1 00:00:01,890 --> 00:00:08,100 So today, we're going to discuss the topic of definitions of art or theories of art, 2 00:00:08,100 --> 00:00:15,760 as it's sometimes called, and this sort of brings to the fore our question of the third kind. 3 00:00:15,760 --> 00:00:20,410 That I distinguished at the beginning of the course that I dealt with in aesthetics, 4 00:00:20,410 --> 00:00:28,470 namely questions about the nature of art, metaphysical or ontological questions in the philosophy of art. 5 00:00:28,470 --> 00:00:36,390 And this question arises in a particularly pointed way and interests a lot of people, 6 00:00:36,390 --> 00:00:45,000 primarily because of the dramatic developments in art during the 20th century. 7 00:00:45,000 --> 00:00:55,950 One example that's often talked about in the literature on this is a famous piece by Marcel Duchamp, French artist, 8 00:00:55,950 --> 00:01:09,830 who in 1917 was on the board of a group called the American Society of Independent Artists, which had a very sort of democratic agenda. 9 00:01:09,830 --> 00:01:16,810 And at their founding, they released a statement talking about the need for, as they put it, 10 00:01:16,810 --> 00:01:25,890 an exhibition where artists of all schools can exhibit together certain that whatever they send in will be displayed. 11 00:01:25,890 --> 00:01:29,350 So Duchamp, who, as I said, was part of the board, 12 00:01:29,350 --> 00:01:40,590 or at least one of the leaders of this movement decided to test this commitment to democratic values in art. 13 00:01:40,590 --> 00:01:51,540 And so he anonymously submitted a urinal for display and he paid the submission fee, 14 00:01:51,540 --> 00:02:00,780 which they had said would guarantee anybody to have their work displayed, whatever they sent in. 15 00:02:00,780 --> 00:02:12,570 He didn't tell anybody, of course, that he was the one who sent this in and he didn't alter the urinal except to sign it with the name are MUT, 16 00:02:12,570 --> 00:02:17,220 which I think a number of people have pondered the significance of. 17 00:02:17,220 --> 00:02:24,450 But I don't think anybody's ever come to any conclusions as to why he chose that particular pseudonym. 18 00:02:24,450 --> 00:02:30,990 And so this pose a great difficulty to the American Society of Independent Artists. 19 00:02:30,990 --> 00:02:42,750 And they debated about whether this work, which Duchamp called Fountain, was actually a work of art and whether they should accept it or not. 20 00:02:42,750 --> 00:02:51,600 And in the end, they decided that it was not a work of art. And I believe it was the only submission that they rejected out of hundreds. 21 00:02:51,600 --> 00:02:57,330 I think possibly the thousands of submissions that they received. 22 00:02:57,330 --> 00:03:05,640 Duchamp resigned in protest at this and found him. 23 00:03:05,640 --> 00:03:10,620 The original was lost. People don't really know what happened to it. 24 00:03:10,620 --> 00:03:16,680 I think some people suspect that it was thrown out by the cleaning staff at the gallery. 25 00:03:16,680 --> 00:03:22,230 There's all kinds of theories about where it ended up. 26 00:03:22,230 --> 00:03:39,990 In 2004, a group of British art critics, I think 500 of them voted Fountain, the most influential artwork of the 20th century. 27 00:03:39,990 --> 00:03:44,130 And it was the only artwork that was rejected by the American Society of 28 00:03:44,130 --> 00:03:51,090 Independent Artists exhibition on the grounds that it wasn't an artwork at all. 29 00:03:51,090 --> 00:04:03,450 So it's examples like that. And that particular example that poses this question about the nature of works of art. 30 00:04:03,450 --> 00:04:07,440 And it's interesting that this is one of the few questions that we'll have discussed in 31 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:16,140 this course that you are not unlikely to read about in the newspapers from time to time, 32 00:04:16,140 --> 00:04:21,750 what people want to know is some way of deciding whether these particularly unusual or 33 00:04:21,750 --> 00:04:30,540 outlandish artwork's pieces of performance art and so forth actually qualify as works of art. 34 00:04:30,540 --> 00:04:36,810 People get angry, for example, about government funding going to these kinds of projects. 35 00:04:36,810 --> 00:04:50,040 That's maybe not so much a worry nowadays, but there is a natural curiosity about what we're supposed to make of these things that have been produced, 36 00:04:50,040 --> 00:05:02,640 particularly, as I say, in the 20th century. And philosophers have quite dusa tactically embraced this project of attempting to define art. 37 00:05:02,640 --> 00:05:08,010 Definition plays a very important role in the history of philosophy. 38 00:05:08,010 --> 00:05:19,860 So in many Plato's dialogues, the goal is essentially to define justice, for example, or piety, friendship, things like this. 39 00:05:19,860 --> 00:05:24,660 And as many of you will be very familiar with, 40 00:05:24,660 --> 00:05:30,630 one of the largest research programmes epistemology in the 20th century has been the attempts 41 00:05:30,630 --> 00:05:38,760 to analyse knowledge to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing something. 42 00:05:38,760 --> 00:05:45,360 And equally, there is a great deal of scepticism about the viability of projects like this. 43 00:05:45,360 --> 00:05:52,110 And it's worth if you know a little bit about the literature on the attempt to analyse knowledge. 44 00:05:52,110 --> 00:05:58,140 It's worth thinking about some of the questions that that raises, because, as I say, a great deal of work has been done on that, 45 00:05:58,140 --> 00:06:07,470 and a great deal of scepticism, particularly in recent years, has been engendered about the prospects for success at that. 46 00:06:07,470 --> 00:06:17,040 And you may want to look at on the sceptical side of things in that area, Chapter one, Section three of Timothy Williamson's book, 47 00:06:17,040 --> 00:06:26,160 Knowledge and Its Limits, and consider whether some of the considerations he raises there might apply to other areas, 48 00:06:26,160 --> 00:06:40,860 such as the attempts to define art. I think it's important at the outset to say a little bit about definitions in general, 49 00:06:40,860 --> 00:06:51,570 partly because it's important to get clear in your mind what would count as success in a definition of art, 50 00:06:51,570 --> 00:07:00,930 or indeed, what are we interested in when we express a desire for a definition of art? 51 00:07:00,930 --> 00:07:02,340 And I say this for a number of reasons. 52 00:07:02,340 --> 00:07:14,970 So you might think what we're interested in is a way of accepting or ruling out avant garde works like Fountain as being works of art. 53 00:07:14,970 --> 00:07:21,450 However, if that's what we're interested in, then it's not clear that we're necessarily going to need a definition. 54 00:07:21,450 --> 00:07:26,130 We may only need a test for whether something is a work of art. 55 00:07:26,130 --> 00:07:32,040 So you remember when we discussed Hume, I said that Hume, 56 00:07:32,040 --> 00:07:39,510 at the very least in providing standard of taste, is providing a test for whether something is beautiful. 57 00:07:39,510 --> 00:07:47,600 It's not clear that he's attempting to define beauty, but he's presenting a way of determining whether something is beautiful. 58 00:07:47,600 --> 00:07:55,860 And you might think what we want is a test for whether something is a work of art. 59 00:07:55,860 --> 00:08:05,460 And for that, it would be enough to show that something like Fountain fails to meet some necessary condition of being an artwork. 60 00:08:05,460 --> 00:08:11,640 You would need a full-blown definition of what an artwork is in order to rule it out. 61 00:08:11,640 --> 00:08:17,460 If he could show that Fountain fails to meet a necessary condition of being a work of art, or on the other hand, 62 00:08:17,460 --> 00:08:24,060 you could include it by showing that it meets a sufficient condition of being a work of art, 63 00:08:24,060 --> 00:08:35,910 but merely having a necessary condition of of being art or a sufficient condition of being art would not of itself necessarily be a definition of art. 64 00:08:35,910 --> 00:08:45,000 So that's one point whether what we're interested in is a test of art hould or a definition of art. 65 00:08:45,000 --> 00:08:50,970 Another distinction that I think is worth making here is the distinction between defining 66 00:08:50,970 --> 00:09:00,800 something and providing necessary and sufficient conditions of being that thing. 67 00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:09,530 It's possible to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of being a thing without defining the word for that thing, 68 00:09:09,530 --> 00:09:18,560 that kind of thing, or defining what that thing is, very trivial example. 69 00:09:18,560 --> 00:09:23,870 You could say a bachelor is what is not not a bachelor. Very easy. 70 00:09:23,870 --> 00:09:30,890 That is a necessary and sufficient condition of being a bachelor, not not being a bachelor. 71 00:09:30,890 --> 00:09:40,850 Somewhat less trivial example, confined to mathematics. And this is on your handouts being triangular, closed, 72 00:09:40,850 --> 00:09:51,170 plain rectilinear figure is a necessary and sufficient condition of being a trilateral closed plane rectilinear figure. 73 00:09:51,170 --> 00:09:57,890 So being basically three sided figure provided it's close Blaine and rectilinear is 74 00:09:57,890 --> 00:10:05,240 necessary and sufficient for getting a three angled closed plane rectilinear figure. 75 00:10:05,240 --> 00:10:11,990 But that's not a definition of being triangular because being trilateral is about having three sides, 76 00:10:11,990 --> 00:10:18,170 has to do with three sidedness and being triangular has to do with having three angles. 77 00:10:18,170 --> 00:10:24,830 Nevertheless, if one if the one condition obtains, then the other condition obtains. 78 00:10:24,830 --> 00:10:34,670 So that's another sort of standard case in which you can have necessary and sufficient conditions without a definition. 79 00:10:34,670 --> 00:10:44,420 This then raises the question, well, what do you need to add to necessary and sufficient conditions in order to have a definition? 80 00:10:44,420 --> 00:10:48,560 And I think there's at least two things you might say about this. 81 00:10:48,560 --> 00:10:56,210 And which of these you go with will depend on what you consider to be the object of the definition. 82 00:10:56,210 --> 00:11:08,930 That is what you think you are defining. You might think that you are defining words or sometimes said defining concepts 83 00:11:08,930 --> 00:11:15,500 bit more useful to talk about analysing concepts than defining concepts. But you get that as well. 84 00:11:15,500 --> 00:11:16,790 If that's what you're doing, 85 00:11:16,790 --> 00:11:29,000 then presumably you want your definition or phrase in the defining clause of the definition to have the same sense or meaning 86 00:11:29,000 --> 00:11:41,840 as the word being defined or to express the same concept as the concept expressed by the first part of the definition. 87 00:11:41,840 --> 00:11:48,950 And you might think this is why the definition of this would fail as a definition of parity. 88 00:11:48,950 --> 00:11:55,910 The words triangular parity doesn't have the same meaning as the word. Try laterality. 89 00:11:55,910 --> 00:12:05,930 Nor does it express the very same concept. That's one reason that would fail is the definition of that word or that concept. 90 00:12:05,930 --> 00:12:18,410 But philosophers also distinguish defining words and concepts from stating the essence of a thing, or as it's sometimes put, defining objects, 91 00:12:18,410 --> 00:12:27,770 defining things as a variable distinction between what's called real definition and nominal definition, 92 00:12:27,770 --> 00:12:36,290 where a real definition states the essence of a thing, what it is to be a thing of that kind. 93 00:12:36,290 --> 00:12:44,030 Nominal definition gives the meaning of a word real here doesn't mean real as opposed to fake, I should say. 94 00:12:44,030 --> 00:12:55,270 It just means pertaining to things or objects. So how might a real and a nominal definition come apart? 95 00:12:55,270 --> 00:13:02,980 Well, some people are very inclined to say that the claim that water is what has the chemical structure. 96 00:13:02,980 --> 00:13:13,690 H2O is a case of stating the essence of water, saying what it is for something to be water. 97 00:13:13,690 --> 00:13:24,250 But it's not a definition of the word water. So the word water on this line of thinking doesn't mean the same as has the chemical structure, 98 00:13:24,250 --> 00:13:33,220 a H2O or thing that has the chemical structure, H2O stuff that has it, that structure. 99 00:13:33,220 --> 00:13:43,220 And one reason you might think this is that people understood the word water and can understand the word water with no concept of hydrogen or oxygen, 100 00:13:43,220 --> 00:13:58,150 anything like that. That's part of the motivation for wanting to distinguish between stating essences of things and defining words for those things. 101 00:13:58,150 --> 00:14:06,790 So all of this, I think, is important to keep in mind, as you're considering assessing definitions of art. 102 00:14:06,790 --> 00:14:13,300 Is the aim to provide a definition of the word? Is the aim deprived state the essence of the thing? 103 00:14:13,300 --> 00:14:18,280 Is it just to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of being art or intern? 104 00:14:18,280 --> 00:14:29,460 Do we want simply a test to help us deal with quirky works like Fountain? 105 00:14:29,460 --> 00:14:36,750 I should also say one reason why a lot of people describe their views as theories of art is because they're 106 00:14:36,750 --> 00:14:43,390 reluctant to say what they're doing is providing a definition of art or some of the reasons that I've mentioned. 107 00:14:43,390 --> 00:14:51,640 Most people would talk. We'll be talking about. However, I actually do present their claims as definitions. 108 00:14:51,640 --> 00:15:00,180 OK, so those are some considerations about definition and related matters. It's also worth saying a little bit about what sense of the word art. 109 00:15:00,180 --> 00:15:05,310 We want to use whether we want to state the essence of it or to define the word. 110 00:15:05,310 --> 00:15:12,360 We're still going to have to use the words to state the problem. So it's worth considering what sense or use of that word. 111 00:15:12,360 --> 00:15:22,230 We're talking about now the word art or the arts actually has a quite a variety of senses, particularly historically. 112 00:15:22,230 --> 00:15:31,020 We talk about the art of angling. We use the word art to refer to a skill or a practical application of some knowledge. 113 00:15:31,020 --> 00:15:35,970 Talk about the liberal arts. Describe something as more an art than a science. 114 00:15:35,970 --> 00:15:43,140 Those sorts of uses are historically important, but are not are clearly not quite. 115 00:15:43,140 --> 00:15:55,590 Our focus here, too, uses or senses of the word art that we're interested in I think are also worth distinguishing. 116 00:15:55,590 --> 00:16:03,570 So one is the use of art in an evaluative sense to provide a positive evaluation of something. 117 00:16:03,570 --> 00:16:11,200 You may describe it as a work of art. And you get this with other words as well. 118 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:19,450 So he's a man would be an example where you're not just classifying somebody as human and male, 119 00:16:19,450 --> 00:16:27,410 but you're saying he displays the attributes of manliness, strength and so forth. 120 00:16:27,410 --> 00:16:39,130 A lot of people. Well, I think pretty much everybody writing in this area says we're not interested in explaining that use of the word evaluative, 121 00:16:39,130 --> 00:16:49,720 but rather we are interested in the classification classify Katri use of the word art. 122 00:16:49,720 --> 00:16:52,750 So that can be bad art. That can be good art. 123 00:16:52,750 --> 00:17:03,910 And it's that sense of the word which is compatible with something failing as art that we're interested in using. 124 00:17:03,910 --> 00:17:16,350 And in particular, it's that class of the Katri sense of the word whose central examples are what have become known as the fine arts. 125 00:17:16,350 --> 00:17:25,020 There's a very important paper by Paul Oscar Chris Steller called The Modern System of the Arts, 126 00:17:25,020 --> 00:17:36,090 in which he traces the development of this concept of art and argues that our current notion of art, 127 00:17:36,090 --> 00:17:43,980 which has the fine arts as they're central cases, did not develop, are assumed definite form. 128 00:17:43,980 --> 00:17:57,630 I think he puts it before the 18th century. So the Greeks group certain arts together on the grounds of mimesis and you get precursors like that. 129 00:17:57,630 --> 00:17:58,860 But they didn't group together. 130 00:17:58,860 --> 00:18:08,720 According to Chris Steller, the ones that we grouped together as and particularly they didn't group together the fine arts. 131 00:18:08,720 --> 00:18:15,180 The fine arts, according to Chris, Stellar were codified in the mid 18th century. 132 00:18:15,180 --> 00:18:25,080 And the there were five distinguished back then painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry and music. 133 00:18:25,080 --> 00:18:35,220 And over the years, people considered whether to include other things like engravings, prose, literature, things like this as arts as well. 134 00:18:35,220 --> 00:18:40,290 But these formed the kind of core or nucleus. So that's we're thinking about. 135 00:18:40,290 --> 00:18:49,590 And it's kind of an interesting fact if it's true that earlier societies in the West did not 136 00:18:49,590 --> 00:19:00,450 group together the things that we group together as art under a single concept or a term. 137 00:19:00,450 --> 00:19:08,430 OK, so I mentioned last week in the discussion of expression that early in the 20th century, 138 00:19:08,430 --> 00:19:16,800 one theory of art was the so-called expression theory of art, according to which art is a kind of expression. 139 00:19:16,800 --> 00:19:21,900 Now, this for I think, rather obvious reasons, is no longer really in favour. 140 00:19:21,900 --> 00:19:25,770 It doesn't seem to do justice even to all musical works. 141 00:19:25,770 --> 00:19:32,730 Not all musical works are expressive or IC's are forms of expression. 142 00:19:32,730 --> 00:19:41,100 And you had other attempts like by Clive Bell, for example, to define art as what he called significant form. 143 00:19:41,100 --> 00:19:50,160 That's not really in favour anymore, partly because of the obscurity of the notion of significant form in Bell's writings on it. 144 00:19:50,160 --> 00:20:01,380 And so for reasons I'll get to at the end of this lecture, there arose a great deal of scepticism about the prospects for defining art. 145 00:20:01,380 --> 00:20:10,750 But this changed in the late 60s with the work of George Dickie. 146 00:20:10,750 --> 00:20:17,140 So the move that Dickie made was to say you shouldn't think of defining art in terms 147 00:20:17,140 --> 00:20:27,040 of perceptible features of it or intrinsic features of things that are artworks. 148 00:20:27,040 --> 00:20:35,710 That's not going to work. That's not going to cover the full range of prose, literature, music, painting, sculpture, cetera. 149 00:20:35,710 --> 00:20:40,060 There's no perceptible feature to Dickie. That all of those things have. 150 00:20:40,060 --> 00:20:48,850 And certainly it won't accommodate Marcel Duchamp's works. Rather, what you've got to consider arts relations to other things. 151 00:20:48,850 --> 00:21:00,910 And particularly its place within an institutional framework. It's those relations that make a thing on artwork. 152 00:21:00,910 --> 00:21:06,160 And Dickey's theory is accordingly called the institutional theory of art. 153 00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:15,220 And his arguments for it derive from some considerations originally advanced by Arthur Danto. 154 00:21:15,220 --> 00:21:21,130 Although Danto, it should be said, disagrees with Dickeys institutional theory of art. 155 00:21:21,130 --> 00:21:29,830 But Danto observed that you could have two perceptibly indistinguishable objects, one of which is an artwork. 156 00:21:29,830 --> 00:21:38,950 And the other is not. So again. Fountain would be a perfectly good example of this. 157 00:21:38,950 --> 00:21:48,970 You could have a urinal and fountain looking exactly the same, but one be an artwork and the other not. 158 00:21:48,970 --> 00:21:55,540 Or again, in Dante's example, Andy Warhol is Brillo boxes. 159 00:21:55,540 --> 00:22:02,710 You could have actual Brillo boxes that were indistinguishable from an artist's Brillo box. 160 00:22:02,710 --> 00:22:09,040 And yet one of them is a work of art and the other is not. 161 00:22:09,040 --> 00:22:21,070 What accounts for this? Asks Danto. Well, he thinks this shows that what makes the thing a work of art can't be something visible to the senses, 162 00:22:21,070 --> 00:22:30,350 but rather, as Danto put it on atmosphere, a theory that the eye cannot describe. 163 00:22:30,350 --> 00:22:43,330 In Dickey's work. The basic thought is that it's its place in an institutional framework. 164 00:22:43,330 --> 00:22:57,340 Fountain has a certain place in the institutions of the art world that a regular urinal does not. 165 00:22:57,340 --> 00:23:04,960 What is that framework then becomes the question. So that argument is supposed to show that it's got to be some framework or other 166 00:23:04,960 --> 00:23:14,050 rather than the exhibited or intrinsic properties of the work that makes it art. 167 00:23:14,050 --> 00:23:19,810 And to answer that question, Dickey, over the years has provided two different theories. 168 00:23:19,810 --> 00:23:28,320 The original institutional theory, and this is on the back of your hand out stated as follows, 169 00:23:28,320 --> 00:23:37,210 an artwork is an artefact with aspects that have had conferred upon them by some person or persons acting on behalf of the art world. 170 00:23:37,210 --> 00:23:43,840 The status of candidates for appreciation. 171 00:23:43,840 --> 00:23:55,240 So in Dickey's example, in his first statement of this theory, a chimpanzee might make a painting, as I think he was talking about. 172 00:23:55,240 --> 00:24:04,660 Particular case where it did and it might be displayed by the zoo, but it would not be a work of art, says Dickey. 173 00:24:04,660 --> 00:24:13,780 However, if he took it down the street to the art gallery and the curator displayed it and as a candidate for appreciation, 174 00:24:13,780 --> 00:24:24,100 it would become an artwork. So Dickey says, and this is supposed to illustrate that it's those aspects of the framework, 175 00:24:24,100 --> 00:24:36,820 namely it's being given or aspects of it being given the status of candidates for appreciation by someone acting on behalf of the art world. 176 00:24:36,820 --> 00:24:54,130 That makes it into a work of art. Now, the original institutional theory generated an enormous amount of attention. 177 00:24:54,130 --> 00:25:02,770 And I'm not going to go into the great debates about that one because I I'd rather focus on dickeys, 178 00:25:02,770 --> 00:25:12,370 update of this theory, the new institutional theory of art, which he offered in nineteen eighty four. 179 00:25:12,370 --> 00:25:19,850 So according to the new institutional theory and I'll explain why he's made these changes in a moment is a bit simpler. 180 00:25:19,850 --> 00:25:31,350 And this is also in the handout. According to it, an artwork is an artefact of a kind created to be presented to an art world public. 181 00:25:31,350 --> 00:25:37,330 And Dickey explains each component of this definition. 182 00:25:37,330 --> 00:25:49,600 So first of all, an artefact includes not only objects, but also events and also physical objects used in a new way. 183 00:25:49,600 --> 00:26:01,750 Without the material of which they're made being altered. This, of course, is to help accommodate cases like fountain or again, 184 00:26:01,750 --> 00:26:08,500 simpler example, a piece of driftwood might be taken from the beach, put on display. 185 00:26:08,500 --> 00:26:16,260 It's used in a new way, even if the material substance of it is not altered. 186 00:26:16,260 --> 00:26:25,140 An artist, Karen Dickey, is someone who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art. 187 00:26:25,140 --> 00:26:29,070 The key notion of an art world public, he explains. 188 00:26:29,070 --> 00:26:46,160 As a public who is aware that what is presented is art and has a minimal understanding of the media of a particular art form. 189 00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:49,700 Other important notions in his theory. 190 00:26:49,700 --> 00:27:00,510 One of which is an art world system, which is his term for the framework, for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an art world public. 191 00:27:00,510 --> 00:27:10,790 So the system of institutional relations that makes this possible and the art world is the totality of these art world systems, 192 00:27:10,790 --> 00:27:24,630 these frameworks within which it is presented. Now, one thing that may strike you about this definition, once the terms of it are explained, 193 00:27:24,630 --> 00:27:34,230 is that it is circular and Dickey is perfectly aware of this and he says this is not a problem. 194 00:27:34,230 --> 00:27:43,260 And the reason it's not a problem is that circular definitions can still sometimes be informative. 195 00:27:43,260 --> 00:27:49,100 One purpose for which we use definitions is to explain the meaning of a term to someone else. 196 00:27:49,100 --> 00:27:55,410 And if we're doing that, then evidently it's not so good if it's circular. 197 00:27:55,410 --> 00:27:59,580 However, this is not the purpose of this definition. 198 00:27:59,580 --> 00:28:09,330 We all understand we have an implicit at least understanding of what art is, and it can be informative to learn of its relations to other things, 199 00:28:09,330 --> 00:28:17,380 even if those other things ultimately have to explain and b explain themselves in terms of their relation to artworks. 200 00:28:17,380 --> 00:28:30,690 Dickey says We acquire the concept of art along with all these other concepts, like the concept of an art world or of an artist. 201 00:28:30,690 --> 00:28:42,430 And so by definition, that displays the relations between these concepts can still be true and informative by making explicit what the relations are. 202 00:28:42,430 --> 00:28:49,080 And he thinks many concepts are like this. So he thinks the concept of law. You don't acquire the concept of law on its own. 203 00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:56,850 You also acquire the concept of a legislature, an executive and a judiciary. 204 00:28:56,850 --> 00:29:04,440 And these things are explained in terms of one another. And the concepts of these are grasped together. 205 00:29:04,440 --> 00:29:14,220 And so a good definition of them, will it be circular in the sense that you need to explain the concepts on the one side of the definition? 206 00:29:14,220 --> 00:29:33,610 Ultimately, in terms of the concept being defined. So why think that this definition is the right way to go for an institutional theory? 207 00:29:33,610 --> 00:29:40,960 Dickie thinks there are a few problems with the original theory that were raised to him by Monroe Beardsley. 208 00:29:40,960 --> 00:29:41,560 One thing, 209 00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:50,220 one problem he thinks there is with the old theory is that it's talked about people acting on behalf of the art world problem with this stick. 210 00:29:50,220 --> 00:30:00,290 He says, is that the art world is an informal institution. It's just a practise and you can't act on behalf on behalf of a practise. 211 00:30:00,290 --> 00:30:12,510 So to the original theory talks about conferring a status on an object, the status of a candidate for appreciation. 212 00:30:12,510 --> 00:30:20,180 And you think it's inappropriate to talk in such informal concept contexts of conferring status? 213 00:30:20,180 --> 00:30:28,490 It's formal concepts like contexts like degrees, ceremonies at universities in which a status is conferred. 214 00:30:28,490 --> 00:30:36,640 So he hopes to simplify it in this way. 215 00:30:36,640 --> 00:30:48,190 And further, the reason he's gone with this characterisation, namely that an artwork is an artefact of a kind created to be presented to an art world, 216 00:30:48,190 --> 00:30:55,600 public is, as he somewhat incautiously puts it at one point. 217 00:30:55,600 --> 00:31:08,630 An artist always creates for a public of some sort. And I say that was incautious of him because he then backtracks on it and says it is, of course, 218 00:31:08,630 --> 00:31:18,280 true that artists withhold their work from art world publics, for example, if they don't think it's good enough. 219 00:31:18,280 --> 00:31:19,150 But, says Dickey, 220 00:31:19,150 --> 00:31:30,280 the very fact that they have withheld their work indicates that what they've created is a thing of a kind that gets presented to an art world public. 221 00:31:30,280 --> 00:31:42,210 So, for example, they may have created a sculpture. Sculptures are a kind of thing that gets presented to an art world public. 222 00:31:42,210 --> 00:31:51,660 Now, that is meant to deal with one of the more common objections to the institutional theory, at least in its original form. 223 00:31:51,660 --> 00:31:53,010 So at least in its original form, 224 00:31:53,010 --> 00:32:05,280 the institutional theory seems to imply that someone with no contact with an art world outside of that institution could not create art. 225 00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:18,390 So perhaps a feral child raised in the woods seems not inconceivable any way that a feral child could create something that is an artwork. 226 00:32:18,390 --> 00:32:25,080 And Dickey's original theory seems not to allow that. 227 00:32:25,080 --> 00:32:31,440 This variation of the theory is supposed to accommodate that, 228 00:32:31,440 --> 00:32:38,640 because it could be that the feral child create something that is at least of a kind that gets presented to an art world public. 229 00:32:38,640 --> 00:32:55,940 Maybe he creates a sculpture, for example, even if he has no concept of an art world public or contact with it. 230 00:32:55,940 --> 00:33:06,110 OK, now I'm going to move on to the next theory, partly because we're a little pressed for time. 231 00:33:06,110 --> 00:33:14,240 If you want to read more about this, as you should, because this is probably the most important of the theories of art that have been presented. 232 00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:18,980 It's worth taking a look at Stephen Daviess book Definitions of Art, 233 00:33:18,980 --> 00:33:26,930 which is quite an exhaustive survey of the various definitions of art that have been presented. 234 00:33:26,930 --> 00:33:35,480 I should say a bit of a downside of that book is that it focuses primarily on the original institutional theory, 235 00:33:35,480 --> 00:33:41,370 but it's still worth taking a look at. OK. 236 00:33:41,370 --> 00:33:49,670 The next main class of theories of art are what have been called aesthetic theories of art 237 00:33:49,670 --> 00:33:56,990 and Munmorah Monroe Beardslee is probably the most best-known exponent of one of these. 238 00:33:56,990 --> 00:34:07,190 And these tried to explain the concept of art in terms of the concept of a set of the aesthetic and Beardsley's version, which is on your hand out. 239 00:34:07,190 --> 00:34:18,650 The claim is that an artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest. 240 00:34:18,650 --> 00:34:29,780 Satisfying the aesthetic interests here just means providing an aesthetic experience, an aesthetic experience fiercely does not define. 241 00:34:29,780 --> 00:34:34,610 That's at least as tricky as defining art itself. 242 00:34:34,610 --> 00:34:41,570 He gives a partial characterisation of what aesthetic experience is, though he says that it's characterised, 243 00:34:41,570 --> 00:34:47,980 at least in part, by having some or all of the following characteristics. 244 00:34:47,980 --> 00:34:49,440 And you don't need to write this down. 245 00:34:49,440 --> 00:34:58,660 This will be on the detailed panned out says it's characterised by a certain sense of freedom from concern about matters outside the object, 246 00:34:58,660 --> 00:35:00,550 a certain intense affect, 247 00:35:00,550 --> 00:35:10,520 detached, detached from practical ends and an exhilarating sense of exercising powers of discovery and of integration of the self and its experiences. 248 00:35:10,520 --> 00:35:21,530 So a lot of this is quite clearly derived from Kant talking about the kind of disinterested pleasure involved in aesthetic experience. 249 00:35:21,530 --> 00:35:28,850 Two notable features of this way of defining art. First of all, the aesthetic intention, 250 00:35:28,850 --> 00:35:31,490 the intention to create something with the capacity to provide aesthetic 251 00:35:31,490 --> 00:35:39,230 experience need not be the only intention with which the artist creates a work. 252 00:35:39,230 --> 00:35:45,680 So they might have religious intentions. They might create the work in order to glorify God, for example, 253 00:35:45,680 --> 00:35:53,180 and those might even be more important to the artist or for understanding this artefact. 254 00:35:53,180 --> 00:36:01,400 Beardsley's point is only that aesthetic intention must also be there in order for it's to be a work of art. 255 00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:07,730 And likewise, since it's just the intention to give it the capacity to provide these experiences, 256 00:36:07,730 --> 00:36:12,860 the work need not actually provide aesthetic experience. 257 00:36:12,860 --> 00:36:21,570 It might be I think his example might get struck by lightning before anybody ever gets any aesthetic experience from it. 258 00:36:21,570 --> 00:36:28,950 But because that intention was present. It's an artwork. Now, 259 00:36:28,950 --> 00:36:43,770 one question that is really sort of glaring regarding these this aesthetic theory is that it seems not to 260 00:36:43,770 --> 00:36:50,220 apply to the problematic cases that raise this question about the definition of art in the first place. 261 00:36:50,220 --> 00:36:57,930 So one of the reasons that Duchamp's fountain is problematic, according to many at least, 262 00:36:57,930 --> 00:37:08,340 is that it appears not to have been created with the intention of providing an aesthetic experience. 263 00:37:08,340 --> 00:37:11,280 That's not to say it can't provide an aesthetic experience. 264 00:37:11,280 --> 00:37:16,730 A lot of people have talked about how nice the gleam of the porcelain looks when you look at the thing. 265 00:37:16,730 --> 00:37:25,560 But the point being that the intention with which it was created was not to provide that aesthetic experience. 266 00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:29,730 What does Beardslee say about that? 267 00:37:29,730 --> 00:37:40,770 He argues that his definition captures the point of a definition of art better than ones that attempts to accommodate cases like Fountain. 268 00:37:40,770 --> 00:37:51,690 So according to him, the point of having a definition of art is to say, what are the noteworthy features to which the word art draws our attention? 269 00:37:51,690 --> 00:38:08,880 And so to what are the theoretically important distinctions which the word art is most apt for making? 270 00:38:08,880 --> 00:38:23,010 And because of this purpose of providing such a definition, the definition we provide needs closely reflect ordinary usage of this word. 271 00:38:23,010 --> 00:38:34,020 And as it happens, he thinks that his definition meets this purpose because one of the distinctions that we want to make is 272 00:38:34,020 --> 00:38:41,580 that between objects that enter artistic activities because of their connexion to the aesthetic interest. 273 00:38:41,580 --> 00:38:50,760 So our interest in having aesthetic experiences and objects that enter artistic practises in other ways. 274 00:38:50,760 --> 00:38:58,500 And he says the word art is most appropriate for making this distinction. 275 00:38:58,500 --> 00:39:07,410 In particular, he says there is no advantage to using this word in order to classify as art whatever comments on art. 276 00:39:07,410 --> 00:39:17,520 He thinks this is what we should say about Fountain. That it's a witty comment on the art world, but it's not itself an artwork. 277 00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:25,560 He says if you classify everything, the comments on art as art then reviews in the newspaper of art exhibitions will have to count as art. 278 00:39:25,560 --> 00:39:36,330 Any comment made about art will count as art. So, too, we shouldn't count just anything that's exhibited as a work of art, 279 00:39:36,330 --> 00:39:43,280 because this would count exhibits at science museums, stamp clubs and world fairs as art. 280 00:39:43,280 --> 00:39:52,290 Quite a dated example. And likewise, we shouldn't call art whatever happens to be called art by artists. 281 00:39:52,290 --> 00:39:57,050 And he says this wouldn't classify it all, but would rather be circular. 282 00:39:57,050 --> 00:40:05,300 By which I assume he means we wouldn't be explaining what they mean when they call it art. 283 00:40:05,300 --> 00:40:16,850 OK. So that's his rationale for that. Now, I think there is a bit of a problem with this. 284 00:40:16,850 --> 00:40:30,170 So what, Dickie, is in effect, what. Beardslee is in effect providing is what the philosopher Rudolf Carnap described as an explicative definition. 285 00:40:30,170 --> 00:40:43,670 So an explicative definition tries to respect the central cases of the use of a word, but without worrying about the other cases. 286 00:40:43,670 --> 00:40:45,620 So it's it's. 287 00:40:45,620 --> 00:40:58,220 It's basically a way of coining a new word or assigning a new meaning to the word, but one which respects central cases of the old meaning. 288 00:40:58,220 --> 00:41:12,480 And you do this if the ordinary word is too vague, imprecise, fuzzy, and it can be useful for certain theoretical purposes. 289 00:41:12,480 --> 00:41:22,670 But it's worth stressing that it is to assign a new meaning to the word rather than to try and capture the meaning the word already has. 290 00:41:22,670 --> 00:41:32,190 It tries to respect it in part. So it's not a complete stipulation of how you're going to use the word. 291 00:41:32,190 --> 00:41:37,740 But it's at least in part, a stipulation of how you're going to use the word. 292 00:41:37,740 --> 00:41:44,190 So it's not like saying I'm going to use the word bank to mean cow. But it's partly like that. 293 00:41:44,190 --> 00:41:53,350 It's a decision to use a word in a certain way, not attempt to describe how the word is ordinarily used. 294 00:41:53,350 --> 00:41:59,970 What? So what Beardslee is in effect saying is we shouldn't try to provide descriptive definitions of art. 295 00:41:59,970 --> 00:42:07,520 Rather, we should be providing explicative definitions in current EPP's sense. 296 00:42:07,520 --> 00:42:11,850 And I don't see where he's justified this claim. 297 00:42:11,850 --> 00:42:14,640 I'm not saying it can't be justified. 298 00:42:14,640 --> 00:42:23,850 But part of the reason we were interested in this question, the first place was to understand art in the ordinary sense, to be told. 299 00:42:23,850 --> 00:42:32,820 We shouldn't be asking that question. And rather, we should be in part stipulating a new meaning for this word related to the old meaning. 300 00:42:32,820 --> 00:42:41,950 Whatever that was, I think required some justification that Beardslee does not provide. 301 00:42:41,950 --> 00:42:49,600 So that's that's one concern about the aesthetic theory in Beardsley's version of it. 302 00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:58,540 I'm just going to briefly discuss the third class of theories before moving on to scepticism about the project of defining art itself. 303 00:42:58,540 --> 00:43:08,440 So the third main class of theories of art around nowadays are what are known as historical theories of art. 304 00:43:08,440 --> 00:43:14,920 And the main proponent of this is Gerald Levinsohn. 305 00:43:14,920 --> 00:43:23,650 And this, too, is on your hand out. So in Levinson's view on artwork is an object that, as he puts it, 306 00:43:23,650 --> 00:43:31,180 is non passingly intended by a person or persons with a proprietary right over it to be regarded 307 00:43:31,180 --> 00:43:39,910 in any of the ways in which prior works of art have been correctly or standardly regarded. 308 00:43:39,910 --> 00:43:42,610 Point about the reference to non passing intentions. 309 00:43:42,610 --> 00:43:48,550 Is that it can't be just a whim that you have for a few moments to intended to be regarded in a certain way. 310 00:43:48,550 --> 00:43:56,140 That's not enough to turn it into a work of art. And the basic idea is that something becomes a work of art. 311 00:43:56,140 --> 00:44:00,370 On account of its relations to pass the works of art, 312 00:44:00,370 --> 00:44:06,400 i.e. in relations between the way in which the artist intends for it to be regarded 313 00:44:06,400 --> 00:44:15,270 and the way in which past works of art were standardly or correctly regarded. 314 00:44:15,270 --> 00:44:27,680 The claim is not, I should say, that the artist needs to have the concept of art or needs even to be aware of the history of art. 315 00:44:27,680 --> 00:44:34,760 All that matters is that the artist intend for the work to be regarded in a certain way and for it to be true 316 00:44:34,760 --> 00:44:44,900 that that way of regarding this work is a way in which past works were correctly regarded or standardly regarded. 317 00:44:44,900 --> 00:44:50,760 I think that that's worth stressing because there's two ways of reading this claim about intention. 318 00:44:50,760 --> 00:44:56,140 OK. So I've provided a lengthy discussion of Levinsohn on the detailed handout, which will be up on Web lern. 319 00:44:56,140 --> 00:45:00,500 But for the moment, that's what I'll say about that. 320 00:45:00,500 --> 00:45:11,570 Now, I mentioned that beginning in the particularly the 50s, a great deal of scepticism arose about the very possibility of defining art. 321 00:45:11,570 --> 00:45:17,930 And you often get this regarding the project of definition. So I mentioned attempts to analyse knowledge. 322 00:45:17,930 --> 00:45:23,600 A lot of scepticism about the prospects of that being successful. 323 00:45:23,600 --> 00:45:27,500 And this was motivated in the 50s by Vic and Shine's discussion in the 324 00:45:27,500 --> 00:45:35,000 philosophical investigations of what he described as family resemblance concepts. 325 00:45:35,000 --> 00:45:42,230 Now, I provided the quotation on the handout from the investigation's not going to read it out, 326 00:45:42,230 --> 00:45:48,770 actually, but I'm just going to highlight kind of the key claims of this. 327 00:45:48,770 --> 00:45:50,120 So it begins Stein's view. 328 00:45:50,120 --> 00:46:01,070 It's in the context in which he's discussing language and whether we can talk about whether we can give an essence to language. 329 00:46:01,070 --> 00:46:05,120 And Vic, insurance claim is that for some words, 330 00:46:05,120 --> 00:46:16,990 there's nothing that all the things that they apply to have in common and in virtue of which we apply the same words to all. 331 00:46:16,990 --> 00:46:27,280 For example, the word game, Sophus, in the case of a word like game. 332 00:46:27,280 --> 00:46:35,560 There are many different kinds of affinity between the things that we apply the words to, 333 00:46:35,560 --> 00:46:41,050 and we apply the same words to all of these things in virtue of these affinities. 334 00:46:41,050 --> 00:46:54,580 So a couple of things he mentions on in this quotation, board games, card games, ball games, athletic games and so on. 335 00:46:54,580 --> 00:47:02,260 If you talk about these games and trying to find a feature they all share and in virtue of which we call them all games, 336 00:47:02,260 --> 00:47:12,040 you might think, well, they're all entertaining. But that's less clear with a case like chess or knots and crosses versus noughts and crosses, 337 00:47:12,040 --> 00:47:16,270 which I assume is meant to be an example of an entertaining one. 338 00:47:16,270 --> 00:47:22,120 So, two, you might think there's always winning and losing or competition between players. 339 00:47:22,120 --> 00:47:25,870 But think of patients in ball games. 340 00:47:25,870 --> 00:47:30,580 There's winning and losing. But when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again. 341 00:47:30,580 --> 00:47:34,390 This feature has disappeared. And as he says, think now. 342 00:47:34,390 --> 00:47:41,980 Singing and dancing games. Here we have the element of entertainment. But how many other characteristic features have disappeared? 343 00:47:41,980 --> 00:47:49,680 And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way. Can see how similarities crop up and disappear, disappear. 344 00:47:49,680 --> 00:47:53,770 And the upside of these considerations is that we see a network, 345 00:47:53,770 --> 00:48:02,410 complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss crossing similarities in the large and small famous passage. 346 00:48:02,410 --> 00:48:05,910 I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than family 347 00:48:05,910 --> 00:48:12,220 resemblances for the various resemblances between members of a family build features, 348 00:48:12,220 --> 00:48:20,230 colour of eyes, gait, temperament, so on and so forth, overlap and crisscross in the same way. 349 00:48:20,230 --> 00:48:24,340 So members of family can resemble each other in their physical appearance. 350 00:48:24,340 --> 00:48:28,460 But that's not because there's one feature of their appearance that they all share. 351 00:48:28,460 --> 00:48:37,060 They might share one thing with B and B might share something with C, but ANC don't share the same feature. 352 00:48:37,060 --> 00:48:47,230 That's the basic thought. And in a very influential article, philosopher by the name of Maurice White's applied this to Art. 353 00:48:47,230 --> 00:48:54,460 His claim was that no single condition is either necessary or sufficient for being a work of art. 354 00:48:54,460 --> 00:49:00,790 Indeed, invites his view. Even being an artefact is not a necessary condition of being a work of art. 355 00:49:00,790 --> 00:49:11,230 Because, he says, we can see this piece of driftwood. We can say this piece of driftwood, which we found on the beach, is a lovely piece of sculpture. 356 00:49:11,230 --> 00:49:15,730 Rather, it's more like the concept of a game as vacante, Stein describes it. 357 00:49:15,730 --> 00:49:22,570 So there are various conditions. This is vite stalking by which we recognise something as an artwork. 358 00:49:22,570 --> 00:49:28,600 And it's true that a thing must meet some of these conditions in order to be an artwork. 359 00:49:28,600 --> 00:49:37,630 However, there is no one condition such that a thing must meet it in order to be an artwork. 360 00:49:37,630 --> 00:49:41,620 This is a reiteration of that point that there is no single condition. 361 00:49:41,620 --> 00:49:45,730 That's a necessary condition of being an artwork. 362 00:49:45,730 --> 00:49:51,100 There's a variety of conditions in which we're in virtue of which things count as artworks. 363 00:49:51,100 --> 00:49:58,970 But no single one is one that every artwork has to meet. Now Veitch goes further. 364 00:49:58,970 --> 00:50:06,770 He says not only is this the case, but we cannot list what all of these conditions are. 365 00:50:06,770 --> 00:50:12,160 So you could have this claim and say there's a fixed number of conditions. 366 00:50:12,160 --> 00:50:18,230 You've got to meet either A, B, C or D. No individual one is necessary. 367 00:50:18,230 --> 00:50:24,440 But meeting one or the other of them is necessary. But that's not vises view. 368 00:50:24,440 --> 00:50:33,080 He thinks the list is not closed. The list of conditions is not closed. 369 00:50:33,080 --> 00:50:38,890 Our concept of art hasn't settled. What all of the conditions that a thing can meet. 370 00:50:38,890 --> 00:50:48,320 That can make a thing art. And he thinks this is on account of the role of adventure, creativity in art. 371 00:50:48,320 --> 00:50:55,970 So when when we get a new work of art like fountain because of this open character of the concept, 372 00:50:55,970 --> 00:50:59,840 we have to make a decision as to whether we're going to include it or not, 373 00:50:59,840 --> 00:51:04,010 whether we're going to add a condition to our concept of art that this thing 374 00:51:04,010 --> 00:51:11,570 meets and in virtue of which it counts as art or if we're going to exclude it. 375 00:51:11,570 --> 00:51:18,680 But the key point and the reason that the concept is open reason he describes it that way is that it's not 376 00:51:18,680 --> 00:51:26,120 we shouldn't think of this as something that the concept we have has already implicitly settled or decided. 377 00:51:26,120 --> 00:51:35,950 When new cases come up, we have to make a decision as to whether we're going to modify the conditions of applying the concept or not. 378 00:51:35,950 --> 00:51:40,520 He says we could, of course, close the concept. We could decide that's it. 379 00:51:40,520 --> 00:51:46,610 No more conditions. But Vite says we shouldn't make that decision. 380 00:51:46,610 --> 00:51:58,670 It is up to us. And he's recommending against it because he thinks this would foreclose on the conditions of creativity in the arts, as he puts it. 381 00:51:58,670 --> 00:52:06,920 And he thinks that past definitions of art, such as the expression theory, fail as definitions. 382 00:52:06,920 --> 00:52:11,900 But they do point to some of the conditions that are involved in our concept of art. 383 00:52:11,900 --> 00:52:17,960 They're not necessary conditions, but they point to some of these conditions and in particular, 384 00:52:17,960 --> 00:52:23,360 they point to some of the things that these theories have regarded as valuable things 385 00:52:23,360 --> 00:52:32,070 to pay attention to in artworks such as its form and such as its expressive character. 386 00:52:32,070 --> 00:52:42,570 OK. Now, I see we don't have any more time, but I've listed some of the considerations to think about with reference device on the handout. 387 00:52:42,570 --> 00:52:45,720 Some of the objections to it. And of course, 388 00:52:45,720 --> 00:52:56,310 the main objection would be if we can find an actual definition of art that would show that Bite's is mistaken about the character of art here. 389 00:52:56,310 --> 00:53:02,000 Thank you very much.