So I'd like to start out by thanking Peter not just for inviting people, organising and finding really spectacular.
I don't know that I've ever been to one as large as this, which has run as smoothly as this has.
And the quality of the sessions has been wonderful.
Thank you. Thank you very much.
OK, so I've taken the topics of the conference mind in nature as an opportunity to reflect on Nietzsche's attacks on dualism.
My nature, after all, two of the familiar terms in which the traditional dualism has been stated.
And I think every reader and nature quickly sees that he's a vigorous opponent of such
dualism and that he insists to the country that might be understood as a part of nature.
So he embraces some version of this. This is most vividly expressed in a famous passage from South Australia.
But the awakened one, the one who knows, says Body am I through and through.
And nothing besides. And soul is merely a word for something about the body.
By the way, I haven't. There's an end out there which has a kind of outline of a tough rhythm.
Some of the quotations I want to show, though, the issue is much more complex and I hope more interesting than it might have for a scene.
I want to show that on the one hand, Nietzsche's attack on dualism carries him very far, much further than we initially expected.
It carries him indeed to a radical feminism that is, however, very hard to square with this other strong commitments.
And so Nietzsche has repeatedly pulled back from this modernism to duellist abuse at seeming odds with it.
This opens up a great tension, an apparent contradiction in his thinking and poses the question what philosophical means he has for addressing it.
This tension is aligned with certain others in his thought, in particular without advising from his perspective.
As I think examining this issue over monism versus dualism throws helpful light on some of these other basic issues as well.
And let me just insert quickly here. This is a new topic for me.
This is a topic on which my thinking has in many ways not quite crystallised yet.
So I hope you'll bear with me for a certain. And I may be shifting and uncertain character in some of what I have to say.
Now, as I said, I think our first reaction is that he rejects dualism altogether.
Let me start with a sketch of some pretty familiar elements of this critique of dualism and of the view nature offers in its place.
Nature doesn't especially identify this dualism with Descartes. But he clearly has a focus,
I think a view we ourselves call Cartesian distinguishing immaterial mind a thinking thing from body defined as entirely as extended thinking
and extension matter in mind out of such utterly different ontological categories that they support completely different sets of properties.
It's nonsense to suppose that mind could have a weight or a shape or that matter could have feelings or views.
Nietzsche's attack runs mainly against the mind side of this dualism.
So Antichrist 14 says that Descartes boldly viewed animals as machines.
But we go further and view humans as such, too.
We see consciousness as a symptom of, quote, the relative imperfection of the organism.
Pure spirit is a pure stupidity. When we discount the nervous system and the senses, the mortal shroud.
We miscount nothing more. But really, I think nature rejects both sides of the duality.
There's no merely material body anymore than there is an incorporeal mind.
If he absorbs mind and the body, it is into a body with very different properties than Descartes smatter.
Indeed, each argues that Cartesian extension is something we interpret into the world.
It's not real, much less essential. Instead, he thinks a body is essentially a capacity definiteness.
Moreover, he crucially thinks that this capacity as intentional in the sense that it means and aims at things.
So body the one substance there is has as its most important properties,
not extension for weight or shape, but in attending's that Descartes would have restricted to mind.
Thus, nature promotes against that dualism of mind in nature an ontological bonus.
Ultimately, there is only one kind of entity, one basic way of being an entity.
Everything is of the same sort. I'll call this being Monas.
Each associates this monism and many of the related views will examine with Heraclitus.
So from a philosophy of a tragic age of the Greeks, Nietzsche says that Heraclitus, quote,
denied the duality of totally diverse worlds, a position which the next commander had been compelled to assume.
He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one.
I'll point out these connexions at various points. These connexions to Heraclitus at various points as we go.
So there is one kind of entity, and for it each has one term.
He overwhelmingly prefers life. This is his crucial notion.
I think much more important to him, the nature and also or basic and will to power, which is offered as an hypothesis about life.
Accordingly, we can understand life as capacities that aim or mean everything that is according to nature is such a directness.
However, we also know that values are much more important to nature than facts.
Even more important than very basic ontological facts. So more important than his attack amounts, a logical dualism is a parallel campaign.
He fights against valuated dualism. And this is going to be the real focus of my cock.
Indeed, I think his main objection to being dualism is it serves as a prop for value dualism.
People have needed to believe that being is doable and supported their belief that values are true.
This is why nature cares about the Cartesian dualism so much. It's associated with a sickness in our values,
and this sickness is more directly expressed in our tendency towards a value dualism, our faith in opposite values.
This attack of value dualism plays a major role in this thought.
It's not too much to say. I suggest that this rejection is his main reply to morality.
His main motive for replacing moral with aesthetic values, or, to put it another way,
gets his main motive for replacing a morality of good versus evil with values of good versus bad.
This attack on opposite values has been widely noticed,
but it may be more controversial to claim that nature intends to replace it with a modernism about values and others.
I mean this differently than a common. There is a common use of humanism,
but the use that I've been able to find is a view that makes a view that claims that all intrinsic value lies in a single property.
For example, happiness. I need something more radical and I think difficult than that view.
I mean, instead, the claim that everything has the same kind of value or indeed is maybe going a little too far.
Everything has the same value in furniture.
That value is good. So the idea valuable is value voters and I suggest is that everything is good.
So values are discrepant kinds. They aren't opposite or indeed ultimately different from one another.
Now, initially, this doesn't seem like an appealing or even a coherent position, nor something that we might recognise in nature yet.
I think it's one of the views that he holds, dearest. It finds expression in many places in different degrees of completeness.
And I want to remind you of this value Mon ISM's ultimate form, where it's expressed in several of his most famous ideas.
All of them are entangled with one another, as these photos show. These views aren't saying yes, you turtle return.
I'm awful empty and the DI Nicaea. So first Nature most prides himself as someone who says yes.
He says yes to everything, even what seems most unsatisfactory in or about life, both his own life and life in general.
He commands or indeed preaches this attitude to us. This is our ancestors identity to be the ultimate yes.
Sayer quote, the opposite of a no same spirit. That's from Mecca.
And each of presents himself. So in gay science, two, seven six.
He presents this as his New Year's ambition as a New Year's resolution.
I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things because what is beautiful in them.
Thus, I will I will be one of those who make things beautiful.
Then there's a sentence about on 40. I do not want to accuse.
I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let walking away be my only negation.
And all in all, I know the whole. Someday I want only to be a yes sayer.
Now I agree with Bernard in his recent book on the importance of this, Bernard says that,
quote, Nature regards the affirmation of life as his defining philosophical achievement.
So I take the paper to explore as a word.
At least one radical form that this affirmation of life takes a second set of passages of concern.
Of course, the thought of eternal return gets entangled with this, saying yes,
so echa homo won't get the full reference introduces a total return as the highest possible formula of affirmation.
One's ability to embrace eternal return is telling precisely because it shows that one can say yes to everything,
even the most repellent features of life.
So the thought of eternal return serves are stre as quote, one more reason for himself to be the eternal yes to all things the incredible boundless.
Yes, saying a menacing third set of passages concern more far to one example again from Eickhout Homo.
Both a formula for greatness in a human being is off or phonte.
That one wants nothing to be different. Not forward, not backward, not an all eternity, not merely bare what is necessary, but love.
And then fourthly, the die. Nicaea also, of course, involves this.
Yes. Saying passage from God to power.
Ten forty one quote a diet Nicaea. An affirmation of the world as it is without subtraction, exception or selection.
The highest state a philosopher can attain to stand in a diet ICN relationship to existence.
My formula for this is 14 and then go to PowerGen 52.
The note says that in the nine ICN state quote, being is counted as wholly enough to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering.
Now, it might be doubted, though, that this saying yes, even saying yes to everything,
really involves a value moaners that is saying that each thing is good.
So Miten, Nietzsche's point instead, B, that the sum or totality of life is good.
Not that every single instance of it is. So like his idea B, that there are a lot of bad things in the totality.
But that they're outweighed by the good things. So the affirmation, as it were, applies to the totality.
But it's not distributed down to each member. All of the individual entities in this case, the affirmation would be only a yes to the song.
And often it seems that that's what nature is indeed saying.
It seems that he's judge in the aggregate and that he's not inclined in some passages to say that the weak or the sick or the herd,
like, for example, are good. But I'm going to argue that nature means,
at least at these moments when he thinks ultimate thoughts about eternal return and so on, that we must say yes to each thing.
That is, we have to recognise each thing as good. So the affirmation, I'm going to say is also at least.
Yes. To each. We've seen that willing a turtle return requires saying yes to even the most repellent parts or aspects of life.
The drama of South Australia, in fact, hinges on the difficulty of this last step, too.
Will the recurrence of even the most loathsome Zarit history marks how it is easy to turn eternal return into a Mires song, pretty dirty song.
It's also translated depicting the cyclical character of everything beautifully.
What's hard is to think this thought with respect to what one dislikes the most in Zarit distress case,
the small man to the tawdry in, I think himself and in others.
The challenge is not just to say yes to a world that contains this, I suggest, but to say yes to this particular detested thing itself.
Also notice in this regard how homo develops the indispensability of the small and the sick in nature himself.
He loves even this about himself.
This distribution of intrinsic value down to every individual bit of life is buttressed by nature's metaphysical claim that everything is essential.
Nothing in the world and all its history could be different without everything being different.
Inasmuch as everything is essential, to say yes to anything requires saying yes to everything.
This is a passage from our first drug. Did you ever say yes to a single joy?
All my friends. Then you said yes to all well as well. All things are chained together, entwined in love.
If you ever wanted one time. A second time. If you ever said you please me.
Happiness quick moment. Then you wanted it all back.
Nevertheless, I think even this isn't as strong as nature sometimes makes the point,
for it still allows that many things could be good only instrumentally, only because they are necessary for other things that are good.
It allows that although we say yes to each thing,
we say yes to some of these things only because there are a means to necessary for other things that are intrinsically good.
But I claim to each other at least sometimes wants the point to be that they are also good intrinsically.
That is good in their own right or for themselves. So I suggest the affirmation of least sometimes is even stronger.
It's a yes to each for itself. So it's not enough to value the weak for the use they serve to the strong or to the economy of the whole.
We must somehow value weakness for itself.
Now, as we'll see, one main argument he makes is that weakness, for example, is not just causally necessary for certain goods,
but essential or logically necessary in such a way that it is a constituent element of those goods.
Now, notice that even that still leaves these things goodness dependent on an argument from the goodness of the more encompassing things.
And I don't think the media is always content even with that.
It's not clear that weakness would be intrinsically good in this case, where it's good as an element in a larger situation.
So look it w will to power two nine three. Nothing that happened at all can be in itself reprehensible for one should not want to eliminate it,
for everything is so bound up with everything else that to want to exclude something means to exclude everything.
Reprehensible action means of representing the world. And sometimes the point is that everything,
at least everything alive is in and by itself wholly and in some sense of equal value as our illustrious animals put it.
The centre is everywhere that that seems to me to articulate the idea that everything is of equal value.
Now, these ideas. Nature into harmony with certain mysticism and Cathy isms, Heraclitus passage, the God.
Day, night. Winter. Summer war. Peace. Satiety.
Hunger and philosophy. The tragic age of the Greeks says about Heraclitus.
But before the gods fire gaze, not a crop of injustice remains in the world.
For all around him. For each, too. The views associated with the day of vacation of all life.
It's not just good, but holy wield power. 1005, says the children.
Howard, quote, did not understand how to deify the will.
He failed to grasp that there can be an infinite variety of ways of being different.
Even a being God will to power 10 50, says the God at the nine ICN means quote,
the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good.
Even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life and to power tend to be too, says the Duyen.
ICN, is the religious affirmation of life like whole and not denied, or in part now.
One way to put the puzzle behind eventually going to come back to is mysticism is commonly promote a non willing or selflessness.
So how can this value Moate ism that I'm attributing to Nicha be consistent with in nature, with the promotion of willing and selfishness?
Now, as mysticism as must be, this is both very hard to spell out and very hard to adhere to.
It's difficult to state this value mon ism in a way that seems coherent.
It seems to issue in various contradictions. Does saying that everything is good.
And so denying opposite values mean that nothing is bad?
Or if we say that some things are bad. How is this consistent with also saying yes to that?
And don't values need to come with opposites? To say that X is good requires some.
Supposing that something else is, by contrast, bad, it seems.
What sense can there be in saying that everything is good?
It seems that nature must be pulled to a value dualism by the very need to make judgements, pro and con.
This difficulty is compounded if we take the view to be that everything is not just good but equally good centres everywhere.
For this case, not only can we distinguish some is good and others as bad, but we can't even make distinctions amongst.
Yes, right. But we can't even make distinctions amongst the good. We can't frank the good.
We can't make up for the loss of the contrast turned bad by shifting to the idea.
That's good.
This makes it harder to see how the all affirming stance is consistent with valuing at all, since valuing, it seems, involves making distinctions.
Moreover, further complication. Some bits of life are themselves cases of say no.
So when we say yes to everything, it seems we are also saying yes to say no.
This calls into question in what sense nature can be commending to us saying yes rather than saying no.
Isn't he in effect saying sorry? Isn't he in effect saying yes to saying yes, but saying no to saying no?
Hence not universally affirming after all. So there are these various puzzles, I think, that are wrapped up in this idea.
Moreover, Nietzsche will be the first to say that living requires not just saying yes, but also saying no.
Sometimes he seems to make this very point in reply to the most ideas that we've just looked at.
So we'll to power three, three,
three to desire that something should be different from what it is means to desire that everything should be different.
It involves a condemnatory critique of the whole. But life itself is such a desire.
So life involves desiring the desiring is itself a wanting to be other.
That is strictly a rejecting of the whole life indeed requires us not just to say no,
but even to hate and fight against some things, as Nietzsche himself obviously did.
And so to say, a very emphatic and vehement no.
Indeed, when the Diane Isy instance loves destruction, it loves the most violently practical way of saying no.
So how can that value monism be liveable or even coherent?
Once nature makes value, monism require so very much as he does in those thoughts about universal affirmation.
He sets a lower standard. For a value dualism, which is very difficult then for him to avoid falling into now,
Nietzsche himself is well aware of the apparent discrepancy between his claimed
identity as the ultimate yes sayer and his constant devastating attacks and critiques.
Hello. I obey my day and I see a nature which does not know how to separate doing no from saying yes nature more
acutely and aggressively than any of us wants to bring out evaluative differences and distinctions,
ways that some things fail and fall short of ways they might and should be.
Indeed, one of these, as noted, this is very attack on value dualism.
But this makes him prone to certain value judgements after all.
Moreover, the need to say no, so it radically overriding or suspending the monism in his values leads nature to temperate.
I suggest in his ontology as well, he's pulled towards a by frication of organisms or persons who are drives into two opposite kinds,
reflecting their sharply different intrinsic value. Everything is life.
Indeed, but life comes into antithetic all kinds.
One of which has lost part of what is essential to life. It not only takes a position against life,
it's a. like it falls away from the full nature of life and nature especially tends to view mine or reason in.
In particular in this way. So that he reproduces.
Started out with the seeming dualism of mind in nature.
I'm suggesting now is that he replaces he, as it were, repeats this dualism in some of his thoughts in the Valley.
Which of realm? He reproduces a version of the mind nature dualism, after all, by making mine a principle contrary to life.
So he bifurcates into active, reactive, healthy, sick, weak, strong, as if they are distinct kinds of persons or organisms.
Of course, we find this tendency of leeches to bifurcates and many other places as well,
you know, beginning with the Apollonian diet ICN distinction also in The Master Slave.
And so on. OK.
Now, in many cases, in many such cases,
he uses by Frication to express a kind of fervour or even fury that's comparable to the moral denunciations he criticises.
This doonas tendency is most active where nature offers his values most truly, which is in the Antichrist longboat.
I think I won't read, but if it's from Antichrist 18 condemning the Christian idea of God.
The problem, man, is to explain how nature can be at once.
The person who says yes to life in general and in each particular, and the one who is relentlessly and harshly negative in most of his appraiser's.
And what's a value noticed and a value duellist?
Now, I think a first reaction to my sketch of this problem is that his real allegiance is to neither Votizen nor dualism,
and that we should really see him as a pluralist with respect to being or what is.
We remark his emphasis on the great diversity of different kinds of life and persons and social and historical settings.
Similarly, with respect to values, Nietzsche thinks that the value of people comes in a great hierarchy of degrees, all the steps up the ladder.
He so often imagines, however, I think these pluralism is about being a value, are really consistent with his mannerisms here.
The great diversity of forms of life, after all. All forms of life, the one fundamental kind of thing there is.
And similarly, I'll try to show for the great hierarchy or ladder of values, they are all ways of having the goodness that belongs to life.
So the pluralism by itself, I think, doesn't pose a threat to my account of beaches.
Monas. However, the pluralism may be associated with another doctrine that raises greater problems.
And this is nature's so-called perspective.
Sometimes it seems he gives authority concerning being concerning values to all, or at least to a great plurality of perspectives.
He makes being an value person at times.
It seems we might take into exemplify this perspective ism in his own freewheeling way of articulating a great scatter of perspectives all by himself.
So he sometimes expresses phoniest sympathy sentiments, other times duellist, other times pluralist.
But the last suggestion maybe is also the view of the pluralist is also the view that he holds at the metal level.
And so there's a kind of perspective of pluralism which embeds Môn ism and dualism within it.
Now, for these and other reasons, it may well seem that there isn't a serious question here as to whether each is an honest or.
But I want to persuade you that these are indeed two powerful tendencies or inclinations
in one or the other of which finds expression in most of his most famous views.
I'm not going to skip the section which which I compact's on the topic of the conference and discuss the being monas teeth to this kind of nature.
And I'm going to turn to I want to focus now on one famous way that each of states has value modernism as an attack on opposite values.
The most prominent locus for this is his critique of metaphysics and beyond good and evil, too.
There's a famous passage for the fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the eighth in opposite values and beyond good and evil, too.
It goes on to say that no one may doubt first whether there are any opposites at all.
Moreover, it's possible that both what constitutes the value of these good and revered things is
precisely that they are insidiously related to a related tie to an involved with these wicked,
seemingly opposite things. Maybe even one with them.
In essence, this line of thought is developed in many other places, both later and beyond, good and evil and elsewhere.
So beyond good and evil 47 quote The dominion of morals.
It believed in opposite moral values and saw read interpreted these opposites into the text and the facts zoref.
Thus draw the historical zah at this try. Nature's conception was in the adventure of the good evil opposition of the value of dualism.
And so the spokes are the story is the story of his recantation of that dualism.
This is a point that we find Meachem make it from very early on,
read a passage from human to human, the very first section of it, which I am going to skip over.
I think it's clear that this rejection of opposite values is part of the complaint against the values of good versus evil,
the kind of values he often calls just slave morality and sometimes just morality.
I think it's clear this rejection of opposite values that that part of his
criticism of these values is directed against what they value their content,
but that some of it is also directed against how they value his contents.
And of that formal part of his criticism of good, evil, morality part is against the way good and evil polarises or bifurcates the world.
So when Nicha offers his own valuations of things healthy or sick, as strong or weak, as high or low, I'm going to sum these as simply good and bad.
He presumably means those contrasts not as opposite values.
So I think we can take it that the sense in which nature denies that values are opposite is a key to the sense in which he rejects value dualism.
Hence to the way he's a value, honest. So just what does nature mean by his denial of obvious about?
It seems a natural and obvious distinction in Nietzsche's voice. But what does a really consistent.
What is it to have one's values as opposites? In what sense are good and evil meant as opposites?
But each his own values of good. Bad. Not now.
Not surprisingly, analysis shows. I think that nature means a variety of things.
In his critiques of opposite values, in the various passages in which he treats this theme, I want to try to organise some of this variety.
I'm going to arrange it from weakest to strongest,
starting with the more obvious in ordinary things he means and building to the more radical and difficult.
These weaker points, I think, are, as it were, the steps by which he tries to help us and himself up to the ultimate lesson.
And we when we get to the most radical sense, we will have arrived back at the strong value voters in my survey before.
And I'm then going to return to the question how nature can consistently or coherently hold it now before proceeding to this catwalk.
I need to make a few background orienting points.
I want to set it aside a couple of special issues that cut against the grain of the senses that distinguish.
So first, background point, these senses that all distinguish of having opposite values,
the value dualism are all ways of thinking about one's values.
They're matters of the status one attributes to them.
Now, it might be argued against us that having opposite values is really for nature,
not a matter of how you think or as a word cognise your values, but a matter of the emotive force with which you hold them.
So in the receptors, no, there's a special intensity of animosity towards his enemies.
And this strength or ship shape of feeling might be thought to be the really crucial element in the judgement.
Evil nature does indeed emphasise this difference in feeling that the strong birds of prey,
as he once memorably puts it, are a lot more favourably disposed towards those.
They judge bad lambs than a ladder out towards them.
But I think Nietzsche clearly believes that this emotive force is fuelled and justified by certain beliefs about the status of one's values.
Good and evil are meant are thought to be values of a particular kind.
Not just felt with a certain intensity or from certain ulterior motives.
And Nietzsche's own way of altering the feeling is by altering those beliefs,
the senses of having opposite values all distinguish second second background point.
The senses of having opposite values that are distinguish are all meant as general points about how any values are held.
So I'm taking them as not directed against and limited to particular value contents.
Now sometimes we'll see when we look at the passages that nature's complaint is not against having opposite values per say,
but against valuing certain particular things as opposites.
Viewing certain things as an opposite. It's sometimes that seems to be more a critique of the good evil opposition as it is widely held today.
But these particular things called evil are in fact a better.
More valuable than those called. Good. So aggressiveness or suffering were taken as evil, but are in fact value.
And the Diane ICN embraces these. In particular, it might be thought, but not other things.
So go to power. Ten, forty one.
It is part of this by an icy and state to perceive not merely the necessity of those sides of existence hitherto denied,
but their desirability and not their desirability merely in relation to the sides hitherto affirmed,
perhaps as a compliment, a precondition, but for their own sake, as the more powerful,
more fruitful, truer sides of existence in which its we'll find clearer expression.
So note, if you will, side about just valuing the good side, and that seems to open an opposite kind of dualism.
And that's in fact, the way that particular passage goes on, since nature very often makes his point against opposite values.
With respect to good and evil, we have to consider whether he really would apply the point to his own values.
Would he also say of the things he calls bad or sick or weak or hurt like that?
They are also good. My claim is that he does.
That he that he denies that dualism. He denies dualism and affirms a kind of monism also with respect to his own values.
So my suggestion is that we need to separate out from his attacks on the evil, the good evil dichotomy.
Those elements that are directed against or only value balut, given its content, the particular trade signals.
Good. And the problem of value dualism is the question whether it turns out to be mostly a matter of context.
So the neches on values are just about as dualistic as equal values.
So in the following I'm going to preserve the Deach also means to deny that his good and bad are opposite values,
that his arguments against opposite values militate against taking good and bad.
So as well. Now, let's proceed now to the things that each a might and sometimes does, I think mean by his attack on having opposite values.
So the first and weakest suggestion is those values.
Good and bad don't originate. You aren't somehow rounded different ontological rules.
So good in particular doesn't issue from an immaterial substance such as a free and rational soul.
Sometimes the opposite, less of dualistic values seems to lie just in the claim.
These values are grounded in such a dualism,
so each often makes the point that good actions must be explained by the same naturalistic principles that apply to the bad.
In particular, the same aggressive and sensual bodily drives that have long been blamed for bad
behaviour are also the ultimate source of even our most altruistic and saintly acts.
Will to power three seven five four.
All the drives and powers that morality praises seem to me to be essentially the same as those in games and rejects.
That is our Chief Justice, as world power will to truth, as a tool of the will to power and wield power to seven to vote.
My purpose to demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events and the application of moral
distinctions has occasioned my perspective to demonstrate how everything praised as moral is identical,
in essence, with everything immoral and was made possible.
As in every development of morality within moral means and Morgan moral ends.
Similarly, he stresses how good and evil traits morph into one another.
Here I have another Herek Titus passage. For comparison, Heraclitus says the same.
Living and dead and waking and sleeping in young and old for these transposed are those and those transposed again are these.
So on this reading, this first reading value dualism is defined by its metaphysical postulation of another world.
Each year cleaves to a literal sense of metaphysics beyond nature.
It's postulating something apart from nature, life.
So this passage from genealogy of morality, the idea we are fighting about here is the valuation of our life on the part of the ascetic priest.
He relates our life together with that to which it belongs.
Nature, world, the entire sphere of becoming in a transitory ness to an entirely different kind of existence, which it opposes and excludes unless.
Perhaps it worked to turn against itself, to negate itself. So understood, Leach's critique of value dualism would be straightforward.
There is no such other world. No separate kind of cause will to power 786.
One has invented an antithesis to the motivating forces and believes one has described another kind of force.
One has imagined that premium will be light. That does not exist at all, according to the valuation.
That ball the antithesis moral and immoral in general. One has to say there are only immoral intentions and actions later.
Altruistic actions are only a species of egoistic actions.
So here the value of dualism Sarte here, the fear that being here, the being monism, is used to refute value dualism.
Understanding the latter as my definition, positing being dualism elsewhere.
However, I think it's clear that nature doesn't just reduce value dualism to this view that hangs on being dualism,
although being dualism is often used to support value.
He thinks the value dualism has an independent motive and an independent identity.
Then this reference to an other worldly source. Second thing,
the second somewhat stronger thing that the denial of opposite values might mean values
good that are never instantiated purely or completely to put the idea point abstractly.
No ex is ever fully good or fully bad.
But of course there are many different ways of understanding this, depending first on how we understand what replaces X in the claim as neutral means.
So first, does the point apply to types of entities or does it apply to particulars?
Is it, for example, suffering as a kind of human experience that nature claims is not fully back?
But also in this case,
nature's point might be that there are some cases in which suffering is good and he would allow it to be possible that in other cases it is just bad.
So that would be to treat, you know, what it is that is never fully good or fully bad.
As a type of of of property,
or is it rather that suffering in each instance as undergone by a particular organism in some particular situation is always good as well as bad?
Now, I encourage you to look at Nietzsche's arguments here. Many of them, I think, support only the former claim former.
We can claim, for example,
the argument that suffering is essential for growth or creativity seems to apply only to particular kinds of suffering of particular people.
But the latter view the claim that suffering. In each case is always good as well as bad.
That is obviously a much stronger view and much more difficult to argue or accept.
It does need you think that even the bodily suffering of those quite unable to overcome it and to grow through it is also good.
Nevertheless, harder to accept.
It seems to me that nature does hold this stronger view, at least in these sort of transcendent moments in which he is a universal.
Yes. Our second question that comes up about this this way of understanding the denial of opposite values.
What is the range or level of entities that the ex applies to when he says that no ex has ever fully.
Good or bad? Is it that no person is ever thoroughly good or bad?
That would leave it open that some particular acts by a person could be thoroughly good or thoroughly bad?
Or does the point apply also to particular acts such as acting from pity or experiences such as suffering a particular suffering?
Again, it seems to me if you look at Peter's arguments, I think you'll see that many of them apply only to the weaker point.
It seems to me he is trying to drive us, steer us towards the stronger point.
He wants the stronger point. He, it seems to me, wants to deny value purity all the way down.
Okay. Now why. And then I going actually skip over.
I mean, there's a further. No distinctions about that, try to examine what that value purity might how it might be understood.
You know, whether it's a matter of how the denial of the value of purity might get tested,
whether it's a matter that everything has parts that are good as well as parts that are bad,
whether it's a matter of having aspects that are good at aspects that are bad or
whether it's a matter of having facts that are good as well as effects that are bad.
If there are various ways, it seems to me that the argument gets put off by him, skip over this complexity.
Why does nature think or how does he argue that there is no pure good or bad leaving out a prospective IST argument?
I think there are two main reasons. First is an entity.
The person the drive in act is never completely good or bad because each depends practically on being the other in some way.
So will the power, 351 says,
against what he calls the PGA of the good man who separates off one side of various dualisms and insists on just his quote,
what is good on condition one also knows how to be evil.
One is evil because otherwise one would not understand how to be good.
Whence then comes the sickness, an ideological unnaturalness that rejects this doubleness, that teaches that it is a higher thing to be efficient.
On only one side, whence comes the Hemas PGA, the virtue, the invention of the good man.
This unnaturalness corresponds then to that dualistic conception of a merely good and a merely evil creature.
And so the idea is that as a practically speaking, you can only be good if you also have bad grades, only be bad if you also are good at certain ways.
You a good thief or bad idea and only be bad as a thief.
Not sure just how, but let me let me skip that over. Okay. Second second kind of argument.
I think you give nothing. No person driver act is ever completely good or bad because it inevitably has opposite effects on different
organisms or people due to the immense differences in the different people in actions say effects,
it will inevitably further some but inhibit others.
OK, now, although nature does hold all of these points, I think it would fine.
I think you'd recognise all of these as arguments that he makes in various places, makes all of these points rejecting value purity.
I think this still isn't the gist of his point. And I think we should suspect this.
When we see how easy it is to agree with most of these planes, we'll readily admit that nobody's perfect.
Perhaps we'll also be happy to apply this even to particular acts or experiences.
Isn't there always at least some tinge of the negative in any action?
Perhaps we'll also agree that things effects are multifarious and that some of them are good, some of them are bad.
In this way, this isn't very far from common sense.
It seems quite consistent with ratter ordinary admonition to analyse and sum up the manifold goods and bads of a person or an act,
and so arrive at judgements about its overall goodness or badness.
It doesn't change, as it were, the logic of good and bad themselves.
But only the conception of how they are distributed in the world, distributed in true intermittently, as it were, not concentrated or pure.
So I want to go on now to more radical claims of a claim about the logic of good and bad, rather than about how they happen to show up in the world.
So the third thing that he might mean by the denial about his account is,
is that values good and bad are scalar or comparative rather than bifurcating or inherent.
So the reasons that I talk about just now for thinking that good and bad must always be co instantiated are causal reasons and spiritual reasons.
But each, I think, also has what you might call conceptual reasons, connecting good and bad by necessity.
The simplest form of such an argument is to call something good requires that there be a bad.
It's contrasted with so there's something incoherent about hoping for a world in which bad.
The contrast case is eliminated. Again, a quote from Heraclitus for humans to get all they want is not better.
Disease makes health sweet and good hunger's. He weariness, last quote, from nature will to power three lives one.
It takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another. Not as complimentary value concepts, which would be the truth.
It advises taking the side of the good and desires. The good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots.
Yet there with actually a life which has in all its instincts, both yes and no.
But each, I think, makes us stronger and more interesting point than this.
Good requires bad not just for contrast, but as an element in itself.
Good is always an overcoming of a bad in one that way that nature argues this is with respect to suffering.
And again, I refer to Bernhard's develops this point, I think, very well.
He says that suffering is valued for its own sake because it is metaphysically necessary for creativity,
as overcoming creativity is always an overcoming of suffering.
More generally, it seems to me, we can find this logic in Nietzsche's idea of power.
As a matter of overcoming power is a growth that rises above something it leaves behind as bad.
This can be another organism that incorporates but more essentially, I think it's the inferior earlier condition itself.
Power is precisely the transition from a good, from a bad to a good.
And so depends on both elements. Hence good and bad.
And in an asymmetric relation, Reachin says the latter is presupposed by even contained within the former as what it overcomes.
But that doesn't in the same way contain good is not a dissent from the good nature draws the lesson from this applied not to good bad,
but to pleasure pain that they are therefore not opposites. This is world power.
Six, nine, nine. Pain is something different from pleasure.
I mean to say it is not. Its opposite for unpleasant. And this is now not prote but sort of summary for unplayed here isn't it.
Riedy Indian pleasure.
As we see from tickling and sex, which nature thinks are pleasures composed of quote, a certain rhythmic succession of small and pleasurable stimuli.
End quote. But pleasure is not simply contained within pain.
Similarly, Southeaster says that creating requires destroying and quote thus does the highest evil belong to the highest good.
But the latter is the creative.
This idea is expressed, of course, in the way nature so commonly thinks of values in terms of a scale or ladder of which we aspire to ascend.
Let's see. I think I'm going to have to skips things.
Yes, I'm going to skip and I'm going to go on to the fourth thing that each year might mean by the dialogue's values.
And that is what I want to say, is that each year goes an important step beyond this point that I just made,
which is I'm suggesting a kind of scalar point that there is a lack of value
and that things have value by their relative positions in this latter nature.
Those are important step beyond the scale of point. He specifies the common value which fall of these positions are degrees of.
He specifies the common value as good. So he takes the opposite stance.
We might say from Shukman power, for whom all life is bad and all quote unquote goods are merely lesser degrees of bad.
So escape from willing is, as it were, a zero degree of bad for children.
How are the best thing to do?
Now, let's say that this is really what the essay convinced to, that the common value which there are all of these degrees is good.
To say yes to something is to judge it good and saying yes to everything is to judge everything is good
is to place everything on a scale of values whose common character is that the common value is good now.
So we'll cover ten, thirty five God conceived as an emancipation from morality,
taking into himself the whole fullness of life's antithesis and in divine torment,
redeeming and justifying God as the beyond and above the wretched Bofors morality of good evil.
So if nature's ultimate judgement of things is that they are good, it seems that when he calls them bad.
This must be kind of specification of their goodness. Their badness is their way of being good.
That simply means less good at what they could do. So well.
The bad. Occupy the same scale as the grid. By contrast, in the good evil morality, the evil are not treated as good.
They don't have a common project with the good. It's not the case in that morality that their goodness is a way of being bad.
Sorry. It's so great to meet you. Out of the goodness of things on the scale is not a way of being bad.
Only the opposite poles. Now, of course we should ask, what grounds does nature have for this?
Why believe that all bad is a form of good?
Now, from God's eye point of view, why doesn't everything just become a location on this scale at once, both good to an extent and bad to an extent.
Now, in the positive this period, I think nature accepts this lesson so that from an ultimate viewpoint, there aren't a certain sense, no values.
They're just positions on a certain scale. I have a quote here from human to human one, one of seven, which I'm not going to read.
But in his later writings, he throws himself back into value into valuing everything as good.
OK. Now, why? So why do you think that's that's why I need you to think that all of the values on this scale.
Good. I think that his his argument is ultimately the role that life plays in constituting all values.
So there are values only by virtue of like value is only in life's value.
Moreover, what life values as good is itself more of itself.
So life as the transcendental condition of all values.
And as the built in aim of all values is the ultimate good.
So what we can say from the broadest perspective, the perspective of life, is that life is good.
Any distinctions we go on to make? We'll speak of only one kind of life.
This will find some life good and other life bad. So beyond.
So. So below. The Monas perspective of life itself. There's a value of pluralism.
They're different goods internally to the different perspectives. But from the transcendent point of view, point of view as a way of life itself.
Life is simply the good. And I suggest that this is a key feature of the good, bad values nature promotes in place of the good,
evil morality it operates with the orienting judgement that life itself, in general and in every instance is good.
And nature's cheap argument against the good, evil,
morality or Christianity or the ascetic ideal is that it operates with ultimately the opposite judgement that life is bad.
Now,
there is still a question of why this universal gas doesn't collapse the scale of values altogether and lead to a blanket or monochrome affirmation.
Can nature really reconcile,
harmonise this universal yes to the idea of on a comparative scale and its determination of one direction or relation as bad?
How can we affirm universally yet still say no?
How can that be a degree of good? We know that each is extremely ready to say no.
His work is not a universal yes. And in fact, he explicitly rejects that.
Make an affirmation. Certain passages. I have a quotation from Sir of those stre three A which I won't read.
So the question is, how can you just say yes to life, not just in the aggregate, but also in every individual, but also go on to say no.
That is disvalue evaluate as bad. So many things happening consistently, disvalue, anything.
This is what I want to address in the last section, which I'm going to have to skate through very quickly.
OK. So my suggestion is that each has two strategies for responding to this problem.
The problem, how he can at once affirm everything as good.
Yet on the other hand, a value which distinctions and say no to any particular things.
Now, a first so first possible answer is this.
The teacher simply passes back and forth in these different passages between two perspectives.
On the one hand, a transcendental perspective that sees light has ultimate value.
Secondly, a perspective within life, his own perspective. The disvalue is many kinds of life.
So another passage from Heraclitus, a famous passage. I guess it's not supposed to be her classes of words, but an approximation for God.
All things are beautiful. So valuing we occupy the transcendent perspective, but then we throw ourselves back into life and into the internal.
Yes and no valuing required for living. OK.
Now have passages to show that he does, in fact, think of that transcendent perspective as a perspective.
And then he thinks of it. He sometimes describes it as a temporary perspective. OK.
So one way to accommodate the dualism is to say that the moment is.
Yeah. The monism is offered from a God's eye. Super. Earth perspective, I would position the dualism is offered from within Nietzsche's personal view.
But as it stands,
I think we have to notice that this reading of nature performs a fine frication of his position into two views that don't affect one another.
The transcendental yes, saying approves of the within life saying no.
But it doesn't affect how we say no or what we say no to.
So it is in this respect, at least, podiums, it turns a wheel.
The transcendental essay doesn't affect the way in which we sing within life.
Surely that can't be so. Nature surely wants to improve the ways that we judge.
Yes and no. Within life by virtue of that honest insight.
Now, I think there are resources to begin to answer that challenge already within the perspective of position itself to really go fast here.
But for nature can say that even though the divine perspective doesn't.
Can't determine within like any particular values for us, it can affect how we hold those values.
It can demand that we hold them just as our values.
That is, recognising their perspectival status, recognising their containment within a divine value.
In all of life. So we go back into differential valuing in a way that preserves in a certain sense that transcend transcendentally inside.
In particular, we don't take values to come from some other world.
We sometimes we somehow hold in the back of our minds the recognition that these values
are just powers and that the values of others we oppose are also equally valid,
the expressions of life and pro life. So is Arthus true?
Three above. But he has discovered himself. Who can say this is by good and evil?
OK. And we might think, by contrast, that the key point at holding opposite values is the refusal to step into the other viewpoint.
The rejection of it altogether. I think there's a lot in favour of this perspective, first,
as a resolution of the tension that I'm trying to bring out, but I think of nature often has a strong position.
Nature often wants to draw from the transcendent affirmative perspective.
He wants to draw not just, as it were, a way of having values.
He wants to draw particular value content's conclusions about what we should value within life.
And in order to get these value contents out of the value Mohsin, nature needs to specify life as well to power.
This lets him specifying an ultimate point to life. An essential aim in its valuing.
And this lets the monism deliver a value content that can be then be used as a standard in evaluating particular cases of life.
So now particular values are not just my point of view.
And the only virtue is not just recognising that status. Now values can be judged by how well they serve life's ultimate end, which is power.
Life as well to power can be graded by the goal. Power.
Does a particular organism wield power effectively? What degree of power does a particular organism achieve?
So the individual Egypt is able to take the point of view of life and make differential values, differential judgements on its feet.
OK, now. OK.
So the last point that I have and I'm sorry that over the last point that I have is that Miccio taking this strong position,
using this way of drawing out of the value monas, that God's perspective particular value, two conclusions.
He does this in a way which strongly reintroduces bifurcating values.
He does this in a way.
See, the suggestion is one could do it in such a way that one gets them simply the kind of scalar values that I was talking about before.
But that's not how nature often those are not often teaching extracts values from
the value of Mormonism which have this or bifurcating and duellist character.
And that is expressed in this argumentative how in Nietzsche's accusation that some life is anti life.
I think it's very telling that his arguments often take this form.
This is where he is duellist Virge gets its place closest to my heart, I think, of his system.
He claims that not just that there are some people who are stronger than others, you know, relatively.
He claims that some individuals are sick in the sense that they are directed contrary to the essential end of life.
Moreover, he claims that some of the people are so sick that they are actually anti life.
So the ascetic ideal is hostile to life. And this is, I think, the way in which he puts the, as it were,
the lesson that he extracts from the value of feminism when he is most, as it were, value listed bifurcating.
So, for example, I get home 047 But Christianity is criminality, par excellence.
The crime against life. This is the only morality that has been taught so far.
The morality of on salving demonstrates a will to the end.
It negates life as the most basic level. OK, I have I have a last section which is going to show how even this value dualism,
which has some at times extracts from value modernism, is itself sort of reconciled or harmonised with the monism.