by 2020 but we will raise it to 30% if other parties step up to the table." Now, they didn’t, so what does the EU do? It says "Right, we’re not doing 30%, we’ll have to do 10% and we’ll build another 10 coal-fired power stations and sod you,” you know. It doesn’t make any sense as a negotiating strategy, nor does it make any sense as an energy policy.

So the only thing that makes any sense is the, sort of, unilateralist approach to mitigation where you do as much as you can possibly square with your domestic electorate, to be honest, which is, sort of, what the US is going to be doing, same in Australia, same in the other big countries.

But, as I say, to go back to the developing thing, the US is like a Soviet Union of energy. It’s an enormous dinosaur and they’ve got huge amounts of plant that they’re going to have to restructure. They’re going to have to rebuild all their cities - I mean, look at LA in terms of its carbon emissions, because everyone’s so spread out in the suburbs - so it’s much more difficult for the US to go carbon neutral than it is for the Maldives, of course, or any other small least-developed country. So these countries must be given the financial assistance and they must be given a political structure which enables them to be supported and to take serious mitigation action.

At the moment, developing countries, like the Maldives, who say "We're going to get serious about mitigation," are seen as traitors by the other developing countries who don’t want to mitigate. So you’ve got this big political divide here going on. I think it will be really interesting to see what happens, going on with the basic countries, about how they actually decide - what they decide to do by the January 31st deadline.

Of course, remember India and China have a formalised alliance on climate change negotiations. They met a month before Copenhagen and that alliance is very much what underlay their own strategies at these talks. The G77 itself doesn’t really exist, except as a front for these more powerful voices. So when you hear the Sudanese speak and tear into the developed countries and say how this is a holocaust and so on and so forth, they're not really meaning that. This is actually a, sort of, proxy for different kinds of interests.

And it’s difficult - I don’t completely understand why the Bolivians are against it and the Cubans at the moment are trying to force everyone to not to be able to actually associate with the accord at all and to say it’s an illegal document. I don’t quite know why they’re doing that either, given that most...

Diana Liverman : Anti-capitalism.

Mark Lynas What’s that?

Diana Liverman Anti-capitalism. It’s a global position; it’s not about climate change.

Mark Lynas Yes, I suppose. I suppose they’re still fighting their anti-imperialist battle so maybe that is what’s going on. I sort of assumed that there was - it wasn’t what they said it was because that seems to be the general rule of this.

(Laughter)
But in years to come, I think we’ve got to also really focus on getting the developing countries who are serious about going carbon neutral to be supported to do that. That’s certainly going to be my main agenda as well.

Heike Schroeder James?

James Painter Very briefly, obviously from a media point of view we’re going to be looking at where Copenhagen goes from here, whether it’s a one-track, two-track, multi-track process. And particularly looking at whether the basic countries are going to come up with something. But my hope, rather than whether it’ll actually happen, is that the media as a whole does much more on the positive aspects of what countries, states, business, cities are doing in terms of decarbonising their economies, or their local economies. The reason is - there are lots of reasons.

One is the problem is that media tend to focus far too much on these events and not what’s going on outside of these events.

The second reason is there’s all this evidence that suggests that media representations of doom and gloom does absolutely nothing to motivate personal behaviour change or even involvement with the issue. So the more positive stories that the media can put out there about what’s going on outside of these process get better. And I very, very much hope and argue vociferously within the BBC that we do much more of that in the months to come.

Heike Schroeder Well, we will stay tuned whether COP15 will indeed be merely a stepping stone in the process that we have or whether it might be regarded as a dead-end in hindsight. Until then, I hope that we will keep the discussion going and all keep our good work up.

And I’d like to thank the panel very much for a very insightful discussion, also all of you for taking part in it. Thank you.

Male 4 Just before you go, we just a meeting before this one confirming that there’s going to be an event open to the public on Friday the 26th at five o’clock, probably in this very...

Male 5 February.

Male 4 Sorry, Friday, February the 26th, probably in this very theatre on what’s next for climate change reporting. We’ve had confirmed David Shukman of the BBC, David Adam with the Guardian, Fiona Harley. So do please put that in your diaries and information will be going out soon. What next for climate change reporting if you’re interested in the meeting. Thank you.

Heike Schroeder Really quick, before you’re all out of the room. This was recorded by Voices from Oxford and you’ll be able to find it on the Internet very soon. We also have an audio recording which we will put up on the Internet.