1 00:00:01,190 --> 00:00:06,460 So the second to see if the genealogy is recently attracted considerable amounts of attention. 2 00:00:06,460 --> 00:00:16,410 It ostensibly develops on account of the origins of the feeling of guilt, which is marked by at least the appearance of ties to conceptual behaviours. 3 00:00:16,410 --> 00:00:23,460 The first essay begins with the ladies of the concept of actually meet. The essay begins with an analysis of the concept of conscience. 4 00:00:23,460 --> 00:00:31,530 Proceeds to an examination of bad conscience and concludes was a view of more bad conscience or guilt itself was an 5 00:00:31,530 --> 00:00:39,700 emphasis throughout the essay on the crucial influence of socialisation on the development of all these phenomena. 6 00:00:39,700 --> 00:00:44,070 Now there remains much disagreement amongst scholars over the precise structure of 7 00:00:44,070 --> 00:00:49,230 Nietzsche's account and indeed over the precise nature of the feeling of guilt, 8 00:00:49,230 --> 00:00:51,570 which is its purported object. 9 00:00:51,570 --> 00:01:02,400 This object is what I shall call Christian gift, or the feeling of guilt as it operates and is understood in the Christian more often. 10 00:01:02,400 --> 00:01:08,040 This much we can gather, not only from the role played by Christianity in Nietzsche is a cold, 11 00:01:08,040 --> 00:01:17,110 but also from the Unfastens he places on the Christian view of countries in the brief review of the second to see your first Nick. 12 00:01:17,110 --> 00:01:21,220 This is of course, the first quote on the end of the second enquiry. 13 00:01:21,220 --> 00:01:30,490 He writes, Offers the psychology of conscience, which is not, as people may believe, the voice of God in man. 14 00:01:30,490 --> 00:01:34,500 No, in contrast, a widespread line of interpretation. 15 00:01:34,500 --> 00:01:40,500 I would argue that Nietzsche is objective in the second to say it's not at least not wholly and perhaps not 16 00:01:40,500 --> 00:01:49,350 primarily to challenge the non naturalistic accord of the feeling of guilt promoted by the Christian último, 17 00:01:49,350 --> 00:01:53,850 namely guilt as a manifestation of the voice of God in man. 18 00:01:53,850 --> 00:01:59,970 But to show that the representation of guilt is not so much an account of the ordinary feeling of guilt, 19 00:01:59,970 --> 00:02:07,620 that is to say, the diminution of self esteem we experience when we fall short of our own normative expectations, 20 00:02:07,620 --> 00:02:17,730 as it is the product of the exploitation of the human susceptibility to that feeling as an instrument of self directed cruelty. 21 00:02:17,730 --> 00:02:23,940 Christian guilt is therefore not a more emotionally responsive reasons. 22 00:02:23,940 --> 00:02:29,310 But what I shall call and I'll come back to death as a failure of the paper irrational passion, 23 00:02:29,310 --> 00:02:39,300 by which I mean a partial to which only a rational being is susceptible because it essentially exploits his responsiveness to reasons and which, 24 00:02:39,300 --> 00:02:48,100 unlike other passions, not only overrides or bypasses, but actually corrupts his responsiveness to reason. 25 00:02:48,100 --> 00:02:56,370 No, I do not mean to suggest, however, that she has nothing of particular interest to say about the ordinary feeling of guilt. 26 00:02:56,370 --> 00:03:04,050 On the contrary, his genealogical record of guilt of Christian guilt presupposes an intriguing view of ordinary guilt, 27 00:03:04,050 --> 00:03:10,440 which differs in important respects from the view of ordinary guilt, which is sanctioned by the Christian outlook. 28 00:03:10,440 --> 00:03:16,390 And I shall have to consider at least some aspects of. So let me begin. 29 00:03:16,390 --> 00:03:22,230 And I'll start with scholarships, since the feeling of guilt is a species of bad conscience. 30 00:03:22,230 --> 00:03:27,400 Nietzsche begins this investigation with an examination of the concept of conscience. 31 00:03:27,400 --> 00:03:36,670 The concept of conscience typically designates Anina false, defamed voice of conscience, which reminds each of us of our obligations. 32 00:03:36,670 --> 00:03:42,730 Nietzsche rejects the idea that it is the voice of God in man asks Small. 33 00:03:42,730 --> 00:03:48,850 As a matter of American fact, such or such a structure could have developed in the human psyche. 34 00:03:48,850 --> 00:03:53,980 In so far as it is Evars reminding us of our obligations and commitments. 35 00:03:53,980 --> 00:04:02,680 Conscience is what he calls the Wills Memorial. Not since undertaking an obligation or commitment is like making a promise. 36 00:04:02,680 --> 00:04:09,490 The possession of a memory of the will underwrites what he calls the right to make promises. 37 00:04:09,490 --> 00:04:14,320 We do not have the right to make promises unless we have the ability to keep them. 38 00:04:14,320 --> 00:04:18,710 And this ability requires, of course, that we be reminded of that. No, 39 00:04:18,710 --> 00:04:24,820 Nietzsche observes that our minds are naturally adult with an active forgetfulness 40 00:04:24,820 --> 00:04:30,340 by virtue of which it disposes of impressions that would otherwise linger in. 41 00:04:30,340 --> 00:04:39,190 And Cruddas, our consciousness infers that the memory is not part of our not innate natural adornment, 42 00:04:39,190 --> 00:04:43,810 but constitutes a capacity that has to read to us. 43 00:04:43,810 --> 00:04:47,440 This is a quote. This is a second court from the handle. 44 00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:54,070 It is by no means a mere passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its impact. 45 00:04:54,070 --> 00:05:02,470 Nor is it just indigestion caused by giving your word on some occasion and finding that you cannot call. 46 00:05:02,470 --> 00:05:12,370 Instead, it is an active desire not to let go, but desire to keep on desiring what has been on some occasion desired. 47 00:05:12,370 --> 00:05:19,630 Really, it is the Wills Memorial so that a world of strange new things, 48 00:05:19,630 --> 00:05:27,430 circumstances and even acts of will may be placed quite safely between the original. 49 00:05:27,430 --> 00:05:32,290 I will. I shall do. And the actual discharge of the will. 50 00:05:32,290 --> 00:05:38,140 It's sparked without breaking this long chain of wit. 51 00:05:38,140 --> 00:05:46,470 So by defining this memory of the will as a matter of keeping or desiring what has been on some occasion desired, 52 00:05:46,470 --> 00:05:53,560 Nietzsche suggests that it is more that than the memory of the fact that I once desired something. 53 00:05:53,560 --> 00:05:58,660 It is rather a perpetuation of desire itself. 54 00:05:58,660 --> 00:06:00,400 Nietzsche's use of the word desire. 55 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:09,130 In this context may cause some confusion for a memory of the will is not simply the perpetration of some wish or inclination. 56 00:06:09,130 --> 00:06:16,750 I once had the will to be remembered. Here is an obligation undertaken or a promise made. 57 00:06:16,750 --> 00:06:23,230 I would I shall do to define this memory in terms of keeping on desiring is 58 00:06:23,230 --> 00:06:28,840 simply to indicate that what is to be perpetuated is the motivation itself, 59 00:06:28,840 --> 00:06:33,730 not the awareness that I was once so motivated in making a promise. 60 00:06:33,730 --> 00:06:39,340 I expressed the intention or the desire in a broad sense to do what I have promised. 61 00:06:39,340 --> 00:06:44,590 The winner's memory simply is the perpetuation of this desire. 62 00:06:44,590 --> 00:06:47,980 So much for conscience, for not nonissues. 63 00:06:47,980 --> 00:06:57,670 Enquiry then proceeds to an examination of the concept of indebtedness because guilt and indebtedness bear a clause etymological connexion. 64 00:06:57,670 --> 00:07:03,080 Chairman good word for willed should also means that or indebtedness. 65 00:07:03,080 --> 00:07:08,290 Nietzsche thinks this etymological connexion to suggest a conceptual one. 66 00:07:08,290 --> 00:07:14,470 And concludes that we stand to learn much about guilt from an analysis of indebtedness. 67 00:07:14,470 --> 00:07:19,000 Not a feeling of indebtedness arises in the context of contractual relationships, 68 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:28,240 which are essentially relationships established by promising and so involved a whole apparatus designed to make such promising possible, 69 00:07:28,240 --> 00:07:34,300 particularly the recourse to the infliction of pain. This is number three on your hand off. 70 00:07:34,300 --> 00:07:39,310 Precisely. Here, your rights promises are made precisely here. 71 00:07:39,310 --> 00:07:44,020 The person making the promise has to have a memory made for him precisely. 72 00:07:44,020 --> 00:07:47,830 Here we can guess he's a repository of hard, cruel, 73 00:07:47,830 --> 00:07:53,140 painful things that are in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will 74 00:07:53,140 --> 00:07:58,690 be honoured in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise, 75 00:07:58,690 --> 00:08:04,820 and in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience to pass on something to the creditor by 76 00:08:04,820 --> 00:08:10,900 means of the contrast of the contract in case he does not pay something which is to the bosses in control of his body. 77 00:08:10,900 --> 00:08:20,380 His wife is freedom of law. No contractual relationship is established between two parties when one debtor. 78 00:08:20,380 --> 00:08:26,710 Promises to repay the other, the creditor in some fashion for something such as a monetary loan, 79 00:08:26,710 --> 00:08:34,390 some kind of service that the creditor agrees to provide if the debtor fails to keep his promise and repay. 80 00:08:34,390 --> 00:08:40,900 Is that in kind? He's liable to some form of court court punishment. 81 00:08:40,900 --> 00:08:44,860 But Neidjie emphasises that punishment in this context is very red. 82 00:08:44,860 --> 00:08:53,800 At any rate, a practise that looks like punishment, like inflicting pain on the delinquent debtor, is not an expression of disapproval. 83 00:08:53,800 --> 00:09:03,610 More or otherwise, it involves no judgement on the part of either party that the delinquent that it has acted in an evil or reprehensible way, 84 00:09:03,610 --> 00:09:14,680 which makes him deserving of that punishment. It is mamby, but now to another form of repayment by the debtor for the debt he contracted. 85 00:09:14,680 --> 00:09:23,730 Well, did you observe that far and away? The preferred form of alternative concept sensation in cases of delinquency is the infliction of pain. 86 00:09:23,730 --> 00:09:31,930 The compensation, he writes, consists in a warrant for a title to prove it, and he marvels at the strangeness of this idea. 87 00:09:31,930 --> 00:09:39,900 This is number four, which I'm not going to read. It turns out that two strange features in this conception of punishment. 88 00:09:39,900 --> 00:09:51,690 First, does this idea that every injury or loss of possessions of a loved one and Delie as its equivalent in a fireboat amount of pleasure? 89 00:09:51,690 --> 00:10:01,890 The other strange feature of cruelty is the idea that's called to make someone suffer displeasure in its highest form. 90 00:10:01,890 --> 00:10:05,100 Well, the conjecture that Nishino first to explain the latter, 91 00:10:05,100 --> 00:10:12,930 a strange feature of cruelty is that it's pleasurable because it gratifies the will to part. 92 00:10:12,930 --> 00:10:22,830 I've argued elsewhere that the window bar is the desire to engage in the activity of confronting and overcoming resistance cruelty. 93 00:10:22,830 --> 00:10:29,490 Making someone suffer is a party public manifestation of the will to bar in the following way. 94 00:10:29,490 --> 00:10:36,120 The prospect of suffering necessarily creates resistance in its intended victim, 95 00:10:36,120 --> 00:10:43,170 which the cruel individual simply overcomes by managing to make his victim suffer. 96 00:10:43,170 --> 00:10:51,840 So when he she knows that this is a quote through punishment of the tender, the creditor takes part in the rights of the Masters. 97 00:10:51,840 --> 00:11:00,600 He indicates that what the Predator enjoys is not the suffering of the debtor as such, but the overcoming of the resistance, 98 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:09,270 which the prospect of this suffering is bound to rolls into tender by the very fact that he's made to suffer. 99 00:11:09,270 --> 00:11:15,300 Now, it is crucial to note that original contractual relationships when he she I'm not relationships 100 00:11:15,300 --> 00:11:21,570 of trust between individuals who are already possess the right to make promises. 101 00:11:21,570 --> 00:11:28,980 This is why the individual who contracted that court has to have a memory made for it through the threat of court. 102 00:11:28,980 --> 00:11:37,590 Hard, cruel, painful things. The purpose of which is to put extra duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience. 103 00:11:37,590 --> 00:11:45,000 So the original data is motivation for keeping his promises. Is the dread of the Predator a spa? 104 00:11:45,000 --> 00:11:50,580 He does not consider that his words or standing is at stake in the keeping of his promises, 105 00:11:50,580 --> 00:11:55,320 and therefore he does not regard its failure to do so as wrongdoing. 106 00:11:55,320 --> 00:11:58,200 And this punishment is deserved. 107 00:11:58,200 --> 00:12:05,220 The fear of the unpleasant consequences of his promise breaking, which constitutes the original feeling of indebtedness, 108 00:12:05,220 --> 00:12:12,960 is therefore not a feeling of guilt precisely because it does not involve the ammunition, his self-esteem. 109 00:12:12,960 --> 00:12:19,410 So Nietzsche observes that if a delinquent tenor does not already feel guilty for his indebtedness, 110 00:12:19,410 --> 00:12:23,490 the punishment exacted cannot arouse such a feeling for two reasons. 111 00:12:23,490 --> 00:12:30,720 The first, of course, is that he chasey others. So the debtor sees that, you know, what he did is being done to him. 112 00:12:30,720 --> 00:12:35,700 And so is being able to in which a good conscience or with its approved off, 113 00:12:35,700 --> 00:12:40,800 which means that he cannot as Nietzsche, which is regarded as reprehensible as such. 114 00:12:40,800 --> 00:12:49,980 But second, he could not regard punishment as anything more than a stroke of bad luck or the unfortunate consequence of miscalculation. 115 00:12:49,980 --> 00:12:55,000 This is No. Number five on your hands. 116 00:12:55,000 --> 00:13:05,400 And which recently part of it for millennia. Wrong with the words overtaken by punishment have felt something has gone unexpectedly wrong here. 117 00:13:05,400 --> 00:13:12,970 Not I hope not to have done that. They submitted to punishment as you submit to illness or misfortune or death. 118 00:13:12,970 --> 00:13:18,480 If in those days there was any criticism of the deed, it came from intelligence. 119 00:13:18,480 --> 00:13:26,380 We must certainly see the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in the lengthening of the memory. 120 00:13:26,380 --> 00:13:33,630 We need to be more cautious, less trusting to go about things more circumspectly. 121 00:13:33,630 --> 00:13:41,340 So the crucial implication of this view is that GILD's kind of consists of a fear of punishment for the effect of punishment. 122 00:13:41,340 --> 00:13:45,330 Kellert A Rawl's the feeling of guilt in those who do not already regard what they did is 123 00:13:45,330 --> 00:13:52,080 wrong and can only make them more cautious and circumspect in continuing to do what they did. 124 00:13:52,080 --> 00:13:56,940 Then the prospect of punishment will not arouse guilt feelings either, 125 00:13:56,940 --> 00:14:05,610 and will amount to nothing more than the apprehension of the unpleasant consequences of further imprudence or miscalculation. 126 00:14:05,610 --> 00:14:10,440 The one way Gabriel discovered trust is to point out that if a delinquent debtor 127 00:14:10,440 --> 00:14:14,490 came to believe that he has gotten away with it and will escape punishment, 128 00:14:14,490 --> 00:14:17,100 no pangs of conscience would remain. 129 00:14:17,100 --> 00:14:25,230 By contrast, if he felt guilty, the conviction that he would escape punishment for his wrongdoing would not make him feel any less guilt. 130 00:14:25,230 --> 00:14:34,280 And so guilt cannot be the fear of punishment. So not a bad conscience. 131 00:14:34,280 --> 00:14:37,490 No change lives. They were going to bad conscience in the following terms. 132 00:14:37,490 --> 00:14:42,050 Not great read, but two fairly long passages because they are very important. 133 00:14:42,050 --> 00:14:46,460 The first is this. I wrote on bad conscience as a serious illness. 134 00:14:46,460 --> 00:14:53,960 Which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of over changes which he experienced 135 00:14:53,960 --> 00:15:01,010 that change whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace? 136 00:15:01,010 --> 00:15:05,120 It must have been no different for this Semite anymore. 137 00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:09,140 Happy the other day to the wilderness war. The wandering life. 138 00:15:09,140 --> 00:15:17,900 An adventure. It was for to see animals where they were when they were forced to either be could become land animals or perish. 139 00:15:17,900 --> 00:15:23,330 At one go, all instincts become devalued and suspended. 140 00:15:23,330 --> 00:15:27,500 They felt they were clumsy and performing the simplest task. 141 00:15:27,500 --> 00:15:36,920 They did not. They have their familiar guide anymore. For this new unknown world, those regulating impulses which unconsciously led them to safety. 142 00:15:36,920 --> 00:15:41,970 The poor things were reduced to relying thinking in Ferentz. 143 00:15:41,970 --> 00:15:44,770 And the connecting, of course, these effects, 144 00:15:44,770 --> 00:15:52,910 though it's very important to notice right away that Nietzsche's conception of the state of nature prior to socialisation 145 00:15:52,910 --> 00:16:02,270 is not as it is for from the helpless and dreadful state of individuals ill-suited for solitary life in nature. 146 00:16:02,270 --> 00:16:08,840 Nietzsche is pretty socially individual. By contrast, is happily adapted to the wilderness. 147 00:16:08,840 --> 00:16:16,810 Nietzsche, therefore, assumes that it must have taken an act of violence to tear him away from his happily adopted state. 148 00:16:16,810 --> 00:16:21,890 And he attributes this initial act of violence to a small group of strong individuals, 149 00:16:21,890 --> 00:16:25,510 some pack of blonde beasts of free, a conqueror and master race. 150 00:16:25,510 --> 00:16:33,890 As you could see, who are bent on exercising their way too far in the court shaping of a population which had up till now been 151 00:16:33,890 --> 00:16:42,840 unrestrained and shapeless into a fixed form no matter what they choose most interested in here is one party. 152 00:16:42,840 --> 00:16:51,470 The effect of this force socialisation, namely a change can individual in the individual's relationship to his instincts. 153 00:16:51,470 --> 00:16:58,940 As he puts it, at one level, all its things become of where devaluated and suspended. 154 00:16:58,940 --> 00:17:05,330 Not a very INSTINCT'S or regular regulating impulses which were once reliable guides to safety 155 00:17:05,330 --> 00:17:13,490 become the new social conditions of existence and come to be seen as dangerous mobility's. 156 00:17:13,490 --> 00:17:21,230 I can no longer trust that the pursuit of an impulse I feel in a given circumstance will be in my best interest, 157 00:17:21,230 --> 00:17:25,150 and I must instead rely on thinking in Ference calculation. 158 00:17:25,150 --> 00:17:32,120 And the connecting, of course, was effect. Now, this first problem followed by schools, by socialisation, 159 00:17:32,120 --> 00:17:39,830 that the oldest things could no longer be trusted is compounded by another which Nietzsche describes as follows. 160 00:17:39,830 --> 00:17:42,310 This is number seven. 161 00:17:42,310 --> 00:17:53,120 Meanwhile, says the all these things have not suddenly ceased to make their demands, but it was difficult and sell them impossible to give in to them. 162 00:17:53,120 --> 00:18:02,840 They mainly had to seek new. And as it were, underground gratifications Oden's things, which are not discharged, ultimately turn inwards. 163 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:12,530 This is what I call the internalisation of man. All those instincts of the wild free woofing man would turn Backwords against man himself. 164 00:18:12,530 --> 00:18:21,350 Animosity, cruelty to pleasure of pursuing rating, changing and destroying all this pitted against a person who had such instincts. 165 00:18:21,350 --> 00:18:31,970 That is the origin of bad conscience. So the origin of bad conscience lies in what Nietzsche calls the internalisation of man. 166 00:18:31,970 --> 00:18:40,070 I've already noted one aspect of this process of improvisation the emergence of what Nietzsche calls these really dismal thing called reflection, 167 00:18:40,070 --> 00:18:49,520 by which the old instincts become objects of reflective awareness. So you can imagine that a picture goes like this prior to forced socialisation. 168 00:18:49,520 --> 00:18:54,140 The individual's point of view is directed outward is instinct's frame. 169 00:18:54,140 --> 00:19:00,860 This point of view, but not its focus, since he's happy to adapt it to life in the wilderness. 170 00:19:00,860 --> 00:19:05,150 He never has to reflect on that old question, those instincts. 171 00:19:05,150 --> 00:19:11,490 And when they are frustrated as they are bound to be from time to time, he is wrong to think that the problem is, 172 00:19:11,490 --> 00:19:20,390 was the world always his calculations about not with those instincts themselves under conditions of force authorisation. 173 00:19:20,390 --> 00:19:29,400 By contrast, the frustration of the old instincts become systematic, and this forms a reorientation of the individual's point of view, which is not. 174 00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:36,090 Directed inward, he's old things become objects of reflective awareness and criticisms. 175 00:19:36,090 --> 00:19:40,890 After all, they would be appropriate not to be trusted anymore. 176 00:19:40,890 --> 00:19:48,420 They seems to shave the point of view from which he thinks about and evaluates the world and becomes object and become objects to, 177 00:19:48,420 --> 00:19:53,100 which is thought and evaluation are directed. Now, 178 00:19:53,100 --> 00:19:59,550 the remarkable effect which captures the chief's attention is that this internalisation of man does not 179 00:19:59,550 --> 00:20:06,060 simply consist of such a reflective reorientation of his point of view toward the inner world of existence. 180 00:20:06,060 --> 00:20:14,280 It also involves what she calls a declaration of war against the old its things or devaluation of them. 181 00:20:14,280 --> 00:20:20,880 So it's no doubt true that given Nietzsche's superstition of an original state of happy adaptation, 182 00:20:20,880 --> 00:20:28,070 the individual could only be induced to reflect on his instincts when they become problems or liabilities as they are. 183 00:20:28,070 --> 00:20:34,900 Of course, in conditions in which they're pursued has become a source of systematic torment and frustration. 184 00:20:34,900 --> 00:20:44,110 But it remains to be seen why their frustration actually problems, a condemnation of these old INS things themselves. 185 00:20:44,110 --> 00:20:49,660 Robert, adopt a new external conditions that make their satisfaction impossible. 186 00:20:49,660 --> 00:20:53,590 And the explanation of this remarkable fact, according to the chief, is that, 187 00:20:53,590 --> 00:20:58,030 quote, the all these things have not suddenly ceased to make their demands, 188 00:20:58,030 --> 00:21:04,690 but since they can no longer be discharged outwardly, they turn inwards off against themselves. 189 00:21:04,690 --> 00:21:10,990 Not since, as I noted, Nietzsche singles old cruelty as a party money instance of the instinct for freedom. 190 00:21:10,990 --> 00:21:15,660 He describes bad conscience as, quote, cruelty turns against itself, 191 00:21:15,660 --> 00:21:21,700 though it's true that Nietzsche sometimes describes bad conscience as, quote, the individual directed against himself. 192 00:21:21,700 --> 00:21:26,890 But the means against himself in so far as he harbours cruel impulses. 193 00:21:26,890 --> 00:21:35,170 So in other words, bad conscience is not any kind of instinctual deprivation, but only but not talk of the instincts of freedom. 194 00:21:35,170 --> 00:21:44,380 So this is a quote. This is the next book of eight. He makes it to the instant of freedom, forcibly made latent the instinct of freedom, forced back, 195 00:21:44,380 --> 00:21:51,790 repressed, incarcerating within itself and finally able to discharge an Ilija itself only against itself. 196 00:21:51,790 --> 00:21:57,310 That and that alone is bad conscience in its beginnings. 197 00:21:57,310 --> 00:22:04,560 No need to suggest two ways of explaining why the instinct of freedom can discharge itself only against itself in this matter. 198 00:22:04,560 --> 00:22:12,340 First, since the conditions of forced socialisation, the instinct needs Borst to be suppressed and to be discharged. 199 00:22:12,340 --> 00:22:18,790 It makes good economic sense to borrow a floating phrase, to make its own suppression on occasion for discharge. 200 00:22:18,790 --> 00:22:23,830 Second, Nichi also suggests that under conditions of forced socialisation, 201 00:22:23,830 --> 00:22:28,300 the indiscriminate suppression of by the individuals of any or all of its its 202 00:22:28,300 --> 00:22:33,400 things could well threaten the coherence and survival of the social organisation. 203 00:22:33,400 --> 00:22:43,020 And is therefore actively inhibited. I mean, you need some instinctual modification or you need some instincts to operate well to make life. 204 00:22:43,020 --> 00:22:47,230 So Sargents no bad conscience. 205 00:22:47,230 --> 00:22:49,900 It's obviously an unpleasant feeling. 206 00:22:49,900 --> 00:22:57,640 Nietzsche notes that we speak of the Panopto to stinkweed of conscience and the individual with a bad conscience feels bad. 207 00:22:57,640 --> 00:23:06,010 Not because he's all these things are not denied satisfaction. He feels bad for having them in the first place. 208 00:23:06,010 --> 00:23:11,980 But if you think about it, one can feel bad for having certain instincts in all sorts of ways. 209 00:23:11,980 --> 00:23:19,000 Let me give you some examples. The individual forced into suspecting might regret having cool instincts, 210 00:23:19,000 --> 00:23:25,240 which by now being denied satisfaction, have become a source of perpetual torment. 211 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:31,590 Or the individual who subscribe to showboater is conception of happiness in terms of peace and contentment. 212 00:23:31,590 --> 00:23:36,790 We'll deplore his Claudine's things because he deplores having any instincts at all, 213 00:23:36,790 --> 00:23:41,320 since their presence proves to be the main obstacle to his happiness. 214 00:23:41,320 --> 00:23:50,020 He feels bad about having them much in the way the prisoner who aspires to freedom feels bad of all these shackles. 215 00:23:50,020 --> 00:23:58,420 Finally, the Christian deplores his court instance because it believes that having them diminishes his worth as a person. 216 00:23:58,420 --> 00:24:05,860 He feels bad about having them in the way the sinner feels bad about his sinful proclivities. 217 00:24:05,860 --> 00:24:10,960 Clearly, the devaluation of INSTINCT'S in the first two cases is going to be prudential. 218 00:24:10,960 --> 00:24:14,770 Cruellest things make one unable to achieve happiness, 219 00:24:14,770 --> 00:24:23,220 whereas in the last case it is more Cronin's things make one deserving of happiness, not the individuals. 220 00:24:23,220 --> 00:24:23,870 More regrets. 221 00:24:23,870 --> 00:24:33,460 What he brought his instincts on prudential roles by recognising them obstacles to his happiness is not motivated by self directed cruelty. 222 00:24:33,460 --> 00:24:37,960 His purpose in condemning his instincts is not to make himself suffer. 223 00:24:37,960 --> 00:24:45,760 No, it is true that like the shopworn Orien ascetic you might deliberately and systematically deny is insisting satisfaction. 224 00:24:45,760 --> 00:24:53,560 But it is to the end of liberating himself from them. By becoming indifferent to the suffering caused by their frustration. 225 00:24:53,560 --> 00:25:03,190 In this case, you will see the war in wages against his instincts, not as only a means to his eventual liberation. 226 00:25:03,190 --> 00:25:08,740 When the Wardi individual wages against his instincts is motivated by self directed cruelty. 227 00:25:08,740 --> 00:25:13,720 By contrast, it becomes a land. He denies a16 satisfaction. 228 00:25:13,720 --> 00:25:18,460 Not in order to liberate himself from them, but in order to enjoy the very suffering, 229 00:25:18,460 --> 00:25:27,730 their frustration causes which might incidentally and perversely enough, require him to keep them alive. 230 00:25:27,730 --> 00:25:34,200 No. Still, there remains a difference between the deliberate, masochistic frustration of one's. 231 00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:43,760 Poses what Nietzsche calls anymore bad conscience and the combination of those impulses as evil, which makes one feel guilty for having them, 232 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:52,280 or more bad conscience changing the direction of cruelty, turning it in words does not necessarily think the for profit. 233 00:25:52,280 --> 00:25:54,570 More condemnation of it. 234 00:25:54,570 --> 00:26:03,640 So although the feeling of guilt may well be a form of bad conscience, it is self directed cruelty manifested as more self reproach. 235 00:26:03,640 --> 00:26:10,940 And that is as a man of conscience has not yet supplied. But nobody's Gil. 236 00:26:10,940 --> 00:26:17,070 OK, so now let's turn to the phenomenon which she calls the body's ization of indebtedness, 237 00:26:17,070 --> 00:26:25,250 but she acknowledges that his enquiries into indebtedness and contractual obligation have so far ignored the modernisation of these concepts. 238 00:26:25,250 --> 00:26:27,590 It's not a question. 239 00:26:27,590 --> 00:26:36,510 And this is an important question on which commentators are deeply divided, concerns the nature of this, quote unquote, modernisation. 240 00:26:36,510 --> 00:26:41,070 This is where I'm going to take a stab that. 241 00:26:41,070 --> 00:26:43,160 There are two ways of looking at it. 242 00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:54,350 Is it on the one hand, the process whereby the nonwar concepts of indebtedness and contractual obligation become the moral concept of guilt acute? 243 00:26:54,350 --> 00:26:59,780 Or is it a different process whereby the concepts of guilt and obligation already 244 00:26:59,780 --> 00:27:05,720 understood in a generic more science are enrolled in the service of the aims of morality? 245 00:27:05,720 --> 00:27:15,540 Understood. Now, in a specific sense, namely, yes, slave auditing or as what Brian libraries called quantity into pejorative sense. 246 00:27:15,540 --> 00:27:17,190 Let's see. 247 00:27:17,190 --> 00:27:27,600 Dick Cheney finds the amortisation of the word Chubin freight, which are ambiguous between dart board and preborn, and then he defines it as port. 248 00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:36,660 This is on your handout. This is an important port. This system, Ranaan, is the way they are pushed back in to conscience, 249 00:27:36,660 --> 00:27:41,840 more precisely the way bad conscience is woven together with the concept of God. 250 00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:49,890 All it is there really nation to bad conscience. There's this definition is less than ideal to clear. 251 00:27:49,890 --> 00:27:56,770 It suggests that demoralised feeling of guilt. Results from the combination of indebtedness with bad conscience. 252 00:27:56,770 --> 00:28:01,870 Or more precisely, of the use of indebtedness as an instrument of self directed cruelty. 253 00:28:01,870 --> 00:28:09,870 And it also suggests that the possibility of a more normalised feeling of guilt requires not just the notion of indebtedness, but of indebtedness. 254 00:28:09,870 --> 00:28:17,910 Scott. I always will consider briefly two contrasting lines of interpretation of dispossession that falls into the church. 255 00:28:17,910 --> 00:28:25,170 The fundamental premise of the first interpretation is that the feeling of indebtedness is not yet a feeling of guilt, 256 00:28:25,170 --> 00:28:30,820 but becomes sold through its association with bad conscience. 257 00:28:30,820 --> 00:28:38,790 Which records are much your speciality? But of course, this is a view that has been defended by others as well, such as Aaron really and others. 258 00:28:38,790 --> 00:28:45,000 So it's not just me supporting, quote, failing to pay one's that's by no means decreases once, 259 00:28:45,000 --> 00:28:51,810 but worth as a person simply because there's no point of view from which one's of all worth as a person is assessed. 260 00:28:51,810 --> 00:28:59,970 The implication of this passage is the feeling of guilt is the feeling of indebtedness when one's worth as a person is at stake in the repayment. 261 00:28:59,970 --> 00:29:08,790 After that, the failure to repay by. That concerns me only because of the unpleasant consequences my delinquency might bring upon me, 262 00:29:08,790 --> 00:29:16,910 and not because it decreases my worth as a person, my failure to fulfil a contractual obligation with a role as a feeling of guilt. 263 00:29:16,910 --> 00:29:21,330 Only if I take this obligation to possess a special character. 264 00:29:21,330 --> 00:29:28,230 It is an obligation in the fulfilment of which my worth as a person is somehow at stake. 265 00:29:28,230 --> 00:29:34,260 And to give it a name, I propose to quoting it categorical obligation in order to distinguish it from the 266 00:29:34,260 --> 00:29:41,280 purely prudential obligation involved in three more contractual relationships. 267 00:29:41,280 --> 00:29:48,090 Nietzsche remarks that when my failure to repay my debt is the consequence of negligence or miscalculation, 268 00:29:48,090 --> 00:29:52,380 I may criticise myself for my impudence on my incompetence. 269 00:29:52,380 --> 00:30:02,610 But feeling incompetent, stupid or small, even if I believe that I have no one to blame for it but myself is not yet feeling guilty. 270 00:30:02,610 --> 00:30:06,210 Only my worth as a competent, professional, capable agent is at stake. 271 00:30:06,210 --> 00:30:10,560 Not my worth as a person for my prudence matters to me. 272 00:30:10,560 --> 00:30:16,020 Only if the determinate and seek enables me to realise matter to me in the first place. 273 00:30:16,020 --> 00:30:23,430 Of course I may under certain circumstances, deplore my opponents, not just because of the unpleasant consequences it brings upon me, 274 00:30:23,430 --> 00:30:27,400 but also because of what it tells us about me as a person in this case. 275 00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:34,250 Moreover, I regard being prudent, if only implicitly, a categorical obligation. 276 00:30:34,250 --> 00:30:39,810 No, it's important to note because there's a lot of confusion needed in its prewar form. 277 00:30:39,810 --> 00:30:48,210 The feeling of indebtedness can already be pushed back into the bad conscience and used as an instruments of self directed cruelty. 278 00:30:48,210 --> 00:30:52,500 So I could imagine that harbouring cruel impulses as I do, 279 00:30:52,500 --> 00:30:59,820 is a breach of contract and torture myself with thoughts of terrific punishments for harbouring them. 280 00:30:59,820 --> 00:31:05,310 But if the feeling of indebtedness produces no diminution in the delinquent debt or self-esteem, 281 00:31:05,310 --> 00:31:12,360 it is hard to see how it could be marshalled to produce more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt. 282 00:31:12,360 --> 00:31:18,420 No Reeser acknowledges this difficulty and goes on to suggest that Christianity proposes 283 00:31:18,420 --> 00:31:23,190 or provides a solution for it by introducing the notion of indebtedness towards God, 284 00:31:23,190 --> 00:31:29,970 which this is, research again turns it into a deep sense of fear, complete failure with respect to what one is. 285 00:31:29,970 --> 00:31:34,540 First and more foremost, they mean God's creature. 286 00:31:34,540 --> 00:31:42,870 No, the problem is this is that is if, as research argues, the feeling of indebtedness itself by no means decreases one's voice as a person. 287 00:31:42,870 --> 00:31:49,020 It's very hard to see Paul making it indebtedness towards God would have this effect. 288 00:31:49,020 --> 00:31:59,370 You think that it does is to affect self-esteem. It must be in virtue of its character as indebtedness, not in virtue of who one is indebted to. 289 00:31:59,370 --> 00:32:05,370 It must be being a delinquent better as such, that decreases what's worth as a person. 290 00:32:05,370 --> 00:32:11,790 But in that case, the feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt and indebtedness towards God. 291 00:32:11,790 --> 00:32:20,320 The only intensified feeling of. There might be ways to improve resource proposals in an attempt to circumvent this difficulty. 292 00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:23,490 So, for instance, you might think that God expects us, 293 00:32:23,490 --> 00:32:28,440 the Christian God expects us not only to follow his commandments, but also to treat them as ethical obligations. 294 00:32:28,440 --> 00:32:38,220 That might be wise. But besides very uncertain prospects of success to required emendations would involve the addition of essential details, 295 00:32:38,220 --> 00:32:45,630 such as what I just mentioned, which neither research nor Nietzsche, for that matter, take the pain to space too far. 296 00:32:45,630 --> 00:32:51,030 So there's difficulty with which this proposal invites an alternative line of interpretation, 297 00:32:51,030 --> 00:32:53,730 according to which the feeling of indebtedness would involve, 298 00:32:53,730 --> 00:33:01,920 prior to its modernisation, a genuine commitment to the categorical authority of the obligation. 299 00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:06,540 Which one has often taken such and such that the failure to discharge these 300 00:33:06,540 --> 00:33:12,930 obligations would cause a decrease in one's worth as a person of this view, 301 00:33:12,930 --> 00:33:18,870 which is proposed by Simon Lee. The feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt. 302 00:33:18,870 --> 00:33:25,890 And I quote me. This is no, I've never heard of the debtor. 303 00:33:25,890 --> 00:33:33,780 Predetermination has successfully modelled scales only because it already contains the latter's key principles issue, 304 00:33:33,780 --> 00:33:43,920 namely of personal accountability, which he specifies as being a strong sense that one's obligations are justified. 305 00:33:43,920 --> 00:33:51,600 I take it Simon may not agree with me on this, but I'm categorically justified this resolution. 306 00:33:51,600 --> 00:33:57,990 The chief advantage of this proposal is that by taking the feeling of indebtedness to involve a decrease in one's worth as a person, 307 00:33:57,990 --> 00:34:07,890 it manages to explain how pushing back indebtedness into bad conscience would produce a distinctively more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt, 308 00:34:07,890 --> 00:34:18,930 more bad conscience, as we call it, self directed cruelty manifested under the guise of more self reproach or recourse of one's self as a person. 309 00:34:18,930 --> 00:34:23,230 Self directed cruelty could assume these guys, by representing an individual, 310 00:34:23,230 --> 00:34:28,680 is continuing to harbour Cronin's things as the violation of a contractual obligation. 311 00:34:28,680 --> 00:34:36,690 Given that such a function of such a violation decreases your first nor the obvious problem we are 312 00:34:36,690 --> 00:34:42,900 left to Bybee's proposal is that if the feeling of indebtedness is already a feeling of guilt, 313 00:34:42,900 --> 00:34:48,660 it becomes unclear what the warren zation of the concepts of and duty could accomplish. 314 00:34:48,660 --> 00:34:56,340 May himself suggest that the amortisation of guilt is called defined by the idea that one's human nature is essentially either dischargeable guilty. 315 00:34:56,340 --> 00:35:00,960 Evans the. No, I think there's a suggestion there and I want to develop. 316 00:35:00,960 --> 00:35:05,370 We may differ on this suggestion by recording first. This is important. 317 00:35:05,370 --> 00:35:13,880 Trade is not always noted that Viji emphasises the fact TWA's that as a consequence of their Mornese ation, 318 00:35:13,880 --> 00:35:20,760 the concepts of guilt and duty become the exclusive property of bad conscience. 319 00:35:20,760 --> 00:35:30,060 This indicates that more eyes, guilt and duty can only evoke a diminished self-esteem in the age of the experiences. 320 00:35:30,060 --> 00:35:34,920 And of course, it's easy to see how the association of bad conscience because the concept of God, 321 00:35:34,920 --> 00:35:39,410 particularly the notion of indebtedness towards God, could achieve this. 322 00:35:39,410 --> 00:35:41,630 The notion of indebtedness towards God is, in effect, 323 00:35:41,630 --> 00:35:48,960 the notion of an inexcusable guilt and the contractual obligation that cannot be fulfilled there before represents a normative standard, 324 00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:57,820 but duty that is designed only to leave men could power property conference of his own absolute unworthiness. 325 00:35:57,820 --> 00:36:05,660 So let me know. Develop this interpretation of democratisation, of gift. According to the interpretation I'm proposing. 326 00:36:05,660 --> 00:36:11,410 You need change takes the Christian representation of guilt to be not a party killer, 327 00:36:11,410 --> 00:36:18,570 a cold of the ordinary feeling of guilt, but a perversion of the human susceptibility to that feeling. 328 00:36:18,570 --> 00:36:23,190 This, in turn, supposes that he has a coat of this ordinary feeling of guilt. 329 00:36:23,190 --> 00:36:27,720 And I believe that he does and that the so-called differs in significant respects 330 00:36:27,720 --> 00:36:31,990 from vehicle that is officially sanctioned by the Christian outlook in particular, 331 00:36:31,990 --> 00:36:37,200 which Nietzsche argues that the ordinary feeling of guilt is not an innate disposition, 332 00:36:37,200 --> 00:36:41,840 whose explanation requires the invocation of non-natural entities such as God. 333 00:36:41,840 --> 00:36:50,890 It is, on the contrary, an acquired disposition which they've robs under the causal pressure of Rajani natural forces. 334 00:36:50,890 --> 00:36:52,640 He's on a comet. This is important. 335 00:36:52,640 --> 00:37:01,460 Begins with the surmise that the susceptibility to the feeling of guilt emerges from the original legal practise of making contrast contracts. 336 00:37:01,460 --> 00:37:10,130 This is number twelve in this sphere of legal obligations that we find a breeding ground of the more conceptual world of guilt, 337 00:37:10,130 --> 00:37:13,700 conscience, duty, sacred duty. 338 00:37:13,700 --> 00:37:20,730 Since NUJ insists that the origin or feeding of indebtedness is not tantamount to the feeding of guilt, we must ask Hald or not. 339 00:37:20,730 --> 00:37:25,050 It could emerge from the of the ways in which he understands it. 340 00:37:25,050 --> 00:37:28,460 Freedom is being indebted in a way that decreases once more. 341 00:37:28,460 --> 00:37:35,300 Is this a person? What requires explanation is therefore what one's worse as a person amounts to and how it 342 00:37:35,300 --> 00:37:40,960 could have come to be at stake in the forefront of one's contract contractual obligations. 343 00:37:40,960 --> 00:37:44,000 Well, the need for contractual relationships motivates the enterprise. 344 00:37:44,000 --> 00:37:49,970 As you might recall, of reading on Unevolved was the right to make promises, always a conscience. 345 00:37:49,970 --> 00:37:58,850 And this, which observes. This is a quote, is precisely what constitutes the long history of the origins of responsibility. 346 00:37:58,850 --> 00:38:06,400 So the position of the commission of a conscience, according to Nietzsche, is what makes me a responsible agent. 347 00:38:06,400 --> 00:38:11,070 Now it is crucial to understand what Nietzsche means. 348 00:38:11,070 --> 00:38:21,170 My responsibility is complex. Calling someone responsible might first denote the fact that he is free and as the chief would say, 349 00:38:21,170 --> 00:38:26,090 could have done otherwise so that his action is computable to him rather than 350 00:38:26,090 --> 00:38:31,430 merely to some part of him or to some even told to get her external trade. 351 00:38:31,430 --> 00:38:40,550 But in the second place, holding someone responsible might also refer to the fact that he can be trusted or relied upon, 352 00:38:40,550 --> 00:38:48,460 that he's someone who truly has the right to make promises because his word, once given is good and secure. 353 00:38:48,460 --> 00:38:54,800 No need change. He's interested primarily in the second sense of responsibility. 354 00:38:54,800 --> 00:38:58,860 A responsible agent is one who can be trusted or relied upon. 355 00:38:58,860 --> 00:39:04,730 He calls the individual who has become fully responsible in this sense, the sovereign individual. 356 00:39:04,730 --> 00:39:12,950 So I go back to the early part of the essay because it provides a clue to this is a common feeling of guilt. 357 00:39:12,950 --> 00:39:16,700 We get into a more precise understanding of the character of the sovereign individual. 358 00:39:16,700 --> 00:39:21,890 By examining the process through which he's produced, Nietzsche came claims that conscience, 359 00:39:21,890 --> 00:39:29,110 all the windows to memory is spread through pain, which he does the most powerful eight mnemonics. 360 00:39:29,110 --> 00:39:37,850 It is the prospect of the pain incurred for breaking one's promises, but ensures the perpetuation of the motivation to keep them. 361 00:39:37,850 --> 00:39:47,590 However, it is crucial to note that the fear of band plays a memory and they really roll into development of conscience, 362 00:39:47,590 --> 00:39:57,550 but is not constitutive for the fear of pain, which initially motivates the individual to control doors. 363 00:39:57,550 --> 00:40:02,390 A morgue is intervening desires and emotions that conflict with his promise keeping 364 00:40:02,390 --> 00:40:08,330 can eventually become replaced by one Beecher describes as a feeling of power, 365 00:40:08,330 --> 00:40:15,710 of freedom. The frustration of conflicting intervening desire is another to fulfil the promise is, of course, 366 00:40:15,710 --> 00:40:21,740 itself a source of pain and the individual who learns to overcome disspain in this manner. 367 00:40:21,740 --> 00:40:28,280 That is to say, courage to overcome the resistance that is opposed by those conflicting desires comes to derive from pain, 368 00:40:28,280 --> 00:40:33,200 come to derive a feeling of power and freedom from this overcoming. 369 00:40:33,200 --> 00:40:38,330 It is at the end of this process when the feeling of freedom in part has replaced the feel 370 00:40:38,330 --> 00:40:44,940 of pain as the motivation for from escaping that we find a separate individual quote. 371 00:40:44,940 --> 00:40:52,190 Then the 13 read-only part of the Freeman deposits out of a durable unbreakable will, 372 00:40:52,190 --> 00:40:58,010 thus has his own standard of fighting in the possession of sexual viewing. 373 00:40:58,010 --> 00:41:04,910 Others, from his own standpoint, he respects or despises. He confers an honour when he places his trust, gives his word, 374 00:41:04,910 --> 00:41:14,090 is something which can be relied on because he is strong enough to remain upright in the face of mishap or even in the face of fate. 375 00:41:14,090 --> 00:41:18,950 The proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, 376 00:41:18,950 --> 00:41:29,990 the awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny has penetrated him to the depths and becomes an instinct is dominant. 377 00:41:29,990 --> 00:41:34,830 This suffering man calls it his conscience. 378 00:41:34,830 --> 00:41:42,020 So the conscience of the sovereign individual is not, quote, an actual awareness of power and freedom. 379 00:41:42,020 --> 00:41:47,930 The driving force, in other words, behind the conscience of the sovereign individual is not the feel of pain, 380 00:41:47,930 --> 00:41:55,370 but the enjoyment of the feeling of power. Well, nature doesn't explain why an angel becomes responsible. 381 00:41:55,370 --> 00:42:01,340 Only when the feeding of part is substituted for the few of pain in motivating its promiscuity. 382 00:42:01,340 --> 00:42:07,700 But we me, my Lofoten following survives. No, first of all, that we don't call responsible. 383 00:42:07,700 --> 00:42:12,350 Anyone who we can depend to do what he has promised to do. 384 00:42:12,350 --> 00:42:13,400 For instance, 385 00:42:13,400 --> 00:42:23,540 we will not just judge trustworthy or responsible an agent who keeps his promises only because he fears the unpleasant consequences of breaking them. 386 00:42:23,540 --> 00:42:29,090 And one possible motivation for attitude is in disguise is the recognition that 387 00:42:29,090 --> 00:42:35,030 the Ajram does not care about keeping his promises as such and would break them. 388 00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:40,610 The moment the unpleasant consequences of Suhui would be either avoidable or all 389 00:42:40,610 --> 00:42:50,150 outweighed by the pleasures for the sake of which he would break his promises. This suggests that we consider an agent trustworthy or responsible. 390 00:42:50,150 --> 00:42:54,080 Only if he finds some positive satisfaction in promise, 391 00:42:54,080 --> 00:43:00,340 keeping as such an agent who derives the feeding of part of freedom from his promise 392 00:43:00,340 --> 00:43:06,800 keeping thereby find some positive satisfactory it gratifies is Winter Park. 393 00:43:06,800 --> 00:43:11,060 But of course, the pleasure derived from satisfying the root bar could conceivably still be 394 00:43:11,060 --> 00:43:16,040 outweighed by the pleasure afforded by the gratification of other stronger impulses. 395 00:43:16,040 --> 00:43:21,260 Soloveitchik concludes that we consider truly responsible recall subframe only 396 00:43:21,260 --> 00:43:25,520 the individual in whom the instinct for freedom the winterbourne has become, 397 00:43:25,520 --> 00:43:34,990 as he puts it, the dominant instead. No, this is a move that is unmotivated for the cheap but very important to come. 398 00:43:34,990 --> 00:43:37,790 Nietzsche goes must take significant step further. 399 00:43:37,790 --> 00:43:48,350 Probably keeping and the self mastery it requires is a source not only of pleasure, but also as if it's a problem of self-esteem. 400 00:43:48,350 --> 00:43:53,290 The possession of a durable, reliable RIL is for the sovereign individual, 401 00:43:53,290 --> 00:44:01,220 a standard of thought in terms of which determines what is respectable, honourable or contemptible. 402 00:44:01,220 --> 00:44:08,280 Being responsible, being responsible is therefore not just a pleasant state in which is desirable or is ready for 403 00:44:08,280 --> 00:44:15,260 it is a standard or status in which the body davonte with former of freedom is instantiated. 404 00:44:15,260 --> 00:44:21,320 Being responsible makes him honourable and worthy of respect. 405 00:44:21,320 --> 00:44:25,970 The notion of responsibility, palsied reframes not the concept of personal macoutes. 406 00:44:25,970 --> 00:44:32,360 As a standing that warrants respect, Nietzsche appears to suppose that it is so enduring legal framework, 407 00:44:32,360 --> 00:44:39,080 which constitutes a conceptual breeding ground for the feeling of guilt and its concept of responsibility. 408 00:44:39,080 --> 00:44:42,740 Understood as the ability to govern one's behaviour in accordance with obligations 409 00:44:42,740 --> 00:44:47,810 or commitments bears a close resemblance to the notion of rationality, 410 00:44:47,810 --> 00:44:52,830 which has long been thought to distinguish human beings from animals and indeed say, 411 00:44:52,830 --> 00:44:59,750 as Nietzsche constitutes man's sense of superiority over the animals, not on the view and attributed to Nietzsche, 412 00:44:59,750 --> 00:45:09,420 that one is right to make promises becomes, quote, the proud realisation of if a privilege or evidence of state or so splendid the breaking. 413 00:45:09,420 --> 00:45:16,790 I promise will in and of itself decrease once forces are first person in the way that's characteristic of ordinary guilt, 414 00:45:16,790 --> 00:45:23,070 since it puts the individual standing as a responsible agent into question. 415 00:45:23,070 --> 00:45:29,720 No. There's one feature of the ordinary conception of guilt that I think this particular called illuminates, 416 00:45:29,720 --> 00:45:35,790 and it's a feature that intrigues Nietzsche greatly himself. And it's the connexion between guilt and punishment. 417 00:45:35,790 --> 00:45:37,210 So according to the chain, 418 00:45:37,210 --> 00:45:44,810 the legal backdrop of contractual relationships is also supposed to illuminate the connexion between guilt and punishment suffered. 419 00:45:44,810 --> 00:45:51,440 And this is the 14th in the same way it was here that the uncanny and perhaps 420 00:45:51,440 --> 00:45:56,410 inextricable link between the ideas of guilt and suffering his first getting together, 421 00:45:56,410 --> 00:45:59,780 no doubt to a possible question to be, you may ask why, you may ask one. 422 00:45:59,780 --> 00:46:04,190 What hall does the victim overall experience the punishment of the perpetrator? 423 00:46:04,190 --> 00:46:08,750 Well, you may ask Paul, does forgiveness his punishment? We'll see some interesting psychology of guilt. 424 00:46:08,750 --> 00:46:16,010 I'm going to focus on the old amount of question. No. What's what's characteristic of the guilty is relationship to his punishment. 425 00:46:16,010 --> 00:46:26,830 Well, first of all, the guilty not only accepts his punishment, but she regards as deserved, but he also welcomes it as a way of expiated his gift. 426 00:46:26,830 --> 00:46:35,600 No, it is very tempting to support, of course, that punishment experience his guilt by providing reparation for his wrongdoing. 427 00:46:35,600 --> 00:46:41,390 But disregarding view of punishment faces some significant difficulties in the first place. 428 00:46:41,390 --> 00:46:44,810 And this is something that Nietzsche observes himself. 429 00:46:44,810 --> 00:46:51,500 Punishment is often of such a nature, various kinds of suffering, deprivation inflicted upon the perpetrator. 430 00:46:51,500 --> 00:46:56,300 But it can hardly constitute a reparation for the harm done huggin depriving 431 00:46:56,300 --> 00:47:00,920 the thief of his freedom compensate his victims for the loss of their wealth. 432 00:47:00,920 --> 00:47:08,930 You ask people who invested was Bernard Madoff, who confronted with this programme, which suggests, as we know, 433 00:47:08,930 --> 00:47:12,860 that the suffering of the guilty provides the victim of his own doing a certain pleasure, 434 00:47:12,860 --> 00:47:17,930 the pleasure of cruelty, which compensates him for them for the wrong done to him. 435 00:47:17,930 --> 00:47:20,630 But the deeper difficulty is the report, if you will. 436 00:47:20,630 --> 00:47:28,180 Punishment, however, lies in the supposing show that the guilty welcomes his punishment because he wishes to, 437 00:47:28,180 --> 00:47:33,810 before all, to repair the particle damage caused by his wrongdoing. 438 00:47:33,810 --> 00:47:38,190 But this is Gabriele Taylor. His argument is not the case. 439 00:47:38,190 --> 00:47:48,350 This is a court for 50. The important feature of guilt is the thought of the guilty concentrates on herself as the door of the deed, 440 00:47:48,350 --> 00:47:55,460 having brought about what is 4B to whom she has harmed herself. She has put herself in a position where repayment from her is due. 441 00:47:55,460 --> 00:47:58,910 But the part of the payment is not always only. 442 00:47:58,910 --> 00:48:04,900 Incidently, that the more wrong should be right. This is this. 443 00:48:04,900 --> 00:48:09,320 The writing for overall wrong may want to be the form that the repayment takes. 444 00:48:09,320 --> 00:48:16,760 But from the point of view of the guilty person, this is only a means towards the end that she should be rid of the burden, 445 00:48:16,760 --> 00:48:20,470 that she should be able again to live with herself. 446 00:48:20,470 --> 00:48:25,250 The painfulness of the guilt feelings is therefore explained by the uneasiness of the person concerned. 447 00:48:25,250 --> 00:48:31,730 The person looks and feels herself. What matters to the guilty, in other words, is the fact that by violating the obligations, 448 00:48:31,730 --> 00:48:36,950 she has diminished her standing or worse as a person and not primarily these. 449 00:48:36,950 --> 00:48:44,360 The fact that she has caused harm in doing so. Accordingly, the port of undergoing punishment is to restore her that much spending, 450 00:48:44,360 --> 00:48:51,440 not to repair the harm she has caused, even if the punishment provides such liberation as apparently from the jail. 451 00:48:51,440 --> 00:48:58,100 Nearly two years ago, I think, helps us to see if a punishment could have assumed this peculiar significance for the guilty. 452 00:48:58,100 --> 00:49:03,680 In, as you remember, the feeling of guilt is a consequence of the breaking of a promise. 453 00:49:03,680 --> 00:49:11,960 Knowing observes that even in the pre-war legal contractual framework under which the concept of guilt is supposed to emerge. 454 00:49:11,960 --> 00:49:16,190 The breaking of a promise is already wrong in two different respects. 455 00:49:16,190 --> 00:49:21,890 There is what he calls the immediate damage done by the agents breaking off some part of good promise. 456 00:49:21,890 --> 00:49:27,500 And then there is the loss of his standing as a responsible agent who has the right to make promises. 457 00:49:27,500 --> 00:49:37,550 This is part of the food number, 60 year sentence, and living on the image of damage done by the offender is what we are talking of off lease. 458 00:49:37,550 --> 00:49:41,660 Quite apart from this, the law breaker is a breaker. 459 00:49:41,660 --> 00:49:46,200 Somebody who has broken his contract and his work. 460 00:49:46,200 --> 00:49:52,490 So in this free, more contractual context, Neches suggests the stunning loss is simply that of a trustworthy, 461 00:49:52,490 --> 00:49:58,090 reliable promise keeper, which presumably matters to the agent of essentially prudential rights. 462 00:49:58,090 --> 00:50:05,840 In losing constantly, he deprives himself of the benefits of contractual relationships, particularly doors that bind him to a community. 463 00:50:05,840 --> 00:50:09,290 The purpose of punishment as this case is not simply to repair. 464 00:50:09,290 --> 00:50:16,550 The immediate damage he has done, but to attempt to restore his status as a reliable from his keep. 465 00:50:16,550 --> 00:50:20,420 Likewise, in the context of moralised indebtedness, 466 00:50:20,420 --> 00:50:27,230 the wrongdoers violation of his obligation affects his self-esteem by putting his worth as a person into question. 467 00:50:27,230 --> 00:50:33,980 What he won comes from punishment is not the opportunity to repair the immediate damage his transgression has caused, 468 00:50:33,980 --> 00:50:41,870 but an opportunity to restore his standing as a responsible agent. That is to say, not just somebody who is reliable and trustworthy, 469 00:50:41,870 --> 00:50:48,470 contract partner with the ice holders, but are somebody who is a sovereign individual, 470 00:50:48,470 --> 00:50:56,000 one who maskers his desires and emotions and is so able to conduct his life in accordance with the commitments he has undertaken. 471 00:50:56,000 --> 00:51:03,020 So to restore his standing, the promise breaker would have first to accept punishment or regarded as deserved. 472 00:51:03,020 --> 00:51:08,660 Such acceptance would indicate that he recognises the normatively binding character of his contractual obligations. 473 00:51:08,660 --> 00:51:17,690 But he chicos the solemn duty and sanctity of this promise. Did indeed acknowledge also that he was wrong and violated. 474 00:51:17,690 --> 00:51:23,220 But this all, of course, doesn't suffice to quantify him as a responsible agent who has the right to be. 475 00:51:23,220 --> 00:51:28,820 Promises to have this right. He must also have acquired a memory of the world. 476 00:51:28,820 --> 00:51:36,950 That is to say, the ability to maintain his motivation, to fulfil his promises, regardless of intervening, even some desires. 477 00:51:36,950 --> 00:51:41,600 In other words, the merit to merit to the standing of a responsible agent. 478 00:51:41,600 --> 00:51:47,990 He must not only sincerely believe that he ought to keep his promises, he must also prove capable of doing so. 479 00:51:47,990 --> 00:51:53,840 His ability to endure the punishment would aim to provide precisely such a proof. 480 00:51:53,840 --> 00:52:02,900 Keeping one's promises requires the capacity to withstand the suffering caused by the deliberate frustration of conflicting desires and emotions. 481 00:52:02,900 --> 00:52:09,890 By welcoming and withstanding this punishment, the wrongdoer would seek to demonstrate that he still possesses this capacity. 482 00:52:09,890 --> 00:52:15,770 Contrary to what is present, wrongdoing may suggest this may also be war. 483 00:52:15,770 --> 00:52:24,830 It is not untypical of the wrongdoer who seeks to restore his responsible striving to find merit compensation for the party got it wrong. 484 00:52:24,830 --> 00:52:30,500 He has done insufficient and to insist on overcompensation what might look like 485 00:52:30,500 --> 00:52:36,860 excessive punishment in order to provide a firmer proof of his responsibility. 486 00:52:36,860 --> 00:52:43,370 So it's not always the case. So let me conclude. 487 00:52:43,370 --> 00:52:49,610 Let me come to this view to which I need it to be that to give Christian guilt for change. 488 00:52:49,610 --> 00:52:54,790 In fact, this is a rational, rational. 489 00:52:54,790 --> 00:52:59,740 Indeed, your prediction of proposing here, geneology conditions, fields of Christian guilt exposes it as a rational, 490 00:52:59,740 --> 00:53:08,260 partially rational passions are passions to which only a rational being is susceptible because they essentially exploit his 491 00:53:08,260 --> 00:53:18,610 responsiveness to reasons like and I like any other passion over rational portions of themselves responsive to such reasons. 492 00:53:18,610 --> 00:53:20,800 But this is important. 493 00:53:20,800 --> 00:53:29,920 It is a distinctive trait of rational passions that their gratification requires at least the appearance of reason responsiveness. 494 00:53:29,920 --> 00:53:37,380 It follows that, whereas ordinary passions typically would only override or bypass reason that will do. 495 00:53:37,380 --> 00:53:41,610 McNall pretends to be responsive to reason rational abortions. 496 00:53:41,610 --> 00:53:49,000 Who needs this will often end up corrupting responsiveness, which we give you the example, 497 00:53:49,000 --> 00:53:53,980 the example of the quite the narcissistic passion for thinking. 498 00:53:53,980 --> 00:53:59,340 Well, this is an instance of irrational passion to be susceptible to such a passion, 499 00:53:59,340 --> 00:54:04,990 to narcissism, to be responsive to norms and to serve self-assessment of her. 500 00:54:04,990 --> 00:54:15,510 But in order to ensure its own gratification, his passion might also lead him to correct these norms so as to ensure a favourable self-assessment. 501 00:54:15,510 --> 00:54:18,700 But what I want to suggest is that the Christian skilled. 502 00:54:18,700 --> 00:54:25,730 Another instance of irrational passions, which is the passion for thinking ill of oneself, all as the chief would say, 503 00:54:25,730 --> 00:54:33,940 support the will to find oneself to find find himself guilty and condemned his article of retreat. 504 00:54:33,940 --> 00:54:37,480 Nietzsche argues that Christian guilt operates with normative expectations that 505 00:54:37,480 --> 00:54:43,180 have been distorted by his passion for self debasement as he conceives of it, 506 00:54:43,180 --> 00:54:48,020 guilt, Christian guilt, his indebtedness towards God, which is the most extreme development of a party, 507 00:54:48,020 --> 00:54:56,110 a form of indebtedness or indebtedness to the ancestors. The individual is justified in feeling it that it only if he believes that God, 508 00:54:56,110 --> 00:55:01,500 the ancestors, has in fact deliver the goods for the possession of which he feels indebted. 509 00:55:01,500 --> 00:55:08,590 You know, the distinctive feature of Christian guilt is that it is an experience. 510 00:55:08,590 --> 00:55:14,290 It is next feel more because God's gift itself is of such transcendence and holiness 511 00:55:14,290 --> 00:55:22,120 that it cannot be paid off by finite animals are finite animal being such as we are, 512 00:55:22,120 --> 00:55:28,450 as Nietzsche indicates. The problem is not just that that's got be paid off, but that guilt is an experience. 513 00:55:28,450 --> 00:55:37,450 That is to say, it's not just that a Christian cannot compensate God, but if he cannot reclaim his standing as a responsible agent. 514 00:55:37,450 --> 00:55:45,850 Indeed, in so far as he was never able to fulfil his obligations to God, he could never even claim that standing in the first place. 515 00:55:45,850 --> 00:55:54,560 No. Here's the thing. If Christian Gilb was responsive to the normative logic of indebtedness, we would expect a loss in. 516 00:55:54,560 --> 00:55:59,950 And also belief in the existence and power of God to result in a loss of guilt. 517 00:55:59,950 --> 00:56:06,040 As Nietzsche puts it, this is number 18. 518 00:56:06,040 --> 00:56:13,300 We should be justified. And did you think his normal property. That from the unstoppable decline into faith in the Christian God. 519 00:56:13,300 --> 00:56:17,440 There is even not a considerable decline in the consciousness of guilt. 520 00:56:17,440 --> 00:56:21,580 But Nietzsche observes, this is precisely not what happens each year. 521 00:56:21,580 --> 00:56:30,070 The facts diverge from this in a terrible way, with the morning zation, with the concepts, guilt and duty and their relegation to bad conscience. 522 00:56:30,070 --> 00:56:37,460 We have, in reality, an attempt to reverse the direction of the different I have described, or at least to halt its movement. 523 00:56:37,460 --> 00:56:43,210 Now the prospect for once and for payment is to be foreclosed. 524 00:56:43,210 --> 00:56:50,350 This, of course, leads me to surmise that what is at work in Christian guilt is not answerability to existing norms of self assessment, 525 00:56:50,350 --> 00:56:53,560 but the corruption of self directed cruelty. 526 00:56:53,560 --> 00:57:01,780 Quote, You will already have guessed what has really gone on with all this is beyond all this that will determine oneself, 527 00:57:01,780 --> 00:57:08,650 that suppressed cruelty of animal man who is being frightened back into himself and given a little life. 528 00:57:08,650 --> 00:57:17,490 We have here a sort of madness of the willing showing itself in mental cruelty, which is a powerful man's will to find himself guilty and condemned, 529 00:57:17,490 --> 00:57:24,460 was our hope of reprieve, his will to think of himself as punished without the punishment ever measuring up to the crime. 530 00:57:24,460 --> 00:57:33,670 This will to set up an ideal body guard in order to be palpably convinced of his own absolute worthlessness in the face of this idea. 531 00:57:33,670 --> 00:57:39,380 It is not, in other words, because he happens to believe in a transcendent God to whom he owes more than he can repay. 532 00:57:39,380 --> 00:57:46,390 The Depression feels guilty. It is wrong to, because of his will, to find himself guilty that he believes in such a God. 533 00:57:46,390 --> 00:57:53,230 So in Nietzsche's view that Christianity did not invent the ordinary concept of guilt, but under the sway of. 534 00:57:53,230 --> 00:57:59,440 Anymore, bad conscience transformed it into a perfect instrument of self directed cruelty. 535 00:57:59,440 --> 00:58:05,170 By introducing the notion of guilt towards God, quote, this man of bad conscience, which he writes, 536 00:58:05,170 --> 00:58:14,620 has seised on religious precept in order to provide a self-torture as its most horrific hardness and sharpness, guilt towards God. 537 00:58:14,620 --> 00:58:21,540 This all becomes an instrument of torture. No, it is self directed cruelty in the first place. 538 00:58:21,540 --> 00:58:26,560 In so far, it is precisely in virtue of harbouring any more instinct, such as cruelty. 539 00:58:26,560 --> 00:58:33,630 That man fails to fulfil his obligation towards a holy God. Quote, In God, he seises upon the ultimate antithesis. 540 00:58:33,630 --> 00:58:40,970 Is he confined to his real and irredeemable demotes things. He reinterprets these selfsame animal instincts, his guilt before God. 541 00:58:40,970 --> 00:58:50,860 And it is also a perfect form of self corrective cruelty insofar as it represents guilt as an experience prior to its Christian reinterpretation. 542 00:58:50,860 --> 00:58:55,060 The distinctive feeding of diminished self esteem experienced by the guilty could 543 00:58:55,060 --> 00:58:59,710 only be an imperfect instrument of self-torture because guilt could always, 544 00:58:59,710 --> 00:59:07,360 in principle, be expiated. One only had to undergo punishment to restore one's voice as a person once it is conceivable, 545 00:59:07,360 --> 00:59:11,800 conceived as the next feeble guilt towards God by the loss of words. 546 00:59:11,800 --> 00:59:22,450 As a person becomes upsweep, a loss which nothing can redeem short of a radical, self-denial, short or repudiation of one's animal nature. 547 00:59:22,450 --> 00:59:29,710 Which of course leads us to the ascetic aspiration for aspiration to a quite different kind of existence. 548 00:59:29,710 --> 00:59:37,881 This, of course, is a story for another.