1 00:00:00,450 --> 00:00:08,970 So today, we're going to discuss literary interpretation. And as I said, start of the chorus, 2 00:00:08,970 --> 00:00:19,500 one of the large categories of question that is dealt with in aesthetics are questions about our understanding and our appreciation of works of art. 3 00:00:19,500 --> 00:00:29,610 And today, we're going to deal with one of the largest questions of sets of questions in terms of volume of philosophical material written about it, 4 00:00:29,610 --> 00:00:37,200 certainly. And that is understanding literary works and interpreting them. 5 00:00:37,200 --> 00:00:44,640 And for better or for worse, most of the discussion of literary interpretation in the philosophical literature has focussed 6 00:00:44,640 --> 00:00:51,860 on what the role of the author's intentions are in determining the meaning of a literary work. 7 00:00:51,860 --> 00:01:01,840 Now it's important to clarify at the start that this is not a debate about whether, at least for those who think that literary works have a meaning, 8 00:01:01,840 --> 00:01:09,330 there's not a debate about whether the meaning of a work and what the author meant can coincide or not. 9 00:01:09,330 --> 00:01:18,600 Rather, what's at issue is whether what the author means or the author's intention determines what the work means. 10 00:01:18,600 --> 00:01:22,620 It's a matter of whether we can use our discoveries about the author's intention 11 00:01:22,620 --> 00:01:30,150 as evidence or as a standard by which to test an interpretation of a work. 12 00:01:30,150 --> 00:01:39,810 So that's roughly speaking, what's at issue here. And this debate really took off or is said, at least nowadays, 13 00:01:39,810 --> 00:01:52,470 to have taken off in 1946 with the publication of a paper entitled The Intentional Fallacy by Monroe Beardslee and William Winstead. 14 00:01:52,470 --> 00:02:07,680 And as the title indicates, they regarded it as a mistake to use the author's intention as a standard for literary interpretation on this view. 15 00:02:07,680 --> 00:02:12,360 It's not the office intention that ever determines what the literary work means. 16 00:02:12,360 --> 00:02:25,650 And indeed, they later expressed his position by saying it's not evidence for an interpretation that it's gives the meaning that the author intended. 17 00:02:25,650 --> 00:02:33,930 And this, you can sort of understand, caused a great deal of interest because it's natural to think. 18 00:02:33,930 --> 00:02:37,800 I mean, maybe not anymore, but in certain contexts anyway. 19 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:45,610 It's natural to think when you find an artwork puzzling or literary work puzzling that the author is trying to get something across. 20 00:02:45,610 --> 00:02:49,590 The artist is trying to get something across, have a meaning in mind. 21 00:02:49,590 --> 00:02:56,850 And that's it's natural then to think, well, if only the artist were here, we could just ask them, what did they mean? 22 00:02:56,850 --> 00:03:01,590 And that would save us a whole lot of trouble if Beardslee and Wimps Out are right. 23 00:03:01,590 --> 00:03:09,740 That's not how you do it. Obviously, most of the time when we're looking at artwork or reading a book, the artist is not there. 24 00:03:09,740 --> 00:03:15,030 The thought is even if they were, that would not tell us what the work means. 25 00:03:15,030 --> 00:03:17,690 And this was a very attractive view at the time, 26 00:03:17,690 --> 00:03:24,150 in particular because the dominant form of literary criticism was a school of criticism known as new criticism, 27 00:03:24,150 --> 00:03:31,350 one of whose slogans or principles was too focussed squarely on what's in the text. 28 00:03:31,350 --> 00:03:39,990 They had the view that previous criticism had focussed too much on the author's personality and the author's biography. 29 00:03:39,990 --> 00:03:45,510 Information like this and that critics were sort of abandoning the task of criticising the work 30 00:03:45,510 --> 00:03:53,130 that was in front of them and instead were engaging in biography or psychology or anthropology. 31 00:03:53,130 --> 00:03:59,610 So it's harmonised very much with the spirit of the Times as well as presenting thesis. 32 00:03:59,610 --> 00:04:02,580 That's interesting for various reasons. 33 00:04:02,580 --> 00:04:11,430 Now, reading this paper, it is kind of difficult to see what the argument is actually when you try and pick it out. 34 00:04:11,430 --> 00:04:21,960 So what I'm going to suggest is a bit of a reconstruction. I think that they present us with a dilemma in various bits of the paper. 35 00:04:21,960 --> 00:04:29,970 So they say, OK, well, suppose that the author's intention does determine the meaning of the work. 36 00:04:29,970 --> 00:04:35,520 We're left with the question of how we figure it out. There's two possibilities. 37 00:04:35,520 --> 00:04:42,890 Either the author succeeded in fulfilling his intention in the work or he did not. 38 00:04:42,890 --> 00:04:47,940 So take the case in which the authors succeeded. 39 00:04:47,940 --> 00:04:57,450 If the author fulfils his intentions, then the poem in their example will show us what his intentions are. 40 00:04:57,450 --> 00:05:02,640 However, the implication seems. And again, it's I must say, it's not explicit. 41 00:05:02,640 --> 00:05:11,140 If the poem does show us what the author's intentions are, then discovering his intentions will not tell us what the poem means. 42 00:05:11,140 --> 00:05:14,550 The thought seems to be that it's actually the other way around. 43 00:05:14,550 --> 00:05:18,840 You have to first determine what the poem means to figure out the author's intentions. 44 00:05:18,840 --> 00:05:28,560 In the case where the intentions are fulfilled, not discover intentions to determine what the poem means. 45 00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:37,740 As I say, that's my reconstruction of it. That bit of it is not explicit, but that seems to be what they mean. 46 00:05:37,740 --> 00:05:46,020 So that's the case in which the author fulfils his intentions. Now, let's suppose the intentions are not fulfilled. 47 00:05:46,020 --> 00:05:53,820 In that case, they say the poem will not be evidence of the off his intentions. 48 00:05:53,820 --> 00:06:00,570 And we have to go outside of the work in order to determine what the intentions were. 49 00:06:00,570 --> 00:06:08,640 So to the poet's letters, diaries, interviews, things like that. 50 00:06:08,640 --> 00:06:15,240 But if we're going outside the poem, again, the implication seems to be that's not doing criticism. 51 00:06:15,240 --> 00:06:21,810 That's doing biography or journalism or what have you. 52 00:06:21,810 --> 00:06:26,100 It's not reading the poem anymore. It's not interpreting it anymore. 53 00:06:26,100 --> 00:06:33,900 So clearly, that's not discovering what the poem means. So in either case, the thought seems to be the author's intentions. 54 00:06:33,900 --> 00:06:41,470 Don't tell us what the poem means. They don't make it the case that the poem means what it does. 55 00:06:41,470 --> 00:06:49,500 OK. So that, as I say, with a little bit of reconstruction seems to be their principal argument. 56 00:06:49,500 --> 00:06:55,710 Now, Beardsley, who was a philosopher, wimps that I think was a critic rather than a philosopher. 57 00:06:55,710 --> 00:07:06,660 But Beardsley revisited this theme a number of times later in his career and on the full version of the handout, which I'm going to post on Web Learn. 58 00:07:06,660 --> 00:07:12,510 I've gone through three other arguments that he presents in his other works. 59 00:07:12,510 --> 00:07:16,860 I'm not going to go through all of them here, but I'll just mention one other one, 60 00:07:16,860 --> 00:07:20,850 because I think it gives kind of an insight into how he's thinking about this 61 00:07:20,850 --> 00:07:26,160 issue and also about what he sort of thing he thinks the literary work is. 62 00:07:26,160 --> 00:07:30,270 So 1970, in a book called The Possibility of Criticism, 63 00:07:30,270 --> 00:07:39,030 Beardslee presented a number of counter examples to the claim that the author's intention or what 64 00:07:39,030 --> 00:07:44,460 he took to be count examples became the author's intention determines the meaning of the work. 65 00:07:44,460 --> 00:07:50,490 So the argument seems to be that if there can be texts with meanings that were not intended by an author, 66 00:07:50,490 --> 00:07:54,660 then the off his intentions do not determine textual meaning, anything. 67 00:07:54,660 --> 00:07:57,450 Indeed, there can be such texts. 68 00:07:57,450 --> 00:08:06,930 So he says there can be meaningful texts that have no offer, such as certain typographical errors or even computer generated texts. 69 00:08:06,930 --> 00:08:10,950 He thinks the text that ends up being produced sometimes can be meaningful. 70 00:08:10,950 --> 00:08:21,090 I think he gives the example of typographical error of being filled with righteous indigestion, which you can sort of give a meaning to. 71 00:08:21,090 --> 00:08:31,290 It seems, he says. And any way you can imagine certain less controversial, less metaphorical, I should say, examples. 72 00:08:31,290 --> 00:08:39,690 So the thought seems to be these text can have meaning with no author. Therefore, authorial intention does not determine the meaning. 73 00:08:39,690 --> 00:08:48,420 And even amongst offered texts, he thinks there are cases in which they have meanings that the office didn't intend. 74 00:08:48,420 --> 00:08:52,980 So an example that's become a bit notorious. 75 00:08:52,980 --> 00:08:58,980 He quotes a poem by the 18th century poet Mark Aiken, side or ACoNs side, 76 00:08:58,980 --> 00:09:07,890 called The Pleasures of Imagination, in which can side talks of someone raising their plastic arm. 77 00:09:07,890 --> 00:09:14,790 He says this line has changed its meaning since ACON side has died because the word plastic has changed its meaning. 78 00:09:14,790 --> 00:09:20,660 It's now refers to this synthetic material that lots of stuff is made of. 79 00:09:20,660 --> 00:09:25,200 Agins I couldn't have intended this because he was dead when it changed its meaning. 80 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:31,410 Therefore, authors intentions don't determine the meaning. 81 00:09:31,410 --> 00:09:38,970 Third counter example he gives is that there can be even texts that are authored and the author is still alive, 82 00:09:38,970 --> 00:09:44,670 but which have meanings that the author is unaware of and therefore could not have intended. 83 00:09:44,670 --> 00:09:52,560 So double entendres are a good example here. They're embarrassing because you produced a text or an utterance or whatever that 84 00:09:52,560 --> 00:09:59,720 has a meaning that you weren't aware of and therefore could not have intended. 85 00:09:59,720 --> 00:10:06,750 OK. So those are some of Beardsley's arguments for the anti internationalist position. 86 00:10:06,750 --> 00:10:12,960 But there are others and there are a number of varieties of anti intentional ism, as we'll see shortly. 87 00:10:12,960 --> 00:10:24,150 Gerald Levinsohn provides another argument against the relevance of the actual author's intentions and explain what I mean by that in a moment. 88 00:10:24,150 --> 00:10:31,590 So Levinsohn says that there are certain categories of evidence, 89 00:10:31,590 --> 00:10:42,900 so types of evidence that it's legitimate and other categories of evidence that it's not legitimate to expect a reader to have. 90 00:10:42,900 --> 00:10:50,100 And he thinks that sometimes in order to discover on author's intention, 91 00:10:50,100 --> 00:10:55,410 you would need evidence that it's not legitimate to expect the reader to have. 92 00:10:55,410 --> 00:11:04,860 So, for example, sometimes it's possible for the author's intentions to be revealed only by private diaries, 93 00:11:04,860 --> 00:11:09,750 private papers, conversations that he's had with his loved ones at night. 94 00:11:09,750 --> 00:11:18,840 Things like this, it's not reasonable to expect that the reader of the text an author produces would have not legitimate, 95 00:11:18,840 --> 00:11:24,830 I think is what he says more often to expect that a reader would have access to this evidence. 96 00:11:24,830 --> 00:11:30,630 Sometimes that's what you would need in order to discover on authors intentions. 97 00:11:30,630 --> 00:11:40,740 So if it were the case that the meaning was determined by authors intentions, then there wouldn't be this sort of implicit contract, 98 00:11:40,740 --> 00:11:52,770 as he puts it, between author and reader, that certain demands are reasonable to put on the reader and certain ones are not. 99 00:11:52,770 --> 00:12:01,260 And the meaning of a word can't be something that you can only access by submitting to unreasonable demands of these kinds. 100 00:12:01,260 --> 00:12:09,800 Knowing about his private diaries, knowing about his private conversations. 101 00:12:09,800 --> 00:12:17,590 OK. And that sort of thought is repeated in a number of anti intentional writings, also in the full version of the handout. 102 00:12:17,590 --> 00:12:26,860 I've given an argument by Joseph Raas, who's much better known as a legal and political philosopher, to the same effect. 103 00:12:26,860 --> 00:12:33,070 It's similar to Levinson's argument, but he adds some other points. 104 00:12:33,070 --> 00:12:38,770 So these are the anti essentialist criticisms of the relevance of intentions. 105 00:12:38,770 --> 00:12:46,690 What did they put in its place? What do they think determines the meaning of a work? 106 00:12:46,690 --> 00:12:55,390 I think, broadly speaking, we can distinguish three kinds of theories that are current in the anti intentionally camp. 107 00:12:55,390 --> 00:13:03,340 One claim is that its conventions of various kinds. That's determine what a literary work means. 108 00:13:03,340 --> 00:13:10,570 So linguistic conventions, literary conventions, these sorts of things. 109 00:13:10,570 --> 00:13:14,650 Beardslee in wimps that don't call themselves conventional lists. 110 00:13:14,650 --> 00:13:22,390 They just call themselves that the intention lists. But I think it's not misleading to categorise them this way because their 111 00:13:22,390 --> 00:13:28,600 positive account of what determines literary meaning is that it's determined. 112 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:32,740 They put it through the syntax and semantics of the language through grammars and 113 00:13:32,740 --> 00:13:39,490 dictionaries are habitual knowledge of the language and the history of word use. 114 00:13:39,490 --> 00:13:47,680 So the history of word use may is maybe intention with classifying them as conventional list. 115 00:13:47,680 --> 00:13:55,420 But otherwise that seems to be basically their view. Now they qualify their view in a number of ways, their positive account. 116 00:13:55,420 --> 00:14:02,710 So they point out that, of course, the author, his own use of the words in private, 117 00:14:02,710 --> 00:14:10,930 even in private meetings that he and his circle may attached to the words, is part of the history of those words use. 118 00:14:10,930 --> 00:14:16,390 And for that reason, that can be drawn upon as part of the evidence for what they mean. 119 00:14:16,390 --> 00:14:20,170 So the author is a member of the public like anybody else. Speaker of the language. 120 00:14:20,170 --> 00:14:26,860 Like anybody else. And if the way words are used determines what they mean, then the way he uses them. 121 00:14:26,860 --> 00:14:33,190 And that sense can help determine what they mean. But the thought seems to be just that. 122 00:14:33,190 --> 00:14:40,050 That's only part of the evidence. And the fact that the author is using those words carries no special weight here. 123 00:14:40,050 --> 00:14:45,670 It's just part of the evidence. Part of the whole history of the use of the language. 124 00:14:45,670 --> 00:14:49,120 And in particular, it's not because they are there. 125 00:14:49,120 --> 00:14:54,490 It's evidence of what the author intended. That it's OK to draw upon that evidence. 126 00:14:54,490 --> 00:15:02,110 Rather, it's because it's part of the history of the use of the word that it's OK to draw upon that evidence. 127 00:15:02,110 --> 00:15:11,110 And the history of the use the word it's part of what determines what the works in which that word occurs mean. 128 00:15:11,110 --> 00:15:16,180 And they also make the point that it's not as though either that's knowing about the author's intentions, 129 00:15:16,180 --> 00:15:27,280 can't give us clues about what to look for in the text. So you might not have thought to try and find a certain meaning in a text. 130 00:15:27,280 --> 00:15:31,750 But learning of the author's intentions might prompt you to do so, 131 00:15:31,750 --> 00:15:41,890 provided that you find it and not based on the author's intentions in the way they intentionally would claim, then that's perfectly legitimate. 132 00:15:41,890 --> 00:15:47,470 So obvious intentions can be clues for what to look for. That's OK. But they don't determine what it means. 133 00:15:47,470 --> 00:15:53,590 They don't make it the case that the text has the meaning that it does. 134 00:15:53,590 --> 00:15:58,480 So that's the Beardslee wimps. That's version of conventional wisdom. 135 00:15:58,480 --> 00:16:05,200 Levinsohn supports a view that he calls hypothetical intentional ism. 136 00:16:05,200 --> 00:16:09,870 I think it's accurate to describe him as an anti intentional lists. 137 00:16:09,870 --> 00:16:18,040 He distinguishes themselves from an intention lists. But I think really he's just distinguishing himself from himself from Beardslee here. 138 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:28,780 So he thinks, as I mentioned, that meaning can only be determined by what could be found out by someone with logit, 139 00:16:28,780 --> 00:16:32,500 with evidence that it's legitimate to expect them to have again. 140 00:16:32,500 --> 00:16:38,020 So not private conversations and diaries, for example. 141 00:16:38,020 --> 00:16:47,170 So he he thinks that, in fact, the meaning of a work is what would be is the intention that would be attributed to the author. 142 00:16:47,170 --> 00:16:57,730 The best hypothesis about what the author's intention would be that you arrive at using only evidence that it's legitimate to have. 143 00:16:57,730 --> 00:17:07,910 So it's a bit like in a jury trial when the judge says to the jury, don't consider that bit of evidence because it was obtained. 144 00:17:07,910 --> 00:17:13,430 Legally or otherwise inadmissible. 145 00:17:13,430 --> 00:17:20,150 Just arrive at the decision that the admissible legal evidence supports. 146 00:17:20,150 --> 00:17:29,540 Now, that's. So even if the illegal evidence shows something different, that if you were to take the illegal evidence into account, 147 00:17:29,540 --> 00:17:35,270 you would arrive at a different verdict in the case of a court setting. 148 00:17:35,270 --> 00:17:41,450 Juries are not supposed to do that. They're only supposed to consider admissible evidence, 149 00:17:41,450 --> 00:17:47,870 even if taking all the evidence admissible and inadmissible together would lead you to a different conclusion. 150 00:17:47,870 --> 00:17:57,110 Levinson thinks something similar is going on with literary interpretation, that you're only the meaning can only be what you would arrive at, 151 00:17:57,110 --> 00:18:05,810 a hypothesis you would arrive at about the author's intentions using only legitimate evidence. 152 00:18:05,810 --> 00:18:08,900 That's why it's called hypothetical intention ism, 153 00:18:08,900 --> 00:18:14,200 because it might turn out the best hypothesis about what the author's intentions are that you arrive at. 154 00:18:14,200 --> 00:18:20,570 Using only legitimate evidence is different from what the author's intention actually is, 155 00:18:20,570 --> 00:18:32,090 or indeed different from the best hypothesis to write about using all the possible evidence or all even all the available evidence. 156 00:18:32,090 --> 00:18:36,920 Okay, it might say a little bit more about that later, but that's in summary. 157 00:18:36,920 --> 00:18:42,950 His view is trying to capture the truth in the thought that the intention is relevant to 158 00:18:42,950 --> 00:18:51,080 determining the meaning without going so far as to say it simply does determine the meaning. 159 00:18:51,080 --> 00:18:59,000 Another family of A.I. intentional. Its theories have recently been dubbed value maximising theories a little bit. 160 00:18:59,000 --> 00:19:04,370 It might be a little bit misleading to call them value maximising, 161 00:19:04,370 --> 00:19:15,650 but the basic thought common to them is that one thing that counts in favour of an interpretation excuse me is that it makes the work look good. 162 00:19:15,650 --> 00:19:25,160 So other things being equal to interpretations that account for all the same things equally well. 163 00:19:25,160 --> 00:19:34,570 But from one of which it follows that the work is good. And from the other of which it follows that the work is not so good or even bad. 164 00:19:34,570 --> 00:19:43,550 In a situation like that, you go with the one that makes the work look better. From which it follows that the work is better. 165 00:19:43,550 --> 00:19:48,740 So it's it's not I stress the thought that it's enough that it make the work look good. 166 00:19:48,740 --> 00:19:52,480 That's for it to be a good interpretation. 167 00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:58,670 I thought just is that amongst the factors we've got to consider are whether it does make the work look good 168 00:19:58,670 --> 00:20:05,450 and how much weight you want to put on that and how that interacts with other factors can vary in your theory. 169 00:20:05,450 --> 00:20:12,620 But that's one thing that is common to these kinds of theories. 170 00:20:12,620 --> 00:20:23,660 And so Joseph Rad's, as I mentioned, is a proponent of this view of literary interpretation. 171 00:20:23,660 --> 00:20:34,160 And so he thinks that, as he puts it, the meaning or meanings of a work are what is given by an explanation, which, as he puts it, 172 00:20:34,160 --> 00:20:42,560 adequately covers the significant aspects of the work, is not inconsistent with any aspect of the work, 173 00:20:42,560 --> 00:20:51,560 explains those aspects of the work it chooses to focus on. And and this is the key point that makes it a value maximising very best accounts for 174 00:20:51,560 --> 00:20:58,130 the reasons that there are for us to pay attention to it as a work of art of its kind. 175 00:20:58,130 --> 00:21:06,920 Sometimes gas's this out by saying that interpretation should reveal why the work is important. 176 00:21:06,920 --> 00:21:10,820 So what does he offer in favour of this view? Well, 177 00:21:10,820 --> 00:21:17,660 he thinks one thing in its favour is that it explains how interpretations or explicit 178 00:21:17,660 --> 00:21:27,170 explanations of a works meaning differ from other explanations of aspects of a work. 179 00:21:27,170 --> 00:21:33,440 So this is something that any theory had a distinction that any theory of interpretation had better respect. 180 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:43,760 The thought is. So in his example, to illustrate that not all explanations of aspects of work, of a work are interpretations. 181 00:21:43,760 --> 00:21:52,190 He says you could show that Hamlet's behaviour is perfectly consistent with the laws of physics as far as we know them. 182 00:21:52,190 --> 00:21:58,670 And he said this might even be a true explanation of Hamlet's behaviour. 183 00:21:58,670 --> 00:22:07,950 But it would not be an interpretation. It would not be an explanation of what the work means. 184 00:22:07,950 --> 00:22:14,580 He thinks that what makes an explanation into an interpretation of a literary work 185 00:22:14,580 --> 00:22:19,440 is that it gives us the reasons that there are for paying attention to Hamlet. 186 00:22:19,440 --> 00:22:28,820 What's important about the play? And he thinks a second reason in favour of his view, 187 00:22:28,820 --> 00:22:37,860 apart from the fact that it gives us a way of marking the distinction between interpretations and other explanations, 188 00:22:37,860 --> 00:22:44,370 is that his view is the best explanation of how new or innovative interpretations 189 00:22:44,370 --> 00:22:50,130 can become possible when general truths about the world are discovered. 190 00:22:50,130 --> 00:22:59,520 So he gives the example of psychoanalysis. It became very well known interpretation of Hamlet during the 20th century to 191 00:22:59,520 --> 00:23:06,150 interpret Hamlet's behaviour in terms of the Oedipal complex proposed by Freud. 192 00:23:06,150 --> 00:23:10,950 And Raas says, What? 193 00:23:10,950 --> 00:23:22,230 What's going on here? On one view, you could think that what's happening is that when theories like this are discovered, 194 00:23:22,230 --> 00:23:28,050 they reveal the meaning of the work that has been hidden all this time. 195 00:23:28,050 --> 00:23:39,350 And it was only with the discovery of the theory that this meaning of Hamlet became manifest to anyone. 196 00:23:39,350 --> 00:23:46,950 And although he admits that sometimes the meaning of a word can be hidden for a while from everyone. 197 00:23:46,950 --> 00:23:50,700 In a way like that. 198 00:23:50,700 --> 00:23:59,010 He doesn't think it's plausible to say that the meaning of a work can be hidden from everyone in any in every case and in particular in this case, 199 00:23:59,010 --> 00:24:04,680 he doesn't think that's plausible. He doesn't sort of spell it out. 200 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:14,220 But the thought seems to be that it's implausible that the work could be around for so long and this meaning be completely hidden from everyone. 201 00:24:14,220 --> 00:24:22,830 And the support he gives for that is to say this is like supposing that there was an English word or an expression 202 00:24:22,830 --> 00:24:29,760 that was around for a really long time and had a meaning that was hidden from absolutely everybody who was using it. 203 00:24:29,760 --> 00:24:38,040 Nobody knew what the meaning was of this English word until somebody came along with a theory that suddenly revealed it. 204 00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:46,440 He thinks it's analogous to that. And that's why he thinks it's implausible to suppose that, as he puts it, with psychoanalysis, 205 00:24:46,440 --> 00:24:54,630 we're unable to retrieve the meaning of the work, the hidden meaning of the work. 206 00:24:54,630 --> 00:25:02,580 His theory, he thinks, explains this. These kinds of innovative interpretations better. 207 00:25:02,580 --> 00:25:07,680 He thinks that with theories like psychoanalysis, what happens is that the meaning changes. 208 00:25:07,680 --> 00:25:16,140 So it's not that there was a meaning there all along that became uncovered. It's that the work acquired a meaning. 209 00:25:16,140 --> 00:25:26,820 And the reason it acquired a meaning on his theory is that we acquired new reasons to pay attention to it with the discovery of psychoanalysis. 210 00:25:26,820 --> 00:25:34,530 The work became important for reasons that it hadn't been important before. 211 00:25:34,530 --> 00:25:37,230 With the discovery of, for example, psychoanalysis. 212 00:25:37,230 --> 00:25:42,870 Now he's not committing himself to the claim that the psychoanalytic interpretation of Hamlet is a sound one. 213 00:25:42,870 --> 00:25:46,920 He's just using this as an example of the type of thing that he does. 214 00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:52,560 It is possible and he thinks this is how you explain it when it happens, 215 00:25:52,560 --> 00:25:58,410 that the meaning changes because our reasons to pay attention to a change and interpretations, 216 00:25:58,410 --> 00:26:06,030 unlike other kinds of explanation, reveal the reasons we have to pay attention to it, account for, as he sometimes puts it. 217 00:26:06,030 --> 00:26:14,670 The reasons we have to pay attention to it. OK. 218 00:26:14,670 --> 00:26:24,240 So those are very, as I say, quick overview of a large field of theories, anti internationalist theories, 219 00:26:24,240 --> 00:26:33,210 the view that it's not the author's intention, but something else that determines the meaning of a work. 220 00:26:33,210 --> 00:26:37,750 Now, I'd like to get into some of the intentional list replies to this. 221 00:26:37,750 --> 00:26:46,560 So for a long time it was pretty much accepted that ASEAN centralism was right. 222 00:26:46,560 --> 00:26:54,330 And as far as I know in literature departments, I think that's still the dominant view. 223 00:26:54,330 --> 00:27:05,670 But within at least analytic philosophy of art, there's been a lot of people opposed to anti essentialism think that there actually is some 224 00:27:05,670 --> 00:27:12,360 truth in the idea that the author's actual intentions determine the meaning of the work. 225 00:27:12,360 --> 00:27:19,800 So some of the earliest criticisms of Beardslee and Web sites article before I go into those, 226 00:27:19,800 --> 00:27:25,080 I should say it is a distinction you want to make here between what's sometimes called extreme, 227 00:27:25,080 --> 00:27:31,080 actual intentional ism and moderate actual intentional ism. 228 00:27:31,080 --> 00:27:35,940 I don't know if anybody holds the view that's called extreme, actual intentional ism. 229 00:27:35,940 --> 00:27:42,930 This is associated with a lot of people like to use this example, Humpty Dumpty and Alice in Wonderland, 230 00:27:42,930 --> 00:27:50,460 who at one point says, when I say when I said just now, there's glory for you. 231 00:27:50,460 --> 00:27:58,050 That meant that's a nice knock down argument because I can make words mean whatever the heck I want. 232 00:27:58,050 --> 00:28:04,890 This is sometimes taken to be an expression of an extreme actual intention list view, 233 00:28:04,890 --> 00:28:10,890 namely that being intended is just a sufficient condition of being the works. 234 00:28:10,890 --> 00:28:17,070 Meaning doesn't matter what the words are. Doesn't matter what the literary conventions are. 235 00:28:17,070 --> 00:28:22,170 None of that else matter. None of that matters. It's just if you intend it. 236 00:28:22,170 --> 00:28:30,060 That's what it means. End of story. That's a sufficient condition of that being what it means. 237 00:28:30,060 --> 00:28:37,980 Now, as I say, I am not aware of anyone in the real world who holds this view. 238 00:28:37,980 --> 00:28:42,480 E.D. Hirsch is sometimes classified as an extreme actual internationalist, 239 00:28:42,480 --> 00:28:51,600 but I think it's demonstrably false to regard him as an extreme actual intention list for reasons I'll get to in a second. 240 00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:57,540 So for the most part, what we're talking about is moderate, actual intentional ism. 241 00:28:57,540 --> 00:29:07,530 And the variations on this view are that sometimes, yes, the author's intentions do determine what the word means. 242 00:29:07,530 --> 00:29:15,240 And you might think if it does have a meaning, it always is determined by what the author's intentions are. 243 00:29:15,240 --> 00:29:22,680 But there are limits on which intentions of the author can become the works, meaning. 244 00:29:22,680 --> 00:29:32,610 So, as E.D. Hirsch himself puts it, actually the author's verbal meaning is limited by the linguistic possibilities. 245 00:29:32,610 --> 00:29:39,060 So there are certain meanings that the text can possibly support and on an actual intentionally set view. 246 00:29:39,060 --> 00:29:45,390 It's the author's intention that if the author intends one of those meanings that the text can support, 247 00:29:45,390 --> 00:29:50,850 then that becomes the texts, meaning that breaks the tie, 248 00:29:50,850 --> 00:30:03,180 so to speak, between the range of possible meanings the text could have and b meaning it acts and determines it as meaning it actually has. 249 00:30:03,180 --> 00:30:10,320 OK. So that's the landscape. 250 00:30:10,320 --> 00:30:16,710 Now, what are some of their replies to beardslee in Web sites criticisms. Well, early reply, 251 00:30:16,710 --> 00:30:25,380 important reply to Beardslee in Wims that was offered by Frank Choppy in think 1963 and Chalfie 252 00:30:25,380 --> 00:30:33,120 raises a number of points and takes them up on a number of the examples they gave in particular. 253 00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:42,960 Some of the replies he makes, it eats. So he says it's certainly true that often we continue to think that an interpretation is right. 254 00:30:42,960 --> 00:30:54,660 Even when we discover that the author disavows it, he says that is a familiar phenomenon and that is familiar enough anyway. 255 00:30:54,660 --> 00:30:58,050 That's the sort of thing that lends credibility to the anti intentional, 256 00:30:58,050 --> 00:31:08,760 its view that Chalfie says that doesn't mean that the author's intention doesn't determine the meaning. 257 00:31:08,760 --> 00:31:20,510 All it shows is that sometimes the text is better evidence of his intention than the stuff he says after the fact. 258 00:31:20,510 --> 00:31:24,860 So you've got to distinguish between what the author's telling you about what 259 00:31:24,860 --> 00:31:33,650 the text means or what its intention was and what his intention actually was, 260 00:31:33,650 --> 00:31:38,420 and what he tells you is just one bit of evidence for his intention. 261 00:31:38,420 --> 00:31:46,790 The text itself in some circumstances can be better evidence of what his intention was than what he tells you. 262 00:31:46,790 --> 00:31:55,850 And Chalfie thinks this is particularly true when the effect produced by a text is especially complex. 263 00:31:55,850 --> 00:32:02,960 So he thinks in situations like this, if the author says, well, I didn't intend to have that effect, 264 00:32:02,960 --> 00:32:12,370 sometimes it's really not plausible to think that effect could have come about by accident and not been intended. 265 00:32:12,370 --> 00:32:20,900 And it's much more plausible, thank the authors, for whatever reason, self deceived or not telling the truth about what its intentions were. 266 00:32:20,900 --> 00:32:23,140 In that case, 267 00:32:23,140 --> 00:32:34,760 the point about the complexity of effects and the unlikelihood that those could just be accidental in some cases thinks that suitcase of this kind. 268 00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:41,420 And second, he thinks that a. intentional ism ignores the fact that we just don't stand in the same relation to, 269 00:32:41,420 --> 00:32:48,830 say, a poem after we learnt that the author could not possibly have intended a certain meaning. 270 00:32:48,830 --> 00:33:03,440 So Blake's famous hymn, Jerusalem, where he talks about the dark satanic mills, often taken to be a complaint against the Industrial Revolution. 271 00:33:03,440 --> 00:33:08,750 But apparently there's pretty conclusive evidence that Blake couldn't have been talking 272 00:33:08,750 --> 00:33:16,580 about industrial mills in that line when he's talking about dark satanic mills. 273 00:33:16,580 --> 00:33:24,920 And Chafee says, look, discovering this just just does change how we relate to the poem. 274 00:33:24,920 --> 00:33:36,560 And anti intentional ism fails to capture that fact. So too choppy makes a point that would relate to what Levinson said. 275 00:33:36,560 --> 00:33:48,500 Although Levinson was writing much later about this matter of legitimate evidence, what we can be reasonably expected to know, 276 00:33:48,500 --> 00:33:55,460 he says it's not really clear where we would draw the line or what makes a piece of evidence legitimate. 277 00:33:55,460 --> 00:33:58,340 And Levinson, for his part, is actually quite open about this. 278 00:33:58,340 --> 00:34:03,860 He says, I don't have a principled answer to the question of what makes evidence legitimate. 279 00:34:03,860 --> 00:34:10,330 All I mean is that there are some clear cases of illegitimate and clear cases of legitimate evidence. 280 00:34:10,330 --> 00:34:19,670 But Chalkie gives the example of a particularly innovative or brilliants interpretation of a work offered by a critic. 281 00:34:19,670 --> 00:34:24,710 And he thinks this is exactly the sort of thing that can enhance our understanding 282 00:34:24,710 --> 00:34:30,770 of the work that we can draw on in order to interpret it for ourselves. 283 00:34:30,770 --> 00:34:39,470 But it may be something that didn't occur to anybody and wouldn't have occurred to somebody who wasn't particularly brilliant or imaginative. 284 00:34:39,470 --> 00:34:44,210 And the question arises, Jocky says, well, is it legitimate for us to draw on that evidence? 285 00:34:44,210 --> 00:34:57,590 Could we be legitimately expected to have that particularly creative, ingenious interpretation in our evidence base when interpreting the work? 286 00:34:57,590 --> 00:35:06,140 He says. It's not clear that there's a good answer to that that will help people who want to appeal to the idea of legitimate evidence. 287 00:35:06,140 --> 00:35:15,950 So those are a few of Chaffee's points. Richard Boeheim is also quite well known for some of his responses to anti potential concerns, 288 00:35:15,950 --> 00:35:21,380 particularly the kind raised by Beardslee and wimps that so Boeheim says, look, 289 00:35:21,380 --> 00:35:26,270 beardslee in wimps out in their argument, which I described to you at the start. 290 00:35:26,270 --> 00:35:29,510 Assume that if an author's intentions are not fulfilled, 291 00:35:29,510 --> 00:35:36,650 then they can't possibly be relevant to interpreting the work that getting into them is just doing biography. 292 00:35:36,650 --> 00:35:45,200 It's changing the subject. Whatever it is, it's not enhancing our understanding of the work. 293 00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:50,120 But Boeheim says actually there's lots of cases where, first of all, 294 00:35:50,120 --> 00:35:58,820 knowing that an off his intentions were unfulfilled can enhance our understanding of the work. 295 00:35:58,820 --> 00:36:04,320 So Boeheim gives the example of a novel by Dostoyevsky. I think it's the idiot. 296 00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:12,410 But I'm not sure cheque on that in which he says the character of Prince 297 00:36:12,410 --> 00:36:21,020 Myshkin was intended by Dostoyevsky to be a portrayal of a perfectly good man. 298 00:36:21,020 --> 00:36:25,970 And Vilhelm says he failed in portraying a perfectly good man. 299 00:36:25,970 --> 00:36:31,940 Nevertheless, knowing that this was his intention can affect how we read the work. 300 00:36:31,940 --> 00:36:40,220 It can cause us to notice character traits of the work of Prince Myshkin that we wouldn't have otherwise been able to see, 301 00:36:40,220 --> 00:36:54,170 or at least wouldn't have otherwise seen. So knowing of the unfulfilled intentions of the author is not as irrelevant as his main websites claim. 302 00:36:54,170 --> 00:37:08,000 So, too, he thinks that knowing about intentions that the author or artist originally had and then changed can also affect how we understand the work. 303 00:37:08,000 --> 00:37:18,830 So he gives the example of the sculptor Rodanthe, who was commissioned to do sculpture of the novelist Bozak. 304 00:37:18,830 --> 00:37:28,160 Originally, he intended to make it a nude, and partway through the process he changed his mind and decided to portray Balzac as clothed. 305 00:37:28,160 --> 00:37:42,980 Well, Boeheim says this is the sort of thing that can give us an insight into to how Roedad sees the monumental Cees monumental sculpture. 306 00:37:42,980 --> 00:37:49,160 And so here's another case where that's not even an intention the author tried to fulfil in the end. 307 00:37:49,160 --> 00:37:58,250 The artist tried to fulfil it, but knowing about it, so says Vilhelm, can affect how we understand the work. 308 00:37:58,250 --> 00:38:05,810 So those are some of the examples of the kind of counter-attack that was offered by the intense police writers. 309 00:38:05,810 --> 00:38:09,320 What are the views that they've developed? 310 00:38:09,320 --> 00:38:21,650 Well, E.D. Hirsch, I've mentioned a couple of times already, was one of the earliest, most prominent internationalists to reply to BEARDING website. 311 00:38:21,650 --> 00:38:34,640 And he argues that the author's intention is the only thing that can supply us with a good standard for what the meaning of a word could be. 312 00:38:34,640 --> 00:38:41,600 So he says Beardslee wimps out want to say that it's the conventions of language that determine the meaning of the work. 313 00:38:41,600 --> 00:38:51,350 But they fail to recognise that the conventions of language permit multiple readings of virtually any sequence of words. 314 00:38:51,350 --> 00:38:58,250 They don't determine meaning in almost all cases, he says. 315 00:38:58,250 --> 00:39:10,400 So in some of his examples, the sentence in a sentence as simple as I'm going to town today, that sequence of words, he says, well, 316 00:39:10,400 --> 00:39:19,040 depending on which of those words you stress, it can have a range of different meanings consistent with what the conventions of language would permit. 317 00:39:19,040 --> 00:39:25,460 And another example he gives, my car ran out of gas. 318 00:39:25,460 --> 00:39:28,160 He says, well, there's one natural way of reading this, 319 00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:36,400 but the conventions of language also permit you to read it as the train car emerged from a cloud of argon. 320 00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:41,480 It is somewhat farfetched example and says the only reason that we go for the first reading, 321 00:39:41,480 --> 00:39:47,960 the normal reading that it's out of fuel is because of the reference to the author's intentions. 322 00:39:47,960 --> 00:39:53,210 We know they couldn't possibly have intended it to mean my train car emerge from a cloud of argon. 323 00:39:53,210 --> 00:40:00,470 Rather, we know they intended it to mean that ran out of fuel. 324 00:40:00,470 --> 00:40:12,420 The basic thought being that sequences of words can only be given a meaning by a human consciousness, as he puts it. 325 00:40:12,420 --> 00:40:17,530 Conventions of language don't determine what a sequence of words can mean. 326 00:40:17,530 --> 00:40:27,390 And I think he must be implying here, too, that it wouldn't be plausible to think that the that every meaning that a sequence of words 327 00:40:27,390 --> 00:40:37,340 is permitted by the conventions to have is a meaning that it does have on this occasion. 328 00:40:37,340 --> 00:40:44,150 Only the author's intention can select from those meanings, it's permitted to have to provide a standard to determine the meaning. 329 00:40:44,150 --> 00:40:48,650 But it does have and it gives a few other arguments, 330 00:40:48,650 --> 00:40:52,730 which I'll put on the full version of the handout as to why it can't be the judgement of 331 00:40:52,730 --> 00:41:01,340 sensitive reader and various other things that select what the meaning of the work is. 332 00:41:01,340 --> 00:41:10,160 Now, within the moderate actual intentional list camp, which I say it's pretty much everybody in the real world who's an essentialist, 333 00:41:10,160 --> 00:41:19,280 there is a division between people who think that being intended is a necessary condition of being the literary works. 334 00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:24,050 Meaning. And those who don't think that. 335 00:41:24,050 --> 00:41:27,830 So Hirsch thinks the meaning of work is what the author intended. 336 00:41:27,830 --> 00:41:34,160 So that means that if it's got a meeting at all, then it was intended by the author. 337 00:41:34,160 --> 00:41:39,920 And this, I think it's fair to say, is no Carroll's view as well. 338 00:41:39,920 --> 00:41:46,130 His view, which calls modest, actual intentional ism. But you could have a different view. 339 00:41:46,130 --> 00:41:55,010 You could say other things sometimes can determine the meaning of a work without the author's intention. 340 00:41:55,010 --> 00:42:10,020 So this is Robert Stackers view. He says sometimes the author's intention determines the meaning of the work, but sometimes. 341 00:42:10,020 --> 00:42:20,010 As he puts it, convention and context at the time of utterance determines the meaning of the work. 342 00:42:20,010 --> 00:42:27,490 If the author fails to fulfil, his intention is meaning intention. 343 00:42:27,490 --> 00:42:38,970 The work may still have a meaning because the conventions of language and the context may well determine. 344 00:42:38,970 --> 00:42:43,170 And probably and I don't mean that he's just saying the conventions of language either 345 00:42:43,170 --> 00:42:51,430 conventions of literature maybe relevant to may well determine what the meaning of the work is. 346 00:42:51,430 --> 00:42:58,430 So you can go either way on this amongst moderate actual intention lists. 347 00:42:58,430 --> 00:43:10,130 OK. So, as I say, debate about role of intention, determining meaning has played a very large role in the discussion of literary interpretation. 348 00:43:10,130 --> 00:43:20,990 But what's common to all of these views is the assumption that literary works have a meaning and some have doubted that. 349 00:43:20,990 --> 00:43:37,680 So Steinhagen Olson has argued that, well, in effect, that literary works are not the kind of things that have meaning. 350 00:43:37,680 --> 00:43:43,800 He tends to put this by saying it's not useful to focus on the concept of literary meaning. 351 00:43:43,800 --> 00:43:49,020 But I think his arguments are effectively in support of the view that there isn't such a thing. 352 00:43:49,020 --> 00:43:52,440 I think his arguments, if they're successful, show that the notion, 353 00:43:52,440 --> 00:44:04,410 the meaning of a poem talking about the meaning of a poem or play of a novel is a kind of category mistake that poems, 354 00:44:04,410 --> 00:44:15,120 plays, novels are not the kinds of things that that can have a meaning anymore than an idea is the sort of thing that can be green. 355 00:44:15,120 --> 00:44:23,380 That's an overt category mistake. This is a subtler category at stake that we tend to fall into. 356 00:44:23,380 --> 00:44:37,110 Olson thinks and he says it's very natural to talk about the meanings of metaphors, sentences, utterances, but it's distinctly odd. 357 00:44:37,110 --> 00:44:42,900 It would be distinctly odd to ask what is the meaning of Macbeth? 358 00:44:42,900 --> 00:44:50,490 So he says, if you are a student asked this question on an exam, you would be justified in complaining. 359 00:44:50,490 --> 00:44:55,620 You're not sure what kind of answer is being expected. 360 00:44:55,620 --> 00:45:04,110 What is the meaning of Macbeth? And I think it's perhaps significant that he uses a particular example here, 361 00:45:04,110 --> 00:45:08,250 because we're very used to talking about the meanings of poems, meanings of novels. 362 00:45:08,250 --> 00:45:15,510 But when you slide in the name of a particular novel play poem, at least in one hearing, 363 00:45:15,510 --> 00:45:24,870 one reading it does sound a bit odd to say what is the meaning of Oliver Twist like that? 364 00:45:24,870 --> 00:45:30,450 What is the meaning of Macbeth in his example? Does that oddness that he uses? 365 00:45:30,450 --> 00:45:37,440 That's one point. Another thing he mentions is that literary works don't have the kinds of 366 00:45:37,440 --> 00:45:42,870 meaning producing features that are analogous to those possessed by sentences, 367 00:45:42,870 --> 00:45:48,270 metaphors and utterances. So take, for example, 368 00:45:48,270 --> 00:46:01,170 sentence standard sort of view is that the meaning of a sentence is a function of or arises out of the meanings of the words and how they're combined. 369 00:46:01,170 --> 00:46:06,540 Those two factors. Words have a certain meaning combined in a certain way. 370 00:46:06,540 --> 00:46:14,040 From that arises the meaning of the sentence, Olson says. 371 00:46:14,040 --> 00:46:27,980 It's very unclear what the analogous parts of a literary work would be or what the modes, the analogous mode of combination would be. 372 00:46:27,980 --> 00:46:38,760 So, as he puts it, a speaker of a language tends to be able to identify as he puts the minimal semantic unit of a sentence. 373 00:46:38,760 --> 00:46:41,430 So the smallest part, that's meaningful. 374 00:46:41,430 --> 00:46:49,440 So you get down to the level of the word that has a meaning down to the level of a two letters at the end of the word that doesn't have meaning. 375 00:46:49,440 --> 00:47:00,930 That's the kind of thought. But it's not really clear how you would do that if you were trying to model literary works on sentences, at least. 376 00:47:00,930 --> 00:47:10,530 And so there's that's another reason to be suspicious of the claim that literary works have meanings. 377 00:47:10,530 --> 00:47:16,800 Now, I'm not going to stick my neck out here and sales and is right. 378 00:47:16,800 --> 00:47:22,680 But I do think there's I do think his view is worth considering taking seriously. 379 00:47:22,680 --> 00:47:33,150 And it would be attractive and kind of convenient if it were right. Because often when debates and philosophy are very intractable, people often say, 380 00:47:33,150 --> 00:47:39,810 well, sometimes that's because both sides are making an assumption that's false. 381 00:47:39,810 --> 00:47:46,710 And so there's a certain amount of attraction to the idea that maybe that's what's going on in the debate about literary interpretation. 382 00:47:46,710 --> 00:47:52,290 Both sides have wrongly assumed that literary works have meanings. 383 00:47:52,290 --> 00:47:57,180 And from there arises all the difficulties and confusions. 384 00:47:57,180 --> 00:48:00,360 Now, I don't know if that's possible because you might say, well, 385 00:48:00,360 --> 00:48:05,760 if they don't have meanings, they have something that's something that critics are doing. 386 00:48:05,760 --> 00:48:11,940 And maybe all these same problems would arise again once we recognise what that is. 387 00:48:11,940 --> 00:48:20,400 So as say, they want to stick my neck out here for the truth of this theory or for the notion that it would just dissolve all these kinds of problems. 388 00:48:20,400 --> 00:48:23,820 But I think there's some things you can think of in favour of it. 389 00:48:23,820 --> 00:48:30,840 So think of the kinds of reasons that lead us say that literary works do have meanings. 390 00:48:30,840 --> 00:48:36,300 I think one thing that leads us to say that is that it's possible to understand a literary work. 391 00:48:36,300 --> 00:48:44,420 It's possible to misunderstand this. It's possible to understand it better than you did before. 392 00:48:44,420 --> 00:48:49,950 But the fact that you can understand something doesn't entail that understanding. 393 00:48:49,950 --> 00:48:55,470 It is a matter of grasping a meaning that it has. 394 00:48:55,470 --> 00:49:01,470 So this is clear if you think about all kinds of contexts in which we talk about understanding something. 395 00:49:01,470 --> 00:49:08,880 So two people who love each other might be described as understanding each other very well. 396 00:49:08,880 --> 00:49:20,660 That doesn't seem to be a case of grasping the meaning of the other person. Similarly, understanding a natural phenomenon like the tides. 397 00:49:20,660 --> 00:49:30,090 Something like this doesn't seem to be a case of grasping the meaning or a meaning of the phenomenon. 398 00:49:30,090 --> 00:49:36,370 We can talk about understanding subject matters like economics. 399 00:49:36,370 --> 00:49:46,570 If you understand economics or say you fail to understand economics, it's not because you fail to grasp the meaning of economics. 400 00:49:46,570 --> 00:49:53,770 So the fact that it's possible to understand literary works doesn't commit us, at least the view that literary works have meanings, 401 00:49:53,770 --> 00:49:58,450 nor does the fact that literary works have parts or elements that themselves have meanings. 402 00:49:58,450 --> 00:50:03,040 Commit us to the view that literary works themselves have meanings. 403 00:50:03,040 --> 00:50:13,060 So the words of which they're made have meanings, sentences, let's say, have meanings, but it doesn't follow from that. 404 00:50:13,060 --> 00:50:21,910 The work itself has a meaning. I've marked a lot of essays and I don't think I've ever asked anybody. 405 00:50:21,910 --> 00:50:27,370 What did your essay mean? I've asked people. What did you mean by this passage? 406 00:50:27,370 --> 00:50:34,330 Things like this or what does. What did you argue in it? But again, it does sound a bit odd. 407 00:50:34,330 --> 00:50:42,490 Just like in the McBeath case to ask, what does your essay mean? The mere fact it's made up of meaningful parts doesn't permit us to. 408 00:50:42,490 --> 00:50:48,220 That further striking fact is that in this debate, 409 00:50:48,220 --> 00:50:58,780 almost invariably the examples philosophers use to support their points are not, if they're examples of the meaning of anything. 410 00:50:58,780 --> 00:51:09,550 Don't tend to be examples of the meaning of a work. So example Beardslee in Wimps Out discuss is whether the phrase moving of the earth 411 00:51:09,550 --> 00:51:18,040 in one of John Dunn's poems is about earthquakes or about the rotation of the earth. 412 00:51:18,040 --> 00:51:24,990 And that's the sort of thing you might debate. But if that's a question about meaning, it's clearly not a question about the meaning of the poem. 413 00:51:24,990 --> 00:51:30,280 It's a question about the meaning of that phrase within the poem. Likewise. 414 00:51:30,280 --> 00:51:40,240 Raz talks about the meaning of the colour blue in paintings of the Madonna and Renaissance paintings, says it symbolises virginity. 415 00:51:40,240 --> 00:51:44,380 Well, once again, that's a case of the meaning of the colour of her cloak. 416 00:51:44,380 --> 00:51:53,770 It's not a question about the meaning of the painting. And lastly, and here, I'll just go through it quickly. 417 00:51:53,770 --> 00:52:01,540 If you look closely at what critics do when they render a work, understandable to us, 418 00:52:01,540 --> 00:52:07,810 it's not plausible to construe a lot of these operations as cases of discovering the meaning of anything. 419 00:52:07,810 --> 00:52:14,680 So talking about the theme of a work, say if you say the theme of Othello is jealousy. 420 00:52:14,680 --> 00:52:19,720 Well, the theme of the work is not its meaning. You don't say Othello means jealousy. 421 00:52:19,720 --> 00:52:31,420 The theme of Othello, a theme of Othello, is jealousy, but it's slurring over important distinctions to equate the theme with the meaning. 422 00:52:31,420 --> 00:52:34,870 Likewise, critics often postulate facts about the world of a work. 423 00:52:34,870 --> 00:52:43,420 To explain puzzling features of the story. So they try and figure out why Hamlet procrastinated, for example. 424 00:52:43,420 --> 00:52:46,180 But that's not obviously explaining the meaning of it. 425 00:52:46,180 --> 00:52:53,680 Now, there may be some sense in which it's trying to fill out the content of it or to explain why it has certain content. 426 00:52:53,680 --> 00:52:57,880 But once again, it's not clear that this is a case of trying to discover the works meaning. 427 00:52:57,880 --> 00:53:00,460 And similarly, critics talk about the function of a character. 428 00:53:00,460 --> 00:53:06,580 So in first part of Henri, the fourth, people often say the Hotspur functions as a foil to Prince. 429 00:53:06,580 --> 00:53:12,790 How? Because he's hotheaded and Prince Hal is cool and calculating. 430 00:53:12,790 --> 00:53:16,630 OK, that's definitely what they do. And we understand it better. 431 00:53:16,630 --> 00:53:24,820 But it's seems very unnatural to describe that as a case of describing of explaining the meaning of Hotspur. 432 00:53:24,820 --> 00:53:30,250 Explaining how he functions is not automatically a case of explaining meaning. 433 00:53:30,250 --> 00:53:34,630 And so to categorising or contextualising works and characters in it. 434 00:53:34,630 --> 00:53:43,060 Critics talk about character being of a stock type. So might describe someone as a character is a femme fatale or the braggart soldier. 435 00:53:43,060 --> 00:53:51,970 Things like this, again, that helps us understand it, but it's not clear that it's a matter of discovering the meaning. 436 00:53:51,970 --> 00:53:56,740 So as I say, I haven't thought about this enough to stick my neck out and say, all right. 437 00:53:56,740 --> 00:54:01,690 Or that this is the right way to think about it. But I do think that it deserves further thought that it's received. 438 00:54:01,690 --> 00:54:07,000 Thanks very much.