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Last time we went through Alan Turing's 1950 paper on the Turing test.

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And today we're going to be looking a bit more at that, but mainly at some related issues to do with some other thought experiments and a

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kind of software that cast serious doubt on the Turing test in the last lecture.

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Next time, I'm going to be trying to bring threads together, looking at how Turing and Cell match up in this lecture, we're going to see.

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John Searle getting the upper hand, but I promise you that will be redressed.

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So first of all, a thought experiment from Net Block, very aptly called Blockhead, though I don't think he gave it that name.

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So the idea is that the Turing test cannot be a good test of intelligence because you can imagine you can

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do a thought experiment of a system that would pass the Turing test and yet very clearly be mindless,

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unintelligent. So let's suppose we imagine every possible sensible conversation of a given length being stored.

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So humongous range of all the possible sensible conversations that you could have in English.

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And imagine then that we have a system which goes through the ease.

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And when it gets an input that presumably a sensible input from its interlocutor,

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it looks through all the sensible conversations until it finds one that matches and then it gives the appropriate response.

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Now, clearly, if that were to be done, then what comes from the machine will be a sensible conversation.

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So in that case, it would pass the Turing test, but nevertheless, it clearly isn't an intelligent system because it's just a gigantic look up table.

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There's no understanding there. We can't call it intelligent. All right.

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Let's just, first of all, do a little reality check on this thought experiment.

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One thing I'd advise you quite generally when you come across a thought experiment in philosophy and there are lots of them.

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It's always worth asking, is this the least bit plausible?

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Because if it isn't, that might cast doubt on it. Okay, so let's just so that we've got some numbers to play with.

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Imagine that we're thinking of a conversation which has 10 sentences, each one from the of one from the respondent.

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And imagine that on average, each of these sentences is 10 words.

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Let's suppose that on average, each word can be chosen from a menu of about 100 choices.

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Right? I mean, there are thousands, tens of thousands of words in English, so we're being pretty modest here.

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But let's just get a ballpark figure. How many conversations does that generate?

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Well, we've got 20 sentences, each involving 10 words and each of those words chosen from a menu of 100 choices.

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So the number of conversations here is about 100 to the 200, which is 10 to the 400.

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Now, the number of atoms in the universe is probably around about 10 to the 80.

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So imagine replacing every atom in the main in the known universe with a complete universe.

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How many atoms do we now have? Well, 10 to 160.

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Imagine doing the same thing three more times, taking every atom and replacing it with a complete universe.

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When you've done that, a total of four times you have 10 to the 400 atoms.

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That's how many conversations we're talking about. OK.

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So it's not that this thought experiment is just a little bit implausible.

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It's absolutely outrageously implausible. And we're only talking here about a conversation that involves 10 questions and replies, OK.

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Now, suppose you imagine a system that exhibits some impressive behaviour.

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Is that enough to attribute it with intelligence? Well, we could mean two things here that there could be two different questions we're asking.

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On the one hand, we might be asking whether that behaviour is definitive of intelligence.

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So anything that behaves like that is correctly described as intelligent just in virtue of that behaviour.

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That's one thing we could mean, but the other thing we could mean is that the behaviour provides strong evidence of intelligence

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because the behaviour could only plausibly be generated by something that is intelligent.

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And those are two different things, right? One says this behaviour is, by definition, intelligent.

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This one says it's strong evidence of intelligence.

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Now, when we come across thought experiments like Blockhead, I want to suggest that our intuitive reaction to it.

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You know, we say, Oh, that clearly isn't intelligent. It's just a giant look up table.

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All right. That reaction suggests that we're not thinking of intelligence as merely to be measured by the appropriate behaviour.

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But actually what we want is behaviour that generated cleverly with limited resources, not just a look up table, but notice in any way.

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But anyway, in practise, the two comes at the same thing. I thought experiments can float free of any plausible reality.

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But if we look in practise, Blockhead just could not exist.

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It's not a plausible thought experiment. So in practise,

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in order to generate the kind of behaviour that we think of as if it's strong evidence of intelligence

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that could only come about by having some pretty nifty processing underneath some clever processing,

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at least it seems that way.

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So I want to suggest that the bloc had thought experiment actually shouldn't be given too much weight and to press home that point,

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I want to give you a different thought experiment.

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Suppose I provide you with a chess playing programme and it plays chess at grandmaster level in real time.

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Would you say that shows that it's at least intelligent at playing chess?

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Well, you might think so, but here's a thought experiment on the other side.

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Suppose someone were to write a computer programme of only about 50 lines of code in a standard general programming language?

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All right, no packages that you can import or anything like that.

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So 50 lines of code which could play chess at a Grandmaster 11 in real time.

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Such a crude programme could not possibly count as genuinely intelligent.

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I mean, I ask you 50 lines of code. All right. Hence, Grandmaster performance chess is not a reliable proof, even if intelligent chess play.

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What I want to suggest is that's a rubbish argument. It's a rubbish argument because the hypothesis that it's based on.

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But you could even have a computer programme that plays grandmaster chess in real time and only 50 lines long is plainly crazy.

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So we should not be persuaded by this kind of argument. I mean, you can see you could make that argument.

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I've chosen chess, but you could make it about any domain. So what I'm suggesting to you is we should be very sceptical about thought experiments

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that are just completely beyond any bounds of plausibility that they come to cheaply.

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You can invent one like this far too easily, and it appeals to our intuitions in certain ways.

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But I'm suggesting that our intuitions shouldn't be allowed to be pulled too much by thought experiments that are so far from reality.

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Very nice quote here from Dan Dennett talking about thought experiments.

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If you look at the history of philosophy,

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you see that all the great and influential stuff has been technically full of holes, but utterly memorable and vivid.

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I think he's slightly exaggerating, but not all the great and influential stuff, but some of it.

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They are what I call intuition pumps, lovely thought experiments like Plato's Cave and Descartes Evil Demon and Hobbes edition of the

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State of Nature in the social contract and even Kemp's idea of the categorical imperative.

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I don't know of any philosopher who thinks that any one of those is a logically sound argument for anything.

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I suspect there are some who do, but their wonderful imagination grabbers, jungle gyms for our imagination.

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They structure the way you think about a problem. These are the real legacy of the history of philosophy.

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Okay. So I think there's a lot in this. I mean, the idea of a thought experiment is as pumping our intuitions is a very strong one.

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But let's look a bit more closely at what that's doing. The thought experiments are trying to illuminate one thing, for example,

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the nature of the world or the social order by harnessing our familiar understanding of something else.

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So Plato's analogy of the cave, you've got shadows cast by a fire, and that's supposed to tell us something about the way the world is.

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Social contract theories suggest that our interactions in the social order are somewhat similar to making an explicit contract.

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So we're encouraged to see one thing as relevantly similar to the other.

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And that can pull our judgements in particular directions regarding that thing.

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The same would be true of computer analogies, so obviously comparing the mind to a computer programme.

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Richard Dawkins gives another example he compares a religion to a computer virus.

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He suggests that religious beliefs have certain characteristics which make

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them spread in a very fertile way in the mind without a critical examination.

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But the problem is that different analogies can easily suggest quite different conclusions.

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So the problem with thought experiments is that they don't necessarily point as ambiguous

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unambiguously in a single direction or a direction that is necessarily merited.

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OK, we'll be coming back to this later. But now I want to introduce the thought experiment, which is nearly as famous as the Turing test.

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John Sayles Chinese room OK, so we imagine a conversation conducted in written Chinese.

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It's very like the Turing test, except that the participant in the Turing test, the one who's giving the responses, is somebody enclosed in a room.

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All right. And like me, who understands English, knows no Chinese at all.

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But the conversation is in fact conducted in Chinese,

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so we have a Chinese speaker who writes questions on one side of a card and posts them into the room and then

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the person in the room that's me has to consult various rulebooks to decide how to process what's written down.

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And then I write down on the other side of the card some symbols which turn out to be Chinese symbols,

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giving meaningful answers to the question that's been posted in.

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Okay, so the guy in the room that's me has no knowledge, whatever of the Chinese language or the meaning,

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the significance of the symbols he's reading or writing. So that's the word semantics here.

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But as far as I'm concerned, when I see these symbols, they have no semantics, no meaning for me.

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Instead, on generating my written answers by strictly applying rules based purely on the syntax that is the shape and

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the structure of the character strings that come in and so gives a very helpful example here of what he means.

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Take a squiggle squiggles sign out of basket number one and put it next to a squiggle squiggle sign from basket number two.

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I've been unable to discern from Chinese friends exactly which symbol is the squiggle squiggle sign or the scroll scroll,

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but maybe get his cartoon from Wicked.

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Wikimedia Commons Commons showing a very simplified version of the Chinese room.

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Notice that this is completely ridiculous.

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We've got individual symbols coming in and going out, and the guy is consulting a single rulebook which looks extremely crude.

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There's no way that's going to produce meaningful answers in a Turing test like situation, right?

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When the questions coming in could be many and varied.

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Vladimir, whose computer science philosophy student at Harvard, has kindly produced an illustration which is a little bit more realistic.

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So here's the guy in the Chinese room income. The questions outgo his answers.

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He's got a huge library of books. He's identifying the symbols.

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This book is telling him right down to this other book page such and such, and you can see that he's got a box of counters there,

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and he's constructing the symbols over here, and there are directions to other various rooms.

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And here there is a map of the whole layout just making clear that we've got an absolutely huge building.

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And maybe, maybe that's a little bit more plausible.

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Well, it's got a lot more plausible than that. Whether it's actually plausible.

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Well, maybe, maybe not.

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But it's a it's a far better step of the kind of sophistication that would be required to fit the Chinese room to get off the ground.

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Okay, so just a point. The original version of the Chinese room is different from from the well-known one, so actually started out in 1980,

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giving a context in which the questions were limited to understanding of a story told in Chinese.

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So a story is produced in Chinese, and then what the guy has to do is answer questions about it.

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So far more limited than a Turing test, but in 1984, so emboldened went beyond that.

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And basically we have a Turing test conducted through the Chinese room.

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OK. What he sells conclusion from all this.

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Well, clearly the man in the room that's me does not understand Chinese, OK?

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Nobody's going to argue that I in the room operating or doing all these symbols without a clue what any of the symbols mean understands Chinese.

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I clearly don't. But I am producing meaningful replies.

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Moral understanding a language or indeed having mental states at all involves more than just having a bunch of formal symbols.

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It involves having an interpretation or a meaning attached to those symbols.

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Computer programmes like the rules, followed by the man in the room, are purely formally specified.

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That is, they have no semantic content. But in fact, Seoul's conclusion,

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or you know what it is that he's denying he's actually not so easy to pin down and

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Searle is rather slippery on this will come back to this in the next lecture, we'll see.

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There's a there's a reason why he's somewhat slippery. But here I want to draw your attention to it.

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So most of the time, he expresses his thesis as a denial of intentionality or semantic content.

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Intentionality, by the way, is and the way in which words and thoughts reach out to things in the world.

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So suppose we take the word tree in Chinese.

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If you're a Chinese speaker for you, that word has intentionality.

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You see the word and you think of trees out there in the world.

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But for me, if I see that symbol, it has no such intentionality.

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I see the symbol. I see it shape, but I've no idea what it refers to.

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OK, so Seoul denies intentionality to the Chinese room semantic content,

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but he also denies that the digital machines can have a mind mental states, mental content, cognitive states, cognitive processes.

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And he describes his argument as attacking the claim of strong artificial intelligence that digital machines can think or have consciousness.

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Now that is a very wide range of claims that seem to me to be potentially very different.

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I've given some citations there so you can follow them up.

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His most cautious interpretation is to say that what cannot happen is that digital computers have semantic state,

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meaningful state purely in virtue of following a symbolic algorithm.

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So that seems a relatively modest claim.

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OK, so that the claim is here I am in the Chinese room processing these symbols.

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I am just following a symbolic algorithm there, and purely in virtue of that,

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my the state that I am manipulating, whether in my mind or in the room, have no semantic significance.

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If they have any semantic significance, they have going to have to acquire it from something more than the formal algorithm.

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But he often goes beyond that as we'll see one point, by the way.

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Just like Alan Turing in his paper, do you remember when he said we exclude men born in the usual way in exactly the same way?

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So is does not want to say that machines can't think because we are machines and we can think,

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at least in his book, but it's digital computers again that can't think.

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And here he's clarifying in virtue of following an algorithm. OK, I'm not going to look at two main replies to cells thought experiment.

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Say we'll be coming back to this next time and digging in a bit deeper.

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But for now, I think these are the two most popular replies, and they're ones that I think particularly important.

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So here's the system reply. OK. The man in the room, you know, I'm processing all these things.

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I don't understand Chinese. That's uncontroversial.

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But now think about the room itself, the room containing me containing the books containing the symbols containing the,

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you know, all the rules that whole system enclosed in the room is actually handling Chinese in an intelligent way.

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Questions are coming in. Intelligent responses are going out.

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Maybe there's understanding that even if I in the room as if you like the central processor unit of the room, I don't have understanding of Chinese.

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Nevertheless, the whole system does. I'm so, so rebuts that he says this is subject to exactly the same objection.

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There is no way that the system can get from the syntax to the semantics.

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I, as the central processing unit, have no way of figuring out what any of these symbols means, but then neither does the whole system.

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Okay. For the moment, I want to just point out and I'm and this is a reference to Copeland's very useful book,

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which I've mentioned before in these lectures. He points out that sells rebuttal here just begs the question, right?

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As a matter of logic, the fact that the man in the room doesn't understand Chinese does not prove that the room doesn't understand Chinese.

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He gives the the following argument bill the cleaner has never sold pyjamas to Korea.

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Therefore, Bill's company has never sold pyjamas to Korea. OK, that's obviously a bad argument.

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Okay. The point is that a component of a system can lack a property that the whole system has.

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So the fact that the man doesn't understand Chinese as a matter of logic does not

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imply that the whole system of which he's a part doesn't understand Chinese.

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So if Sir wants to rebut the system reply, he has to give a more positive argument.

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Of course, the Chinese room still remains false an intuition pump because you might be thinking,

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you know, Okay, Copeland, you've pointed out this footlong response.

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You know that the argument isn't strictly logically valid that come on,

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we all know that a room can't understand anything, you know, in that thought experiment.

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The only plausible understand is the man. So if he doesn't understand Chinese, then nothing there understands Chinese.

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Yeah, OK.

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But if that's the way you're going to argue, you are putting a lot of weight on the thought experiment, which, as we said, is a very implausible one.

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OK. It seems very strange to invent a thought experiment which is so distant from reality

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and then appeal ultimately just to rather basic intuitions about it in that way.

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We want to actually have a more forceful argument. OK, the second reply very popular one is the robot reply.

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So bear in mind that so is putting a lot of emphasis on what he calls semantic content or intentionality.

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And I said intentionality is to do with symbols being able to, as it were,

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reach out to the world to refer to things if we have intentional states like beliefs and desires.

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These are beliefs about things, desires for things.

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They're intentional in that they refer beyond us to things outside.

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OK, now suppose then we take a system like the Chinese room and imagine that it's actually embedded in the world.

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So instead of just having input and output through a through the slots, you know, with questions coming in and answers going back,

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suppose the room were actually connected up to robotic sensors and effectors so that

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the output from the room instead of just being some written symbols in Chinese.

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Instead, the output actually is movements, actions and so forth.

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Well. So it's essentially the same reply as long as we suppose that the robot has only a computer for a brain or,

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you know, the man in the Chinese room being here, the analogue for the computer.

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Then, even though it might behave exactly as if you'd understood Chinese,

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it would still have no way of getting from the syntax to the semantics of Chinese.

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You can see this if you imagine that I am the computer inside a room in the robot's skull.

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I shuffle symbols without knowing that some of them come into me from television cameras

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attached to the robot's head and others go out to move the robot's arms and legs.

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As long as all I have is a formal computer programme. I have no way of attaching any meaning to any of the symbols.

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OK. And again, that probably seems quite plausible. There I am in the Chinese room.

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I'm still in the same position. I mean, I'm getting these symbols in.

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I'm putting symbols out the fact that those are acting as inputs to some motors,

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which are moving the robot around in the world and doing actual things, simulating a comprehending of Chinese.

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You know, imagine the robot is actually interacting with Chinese people.

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Where in the world? And imagine that the symbols that come into me are being taken from microphones and so forth involving Chinese people.

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I there in the robot skull have no knowledge of that at all.

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So again, it seems that the symbols have no semantic content, at least again, that's the claim.

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So we're going to return to this in the last lecture for now.

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I just want you to notice the intimate connexion between cells, Johnny's room and the Turing Test.

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Both of them postulate an algorithmic system capable of generating conversation

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that's indistinguishable in quality from that of an intelligent native speaker.

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But they draw opposite conclusions. So Turing, in effect, is saying something like this.

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Think of the the sonnet example in his paper.

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Imagine a computer programme that's able to converse like this.

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How could you possibly deny that it's genuinely intelligent? It seems quite plausible, right?

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Which Chip Searle is saying? Imagine a computer programme that conducts its conversation using crudely

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syntactic processes like this the man in the room with the baskets and the rolls.

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How could you possibly claim that it's genuinely intelligent?

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So here we've got, you know, two thought experiments, one of them pulling us in one direction,

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one of us pulling in the other two contrary intuition pumps.

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Well, just like with Blockhead, let's go back to reality.

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As I say, we'll be coming back to this debate between them in the last lecture.

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But what I want to do right now is think about the plausibility of the thought experiments.

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Well, first of all, the Chinese room is completely and utterly implausible.

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Sophisticated linguistic behaviour being generated in real time by manually consulting books of rules contained in a room.

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No scope for sensory input, real time updating emotional reactions, let alone the complexity of the whole task.

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Interestingly, Turing's predictions in his paper are far more reasonable.

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So these are from section six of his paper. I drew your attention to them last time, but let's look in a bit more detail at them now.

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I believe that in about 50 years time,

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it will be possible to programme computers with a storage capacity of about a billion to make them play The Imitation Game so well that

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an average interrogator will not have more than 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.

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Second prediction the original question Can machines think, I believe, to be too meaningless to deserve discussion?

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Nevertheless, I believe that at the end of the century, the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one

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will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.

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OK, so I think the second prediction is actually quite reasonable.

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Certainly now imagine I'm playing against a computer playing chess,

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I'm looking at the screen and the screen is showing me the analysis that's currently going on within the computer.

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It shows me the lines that are being considered and it shows me the balance of material.

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And it shows me the overall verdict. So you come up and you say, Peter, why is the computer taking so long to respond?

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And I say it's thinking hard because it's realised that if he tries to defend

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against my attack by bringing its night over to protect the King Knight F6,

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I'll be able to grab its pawn on the other side. The Queen takes 87 percent.

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It's displaying now that it assesses the position is better for me.

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Materially, there's that minus one that it's got, you know, I'm going to be a pawn up,

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but it's predicting that it won't be too badly off it if it decides to let the pawn fall.

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Overall assessment minus nought point one. It's pulled down, but only minus nought point one, so it must think that it's got 0.9 of activity.

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So I think it must be expecting to get some activity to compensate. And what I want to claim is that conversation looks quite natural.

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All right. All of those words in red that are psychological words.

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Nowadays, we do apply them to computer systems without almost a second thought.

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Certainly, it would be. I would be very surprised if someone was so pedantic as to say, Well, of course,

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it's not literally thinking, it's not literally realise anything, it's not literally trying to do anything.

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And so the language seems very natural. In a computational context these days.

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So our thinking about these things has modified what about the other prediction that the Turing test by 2000?

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And will at least have been passed to this rather modest extent.

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There's an average interrogator will not have more than 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.

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Well, I suggest that that was actually eminently plausible in retrospect.

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I don't think it was actually achieved,

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but I think it could have been achieved if that had been what artificial intelligence researchers were trying to achieve.

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I think they'd have done it. But it's plausible for a bad reason.

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And those researchers were entirely right not to devote their efforts to achieving it.

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Let's see why. So I think this is one of the most unfortunate passages in Turing's entire paper because he gives the impression that a criterion

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for progress towards machine intelligence can be based on how well the programme can fool an average interrogator and for how long.

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And as a result, quite a lot of effort has gone in, not from serious A.I. researchers,

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but from others to try to pass the Turing test, according to that kind of criteria.

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But here's the problem. It turns out that fooling an average interrogator is relatively easy to achieve,

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but not by techniques that plausibly involve genuine, genuinely intelligent information processing.

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This, I suggest, is perhaps the fundamental problem with the Turing test.

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Here is a piece from the BBC website.

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I think it was in 2014. June 2014, the Turing test has finally been passed.

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Well, it's a nice bit of publicity for Reading University, but it's really not very plausible, as we shall see.

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But anyway, for the first time, we have Turing's criterion being met.

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OK, humans had no more than 70 percent chance of identifying which was the human which and which was the computer after five minutes of questioning.

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That's the claim to fame. What's going on here was revealed in 1966 by Joseph Eisenhower and Joseph Biden bound basically set

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the pattern for the way in which these things have worked since he published the ELIZA programme,

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together with a script showing how very simple text manipulation can generate a plausible conversation.

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Ingeniously, he had his chat bot playing the role of a rich and psychotherapist, echoing what the human says,

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expressing sympathy, asking gentle questions to elicit their feelings and so forth.

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And the computer responses are generated by making small changes to the human inputs, exchanging first and second person and so on.

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So here is some of the dialogue that he published.

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I'll explain later about the rather dramatic slides, but what I want to do is illustrate this.

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Using some software that I wrote called Elizabeth and Elizabeth is is a chat about creation system except negation of one.

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It allows you to look inside and see what's happening. So let's suppose I've gone to Elizabeth and I want a bit of counselling.

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Yes, like this, I hope, Will. Yeah. Sorry.

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My mum is sad. Tell me more about your family.

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OK. Hmm.

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There's clear understanding there isn't that pretty good.

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Oh, OK. Sorry.

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I can't see it on the screen in front of me, that's the problem we are.

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Yeah. Look at this, I'm very sceptical.

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I'm going to ask, can you think? All right.

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At that point, you will probably conclude this is all smoke and mirrors.

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It is all smoke and mirrors and we can I think there we are there.

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We can see what's going on within Elizabeth. You can actually see how the process is taking place.

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This group doesn't actually use any memory, but there's oh, I didn't try that, just pressing return.

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If I just press return, the response comes back. Can't you think of anything to say?

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The mum gets translated into mother, dad, into father. You can have as many input transformations as you like.

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Keyword transformations, you can see output right at the bottom.

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If the word stupid or idiot occurs that I don't think language like that is going to help.

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I think phrase why do you think phrase mother or father you get?

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Tell me more about your family. Are you the youngest in your family? What do you remember most about your childhood?

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Phrase one is younger than face to, so friends to is older than phrase one and so on.

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I mean, it is basically the responses are just pre-packaged.

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And of course, I've put in some ones about thinking and souls at the end just for a bit of a laugh.

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And that is all run by this script. So basically, you just edit the script and off it goes.

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One thing you can do with this, if you want to play with it, you can. I hope this will work if I open a same dialogue.

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If we are over here, you can't see this. I'm loading the files and bound dialogue and looks right.

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You can go. And now this is actually running the very dialogue that vies bound published, so I put it into Elizabeth, you can, as I say,

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try this on the web, and if I press function key too, we can see his dialogue, so you have to take my word for it.

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This is being produced in exactly the same way men are all alike, in what way they're always bugging us about something or other.

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Can you think of a specific example? Well, my boyfriend made me come here.

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Your boyfriend made you come here. He says, I'm depressed much of the time.

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I am sorry to hear you are depressed. It's true.

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I am unhappy. Do you think coming here will help you not to be unhappy?

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I need some help. That much seems certain. What would it mean to you if you got some help?

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Perhaps I could learn to get along with my mother. Tell me more about your family.

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You see where I got that one from? My mother takes care of me.

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Who else in your family takes care of you? My father.

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Your father can't do anything else with it. Just my father.

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Okay. Your father, sir, you are like my father in some ways.

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What resemblance do you see? You're not very aggressive, but I think you don't want me to notice that.

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What makes you think? I am not very aggressive? You don't argue with me.

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Why do you think I don't argue with you? You are afraid of me.

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Does it please you to believe I am afraid of you? My father is afraid of everybody.

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What else comes to mind when you think of your father? Bullies?

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Does that have anything to do with the fact that your boyfriend made you come here again?

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It is all smoke and mirrors. Moreover, I can reveal that in-bound cheated because in implementing his script as published,

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I had to reverse the order of a couple of the lines in order to get it to work.

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Clearly, he was doing it in such a way that he ended up with that really nice coincidence where you get bullies and the response.

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Does that have anything to do with the fact that your boyfriend made you come here?

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I can tell you the fact that that leads up with bullies was pure coincidence.

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So here's how it works. If you have the word alike in the input back comes the response.

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In what way? Most sentences containing the word alike?

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In what way is an appropriate response, something or other?

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Can you give an example? My ex, my boyfriend, made me come here.

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Your boyfriend made you come here. And by the way, remember the ex might be useful later.

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OK, I need wine. What if you got wine?

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What would it mean to you if you've got wine? So for my mother? All those questions about your family.

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My mother does such and such. Who else in your family does such and such?

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And then if there's no matching pattern, what you saw in my little script there was tell me what you liked doing here.

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One of the responses is, does that have anything to do with the fact that your ex remembered from earlier?

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OK? So it gives the impression of intelligence, but it isn't.

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OK, so let's be quite clear, chat bots are not intelligent.

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You can download my software, play around with it.

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You will very, very soon come to the conclusion that these are rather limited even buys and bound script, which is clever.

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I mean, it's extremely clever. It's got a lot of keywords in there.

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But you know, if you try to conduct any sort of sustained conversation with it, you'll find it extremely frustrating.

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They seem to confirm that Searle is right. You've got mere syntactic processing there.

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No semantics at all. Even the bit of them that looks most clever, right?

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The the switch you may have noticed and wondered about the switch between you and me.

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Sorry, where is the Oh, that's interesting, isn't it?

365
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That's very interesting. Let me go back to.

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The initial script that I showed you before, if I can get to it, sorry, I'm going the wrong way.

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There we are. Here we are.

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You can see the simple change from I am to you, are you all to I am I to you, me, to you and so forth.

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This is this is conducted. This happens in a very, very straightforward way.

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So the way I make Elisabeth work, it's a bit different from vice and bounds.

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That's why I was saying it's interesting vice and doesn't does everything through the key with transformations.

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And it so happens that if you take something like my sister is younger than me, you say so you are older than your sister.

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The change between me and you and my and your and so on happens very, very straightforwardly.

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So even the part of the manipulation gives the impression of most understanding is extremely crude.

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I mentioned the chatterbox that was supposed to pass the Turing test in 2014, or at least was claimed to be called Eugene Gusman.

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It's a chatter bot that claims to be a, I think, a 13 year old Ukrainian boy.

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It's a nice trick. Again, it's like having the Ruggieri and psychotherapist.

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The good thing about a Ukrainian boy is if that if the grammar goes wrong.

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All right. Well, what do you expect? Not a native speaker, right? So, you know, you can see here here.

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This is obtainable from the web. It's very much the same kind of thing.

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You've got simple patterns and responses. And this is part of a dialogue which a guy called Leonid Muszynski tried with the chat bot.

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The chat bot claims to be from Ukraine.

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Well, in that case, you want to know about what had happened in Odessa on May the 2nd that year, and it clearly showed no sign of knowing it at all.

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So basically, Chatterbox, if you try to have any sort of sensible conversation with them,

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a sustained conversation rather than just taking their rather vague outputs at face value, it quickly falls apart.

386
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No, I'm not saying crackpots are completely useless.

387
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They can actually be valuable precisely because we are so inclined to interpret their outputs as intelligent.

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Most people prefer to interact conversationally.

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And so you can have automated help systems and things like that that are based on chat bot technology.

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And often, I mean, imagine you have had an automated help system for tourists to Oxford.

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Most of the time, they will be asking questions that can be answered in a very straightforward way.

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So if you see botanic gardens say in the query, the chances are they want to know where the botanic gardens are and how to get there.

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So if you've got canned responses that give answers appropriately, that can be quite useful,

394
00:46:47,840 --> 00:46:55,280
and chat bot methods can succeed in eliciting information quite effectively.

395
00:46:55,280 --> 00:47:09,620
Just before you look at the next slide, I just want you to focus on the beautiful, low key design of that slide and compare it with this.

396
00:47:09,620 --> 00:47:18,590
So much at both, Elizabeth was picked up by a guy in a market research consultancy in Africa,

397
00:47:18,590 --> 00:47:28,340
and we did a pilot of a study whereby it was used to pick up information about people's mobile phone choices and why they change networks and so on.

398
00:47:28,340 --> 00:47:32,150
So we put kind of questions in in order to elicit that kind of thing.

399
00:47:32,150 --> 00:47:40,280
This is what the market research company did to my slide. So now you know why those earlier slides with Eliza?

400
00:47:40,280 --> 00:47:50,810
And they looked rather dramatic. I found an interesting experience, and one of the funniest things for me was just seeing this.

401
00:47:50,810 --> 00:47:53,820
OK, so let's let's look at the Turing test.

402
00:47:53,820 --> 00:48:03,440
The problem with the Turing test, I've pointed out, is, well, we know that it's not a necessary condition for intelligence.

403
00:48:03,440 --> 00:48:14,000
We've we've seen that Turing acknowledge that you can have things that are intelligent, that don't don't pass for humans.

404
00:48:14,000 --> 00:48:24,080
But unless we interpret it pretty rigorously, it's not sufficient. And that's ironically because of human lack of critical judgement.

405
00:48:24,080 --> 00:48:31,100
So it's our failure of intelligence that actually makes the Turing test an inappropriate test.

406
00:48:31,100 --> 00:48:37,400
And much of our conversation is sloppy and careless in normal life.

407
00:48:37,400 --> 00:48:41,990
You know, you go into a pub, listen to the conversation. A lot of it is very imprecise.

408
00:48:41,990 --> 00:48:51,840
That means that when we come across conversation, that is sloppy and imprecise, we regard it as having been output by an intelligent system.

409
00:48:51,840 --> 00:48:56,270
We read intelligence into it. We try to make sense of it.

410
00:48:56,270 --> 00:49:03,140
So if we have an interlocutor who comes out with the kind of vague responses that Eliza does,

411
00:49:03,140 --> 00:49:09,710
you know, vague, but somewhere in the right ballpark of relevant, we read more in.

412
00:49:09,710 --> 00:49:17,300
We read them as being caused by something that's genuinely intelligent where there is genuine meaning behind it.

413
00:49:17,300 --> 00:49:22,430
And in fact, there isn't. So it's a great shame,

414
00:49:22,430 --> 00:49:30,980
I think the cheering gave the impression that better performance in his test that means fooling us for longer is actually a criterion of intelligence.

415
00:49:30,980 --> 00:49:41,560
It just isn't. So it's a very implausible test if you interpret it in that way.

416
00:49:41,560 --> 00:49:47,950
We've seen it's more plausible as a sufficient condition for intelligence when interpreted more stringently.

417
00:49:47,950 --> 00:49:56,230
So if something produced conversation of the level of Turing's sonnet conversation across a wide range of fields,

418
00:49:56,230 --> 00:50:01,120
that might be a reasonable criterion for intelligence,

419
00:50:01,120 --> 00:50:06,160
at least in the sense of a sufficient criterion, you would think, yes, this is genuinely intelligent.

420
00:50:06,160 --> 00:50:12,730
If it can match that without having its responses, you know, candid and so forth.

421
00:50:12,730 --> 00:50:24,460
But then it seems inappropriate. Be demanding because if you end up with a conversation like that, it's going to be the more intelligence it reveals,

422
00:50:24,460 --> 00:50:32,020
the more material there is which may push us away from seeing it as human.

423
00:50:32,020 --> 00:50:41,860
And there's another problem as well. This is brought out in a paper by Robert French published in Mind in 1990.

424
00:50:41,860 --> 00:50:52,450
You might think this is overkill, but it's fairly easy to devise questions which elicit our cultural understanding of things,

425
00:50:52,450 --> 00:50:57,490
and it's hard to imagine that a computer could be programmed with any ease to do this.

426
00:50:57,490 --> 00:51:05,650
So, for example, right flood as the name of a glamorous model or a cuddly toy?

427
00:51:05,650 --> 00:51:14,080
Well, any native English speaker will see that fugly is a rather bad choice if you're a glamorous movie star, right?

428
00:51:14,080 --> 00:51:18,050
But cuddly toy? Yeah, that's that's that that works quite well.

429
00:51:18,050 --> 00:51:23,950
If you can imagine a baby having a flood, Lee, that's very dear to it.

430
00:51:23,950 --> 00:51:31,160
And questions like this rating things pulls on, draws on a lot of our cultural understanding of things,

431
00:51:31,160 --> 00:51:38,410
and it would be extremely difficult to programme a computer to be indistinguishable from a human in all those respects.

432
00:51:38,410 --> 00:51:43,420
But that really seems a bit irrelevant. I mean, it's this, isn't you?

433
00:51:43,420 --> 00:51:54,160
If you're testing for a computer being intelligent, these sorts of trick questions we feel shouldn't really be the main point.

434
00:51:54,160 --> 00:52:00,520
Okay, so the Turing test is a failure. But can we do better?

435
00:52:00,520 --> 00:52:08,410
Well, I think we can, actually. I'm just adding a couple of letters there and changing it to the tutoring test.

436
00:52:08,410 --> 00:52:16,540
So the big problem with the Turing test, OK, is it is to get plausible performance in a Turing test,

437
00:52:16,540 --> 00:52:20,140
at least, you know, five minutes of questioning, average interrogator and so on.

438
00:52:20,140 --> 00:52:25,840
The best way to go is deceit. You pretend to be something you're not.

439
00:52:25,840 --> 00:52:32,920
Now it's it's not at all desirable to have a test of intelligence, which depends on hiding things.

440
00:52:32,920 --> 00:52:39,310
Rather, we want to test that actually involves revealing things, revealing understanding.

441
00:52:39,310 --> 00:52:50,500
So suppose we imagine a system that's designed to tutor maybe in a limited domain will almost certainly in a limited domain, take chemistry.

442
00:52:50,500 --> 00:52:55,720
So chemistry is a very sophisticated subject.

443
00:52:55,720 --> 00:53:05,620
It's complicated, difficult. There are lots of things that linked together in order to learn chemistry of any sort of deep level,

444
00:53:05,620 --> 00:53:09,940
you need to understand complex informational structures and how they fit together.

445
00:53:09,940 --> 00:53:18,850
OK. Things to do with, you know, quantum schedules and how different elements and different molecules interact.

446
00:53:18,850 --> 00:53:24,550
Now, imagine you had a system which was designed to tutor chemistry.

447
00:53:24,550 --> 00:53:30,190
It's not going to pretend to be human. It's not going to try to be indistinguishable or anything like that.

448
00:53:30,190 --> 00:53:38,740
The test is how well can it tutor? So can someone who doesn't understand the various complexities of chemistry,

449
00:53:38,740 --> 00:53:45,490
go and interact with the system and then say at the end of an hour, it understands something.

450
00:53:45,490 --> 00:53:51,010
The person understands something which he or she didn't before and maybe understands

451
00:53:51,010 --> 00:53:56,800
it just as well as if they had been tutored by a competent human tutor.

452
00:53:56,800 --> 00:54:04,480
So there's something in the spirit of the Turing test. You write the test is can cabinet achieve the competence that a human could?

453
00:54:04,480 --> 00:54:13,870
But we've now got something which works by eliciting real understanding in a human and therefore the more

454
00:54:13,870 --> 00:54:19,870
it has built into it in terms of complex informational structures linking together in appropriate ways,

455
00:54:19,870 --> 00:54:26,980
the better it will do. It's revealing, understanding rather than pretending.

456
00:54:26,980 --> 00:54:33,350
And it has the considerable virtue also potentially of producing seriously useful products.

457
00:54:33,350 --> 00:54:38,120
I put this to Hugh Learner, who organises the LERVE No-Prize,

458
00:54:38,120 --> 00:54:43,220
suggesting that he might wish to reconfigure it in the future, but I'm afraid he's not interested.

459
00:54:43,220 --> 00:54:48,650
There we go. I tried. And that's it for today. See you for the last lecture next time.

460
00:54:48,650 --> 00:54:51,614
Thank you.