1 00:00:10,200 --> 00:00:15,540 So the second essay of Virginia Energy has recently attracted considerable amounts of attention. 2 00:00:15,540 --> 00:00:25,440 It ostensibly develops on account of the origins of the feeling of guilt, which is marked by at least the appearance of tight, consensual behaviours. 3 00:00:25,440 --> 00:00:32,520 The first essay begins with the ladies of the concept of the essay begins with an analysis of the concept of conscience. 4 00:00:32,520 --> 00:00:40,590 Proceeds to an examination of bad conscience and conclude with a view of more bad conscience or guilt itself was an 5 00:00:40,590 --> 00:00:48,730 emphasis throughout the essay on the crucial influence of socialisation on the development of all these phenomena. 6 00:00:48,730 --> 00:00:53,130 Now, there remains much disagreement amongst scholars over the precise structure of 7 00:00:53,130 --> 00:00:58,290 Nietzsche's account and indeed over the precise nature of the feeling of guilt, 8 00:00:58,290 --> 00:01:00,630 which is its purported object. 9 00:01:00,630 --> 00:01:11,460 This object is what I shall call Christian guilt, or the feeling of guilt as it operates and is understood in the Christian morality. 10 00:01:11,460 --> 00:01:17,070 This much we can gather not only from the role played by Christianity in the a cold, 11 00:01:17,070 --> 00:01:24,810 but also from the emphasis he places on the Christian view of countries in the brief review of the second to see your first. 12 00:01:24,810 --> 00:01:31,110 And actually all of this is of course, the first chord on the end of the second enquiry, he writes, 13 00:01:31,110 --> 00:01:39,490 offers the psychology of conscience, which is not, as people may believe, the voice of God in man. 14 00:01:39,490 --> 00:01:47,700 No. In contrast to a widespread line of interpretation, I would argue that Nietzsche's objective is to say, goodness sake, he's not, 15 00:01:47,700 --> 00:01:58,380 at least not all lead and perhaps not primarily to challenge the non naturalistic accord of the feeling of guilt promoted by the Christian Ășltimo, 16 00:01:58,380 --> 00:02:02,890 namely guilt as a manifestation of the voice of God in man. 17 00:02:02,890 --> 00:02:09,120 But to show that the representation of guilt is not so much an account of the ordinary feeling of guilt that 18 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:16,680 you can see the diminution of self esteem we experience when we fall short of our own normative expectations, 19 00:02:16,680 --> 00:02:26,790 as it is the product of the exploitation of the human susceptibility to that feeling as an instrument of self directed cruelty. 20 00:02:26,790 --> 00:02:32,970 Christian guilt is therefore not a more emotion responsive to reasons. 21 00:02:32,970 --> 00:02:38,340 But what I shall call then I'll come back to that at the very end of the paper. Irrational passion, 22 00:02:38,340 --> 00:02:48,330 by which I mean a partial to which only a rational being is susceptible because it essentially exploits his responsiveness to reasons and which, 23 00:02:48,330 --> 00:02:57,370 unlike other passions, not only overrides or bypasses, but actually corrupts his responsiveness to reason. 24 00:02:57,370 --> 00:03:05,430 No, I do not mean to suggest, however, that Nietzsche has nothing of particular interest to say about the ordinary feeling of guilt. 25 00:03:05,430 --> 00:03:13,110 On the contrary, his genealogical record of Guild of Christian Guilt presupposes but intriguing view of ordinary guilt, 26 00:03:13,110 --> 00:03:19,500 which differs in important respects from the view of ordinary guilt, which is sanctioned by the Christian group. 27 00:03:19,500 --> 00:03:23,490 And I shall have to consider at least some aspects of it. 28 00:03:23,490 --> 00:03:31,260 So let me begin and I'll start with scholarships, since the feeling of guilt is a species of bad conscience. 29 00:03:31,260 --> 00:03:36,180 Nietzsche begins this investigation with an examination of the concept of conscience. 30 00:03:36,180 --> 00:03:45,720 A concept of conscience typically designates Anita Volpe's the famed voice of conscience, which reminds each of us of our obligations. 31 00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:51,780 Nietzsche rejects the idea that it is the voice of God in man asks Small. 32 00:03:51,780 --> 00:03:57,900 As a matter of empirical fact, such or such a structure could have developed into a human psyche. 33 00:03:57,900 --> 00:04:07,280 In so far as it is a vase reminding us of our obligations and commitments, conscience is what he calls the Wills Memorial. 34 00:04:07,280 --> 00:04:11,730 No, since undertaking an obligation or commitment is like making a promise, 35 00:04:11,730 --> 00:04:18,540 the possession of a memory of the will underwrite what he calls the right to make promises. 36 00:04:18,540 --> 00:04:23,370 We do not have the right to make promises unless we have the ability to keep them. 37 00:04:23,370 --> 00:04:27,760 And this ability requires, of course, that we be reminded of them. 38 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:33,870 Nietzsche observes that our minds are naturally and dulled with an active forgetfulness. 39 00:04:33,870 --> 00:04:39,390 By virtue of which it disposes of impressions that would otherwise linger in. 40 00:04:39,390 --> 00:04:48,240 And Credle of our consciousness infers that the wind's memory is not part of our not innate natural and dormant, 41 00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:52,860 but constitutes a capacity that has to read to us. 42 00:04:52,860 --> 00:04:56,490 This is a court. This is a second court on the handle. 43 00:04:56,490 --> 00:05:03,120 It is by no means a mere passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its impact. 44 00:05:03,120 --> 00:05:09,010 Nor is it just indigestion caused by giving your word on some occasion and. 45 00:05:09,010 --> 00:05:21,420 Finding that you cannot call. Instead, it is an active desire not to let go, but desire to keep all desiring what has been on some occasion desired. 46 00:05:21,420 --> 00:05:22,270 Really? 47 00:05:22,270 --> 00:05:36,460 It is the Wills memorial so that a world of strange new things, circumstances and even acts of will may be placed quite safely between the original. 48 00:05:36,460 --> 00:05:41,320 I will. I shall do. And the actual discharge of the will. 49 00:05:41,320 --> 00:05:47,170 It's locked without breaking this long chain of will. 50 00:05:47,170 --> 00:05:55,380 So by defining this memory of the will, as a matter of keeping or desiring what has been on some occasion desired, 51 00:05:55,380 --> 00:06:02,620 Nietzsche's suggests that it is more that than the memory of the fact that I once desired something. 52 00:06:02,620 --> 00:06:07,720 It is rather a perpetuation of desire itself. 53 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:09,430 Nietzsche's use of the word desire. 54 00:06:09,430 --> 00:06:18,160 In this context may cause some confusion for a memory of the will is not simply the perpetration of some wish or inclination. 55 00:06:18,160 --> 00:06:25,780 I once had the will to be remembered. Here is an obligation undertaken or a promise made. 56 00:06:25,780 --> 00:06:26,650 I would. 57 00:06:26,650 --> 00:06:37,900 I shall do to define this memory in terms of keeping on desiring is simply to indicate that what is to be perpetuated is the motivation itself, 58 00:06:37,900 --> 00:06:42,790 not the awareness that I was once so motivated in making a promise. 59 00:06:42,790 --> 00:06:48,370 I expressed the intention or the desire in a broad sense to do what I have promised. 60 00:06:48,370 --> 00:06:53,650 The Willa's memory simply is the perpetuation of this desire. 61 00:06:53,650 --> 00:07:01,870 So much for conscience, for not. Nietzsche's enquiry then proceeds to an examination of the concept of indebtedness 62 00:07:01,870 --> 00:07:06,640 because guilt and indebtedness bear a clause etymology called connexion. 63 00:07:06,640 --> 00:07:12,130 The German good word for willed should also means that or indebtedness. 64 00:07:12,130 --> 00:07:17,440 Nietzsche thinks this etymological connexion to suggest a conceptual one and 65 00:07:17,440 --> 00:07:23,530 concludes that we stand to learn much about guilt from an analysis of indebtedness. 66 00:07:23,530 --> 00:07:28,030 Not a feeling of indebtedness arises in the context of contractual relationships, 67 00:07:28,030 --> 00:07:37,270 which are essentially relationships established by promising and so involved the whole apparatus designed to make such promising possible, 68 00:07:37,270 --> 00:07:44,520 particularly the recourse to the infliction of pain. This is number three on the on and off precisely here. 69 00:07:44,520 --> 00:07:48,340 Your rights promises are made precisely here. 70 00:07:48,340 --> 00:07:52,570 The person making the promise has to have a memory made for him. 71 00:07:52,570 --> 00:07:56,890 Precisely. Here we can guess it's a repository of hard, cruel, 72 00:07:56,890 --> 00:08:03,430 painful things that are in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be honoured. 73 00:08:03,430 --> 00:08:07,730 In order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise. 74 00:08:07,730 --> 00:08:13,900 And in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience to pass on something to the creditor by 75 00:08:13,900 --> 00:08:19,960 means of the contrast of the contract in case he does not face something which is to persist and control his body, 76 00:08:19,960 --> 00:08:29,920 his wife, his freedom of luck. No contractual relationship is established between two parties when one the debtor promises 77 00:08:29,920 --> 00:08:35,770 to repay the other creditor in some fashion for something such as a monetary loan, 78 00:08:35,770 --> 00:08:40,450 some kind of service that the creditor agrees to provide. 79 00:08:40,450 --> 00:08:45,750 If the debtor fails to keep his promise and repay it, is that in kind? 80 00:08:45,750 --> 00:08:53,890 Are these liable to some form of court and court punishment? But Neidjie emphasises that punishment in this context is very red. 81 00:08:53,890 --> 00:09:02,830 At any rate, a practise that looks like punishment by inflicting pain on the delinquent debtor is not an expression of disapproval. 82 00:09:02,830 --> 00:09:12,640 More or otherwise, it involves no judgement on the part of either party that the delinquent that or has acted in an evil or reprehensible way, 83 00:09:12,640 --> 00:09:23,870 which makes him deserving of that punishment. It is, Merrilee, but now alternative form of repayment by the debtor for the debt he contracted. 84 00:09:23,870 --> 00:09:32,790 She observes that far and away the preferred form of alternative compensation in cases of delinquency is the infliction of pain. 85 00:09:32,790 --> 00:09:38,360 The compensation, he writes, consists in a warrant for a title to prove it. 86 00:09:38,360 --> 00:09:43,900 And he marvels at the strangeness of this idea. This is before, which I'm not going to read. 87 00:09:43,900 --> 00:09:48,970 It turns out that two strange features in this conception of punishment. 88 00:09:48,970 --> 00:10:00,730 First, there's this idea that every injury, the loss of possessions of a loved one and the like as its equivalent, specify a bowling ball of pleasure. 89 00:10:00,730 --> 00:10:10,930 The other strange feature of cruelty is the idea that sport to make someone suffer is pleasure in its highest form. 90 00:10:10,930 --> 00:10:11,020 Well, 91 00:10:11,020 --> 00:10:21,850 the contract show that Nishino first to explain the latter strange feature of cruelty is that it's pleasurable because it gratifies the will to power. 92 00:10:21,850 --> 00:10:30,670 Though I've argued elsewhere that the window bar is the desire to engage in the activity of confronting and overcoming resistance, 93 00:10:30,670 --> 00:10:38,530 cruelty, making someone suffer. He's a party public manifestation of the will to bar in the following way. 94 00:10:38,530 --> 00:10:45,160 The prospect of suffering necessarily creates resistance in its intended victim, 95 00:10:45,160 --> 00:10:52,210 which the cruel individual simply overcomes by managing to make his victim suffer. 96 00:10:52,210 --> 00:11:00,880 So when the chief knows that this is a quote through punishment of the tender, the creature takes part in the rights of the Masters. 97 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:07,330 He indicates that what the Predator enjoys is not the suffering of the Dederer as such, 98 00:11:07,330 --> 00:11:18,320 but the overcoming of the resistance which the prospect of this suffering is bound to arouse into theatre by the very fact that he is made to suffer. 99 00:11:18,320 --> 00:11:22,550 Now, it is crucial to note that original contractual relationships, 100 00:11:22,550 --> 00:11:30,590 when he she I'm not relationships of trust between individuals who already possess the right to make promises. 101 00:11:30,590 --> 00:11:38,030 This is why the individual who contracted that court has to have a memory made for it through the threat of court. 102 00:11:38,030 --> 00:11:46,640 Hard, cruel, painful things. The purpose of which is to put extra duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience. 103 00:11:46,640 --> 00:11:54,050 So the original Deborah's motivation for keeping his promises is the dread of the predator is poor. 104 00:11:54,050 --> 00:11:59,600 He does not consider that his words or standing is at stake in the keeping of his promises, 105 00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:04,370 and therefore he does not regard his failure to do so as wrongdoing. 106 00:12:04,370 --> 00:12:07,250 And this punishment is deserved. 107 00:12:07,250 --> 00:12:14,270 The fear of the unpleasant consequences of his promise breaking, which constitutes the original feeling of indebtedness, 108 00:12:14,270 --> 00:12:22,010 is therefore not a feeling of guilt precisely because it does not involve a diminishment in his self-esteem. 109 00:12:22,010 --> 00:12:28,460 So Nietzsche observes that if a delinquent debtor does not already feel guilty for his indebtedness, 110 00:12:28,460 --> 00:12:32,510 the punishment exacted cannot arouse such a feeling. For two reasons. 111 00:12:32,510 --> 00:12:39,770 The first, of course, is that he chasey others. So the debtor sees that, you know, what he did is being done to him. 112 00:12:39,770 --> 00:12:44,720 And so as being able to him was a good conscience. So, you know, we disapproved of. 113 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:49,820 Which means that he cannot as niching, which is regarded as reprehensible as such. 114 00:12:49,820 --> 00:12:59,030 But second, he could not regard punishment as anything more than a stroke of bad luck or the unfortunate consequence of miscalculation. 115 00:12:59,030 --> 00:13:04,530 This is No. Number five on your hand out, 116 00:13:04,530 --> 00:13:14,450 which recently part of it for me and you are wrong with the words overtaken by punishment have felt something has gone unexpectedly wrong here. 117 00:13:14,450 --> 00:13:17,480 Not I hope not to have done that. 118 00:13:17,480 --> 00:13:25,490 They submitted to punishment as you submit to illness or misfortune or death, if in those days there was any criticism of the deed. 119 00:13:25,490 --> 00:13:27,530 It came from intelligence. 120 00:13:27,530 --> 00:13:35,390 We must certainly see the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in the lengthening of the memory. 121 00:13:35,390 --> 00:13:40,620 We will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about things more circumspectly. 122 00:13:40,620 --> 00:13:49,040 Fenelon. So the crucial implication of this view is that gilds kind of consist of a fear of punishment, 123 00:13:49,040 --> 00:13:53,780 or if the effect of punishment Kellert arouse the feeling of guilt in those who do not already regard what 124 00:13:53,780 --> 00:14:01,100 they did is wrong and can only make them more cautious and circumspect in continuing to do what they did, 125 00:14:01,100 --> 00:14:05,990 then the prospect of punishment will not arouse guilt feelings either, 126 00:14:05,990 --> 00:14:14,670 and will amount to nothing more than the apprehension of the unpleasant consequences of further impudence or miscalculation. 127 00:14:14,670 --> 00:14:19,490 The one way to bring all this contrast is to point out that if a delinquent debtor 128 00:14:19,490 --> 00:14:23,540 came to believe that he has gotten away with it and will escape punishment, 129 00:14:23,540 --> 00:14:26,150 no pangs of conscience would remain. 130 00:14:26,150 --> 00:14:34,280 By contrast, if he felt guilty, the conviction that he would escape punishment for his wrongdoing would not make him feel any less guilt. 131 00:14:34,280 --> 00:14:43,430 And so guilt cannot be a fear of punishment. So not a bad conscience. 132 00:14:43,430 --> 00:14:51,100 NUJ describes the origin of bad conscience in the following terms. Not a great read, but two fairly long passages because they are very important. 133 00:14:51,100 --> 00:14:55,510 The first is this. I wrote on bad conscience as a serious illness. 134 00:14:55,510 --> 00:15:03,010 Which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of over changes which he experienced 135 00:15:03,010 --> 00:15:10,060 that change whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace? 136 00:15:10,060 --> 00:15:19,720 It must have been no different for this SMI. Unable, happy the other feet to the wilderness war, the wandering life, an adventure. 137 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:26,920 Then it was good to see animals where they were when they were forced to either be could become land animals or perish. 138 00:15:26,920 --> 00:15:32,380 At one go, all instincts become devalued and suspended. 139 00:15:32,380 --> 00:15:37,000 They felt they were clumsy and performing the simplest task they did on. 140 00:15:37,000 --> 00:15:45,960 They have their familiar guide anymore. For this new unknown world, those regulating impulses which unconsciously led them to safety, 141 00:15:45,960 --> 00:15:54,110 the poor things were reduced to relying on thinking inference, action and the connecting, of course, these effects. 142 00:15:54,110 --> 00:16:00,160 Now, it's very important to notice right away that Nietzsche's conception of the state of nature 143 00:16:00,160 --> 00:16:08,220 prior to socialisation is not as it is for from the helpless and dreadful state of individuals, 144 00:16:08,220 --> 00:16:13,150 ill or solitary life in nature. Nietzsche is presumption individual. 145 00:16:13,150 --> 00:16:17,890 By contrast, he is happily adapted to the wilderness. 146 00:16:17,890 --> 00:16:25,870 Nietzsche, therefore, assumes that it must have taken an act of violence to tearing away from this happily adopted state. 147 00:16:25,870 --> 00:16:30,940 And they attribute this initial act of violence to a small group of strong individuals, 148 00:16:30,940 --> 00:16:34,570 some pack of Bronn beasts of free, a conqueror and master race. 149 00:16:34,570 --> 00:16:41,230 As you can see, who are bent on exercising their way too far in the court shaping of a population 150 00:16:41,230 --> 00:16:47,230 which had up till now been unrestrained and shapeless into a fixed form. 151 00:16:47,230 --> 00:16:54,730 No. What they choose most interested in here is one party or the effect of this forced socialisation, 152 00:16:54,730 --> 00:17:00,520 namely a change in division in the individual's relationship to his instincts. 153 00:17:00,520 --> 00:17:07,990 As he puts it, at one vote, all its things become of where devaluated and suspended. 154 00:17:07,990 --> 00:17:14,380 Not a very INSTINCT'S or regular regulating impulses which were once reliable guides to safety, 155 00:17:14,380 --> 00:17:22,540 become the new social conditions of existence and come to be seen as dangerous liabilities. 156 00:17:22,540 --> 00:17:30,280 I can no longer trust that the pursuit of an impulse I feel in a given circumstance will be in my best interest, 157 00:17:30,280 --> 00:17:36,920 and I must instead rely on thinking Ference calculation and the connecting, of course, was effect. 158 00:17:36,920 --> 00:17:41,170 Now, this first programme, followed by surprise, by socialisation, 159 00:17:41,170 --> 00:17:48,880 that the audience things could no longer be trusted is compounded by another which Nietzsche describes as follows. 160 00:17:48,880 --> 00:17:51,340 This is number seven. 161 00:17:51,340 --> 00:18:02,170 Meanwhile, he says, all these things have not suddenly ceased to make their demands, but it was difficult and seldom possible to give in to them. 162 00:18:02,170 --> 00:18:11,890 They mainly had to seek you. And as it were, underground gratifications, audience things which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards. 163 00:18:11,890 --> 00:18:21,580 This is what I call the internalisation of man. All those instincts of the wild, free moving man were turned backwards against man himself. 164 00:18:21,580 --> 00:18:30,400 Animosity, cruelty to pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying all this pitted against a person who had such instincts. 165 00:18:30,400 --> 00:18:41,020 That is the origin of bad conscience. So the origin of bad conscience lies in what Nietzsche calls the internalisation of man. 166 00:18:41,020 --> 00:18:49,120 I've already noted one aspect of this process of improvisation the emergence of what Nietzsche calls this really dismal thing called reflection, 167 00:18:49,120 --> 00:18:58,570 by which the old instincts become objects of reflective awareness. So you can imagine that the picture goes like this prior to forced socialisation. 168 00:18:58,570 --> 00:19:03,190 The individual's point of view is directed outward is instinct's frame. 169 00:19:03,190 --> 00:19:07,420 This point of view, but down off its focus since he's happy. 170 00:19:07,420 --> 00:19:13,080 The other put it to life in the wilderness. He never has to reflect on the whole question. 171 00:19:13,080 --> 00:19:22,030 Things and when they are frustrated as they are born to be from time to time, is prone to think that the problem is with the autoworker. 172 00:19:22,030 --> 00:19:29,440 Always his calculations about not with those instincts themselves and the conditions of force authorisation. 173 00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:38,690 By contrast, the frustration of the old INS things become systematic and this forms a reorientation of the individual's point of view, which is No. 174 00:19:38,690 --> 00:19:45,140 It'd been worth his olding things become objects of reflective awareness and criticisms. 175 00:19:45,140 --> 00:19:49,940 After all, they would be appropriate not to be trusted anymore. 176 00:19:49,940 --> 00:19:54,500 They seemed to shade the point of view from which he thinks about all anybody needs the 177 00:19:54,500 --> 00:20:01,510 world and becomes object and become objects to which is thought and evaluation are directed. 178 00:20:01,510 --> 00:20:08,600 No, the remarkable effect which captures Nietzsche's attention is that this internalisation of man does not 179 00:20:08,600 --> 00:20:15,110 simply consist of such a reflective reorientation of his point of view toward the inner world of existence. 180 00:20:15,110 --> 00:20:23,360 It also involves what he calls a declaration of war against the old its things or a devaluation of them. 181 00:20:23,360 --> 00:20:29,900 So it's no doubt true that given Nietzsche's superstition of an original state of happy adaptation, 182 00:20:29,900 --> 00:20:37,200 the individual could only be induced to reflect on his instincts when they become problems or liabilities as they are. 183 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:43,920 Because in conditions in which they're pursued has become a source of systematic torment and frustration. 184 00:20:43,920 --> 00:20:53,160 But it remains to be seen why their frustration actually prom's a condemnation of these old INS things themselves. 185 00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:58,670 Robert. And of the new external conditions that make their satisfaction impossible. 186 00:20:58,670 --> 00:21:02,640 And the explanation of this remarkable fact, according to the chief, is that, 187 00:21:02,640 --> 00:21:07,080 quote, the all these things are not suddenly seised to make their demands, 188 00:21:07,080 --> 00:21:13,750 but since they can no longer be discharged outwardly, they turn inwards off against themselves. 189 00:21:13,750 --> 00:21:20,040 No Sane says, I know that Nietzsche singles old cruelty as a party maddigan spens of the instinct for freedom. 190 00:21:20,040 --> 00:21:24,870 He describes bad conscience as, quote, cruelty turned against itself. 191 00:21:24,870 --> 00:21:28,410 No, it's true that Nietzsche sometimes describes bad conscience as cruelty, 192 00:21:28,410 --> 00:21:35,940 the individual directed against himself, but the means against himself insofar as he harbours cruel impulses. 193 00:21:35,940 --> 00:21:44,220 So in other words, bad conscience is not any kind of instinctual deprivation, but only not talk of the instincts of freedom. 194 00:21:44,220 --> 00:21:51,380 So this is a quote. This is an export of hate. He makes it to the instant of freedom forcibly made later. 195 00:21:51,380 --> 00:22:00,840 The instinct of freedom forced back, repressed incarcerating was in itself and finally able to discharge and Ilija itself only against itself. 196 00:22:00,840 --> 00:22:06,060 That and that alone is bad conscience in its beginnings. 197 00:22:06,060 --> 00:22:13,590 No suggests suggest two ways of explaining why the instinct of freedom can discharge itself only against itself in this manner. 198 00:22:13,590 --> 00:22:21,390 First, since the conditions of forced cauterisation the instinct needs Borst to be suppressed and to be discharged. 199 00:22:21,390 --> 00:22:27,840 It makes good economic sense to borrow a floating phrase to make its own suppression on occasion for discharge. 200 00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:32,880 Second, Nichi also suggests that under conditions of forced socialisation, 201 00:22:32,880 --> 00:22:38,520 the indiscriminate suppression of by the individual of any or all of its sense things could well 202 00:22:38,520 --> 00:22:46,680 threaten the coherence and survival of the social organisation and is therefore actively inhibited. 203 00:22:46,680 --> 00:22:52,110 I mean, you need some instinctual modification or you need some instinct to operate well to make life. 204 00:22:52,110 --> 00:22:56,280 So Sargents no bad conscience. 205 00:22:56,280 --> 00:22:58,880 It's obviously an unpleasant feeling. 206 00:22:58,880 --> 00:23:06,690 Nietzsche notes that we speak of the Panopto the sting of conscience and the individual with a bad conscience feels bad. 207 00:23:06,690 --> 00:23:15,060 Not because he's all these things I know denied satisfaction. He feels bad for having them in the first place. 208 00:23:15,060 --> 00:23:21,030 But if you think about one can feel bad for having certain instincts in all sorts of ways. 209 00:23:21,030 --> 00:23:28,050 Let me give you some examples. The individual forced into suspecting might regret having more instincts, 210 00:23:28,050 --> 00:23:34,290 which by now being denied satisfaction, have become a source of perpetual torment. 211 00:23:34,290 --> 00:23:40,620 Or the individual who subscribes to Shobana was conception of happiness in terms of peace and contentment. 212 00:23:40,620 --> 00:23:45,840 We'll deplore as Claudine's things because he deplores having any instincts at all, 213 00:23:45,840 --> 00:23:50,370 since their presence proves to be the main obstacle to his happiness. 214 00:23:50,370 --> 00:23:59,070 He feels bad about having them much in the way the prisoner who aspires to freedom feels bad of all these shackles. 215 00:23:59,070 --> 00:24:07,460 Finally, the Christian deplores his court instance because it believes that having them diminishes his worth as a person. 216 00:24:07,460 --> 00:24:14,910 He feels bad about having them in the way the sinner feels bad about this sinful proclivities. 217 00:24:14,910 --> 00:24:20,010 Clearly, the devaluation of INSTINCT'S in the first two cases is going to be prudential. 218 00:24:20,010 --> 00:24:27,040 Cruellest things make one unable to achieve happiness, whereas in the last case it is more calling's. 219 00:24:27,040 --> 00:24:32,770 Things make one deserving of happiness, not the individuals more regrets. 220 00:24:32,770 --> 00:24:42,510 What he probers his instincts on prudential rules by recognising in them obstacles to his happiness is not motivated by self directed cruelty. 221 00:24:42,510 --> 00:24:47,010 His purpose in condemning his instincts is not to make himself suffer. 222 00:24:47,010 --> 00:24:54,840 No, it is true that like the shopworn orien ascetic you by deliberately and systematically deny is insisting satisfaction. 223 00:24:54,840 --> 00:25:02,610 But it is to the end of liberating himself from them. By becoming indifferent to the suffering caused by their frustration. 224 00:25:02,610 --> 00:25:12,240 In this case you will see the war in wages against his instincts, not as only a means to his eventual liberation. 225 00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:17,760 When the Wardi individual wages against his instincts is motivated by self directed cruelty. 226 00:25:17,760 --> 00:25:22,770 By contrast, it becomes an act he denies is instant satisfaction. 227 00:25:22,770 --> 00:25:32,100 Not in order to liberate himself from them, but in order to enjoy the very suffering their frustration causes which might incidentally, 228 00:25:32,100 --> 00:25:36,960 perversely enough, require way to keep them alive in life. 229 00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:43,920 No. Still, there remains a difference between the deliberate, masochistic frustration of one's cruel impulses. 230 00:25:43,920 --> 00:25:50,220 What Nietzsche calls anymore bad conscience and the combination of those impulses as evil, 231 00:25:50,220 --> 00:25:57,540 which makes one feel guilty for having them all more bad conscience changing the direction of cruelty to. 232 00:25:57,540 --> 00:26:03,610 Putting it in words does not necessarily take the fall profit, more condemnation of it. 233 00:26:03,610 --> 00:26:12,720 So although the feeling of guilt may well be a form of bad conscience, it is self directed to be manifested as more self reproach. 234 00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:19,970 And that is, as a man of conscience, has not yet supplied nobody's guilt. 235 00:26:19,970 --> 00:26:26,140 OK, so now let's turn to the phenomenon which she calls the body's Asian indebtedness, 236 00:26:26,140 --> 00:26:34,400 but acknowledges that these enquiries into indebtedness and contractual obligation have so far ignored the modernisation of these concepts. 237 00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:36,620 It's not a question. 238 00:26:36,620 --> 00:26:45,560 And this is an important question on which commentators are deeply divided, concerns the nature of this, quote unquote, modernisation. 239 00:26:45,560 --> 00:26:53,490 This is where going to take a stab. That, too, there are two ways of looking at it is it's on the one hand, 240 00:26:53,490 --> 00:27:01,670 the process whereby the nonwar concepts of indebtedness and contractual obligation become the moral concept of guilt. 241 00:27:01,670 --> 00:27:08,850 But. Oh, is it a different process whereby the concepts of guilt and obligation already 242 00:27:08,850 --> 00:27:14,760 understood in a generic more science and in into service of the aims of morality? 243 00:27:14,760 --> 00:27:24,590 Understood. Now, in a specific sense, namely, yes. Slave auditing or as Brian libraries called, body it a pejorative sense. 244 00:27:24,590 --> 00:27:34,400 Let's see. Dick Cheney finds democratisation of the world should the fleet, which are ambiguous between the more preborn and the standard. 245 00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:38,810 He defines it as port. This is on your handheld. 246 00:27:38,810 --> 00:27:45,710 This is an important port. This system, Ranaan, is the way they are pushed back in to conscience, 247 00:27:45,710 --> 00:27:55,190 more precisely the way bad conscience is woven together with the concept of God, or it is their relegation to bad conscience. 248 00:27:55,190 --> 00:28:02,090 There's this definition is less than ideal. Be clear. It suggests that demoralised feeling of guilt. 249 00:28:02,090 --> 00:28:05,810 Results from the combination of indebtedness with bad conscience. 250 00:28:05,810 --> 00:28:10,910 Or more precisely, of the use of indebtedness as an instrument of self directed cruelty. 251 00:28:10,910 --> 00:28:18,940 And it also suggests that the possibility of a moralised feeling of guilt requires not just the notion of indebtedness, but of indebtedness. 252 00:28:18,940 --> 00:28:26,960 Scott, I always would consider briefly two contrasting lines of interpretation of dispossession that are formed into the church. 253 00:28:26,960 --> 00:28:34,220 The fundamental premise of the first interpretation is that the feeling of indebtedness is not yet a feeling of guilt, 254 00:28:34,220 --> 00:28:41,840 but becomes sold through its association with bad conscience and which records or much else history. 255 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:47,840 But of course, this is a view that has been defended by others as well, such as Aaron Ridley and others. 256 00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:51,080 So it's not just me supporting, quote, failing to pay one's. 257 00:28:51,080 --> 00:29:00,870 That's by no means decreases once, but worth as a person simply because there's no point of view from which ones of all worth as a person is assessed. 258 00:29:00,870 --> 00:29:04,640 The implication of this passage is the feeling of guilt is the feeling of 259 00:29:04,640 --> 00:29:10,550 indebtedness when one's worth as a person is at stake in the repayment of the debt. 260 00:29:10,550 --> 00:29:11,690 The failure to repay my. 261 00:29:11,690 --> 00:29:21,470 That concerns me only because of the unpleasant consequences my delinquency might bring upon me, and not because it decreases my worth as a person. 262 00:29:21,470 --> 00:29:25,940 My failure to fulfil a contractual obligation with a role is a feeling of guilt. 263 00:29:25,940 --> 00:29:30,380 Only if I take this obligation, due process or special character. 264 00:29:30,380 --> 00:29:37,280 It is an obligation in the one of which my worth as a person is somehow at stake. 265 00:29:37,280 --> 00:29:43,310 And to give it a name, I propose to quoting it categorical obligation in order to distinguish it from the 266 00:29:43,310 --> 00:29:50,140 purely prudential obligation involved in three more contractual relationships. 267 00:29:50,140 --> 00:29:57,140 Nietzsche and remarks that when my failure to repay my debt is the consequence of negligence or miscalculation, 268 00:29:57,140 --> 00:30:01,430 I may criticise myself for my improvements on my competence. 269 00:30:01,430 --> 00:30:11,660 But feeling incompetent, stupid or small, even if I believe that I have no one to blame for it but myself is not yet feeling guilty. 270 00:30:11,660 --> 00:30:15,230 Only my worth as a competent, professional, capable agent is at stake. 271 00:30:15,230 --> 00:30:19,610 Not my worth as a person for my prudence matters to me. 272 00:30:19,610 --> 00:30:25,070 Only if the determinate answer it enables me to realise matter to me in the first place. 273 00:30:25,070 --> 00:30:28,610 Of course, I mean under certain circumstances, deplore my opponents, 274 00:30:28,610 --> 00:30:35,810 not just because of the unpleasant consequences it brings upon me, but also because of what it tells about me as a person. 275 00:30:35,810 --> 00:30:43,280 In this case, moreover, I regard being prudent, if only implicitly, a categorical obligation. 276 00:30:43,280 --> 00:30:48,860 No, it's important to note because this sort of confusion was needed in its prewar form. 277 00:30:48,860 --> 00:30:57,260 The feeling of indebtedness can already be pushed back into the bad conscience and used as an instrument of self directed cruelty. 278 00:30:57,260 --> 00:31:01,550 So I could imagine that harbouring cruel impulses as I do, 279 00:31:01,550 --> 00:31:08,870 is a breach of contract and torture myself with thoughts of terrific punishments for harbouring them. 280 00:31:08,870 --> 00:31:14,360 But if the feeling of indebtedness produces no diminution in the delinquent that self-esteem, 281 00:31:14,360 --> 00:31:21,410 it is hard to see how it could be marshalled to produce more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt. 282 00:31:21,410 --> 00:31:29,210 No research acknowledges this difficulty and goes on to suggest that Christianity proposes or provides a solution for it. 283 00:31:29,210 --> 00:31:33,260 By introducing the notion of indebtedness towards God, which this is, 284 00:31:33,260 --> 00:31:39,020 research again turns it into a deep sense of fear, complete failure with respect to what one is. 285 00:31:39,020 --> 00:31:43,600 First and more foremost, they mean God's creature. 286 00:31:43,600 --> 00:31:51,920 No, the problem is this is that there is if, as research argues, the feeling of indebtedness itself by no means decreases one's voice as a person. 287 00:31:51,920 --> 00:31:58,070 It's very hard to see Paul making it indebtedness towards God would have this effect. 288 00:31:58,070 --> 00:32:08,420 You think that this is to affect self esteem? It must be in virtue of its character and his indebtedness, not in virtue of who one is indebted to. 289 00:32:08,420 --> 00:32:14,420 It must be being a delinquent that her head is such that decree's is what's worth as a person. 290 00:32:14,420 --> 00:32:24,650 But in that case, the feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt, and indebtedness towards God would only intensified a feeling of. 291 00:32:24,650 --> 00:32:29,370 There might be ways to improve research proposal in an attempt to circumvent this difficulty. 292 00:32:29,370 --> 00:32:32,540 So, for instance, you might think that God expects us, 293 00:32:32,540 --> 00:32:37,490 the Christian God expects us not only to follow his commandments, but also to treat them as ethical obligations. 294 00:32:37,490 --> 00:32:47,270 That might be weird. But besides very uncertain prospects of success to required emendations would involve Davisson the addition of essential details, 295 00:32:47,270 --> 00:32:54,650 such as what I just mentioned, which neither research nor any change for the better take the pain to specify. 296 00:32:54,650 --> 00:33:00,080 So there's difficulty with Bush's proposal invites an alternative line of interpretation, 297 00:33:00,080 --> 00:33:05,330 according to which the feeling of indebtedness would involve, prior to its modernisation, 298 00:33:05,330 --> 00:33:11,100 a genuine commitment to the categorical Obree authority of the obligation, 299 00:33:11,100 --> 00:33:19,160 as one has often taken such and such that the failure to discharge these obligations would cause a decrease in one's worth. 300 00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:24,200 As a person of this view, which is proposed by Simon Me. 301 00:33:24,200 --> 00:33:29,210 The feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt. And I quote me. 302 00:33:29,210 --> 00:33:37,780 This is no, I've never heard of the debtor creditor relationship successfully models. 303 00:33:37,780 --> 00:33:45,710 It is only because it already contains the latter's key principles issue, namely of personal accountability, 304 00:33:45,710 --> 00:33:52,970 which he specifies as being a strong sense that one's obligations are justified. 305 00:33:52,970 --> 00:34:00,630 I take it Simon may not agree with me on this, but I should categorically justify this examination. 306 00:34:00,630 --> 00:34:07,040 The chief advantage of this proposal is that by taking the feeling of indebtedness to involve a decrease in one's worth as a person, 307 00:34:07,040 --> 00:34:16,940 it manages to explain how pushing back indebtedness into bad conscience will produce a distinctively more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt, 308 00:34:16,940 --> 00:34:27,980 more bad conscience, as we call it, self directed cruelty manifested under the guise of more self reproach or recourse of one's self as a person. 309 00:34:27,980 --> 00:34:32,540 Self directed cruelty could assume disguise by representing an individual's 310 00:34:32,540 --> 00:34:37,730 continuing to harbour Cronin's things as the violation of a contractual obligation. 311 00:34:37,730 --> 00:34:46,110 Given that such a function of such a violation decreases your first nor the obvious problem we are left to, 312 00:34:46,110 --> 00:34:51,950 his Bybee's proposal is that if the feeling of indebtedness is already a feeling of guilt, 313 00:34:51,950 --> 00:34:57,710 it becomes unclear what the warren zation of the concepts of guilt and duty could accomplish. 314 00:34:57,710 --> 00:35:05,410 May himself suggest that the amortisation of guilt is called defined by the idea that one's human nature is essentially either dischargeable guilty. 315 00:35:05,410 --> 00:35:10,010 Evans defective. No, I think there's a suggestion there and I want to develop. 316 00:35:10,010 --> 00:35:14,420 We may differ on this suggestion by recalling first. This is important. 317 00:35:14,420 --> 00:35:18,960 Tree is not always noted that the tree emphasises the fact. 318 00:35:18,960 --> 00:35:22,920 What's that? As a consequence of their Mornese ation? 319 00:35:22,920 --> 00:35:29,810 The concepts of guilt and duty become the exclusive property of bad conscience. 320 00:35:29,810 --> 00:35:37,200 This indicates that more lies, guilt and duty can only evoke a diminished self-esteem in the age. 321 00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:43,940 Who experiences that? And of course, it's easy to see how the association of bad conscience because the concept of God, 322 00:35:43,940 --> 00:35:48,470 particularly the notion of indebtedness towards God, could achieve this. 323 00:35:48,470 --> 00:35:53,600 The notion of indebtedness towards God is in effect a notion of an inexplicable guilt. 324 00:35:53,600 --> 00:35:55,880 And the contractual obligation that cannot be fulfilled, 325 00:35:55,880 --> 00:36:06,860 therefore represents a normative standard for duty that is designed only to leave man Port Power property conference of his own absolute unworthiness. 326 00:36:06,860 --> 00:36:14,710 So let me not develop this interpretation of demoralisation of guilt. According to the interpretation I'm proposing. 327 00:36:14,710 --> 00:36:23,290 You need change takes the Christian representation of guilt to be not a party to a cold of the ordinary feeling of guilt, 328 00:36:23,290 --> 00:36:32,240 but a perversion of the human susceptibility to that feeling. This, in turn, supposes that he has a account of this ordinary feeding of guilt. 329 00:36:32,240 --> 00:36:40,380 And I believe that he does and that the so-called differs in significant respects from vehicle that is officially sanctioned by the Christian outlook. 330 00:36:40,380 --> 00:36:46,220 In particular, Nietzsche argues that the ordinary feeling of guilt is not an innate disposition 331 00:36:46,220 --> 00:36:50,900 whose explanation requires the invocation of non-natural entities such as God. 332 00:36:50,900 --> 00:36:59,900 It is, on the contrary, an acquired disposition which they robs under the causal pressure of Rajani natural forces. 333 00:36:59,900 --> 00:37:01,690 He's on a comet. This is important. 334 00:37:01,690 --> 00:37:10,510 Begins with the surmise that a susceptibility to the feeling of guilt emerges from the original legal practise of making contrast contracts. 335 00:37:10,510 --> 00:37:19,110 This is number twelve in this sphere of legal obligations that we find a breeding role of the more conceptual world of guild. 336 00:37:19,110 --> 00:37:22,750 Conscience. Duty. Sacred duty. 337 00:37:22,750 --> 00:37:29,780 Since NUJ insists that the origin feeling of indebtedness is not tantamount to the feeling of guilt, we must ask Hald or not. 338 00:37:29,780 --> 00:37:34,100 It could emerge from the form of the ways in which she understands it. 339 00:37:34,100 --> 00:37:37,510 Feeling is being indebted in a way that decreases once more. 340 00:37:37,510 --> 00:37:42,400 Is this a person which requires explanation is therefore what one source as a person 341 00:37:42,400 --> 00:37:47,440 amounts to and how it could have come to be at stake in the fulfilment of one's contract? 342 00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:53,050 Contractual obligations called the need for contractual relationships motivates the enterprise. 343 00:37:53,050 --> 00:37:59,020 As you might recall of reading on Unevolved was the right to make promises, always a conscience. 344 00:37:59,020 --> 00:38:07,900 And this, which he observes. But this is a quote, is precisely what constitutes the long history of the origins of responsibility. 345 00:38:07,900 --> 00:38:15,530 So the position of the commission of a conscience, according to the chief, is what makes me a responsible agent. 346 00:38:15,530 --> 00:38:20,110 Now it is crucial to understand what Nietzsche means. 347 00:38:20,110 --> 00:38:21,410 My responsibility. 348 00:38:21,410 --> 00:38:32,170 This complex calling someone responsible might first denote the fact that he is free and as the chief would say, could have done otherwise. 349 00:38:32,170 --> 00:38:40,480 So that his action is computable to him rather than merely to some part of him or to some even told to get her external to me. 350 00:38:40,480 --> 00:38:49,540 But in the second place, cording someone responsible might also referred to the fact that he can be trusted or relied upon, 351 00:38:49,540 --> 00:38:57,570 that he is someone who truly has the right to make promises because his word, once given is good and secure. 352 00:38:57,570 --> 00:39:03,850 Knowledge chain is interested primarily in the second sense of responsibility. 353 00:39:03,850 --> 00:39:11,920 A responsible agent is one who can be trusted or relied upon because the individual who has become fully responsible in this sense, 354 00:39:11,920 --> 00:39:22,020 the sovereign individual. So I go back to the early part of the essay because it provides a clue to the issues of common feelings. 355 00:39:22,020 --> 00:39:29,080 We get any more precise understanding of the character of the Sangrail individual by examining the process to which he he's produced. 356 00:39:29,080 --> 00:39:38,170 Nietzsche came claims that conscience, all the winner's memory is spread through pain, which he does the most powerful eight mnemonics. 357 00:39:38,170 --> 00:39:46,840 It is the prospect of the pain incurred for breaking one's promises, but ensures the perpetuation of the motivation to keep them. 358 00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:56,600 However, it is crucial to note that the fear of pain plays a memory and they role in the development of conscience, 359 00:39:56,600 --> 00:40:06,410 but is not constructive for the fear of pain, which initially motivates the individual to control doors. 360 00:40:06,410 --> 00:40:11,440 A morgue is intervening desires and emotions that conflict with his promise keeping 361 00:40:11,440 --> 00:40:17,380 can eventually become replaced by one Bitchier describes as a feeling of power, 362 00:40:17,380 --> 00:40:24,750 of freedom. The frustration of conflicting intervening desire is another to fulfil the promise is, of course, 363 00:40:24,750 --> 00:40:30,780 itself a source of pain and the individual who learns to overcome this pain in this manner. 364 00:40:30,780 --> 00:40:35,780 That is to say, learns to overcome the resistance that is opposed by those conflicting desires. 365 00:40:35,780 --> 00:40:42,240 Couples to derive can come to derive a feeling of power and freedom from this overkilling. 366 00:40:42,240 --> 00:40:47,130 It is at the end of this process when the feeling of freedom in part has replaced a 367 00:40:47,130 --> 00:40:52,410 feel of pain as the motivation for from escaping that we find a sovereign individual, 368 00:40:52,410 --> 00:40:56,910 quote unquote, 13 Ridolfi part of it. 369 00:40:56,910 --> 00:41:07,050 The Freeman deposits are of a durable, unbreakable will, thus has his own standard of value in the possession of sexual viewing. 370 00:41:07,050 --> 00:41:13,950 Others from his own standpoint, he respects or despises. He confers an honour when he places his trust, gives his word, 371 00:41:13,950 --> 00:41:23,130 is something which can be relied on because he is strong enough to remain upright in the face of mishap or even in the face of fate. 372 00:41:23,130 --> 00:41:27,990 The proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, 373 00:41:27,990 --> 00:41:39,030 the awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny has penetrated him to the depths and becomes an instinct is dominant. 374 00:41:39,030 --> 00:41:44,430 This suffering cause it is conscience. 375 00:41:44,430 --> 00:41:51,040 So the conscience of the sovereign individual is not, quote, an actual awareness of power and freedom. 376 00:41:51,040 --> 00:41:56,970 The driving force, in other words, behind the conscience of the sovereign individual is not the feel of pain, 377 00:41:56,970 --> 00:42:00,160 but the enjoyment of the feeling of power. Well, 378 00:42:00,160 --> 00:42:05,410 nature doesn't explain why an agent becomes responsible only when the feeding 379 00:42:05,410 --> 00:42:10,390 of part is substituted for the few of pain in motivating its promiscuity. 380 00:42:10,390 --> 00:42:18,880 But to me, my wife wrote the following signals. Not first of all, that we don't call responsible anyone on whom we can depend. 381 00:42:18,880 --> 00:42:22,450 To do what he has promised to do. For instance, 382 00:42:22,450 --> 00:42:32,560 we will not just judge trustworthy or responsible manager who keeps his promises only because he fears the unpleasant consequences of breaking them. 383 00:42:32,560 --> 00:42:38,140 And one possible motivation for attitude is in this case is the recognition that 384 00:42:38,140 --> 00:42:44,080 the Ajram does not care about keeping his promises as such and would break them 385 00:42:44,080 --> 00:42:49,560 the moment the unpleasant consequences of we would be either avoidable or all 386 00:42:49,560 --> 00:42:59,200 outweighed by the pleasures for the sake of which he would break his promises. This suggests that we consider an agent trustworthy or responsible. 387 00:42:59,200 --> 00:43:09,970 Only if he finds some positive satisfaction in promise, keeping as such an agent who derives a feeding of part of freedom from his promise keeping. 388 00:43:09,970 --> 00:43:15,820 Thereby find some positive satisfactory it gratifies is willing to part. 389 00:43:15,820 --> 00:43:21,730 But of course, the pleasure derived from satisfying the root bar could conceivably still be outweighed by the pleasure afforded 390 00:43:21,730 --> 00:43:28,650 by the gratification of other stronger impulses solely chingo crude's that we consider truly responsible. 391 00:43:28,650 --> 00:43:36,060 Of summary. Only the individual in whom the instinct for freedom to Winterbourne has become, as he puts it, the dominant. 392 00:43:36,060 --> 00:43:44,300 It's No. And this is a move that is unmotivated for the cheap but very important to second nature. 393 00:43:44,300 --> 00:43:52,930 Goals must take significant step further. Probably escaping and the self mastery it requires is a source not only of pleasure, 394 00:43:52,930 --> 00:43:59,350 but also as if instead of proper self-esteem, the possession of a durable, 395 00:43:59,350 --> 00:44:10,330 reliable RIL is for the sobering individual, a standard of thought in terms of which determines what is respectable, honourable or contemptible. 396 00:44:10,330 --> 00:44:15,940 Being responsible, being responsible is therefore not just a pleasant state in which is desirable, 397 00:44:15,940 --> 00:44:24,280 is ready for it is a standing or status in which defining Davonte with power of freedom is instantiated. 398 00:44:24,280 --> 00:44:30,370 Being responsible makes him honourable and worthy of respect. 399 00:44:30,370 --> 00:44:37,930 The notion of responsibility pawsey be framed, not the concept of personal kaputt as a standing that warrants respect. 400 00:44:37,930 --> 00:44:42,490 Niching appears to suppose that it is so enduring legal framework which constitutes the 401 00:44:42,490 --> 00:44:48,130 conceptual breeding ground for the feeling of guilt and his concept of responsibility. 402 00:44:48,130 --> 00:44:51,790 Understood as the ability to govern one's behaviour in accordance with obligations 403 00:44:51,790 --> 00:44:56,860 or commitments bears a close resemblance to the notion of rationality, 404 00:44:56,860 --> 00:45:01,900 which has long been thought to distinguish human beings from animals and indeed say, 405 00:45:01,900 --> 00:45:07,240 as Nietzsche constitutes man's sense of superiority over the animals, 406 00:45:07,240 --> 00:45:13,990 not on the view of attributing to Nietzsche that one is the right to make promises becomes, quote, the problem organisational. 407 00:45:13,990 --> 00:45:19,810 If a privilege or evidence of state or suspending the breaking of a promise will in and of 408 00:45:19,810 --> 00:45:25,840 itself decrees once worth as a person in the way that's characteristic of ordinary guild, 409 00:45:25,840 --> 00:45:31,540 since it puts the individual standing as a responsible agent into question. 410 00:45:31,540 --> 00:45:38,740 No. There's one feature of the ordinary conception of guilt that I think this particular cold eliminates, 411 00:45:38,740 --> 00:45:44,810 and it's a feature that intrigues Nietzsche greatly himself, and it's the connexion between guilt and punishment. 412 00:45:44,810 --> 00:45:46,270 So according to the chain, 413 00:45:46,270 --> 00:45:53,860 the legal backdrop of contractual relationships is also supposed to illuminate the connexion between guilt and punishment of suffering. 414 00:45:53,860 --> 00:45:56,980 And this is before time. 415 00:45:56,980 --> 00:46:05,310 In the same way it was here that the uncanny and perhaps inextricable link up between the ideas of guilt and suffering his first court together, 416 00:46:05,310 --> 00:46:08,820 no doubt to a possible question would be you may ask why. You may ask one. 417 00:46:08,820 --> 00:46:13,240 What hall does the victim of a wrong experience, the punishment of the perpetrator? 418 00:46:13,240 --> 00:46:17,790 Or you may ask Polders forgiveness is his punishment. See some interesting psychology of guilt. 419 00:46:17,790 --> 00:46:22,240 Ambridge focus on the old amount of question. No. What's what's characteristic of it? 420 00:46:22,240 --> 00:46:25,060 Of difficulties. Relationship to his punishment. 421 00:46:25,060 --> 00:46:35,870 Well, first of all, the guilty not only accepts his punishment, which he regards as deserved, but he also welcomes it as a way of expiated his gift. 422 00:46:35,870 --> 00:46:44,650 No, it is very tempting to support, of course, that punishment experience his guilt by providing reparation for his wrongdoing. 423 00:46:44,650 --> 00:46:50,440 But this Revathi view of punishment faces some significant difficulties in the first place. 424 00:46:50,440 --> 00:46:53,860 And this is something that Nietzsche observes himself. 425 00:46:53,860 --> 00:47:00,540 Punishment is often of such a nature, various kinds of suffering, deprivation inflicted upon the perpetrator, 426 00:47:00,540 --> 00:47:06,910 but it can hardly constitute a reparation for the harm done huggin depriving the thief of his freedom, 427 00:47:06,910 --> 00:47:11,970 compensate his victims for the loss of their wealth and ask people to invest. 428 00:47:11,970 --> 00:47:16,090 It was Bernard Madoff who confronted with this programme. 429 00:47:16,090 --> 00:47:21,910 NUJ suggests, as we know, that the suffering of the guilty provides the victim of his own doing a certain pleasure, 430 00:47:21,910 --> 00:47:26,980 the pleasure of cruelty, which compensates him for them for the wrong done to him. 431 00:47:26,980 --> 00:47:29,680 But the deeper difficulty is the report, if you will. 432 00:47:29,680 --> 00:47:37,150 Punishment, however, lies in the supposing show that the guilty welcomes his punishment because he wishes, 433 00:47:37,150 --> 00:47:42,840 before all to repair the particle damage caused by his wrongdoing. 434 00:47:42,840 --> 00:47:47,350 But this is Gabriele Taylor has argued is not the case. 435 00:47:47,350 --> 00:47:57,400 This is a court folktale. Fifty. The important feature of guilt is the thought of the guilty concentrates on herself as the door of the deed, 436 00:47:57,400 --> 00:48:04,440 having brought about what he saw between she has harmed herself. She has put herself in a position where repayment from her is due. 437 00:48:04,440 --> 00:48:07,960 But the part of the payment is not always only. 438 00:48:07,960 --> 00:48:13,970 Incidently, that the more wronged should be right. This is this. 439 00:48:13,970 --> 00:48:18,370 The writing from over Rome may well be the form that the repayment takes. 440 00:48:18,370 --> 00:48:25,810 But from the point of view of the guilty person, this is only a means towards the end that she should be rid of the burden, 441 00:48:25,810 --> 00:48:29,510 that she should be able again to live with herself. 442 00:48:29,510 --> 00:48:34,300 The painfulness of the guilt feelings is therefore explained by the uneasiness of the person concerned. 443 00:48:34,300 --> 00:48:40,780 The person looks and feels herself. What matters to the guilty, in other words, is the fact that by violating her obligations, 444 00:48:40,780 --> 00:48:45,990 she has diminished her standing over words as a person and not primarily please. 445 00:48:45,990 --> 00:48:48,730 The fact that she has caused harm in doing so. 446 00:48:48,730 --> 00:48:55,540 Accordingly, the port of undergoing punishment is to restore that much spending, not to repair any harm she has caused, 447 00:48:55,540 --> 00:49:01,660 even if the punishment provides some premeditation is apparently from ejido and stopped nearly two years ago, 448 00:49:01,660 --> 00:49:07,140 I think helps us to see what punishment could ever assumed this peculiar significance for the guilty. 449 00:49:07,140 --> 00:49:12,550 In his view, remember, the feeling of guilt is a consequence of the breaking of a promise. 450 00:49:12,550 --> 00:49:21,010 No, he observes that even into pre-war legal, proper contractual framework under which the concept of guilt is supposed to emerge. 451 00:49:21,010 --> 00:49:25,240 The breaking of a promise is already wrong in two different respects. 452 00:49:25,240 --> 00:49:30,940 There is what he calls the immediate damage done by the agents breaking of some pretty promise. 453 00:49:30,940 --> 00:49:36,550 And then there is the loss of his standing as a responsible agent who has the right to make promises. 454 00:49:36,550 --> 00:49:40,960 This is part of the fourth never succeed in sentencing. 455 00:49:40,960 --> 00:49:44,800 The major damage done by the offender is what you are talking about. 456 00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:55,330 This is quite apart from this. The moderator is paid Braco, somebody who has broken his contract and his work. 457 00:49:55,330 --> 00:50:01,540 So in this pre-war contractual context, did you suggests the standing loss is simply that of a trustworthy, 458 00:50:01,540 --> 00:50:08,620 reliable promise keeper, which presumably matters to the agent and essentially prudential rights in losing constantly? 459 00:50:08,620 --> 00:50:14,890 He deprived himself of the benefits of contractual relationships, particularly doors that bind him to a community. 460 00:50:14,890 --> 00:50:20,830 The purpose of punishment as this case is not simply to repair the immediate damage he has done, 461 00:50:20,830 --> 00:50:25,600 but to attend to risk to restore his status as a reliable from his keep. 462 00:50:25,600 --> 00:50:29,440 Likewise, in the context of Lorelei's indebtedness, 463 00:50:29,440 --> 00:50:36,280 the wrongdoers violation of his obligation affects his self-esteem by putting his worth as a person into question. 464 00:50:36,280 --> 00:50:43,030 What he won comes from punishment is not the opportunity to repair the immediate damage his transgression has caused, 465 00:50:43,030 --> 00:50:50,920 but an opportunity to restore his standing as a responsible agent. That is to say, not just somebody who is reliable and trustworthy, 466 00:50:50,920 --> 00:50:57,520 contract partner in the eyes of others, but are somebody who is a sovereign individual, 467 00:50:57,520 --> 00:51:05,200 one who masters his desires and emotions and is so able to conduct his life in accordance with the commitments he has undertaken. 468 00:51:05,200 --> 00:51:12,070 So to restore his standing, the promise breaker would have first to accept punishment or regarded as deserved. 469 00:51:12,070 --> 00:51:17,710 Such acceptance would indicate that he recognises the normatively binding character of his contractual obligations. 470 00:51:17,710 --> 00:51:26,960 But he chicos the solemnity and sanctity of this promise. Did indeed acknowledge also that he was wrong and violated. 471 00:51:26,960 --> 00:51:35,200 But this rule, of course, doesn't suffice to quantify him as a responsible agent who has the right to be probably seems to have this right. 472 00:51:35,200 --> 00:51:38,440 He must also have acquired a memory of the world, that is to say, 473 00:51:38,440 --> 00:51:43,880 the ability to maintain his motivation to fulfil his promises regardless of interview. 474 00:51:43,880 --> 00:51:50,670 And even some designs, in other words, the merit to merit to the standing of a responsible agent. 475 00:51:50,670 --> 00:51:57,060 He must not only sincerely believe that he ought to keep his promises, he must also prove capable of doing so. 476 00:51:57,060 --> 00:52:02,880 His ability to endure the punishment would aim to provide precisely such a proof. 477 00:52:02,880 --> 00:52:11,940 Keeping one's promises requires the capacity to withstand the suffering caused by the deliberate frustration of conflicting desires and emotions. 478 00:52:11,940 --> 00:52:18,960 By welcoming and withstanding this punishment, the wrongdoer would seek to demonstrate that he still possesses this capacity. 479 00:52:18,960 --> 00:52:24,840 Contrary to what is present, wrongdoing may suggest this may also be one. 480 00:52:24,840 --> 00:52:33,860 It is not untypical of the wrongdoer who seeks to restore his responsible starting to find merit compensation for the particular wrong. 481 00:52:33,860 --> 00:52:39,540 He has done insufficient and to insist on overcompensation what might look like 482 00:52:39,540 --> 00:52:45,900 excessive punishment in order to provide a firmer proof of his responsibility. 483 00:52:45,900 --> 00:52:52,440 So it's not always the case. So let me go through. 484 00:52:52,440 --> 00:52:57,890 Let me come to the dispute. The time to which I handed it to beginning to get christner. 485 00:52:57,890 --> 00:53:03,270 Guilty, Chief. In fact, this is a rational. 486 00:53:03,270 --> 00:53:08,790 In the interpretation I propose proposing year genial neches years of Christian guilt exposes it as a rational, 487 00:53:08,790 --> 00:53:19,660 partially rational passions are passions to which only a rational being is susceptible because they essentially exploit his responsiveness to reasons. 488 00:53:19,660 --> 00:53:27,640 I cannot like any other passion over rational portions of themselves responsive to such reasons. 489 00:53:27,640 --> 00:53:29,860 But this is important. 490 00:53:29,860 --> 00:53:38,980 It is a distinctive trait of rational passions that their gratification requires at least the appearance of reason responsiveness. 491 00:53:38,980 --> 00:53:46,080 It follows that, whereas ordinary passions typically would only override or bypass reason. 492 00:53:46,080 --> 00:53:56,440 The value McMeel pretends to be responsive to recent Russian abortions who need such qualities will often end up corrupting responsiveness to reason. 493 00:53:56,440 --> 00:54:01,270 Give me an example. Example Nietzsche quite lost. 494 00:54:01,270 --> 00:54:08,430 The narcissistic penchant for thinking weathervanes is an instance of irrational passion to be susceptible to such a passion, 495 00:54:08,430 --> 00:54:14,020 to narcissism, to be responsive to norms and to serve self-assessment reconfirm. 496 00:54:14,020 --> 00:54:24,540 But in order to ensure its own gratification, his partner might also medium to correct these norms so as to ensure a favourable self-assessment. 497 00:54:24,540 --> 00:54:28,660 But what I want to suggest is that the Christian skilled is another instance of 498 00:54:28,660 --> 00:54:33,280 irrational passion passions which it is the passion for thinking ill of oneself, 499 00:54:33,280 --> 00:54:42,970 all as the chief would say, to support the will, to find oneself, to find find himself guilty and condemned his article three feet. 500 00:54:42,970 --> 00:54:46,480 Nietzsche argues that Christian guilt operates was normative expectations that 501 00:54:46,480 --> 00:54:52,210 have been distorted by his passion for self debasement as he conceives of it. 502 00:54:52,210 --> 00:54:54,970 Guilt, Christian guilt is indebtedness towards God, 503 00:54:54,970 --> 00:55:01,000 which is the most extreme development of a particular form of indebtedness or indebtedness to the ancestors. 504 00:55:01,000 --> 00:55:06,100 The individual is justified in feeling it that it only if he believes that God, the ancestors, 505 00:55:06,100 --> 00:55:10,590 has in fact delivered the goods for the possession of which he feels indebted to. 506 00:55:10,590 --> 00:55:17,620 You know, the distinctive feature of Christian guilt is that it is an experiment. 507 00:55:17,620 --> 00:55:23,320 It is next to a law because God's gift itself is of such transcendence and holiness 508 00:55:23,320 --> 00:55:31,180 that it cannot be paid off by finite animals are a finite animal being such as we are. 509 00:55:31,180 --> 00:55:37,510 As Nietzsche indicates, the problem is not just that that's cannot be paid off, but that guilt is an experience. 510 00:55:37,510 --> 00:55:46,510 That is to say, it's not just that a Christian cannot compensate God, but that he cannot reclaim is standing as a responsible agent. 511 00:55:46,510 --> 00:55:54,910 Indeed, in so far as he was never able to fulfil his obligations to God, he could never even claim that standing in the first place. 512 00:55:54,910 --> 00:56:01,240 No. Here's the thing. If Christian guilt was responsive to the normative logic of indebtedness, 513 00:56:01,240 --> 00:56:08,980 we wouldn't expect a loss in a loss of belief in the existence of far of God to result in a loss of guilt. 514 00:56:08,980 --> 00:56:16,390 As Nietzsche puts it, this is number 18 we should be justified in. 515 00:56:16,390 --> 00:56:22,330 Did you think his normal probability that from the unstoppable decline in the face of the Christian God, 516 00:56:22,330 --> 00:56:26,500 there is even not a considerable decline in the consciousness of guilt? 517 00:56:26,500 --> 00:56:30,640 But Nietzsche observes, this is precisely not what happens each year. 518 00:56:30,640 --> 00:56:39,100 The facts diverge from this in a terrible way, with the bodies ation of the concepts, guilt and duty and their relegation to bad conscience. 519 00:56:39,100 --> 00:56:46,520 We have in reality, an attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have described, or at least to halt its movement. 520 00:56:46,520 --> 00:56:52,270 Now the prospect for once and for payment is to be for a cause. 521 00:56:52,270 --> 00:56:59,410 This, of course, leads Nietzsche to surmise that what is at work in Christian guilt is not answerability to existing norms of self-assessment, 522 00:56:59,410 --> 00:57:03,640 but the correction of self directed cruelty. Quote, 523 00:57:03,640 --> 00:57:10,210 You will already have guessed what has really gone on with all this behind all this that will determine to 524 00:57:10,210 --> 00:57:17,680 oneself that suppressed cruelty of animal man who has been frighting back into himself and given little life. 525 00:57:17,680 --> 00:57:22,480 We have here a sort of madness of the willing showing itself in mental cruelty, 526 00:57:22,480 --> 00:57:28,180 which is a part of man's will to find himself guilty and condemned without hope of reprieve, 527 00:57:28,180 --> 00:57:33,520 his will to think of himself as punished without the punishment ever measuring up to the crime. 528 00:57:33,520 --> 00:57:42,730 This will to set up an ideal of God in order to be palpably convinced of his own absolute worthlessness in the face of this psycho. 529 00:57:42,730 --> 00:57:48,430 It is not, in other words, because he happens to believe in a transcendent God to whom he owes more than he can repay. 530 00:57:48,430 --> 00:57:55,420 The Depression feels guilty. It is wrong to, because of his will, to find himself guilty that he believes in such a God. 531 00:57:55,420 --> 00:58:01,180 So in the judge's view that Christianity did not invent the ordinary concept of guilt. 532 00:58:01,180 --> 00:58:08,480 But under the sway of. Anymore, bad conscience transformed it into a perfect instrument of self directed cruelty. 533 00:58:08,480 --> 00:58:16,740 By introducing the notion of guilt towards God, put this man of bad conscience that she writes has seised on religious precepts in 534 00:58:16,740 --> 00:58:22,190 order to provide the self-torture with its most horrific hardness and sharpness, 535 00:58:22,190 --> 00:58:27,170 guilt towards God. This all becomes an instrument of torture. 536 00:58:27,170 --> 00:58:30,580 No, it is self directed cruelty in the first place. 537 00:58:30,580 --> 00:58:39,020 In so far as it is precisely in virtue of harbouring animal instinct such as cruelty, that man fails to fulfil his obligation towards a holy God. 538 00:58:39,020 --> 00:58:42,770 Quote, In God, he seises upon the ultimate antithesis. 539 00:58:42,770 --> 00:58:50,030 He confined to his real and irredeemable demotes things. He reinterprets these selfsame animal instincts as guilt before God. 540 00:58:50,030 --> 00:58:59,930 And it is also a perfect form of self directed cruelty insofar as it represents guilt as it experienced prior to its Christian reinterpretation. 541 00:58:59,930 --> 00:59:04,100 The distinctive feeding of diminished self esteem experienced by the guilty could 542 00:59:04,100 --> 00:59:08,750 only be an imperfect instrument of self-torture because guilt could always, 543 00:59:08,750 --> 00:59:16,400 in principle, be expiated. One only had to undergo punishment to restore one's voice as a person once it is conceivable, 544 00:59:16,400 --> 00:59:20,840 conceived as inexplicable guilt towards God by the loss of words. 545 00:59:20,840 --> 00:59:31,490 As a person becomes absolute, a loss which nothing can redeem short of radical self-denial, short or repudiation of one's animal nature. 546 00:59:31,490 --> 00:59:38,780 Which of course leads us to the acetic aspiration for aspiration to a quite different kind of existence. 547 00:59:38,780 --> 01:00:20,240 This, of course, is a story for another time.