1 00:00:05,930 --> 00:00:09,740 Welcome to the fifth lecture on David Hume. 2 00:00:09,740 --> 00:00:20,320 And now we're going to be focussing on the sections in book one, part three following the discussion of induction. 3 00:00:20,320 --> 00:00:28,540 So some of this covers probability, both respectable versions of it and less respectable versions. 4 00:00:28,540 --> 00:00:33,910 I'm going to be skipping through those quite quickly and focussing the vast majority 5 00:00:33,910 --> 00:00:39,340 of the lecture on Hume's famous discussion of the idea of necessary connexion. 6 00:00:39,340 --> 00:00:46,680 The idea of causal necessity. A reminder of the context. 7 00:00:46,680 --> 00:00:55,470 So going right back to Treaties 132, Hume identified causation as a particularly important relation, 8 00:00:55,470 --> 00:01:05,550 the only relation which can ground an inference from what we observe to what we don't observe or indeed in general, from one object to another. 9 00:01:05,550 --> 00:01:11,700 In attempting to identify the components of the idea of causation, 10 00:01:11,700 --> 00:01:23,970 he noted contiguity priority in time of the cause to the effect and necessary connexion and necessary connexion seemed somewhat elusive. 11 00:01:23,970 --> 00:01:27,870 So he set off searching around neighbouring fields, 12 00:01:27,870 --> 00:01:34,980 and one of those fields was causal inference and within the discussion of causal inference one three six. 13 00:01:34,980 --> 00:01:45,130 What we now know of as the argument concerning induction, Hume identified constant conjunction as a key. 14 00:01:45,130 --> 00:01:53,440 And he didn't make very explicit the link between calls, constant conjunction and necessary connexion, but that's going to come later. 15 00:01:53,440 --> 00:02:01,260 But he did hint that he was going to turn out to be the solution to the problem. 16 00:02:01,260 --> 00:02:09,870 In one, three six, he argued that inductive inference is not founded on reason, but instead on custom or habit. 17 00:02:09,870 --> 00:02:19,410 Our tendency to infer for the future what we've seen in the past, simply by instinct rather than by reasoning it out. 18 00:02:19,410 --> 00:02:27,690 And we've seen his hydraulic theory of belief, whereby belief comes about from transfer of force and vivacity. 19 00:02:27,690 --> 00:02:34,140 When we have an associational connexion between A and B because we've seen a followed by B again and again and again, 20 00:02:34,140 --> 00:02:41,970 we see a the foursome vivacity from the impression of A is carried down the associational link to our 21 00:02:41,970 --> 00:02:47,790 idea of B with which it's associated and our idea of B is enlivened and therefore becomes a belief. 22 00:02:47,790 --> 00:02:52,960 So we've got what I described as a hydraulic theory of belief. 23 00:02:52,960 --> 00:03:01,510 OK. So very quickly, I'm going to take you through some highlights from these four five sections of the treaties, 24 00:03:01,510 --> 00:03:10,210 just particularly notable things that you can watch out for as you read or skim through them. 25 00:03:10,210 --> 00:03:14,320 In one, three, nine of the effects of other relations and other habits, 26 00:03:14,320 --> 00:03:22,330 Hugh points out that causation isn't the only associative relation that conveys false and vivacity to a related idea. 27 00:03:22,330 --> 00:03:30,640 Remember, he said that there are three natural relations three relations that convey association. 28 00:03:30,640 --> 00:03:36,160 One of them is resemblance. One of them contiguity and the other causation. 29 00:03:36,160 --> 00:03:42,460 But of these three, causation seems to be unique in generating belief. 30 00:03:42,460 --> 00:03:47,820 And why is that? The seems to be a bit of a puzzle here. 31 00:03:47,820 --> 00:03:54,410 Now. In the enquiry, Hume actually was rather clearer about this. 32 00:03:54,410 --> 00:04:00,620 He distinguished between causal association and custom. 33 00:04:00,620 --> 00:04:05,360 But in the treatise, we get an ingenious explanation of why. 34 00:04:05,360 --> 00:04:10,720 Association by causation is privileged. 35 00:04:10,720 --> 00:04:20,560 And the general idea is that in association by resemblance and contiguity, our minds are free to wander all over the place. 36 00:04:20,560 --> 00:04:26,290 If I see something a man, I associate it with something through resemblance. 37 00:04:26,290 --> 00:04:31,850 There are lots of different things with which I could associated. 38 00:04:31,850 --> 00:04:38,660 On the other hand, with cause and effect, the object, it presents a fixed and unalterable. 39 00:04:38,660 --> 00:04:45,380 If I see a followed by B again and again and that's a set up, an association associational relation. 40 00:04:45,380 --> 00:04:56,460 And I then see in a. Custom leads me to infer a b at exactly that time and place, so there's a very specific target. 41 00:04:56,460 --> 00:05:06,510 In the case of the associational relation of causation, again, I want to point out humans being a little bit vague here. 42 00:05:06,510 --> 00:05:13,150 Actually, it's custom that generates the specific prediction in the specific place. 43 00:05:13,150 --> 00:05:18,750 A simple association, but by causation needn't do that at all. 44 00:05:18,750 --> 00:05:27,360 If I see a and my mind starts wandering about regarding what were the causes of a, then that's not generating a prediction. 45 00:05:27,360 --> 00:05:30,420 That's just a causal association. 46 00:05:30,420 --> 00:05:41,120 But custom specifically seeing an AI and expecting a B to follow that is somewhat different and does have this advantage of. 47 00:05:41,120 --> 00:05:48,920 Enlivening, a very specific idea in a specific time and place. 48 00:05:48,920 --> 00:05:55,550 One theme that runs through quite a lot of Hume's writing, or often incidental, 49 00:05:55,550 --> 00:06:03,030 but there's enough of it that you can see it, it's there pretty systematically. 50 00:06:03,030 --> 00:06:07,530 Is little digs against religion. In fact, 51 00:06:07,530 --> 00:06:13,410 this serves his purpose in other ways to what he is pointing out is the way in which 52 00:06:13,410 --> 00:06:20,430 religious practise tends to take advantage of the imagination to enliven belief. 53 00:06:20,430 --> 00:06:24,450 So he claims that the memories of Roman Catholicism, 54 00:06:24,450 --> 00:06:33,390 the use of statues of saints and that sort of thing that makes religious belief more vivid because it's taking advantage of the relation 55 00:06:33,390 --> 00:06:41,370 of resemblance because of the resemblance between the statues and the real people who were the saints or supposed real people. 56 00:06:41,370 --> 00:06:49,110 That makes my my thoughts of the my ideas of those people more vivid, and therefore I'm more inclined to believe. 57 00:06:49,110 --> 00:06:58,380 Likewise, relics, if I touch a relic or see a relic that was actually had some causal relation with a particular individual, 58 00:06:58,380 --> 00:07:09,110 you know, this is part of the true cross, something like that, again, that verifies my ideas and makes me closer to belief. 59 00:07:09,110 --> 00:07:19,220 And as you can see, he gives other examples, too. Including a short discussion of credulity in respect of testimony. 60 00:07:19,220 --> 00:07:27,260 We know, by the way, from a letter that Hugh sent to Henry Hume, Lord Keynes in 1737. 61 00:07:27,260 --> 00:07:29,870 This is two years before the treatise was published. 62 00:07:29,870 --> 00:07:36,800 We know that the original version of the treaties had a discussion of miracles in there, and Hume took it out. 63 00:07:36,800 --> 00:07:42,800 He said I'm present castrating my work that is cutting off its noble parts. 64 00:07:42,800 --> 00:07:45,650 In order to avoid that, it avoided giving offence. 65 00:07:45,650 --> 00:07:55,160 He was hoping to present the treaties to Bishop Joseph Butler for comment, and he removed some of the most overtly anti-religious stuff. 66 00:07:55,160 --> 00:08:06,370 So the discussion of testimony for miracles which would otherwise have been in the treaties actually only appeared in the in the first enquiry. 67 00:08:06,370 --> 00:08:16,960 The notice also, there's a there's a mischievous suggestion that actually, in respect of the afterlife, people don't really believe it. 68 00:08:16,960 --> 00:08:26,410 The fact that we get pleasure from terrifying sermons about hail shows that we don't really believe it's true. 69 00:08:26,410 --> 00:08:32,830 And in the index that Hume put to his essays and treatises on several subjects, 70 00:08:32,830 --> 00:08:40,000 he actually has a rather mischievous reference where he talks about he refers 71 00:08:40,000 --> 00:08:48,500 from the index suggesting that this sort of thing is an instance of atheism. 72 00:08:48,500 --> 00:08:54,410 OK. In one 311, he tends to what we would call probability. 73 00:08:54,410 --> 00:08:58,880 So he obviously is thinking of causal inference in general is probable inference. 74 00:08:58,880 --> 00:09:05,960 That's what Locke called it, because it's they're contrasted with demonstrative inference. 75 00:09:05,960 --> 00:09:13,400 But Hugh makes the point against Locke that talking about probable inference in a case of, say, 76 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:19,010 one Billy a ball hitting another or a stone falling when it's released in air seems very odd. 77 00:09:19,010 --> 00:09:24,080 We don't think of it as just a probable inference. We think of it as yielding certainty. 78 00:09:24,080 --> 00:09:29,000 One would appear ridiculous, who would say that his only probable the Sun will rise tomorrow, 79 00:09:29,000 --> 00:09:33,530 or that all men must die so to fit better with common language. 80 00:09:33,530 --> 00:09:38,090 Hume draws a distinction between proofs and probabilities, 81 00:09:38,090 --> 00:09:47,210 and proofs are those arguments which are derived from the relation of cause and effect, which are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty. 82 00:09:47,210 --> 00:09:54,350 So in this section and the next he is discussing what probability proper that is. 83 00:09:54,350 --> 00:10:04,860 Cases of inference where we don't have consistent experience, where it's not every day that's being followed by be. 84 00:10:04,860 --> 00:10:14,460 And this section gives the most detailed account of Hume's hydraulic theory of belief, but applied in the case of probability. 85 00:10:14,460 --> 00:10:20,610 So again, a few highlights what the vulgar course chance is nothing but a secret and concealed cause. 86 00:10:20,610 --> 00:10:23,670 That's one instance of Hume saying this sort of thing. 87 00:10:23,670 --> 00:10:33,060 Quite a lot of this comes up later in book two two three one two three two where Hume discusses liberty and necessity the issue of free will. 88 00:10:33,060 --> 00:10:38,610 And again, he says chomps isn't real. There's no such thing as chance in the world. 89 00:10:38,610 --> 00:10:43,740 What people call chance is simply ignorance of the real causes. 90 00:10:43,740 --> 00:10:47,910 And I've noticed there that there's very strong evidence that humans determine its dimension. 91 00:10:47,910 --> 00:10:55,660 This, I think, in the first lecture. I'm not going to go through all the evidence here, but most scholars accept this. 92 00:10:55,660 --> 00:11:05,210 OK, so probable judgement is derived from custom, just like proof is, but strength of association builds up gradually. 93 00:11:05,210 --> 00:11:12,430 Suppose I see a follow by B once a mention a I may be somewhat inclined to expect to be, 94 00:11:12,430 --> 00:11:18,190 especially if I'm habituated to inductive inference, but the strength builds up gradually. 95 00:11:18,190 --> 00:11:21,370 The more as I see followed by B, the more and more certain I become, 96 00:11:21,370 --> 00:11:28,180 and eventually I will feel completely certain that I is going to be followed by B. 97 00:11:28,180 --> 00:11:33,880 Whereas followed by different things may be said on different occasions. 98 00:11:33,880 --> 00:11:35,590 We get the hydraulic theory, 99 00:11:35,590 --> 00:11:45,010 the force and vivacity of seeing in a gets divided down the various associational channels in proportion to the pass frequencies. 100 00:11:45,010 --> 00:11:53,710 So we have a psychological explanation of why if we've seen a followed by be 60 percent of the time and see 40 per cent of the time, 101 00:11:53,710 --> 00:11:59,990 we will tend to have a 60 per cent belief in B when we see in a. 102 00:11:59,990 --> 00:12:04,490 And he made some comments about reasoning from analogy. 103 00:12:04,490 --> 00:12:15,820 One very interesting passage in one 312 is this one having presented his theory, he imagines somebody finding it a bit hard to accept. 104 00:12:15,820 --> 00:12:22,570 And he says, well, given what I've already argued, you should find this relatively straightforward. 105 00:12:22,570 --> 00:12:29,290 Let men be once fully persuaded of these two principles that there is nothing in any object 106 00:12:29,290 --> 00:12:34,540 considered in itself which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it. 107 00:12:34,540 --> 00:12:40,420 And that even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, 108 00:12:40,420 --> 00:12:49,130 we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience. 109 00:12:49,130 --> 00:12:54,110 I say let me once fully convinced of these two principles, 110 00:12:54,110 --> 00:13:03,390 and this will throw them so loose from all common systems that they will make no difficulty of receiving any which may appear the most extraordinary. 111 00:13:03,390 --> 00:13:11,730 So he's referring back to one, three, six, and he's speaking about the conclusion they're far more dramatically than he did at the time. 112 00:13:11,730 --> 00:13:21,450 He's now suggesting that his argument concerning induction actually should throw us loose from all common systems. 113 00:13:21,450 --> 00:13:30,120 So those who interpret the argument concerning induction as being really rather mild and non sceptical, 114 00:13:30,120 --> 00:13:36,780 I think have a bit of a problem with this passage. We see a development in humans thought when he originally presents the argument. 115 00:13:36,780 --> 00:13:40,080 He doesn't emphasise the sceptical implications here. 116 00:13:40,080 --> 00:13:44,670 He does far more and in the abstract, in the enquiry, get more. 117 00:13:44,670 --> 00:13:50,910 I mean, in the enquiry, the argument is headed sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding. 118 00:13:50,910 --> 00:13:57,880 And in section 12 of the enquiry, the argument is put into the mouth of the Peroni and sceptic. 119 00:13:57,880 --> 00:14:03,640 So just in passing, it's worth noting that. OK. 120 00:14:03,640 --> 00:14:07,960 In fact, most of Hume's discussion of probability is not particularly sceptical, 121 00:14:07,960 --> 00:14:15,370 although clearly his argument concerning induction might give us pause about the basis of the whole thing. 122 00:14:15,370 --> 00:14:21,130 It's all based on custom not reason. Doesn't that mean that the foundations are pretty shaky? 123 00:14:21,130 --> 00:14:26,530 Human does want to build on that foundation, the foundation of expecting the future to resemble the past. 124 00:14:26,530 --> 00:14:34,690 And he advocates that we should do it. And one of the things we should do is seek hidden causes. 125 00:14:34,690 --> 00:14:38,860 He's quite an important passage. I'll be referring to it later. 126 00:14:38,860 --> 00:14:47,950 It's a passage that Hume liked so much that he preserved it in the enquiry, in the discussion of liberty and necessity in the enquiry. 127 00:14:47,950 --> 00:14:50,960 It appears almost verbatim. 128 00:14:50,960 --> 00:15:02,000 So he contrasts vulgar people who when they see something acting in constantly, just say, Oh, well, sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. 129 00:15:02,000 --> 00:15:10,010 With philosophers, wise people who reckon that when they see inconstant things on the surface, 130 00:15:10,010 --> 00:15:15,010 expect if they dig deeper to find hidden causes, that will explain it. 131 00:15:15,010 --> 00:15:21,040 And lo and behold, they do they do actually find typically that on further investigation, 132 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:30,070 they are able to identify hidden causes behind the superficial and constancy from the observation of several parallel parallel instances. 133 00:15:30,070 --> 00:15:39,070 Philosophers former maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary so they don't go for the Chancey causation. 134 00:15:39,070 --> 00:15:50,400 The vulgar postulate and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes. 135 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:55,680 Incidentally, this is the closest Hume comes, I think, to an explicit argument for determinism. 136 00:15:55,680 --> 00:15:59,580 It's that actually when you look for hidden causes, you find them. 137 00:15:59,580 --> 00:16:09,450 And that suggests that there are hidden causes all the way down. Notice the hidden causes needn't be irredeemably hidden. 138 00:16:09,450 --> 00:16:24,800 We can search for hidden causes and we can discover them. One 313 is on and philosophical probability and philosophical probability, 139 00:16:24,800 --> 00:16:31,550 because we're talking about methods of inference that philosophers don't approve of, 140 00:16:31,550 --> 00:16:37,630 but they count as probable inference because they are founded on custom. 141 00:16:37,630 --> 00:16:44,710 So some examples of that would be when we have experience of one thing followed by another. 142 00:16:44,710 --> 00:16:53,170 But in predicting what's going to happen, giving much more weight to recent examples or vivid examples, 143 00:16:53,170 --> 00:17:00,580 you know any case would be, for example, a, you know, a murder gets reported in the press. 144 00:17:00,580 --> 00:17:07,330 And because that's very vividly in our mind, we radically overestimate the chances of someone being murdered in the street. 145 00:17:07,330 --> 00:17:23,720 OK. Just because something's recent and vivid. In lengthy reasoning, we can fail to follow very well, that becomes important in treaties one for one. 146 00:17:23,720 --> 00:17:29,330 We tend to be prejudiced. We jump to making general rules too quickly. 147 00:17:29,330 --> 00:17:34,250 So we meet, say, an Irishman who's very dull. 148 00:17:34,250 --> 00:17:40,520 We meet a Frenchman who has isn't sufficiently solid, whatever that means. 149 00:17:40,520 --> 00:17:48,650 And we form the maxim that an Irishman cannot have wit and the Frenchman cannot have solidity. 150 00:17:48,650 --> 00:17:55,040 Now wise, people realise that these maxims are wrong, that they should be more open minded. 151 00:17:55,040 --> 00:18:01,010 They shouldn't form rules just on the basis of one or two particular examples. 152 00:18:01,010 --> 00:18:08,780 And you can imagine if you live in a context where the Irishman you're most likely to meet are labourers or something like that, 153 00:18:08,780 --> 00:18:16,970 it's very easy to to form a false opinion. When I was a kid, there was this sort of the paradigm. 154 00:18:16,970 --> 00:18:21,320 Frenchman went round on a bicycle with strings of onions around his neck. 155 00:18:21,320 --> 00:18:25,760 That was because there were a lot of French onion sellers in the south of England over that period. 156 00:18:25,760 --> 00:18:28,640 You know that that's how they they flog their onions. 157 00:18:28,640 --> 00:18:34,670 It didn't imply that all French were like that, but if you looked at the cartoons, you might have got that impression. 158 00:18:34,670 --> 00:18:42,920 But we can avoid this prejudice by forming a higher level general rules once we become aware that we are liable to prejudice and it leads us astray. 159 00:18:42,920 --> 00:18:49,800 We can form general rules to correct the prejudices. And that is indeed what we should do. 160 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:57,720 And the higher level general rules by which we correct our prejudices we attribute to our judgement, 161 00:18:57,720 --> 00:19:03,870 the lower level we attribute to the imagination, so we see something here that I alluded to in the second lecture. 162 00:19:03,870 --> 00:19:09,180 Hume sometimes draws distinctions between reason, the understanding, 163 00:19:09,180 --> 00:19:17,310 the judgement on the one hand and imagination on the other, according to how respectable the various operations are. 164 00:19:17,310 --> 00:19:27,990 We'll see more of that later. OK, now let's come to the main business of the idea of necessary connexion treaties one, three 14. 165 00:19:27,990 --> 00:19:32,990 Very, very well known, very controversial section. 166 00:19:32,990 --> 00:19:42,380 So Hume is now returning at last to his quest for the crucial component of the idea of causation, namely the idea of necessary connexion. 167 00:19:42,380 --> 00:19:51,320 And he's trying to identify the source of that idea where is the impression from which it is derived? 168 00:19:51,320 --> 00:19:59,360 Notice, importantly, that he is very, very clear that this is an essential component of the idea of causation. 169 00:19:59,360 --> 00:20:05,140 According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation. 170 00:20:05,140 --> 00:20:11,680 Necessity may be defined two ways conformable to the two definitions of cause of which it makes an essential part, 171 00:20:11,680 --> 00:20:15,040 and I've given other textual links there. 172 00:20:15,040 --> 00:20:21,190 I'm anticipating a bit there with the two definitions, but the point I want to make straight away is humans never in any doubt. 173 00:20:21,190 --> 00:20:29,770 He never expresses any doubt that the idea of necessary connexion is an essential part of the idea of cause. 174 00:20:29,770 --> 00:20:37,330 So if anyone ever tells you as some do that, Hume challenged the idea that necessary connexion is part of causation. 175 00:20:37,330 --> 00:20:43,570 They are misinterpreting more likely what they mean is necessary. 176 00:20:43,570 --> 00:20:51,490 Connexion, as I understand it is not part of Hume's notion of cause that may be true but necessary. 177 00:20:51,490 --> 00:21:00,570 Connexion, as Hume understands, it is definitely an essential part of his notion, of course. 178 00:21:00,570 --> 00:21:05,130 OK, so Hume's discussion is going to apply the coffee principle. We've seen this before. 179 00:21:05,130 --> 00:21:15,090 All simple ideas are copied from impressions. He refers back to this repeatedly during the course of one three 14. 180 00:21:15,090 --> 00:21:26,550 It's important here when we as with induction, so with causation, we are fortunate we have three relevant techs, not just the one. 181 00:21:26,550 --> 00:21:34,170 We've got a brief discussion of causation in the abstract, not nearly as extended as the discussion of induction there. 182 00:21:34,170 --> 00:21:43,830 But we also have the enquiry concerning human understanding, and section seven of the enquiry is humans most polished presentation of this argument. 183 00:21:43,830 --> 00:21:48,600 But the two go very much together. All right. One 314 of the treaty is an enquiry. 184 00:21:48,600 --> 00:21:55,020 Section seven have far more in common than they have a distinct. 185 00:21:55,020 --> 00:22:02,520 So we are able to triangulate. We can use the enquiry to inform our understanding of the treaties, and I'll be doing that later. 186 00:22:02,520 --> 00:22:14,430 It's a this is a big contrast with the text that we will come to in treaties, but one part for where most of the stuff doesn't appear in the enquiry. 187 00:22:14,430 --> 00:22:23,010 And that leaves some obscurity. It means we don't actually know whether we're dealing with a sort of first attempt that Hume later rejected, 188 00:22:23,010 --> 00:22:29,070 or whether it's text that he just admitted from the enquiry for some other reason, e.g. to simplify. 189 00:22:29,070 --> 00:22:33,360 But in the case of treaties one three, 190 00:22:33,360 --> 00:22:42,660 we have this great advantage of a substantial later reworking and in the enquiry that the enquiry went through lots and lots of additions, 191 00:22:42,660 --> 00:22:52,570 whereas the treaties only ever went through one. So the enquiry is a very useful guide for interpreting Hume's mature views. 192 00:22:52,570 --> 00:23:00,400 OK, so Enquiry Section four says sorry, enquiry section seven, paragraph four. 193 00:23:00,400 --> 00:23:07,660 He talks about the copy principle providing a new microscope or species of optics a way we can investigate our ideas. 194 00:23:07,660 --> 00:23:13,810 And that's what Hume is going to do. As I mentioned when I introduced the copy principle in the second lecture, 195 00:23:13,810 --> 00:23:21,220 humanely uses it not for rejecting bogus ideas, but for investigating the actual nature of our ideas. 196 00:23:21,220 --> 00:23:24,350 And that's what he's going to do here. 197 00:23:24,350 --> 00:23:32,660 So he's going to look for the impression from which the idea of necessary connexion that is in the causal sense is copied. 198 00:23:32,660 --> 00:23:41,620 We're not talking about logical, necessary connexion. We're talking about causal, necessary connexion. 199 00:23:41,620 --> 00:23:47,350 There's a paragraph, the very first paragraph of one, three, 14, and it actually summarises the whole argument. 200 00:23:47,350 --> 00:23:53,330 I'm not going to go through that now, but very well worth reading that paragraph he sets out. 201 00:23:53,330 --> 00:24:00,440 This is clearly what I'm going to do. He says. OK. 202 00:24:00,440 --> 00:24:05,030 How does he set out for it? Well, he starts in a slightly surprising way. 203 00:24:05,030 --> 00:24:10,250 I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy agency, power force, energy, 204 00:24:10,250 --> 00:24:17,130 necessity, connexion and product productive quality are all nearly synonymous. 205 00:24:17,130 --> 00:24:23,070 And therefore, it is an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest. 206 00:24:23,070 --> 00:24:29,280 OK, so there's no point in trying to define a causal necessity in terms of one of these 207 00:24:29,280 --> 00:24:34,260 other ideas that's just going to be circular because they're essentially synonymous. 208 00:24:34,260 --> 00:24:42,860 So we're going to have to look for impressions either simple or complex. 209 00:24:42,860 --> 00:24:51,130 But there are two puzzles here. First of all. Why does he treat all of these as virtual synonyms? 210 00:24:51,130 --> 00:24:56,170 Because it's not at all clear that those words are all genuine synonyms, right? 211 00:24:56,170 --> 00:25:05,800 Think of force and necessity. But you can have a false without necessitating its effect, right? 212 00:25:05,800 --> 00:25:11,500 You can you can have something that's that's influenced by a number of different forces where one of them dominates the others. 213 00:25:11,500 --> 00:25:17,950 That doesn't mean there wasn't any force in the other direction, even though it's not bringing a necessary effect. 214 00:25:17,950 --> 00:25:22,030 The other puzzle is, although in the quotes I just showed you, 215 00:25:22,030 --> 00:25:32,350 Hume seems to speculate that the could be a complex impression and idea here actually within his discussion. 216 00:25:32,350 --> 00:25:42,760 Hume just seems to take for granted that the idea of necessary connexion, which is synonymous with all these others, is going to be a simple idea. 217 00:25:42,760 --> 00:25:46,630 It's not made explicit until a note in the enquiry where he basically criticises 218 00:25:46,630 --> 00:25:55,160 Locke for trying to find the source of a simple idea through reasoning. 219 00:25:55,160 --> 00:26:01,460 These are both puzzling, but I suspect there is a simple solution here is my solution. 220 00:26:01,460 --> 00:26:06,800 The site suggested this isn't clearly in the text, but it seems to me to make best sense of it. 221 00:26:06,800 --> 00:26:17,270 Humans whose interest is in a single common element of all of these ideas, he's looking for a common element, which I call consequence reality. 222 00:26:17,270 --> 00:26:23,360 One thing being a consequence of the other. And he's seen that consequent reality. 223 00:26:23,360 --> 00:26:28,760 The basic idea of consequent reality is not something that you can get through. 224 00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:40,900 Apparently, sensation. Or apparently reflection, or at least it seems puzzling how you could on empiricist principles, get this general idea. 225 00:26:40,900 --> 00:26:48,550 That's what I think would make sense of why he isn't interested in the subtle differences between these various virtual synonyms. 226 00:26:48,550 --> 00:26:57,650 It also explains why he just seems to take for granted that what he's looking for is a simple idea. 227 00:26:57,650 --> 00:27:00,460 There's another puzzle. 228 00:27:00,460 --> 00:27:09,880 Which I think is helped by this solution, and it's the following we saw earlier that Hume draws a distinction between the vulgar and philosophers, 229 00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:17,950 the vulgar attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes, as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence. 230 00:27:17,950 --> 00:27:25,770 That's that long paragraph or long quoted paragraph from a few slides back. 231 00:27:25,770 --> 00:27:29,880 In other words, he says the vulgar believe in Chancey causation. 232 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:38,240 Philosophers don't philosophers investigate, they find the hidden causes, and then they form a maxim that all causes are equally necessary. 233 00:27:38,240 --> 00:27:42,480 But the vulgar believe in Chancey causation. Now how is that possible? 234 00:27:42,480 --> 00:27:53,530 How is that even coherent? I mean, if necessity, of course, of necessity, forms an essential part, the most important part of the idea of causation, 235 00:27:53,530 --> 00:28:00,440 then how is it even possible to believe in Chancey causation causation that isn't necessary? 236 00:28:00,440 --> 00:28:08,540 Well, if my suggestion is right, that what Hume is looking for is the source of the general idea of consequence reality. 237 00:28:08,540 --> 00:28:12,860 That's OK because you can have a force that isn't compelling. 238 00:28:12,860 --> 00:28:21,410 So if if the crucial element of the idea, of course, isn't literal necessity but rather consequence reality, 239 00:28:21,410 --> 00:28:29,530 then it makes sense how the vulgar could have that belief. And yet believe that it's chancy. 240 00:28:29,530 --> 00:28:40,600 So this is speculative, I am I'm identifying puzzles in Hume's text, I'm trying to find a way of making best sense of humour. 241 00:28:40,600 --> 00:28:50,290 I'm a little bit of style, a metric support. And this was, I confess, quite a surprise to me when I checked it out because we tend to think, 242 00:28:50,290 --> 00:28:54,850 you know, the the heading of the section is of the idea of necessarily connexion. 243 00:28:54,850 --> 00:28:58,480 The heading in the enquiry is of the idea of necessary connexion. 244 00:28:58,480 --> 00:29:05,260 Most of the crucial bits the most familiar bits are couched in terms of necessary connexion, actually. 245 00:29:05,260 --> 00:29:14,560 But if you count up the terms in power or efficacy, get referred to about three times more often than necessity or necessary connexion. 246 00:29:14,560 --> 00:29:19,430 So most of Hume's discussion actually is talking about power rather than necessary connexion. 247 00:29:19,430 --> 00:29:30,480 And by the way, the original title of the enquiry section of the idea of necessary connexion is of the idea of power unnecessary connexion. 248 00:29:30,480 --> 00:29:34,590 So why does he emphasise necessary Connexions so much? 249 00:29:34,590 --> 00:29:43,200 For example, in the title and when drawing his conclusion? And I think this links to what I was talking about in the very first lecture. 250 00:29:43,200 --> 00:29:52,680 But what's really motivating Hume's investigation of causation is to shed light on the problem of liberty and necessity, free will and determinism. 251 00:29:52,680 --> 00:29:58,580 And at that point, it is really genuine necessity that he's interested in. 252 00:29:58,580 --> 00:30:07,880 OK. So that's a speculation that I'm in, which I endeavour to make more sense of the framework of Hume's discussion. 253 00:30:07,880 --> 00:30:13,830 Let's now proceed through the details of how he goes. 254 00:30:13,830 --> 00:30:21,090 OK. He suggests we he, first of all, refutes Lock and Mallard branch in passing. 255 00:30:21,090 --> 00:30:28,170 So Lock suggests that we get the idea of the existence of power because we see one thing followed by another. 256 00:30:28,170 --> 00:30:33,150 And we reasoned that there must be a power capable of creating something. 257 00:30:33,150 --> 00:30:41,670 You know, when we see an a a must have the power to create b y because we see a followed by B again and again. 258 00:30:41,670 --> 00:30:43,260 And Hume says that's no good. 259 00:30:43,260 --> 00:30:50,770 That's not going to explain how you got a new idea that's taking for granted that we got the idea of power to ascribe Mallah. 260 00:30:50,770 --> 00:30:56,910 Brosh suggests that we get the idea of power from thinking about God again. 261 00:30:56,910 --> 00:31:12,070 That's no good. Then he moves on to think about looking at matter and how material things work, billiard balls, for example. 262 00:31:12,070 --> 00:31:17,350 Now we know from the discussion of induction, we know from the example of Adam and so forth. 263 00:31:17,350 --> 00:31:23,530 But powers can't be found amongst the properties of matter that we perceive when we see 264 00:31:23,530 --> 00:31:30,350 a follow by be the first time we have absolutely no means of making the inference. 265 00:31:30,350 --> 00:31:38,390 Nor can powers be found amongst the properties of mind that we perceive him. 266 00:31:38,390 --> 00:31:43,160 It doesn't seem to have been have considered this when he first wrote the treaties. 267 00:31:43,160 --> 00:31:51,680 He actually added a paragraph in the appendix that that came out with book three of the treaties in 1740 end of 1740. 268 00:31:51,680 --> 00:31:58,850 And he added This point that if you look into your mind, you won't see any power either. 269 00:31:58,850 --> 00:32:06,860 And trying to explain how we can get a general idea of power without first having a specific idea of power is hopeless. 270 00:32:06,860 --> 00:32:13,540 Given what Hume has said about general or abstract ideas. 271 00:32:13,540 --> 00:32:18,230 So where does the idea of power or necessary connexion come from? 272 00:32:18,230 --> 00:32:27,690 Well, we find it when we turn to repeated instances when we see a followed by B again and again. 273 00:32:27,690 --> 00:32:33,600 Then when we see RNA, we immediately can see the connexion betwixt them and draw an inference from one to the other. 274 00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:41,280 This multiplicity of resembling instances therefore constitutes the very essence of power or connexion, 275 00:32:41,280 --> 00:32:45,510 and is the source from which the idea of it arises. OK. 276 00:32:45,510 --> 00:32:51,660 When Hume talks about something being the very essence, he does normally mean the defining qualities. 277 00:32:51,660 --> 00:33:03,430 So that's quite a strong statement. OK, so constant conjunction is, as predicted, proving to be crucial. 278 00:33:03,430 --> 00:33:09,880 But constant conjunction may not seem to help initially, because if I see a followed by B again and again and again, 279 00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:17,940 I'm not getting any new impressions from the objects, I'm just getting repeated impressions the same ones again. 280 00:33:17,940 --> 00:33:22,110 We need to look inside ourselves to find a new impression. 281 00:33:22,110 --> 00:33:34,480 It's the operation of custom within us when we make an inference, that is what gives us the new impression of necessary connexion. 282 00:33:34,480 --> 00:33:43,180 This connexion, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the 283 00:33:43,180 --> 00:33:49,210 sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessarily connexion. 284 00:33:49,210 --> 00:33:54,180 Now that's rather peculiar. I see a. 285 00:33:54,180 --> 00:34:04,910 And I find myself expecting a beef. So I'm making an inference, and Hume seems to be saying that it's the transition or the determination of the mind, 286 00:34:04,910 --> 00:34:12,010 the move from seeing you to expecting B. That is the impression of necessary connexion. 287 00:34:12,010 --> 00:34:17,350 But that's not a feeling that's not a sensation. 288 00:34:17,350 --> 00:34:20,090 How can it provide an impression? 289 00:34:20,090 --> 00:34:28,920 Well, Barry Stroud reckons that he must be postulating that there is some distinctive feeling that occurs when we see and and expect to be. 290 00:34:28,920 --> 00:34:34,290 But that seems to be contrary to other things Hume says about the immediacy of 291 00:34:34,290 --> 00:34:38,940 the inference we see and we just find ourselves expecting B. Hume hasn't said, 292 00:34:38,940 --> 00:34:43,890 Oh, there's some third perception that comes up some distinctive feeling. 293 00:34:43,890 --> 00:34:49,520 He calls. He talks about the determination of the mind and the transition as being an impression. 294 00:34:49,520 --> 00:34:56,480 But I wonder if there is a there is a better way of interpreting this, 295 00:34:56,480 --> 00:35:03,740 and I put a little bit of discussion here which I'm going to skip over in the interest of time. 296 00:35:03,740 --> 00:35:07,310 What I want to suggest here goes back to the discussion. 297 00:35:07,310 --> 00:35:17,810 In the second lecture, I drew a distinct contrast between Locke's view of reflection and Hume's, and I said that when Locke talks about reflection, 298 00:35:17,810 --> 00:35:25,790 he characteristically means internal awareness of the operations of our mind what's going on in our minds? 299 00:35:25,790 --> 00:35:33,970 When Hume talks about impressions of reflection, he characteristically means feelings, passions, desires. 300 00:35:33,970 --> 00:35:43,030 I'm wondering if when he came to talk about the impression of necessary connexion Hume was reverting to the Lockey idea idea, 301 00:35:43,030 --> 00:35:52,090 he was thinking When we make an inference, we have an awareness of making the inference, whereas it were monitoring what's going on inside our mind. 302 00:35:52,090 --> 00:35:57,610 And when we see an and find ourselves inferring a b, it's the awareness of making the inference. 303 00:35:57,610 --> 00:36:06,240 It's the inference reality of it that is giving us that crucial idea of necessary connexion. 304 00:36:06,240 --> 00:36:14,400 If this passage from the enquiry, I think, is particularly striking here, and he talks about that inference of the understanding, 305 00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:19,800 which is the only connexion that we can have any comprehension of, right? 306 00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:31,180 If if Hume is looking for the source of the idea of consequentialist, how it can be that we get at all the idea of one thing following from another. 307 00:36:31,180 --> 00:36:41,110 Our actually making an inference when we see one and infer the other may be the only kind of consequence reality that has the kind of mental intimacy, 308 00:36:41,110 --> 00:36:51,940 this enables us to get that idea. So I suspect that when he discusses when he talks about the inference as being the impression, 309 00:36:51,940 --> 00:36:58,840 he must mean awareness of the inference, it's not clear that Hume himself fully, you know, he never acknowledged this. 310 00:36:58,840 --> 00:37:09,420 He never revised his theory of reflection and so on. But on Hume's behalf, that's the best I can do for him. 311 00:37:09,420 --> 00:37:14,700 OK, we then get some notorious statements in the treaties. 312 00:37:14,700 --> 00:37:26,930 Saying that necessity is in the mind, not in objects. And there are some of the striking quotes have also made some references to others. 313 00:37:26,930 --> 00:37:37,620 And you might misinterpret this, first of all. He is not saying that when we look at billiard balls or whatever, we don't perceive any necessity. 314 00:37:37,620 --> 00:37:41,590 But when we look at the operations of our mines, we do perceive a necessity. 315 00:37:41,590 --> 00:37:52,900 He's certainly not saying that the one three, 14, 29, rather when we can find ourselves inferring be. 316 00:37:52,900 --> 00:37:59,020 The only thing that is there for us to notice is the fact that we are finding 317 00:37:59,020 --> 00:38:02,620 ourselves making the inference is not that we're perceiving any necessity. 318 00:38:02,620 --> 00:38:10,120 It's just that the only kind of necessity that's there at all is the fact that we make the inference. 319 00:38:10,120 --> 00:38:16,140 We can't even make sense of any necessity in objects. 320 00:38:16,140 --> 00:38:18,320 Apparently. 321 00:38:18,320 --> 00:38:26,690 Now, people will find a natural bias against this view, this might might seem crazy, you know, the idea that necessity is in the mind, not in objects, 322 00:38:26,690 --> 00:38:40,040 and we'll see that Hume expresses some quotes to he sort of puts words in the mouth of a supposed opponent, saying how ridiculous this may seem. 323 00:38:40,040 --> 00:38:45,530 He thinks we're naturally biased against this view because the mind has a great propensity to spread 324 00:38:45,530 --> 00:38:51,200 itself on external objects and to conjoin them with any internal impressions which they occassion. 325 00:38:51,200 --> 00:38:57,760 Now that's a famous passage it's commonly read just to show that humans are projected IST. 326 00:38:57,760 --> 00:39:06,490 Please note, Hume here is criticising this tendency. He's saying most people will be biased against my theory and the reason they'll be biased 327 00:39:06,490 --> 00:39:13,660 against it is because they are inclined to spread their ideas on external objects. 328 00:39:13,660 --> 00:39:22,510 The same thing comes up in the enquiry again, it's a mistake the vulgar have a mistaken idea of power because they take something that 329 00:39:22,510 --> 00:39:32,360 is actually internal to their minds and they try to spread it on external objects. 330 00:39:32,360 --> 00:39:35,210 But though the account I've given, says Hume, 331 00:39:35,210 --> 00:39:44,000 that basically we don't get necessity from perceiving ending is still out there only from as it were feeling it in our mind or being aware of it. 332 00:39:44,000 --> 00:39:49,140 The transition? Though this be the only reasonable account we can given necessity, 333 00:39:49,140 --> 00:39:53,970 I doubt not that my sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. 334 00:39:53,970 --> 00:39:59,130 What the efficacy, of course, is lie in the determination of the mind, 335 00:39:59,130 --> 00:40:03,780 as if causes didn't operate entirely independent of the mind and wouldn't continue their operation, 336 00:40:03,780 --> 00:40:10,080 even though there was no mind existent to contemplate them and so forth. 337 00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:13,260 Now, in response to actually stand his ground, 338 00:40:13,260 --> 00:40:19,860 I can only reply to all these arguments that the cases here much the same as if a blind man should pretend to find a 339 00:40:19,860 --> 00:40:26,070 great many absurdities in the supposition that the colour of scarlet is not the same with the sound of a trumpet, 340 00:40:26,070 --> 00:40:33,750 nor like the same with solidity. If we really have no idea of a power or efficacy in any object or of any real connexion between its 341 00:40:33,750 --> 00:40:39,750 causes and effects will be to little purpose to prove that an efficacy is necessary in all operations. 342 00:40:39,750 --> 00:40:47,280 We do not understand our own meaning in talking. So in other words, he's sticking with his koppie principle. 343 00:40:47,280 --> 00:40:53,250 You may think this is absurd, but you don't even have an idea to express what you are trying to say. 344 00:40:53,250 --> 00:40:58,600 It's like the blind man who's been told that Scarlett is like the sound of a trumpet. 345 00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:05,460 And literally, when he thinks of this, a scholar just thinks of the sound of the trumpet. 346 00:41:05,460 --> 00:41:11,130 He hasn't got any idea of what Scarlett really is, and you haven't got any idea. 347 00:41:11,130 --> 00:41:16,830 We haven't got any idea of what necessity in object actually would be. 348 00:41:16,830 --> 00:41:23,480 So. My solution is the only one going. 349 00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:35,030 So in a sense, necessity is only in the mind, it seems. But that doesn't mean that causation cannot be objective. 350 00:41:35,030 --> 00:41:40,850 Objects do bear to each other relations of contiguity in succession and constant conjunction, 351 00:41:40,850 --> 00:41:46,610 and all that is independent of an antecedent to the operations of the understanding. 352 00:41:46,610 --> 00:41:56,700 So who does think that causation has an objective correlate as well as having this internal aspect? 353 00:41:56,700 --> 00:42:01,440 And he somewhat confusingly gives two definitions of calls. 354 00:42:01,440 --> 00:42:08,370 One of them focussing on regular session. What's there objectively, if you like in the objects? 355 00:42:08,370 --> 00:42:14,220 And one of them focussing on our tendency to draw inferences. 356 00:42:14,220 --> 00:42:20,520 One thing I want to notice that's often overlooked. He also gives two definitions of necessity. 357 00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:26,220 So we've got two definitions of cores and two definitions of necessity. 358 00:42:26,220 --> 00:42:36,180 And Hume distinguishes these. For example, in the index of the first enquiry, he they've got separate index entries. 359 00:42:36,180 --> 00:42:42,320 And. When he's talking about definition of cause. 360 00:42:42,320 --> 00:42:48,920 He's talking about identifying an object, which is a cause e.g. a. 361 00:42:48,920 --> 00:42:55,490 When he's talking about necessity, he's talking about the relation between A and B. 362 00:42:55,490 --> 00:43:00,360 And it's important to bear that in mind for a reason I'll come through in a sec. 363 00:43:00,360 --> 00:43:03,900 So here we've got the two definitions in the treaties. 364 00:43:03,900 --> 00:43:09,510 We may define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to another and where all the objects resembling 365 00:43:09,510 --> 00:43:15,420 the former are placed in like relations of presidency and contiguity to those objects which resemble the latter. 366 00:43:15,420 --> 00:43:22,740 So that's the objective one constant conjunction. And then the second definition, an object precedent and contiguous to another. 367 00:43:22,740 --> 00:43:28,200 And so united with it that the idea of the one determines the idea to form the idea of the other. 368 00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:31,510 And the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. 369 00:43:31,510 --> 00:43:41,280 So that's where there's a particular and b that we see together and an association link has been set up in our mind between them, 370 00:43:41,280 --> 00:43:50,940 presumably because of past constant conjunction. Now you'll notice that in the middle between those, we get the comment. 371 00:43:50,940 --> 00:43:58,030 If this definition be esteemed defective because drawn from objects foreign to the cause. 372 00:43:58,030 --> 00:44:05,500 And at the end, should this definition also be rejected for the same reason, it might seem that Hume thinks his own definitions of defective. 373 00:44:05,500 --> 00:44:09,490 He's not saying they're defective. He's saying other people might think they're defective. 374 00:44:09,490 --> 00:44:14,000 And here's a reason why. They're drawn from objects foreign to the cause. 375 00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:20,350 What does that mean? Well, I'm trying to identify a as a cause. 376 00:44:20,350 --> 00:44:27,040 I can only do that by reference to other A's and B's, by reference to past constant conjunctions. 377 00:44:27,040 --> 00:44:34,480 There's nothing within a that you can point to by itself that will identify it as a cause. 378 00:44:34,480 --> 00:44:38,530 In the enquiry, Hume calls this an inconvenience. 379 00:44:38,530 --> 00:44:49,520 Now, Galen Straus, amongst others, has made a lot about these comments and suggested this shows that Hume thinks his own definition is inadequate. 380 00:44:49,520 --> 00:44:51,330 And I want to resist that, 381 00:44:51,330 --> 00:45:01,140 partly because Hume hasn't actually said that he's simply pointing out the inconvenience that you cannot find necessity in a single instance, 382 00:45:01,140 --> 00:45:06,960 but also because these comments only apply to the definitions, of course not the definitions of necessity. 383 00:45:06,960 --> 00:45:12,600 And he uses the definitions of necessity, very importantly, when he's discussing liberty in necessity. 384 00:45:12,600 --> 00:45:18,090 And he never suggests that there's anything wrong with those. He's drawing big conclusions from them. 385 00:45:18,090 --> 00:45:26,550 So we need to be very cautious when we see people claim making that claim against Hume's definitions. 386 00:45:26,550 --> 00:45:28,800 But that clearly is an issue with the two definitions. 387 00:45:28,800 --> 00:45:35,610 There's something funny about them because they're not co extensive, and Hume is clearly aware of this. 388 00:45:35,610 --> 00:45:43,140 We've already seen that Hume drawing a distinction between philosophies and the vulgar and talking about prejudices and so on. 389 00:45:43,140 --> 00:45:49,530 Sometimes we make inferences assuming that there's a constant conjunction when there really isn't. 390 00:45:49,530 --> 00:45:56,530 Sometimes we are completely unaware of constant what constant conjunctions there may be. 391 00:45:56,530 --> 00:45:59,860 So how do we make sense of this? 392 00:45:59,860 --> 00:46:09,420 It seems to me very unlikely that Hume, with his definitions, is purporting to give necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a cause. 393 00:46:09,420 --> 00:46:14,790 Because the two definitions are so obviously not extensive. 394 00:46:14,790 --> 00:46:21,390 But I suggest that there is a fairly straightforward way of understanding the two definitions. 395 00:46:21,390 --> 00:46:30,450 One of them is in terms of giving the source of the idea and the other one is in terms of giving criteria for applying the idea. 396 00:46:30,450 --> 00:46:36,350 I've put quite a lot of detail in the slide. I'm going to go over this quite quickly. 397 00:46:36,350 --> 00:46:48,280 So the idea is this. Literally, the idea is this we get the idea of necessary connexion from making causal inferences. 398 00:46:48,280 --> 00:46:55,720 If we did not have the tendency to make causal inferences by custom, we would never even get that idea. 399 00:46:55,720 --> 00:47:01,450 But having once got the idea, the question is how should we apply it? 400 00:47:01,450 --> 00:47:05,500 And we have seen that Hume thinks we should apply it in a disciplined way. 401 00:47:05,500 --> 00:47:11,230 We should search for hidden causes. We should work out high level general rules. 402 00:47:11,230 --> 00:47:17,560 And indeed, we should apply some rules, which Hume is just about to present in the immediately following section. 403 00:47:17,560 --> 00:47:23,450 The rules by which to judge of causes and effects. So we'll come to those in a moment. 404 00:47:23,450 --> 00:47:31,640 Now, there's a parallel to this in Hume's treatment of virtue or personal merit in the second enquiry. 405 00:47:31,640 --> 00:47:35,240 This is the enquiry concerning the principles of morals. 406 00:47:35,240 --> 00:47:44,750 So on the one hand, personal merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others. 407 00:47:44,750 --> 00:47:52,430 And then he refers back to that as a definition so useful, agreeable or agreeable to oneself or others. 408 00:47:52,430 --> 00:48:02,090 But then in the appendix, he says my hypothesis defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator. 409 00:48:02,090 --> 00:48:14,260 The pleasing sentiment of approbation. So to be very quick about this, Hugh thinks that unless we have the tendency to feel moral approbation. 410 00:48:14,260 --> 00:48:23,140 Were it not for the fact that when I consider certain actions from an abstract point of view without considering my own involvement there? 411 00:48:23,140 --> 00:48:27,850 I will feel approval or disapproval. Oh, that was a kind action. 412 00:48:27,850 --> 00:48:34,820 It doesn't bring any benefit to me, but I approve of it in a general way because it was a kind action or whatever. 413 00:48:34,820 --> 00:48:41,690 If I never felt those kinds of approval or disapproval, I wouldn't understand even what morality is all about. 414 00:48:41,690 --> 00:48:48,230 But having once got those conceptions that then becomes a question of when should we appropriately apply them? 415 00:48:48,230 --> 00:48:53,150 I've got the idea of what a virtue is. Now, where should I apply it? 416 00:48:53,150 --> 00:48:58,070 And Hume's hypothesis is that actually we should only apply the notion of 417 00:48:58,070 --> 00:49:04,670 virtue to mental qualities that are useful or agreeable to oneself or others. 418 00:49:04,670 --> 00:49:17,910 And there's a lovely passage, famous passage in the second enquiry, where we see Hume correcting the list of virtues and vices accordingly. 419 00:49:17,910 --> 00:49:23,040 Every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is allowed to be a part of 420 00:49:23,040 --> 00:49:29,010 personal merit and no other will ever be received where men judge of things by their natural, 421 00:49:29,010 --> 00:49:38,410 unprejudiced reason. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, 422 00:49:38,410 --> 00:49:49,210 solitude and the whole train of monkish virtues are everywhere rejected by men of sense because they serve to no manner of purpose. 423 00:49:49,210 --> 00:49:54,790 Neither advance a man's fortune in the world nor render him a more valuable member of society, 424 00:49:54,790 --> 00:50:00,970 nor qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self enjoyment. 425 00:50:00,970 --> 00:50:05,290 We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends, 426 00:50:05,290 --> 00:50:10,900 stupefied the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. 427 00:50:10,900 --> 00:50:17,890 We justly therefore transfer them to the opposite column and place them in the catalogue of vices. 428 00:50:17,890 --> 00:50:25,210 He goes on to say that the gloomy, harebrained enthusiast may, after his death, have a place in the calendar. 429 00:50:25,210 --> 00:50:28,810 In other words, may be made a saint but will seldom win alive, 430 00:50:28,810 --> 00:50:37,250 be allowed into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself. 431 00:50:37,250 --> 00:50:46,340 So a paragraph that I'm sure Hume greatly enjoyed writing. So what you me saying here is there are some things that people counters virtues, 432 00:50:46,340 --> 00:50:55,940 but actually they should be counted as vices because they don't satisfy the criterion of being useful or agreeable to oneself or others. 433 00:50:55,940 --> 00:51:00,890 So we've got two definitions of virtue. One gives us the general idea. 434 00:51:00,890 --> 00:51:10,480 The other one specifies how we should apply it. And I'm suggesting that the same kind of thing applies to the two definitions, of course. 435 00:51:10,480 --> 00:51:15,730 I mentioned in the first lecture that Hume draws certain corollaries from his definitions. 436 00:51:15,730 --> 00:51:27,150 Here they are. I've already mentioned that immediately after having presented his definitions and those corollaries, Hugh, in the very next section. 437 00:51:27,150 --> 00:51:31,730 Hume presents rules by which to judge of causes and effects. 438 00:51:31,730 --> 00:51:44,270 And again, we get more precise criteria for applying the idea, of course, and notice that humans is completely objectivist in his language here. 439 00:51:44,270 --> 00:51:52,890 It may be proper to fix some general rules by which we may know when objects really are causes and effects. 440 00:51:52,890 --> 00:51:57,960 So again, you've got a contrast here between the apparent subjective ism that we've seen, 441 00:51:57,960 --> 00:52:06,540 and now he seems to be very objective is he sits down very clear rules about when things are to be denominated causes and effects. 442 00:52:06,540 --> 00:52:15,690 And you'll notice that the first three correspond to what we've already seen um, contiguity priority constant conjunction. 443 00:52:15,690 --> 00:52:23,820 So it looks like this is really a more precise specification. So, so the first definition of calls, it's sort of an approximation. 444 00:52:23,820 --> 00:52:37,680 And now he's spelling it out in more detail. OK, I want to end with two improvements to this account that come in the enquiry. 445 00:52:37,680 --> 00:52:47,730 The rules by which the judges, of course, is in effect may appear relatively sophisticated compared with the the very simple first definition, 446 00:52:47,730 --> 00:52:55,850 but you'll notice that it's all couched in terms of one discrete object being followed by another. 447 00:52:55,850 --> 00:53:00,380 The nearest we get to anything more sophisticated is in Rule seven, 448 00:53:00,380 --> 00:53:07,370 where we see one object increasing or diminishing with the increase or diminution of the of the calls. 449 00:53:07,370 --> 00:53:13,880 And then we start to think of that. It is a compounded effect derived from a compounded cause. 450 00:53:13,880 --> 00:53:22,730 But that's not what scientists do. Scientists don't just think in terms of one thing being followed by another. 451 00:53:22,730 --> 00:53:27,980 If they analyse billiard balls, they don't say, Oh, the first billiard ball move, then the second billiard ball moves. 452 00:53:27,980 --> 00:53:33,380 They say things like the first billiard ball was moving with such and such a speed in such and such a direction. 453 00:53:33,380 --> 00:53:39,380 It impacted the second one at such and such an angle. And they do calculations. 454 00:53:39,380 --> 00:53:45,410 Now in the first enquiry, but not in the treaties. Hume recognises this in the first enquiry. 455 00:53:45,410 --> 00:53:51,180 Hume starts talking about powers and forces. That's a quantitative. 456 00:53:51,180 --> 00:53:57,060 And I've put the various references that we've already seen this briefly with Hume's discussion of applied mathematics. 457 00:53:57,060 --> 00:54:02,490 So it seems to me that this is a major improvement between the treaties and the enquiry. 458 00:54:02,490 --> 00:54:10,470 He's recognised how science is done. One important impact of that, this is that in the enquiry, 459 00:54:10,470 --> 00:54:20,160 you find that Hume uses words like force and power and talks about hidden powers or secret powers, whereas in the treaties he hadn't. 460 00:54:20,160 --> 00:54:24,450 I think this is the explanation. 461 00:54:24,450 --> 00:54:33,750 Secondly, within the enquiry, we actually get a rejection, I believe, of the subjective ism that we saw in the treaties. 462 00:54:33,750 --> 00:54:43,620 So all those statements about how power and necessity are in the mind, not in objects in the enquiry, those go except for two passages. 463 00:54:43,620 --> 00:54:50,040 There are only two passages in the enquiry that hint at such a subjective ism. 464 00:54:50,040 --> 00:54:54,240 One of them is from a footnote in section eight, the necessity of any action, 465 00:54:54,240 --> 00:54:59,850 whether a matter of mind is not properly speaking, a quality, you mean a quality in the agent. 466 00:54:59,850 --> 00:55:07,620 But in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action and it considers chiefly consists chiefly 467 00:55:07,620 --> 00:55:13,410 in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding object. 468 00:55:13,410 --> 00:55:22,730 So he's here discussing freewill. And then we've got the second passage, B, when we say, therefore that one object is connected with another. 469 00:55:22,730 --> 00:55:27,540 We mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought. 470 00:55:27,540 --> 00:55:33,230 Those both seems objectivist. Neither of them, I think, carries much weight. 471 00:55:33,230 --> 00:55:38,750 The first one is actually copied, largely verbatim from the treaties. It's a footnote. 472 00:55:38,750 --> 00:55:43,790 It's designing. It's designed to explain the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty. 473 00:55:43,790 --> 00:55:48,650 And you'll notice that it ends by talking about a spectator who can commonly 474 00:55:48,650 --> 00:55:53,450 infer our actions from our motives and character and even where he cannot. 475 00:55:53,450 --> 00:56:01,310 He concludes in general that he might work. He perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper. 476 00:56:01,310 --> 00:56:08,870 And the most secret springs of our complexity and disposition. This is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine. 477 00:56:08,870 --> 00:56:16,160 So it's hypothetical. It's that a spectator who knew everything there was to know would be able to infer. 478 00:56:16,160 --> 00:56:25,120 And that's not the same as saying actual inference. The actual subjective inference is what constitutes causation. 479 00:56:25,120 --> 00:56:36,030 The second passage be we can be. Is even clearer, I think, if you read it in isolation. 480 00:56:36,030 --> 00:56:43,860 When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought. 481 00:56:43,860 --> 00:56:48,330 That gives a misleading impression, because immediately after that, 482 00:56:48,330 --> 00:56:56,190 we get the two definitions of calls and immediately after those in the very same paragraph, 483 00:56:56,190 --> 00:57:02,730 we get a statement that contradicts what was said in the previous paragraph. 484 00:57:02,730 --> 00:57:07,260 We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. 485 00:57:07,260 --> 00:57:09,210 But what do we mean by that affirmation? 486 00:57:09,210 --> 00:57:16,170 We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds, 487 00:57:16,170 --> 00:57:21,090 or that this vibration is followed by the sound and that upon the appearance of one, 488 00:57:21,090 --> 00:57:25,020 the mind anticipates the senses and forms immediately an idea of the other. 489 00:57:25,020 --> 00:57:29,460 We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights. 490 00:57:29,460 --> 00:57:32,220 But beyond these, we have no idea of it. 491 00:57:32,220 --> 00:57:40,910 So previously, he'd said we mean only one thing, and he's now very clearly very next paragraph saying we mean either this or this. 492 00:57:40,910 --> 00:57:51,200 So there is no passage in the enquiry that carries anything like the implications of radical subjective ism that we saw in the treaties, 493 00:57:51,200 --> 00:57:58,790 both works contain lots of evidence that Hume thinks cause a causal relations are genuine objective. 494 00:57:58,790 --> 00:58:06,698 We can discover them, we can do systematic science with them. Thank you very much.