So the second to see if the genealogy is recently attracted considerable amounts of attention.
It ostensibly develops on account of the origins of the feeling of guilt, which is marked by at least the appearance of ties to conceptual behaviours.
The first essay begins with the ladies of the concept of actually meet. The essay begins with an analysis of the concept of conscience.
Proceeds to an examination of bad conscience and concludes was a view of more bad conscience or guilt itself was an
emphasis throughout the essay on the crucial influence of socialisation on the development of all these phenomena.
Now there remains much disagreement amongst scholars over the precise structure of
Nietzsche's account and indeed over the precise nature of the feeling of guilt,
which is its purported object.
This object is what I shall call Christian gift, or the feeling of guilt as it operates and is understood in the Christian more often.
This much we can gather, not only from the role played by Christianity in Nietzsche is a cold,
but also from the Unfastens he places on the Christian view of countries in the brief review of the second to see your first Nick.
This is of course, the first quote on the end of the second enquiry.
He writes, Offers the psychology of conscience, which is not, as people may believe, the voice of God in man.
No, in contrast, a widespread line of interpretation.
I would argue that Nietzsche is objective in the second to say it's not at least not wholly and perhaps not
primarily to challenge the non naturalistic accord of the feeling of guilt promoted by the Christian último,
namely guilt as a manifestation of the voice of God in man.
But to show that the representation of guilt is not so much an account of the ordinary feeling of guilt,
that is to say, the diminution of self esteem we experience when we fall short of our own normative expectations,
as it is the product of the exploitation of the human susceptibility to that feeling as an instrument of self directed cruelty.
Christian guilt is therefore not a more emotionally responsive reasons.
But what I shall call and I'll come back to death as a failure of the paper irrational passion,
by which I mean a partial to which only a rational being is susceptible because it essentially exploits his responsiveness to reasons and which,
unlike other passions, not only overrides or bypasses, but actually corrupts his responsiveness to reason.
No, I do not mean to suggest, however, that she has nothing of particular interest to say about the ordinary feeling of guilt.
On the contrary, his genealogical record of guilt of Christian guilt presupposes an intriguing view of ordinary guilt,
which differs in important respects from the view of ordinary guilt, which is sanctioned by the Christian outlook.
And I shall have to consider at least some aspects of. So let me begin.
And I'll start with scholarships, since the feeling of guilt is a species of bad conscience.
Nietzsche begins this investigation with an examination of the concept of conscience.
The concept of conscience typically designates Anina false, defamed voice of conscience, which reminds each of us of our obligations.
Nietzsche rejects the idea that it is the voice of God in man asks Small.
As a matter of American fact, such or such a structure could have developed in the human psyche.
In so far as it is Evars reminding us of our obligations and commitments.
Conscience is what he calls the Wills Memorial. Not since undertaking an obligation or commitment is like making a promise.
The possession of a memory of the will underwrites what he calls the right to make promises.
We do not have the right to make promises unless we have the ability to keep them.
And this ability requires, of course, that we be reminded of that. No,
Nietzsche observes that our minds are naturally adult with an active forgetfulness
by virtue of which it disposes of impressions that would otherwise linger in.
And Cruddas, our consciousness infers that the memory is not part of our not innate natural adornment,
but constitutes a capacity that has to read to us.
This is a quote. This is a second court from the handle.
It is by no means a mere passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its impact.
Nor is it just indigestion caused by giving your word on some occasion and finding that you cannot call.
Instead, it is an active desire not to let go, but desire to keep on desiring what has been on some occasion desired.
Really, it is the Wills Memorial so that a world of strange new things,
circumstances and even acts of will may be placed quite safely between the original.
I will. I shall do. And the actual discharge of the will.
It's sparked without breaking this long chain of wit.
So by defining this memory of the will as a matter of keeping or desiring what has been on some occasion desired,
Nietzsche suggests that it is more that than the memory of the fact that I once desired something.
It is rather a perpetuation of desire itself.
Nietzsche's use of the word desire.
In this context may cause some confusion for a memory of the will is not simply the perpetration of some wish or inclination.
I once had the will to be remembered. Here is an obligation undertaken or a promise made.
I would I shall do to define this memory in terms of keeping on desiring is
simply to indicate that what is to be perpetuated is the motivation itself,
not the awareness that I was once so motivated in making a promise.
I expressed the intention or the desire in a broad sense to do what I have promised.
The winner's memory simply is the perpetuation of this desire.
So much for conscience, for not nonissues.
Enquiry then proceeds to an examination of the concept of indebtedness because guilt and indebtedness bear a clause etymological connexion.
Chairman good word for willed should also means that or indebtedness.
Nietzsche thinks this etymological connexion to suggest a conceptual one.
And concludes that we stand to learn much about guilt from an analysis of indebtedness.
Not a feeling of indebtedness arises in the context of contractual relationships,
which are essentially relationships established by promising and so involved a whole apparatus designed to make such promising possible,
particularly the recourse to the infliction of pain. This is number three on your hand off.
Precisely. Here, your rights promises are made precisely here.
The person making the promise has to have a memory made for him precisely.
Here we can guess he's a repository of hard, cruel,
painful things that are in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will
be honoured in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise,
and in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience to pass on something to the creditor by
means of the contrast of the contract in case he does not pay something which is to the bosses in control of his body.
His wife is freedom of law. No contractual relationship is established between two parties when one debtor.
Promises to repay the other, the creditor in some fashion for something such as a monetary loan,
some kind of service that the creditor agrees to provide if the debtor fails to keep his promise and repay.
Is that in kind? He's liable to some form of court court punishment.
But Neidjie emphasises that punishment in this context is very red.
At any rate, a practise that looks like punishment, like inflicting pain on the delinquent debtor, is not an expression of disapproval.
More or otherwise, it involves no judgement on the part of either party that the delinquent that it has acted in an evil or reprehensible way,
which makes him deserving of that punishment. It is mamby, but now to another form of repayment by the debtor for the debt he contracted.
Well, did you observe that far and away? The preferred form of alternative concept sensation in cases of delinquency is the infliction of pain.
The compensation, he writes, consists in a warrant for a title to prove it, and he marvels at the strangeness of this idea.
This is number four, which I'm not going to read. It turns out that two strange features in this conception of punishment.
First, does this idea that every injury or loss of possessions of a loved one and Delie as its equivalent in a fireboat amount of pleasure?
The other strange feature of cruelty is the idea that's called to make someone suffer displeasure in its highest form.
Well, the conjecture that Nishino first to explain the latter,
a strange feature of cruelty is that it's pleasurable because it gratifies the will to part.
I've argued elsewhere that the window bar is the desire to engage in the activity of confronting and overcoming resistance cruelty.
Making someone suffer is a party public manifestation of the will to bar in the following way.
The prospect of suffering necessarily creates resistance in its intended victim,
which the cruel individual simply overcomes by managing to make his victim suffer.
So when he she knows that this is a quote through punishment of the tender, the creditor takes part in the rights of the Masters.
He indicates that what the Predator enjoys is not the suffering of the debtor as such, but the overcoming of the resistance,
which the prospect of this suffering is bound to rolls into tender by the very fact that he's made to suffer.
Now, it is crucial to note that original contractual relationships when he she I'm not relationships
of trust between individuals who are already possess the right to make promises.
This is why the individual who contracted that court has to have a memory made for it through the threat of court.
Hard, cruel, painful things. The purpose of which is to put extra duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience.
So the original data is motivation for keeping his promises. Is the dread of the Predator a spa?
He does not consider that his words or standing is at stake in the keeping of his promises,
and therefore he does not regard its failure to do so as wrongdoing.
And this punishment is deserved.
The fear of the unpleasant consequences of his promise breaking, which constitutes the original feeling of indebtedness,
is therefore not a feeling of guilt precisely because it does not involve the ammunition, his self-esteem.
So Nietzsche observes that if a delinquent tenor does not already feel guilty for his indebtedness,
the punishment exacted cannot arouse such a feeling for two reasons.
The first, of course, is that he chasey others. So the debtor sees that, you know, what he did is being done to him.
And so is being able to in which a good conscience or with its approved off,
which means that he cannot as Nietzsche, which is regarded as reprehensible as such.
But second, he could not regard punishment as anything more than a stroke of bad luck or the unfortunate consequence of miscalculation.
This is No. Number five on your hands.
And which recently part of it for millennia. Wrong with the words overtaken by punishment have felt something has gone unexpectedly wrong here.
Not I hope not to have done that. They submitted to punishment as you submit to illness or misfortune or death.
If in those days there was any criticism of the deed, it came from intelligence.
We must certainly see the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in the lengthening of the memory.
We need to be more cautious, less trusting to go about things more circumspectly.
So the crucial implication of this view is that GILD's kind of consists of a fear of punishment for the effect of punishment.
Kellert A Rawl's the feeling of guilt in those who do not already regard what they did is
wrong and can only make them more cautious and circumspect in continuing to do what they did.
Then the prospect of punishment will not arouse guilt feelings either,
and will amount to nothing more than the apprehension of the unpleasant consequences of further imprudence or miscalculation.
The one way Gabriel discovered trust is to point out that if a delinquent debtor
came to believe that he has gotten away with it and will escape punishment,
no pangs of conscience would remain.
By contrast, if he felt guilty, the conviction that he would escape punishment for his wrongdoing would not make him feel any less guilt.
And so guilt cannot be the fear of punishment. So not a bad conscience.
No change lives. They were going to bad conscience in the following terms.
Not great read, but two fairly long passages because they are very important.
The first is this. I wrote on bad conscience as a serious illness.
Which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of over changes which he experienced
that change whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace?
It must have been no different for this Semite anymore.
Happy the other day to the wilderness war. The wandering life.
An adventure. It was for to see animals where they were when they were forced to either be could become land animals or perish.
At one go, all instincts become devalued and suspended.
They felt they were clumsy and performing the simplest task.
They did not. They have their familiar guide anymore. For this new unknown world, those regulating impulses which unconsciously led them to safety.
The poor things were reduced to relying thinking in Ferentz.
And the connecting, of course, these effects,
though it's very important to notice right away that Nietzsche's conception of the state of nature prior to socialisation
is not as it is for from the helpless and dreadful state of individuals ill-suited for solitary life in nature.
Nietzsche is pretty socially individual. By contrast, is happily adapted to the wilderness.
Nietzsche, therefore, assumes that it must have taken an act of violence to tear him away from his happily adopted state.
And he attributes this initial act of violence to a small group of strong individuals,
some pack of blonde beasts of free, a conqueror and master race.
As you could see, who are bent on exercising their way too far in the court shaping of a population which had up till now been
unrestrained and shapeless into a fixed form no matter what they choose most interested in here is one party.
The effect of this force socialisation, namely a change can individual in the individual's relationship to his instincts.
As he puts it, at one level, all its things become of where devaluated and suspended.
Not a very INSTINCT'S or regular regulating impulses which were once reliable guides to safety
become the new social conditions of existence and come to be seen as dangerous mobility's.
I can no longer trust that the pursuit of an impulse I feel in a given circumstance will be in my best interest,
and I must instead rely on thinking in Ference calculation.
And the connecting, of course, was effect. Now, this first problem followed by schools, by socialisation,
that the oldest things could no longer be trusted is compounded by another which Nietzsche describes as follows.
This is number seven.
Meanwhile, says the all these things have not suddenly ceased to make their demands, but it was difficult and sell them impossible to give in to them.
They mainly had to seek new. And as it were, underground gratifications Oden's things, which are not discharged, ultimately turn inwards.
This is what I call the internalisation of man. All those instincts of the wild free woofing man would turn Backwords against man himself.
Animosity, cruelty to pleasure of pursuing rating, changing and destroying all this pitted against a person who had such instincts.
That is the origin of bad conscience. So the origin of bad conscience lies in what Nietzsche calls the internalisation of man.
I've already noted one aspect of this process of improvisation the emergence of what Nietzsche calls these really dismal thing called reflection,
by which the old instincts become objects of reflective awareness. So you can imagine that a picture goes like this prior to forced socialisation.
The individual's point of view is directed outward is instinct's frame.
This point of view, but not its focus, since he's happy to adapt it to life in the wilderness.
He never has to reflect on that old question, those instincts.
And when they are frustrated as they are bound to be from time to time, he is wrong to think that the problem is,
was the world always his calculations about not with those instincts themselves under conditions of force authorisation.
By contrast, the frustration of the old instincts become systematic, and this forms a reorientation of the individual's point of view, which is not.
Directed inward, he's old things become objects of reflective awareness and criticisms.
After all, they would be appropriate not to be trusted anymore.
They seems to shave the point of view from which he thinks about and evaluates the world and becomes object and become objects to,
which is thought and evaluation are directed. Now,
the remarkable effect which captures the chief's attention is that this internalisation of man does not
simply consist of such a reflective reorientation of his point of view toward the inner world of existence.
It also involves what she calls a declaration of war against the old its things or devaluation of them.
So it's no doubt true that given Nietzsche's superstition of an original state of happy adaptation,
the individual could only be induced to reflect on his instincts when they become problems or liabilities as they are.
Of course, in conditions in which they're pursued has become a source of systematic torment and frustration.
But it remains to be seen why their frustration actually problems, a condemnation of these old INS things themselves.
Robert, adopt a new external conditions that make their satisfaction impossible.
And the explanation of this remarkable fact, according to the chief, is that,
quote, the all these things have not suddenly ceased to make their demands,
but since they can no longer be discharged outwardly, they turn inwards off against themselves.
Not since, as I noted, Nietzsche singles old cruelty as a party money instance of the instinct for freedom.
He describes bad conscience as, quote, cruelty turns against itself,
though it's true that Nietzsche sometimes describes bad conscience as, quote, the individual directed against himself.
But the means against himself in so far as he harbours cruel impulses.
So in other words, bad conscience is not any kind of instinctual deprivation, but only but not talk of the instincts of freedom.
So this is a quote. This is the next book of eight. He makes it to the instant of freedom, forcibly made latent the instinct of freedom, forced back,
repressed, incarcerating within itself and finally able to discharge an Ilija itself only against itself.
That and that alone is bad conscience in its beginnings.
No need to suggest two ways of explaining why the instinct of freedom can discharge itself only against itself in this matter.
First, since the conditions of forced socialisation, the instinct needs Borst to be suppressed and to be discharged.
It makes good economic sense to borrow a floating phrase, to make its own suppression on occasion for discharge.
Second, Nichi also suggests that under conditions of forced socialisation,
the indiscriminate suppression of by the individuals of any or all of its its
things could well threaten the coherence and survival of the social organisation.
And is therefore actively inhibited. I mean, you need some instinctual modification or you need some instincts to operate well to make life.
So Sargents no bad conscience.
It's obviously an unpleasant feeling.
Nietzsche notes that we speak of the Panopto to stinkweed of conscience and the individual with a bad conscience feels bad.
Not because he's all these things are not denied satisfaction. He feels bad for having them in the first place.
But if you think about it, one can feel bad for having certain instincts in all sorts of ways.
Let me give you some examples. The individual forced into suspecting might regret having cool instincts,
which by now being denied satisfaction, have become a source of perpetual torment.
Or the individual who subscribe to showboater is conception of happiness in terms of peace and contentment.
We'll deplore his Claudine's things because he deplores having any instincts at all,
since their presence proves to be the main obstacle to his happiness.
He feels bad about having them much in the way the prisoner who aspires to freedom feels bad of all these shackles.
Finally, the Christian deplores his court instance because it believes that having them diminishes his worth as a person.
He feels bad about having them in the way the sinner feels bad about his sinful proclivities.
Clearly, the devaluation of INSTINCT'S in the first two cases is going to be prudential.
Cruellest things make one unable to achieve happiness,
whereas in the last case it is more Cronin's things make one deserving of happiness, not the individuals.
More regrets.
What he brought his instincts on prudential roles by recognising them obstacles to his happiness is not motivated by self directed cruelty.
His purpose in condemning his instincts is not to make himself suffer.
No, it is true that like the shopworn Orien ascetic you might deliberately and systematically deny is insisting satisfaction.
But it is to the end of liberating himself from them. By becoming indifferent to the suffering caused by their frustration.
In this case, you will see the war in wages against his instincts, not as only a means to his eventual liberation.
When the Wardi individual wages against his instincts is motivated by self directed cruelty.
By contrast, it becomes a land. He denies a16 satisfaction.
Not in order to liberate himself from them, but in order to enjoy the very suffering,
their frustration causes which might incidentally and perversely enough, require him to keep them alive.
No. Still, there remains a difference between the deliberate, masochistic frustration of one's.
Poses what Nietzsche calls anymore bad conscience and the combination of those impulses as evil, which makes one feel guilty for having them,
or more bad conscience changing the direction of cruelty, turning it in words does not necessarily think the for profit.
More condemnation of it.
So although the feeling of guilt may well be a form of bad conscience, it is self directed cruelty manifested as more self reproach.
And that is as a man of conscience has not yet supplied. But nobody's Gil.
OK, so now let's turn to the phenomenon which she calls the body's ization of indebtedness,
but she acknowledges that his enquiries into indebtedness and contractual obligation have so far ignored the modernisation of these concepts.
It's not a question.
And this is an important question on which commentators are deeply divided, concerns the nature of this, quote unquote, modernisation.
This is where I'm going to take a stab that.
There are two ways of looking at it.
Is it on the one hand, the process whereby the nonwar concepts of indebtedness and contractual obligation become the moral concept of guilt acute?
Or is it a different process whereby the concepts of guilt and obligation already
understood in a generic more science are enrolled in the service of the aims of morality?
Understood. Now, in a specific sense, namely, yes, slave auditing or as what Brian libraries called quantity into pejorative sense.
Let's see.
Dick Cheney finds the amortisation of the word Chubin freight, which are ambiguous between dart board and preborn, and then he defines it as port.
This is on your handout. This is an important port. This system, Ranaan, is the way they are pushed back in to conscience,
more precisely the way bad conscience is woven together with the concept of God.
All it is there really nation to bad conscience. There's this definition is less than ideal to clear.
It suggests that demoralised feeling of guilt. Results from the combination of indebtedness with bad conscience.
Or more precisely, of the use of indebtedness as an instrument of self directed cruelty.
And it also suggests that the possibility of a more normalised feeling of guilt requires not just the notion of indebtedness, but of indebtedness.
Scott. I always will consider briefly two contrasting lines of interpretation of dispossession that falls into the church.
The fundamental premise of the first interpretation is that the feeling of indebtedness is not yet a feeling of guilt,
but becomes sold through its association with bad conscience.
Which records are much your speciality? But of course, this is a view that has been defended by others as well, such as Aaron really and others.
So it's not just me supporting, quote, failing to pay one's that's by no means decreases once,
but worth as a person simply because there's no point of view from which one's of all worth as a person is assessed.
The implication of this passage is the feeling of guilt is the feeling of indebtedness when one's worth as a person is at stake in the repayment.
After that, the failure to repay by. That concerns me only because of the unpleasant consequences my delinquency might bring upon me,
and not because it decreases my worth as a person, my failure to fulfil a contractual obligation with a role as a feeling of guilt.
Only if I take this obligation to possess a special character.
It is an obligation in the fulfilment of which my worth as a person is somehow at stake.
And to give it a name, I propose to quoting it categorical obligation in order to distinguish it from the
purely prudential obligation involved in three more contractual relationships.
Nietzsche remarks that when my failure to repay my debt is the consequence of negligence or miscalculation,
I may criticise myself for my impudence on my incompetence.
But feeling incompetent, stupid or small, even if I believe that I have no one to blame for it but myself is not yet feeling guilty.
Only my worth as a competent, professional, capable agent is at stake.
Not my worth as a person for my prudence matters to me.
Only if the determinate and seek enables me to realise matter to me in the first place.
Of course I may under certain circumstances, deplore my opponents, not just because of the unpleasant consequences it brings upon me,
but also because of what it tells us about me as a person in this case.
Moreover, I regard being prudent, if only implicitly, a categorical obligation.
No, it's important to note because there's a lot of confusion needed in its prewar form.
The feeling of indebtedness can already be pushed back into the bad conscience and used as an instruments of self directed cruelty.
So I could imagine that harbouring cruel impulses as I do,
is a breach of contract and torture myself with thoughts of terrific punishments for harbouring them.
But if the feeling of indebtedness produces no diminution in the delinquent debt or self-esteem,
it is hard to see how it could be marshalled to produce more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt.
No Reeser acknowledges this difficulty and goes on to suggest that Christianity proposes
or provides a solution for it by introducing the notion of indebtedness towards God,
which this is, research again turns it into a deep sense of fear, complete failure with respect to what one is.
First and more foremost, they mean God's creature.
No, the problem is this is that is if, as research argues, the feeling of indebtedness itself by no means decreases one's voice as a person.
It's very hard to see Paul making it indebtedness towards God would have this effect.
You think that it does is to affect self-esteem. It must be in virtue of its character as indebtedness, not in virtue of who one is indebted to.
It must be being a delinquent better as such, that decreases what's worth as a person.
But in that case, the feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt and indebtedness towards God.
The only intensified feeling of. There might be ways to improve resource proposals in an attempt to circumvent this difficulty.
So, for instance, you might think that God expects us,
the Christian God expects us not only to follow his commandments, but also to treat them as ethical obligations.
That might be wise. But besides very uncertain prospects of success to required emendations would involve the addition of essential details,
such as what I just mentioned, which neither research nor Nietzsche, for that matter, take the pain to space too far.
So there's difficulty with which this proposal invites an alternative line of interpretation,
according to which the feeling of indebtedness would involve,
prior to its modernisation, a genuine commitment to the categorical authority of the obligation.
Which one has often taken such and such that the failure to discharge these
obligations would cause a decrease in one's worth as a person of this view,
which is proposed by Simon Lee. The feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt.
And I quote me. This is no, I've never heard of the debtor.
Predetermination has successfully modelled scales only because it already contains the latter's key principles issue,
namely of personal accountability, which he specifies as being a strong sense that one's obligations are justified.
I take it Simon may not agree with me on this, but I'm categorically justified this resolution.
The chief advantage of this proposal is that by taking the feeling of indebtedness to involve a decrease in one's worth as a person,
it manages to explain how pushing back indebtedness into bad conscience would produce a distinctively more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt,
more bad conscience, as we call it, self directed cruelty manifested under the guise of more self reproach or recourse of one's self as a person.
Self directed cruelty could assume these guys, by representing an individual,
is continuing to harbour Cronin's things as the violation of a contractual obligation.
Given that such a function of such a violation decreases your first nor the obvious problem we are
left to Bybee's proposal is that if the feeling of indebtedness is already a feeling of guilt,
it becomes unclear what the warren zation of the concepts of and duty could accomplish.
May himself suggest that the amortisation of guilt is called defined by the idea that one's human nature is essentially either dischargeable guilty.
Evans the. No, I think there's a suggestion there and I want to develop.
We may differ on this suggestion by recording first. This is important.
Trade is not always noted that Viji emphasises the fact TWA's that as a consequence of their Mornese ation,
the concepts of guilt and duty become the exclusive property of bad conscience.
This indicates that more eyes, guilt and duty can only evoke a diminished self-esteem in the age of the experiences.
And of course, it's easy to see how the association of bad conscience because the concept of God,
particularly the notion of indebtedness towards God, could achieve this.
The notion of indebtedness towards God is, in effect,
the notion of an inexcusable guilt and the contractual obligation that cannot be fulfilled there before represents a normative standard,
but duty that is designed only to leave men could power property conference of his own absolute unworthiness.
So let me know. Develop this interpretation of democratisation, of gift. According to the interpretation I'm proposing.
You need change takes the Christian representation of guilt to be not a party killer,
a cold of the ordinary feeling of guilt, but a perversion of the human susceptibility to that feeling.
This, in turn, supposes that he has a coat of this ordinary feeling of guilt.
And I believe that he does and that the so-called differs in significant respects
from vehicle that is officially sanctioned by the Christian outlook in particular,
which Nietzsche argues that the ordinary feeling of guilt is not an innate disposition,
whose explanation requires the invocation of non-natural entities such as God.
It is, on the contrary, an acquired disposition which they've robs under the causal pressure of Rajani natural forces.
He's on a comet. This is important.
Begins with the surmise that the susceptibility to the feeling of guilt emerges from the original legal practise of making contrast contracts.
This is number twelve in this sphere of legal obligations that we find a breeding ground of the more conceptual world of guilt,
conscience, duty, sacred duty.
Since NUJ insists that the origin or feeding of indebtedness is not tantamount to the feeding of guilt, we must ask Hald or not.
It could emerge from the of the ways in which he understands it.
Freedom is being indebted in a way that decreases once more.
Is this a person? What requires explanation is therefore what one's worse as a person amounts to and how it
could have come to be at stake in the forefront of one's contract contractual obligations.
Well, the need for contractual relationships motivates the enterprise.
As you might recall, of reading on Unevolved was the right to make promises, always a conscience.
And this, which observes. This is a quote, is precisely what constitutes the long history of the origins of responsibility.
So the position of the commission of a conscience, according to Nietzsche, is what makes me a responsible agent.
Now it is crucial to understand what Nietzsche means.
My responsibility is complex. Calling someone responsible might first denote the fact that he is free and as the chief would say,
could have done otherwise so that his action is computable to him rather than
merely to some part of him or to some even told to get her external trade.
But in the second place, holding someone responsible might also refer to the fact that he can be trusted or relied upon,
that he's someone who truly has the right to make promises because his word, once given is good and secure.
No need change. He's interested primarily in the second sense of responsibility.
A responsible agent is one who can be trusted or relied upon.
He calls the individual who has become fully responsible in this sense, the sovereign individual.
So I go back to the early part of the essay because it provides a clue to this is a common feeling of guilt.
We get into a more precise understanding of the character of the sovereign individual.
By examining the process through which he's produced, Nietzsche came claims that conscience,
all the windows to memory is spread through pain, which he does the most powerful eight mnemonics.
It is the prospect of the pain incurred for breaking one's promises, but ensures the perpetuation of the motivation to keep them.
However, it is crucial to note that the fear of band plays a memory and they really roll into development of conscience,
but is not constitutive for the fear of pain, which initially motivates the individual to control doors.
A morgue is intervening desires and emotions that conflict with his promise keeping
can eventually become replaced by one Beecher describes as a feeling of power,
of freedom. The frustration of conflicting intervening desire is another to fulfil the promise is, of course,
itself a source of pain and the individual who learns to overcome disspain in this manner.
That is to say, courage to overcome the resistance that is opposed by those conflicting desires comes to derive from pain,
come to derive a feeling of power and freedom from this overcoming.
It is at the end of this process when the feeling of freedom in part has replaced the feel
of pain as the motivation for from escaping that we find a separate individual quote.
Then the 13 read-only part of the Freeman deposits out of a durable unbreakable will,
thus has his own standard of fighting in the possession of sexual viewing.
Others, from his own standpoint, he respects or despises. He confers an honour when he places his trust, gives his word,
is something which can be relied on because he is strong enough to remain upright in the face of mishap or even in the face of fate.
The proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility,
the awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny has penetrated him to the depths and becomes an instinct is dominant.
This suffering man calls it his conscience.
So the conscience of the sovereign individual is not, quote, an actual awareness of power and freedom.
The driving force, in other words, behind the conscience of the sovereign individual is not the feel of pain,
but the enjoyment of the feeling of power. Well, nature doesn't explain why an angel becomes responsible.
Only when the feeding of part is substituted for the few of pain in motivating its promiscuity.
But we me, my Lofoten following survives. No, first of all, that we don't call responsible.
Anyone who we can depend to do what he has promised to do.
For instance,
we will not just judge trustworthy or responsible an agent who keeps his promises only because he fears the unpleasant consequences of breaking them.
And one possible motivation for attitude is in disguise is the recognition that
the Ajram does not care about keeping his promises as such and would break them.
The moment the unpleasant consequences of Suhui would be either avoidable or all
outweighed by the pleasures for the sake of which he would break his promises. This suggests that we consider an agent trustworthy or responsible.
Only if he finds some positive satisfaction in promise,
keeping as such an agent who derives the feeding of part of freedom from his promise
keeping thereby find some positive satisfactory it gratifies is Winter Park.
But of course, the pleasure derived from satisfying the root bar could conceivably still be
outweighed by the pleasure afforded by the gratification of other stronger impulses.
Soloveitchik concludes that we consider truly responsible recall subframe only
the individual in whom the instinct for freedom the winterbourne has become,
as he puts it, the dominant instead. No, this is a move that is unmotivated for the cheap but very important to come.
Nietzsche goes must take significant step further.
Probably keeping and the self mastery it requires is a source not only of pleasure, but also as if it's a problem of self-esteem.
The possession of a durable, reliable RIL is for the sovereign individual,
a standard of thought in terms of which determines what is respectable, honourable or contemptible.
Being responsible, being responsible is therefore not just a pleasant state in which is desirable or is ready for
it is a standard or status in which the body davonte with former of freedom is instantiated.
Being responsible makes him honourable and worthy of respect.
The notion of responsibility, palsied reframes not the concept of personal macoutes.
As a standing that warrants respect, Nietzsche appears to suppose that it is so enduring legal framework,
which constitutes a conceptual breeding ground for the feeling of guilt and its concept of responsibility.
Understood as the ability to govern one's behaviour in accordance with obligations
or commitments bears a close resemblance to the notion of rationality,
which has long been thought to distinguish human beings from animals and indeed say,
as Nietzsche constitutes man's sense of superiority over the animals, not on the view and attributed to Nietzsche,
that one is right to make promises becomes, quote, the proud realisation of if a privilege or evidence of state or so splendid the breaking.
I promise will in and of itself decrease once forces are first person in the way that's characteristic of ordinary guilt,
since it puts the individual standing as a responsible agent into question.
No. There's one feature of the ordinary conception of guilt that I think this particular called illuminates,
and it's a feature that intrigues Nietzsche greatly himself. And it's the connexion between guilt and punishment.
So according to the chain,
the legal backdrop of contractual relationships is also supposed to illuminate the connexion between guilt and punishment suffered.
And this is the 14th in the same way it was here that the uncanny and perhaps
inextricable link between the ideas of guilt and suffering his first getting together,
no doubt to a possible question to be, you may ask why, you may ask one.
What hall does the victim overall experience the punishment of the perpetrator?
Well, you may ask Paul, does forgiveness his punishment? We'll see some interesting psychology of guilt.
I'm going to focus on the old amount of question. No. What's what's characteristic of the guilty is relationship to his punishment.
Well, first of all, the guilty not only accepts his punishment, but she regards as deserved, but he also welcomes it as a way of expiated his gift.
No, it is very tempting to support, of course, that punishment experience his guilt by providing reparation for his wrongdoing.
But disregarding view of punishment faces some significant difficulties in the first place.
And this is something that Nietzsche observes himself.
Punishment is often of such a nature, various kinds of suffering, deprivation inflicted upon the perpetrator.
But it can hardly constitute a reparation for the harm done huggin depriving
the thief of his freedom compensate his victims for the loss of their wealth.
You ask people who invested was Bernard Madoff, who confronted with this programme, which suggests, as we know,
that the suffering of the guilty provides the victim of his own doing a certain pleasure,
the pleasure of cruelty, which compensates him for them for the wrong done to him.
But the deeper difficulty is the report, if you will.
Punishment, however, lies in the supposing show that the guilty welcomes his punishment because he wishes to,
before all, to repair the particle damage caused by his wrongdoing.
But this is Gabriele Taylor. His argument is not the case.
This is a court for 50. The important feature of guilt is the thought of the guilty concentrates on herself as the door of the deed,
having brought about what is 4B to whom she has harmed herself. She has put herself in a position where repayment from her is due.
But the part of the payment is not always only.
Incidently, that the more wrong should be right. This is this.
The writing for overall wrong may want to be the form that the repayment takes.
But from the point of view of the guilty person, this is only a means towards the end that she should be rid of the burden,
that she should be able again to live with herself.
The painfulness of the guilt feelings is therefore explained by the uneasiness of the person concerned.
The person looks and feels herself. What matters to the guilty, in other words, is the fact that by violating the obligations,
she has diminished her standing or worse as a person and not primarily these.
The fact that she has caused harm in doing so. Accordingly, the port of undergoing punishment is to restore her that much spending,
not to repair the harm she has caused, even if the punishment provides such liberation as apparently from the jail.
Nearly two years ago, I think, helps us to see if a punishment could have assumed this peculiar significance for the guilty.
In, as you remember, the feeling of guilt is a consequence of the breaking of a promise.
Knowing observes that even in the pre-war legal contractual framework under which the concept of guilt is supposed to emerge.
The breaking of a promise is already wrong in two different respects.
There is what he calls the immediate damage done by the agents breaking off some part of good promise.
And then there is the loss of his standing as a responsible agent who has the right to make promises.
This is part of the food number, 60 year sentence, and living on the image of damage done by the offender is what we are talking of off lease.
Quite apart from this, the law breaker is a breaker.
Somebody who has broken his contract and his work.
So in this free, more contractual context, Neches suggests the stunning loss is simply that of a trustworthy,
reliable promise keeper, which presumably matters to the agent of essentially prudential rights.
In losing constantly, he deprives himself of the benefits of contractual relationships, particularly doors that bind him to a community.
The purpose of punishment as this case is not simply to repair.
The immediate damage he has done, but to attempt to restore his status as a reliable from his keep.
Likewise, in the context of moralised indebtedness,
the wrongdoers violation of his obligation affects his self-esteem by putting his worth as a person into question.
What he won comes from punishment is not the opportunity to repair the immediate damage his transgression has caused,
but an opportunity to restore his standing as a responsible agent. That is to say, not just somebody who is reliable and trustworthy,
contract partner with the ice holders, but are somebody who is a sovereign individual,
one who maskers his desires and emotions and is so able to conduct his life in accordance with the commitments he has undertaken.
So to restore his standing, the promise breaker would have first to accept punishment or regarded as deserved.
Such acceptance would indicate that he recognises the normatively binding character of his contractual obligations.
But he chicos the solemn duty and sanctity of this promise. Did indeed acknowledge also that he was wrong and violated.
But this all, of course, doesn't suffice to quantify him as a responsible agent who has the right to be.
Promises to have this right. He must also have acquired a memory of the world.
That is to say, the ability to maintain his motivation, to fulfil his promises, regardless of intervening, even some desires.
In other words, the merit to merit to the standing of a responsible agent.
He must not only sincerely believe that he ought to keep his promises, he must also prove capable of doing so.
His ability to endure the punishment would aim to provide precisely such a proof.
Keeping one's promises requires the capacity to withstand the suffering caused by the deliberate frustration of conflicting desires and emotions.
By welcoming and withstanding this punishment, the wrongdoer would seek to demonstrate that he still possesses this capacity.
Contrary to what is present, wrongdoing may suggest this may also be war.
It is not untypical of the wrongdoer who seeks to restore his responsible striving to find merit compensation for the party got it wrong.
He has done insufficient and to insist on overcompensation what might look like
excessive punishment in order to provide a firmer proof of his responsibility.
So it's not always the case. So let me conclude.
Let me come to this view to which I need it to be that to give Christian guilt for change.
In fact, this is a rational, rational.
Indeed, your prediction of proposing here, geneology conditions, fields of Christian guilt exposes it as a rational,
partially rational passions are passions to which only a rational being is susceptible because they essentially exploit his
responsiveness to reasons like and I like any other passion over rational portions of themselves responsive to such reasons.
But this is important.
It is a distinctive trait of rational passions that their gratification requires at least the appearance of reason responsiveness.
It follows that, whereas ordinary passions typically would only override or bypass reason that will do.
McNall pretends to be responsive to reason rational abortions.
Who needs this will often end up corrupting responsiveness, which we give you the example,
the example of the quite the narcissistic passion for thinking.
Well, this is an instance of irrational passion to be susceptible to such a passion,
to narcissism, to be responsive to norms and to serve self-assessment of her.
But in order to ensure its own gratification, his passion might also lead him to correct these norms so as to ensure a favourable self-assessment.
But what I want to suggest is that the Christian skilled.
Another instance of irrational passions, which is the passion for thinking ill of oneself, all as the chief would say,
support the will to find oneself to find find himself guilty and condemned his article of retreat.
Nietzsche argues that Christian guilt operates with normative expectations that
have been distorted by his passion for self debasement as he conceives of it,
guilt, Christian guilt, his indebtedness towards God, which is the most extreme development of a party,
a form of indebtedness or indebtedness to the ancestors. The individual is justified in feeling it that it only if he believes that God,
the ancestors, has in fact deliver the goods for the possession of which he feels indebted.
You know, the distinctive feature of Christian guilt is that it is an experience.
It is next feel more because God's gift itself is of such transcendence and holiness
that it cannot be paid off by finite animals are finite animal being such as we are,
as Nietzsche indicates. The problem is not just that that's got be paid off, but that guilt is an experience.
That is to say, it's not just that a Christian cannot compensate God, but if he cannot reclaim his standing as a responsible agent.
Indeed, in so far as he was never able to fulfil his obligations to God, he could never even claim that standing in the first place.
No. Here's the thing. If Christian Gilb was responsive to the normative logic of indebtedness, we would expect a loss in.
And also belief in the existence and power of God to result in a loss of guilt.
As Nietzsche puts it, this is number 18.
We should be justified. And did you think his normal property. That from the unstoppable decline into faith in the Christian God.
There is even not a considerable decline in the consciousness of guilt.
But Nietzsche observes, this is precisely not what happens each year.
The facts diverge from this in a terrible way, with the morning zation, with the concepts, guilt and duty and their relegation to bad conscience.
We have, in reality, an attempt to reverse the direction of the different I have described, or at least to halt its movement.
Now the prospect for once and for payment is to be foreclosed.
This, of course, leads me to surmise that what is at work in Christian guilt is not answerability to existing norms of self assessment,
but the corruption of self directed cruelty.
Quote, You will already have guessed what has really gone on with all this is beyond all this that will determine oneself,
that suppressed cruelty of animal man who is being frightened back into himself and given a little life.
We have here a sort of madness of the willing showing itself in mental cruelty, which is a powerful man's will to find himself guilty and condemned,
was our hope of reprieve, his will to think of himself as punished without the punishment ever measuring up to the crime.
This will to set up an ideal body guard in order to be palpably convinced of his own absolute worthlessness in the face of this idea.
It is not, in other words, because he happens to believe in a transcendent God to whom he owes more than he can repay.
The Depression feels guilty. It is wrong to, because of his will, to find himself guilty that he believes in such a God.
So in Nietzsche's view that Christianity did not invent the ordinary concept of guilt, but under the sway of.
Anymore, bad conscience transformed it into a perfect instrument of self directed cruelty.
By introducing the notion of guilt towards God, quote, this man of bad conscience, which he writes,
has seised on religious precept in order to provide a self-torture as its most horrific hardness and sharpness, guilt towards God.
This all becomes an instrument of torture. No, it is self directed cruelty in the first place.
In so far, it is precisely in virtue of harbouring any more instinct, such as cruelty.
That man fails to fulfil his obligation towards a holy God. Quote, In God, he seises upon the ultimate antithesis.
Is he confined to his real and irredeemable demotes things. He reinterprets these selfsame animal instincts, his guilt before God.
And it is also a perfect form of self corrective cruelty insofar as it represents guilt as an experience prior to its Christian reinterpretation.
The distinctive feeding of diminished self esteem experienced by the guilty could
only be an imperfect instrument of self-torture because guilt could always,
in principle, be expiated. One only had to undergo punishment to restore one's voice as a person once it is conceivable,
conceived as the next feeble guilt towards God by the loss of words.
As a person becomes upsweep, a loss which nothing can redeem short of a radical, self-denial, short or repudiation of one's animal nature.
Which of course leads us to the ascetic aspiration for aspiration to a quite different kind of existence.
This, of course, is a story for another.