1 00:00:00,060 --> 00:00:10,740 Today, we're going to discuss Hume and his views on the Senate of Taste and with this lecture. 2 00:00:10,740 --> 00:00:15,840 It's the first lecture in which we're going to be discussing beauty at great length. 3 00:00:15,840 --> 00:00:22,200 And we'll also be covering this in the Kant lecture, which I think is probably going to extend over to lectures. 4 00:00:22,200 --> 00:00:26,670 I don't think it's realistic to do a critique of judgement in just one lecture. 5 00:00:26,670 --> 00:00:30,720 So tomorrow we'll do count as well. And that will probably continue into next week. 6 00:00:30,720 --> 00:00:36,840 And a likelihood, if any of you have done ethics, particularly better ethics, 7 00:00:36,840 --> 00:00:42,450 you'll be already familiar with some of the issues that are going to arise here. 8 00:00:42,450 --> 00:00:53,340 So one of the common questions in philosophy about both moral value and aesthetic value is about the reality of it and the nature of it. 9 00:00:53,340 --> 00:01:02,640 And a lot of very well worked out positions in media ethics that you can take on these questions. 10 00:01:02,640 --> 00:01:15,450 It's worth pointing out that regarding Hume, that he is not least declaims, doubting the existence of beautiful objects of beauty. 11 00:01:15,450 --> 00:01:23,400 His claim is a claim about the nature of beauty. And so I'm going to begin with some of his background views on beauty, 12 00:01:23,400 --> 00:01:29,430 because his views on the nature of beauty are going to be important for understanding his views on the standard of taste. 13 00:01:29,430 --> 00:01:35,040 Now, whether he can maintain this view that he's not dead and the existence of reality of beauty, 14 00:01:35,040 --> 00:01:40,440 while alongside his view on its nature, is another question. 15 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:46,680 But I think we can distinguish between three important theses that emerge in humans, other work, particularly in his essay. 16 00:01:46,680 --> 00:01:52,230 The Sceptic and in some of his moral writings and other writings. 17 00:01:52,230 --> 00:02:02,910 The first is this claim that you get stated in various ways that beauty is not equality objects have in themselves. 18 00:02:02,910 --> 00:02:07,500 Now, this is a very common view, the 18th century standard of taste. 19 00:02:07,500 --> 00:02:15,990 He doesn't even repeat in the arguments for it. He does give some arguments for it in his essay, The Sceptic. 20 00:02:15,990 --> 00:02:26,700 And if any of you are familiar with Hume's views on moral value, you'll be reminded in some ways of his take on that, in his views on beauty. 21 00:02:26,700 --> 00:02:32,250 And similarly, there are similarities between his views on beauty and his views on cause and necessity. 22 00:02:32,250 --> 00:02:40,440 He runs abbreviated versions in effect of some of the arguments he runs for those matters on beauty. 23 00:02:40,440 --> 00:02:49,590 So one of the considerations, in fact, the main consideration he really offers in sceptic is the thought that you can know or explain all of 24 00:02:49,590 --> 00:02:56,100 the qualities that a thing has without either knowing or having explained anything about its beauty. 25 00:02:56,100 --> 00:02:59,400 So he gives a number of examples of this kind. 26 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:08,310 He talks about the circle and says Euclid has mentioned all the properties of the circle, but has said nothing of its beauty. 27 00:03:08,310 --> 00:03:12,000 The reason is evident. Beauty is not a property of the circle. 28 00:03:12,000 --> 00:03:17,850 It doesn't consist in any of the relations between the parts or anything that Euclid has picked out. 29 00:03:17,850 --> 00:03:20,970 Similarly, in his enquiry concerning the principles of morals, 30 00:03:20,970 --> 00:03:29,130 he talks about architecture and he mentions the architectural treatises written at that time which talk about 31 00:03:29,130 --> 00:03:34,440 the kinds of relations that each of the parts of the orders of architecture have to have to one another. 32 00:03:34,440 --> 00:03:40,260 And he says, if you ask Palladio or Parro, these architectural writers, 33 00:03:40,260 --> 00:03:47,460 where is the beauty in all of these relations, they'd say it's not in any of them. 34 00:03:47,460 --> 00:03:54,090 And where is it? Well, Hume says naturally it is in the sentiment of the person who looks at these things. 35 00:03:54,090 --> 00:04:06,950 So this is on the grounds that it's not until you feel a sentiment I'm looking at of things, properties that you become aware of its beauty. 36 00:04:06,950 --> 00:04:13,560 Scuse me. And therefore, as Hume puts it in various ways, beauty lies in the sentiments. 37 00:04:13,560 --> 00:04:22,320 Beauty consists in an agreeable sentiment. These are somewhat obscure ways of putting things because taken at their word, 38 00:04:22,320 --> 00:04:31,320 it sounds a bit like he's saying that it's sentiments that are beautiful, not objects, but he never draws that implication out. 39 00:04:31,320 --> 00:04:36,660 So it's a little bit difficult to understand quite how this claims to be understood. 40 00:04:36,660 --> 00:04:42,030 The claim that beauty lies in the sentiment doesn't mean beauty is a property of the sentiment. 41 00:04:42,030 --> 00:04:49,290 Somehow it consists in an agreeable sentiment. What is clear is that we don't notice that something's beautiful until we have a sentiment and 42 00:04:49,290 --> 00:04:54,480 that's supposed to be evidence in addition to the other considerations that it's not a property. 43 00:04:54,480 --> 00:04:58,980 Objects have in themselves, nevertheless. 44 00:04:58,980 --> 00:05:07,350 And this is the third. Point Hume is well aware that we think of beauty as a property that objects have in themselves. 45 00:05:07,350 --> 00:05:15,990 And this third point has to do with what is related to what he says about cause and necessity as well. 46 00:05:15,990 --> 00:05:25,650 So he phrases it a number of ways, one of which is on the back of the handout. 47 00:05:25,650 --> 00:05:32,880 So the first quotation and this from the sceptic objects have absolutely no worth or value in themselves. 48 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:37,120 They derive their worth merely from the passion who is not sensible. 49 00:05:37,120 --> 00:05:41,100 The power and glory and vengeance are not desirable of themselves, 50 00:05:41,100 --> 00:05:47,820 but derive all their value from the structure of human passions, which begets a desire towards such particular pursuits. 51 00:05:47,820 --> 00:05:52,920 But with regard to beauty, either natural or moral, the case is commonly supposed to be different. 52 00:05:52,920 --> 00:05:57,060 The agreeable quality is thought to lie in the object, not in the sentiment, 53 00:05:57,060 --> 00:06:06,150 and that merely because the sentiment is not so turbulent and violent as to distinguish itself in an evident manner from the perception of the object. 54 00:06:06,150 --> 00:06:15,870 So this is one claim he makes, partly by way of explanation of why we think that beauty is a property of the object itself, 55 00:06:15,870 --> 00:06:19,920 namely that the sentiment in which it consists is a very calm one. 56 00:06:19,920 --> 00:06:26,430 And he thinks that we're confusing that Tom sentiment with a perception of something in the object and in later work. 57 00:06:26,430 --> 00:06:31,980 He elaborates this notion, and this is in the second quotation from the enquiry, 58 00:06:31,980 --> 00:06:36,780 The distinct boundaries and offices of Reason and Taste are easily ascertained. 59 00:06:36,780 --> 00:06:43,650 The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood. The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. 60 00:06:43,650 --> 00:06:48,690 The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature without additions and diminution. 61 00:06:48,690 --> 00:06:56,460 The other has a productive faculty and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment raises in a manner, 62 00:06:56,460 --> 00:07:06,960 a new creation. So it seems like what he's saying is that we in some sense project onto objects when we find them beautiful. 63 00:07:06,960 --> 00:07:13,530 So it's not just the claim that beauty is not a property, the object, or that it lies in the sentiment, whatever that amounts to, 64 00:07:13,530 --> 00:07:23,550 but that in addition, we sort of Project Guild or Stane objects with the colours borrowed from that sentiment. 65 00:07:23,550 --> 00:07:28,020 Now, this sort of view raised a number of questions. 66 00:07:28,020 --> 00:07:36,580 I mean, it can probably be best understood by analogy with what he says about cause and necessity. 67 00:07:36,580 --> 00:07:43,510 So he says, we often think that necessity resides in objects that stand in causal relations as well. 68 00:07:43,510 --> 00:07:50,860 Even though our idea of necessity just comes from our feeling of expectation, we get when we see an object of one kind. 69 00:07:50,860 --> 00:07:56,110 Appear that has always been followed by an object of another kind. 70 00:07:56,110 --> 00:08:01,210 When that happens, we have a tendency to imagine an object of the other kind. 71 00:08:01,210 --> 00:08:04,030 And it's this inclination or tendency, 72 00:08:04,030 --> 00:08:17,290 this feeling that we project onto the object and that accounts for our view that necessity is a property of the object. 73 00:08:17,290 --> 00:08:26,400 I take it that he thinks some sort of mechanism like that is at work here. 74 00:08:26,400 --> 00:08:37,020 And in each case, it sort of raises the question, how can you say that there is some reality to beauty in these cases? 75 00:08:37,020 --> 00:08:45,510 So it looks like he's not willing to say in the causal case that necessity is a property of a tendency, for example. 76 00:08:45,510 --> 00:08:50,520 And of course, it's not a property object, something we project onto it. 77 00:08:50,520 --> 00:08:53,610 So it doesn't seem to be a property of anything. 78 00:08:53,610 --> 00:09:01,160 And likewise with beauty, he doesn't and he shouldn't say that it's only sentiments that have the property of being beautiful. 79 00:09:01,160 --> 00:09:08,400 But he explicitly denies as well that it's objects that have the property of being beautiful. 80 00:09:08,400 --> 00:09:16,710 What is true is that there's an agreeableness to the sentiment and that kind of sentiment gets projected onto the object. 81 00:09:16,710 --> 00:09:21,780 But that's rather different from anything ending up with the property of beauty. 82 00:09:21,780 --> 00:09:26,880 So visibly, there's at least the appearance of a difficulty here. 83 00:09:26,880 --> 00:09:35,880 And it's not so clear that he can say what he does say in the third quotation, which again is from the sceptic. 84 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:39,750 So he says, we're not afraid of appearing too philosophical. 85 00:09:39,750 --> 00:09:45,020 I should remind my reader of that famous doctrine supposed to be fully proved in modern times. 86 00:09:45,020 --> 00:09:49,170 The tastes and colours and all other sensible qualities light on in the bodies. 87 00:09:49,170 --> 00:09:54,000 But merely in the senses. The case is the same with beauty and deformity. 88 00:09:54,000 --> 00:09:58,950 Virtue invites this doctrine, however, and this is the Chebet takes off. 89 00:09:58,950 --> 00:10:05,310 No more reality from the takes off, no more from the reality of the latter qualities than from that of the former. 90 00:10:05,310 --> 00:10:09,000 No need to give any umbrage to either your critics or more or less. 91 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:15,040 The colours were allowed to lie only in the eye with dyers or painters ever be less regarded or esteemed. 92 00:10:15,040 --> 00:10:20,070 There is insufficient uniformity in the senses and feelings of mankind to make all these qualities, 93 00:10:20,070 --> 00:10:24,840 the objects of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on life and manners. 94 00:10:24,840 --> 00:10:31,530 And as it is certain that the discovery above mentioned in natural philosophy makes no alteration on action and conduct. 95 00:10:31,530 --> 00:10:42,210 Why should a like discovery, moral philosophy make any alteration? So this is a comparison that is going to come back to the standard of taste between 96 00:10:42,210 --> 00:10:50,250 beauty on the one hand and secondary qualities like colour and flavour on the other. 97 00:10:50,250 --> 00:10:55,230 But there's a couple of peculiarities of what he said about what he says in this passage. 98 00:10:55,230 --> 00:11:01,020 So when the quote he gives here, I don't know who it's from. 99 00:11:01,020 --> 00:11:09,780 If it from anybody that tastes in colours and all of the sensible qualities lie not in the bodies, but merely in the senses. 100 00:11:09,780 --> 00:11:17,610 Locke famously described colours, flavours of secondary qualities as opposed to primary qualities. 101 00:11:17,610 --> 00:11:20,970 But Locke did not deny that objects are coloured. 102 00:11:20,970 --> 00:11:30,730 What Locke said was that the colour of objects is a power to produce an idea or might more accurately be described as a visual impression in us. 103 00:11:30,730 --> 00:11:38,370 And that visual impression has certain appearance properties that don't resemble anything in the object. 104 00:11:38,370 --> 00:11:42,420 But that's very different from saying that there's no colour in the object, because in Locke's view, 105 00:11:42,420 --> 00:11:47,040 colour in the object is a power to produce a visual impression that has certain 106 00:11:47,040 --> 00:11:53,580 appearance properties that don't themselves resemble anything in the object. 107 00:11:53,580 --> 00:11:59,610 So the thing he quotes here would not be an accurate representation of Locke's view. 108 00:11:59,610 --> 00:12:04,920 Locke's view is there's nothing resembling the quality of our visual impression in the object. 109 00:12:04,920 --> 00:12:06,990 It's not that objects aren't coloured. 110 00:12:06,990 --> 00:12:17,850 It's just that what it is for them to be coloured is for them to have the power to produce this kind of visual impression and this sort of view. 111 00:12:17,850 --> 00:12:24,420 Now, I'm not saying he has to follow Locke, obviously. Maybe he's talking about a different view of secondary qualities. 112 00:12:24,420 --> 00:12:33,090 But at least with Locke, you can point to something that is unambiguously describable as coloured with Hume. 113 00:12:33,090 --> 00:12:37,900 It's not so clear because if you don't want to say the sentiment is beautiful. 114 00:12:37,900 --> 00:12:43,830 And if you don't want to say the object is beautiful and it's not clear if you don't want it to be a beauty is in the object, 115 00:12:43,830 --> 00:12:50,240 I should say it's not quite clear how we should understand this and how he can maintain that beauty, 116 00:12:50,240 --> 00:12:55,230 that this view takes nothing off the reality of beautiful objects of beauty. 117 00:12:55,230 --> 00:13:06,840 That is OK. So this is the background to his essay on the standard of taste. 118 00:13:06,840 --> 00:13:09,960 And one reason why Hume's view on the standard of taste is attractive to a lot 119 00:13:09,960 --> 00:13:18,390 of people is that it seems to offer a way to reconcile two opposing views. 120 00:13:18,390 --> 00:13:24,930 So the first is the view that out there in the world, there's no values. 121 00:13:24,930 --> 00:13:35,310 No beauty. No goodness. Cetera. Things don't have those qualities in themselves, and yet you can get these things wrong. 122 00:13:35,310 --> 00:13:48,110 People can be wrong about what and right. That is, there can be standards about whether something is beautiful or good. 123 00:13:48,110 --> 00:13:59,480 So he seems to offer us a way which is attract a lot of people, both in aesthetics and in ethics, of having both of these positions. 124 00:13:59,480 --> 00:14:05,150 The denial of the reality of these sort of metaphysically dubious or spooky, 125 00:14:05,150 --> 00:14:16,240 according to some properties like beauty and goodness out there in the world, along with the maintenance of standards for judgements of these things. 126 00:14:16,240 --> 00:14:20,080 Now, the motivation to Hume identifies for seeking the standard of taste. 127 00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:26,560 Is the observation that people frequently disagree about the beauty of an object. 128 00:14:26,560 --> 00:14:33,100 So what it is for them to disagree, of course, is for them to have different sentiments about same object. 129 00:14:33,100 --> 00:14:35,260 And he really stresses this at the start. 130 00:14:35,260 --> 00:14:44,020 If you look across cultures and within cultures and within your own social circle, you will find widely divergent views, 131 00:14:44,020 --> 00:14:52,930 very divergent sentiments about which objects are beautiful or whether some particular object is beautiful. 132 00:14:52,930 --> 00:15:02,950 Furthermore, it's not just that we differ, but that we argue. So we are inclined to condemn sentiments that disagree with our own. 133 00:15:02,950 --> 00:15:07,420 And this naturally makes us wonder or at least makes them more reflective amongst us. 134 00:15:07,420 --> 00:15:15,160 Wonder if there is some way of justifying our sentiment. 135 00:15:15,160 --> 00:15:22,480 If there's some way, some grounds for condemning sentiments that differ from our own. 136 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:32,950 And this is what Hume attempts to provide. What he says a standard of taste is, is the following. 137 00:15:32,950 --> 00:15:39,370 He says it is a rule by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled. 138 00:15:39,370 --> 00:15:45,580 At least a decision afforded confirming one sentiment and condemning another. 139 00:15:45,580 --> 00:15:57,940 So ideally, it's a way of ending these disputes. At minimum, it should be a way of figuring out who's right in each of them. 140 00:15:57,940 --> 00:16:07,330 That's the ambition. Now, it's worth noting here that he's not saying I'm trying to define beauty. 141 00:16:07,330 --> 00:16:16,300 Now, I don't mean that he wouldn't accept this as his definition of beauty or say that this is what it is for something to be beautiful. 142 00:16:16,300 --> 00:16:20,250 That is at least the thing that he's going to go on to say. 143 00:16:20,250 --> 00:16:28,570 But it's worth noting that he wouldn't need to do that in order to get this thing a rule enabling us to figure out who is right. 144 00:16:28,570 --> 00:16:36,400 All you need, then, all you'd need for that was some reliable detector of beauty or of condemnable sentiment. 145 00:16:36,400 --> 00:16:42,040 Some criterion by which you can tell that one side is wrong, the other side is right. 146 00:16:42,040 --> 00:16:49,840 Not something as ambitious as a definition of beauty as again, I'm not saying this is not a definition of beauty in his view, 147 00:16:49,840 --> 00:16:55,390 but what he explicitly says is that it's a way of reconciling these views, 148 00:16:55,390 --> 00:16:58,780 a way of finding a way to condemn certain sentiments, 149 00:16:58,780 --> 00:17:09,240 confirm others that can be important at certain points when we're thinking about what kinds of criticisms him is subject to. 150 00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:18,290 OK, well, immediately having presented this possibility, he then considers an objection to the very possibility of finding a standard of taste. 151 00:17:18,290 --> 00:17:26,110 And he says this is an objection drawn from common sense. In fact, it's drawn from a number of philosophical considerations as well. 152 00:17:26,110 --> 00:17:29,950 And it's worth when you're thinking about this objection, being aware of which parts of it. 153 00:17:29,950 --> 00:17:39,030 Hume accepts and which parts he does not. People often read this as misread this as something that Hume accepts wholesale. 154 00:17:39,030 --> 00:17:46,690 He accepts a lot of it, but not all of it. Now, the objection basically is that it's not possible to condemn sentiments. 155 00:17:46,690 --> 00:17:51,760 This rule that's supposed to enable us to do this therefore can't be found. 156 00:17:51,760 --> 00:17:58,000 And the reasons given. I think you can identify at least three in this passage. 157 00:17:58,000 --> 00:18:06,040 The first of which is that sentiment's cannot be condemned for misrepresenting the world. 158 00:18:06,040 --> 00:18:12,010 So sentiment's online judgements don't represent the world as being a certain way. 159 00:18:12,010 --> 00:18:18,340 So if you judge that the cat is on the mat, that represents the world's being a certain way. 160 00:18:18,340 --> 00:18:24,010 And if the cat's not on the mat, it misrepresents the world. But sentiments aren't like that. 161 00:18:24,010 --> 00:18:36,490 Sentiments aren't representational. So they can't misrepresent the world and therefore they can't be condemned for misrepresenting the world. 162 00:18:36,490 --> 00:18:47,440 Another reason they can't be condemned is they cannot be condemned for marking a relation between the mind and the object that's not there. 163 00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:53,230 So although sentiments don't represent the way things are, they do mark or signal, 164 00:18:53,230 --> 00:18:59,710 as he puts it, a relation or conformity between the mind and the object. 165 00:18:59,710 --> 00:19:05,860 But of course, if the sentiment occurs at all, then that relation exists. 166 00:19:05,860 --> 00:19:11,860 And so they can't mark a relation in this way. That's not actually there. 167 00:19:11,860 --> 00:19:17,920 And so you can't condemn them for marking a relation. That's not actually there. 168 00:19:17,920 --> 00:19:20,980 Now, those two points are true of sentiments, generally, 169 00:19:20,980 --> 00:19:32,720 sentiments of beauty in particular cannot be condemned for occurring in the absence of beauty in the object. 170 00:19:32,720 --> 00:19:42,680 Because beauty doesn't exist in the objects as we discuss. So all sentiments of beauty occur in the absence of beauty and the object. 171 00:19:42,680 --> 00:19:45,920 And moreover, beauty exists in a sentiment. 172 00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:53,660 And so it's not a bad thing that all these sentiments of beauty occur in the absence of beauty in the object. 173 00:19:53,660 --> 00:19:59,420 They can't be condemned for occurring in the absence of beauty in the object. 174 00:19:59,420 --> 00:20:07,130 So they can't be condemned on those grounds either. So it seems like it's not possible at all to condemn sentiments. 175 00:20:07,130 --> 00:20:11,090 Now, as I say, Huma represents this as a sort of objection from common sense. 176 00:20:11,090 --> 00:20:17,390 It's the view that Taste's can't be disputed about. 177 00:20:17,390 --> 00:20:25,580 But his reply is that it's as least as well supported by common sense to suppose that at least some sentiments can be condemned. 178 00:20:25,580 --> 00:20:32,100 And he argues from some famous examples here. He says, Anybody who would think that the miners, 179 00:20:32,100 --> 00:20:46,130 Scottish poet John Ogleby and the 17th century English puritan John Bunyan were as good as Joseph Addison and John Milton, 180 00:20:46,130 --> 00:20:53,000 or indeed who preferred them to those guys would have ridiculous and absurd sentiments. 181 00:20:53,000 --> 00:21:02,670 And that's at least as clear, he thinks, as the considerations advanced in the objection. 182 00:21:02,670 --> 00:21:08,520 Now, he's not denying a lot of what the objection sets, as I mentioned at the start. 183 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:13,170 So he agrees that sentiments can't be condemned on any of the grounds mentioned in the objection. 184 00:21:13,170 --> 00:21:16,230 So he's not going to go there, even adds something. 185 00:21:16,230 --> 00:21:24,960 He adds that it may be that when objects are nearly equal in value and people's sentiments diverge, 186 00:21:24,960 --> 00:21:29,730 then we can't say that one side is right and one side is wrong. 187 00:21:29,730 --> 00:21:38,640 But he says it's at least clear that at least some sentiments can be condemned like these once. 188 00:21:38,640 --> 00:21:48,020 And that's at least as clear as anything presented in the objection. And so the hunt is on for a standard enabling us to do this. 189 00:21:48,020 --> 00:21:54,590 Now, famously, the standard he states is that standard of taste is the joint verdict and a verdict. 190 00:21:54,590 --> 00:22:03,800 Here is again, something based on sentiment of all critics who are free of certain obstructions. 191 00:22:03,800 --> 00:22:11,870 And we'll get into what those obstructions are in a moment. But that's the general shape of it. 192 00:22:11,870 --> 00:22:21,920 Is that standard is going to be not the mere occurrence of a sentiment, but the occurrence of a sentiment in the right kinds of people. 193 00:22:21,920 --> 00:22:27,140 And conformity with that sentiment is or lack of conformity with that sentiment. 194 00:22:27,140 --> 00:22:39,090 More to the point is what enables sentiments to be condemned. That's not exactly transparent, what his argument for this view is. 195 00:22:39,090 --> 00:22:43,410 I think you can identify two for this general view. 196 00:22:43,410 --> 00:22:49,170 And then he goes on to argue in particular for what the obstructions are. 197 00:22:49,170 --> 00:22:58,070 But the first, I think, is what I've described in the handout as the argument from Beauty's capacity to please universally. 198 00:22:58,070 --> 00:23:09,210 So a key premise for Hume is that beautiful objects can please anyone, at least have the capacity to please anyone. 199 00:23:09,210 --> 00:23:13,440 Not that they always do, in fact, but they at least have that capacity. 200 00:23:13,440 --> 00:23:20,100 And he gives a number of considerations in support of this. So one is kind of quaint. 201 00:23:20,100 --> 00:23:22,950 But I talked about the rules of composition. 202 00:23:22,950 --> 00:23:34,050 So the rules by which writing can be guided, the rules if you follow, which will enable you to write beautifully. 203 00:23:34,050 --> 00:23:42,360 He says these rules are just observations about what has pleased at all times and in all periods of history. 204 00:23:42,360 --> 00:23:48,870 In fact, if you find something, that's if you find a counterexample to them, then you have to revise the rules, 205 00:23:48,870 --> 00:23:57,420 because what they're aiming at is to get at what has pleased, you know, at all times and in all periods of history. 206 00:23:57,420 --> 00:24:03,120 That's one consideration that's supposed to suggest that beauty at least has the capacity to please universally. 207 00:24:03,120 --> 00:24:07,810 Another consideration is from examples such as Homer. 208 00:24:07,810 --> 00:24:19,670 It's one of his examples pointing out that genuinely beautiful objects have, in fact, pleased in a wide diversity of ages and cultures. 209 00:24:19,670 --> 00:24:32,230 Homer being example. And I think it's on this basis that he is convinced that beautiful works at least have this capacity to please everyone. 210 00:24:32,230 --> 00:24:34,360 He's got to face the fact, of course, that they don't. 211 00:24:34,360 --> 00:24:41,470 In fact, the very fact that he stressed at the beginning, a lot of the time, genuinely beautiful objects don't please everyone who sees them. 212 00:24:41,470 --> 00:24:43,570 And the thought is. 213 00:24:43,570 --> 00:24:54,760 So his next point is that it's just obvious that many obstructions prevent beautiful works from actually actualising this capacity. 214 00:24:54,760 --> 00:24:59,230 And again, he gives a number of points in favour of this. 215 00:24:59,230 --> 00:25:06,170 So one of them is he considers what it is that we do when we try to determine that an object is beautiful. 216 00:25:06,170 --> 00:25:10,120 It says we try and get into the right state of mind. We try and be calm. 217 00:25:10,120 --> 00:25:18,160 Pay attention to the object. Seems like we have to do a lot to prepare in order to judge an object accurately. 218 00:25:18,160 --> 00:25:29,110 That's supposed to suggest that there's loads of possible obstructions in place and we have to make sure that they're absent. 219 00:25:29,110 --> 00:25:38,350 Another reason of the view that there are lots of obstructions preventing beauty from pleasing everyone. 220 00:25:38,350 --> 00:25:40,590 Is based on the test of time. 221 00:25:40,590 --> 00:25:51,390 So we often points to the fact that the work has survived and been enjoyed in all kinds of areas as evidence that it is beautiful. 222 00:25:51,390 --> 00:25:56,340 And he thinks the reason we do this, at least this is how I read this passage, 223 00:25:56,340 --> 00:26:04,620 is to see whether it still pleases once fashion, prejudice and authority fallen away. 224 00:26:04,620 --> 00:26:11,820 That's why the test of time is a good test of beauty, is that it's a test to see whether it pleases, 225 00:26:11,820 --> 00:26:18,810 even when these various obstructions have fallen away. 226 00:26:18,810 --> 00:26:26,540 That, again, seems to imply that there are lots of obstructions to beauteous capacity to please everyone. 227 00:26:26,540 --> 00:26:36,770 And so I think that it's on this basis that he concludes the standard of taste has got to be the sentiment of everyone free of certain obstructions, 228 00:26:36,770 --> 00:26:47,210 because everyone who is free of these obstructions will like it can please everyone, but only provided they're free from the obstructions. 229 00:26:47,210 --> 00:26:59,030 Now, the second argument that I detect in this essay is based on further comparison with secondary qualities in the essay, 230 00:26:59,030 --> 00:27:10,360 particularly colours and flavours. So this I take it to be an argument by analogy, colours and flavours. 231 00:27:10,360 --> 00:27:17,270 He says, if you think about it, are in all relevant respects, similar to beauty. 232 00:27:17,270 --> 00:27:21,710 So as we saw, colours and flavours are not qualities that objects have in themselves. 233 00:27:21,710 --> 00:27:31,120 That's a key thing. Colours and flavours are in the mind. 234 00:27:31,120 --> 00:27:38,620 And this is particularly important. Some people are not qualified to give verdicts about colours and flavours despite 235 00:27:38,620 --> 00:27:44,380 the fact that they're not in the object and that they're only in the mind. 236 00:27:44,380 --> 00:27:51,580 Examples. Someone with jaundice. Not in a position to judge concerning colours. 237 00:27:51,580 --> 00:28:00,190 Someone with a fever. Not in a position to judge concerning flavours in these relevantly similar cases. 238 00:28:00,190 --> 00:28:11,890 The standard of judgement is the response of a person free of certain obstructions. 239 00:28:11,890 --> 00:28:27,620 So with healthy eyes, healthy palate. And that's I take it it's supposed to support the view that the case is similar with beauty. 240 00:28:27,620 --> 00:28:34,430 Now, it's interesting question how much weight he's putting on this analogy. As I say, he's not so explicit about it. 241 00:28:34,430 --> 00:28:42,350 The implication may be that, well, what other standard could there be if there's a standard at all when you've got something that's not a property, 242 00:28:42,350 --> 00:28:47,270 the object, but rather in the mind. And yet there are standards. 243 00:28:47,270 --> 00:28:55,820 What are the standard? Could there be. Except the response of a person of a particularly specified kind. 244 00:28:55,820 --> 00:29:06,080 That may be the implication, as I say. So this is the thought that that's going to be the general shape of the standard of tastes. 245 00:29:06,080 --> 00:29:12,200 And then he argues for what these obstructions are in the case of taste. 246 00:29:12,200 --> 00:29:21,320 Number one, lack of what he calls delicacy and delicacy appears to be the ability to detect features that are hard to detect. 247 00:29:21,320 --> 00:29:27,350 So subtle features of an artwork. And this is relevant. 248 00:29:27,350 --> 00:29:32,600 Lack of delicacy is an obstruction because beautiful works often. 249 00:29:32,600 --> 00:29:38,750 Please. In virtue of hard to detect features. 250 00:29:38,750 --> 00:29:47,420 That's interesting why he thinks this. So again, he appeals to something that is a little bit a little bit quaint again. 251 00:29:47,420 --> 00:29:51,800 So he said he takes it to explain why it's possible to use general principles to 252 00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:58,700 convince somebody that something's beautiful when they didn't initially like it. 253 00:29:58,700 --> 00:30:05,900 So what he imagines is going on here is that we show a person some feature which is known to please universally. 254 00:30:05,900 --> 00:30:15,950 So there's a principle that says anything with this feature, please universally and which pleases him when it's present in a high degree. 255 00:30:15,950 --> 00:30:26,030 And we point out that it's present in a small degree in the work that he doesn't like him, thinks he's got to agree that the thing is beautiful. 256 00:30:26,030 --> 00:30:28,280 And he says it wouldn't be possible, 257 00:30:28,280 --> 00:30:39,380 implies that is wouldn't be possible for this procedure to work or to be convincing if delicacy weren't needed to perceive beauty. 258 00:30:39,380 --> 00:30:41,550 You get the appropriate sentiment. 259 00:30:41,550 --> 00:30:50,930 As I say, this is a little quaint because he's so confident that you can argue somebody into agreeing with you about. 260 00:30:50,930 --> 00:30:57,680 About the beauty of an object. And as we'll see tomorrow, Kant explicitly denies this. 261 00:30:57,680 --> 00:31:02,630 And it's been a sort of one of the main questions in aesthetics is whether you can establish 262 00:31:02,630 --> 00:31:07,520 that something is beautiful by any means other than seeing it and feeling something, 263 00:31:07,520 --> 00:31:14,390 whether an argument could actually be used to justify the view or even to prove the view that something's beautiful. 264 00:31:14,390 --> 00:31:27,150 As we'll see, Kant is going to deny this. Hume, again, strangely enough, take that for granted. 265 00:31:27,150 --> 00:31:36,210 In the course of trying to show the delicacy is relevant, next, obstruction is lack of practise. 266 00:31:36,210 --> 00:31:45,240 So practise here has two aspects. First of all, the critic needs practise contemplating other artworks of the same kind. 267 00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:52,390 And as he puts it, other species of the same kind of beauty. 268 00:31:52,390 --> 00:31:58,350 And he says, if we don't have this, then our sentiments will be obscure and confused. 269 00:31:58,350 --> 00:32:04,380 We won't perceive the works merits. We won't know what kinds of merits they are. 270 00:32:04,380 --> 00:32:17,320 And we won't know how great merit each one is. All of this you can only detect if you have experience in other work artworks of that kind. 271 00:32:17,320 --> 00:32:26,610 That's one aspect of practise. As I say, another aspect is repeatedly perusing the work that you are attempting to judge. 272 00:32:26,610 --> 00:32:32,400 We don't do that, he says. You may not perceive the work's merits clearly. 273 00:32:32,400 --> 00:32:38,610 And an interesting passage, he says there is a flutter or hurry of thought that attends the first perusal of work. 274 00:32:38,610 --> 00:32:44,460 And he says that makes the sentiment a bit obscure. So you have to look at it repeatedly to stop. 275 00:32:44,460 --> 00:32:46,710 You thought from fluttering, I guess. 276 00:32:46,710 --> 00:32:55,260 But at least the thought is that your going to be better enabled to perceive the work's merits much more clearly. 277 00:32:55,260 --> 00:33:04,830 And furthermore, you can make sure that the beauty is not a superficial kind. Some kinds of beauty, please, at first viewing, but not at others. 278 00:33:04,830 --> 00:33:09,810 And again, if one of the marks of a genuinely beautiful object is that a campus, 279 00:33:09,810 --> 00:33:17,010 please, at different times and ages, that's going to be quite relevant. 280 00:33:17,010 --> 00:33:22,410 And into the mix, he throws the consideration that practise is the best way to acquire delicacy, 281 00:33:22,410 --> 00:33:30,270 which is one of the as we established necessary traits of a critic. 282 00:33:30,270 --> 00:33:34,640 So a third thing is what he describes as comparison. 283 00:33:34,640 --> 00:33:43,280 So if you're unable to compare a work with many others, then inferior works often see much better than they are. 284 00:33:43,280 --> 00:33:48,190 This is a bit similar to John Stewart Mills discussion of higher pleasures. 285 00:33:48,190 --> 00:33:54,080 This is how can you tell between two pleasures, whether one is higher than another, intrinsically better than another? 286 00:33:54,080 --> 00:33:58,390 The only way is to ask somebody who's experienced both and ask them which they prefer. 287 00:33:58,390 --> 00:34:09,830 And if they all agree that A is better than B than A is a higher pleasure and B, very similar thing going on here in this qualification of comparison. 288 00:34:09,830 --> 00:34:20,450 Fourthly, prejudice is an obstruction and prejudice is, he understands and a kind of idiosyncratic way. 289 00:34:20,450 --> 00:34:24,440 So he thinks that beautiful works can cause the appropriate sentiments only in people who 290 00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:32,060 put themselves in the mindset of the audience that the work was originally addressing. 291 00:34:32,060 --> 00:34:41,870 So give the example of oratory. So a speech in ancient times at any time, but particularly thinking of ancient orders, 292 00:34:41,870 --> 00:34:45,370 is addressed to a particular audience and for a particular purpose. 293 00:34:45,370 --> 00:34:49,670 And you won't be able to tell whether it's beautiful unless you put yourself in their shoes. 294 00:34:49,670 --> 00:34:58,530 That's what will enable the appropriate sentiment of beauty to come about. 295 00:34:58,530 --> 00:35:02,820 And more generally works addressed to other ages or cultures. 296 00:35:02,820 --> 00:35:08,280 He thinks you have to put yourself into the shoes of the people in those ages and cultures before you can 297 00:35:08,280 --> 00:35:14,880 tell whether the genuinely beautiful you test to see whether it pleases once you adopt their mindset. 298 00:35:14,880 --> 00:35:23,430 And interestingly as well, and this prefigures another thing in Kant, he thinks any work address to the public as opposed to, 299 00:35:23,430 --> 00:35:33,750 I guess, particular subset of the public is such that you must forget all things that are unique to you. 300 00:35:33,750 --> 00:35:39,000 And as he puts it, consider yourself as a man in general and see if it pleases you then. 301 00:35:39,000 --> 00:35:46,140 So his examples are if you're friends with the author or enemies of the author, forget that. 302 00:35:46,140 --> 00:35:50,880 Got to leave that aside and see if the work causes the sentiment of beauty. 303 00:35:50,880 --> 00:35:58,940 And you then it doesn't just scream so that things must read universally. 304 00:35:58,940 --> 00:36:03,330 Well, remember this. And this is one of the obstructions that keeps them from placing the claim earlier 305 00:36:03,330 --> 00:36:10,150 was only that they had the capacity to please universally and they will please. 306 00:36:10,150 --> 00:36:14,760 Conversely, if you're free of these obstructions and one of the obstructions is not putting 307 00:36:14,760 --> 00:36:21,870 yourself in the shoes of a man in general or the audience originally dressed, 308 00:36:21,870 --> 00:36:26,630 does that make sense? Wait, you're not supposed to put yourself in my shoes. 309 00:36:26,630 --> 00:36:32,130 I may be using a double negative here. Not putting yourself in those shoes isn't obstruction. 310 00:36:32,130 --> 00:36:34,680 So prejudice is an obstruction. 311 00:36:34,680 --> 00:36:43,170 What you ought to do is put yourself in the shoes of that person and that's how you get that'll be the appropriate test there. 312 00:36:43,170 --> 00:36:46,640 Does that make sense? Yeah. OK. Yeah. 313 00:36:46,640 --> 00:36:57,960 Surance. Yeah. 314 00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:05,670 So it would imply along with that, that over time, everyone can put themselves in the shoes of the original audience. 315 00:37:05,670 --> 00:37:09,930 When you put those two plans together. Well, that's right. And isn't consciously putting themselves in. 316 00:37:09,930 --> 00:37:14,850 Somebody should be somebody ready to move and just read it. And still enjoys it. 317 00:37:14,850 --> 00:37:20,640 She's not saying it can't. Please. If you don't do this. But that's not the standard of taste. 318 00:37:20,640 --> 00:37:25,800 To the standard of taste is if it does, please, when you do, put yourself in their shoes. 319 00:37:25,800 --> 00:37:29,880 The other kinds of pleasure are not really relevant to determine whether it's beautiful. 320 00:37:29,880 --> 00:37:39,290 And other questions can be intended. 321 00:37:39,290 --> 00:37:48,810 Why? Well, that's a good point. 322 00:37:48,810 --> 00:37:55,320 I mean, I don't think it relies on the claim that every but no work of art is written for the world. 323 00:37:55,320 --> 00:38:00,630 It does rely on the claim that at least some works of art are not written for the whole world. 324 00:38:00,630 --> 00:38:04,260 They're written for some particular bit of it, and it's them. 325 00:38:04,260 --> 00:38:15,510 You have to relate to that case. 326 00:38:15,510 --> 00:38:22,650 Yes, the audience in general, in that case, he talks about the public and he seems to have in mind when he talks about a man in general, 327 00:38:22,650 --> 00:38:27,870 contemporary works, as opposed to more distant ones like that. 328 00:38:27,870 --> 00:38:30,990 I mean, this view prefigures. What was the intent? 329 00:38:30,990 --> 00:38:36,330 The view that it's about disinterested pleasure, what he's going to describe as a disinterested pleasure. 330 00:38:36,330 --> 00:38:45,120 It's not exactly the same as this, but it's going to prove to be an extremely influential view. 331 00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:49,630 And the final abstraction is lack of good sense. 332 00:38:49,630 --> 00:39:01,620 Kind of unsurprisingly, good sense is needed to discern the pleasing relations between the parts of the work. 333 00:39:01,620 --> 00:39:08,220 To see how well the work is fitted for its purpose and also to understand any reasoning 334 00:39:08,220 --> 00:39:17,220 that work contains good sense here just seems to be kind of a general intelligence. 335 00:39:17,220 --> 00:39:21,120 Here, it's also needed to free oneself from prejudice. 336 00:39:21,120 --> 00:39:27,240 He thinks this is another reason why you need it. 337 00:39:27,240 --> 00:39:37,470 So the thought is the standard of taste is the joint verdict of critics with these five characteristics, 338 00:39:37,470 --> 00:39:45,510 good sense, freedom from prejudice, comparison, practise and delicacy. 339 00:39:45,510 --> 00:39:50,440 Now, question arises. Here is how many disputes can this standard settle? 340 00:39:50,440 --> 00:39:58,830 Or is it supposed to settle? And he raised a number of considerations that are relevant to this. 341 00:39:58,830 --> 00:40:10,320 So. Obviously, we can only use this standard if we can identify critics who have these five characteristics. 342 00:40:10,320 --> 00:40:15,720 And he says maybe that'll be a problem. 343 00:40:15,720 --> 00:40:21,750 And that would not be so good because that would defeat the purpose of this whole project. 344 00:40:21,750 --> 00:40:29,940 But he says an advantage here is that whereas questions about the things, beauty, our questions of sentiment, 345 00:40:29,940 --> 00:40:34,350 the question of whether a person has these characteristics is a question of fact. 346 00:40:34,350 --> 00:40:38,640 So we don't determine whether somebody has these characteristics by having a sentiment. 347 00:40:38,640 --> 00:40:47,970 We determine it in the ordinary way or ways that we determine other questions of fact by assembling evidence, arguing about it. 348 00:40:47,970 --> 00:40:56,430 These sorts of things. So the great advantage we've ended up with is that we seem to be on firm ground again. 349 00:40:56,430 --> 00:41:03,600 Is you first identifying the standard way? Who has these characteristics and then find out what their verdict is. 350 00:41:03,600 --> 00:41:10,980 Then you can find out which things are genuinely beautiful and you think there's a number of ways of identifying them. 351 00:41:10,980 --> 00:41:15,120 So the soundness of their understanding, as he puts it, shows their good sense. 352 00:41:15,120 --> 00:41:21,510 So you can tell whether somebody is generally intelligent, quite apart from questions about beauty. 353 00:41:21,510 --> 00:41:28,770 So to if they point out some subtle features of a work that you didn't notice before and help you enjoy them, 354 00:41:28,770 --> 00:41:36,690 then you can tell while they're evidently have greater delicacy than I do. 355 00:41:36,690 --> 00:41:42,450 And he also, interestingly, talks about the ascendent which they acquire in society. 356 00:41:42,450 --> 00:41:47,730 So the lasting influence they have on society's tastes now, 357 00:41:47,730 --> 00:41:53,850 I think the reason he thinks that this is a way of telling who is a true critic relates 358 00:41:53,850 --> 00:42:02,670 to what he says before about how great works of art will last for a long time. 359 00:42:02,670 --> 00:42:11,820 So he says superficial work of art won't stay in favour for too too long, at least, as he puts it, in a civilised society. 360 00:42:11,820 --> 00:42:20,190 If a critic, then it's preferred certain works of art and those preferences stay durable. 361 00:42:20,190 --> 00:42:28,560 We can tell that guy was a true critic because his preferences wouldn't have stayed in favour if he had hit on bad works of art. 362 00:42:28,560 --> 00:42:37,710 He's got he's got good taste because his preferences have endured amongst society. 363 00:42:37,710 --> 00:42:43,680 So that's the thought about identifying them. 364 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:56,190 But another point, and this is often misunderstood, is that there are some differences in sentiment that the standard can't be used to resolve. 365 00:42:56,190 --> 00:43:06,300 And then Hume is perfectly upfront about them, not about it not being able to be used for this purpose. 366 00:43:06,300 --> 00:43:14,100 So in particular, what happens if true critics differ in their sentiments about the same work? 367 00:43:14,100 --> 00:43:24,480 And Hume even thinks that this is bound to happen because he thinks that we can't help preferring an author who is similar to us, 368 00:43:24,480 --> 00:43:32,270 nor can we help referring works that portray customs that are familiar to us. 369 00:43:32,270 --> 00:43:38,720 And so he thinks the true critic won't be able to help, preferring works like this. 370 00:43:38,720 --> 00:43:47,300 And so you'll get to critics of different tent temperaments or from different cultures ranking the works differently. 371 00:43:47,300 --> 00:43:56,160 So one preferring his famous example of it to Tacitus, because he's a young man and his passions are warm and obied right. 372 00:43:56,160 --> 00:44:07,670 Love writes love poetry. Tacitus is a desiccated old historian, whereas 50 year old man prefers Tacitus. 373 00:44:07,670 --> 00:44:18,380 Now, the bit about this that's I say is often misunderstood is that and what's often not often remarked is that Hume is explicit, 374 00:44:18,380 --> 00:44:22,310 that he thinks differences of these kinds are only differences in the degree of 375 00:44:22,310 --> 00:44:27,530 pleasure that you can get that these true critics get from different works. 376 00:44:27,530 --> 00:44:36,890 So they're not cases of one true critic liking the work and another not liking the work. 377 00:44:36,890 --> 00:44:42,590 So it's not that the old guy doesn't like all of it at all. 378 00:44:42,590 --> 00:44:51,550 He gets the sentiment of beauty from Obied, but less intensely than he used to. 379 00:44:51,550 --> 00:44:53,620 So that's a very important qualification, 380 00:44:53,620 --> 00:45:03,040 because what it means is that the standard of taste is still perfectly good as a standard for determining which objects are beautiful. 381 00:45:03,040 --> 00:45:22,840 If he was right and his concession here isn't only that it doesn't always tell us or give an answer to how beautiful it is relative to another work. 382 00:45:22,840 --> 00:45:37,650 So there is no answer. There's no fact of the matter about in this case, whether it is better than Tacitus or vice versa. 383 00:45:37,650 --> 00:45:49,080 And the last feature of the essay that's again confuse a number of people is the discussion at the very end. 384 00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:59,460 So I think what he's doing here is providing examples of controversies that he thinks the standard of taste can settle. 385 00:45:59,460 --> 00:46:08,430 So amongst them, representing strange customs, he thinks if we accept the standard, 386 00:46:08,430 --> 00:46:15,150 we can show that representing strange or unfamiliar customs does not diminish the work's beauty. 387 00:46:15,150 --> 00:46:22,350 And the reason for that is that it doesn't stop a true critic from enjoying it, because remember the true critic free from prejudice. 388 00:46:22,350 --> 00:46:26,700 Now, why might somebody think that it does? I'm not really sure. 389 00:46:26,700 --> 00:46:34,980 But he, in connexion with this, refers to what was then called the dispute over the ancients versus the moderns, 390 00:46:34,980 --> 00:46:45,900 which was a dispute over whether modern learning had exceeded ancient learning, whether we knew more now than the Romans did or the Greeks. 391 00:46:45,900 --> 00:46:50,430 That was, again, very live dispute at the time. 392 00:46:50,430 --> 00:46:58,050 And so he thinks that his standard can shed some light on that kind of thing with that example. 393 00:46:58,050 --> 00:47:01,980 However, there's limits to this. 394 00:47:01,980 --> 00:47:10,590 So he thinks this standard also shows that immorality in a work does diminish its beauty. 395 00:47:10,590 --> 00:47:15,810 So at least if it is portrayed without condemning it. 396 00:47:15,810 --> 00:47:26,280 And the reason for that is that immorality, at least if you're a critic recognising recognise it cannot please the true critic. 397 00:47:26,280 --> 00:47:31,890 It can't cause a pleasurable sentiment in the true critic. 398 00:47:31,890 --> 00:47:44,330 And this is something that's puzzling a lot of people. This phenomenon, which has been called the puzzle of imaginative resistance. 399 00:47:44,330 --> 00:47:51,230 Why is it that artwork's can ask us to imagine that time travel is possible or 400 00:47:51,230 --> 00:47:56,360 that Alice went down the rabbit hole and had all kinds of these adventures? 401 00:47:56,360 --> 00:48:07,040 But we won't accept a world. We won't accept being asked to imagine a world in which genocide is OK or wanton cruelty is great. 402 00:48:07,040 --> 00:48:19,280 We don't seem to accept the request to imagine a world in which moral truths are radically different from what they are. 403 00:48:19,280 --> 00:48:26,090 So that's it's something that humans picked up on. And I think the point of mentioning it is to say that because of this one, 404 00:48:26,090 --> 00:48:33,230 please, that you're a critic and that shows that immorality diminishes beauty. 405 00:48:33,230 --> 00:48:43,070 And he closes by considering error, speculative errors. So he thinks errors, for example, in religion, with certain striking exceptions, 406 00:48:43,070 --> 00:48:48,530 don't diminish the work's beauty because everybody makes mistakes in religion and in philosophy. 407 00:48:48,530 --> 00:48:53,600 And it's not hard for a true critic to put himself in the shoes of somebody who's made those mistakes. 408 00:48:53,600 --> 00:49:02,600 So those mistakes don't diminish, don't prevent them from feeling pleasure with the one exception of superstition. 409 00:49:02,600 --> 00:49:08,840 He thinks superstition is particularly ridiculous or galling type of error, 410 00:49:08,840 --> 00:49:14,690 that the true critic won't be able to put his self into the mind set up or won't be able to get over. 411 00:49:14,690 --> 00:49:26,300 And I think he compared he closes by saying how ridiculous it is that Boccaccio thanks God and the ladies for protecting him, 412 00:49:26,300 --> 00:49:30,170 offering them their protection. That sort of thing. 413 00:49:30,170 --> 00:49:36,430 He thinks the trick critic just won't be able to get over. All right. 414 00:49:36,430 --> 00:49:45,950 So those are, I think, the main points that he makes here in the little time we have left. 415 00:49:45,950 --> 00:49:54,990 I'd like to mention just a few of the objections that have often been raised to this. 416 00:49:54,990 --> 00:49:58,290 One obvious objection is how does he know? 417 00:49:58,290 --> 00:50:13,200 And what kind of evidence has he given us that beautiful objects will please everybody with these five characteristics? 418 00:50:13,200 --> 00:50:26,770 Similarly, but this is a distinct point. How does he know the beautiful objects have the capacity to please everyone? 419 00:50:26,770 --> 00:50:39,970 Is that an empirical claim supported by experience or is it part of what it is to be beautiful, that it has the capacity to please everyone? 420 00:50:39,970 --> 00:50:51,460 As we'll see tomorrow? Thinks that it's the latter, that it's not an empirical claim that beautiful works have the capacity to please everyone. 421 00:50:51,460 --> 00:50:57,040 It's just part of what it is for something to be beautiful, that it has this capacity. 422 00:50:57,040 --> 00:51:04,390 Nothing could count as beautiful if it didn't have this capacity. So that raise an interesting question. 423 00:51:04,390 --> 00:51:16,150 How does Hume conceive of this claim? If you need to go now, you can, but I'm just going to mention one last objection, 424 00:51:16,150 --> 00:51:24,970 which is a pretty standard one, and that's the claim that the standard of taste is circular. 425 00:51:24,970 --> 00:51:34,570 So the objection goes that if indeed this is supposed to help us identify the beautiful objects, 426 00:51:34,570 --> 00:51:40,570 then to claim seems to be to identify beautiful objects. We need to identify true critics. 427 00:51:40,570 --> 00:51:48,220 But how do we identify your critics? They just seem to be the ones who, well, identify the beautiful objects correctly. 428 00:51:48,220 --> 00:51:58,070 So we've got to know that they've they've identified the beautiful objects correctly to know that they're the true critics. 429 00:51:58,070 --> 00:52:04,340 But that's what we wanted to find out in the first place, namely which objects are the beautiful objects. 430 00:52:04,340 --> 00:52:08,060 So we need to know that already before we can find out who's a true critic. 431 00:52:08,060 --> 00:52:15,740 Knowing who is a true critic is not going to help us find out which objects are beautiful. 432 00:52:15,740 --> 00:52:23,540 Now, Peter Kivi has written a well-known response to this objection, so he grants part of it. 433 00:52:23,540 --> 00:52:32,510 He thinks that we can't determine whether critics have practise or have comparison and have the ability to compare works, 434 00:52:32,510 --> 00:52:38,180 at least in the way Hume describes these characteristics, unless we already know which objects are beautiful. 435 00:52:38,180 --> 00:52:45,680 And that's because, Hume says practise involves contemplating other species of beauty and comparing a work with the 436 00:52:45,680 --> 00:52:52,340 several species of excellence that they've seen and to know whether they've seen those things. 437 00:52:52,340 --> 00:52:59,870 We've got to know whether those things are those things that they've seen are beautiful. 438 00:52:59,870 --> 00:53:03,440 However, the other three characteristics are not like this. 439 00:53:03,440 --> 00:53:12,560 So delicacy and Hume effectively makes this point something we can determine whether somebody is got whether we know what's beautiful or not. 440 00:53:12,560 --> 00:53:19,670 Good sense. Freedom from prejudice similarly seemed to avoid the circularity. 441 00:53:19,670 --> 00:53:27,320 Now, I myself don't really think the objection or Kev's response to it are successful. 442 00:53:27,320 --> 00:53:37,490 So take Kev's response. What it seems to require is that Hume drop the requirement of practise and comparison in good critics, 443 00:53:37,490 --> 00:53:45,620 and then he's left with the claim that beautiful objects will please anyone who has good sense, 444 00:53:45,620 --> 00:53:52,010 delicacy and is free from prejudice, regardless of how much practise they have with artworks, 445 00:53:52,010 --> 00:53:57,860 regardless of how much experience they have with works of art. And so that doesn't seem plausible. 446 00:53:57,860 --> 00:54:04,970 And if he were to adjust its position in that way, he would just end up with a new problem. 447 00:54:04,970 --> 00:54:10,520 He'd avoid the circularity objection. But he'd end up with the implausible claim that anybody delicate enough, 448 00:54:10,520 --> 00:54:18,080 intelligent enough and free from prejudice will be a standard of taste, will be a true critic. 449 00:54:18,080 --> 00:54:21,230 And that just doesn't seem plausible. You do need experience with artworks. 450 00:54:21,230 --> 00:54:28,580 A lot of the time in order to figure out which ones are good, if you can figure out which ones are good at all. 451 00:54:28,580 --> 00:54:34,520 However, I don't think that the circularity objection is a good objection either. 452 00:54:34,520 --> 00:54:47,270 So Hume doesn't assume that we can't identify any beautiful objects until we have the standard of taste. 453 00:54:47,270 --> 00:54:52,760 In fact, he assumes that we already know a number of examples which objects are beautiful. 454 00:54:52,760 --> 00:55:01,010 So he assumes that we can. We do know that Homer is beautiful and that Milton and Addison are superior. 455 00:55:01,010 --> 00:55:11,420 The objection represents him as saying that we're totally in the dark about which objects are beautiful until we get the standard of taste. 456 00:55:11,420 --> 00:55:16,550 But if we know that Homer is beautiful, Milton's beautiful Addison, it's beautiful. 457 00:55:16,550 --> 00:55:23,220 All of these things that we can tell whether a critic has practise as he read Homer, as he read Milton, as he read Addison. 458 00:55:23,220 --> 00:55:31,640 OK, well, that's good because we know that they're beautiful. What I think we have to return to is what he says about what a standard of taste is. 459 00:55:31,640 --> 00:55:44,960 It's a rule for resolving disputes. Hard cases in which we're not sure which of the two things are beautiful. 460 00:55:44,960 --> 00:55:58,819 It doesn't seem to be and it doesn't seem to be sold as a rule for determining which things, including the uncontroversial cases, are beautiful.