1 00:00:00,670 --> 00:00:08,510 The title of my papers. Who is the sovereign individual, Nuccio and Freedom Papers should run about 50 minutes. 2 00:00:08,510 --> 00:00:17,000 That should leave us with discussion. So most readers of Nature's on the Genealogy of Morality over the last century, would, 3 00:00:17,000 --> 00:00:21,980 one suspects be astonished to discover the provenance recent scholarship has given to 4 00:00:21,980 --> 00:00:28,350 the enigmatic figure of the sovereign individual who appears just once in Section two? 5 00:00:28,350 --> 00:00:37,520 The second essay geneology and never appears again in the geneology or indeed anywhere else in the corpus. 6 00:00:37,520 --> 00:00:40,730 Yet, according to Keith, answered Pierson, for example, and I quote, 7 00:00:40,730 --> 00:00:45,500 The overriding aim of the genealogy of morals is to show that what kont in the modern 8 00:00:45,500 --> 00:00:50,540 legal tradition of moral and political philosophy and moral political thought simply 9 00:00:50,540 --> 00:00:55,450 take for granted the sovereign individual in possession of a free will and conscience 10 00:00:55,450 --> 00:01:00,600 is in reality the product of a specific historical labour of culture or civilisation. 11 00:01:00,600 --> 00:01:05,840 And quote, If this were really the overriding aim with the geneology, 12 00:01:05,840 --> 00:01:12,170 one would have expected Meachem to be a bit clearer about it and to have more to say about the sovereign individual. 13 00:01:12,170 --> 00:01:20,330 And so Pearson's claim is, to be sure, rather extreme, but his is nonetheless when a reckoning, recognisable continuum with other assessments. 14 00:01:20,330 --> 00:01:24,680 John Richardson, for example, describes Section two of the second essay as, quote, 15 00:01:24,680 --> 00:01:30,920 a dramatic statement of Nietzsche's positive view of freedom for Peter Pollner, 16 00:01:30,920 --> 00:01:33,800 the sovereign individual gives expression to quote, 17 00:01:33,800 --> 00:01:41,540 the constitutive conditions of full fledged autonomous rather than heterogenous self Kenji's states. 18 00:01:41,540 --> 00:01:48,940 The sovereign individual illuminates, quote, genuine agency. The question, what is it to be itself capable of acting? 19 00:01:48,940 --> 00:01:53,690 Indeed. And I quote again, what exactly it is to be a genuine self. 20 00:01:53,690 --> 00:01:58,040 So who is this sovereign individual? The second essay. 21 00:01:58,040 --> 00:02:04,220 And what does he have to do with Nietzsche's conceptions of freewill, freedom or the self? 22 00:02:04,220 --> 00:02:09,020 I shall argue for what would have been at one time a fairly unsurprising view, 23 00:02:09,020 --> 00:02:16,790 namely that first nature denies the people ever act freely and that they are ever morally responsible for anything they do. 24 00:02:16,790 --> 00:02:22,940 Second, that the figure of a sovereign individual in no way supports a denial of this first point. 25 00:02:22,940 --> 00:02:31,100 And third, the nature engages in what Charles Stevenson in his famous 1938 paper on persuasive definitions. 26 00:02:31,100 --> 00:02:37,700 Each engages in what Stevenson would call the persuasive definition of the language of freedom and free will. 27 00:02:37,700 --> 00:02:41,480 Radically revising the content of those concepts, 28 00:02:41,480 --> 00:02:48,740 but in a way that aims to capitalise on their positive, emotive valence and authority for his readers. 29 00:02:48,740 --> 00:02:54,170 More precisely, I am to show that the image of the sovereign individual is in fact consistent with the reading of nature, 30 00:02:54,170 --> 00:02:58,730 has a kind of fatalists which I have defended at length elsewhere. 31 00:02:58,730 --> 00:03:02,390 When the Fatalis reading Nietzsche thinks that persons have certain essential 32 00:03:02,390 --> 00:03:07,970 psychological and physiological traits over which they have no autonomous control, 33 00:03:07,970 --> 00:03:15,380 and which together perhaps with environmental influences like values to determine their life trajectories. 34 00:03:15,380 --> 00:03:22,220 In particular, Nietzsche thinks that the feeling of free will is a bottom and epiphenomenon of a process in which conscious 35 00:03:22,220 --> 00:03:29,210 thoughts that are consistent with and temporarily proximate to succeeding actions are misinterpreted as causal. 36 00:03:29,210 --> 00:03:38,900 When, in fact, both the thoughts and the actions themselves are causally determined by nonconscious, perhaps neuro physical aspects of the person. 37 00:03:38,900 --> 00:03:46,580 The upshot is that our actions are neither cause a soulis nor caused by any conscious state with which we might identify. 38 00:03:46,580 --> 00:03:50,180 And so our actions cannot bear descriptions of responsibility. 39 00:03:50,180 --> 00:03:59,170 That is, description's unjustified praise and blame to show an image of the sovereign individual squares with nature's fatals. 40 00:03:59,170 --> 00:04:05,540 I distinguish in what follows between two different deflationary readings of the past when one such reading, 41 00:04:05,540 --> 00:04:13,220 the figure of the sovereign individual is wholly ironic a mocking of the petite bourgeois who thinks his petty commercial undertakings, 42 00:04:13,220 --> 00:04:18,700 his ability to make promises and remember his debts are the highest fruit of creation. 43 00:04:18,700 --> 00:04:25,760 One another deflation or in reading the sovereign individual does indeed represent an ideal of the self, 44 00:04:25,760 --> 00:04:34,190 one marked by a kind of self mastery foreign to less coherent selves whose momentary impulses pull them this way. 45 00:04:34,190 --> 00:04:40,280 But such a self and itself master is a neat chain in terms of fortuitous natural artefact, 46 00:04:40,280 --> 00:04:46,850 a bit of faith, not an autonomous achievement for which anyone could be responsible. 47 00:04:46,850 --> 00:04:54,530 To associate this ideal of the self with the language of freedom and free will is an exercise in persuasive definition by nature, 48 00:04:54,530 --> 00:05:00,340 a rhetorical skill in which he was often the master. I am inclined to think the second reading. 49 00:05:00,340 --> 00:05:03,670 Probably the second inflationary reading is probably the correct one, though, 50 00:05:03,670 --> 00:05:09,100 the somewhat ridiculously hyperbolic presentation of the sovereign individual to which we return, 51 00:05:09,100 --> 00:05:16,030 we'll make the first reading attractive at some point. But either reading allows us to understand how and why nature fatalists, 52 00:05:16,030 --> 00:05:23,200 an arch sceptic about free will, would have created the figure of the sovereign individual. 53 00:05:23,200 --> 00:05:29,500 So we do well to begin by reminding ourselves of what Nicha actually says about freewill and responsibility 54 00:05:29,500 --> 00:05:34,930 in the many passages from many different books that spanned his entire philosophical career, 55 00:05:34,930 --> 00:05:40,420 that must inform any interpretation of the section on the sovereign individual. 56 00:05:40,420 --> 00:05:45,130 Even if we put to one side human all too human will work of the late 1970s, 57 00:05:45,130 --> 00:05:49,570 in which Nietzsche clearly accepted a straightforwardly incompatible picture in 58 00:05:49,570 --> 00:05:54,550 which the determinism of our universe rules out free will and moral responsibility. 59 00:05:54,550 --> 00:05:58,720 Evidence of nature's scepticism about freedom and responsibility remains plentiful. 60 00:05:58,720 --> 00:06:07,570 In his mature corpus of the eighteen eighties, thus at the start of the decade in DAYBREAK, he writes in Section 128. 61 00:06:07,570 --> 00:06:15,070 Do I have to add that the wise edifice was right, that we really are not responsible for our dreams. 62 00:06:15,070 --> 00:06:25,030 But just as little for our waking life. And that the doctrine of freedom with will as human pride and feeling of power for its father and mother. 63 00:06:25,030 --> 00:06:31,480 So belief and freedom with wills to be explained by the ulterior motivations we have for accepting it, not by its reality. 64 00:06:31,480 --> 00:06:37,400 We are as little responsible for what we do in real life as what we do in our dreams. 65 00:06:37,400 --> 00:06:45,600 It is hard to imagine a embracing denial of freedom and responsibility. The same themes are sounded in one of his very last books, The Antichrist. 66 00:06:45,600 --> 00:06:53,710 This is from Section 14. Formerly man was given a free will as his dowry from a higher order. 67 00:06:53,710 --> 00:06:58,270 Today we have taken his will away altogether in the sense that we no longer admit the will. 68 00:06:58,270 --> 00:07:05,710 As a faculty, the old word will now serves only to denote a result in a kind of individual reaction, 69 00:07:05,710 --> 00:07:12,430 which follows necessarily upon a number of partly contradictory, partly harmonious stimuli. 70 00:07:12,430 --> 00:07:23,050 The will no longer acts or moves denial of the causality of the will or more precisely, what we experience, as will, 71 00:07:23,050 --> 00:07:30,910 is central to Nietzsche scepticism about free will and also explains why he frequently denies unfree will as well. 72 00:07:30,910 --> 00:07:34,930 What we experience, as Will, does not in fact cause our actions. 73 00:07:34,930 --> 00:07:40,030 So the causal determination or freedom of this word is irrelevant. 74 00:07:40,030 --> 00:07:42,760 In DAYBREAK, he writes this a section 124. 75 00:07:42,760 --> 00:07:49,780 We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the son steps out of its room and then says, I will. 76 00:07:49,780 --> 00:07:54,940 That the sun shall rise and at hand we cannot stop a wheel and says, I will. 77 00:07:54,940 --> 00:08:00,040 That it shall roll. And at him, he was thrown down in wrestling and says, Here I lie. 78 00:08:00,040 --> 00:08:06,550 I will lie here. But what, laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently? 79 00:08:06,550 --> 00:08:16,180 Whenever we employ the expression, I will. If the faculty at the will no longer acts or moves as the Antichrist passage puts. 80 00:08:16,180 --> 00:08:21,130 If it is no longer causal, then there remains no conceptual space for the compatible. 81 00:08:21,130 --> 00:08:28,600 This idea that the right kind of causal determination, the will is compatible with responsibility for our actions. 82 00:08:28,600 --> 00:08:33,130 If a through script puts it thought is one thing, the deed is another. 83 00:08:33,130 --> 00:08:38,920 And the image of the deed still another. The wheel of causality does not roll between. 84 00:08:38,920 --> 00:08:43,240 Which is a pithy statement of the point of the DAYBREAK passage I just quoted. 85 00:08:43,240 --> 00:08:45,940 Then there is no room for more responsibility. 86 00:08:45,940 --> 00:08:55,230 I may well identify with my thoughts or my will, but if they cannot cause my actions, how can I possibly be responsible? 87 00:08:55,230 --> 00:09:01,130 In the central discussion of free will and responsibility in the geneology Nature, right? 88 00:09:01,130 --> 00:09:07,420 For just as common people separate the Lightwood from its flesh and take the latter to be a deed, 89 00:09:07,420 --> 00:09:15,400 something performed by a subject for like so popular morality also separates strength from the expressions of strength, 90 00:09:15,400 --> 00:09:23,380 as if there were an indifferent substrate behind the strong person which had the freedom to manifest strength or not. 91 00:09:23,380 --> 00:09:34,030 But there is no such substrate. The suppressed, typically glowing aspects of revenge and hate exploit this belief in a subject or substrate. 92 00:09:34,030 --> 00:09:40,990 And basically even a uphold no other belief or ardently than this one that the strong are free to be weak. 93 00:09:40,990 --> 00:09:49,240 And the birds of prey are free to be lambs. They thereby gain for themselves the right to hold the bird of prey accountable. 94 00:09:49,240 --> 00:09:55,180 The weak need the belief in a neutral subject with free choice, out of an instinct of self-preservation, 95 00:09:55,180 --> 00:10:00,190 self affirmation in which every lie is sanctified at Section 13. 96 00:10:00,190 --> 00:10:05,860 The first test of the will. That was denied as the faculty and the other passages is now here. 97 00:10:05,860 --> 00:10:11,410 I take it up the substrate that stands behind the act and chooses to perform it or not. 98 00:10:11,410 --> 00:10:18,100 But there is no such faculty, whether we call it will or substrate, choosing to manifest strength or weakness. 99 00:10:18,100 --> 00:10:23,590 There just is the doing no doer who bears the responsibility for the discussion 100 00:10:23,590 --> 00:10:28,180 of the four great errors in the twilight of the Idols is to the same effect. 101 00:10:28,180 --> 00:10:35,350 As he concludes that chapter closed today. We no longer have any pity for the concept of free will. 102 00:10:35,350 --> 00:10:43,240 We know only too well what it really is the fallacy of all theologians artifices aimed at making mankind responsible. 103 00:10:43,240 --> 00:10:49,540 In their sense, the doctrine of the will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment. 104 00:10:49,540 --> 00:10:55,780 That is because one wanted to peak guilt. So once again, denial at the will is a causal factor, 105 00:10:55,780 --> 00:11:00,880 which is the central argument of this chapter of Twilight is juxtaposed with a psychological 106 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:06,580 explanation for why people would nonetheless be motivated to believe in freedom and responsibility. 107 00:11:06,580 --> 00:11:10,340 Once we abandon this error free will. That's what Nietzsche calls it. 108 00:11:10,340 --> 00:11:17,460 It should in turn, abandon the reactive concepts whose intelligibility depends on concepts like guilt. 109 00:11:17,460 --> 00:11:23,650 Zaara, through Straw well describes the required revision to our thinking about freedom and responsibility that results. 110 00:11:23,650 --> 00:11:29,070 This is from the section on Pale Criminal Enemy. You shall say, but not below. 111 00:11:29,070 --> 00:11:34,600 Singing we shall say, but not scoundrel. Fool, you shall say. But not a sinner. 112 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:42,910 The abandoned concepts that a villain, scoundrel and sinner are all ones that require freedom and responsibility that would licence blame. 113 00:11:42,910 --> 00:11:51,340 While the substitute concepts aname, singing fool merely describe a person's condition or character without supposing anything 114 00:11:51,340 --> 00:11:57,880 about the agent's responsibility for being in that condition or having that character. 115 00:11:57,880 --> 00:12:01,690 Any account of what is going on in the passage of the sovereign individual must 116 00:12:01,690 --> 00:12:06,910 show how it is consistent with these pervasive themes in the niching corpus. 117 00:12:06,910 --> 00:12:15,490 So let's turn now to the solemn passage. Nature begins the second essay in the geneology with a characteristically naturalistic 118 00:12:15,490 --> 00:12:22,060 question how to breed an animal which is able to make an honour promise. 119 00:12:22,060 --> 00:12:28,630 The assumptions underlying this question are twofold. First, and most obviously, human beings are certain kinds of animals. 120 00:12:28,630 --> 00:12:33,370 And second, as with other animals. One explains what they do. 121 00:12:33,370 --> 00:12:40,060 For example, promised not by appeal to their exercise of some capacity for autonomous choice decision, 122 00:12:40,060 --> 00:12:48,760 but in terms of the causal mechanisms such as bleeding, acting upon them, which yields certain steady behavioural dispositions. 123 00:12:48,760 --> 00:12:55,270 NEACH identifies two preconditions for the behavioural disposition at issue here, namely promise moving. 124 00:12:55,270 --> 00:12:57,850 First, regularity, behaviour. 125 00:12:57,850 --> 00:13:06,520 And second, reliable, memorable regularity is necessary because a promise maker must be, as each puts it, answerable for his own future. 126 00:13:06,520 --> 00:13:10,360 And one cannot be answerable for a future that is utterly unpredictable. 127 00:13:10,360 --> 00:13:18,400 Memory is essential for the obvious reason that only someone who can remember his promises can possible on two factors 128 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:25,510 are singled out by nature as formative for the human animal in its development of regular behaviour and a memory. 129 00:13:25,510 --> 00:13:32,380 One equals the morality of custom, and the other is the role of pain in Dumont's with quote, 130 00:13:32,380 --> 00:13:37,990 the help of the morality of custom and the social straitjacket man was made truly predictable. 131 00:13:37,990 --> 00:13:44,920 That's from Section two of the second essay. Nature here alludes to his own earlier discussion in DAYBREAK, which, 132 00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:53,850 drawing on the etymological connexion between Siedlecki morality and Sepak custom advance a plausible hypothesis that custo. 133 00:13:53,850 --> 00:14:00,600 Constituted the first morality that traditional ways of acting played the same role during early human life. 134 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:09,840 That rarefied and lofty moral codes, rules and principles play today that they provided criteria for moral right and wrong. 135 00:14:09,840 --> 00:14:13,440 In this earlier discussion, however, nation that is DAYBREAK discussion, 136 00:14:13,440 --> 00:14:18,810 Leach's goal was a certain naturalisation of the implausible Quantium account and moral motivation. 137 00:14:18,810 --> 00:14:21,420 As a matter of reference for the more law, 138 00:14:21,420 --> 00:14:28,260 nature proposes instead that it is obedience to tradition and fear of the consequences of deviation from tradition. 139 00:14:28,260 --> 00:14:37,010 That really explains moral motivation. By the time he writes the geneology, Nietzsche is now more interested in the role of custom, 140 00:14:37,010 --> 00:14:41,610 the social straitjacket, as he calls it, in making humans truly predictable. 141 00:14:41,610 --> 00:14:48,090 That is regular in their behaviour. This development eventually yields the individual with a conscience. 142 00:14:48,090 --> 00:14:53,430 The nature refers to variously as a sovereign or autonomous individual. 143 00:14:53,430 --> 00:15:02,160 Here's the crucial facet, which I'm going to quote at some length with the help of the morality of custom in the social straitjacket, 144 00:15:02,160 --> 00:15:12,580 man was made truly predictable. Let us place ourselves, on the other hand, at the end of this immense process where the tree actually bears fruit, 145 00:15:12,580 --> 00:15:18,270 where society and its morality of custom heal what they were simply the means to. 146 00:15:18,270 --> 00:15:24,930 We then find the sovereign individual as the ripest group on its tree, like only to itself. 147 00:15:24,930 --> 00:15:28,470 Having freed itself from the morality of custom and autonomy, autonomous, 148 00:15:28,470 --> 00:15:34,140 super ethical individual because autonomous and ethical are mutually Skip's exclusive. 149 00:15:34,140 --> 00:15:42,870 In short, we find a man with his own independent, durable will who has the right to make a promise and has a proud consciousness quivering in every 150 00:15:42,870 --> 00:15:49,110 muscle of what he has finally achieved and incorporated an actual awareness of power and freedom, 151 00:15:49,110 --> 00:15:56,580 a feeling that man in general has reached completion. This man, who is now free and really does have the right to make a promise. 152 00:15:56,580 --> 00:15:59,910 This master of the free will. This software. 153 00:15:59,910 --> 00:16:07,410 How could he remain ignorant of his superiority over everybody who does not have the right to make a promise or answer for himself? 154 00:16:07,410 --> 00:16:12,630 How much trust, fear and respect he arouses? He merits all three. 155 00:16:12,630 --> 00:16:20,550 And how could he, with his self master, not realise that he has necessarily been given mastery over circumstances, 156 00:16:20,550 --> 00:16:26,970 over nature and over all creatures with a less durable and reliable will the free man. 157 00:16:26,970 --> 00:16:31,980 And now he puts free in quotes. The free man, the possessor of a durable, unbreakable will, 158 00:16:31,980 --> 00:16:39,270 thus has his own standard of value in the possession of such a will, viewing others from his own standpoint standpoint. 159 00:16:39,270 --> 00:16:48,240 He respects or despises, and just as he will necessarily respect his peers, the strong and the reliable, those with the right to give their word. 160 00:16:48,240 --> 00:16:52,950 That is, everyone who makes a promise, makes promises like a sop ponderously, 161 00:16:52,950 --> 00:17:00,420 sell them slowly and is sparing with his trust and confers and honour when he places his trust and gives his word as something 162 00:17:00,420 --> 00:17:08,010 which can be relied on because he is strong enough to remain upright in the face of mishap or even in the face of fate. 163 00:17:08,010 --> 00:17:14,520 So he will necessarily be ready to kick the febrile whippets who make a promise when they have no right 164 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:22,350 to do so and will save the rod for the liar who breaks his word in the very moment it passes his lips. 165 00:17:22,350 --> 00:17:27,090 The proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, 166 00:17:27,090 --> 00:17:34,680 the awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny has penetrated into the depths and become an instinct. 167 00:17:34,680 --> 00:17:43,020 His dominant instinct. What will he call his dominant instinct, assuming that he means a word for no doubt about the answer. 168 00:17:43,020 --> 00:17:50,190 This sovereign man calls it is conscious. So let us start at the beginning. 169 00:17:50,190 --> 00:17:56,070 The sovereign individual is said to be the fruit of the long tradition of the morality of custom. 170 00:17:56,070 --> 00:18:05,040 But the tree bears this fruit at the point when the morality of custom is left behind. 171 00:18:05,040 --> 00:18:15,180 This individual is autonomous or super ethical and disciplined in the quite precise sense of being no longer bound by the morality of custom sitting. 172 00:18:15,180 --> 00:18:17,190 He is the perfected animal, 173 00:18:17,190 --> 00:18:26,880 the one so perfected by the breeding of the morality of custom that he no longer needs the discipline of Cita to perform his trick, as it were. 174 00:18:26,880 --> 00:18:31,080 What exactly is the trick that this well-trained animal surely it bears, 175 00:18:31,080 --> 00:18:39,510 emphasising that he is described as having one and only one skill he can actually make and keep a promise? 176 00:18:39,510 --> 00:18:41,310 And why can he do that? 177 00:18:41,310 --> 00:18:49,800 Because he can remember that he made it and his behaviour is sufficiently regular and predictable that others will actually act based on his promises. 178 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:53,840 This might explain why nature gives this self-important animal the so-called. 179 00:18:53,840 --> 00:19:03,350 Individual, a suitably ridiculous and pompous name, he refers to him in the original as the Suvorov Frenchs Varan individual. 180 00:19:03,350 --> 00:19:09,800 A mix of French and perhaps Latin is also obviously a German, 181 00:19:09,800 --> 00:19:15,760 meaning literally something like a sovereign apple, a phrase he never uses again anywhere in the corpus. 182 00:19:15,760 --> 00:19:21,620 And he never uses any alternative formulation of that same phrase anymore is we can 183 00:19:21,620 --> 00:19:26,780 talk about that discussion and the conscience of this self-important creatures. 184 00:19:26,780 --> 00:19:31,820 Nature makes clear consistent, nothing more than the ability to remember his debts. 185 00:19:31,820 --> 00:19:36,230 One might then be tempted to conclude that this whole passage is little more than a 186 00:19:36,230 --> 00:19:41,180 parody of the contemporary bourgeois who thinks that he has achieved something unique, 187 00:19:41,180 --> 00:19:46,610 something individual, just because he is steady enough to make a promise and honour. 188 00:19:46,610 --> 00:19:52,550 Capitalism, as everyone knows, destroys customary practises. Yet after their demise, there remains. 189 00:19:52,550 --> 00:19:58,610 The upright bushwalk can enter a contract and remember his legal obligations, no less. 190 00:19:58,610 --> 00:20:07,520 The modern Bush line short fancies himself the highest fruit of creation simply because he can remember his business deals. 191 00:20:07,520 --> 00:20:11,630 Now, there is admittedly more to this passage than what we've called to attention. 192 00:20:11,630 --> 00:20:20,120 A pull, potentially, too, so far. Indeed, in a recent vigorous challenge to deflation or in readings and passage, including my own in earlier work, 193 00:20:20,120 --> 00:20:26,530 Thomas Miles has argued this is in the most recent international studies in philosophy. 194 00:20:26,530 --> 00:20:32,810 Think it's year 2007. In keeping with tradition, not just came out of consumer, 195 00:20:32,810 --> 00:20:39,980 Thomas Miles has argued that self mastery is central to the image of the sovereign individual and that, 196 00:20:39,980 --> 00:20:44,740 Miles, this self mastery consists of the self affirming conscience that guy. 197 00:20:44,740 --> 00:20:52,050 This is sovereign individual to take on great tasks and fulfil his commitments to them. 198 00:20:52,050 --> 00:21:00,680 Now, as we've already noted, the only great task concretely on offer by nature is that the sovereign individual can make a promise to keep. 199 00:21:00,680 --> 00:21:09,500 This is not nothing, to be sure, but it seems prima fascia hard to square with the overblown rhetoric of Section two, to which Miles calls attention. 200 00:21:09,500 --> 00:21:17,480 For example, read again portion of the passage, the proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility. 201 00:21:17,480 --> 00:21:25,190 The awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his faith has penetrated into the depths and become an instant. 202 00:21:25,190 --> 00:21:30,650 His dominant is what we call his dominant instinct, assuming that he needs a word for it. 203 00:21:30,650 --> 00:21:37,940 No doubt about the answer to his sovereign man calls it his conscience. But Nicha, as we have already seen, denies. 204 00:21:37,940 --> 00:21:44,300 And not just once. That anyone as quote, freedom and power over himself from his faith than anyone has. 205 00:21:44,300 --> 00:21:49,040 His second essay also claims mastery over circumstances. 206 00:21:49,040 --> 00:21:54,180 The conclusion of the four green arrows from Twilight of the Idols is as clear as any passage in Meech on the subject. 207 00:21:54,180 --> 00:22:01,640 I hope no one gives people their qualities, not God or society's parents or ancestors, not even people themselves. 208 00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:09,020 Nobody is responsible for people existing in the first place or for the state or circumstances or environment they are in. 209 00:22:09,020 --> 00:22:15,560 That means, of course, that the sovereign individual whose privilege of responsibility extends to himself and his faith, 210 00:22:15,560 --> 00:22:22,730 indeed to his circumstances, is delusion. At least if he really believes in this, he may well feel responsible. 211 00:22:22,730 --> 00:22:26,110 But his feeling is on warrant. 212 00:22:26,110 --> 00:22:33,250 Now, that conclusion is, of course, exactly what one should expect from nature's most important discussion of the phenomenon of self mastery. 213 00:22:33,250 --> 00:22:37,730 The trait that Miles emphasises is attributed to the software. 214 00:22:37,730 --> 00:22:39,380 And this is the discussion from DAYBREAK. 215 00:22:39,380 --> 00:22:47,190 The passage from which I have called attention before a striking evidence of nature's fatal in Section one or nine. 216 00:22:47,190 --> 00:22:56,180 Need to canvas is six different ways of combating the vehemence of a draw, for example, by avoiding opportunities for ratification of the drive, 217 00:22:56,180 --> 00:23:04,340 thus weakening over time or by learning to associate painful thoughts with the drive so that its satisfaction no longer has a positive valence. 218 00:23:04,340 --> 00:23:12,200 More significantly, each is also concerned in this passage to answer the question as to the ultimate motive for self master. 219 00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:16,790 And he explains that his followers, and I quote that one, wants to come back. 220 00:23:16,790 --> 00:23:21,800 The vehemence of the drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power, 221 00:23:21,800 --> 00:23:27,140 nor does the choice of any particular method, nor does the success or failure of this method. 222 00:23:27,140 --> 00:23:35,000 What is clearly the case is that if this entire procedure are intellect is only the blind instrument of another drop, 223 00:23:35,000 --> 00:23:39,020 which is a rival of the drive, his vehemence is tormenting us. 224 00:23:39,020 --> 00:23:47,210 While we believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom, it is one drive which is complaining about the other. 225 00:23:47,210 --> 00:23:53,740 That is to say, for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of the drive presupposes the existence of a. 226 00:23:53,740 --> 00:24:03,260 Equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides. 227 00:24:03,260 --> 00:24:05,230 Now, even if the intellect must take sides, 228 00:24:05,230 --> 00:24:12,340 there is no suggestion in his past that the intellect determines which side that to the contrary, the intellect is on nature's picture. 229 00:24:12,340 --> 00:24:21,070 The mere blind instrument of another drug. Thus, the fact that one masters oneself is not a product of autonomous choice by the person, 230 00:24:21,070 --> 00:24:25,690 but rather the fact that the underlying psychological facts characteristic of that person, 231 00:24:25,690 --> 00:24:32,620 namely which of his various drives happen to be the strongest. There is, as it were, no self in self master. 232 00:24:32,620 --> 00:24:37,060 That is, no conscious or free cell count contributes anything to process. 233 00:24:37,060 --> 00:24:45,070 Self mastery is merely an effect that the interplay of certain drives driver drives over which the conscious self exercises no control. 234 00:24:45,070 --> 00:24:48,640 Though it may, as it were, room for one side or the other. 235 00:24:48,640 --> 00:24:54,130 The conscious self and its body is simply an arena in which the struggle drives as played out. 236 00:24:54,130 --> 00:24:58,510 How they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes. 237 00:24:58,510 --> 00:25:04,300 But chlor conscious self or agent. The person takes no active part in the process. 238 00:25:04,300 --> 00:25:07,150 To be sure, some higher types of people. 239 00:25:07,150 --> 00:25:17,890 Gerges and Neches, for example, exemplify a unified hierarchy of drys that nature occasionally dubs as examples of freedom in terms of that flow. 240 00:25:17,890 --> 00:25:21,970 But we do not honour Nietzsche's admonition to read and free of moral prejudices. 241 00:25:21,970 --> 00:25:29,050 If we get to try to reconstruct this as a moral ideal of autonomy and responsibility in song, 242 00:25:29,050 --> 00:25:33,700 we can agree with the emphasis of miles on the self and mastery characteristic of the 243 00:25:33,700 --> 00:25:38,830 sovereign individual and still acknowledge that given nature's conception of self mastery, 244 00:25:38,830 --> 00:25:46,840 it is wholly compatible with his denial of freewill and moral responsibility in so many other passengers. 245 00:25:46,840 --> 00:25:51,790 So how is this account of the sovereign individual passage which shows it to be of a piece with his fatalistic 246 00:25:51,790 --> 00:25:58,210 scepticism about freedom and responsibility to be reconciled with what Nietzsche says elsewhere in his work? 247 00:25:58,210 --> 00:26:01,840 When he talks of freedom and freewill, 248 00:26:01,840 --> 00:26:09,220 Pollner suggests that one important positive view and freedom of freedom in nature represents it as a kind of substantive ideal. 249 00:26:09,220 --> 00:26:17,130 And actually, these papers by Pollner, Richardson, James, that I'm referring to our role in the James and made Michon freedoms in Oconomowoc, 250 00:26:17,130 --> 00:26:25,750 which is which is back there for those who are interested. So Pollner suggests one view is as a freedom, as a kind of substantive ideal. 251 00:26:25,750 --> 00:26:29,170 As Pollner describes and I quote, 252 00:26:29,170 --> 00:26:36,100 Freedom is a substantive ideal is what seems to be at stake in many of those remarks where Nietzsche expresses admiration for people who, 253 00:26:36,100 --> 00:26:44,200 as he sees them, have succeeded in integrating an unusually great multiplicity of drives and a value of commitments into a long lasting, 254 00:26:44,200 --> 00:26:51,550 coherent whole. That's Paul Mischaracterisation. I think this is the best reading of what can Jameses recently been argued with as well. 255 00:26:51,550 --> 00:26:56,590 When he speaks of Nietzsche's why? To understand genuine agency and wanting to change, quote, 256 00:26:56,590 --> 00:27:02,120 his preferred readers from being mere conduit points of a vast array of conflicting inherited drives and 257 00:27:02,120 --> 00:27:08,830 to genuinely unify beings as James I take him to the nature's presenting us with an idea of agency, 258 00:27:08,830 --> 00:27:18,280 one involving a kind of unity of the drops. Perhaps the sovereign individual is meant to represent such an ideal as well, albeit a bit taken. 259 00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:24,400 Yet ideal itself does seem to be a recognisably change. 260 00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:32,470 The question, however, naturally arises why this ideal should be associated with freedom or freewill or autonomy? 261 00:27:32,470 --> 00:27:37,510 Why not just say that nature's ideal agent has a certain pattern of coherent Dreiser dispositions? 262 00:27:37,510 --> 00:27:45,760 The pattern to be specified, of course, and leave it at that. Freedom is, after all, a promiscuous concept in ordinary language. 263 00:27:45,760 --> 00:27:48,960 We say that someone just released from prison is a free man, 264 00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:58,180 but we also say that someone who shuns conventional expectations about careers or styles of dress or other social norms is a free spirit. 265 00:27:58,180 --> 00:28:03,150 But being unconstrained by physical limits, as in prison walls or social conventions, 266 00:28:03,150 --> 00:28:07,660 has an expectations about careers or appearance does not race philosophically. 267 00:28:07,660 --> 00:28:13,120 Interesting points about freedom or human agency for nature or for anyone else. 268 00:28:13,120 --> 00:28:17,410 We need much more evidence than an occasional use of the term freedom to conclude that 269 00:28:17,410 --> 00:28:23,440 nature has a philosophically important positive conception of freedom or free will. 270 00:28:23,440 --> 00:28:29,890 Readers of Nature know that the often employs familiar concepts and revisionary more highly deflation than the senses. 271 00:28:29,890 --> 00:28:36,580 Such is ultimately the case with Nietzsche's view of freedom and free will. I agree with James and Pollner that nature sometimes, 272 00:28:36,580 --> 00:28:42,850 though not nearly as often as they think the passages in some detail that Nietzsche sometimes associate the language 273 00:28:42,850 --> 00:28:49,810 of freedom with certain kinds of persons agency psychic economy has a certain kind of coherence or harmony. 274 00:28:49,810 --> 00:28:53,650 But in so doing, he is engaged in what George Stevens and would have called the persue. 275 00:28:53,650 --> 00:28:55,240 Definition of free. 276 00:28:55,240 --> 00:29:03,670 He wants to radically revise the content of freedom while exploiting the positive values that the traditional concept has with his readers. 277 00:29:03,670 --> 00:29:09,370 This is because nature recognises that to really transform the consciousness of his preferred readers, 278 00:29:09,370 --> 00:29:12,880 he must reach them at an emotional, even subconscious level. 279 00:29:12,880 --> 00:29:20,650 And one way to do so is to associate any change in ideals with values in which his readers are already emotionally invested. 280 00:29:20,650 --> 00:29:28,900 And as nature notes in the gay science, values are amongst the most powerful levers in the involved mechanisms of our actions. 281 00:29:28,900 --> 00:29:36,820 Thus, by associating an ideal of the person with the evaluable, he got his emotion laden ideal with freedom and free will, 282 00:29:36,820 --> 00:29:45,100 which his readers will already accept, which increases the likelihood that he can activate the causal levers of at least some of these readers. 283 00:29:45,100 --> 00:29:52,730 That will lead them towards this new idea, which is a cause to realise this new idea. 284 00:29:52,730 --> 00:30:01,450 Yet from a purely descriptive point of view, he might just as well call this new ideal agents uniformly or causally coherent agents. 285 00:30:01,450 --> 00:30:06,160 Not quite as catchy, since his picture really has nothing to do with free at all. 286 00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:13,650 Nietzsche's ideal unified agent is just a kind of natural artefact, one whose drys interact constructively rather than be struck. 287 00:30:13,650 --> 00:30:21,820 But with regard to his rhetorical laven, nature is shrewd. To sometimes describe such natural artefacts as examples of freedom. 288 00:30:21,820 --> 00:30:24,580 Both genes and Paul, like other writers in this genre, 289 00:30:24,580 --> 00:30:30,340 rely on a very small number of passages to support what they claim is nature's positive account of freedom. 290 00:30:30,340 --> 00:30:36,040 I want to examine these passages with some care more in dealing with the second section of the second essay, 291 00:30:36,040 --> 00:30:40,390 the geneology, since I think it will turn out that they do not generally bear the readings. 292 00:30:40,390 --> 00:30:45,550 James and Paul, I want to give them now to be clear again, I'm not denying that H-E Netsch, 293 00:30:45,550 --> 00:30:50,590 a highly valued persons who buy natural fortuity, exhibit the kind of agency picked out. 294 00:30:50,590 --> 00:30:56,350 I take it by James's notion of genuine agency and polynyas notion of full person. 295 00:30:56,350 --> 00:31:03,330 But none of this has anything to do with any concept that the philosophical traditions of labelled freedom or free will. 296 00:31:03,330 --> 00:31:08,860 Well, what better place to start than the twilight of the Idols? Skirmishes of an untimely man, Section 38. 297 00:31:08,860 --> 00:31:16,390 Which nation explicitly titles my conception of freedom? Here's how he introduces and explains that concept. 298 00:31:16,390 --> 00:31:20,200 And I quote, Liberal institutions ceased to be liberal. 299 00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:28,870 As soon as they are retained later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injuries of freedom than liberal institutions. 300 00:31:28,870 --> 00:31:35,140 Their effects are known well enough. They undermine the wealth of power. They level mountain valley and call that morality. 301 00:31:35,140 --> 00:31:45,560 They make men small, cowardly and hedonistic every time it is the herd and another triumphs with liberalism, in other words, herd embolisation. 302 00:31:45,560 --> 00:31:49,030 Now, the introduction to this conception of freedom seems clear. 303 00:31:49,030 --> 00:31:56,550 One undermines freedom by making, quote, men small, cowardly and hedonistic philosophical and religious traditions. 304 00:31:56,550 --> 00:32:04,030 I've had many views of freedom, to be sure, but I am not aware of any in which being big, brave and indifferent to suffering loomed large. 305 00:32:04,030 --> 00:32:09,760 Yet that appears to be the concept of freedom. Nietzsche in books. The passage continues. 306 00:32:09,760 --> 00:32:14,590 The same liberal institutions produce different effects while they are still being fought for. 307 00:32:14,590 --> 00:32:21,370 Then they really promote freedom in a powerful way. On closer inspection, it is war that produces these effects. 308 00:32:21,370 --> 00:32:26,860 The war for liberal institutions. War educates freedom for what is freedom. 309 00:32:26,860 --> 00:32:32,770 That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains the distance which separates us. 310 00:32:32,770 --> 00:32:37,900 That one becomes more indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even to life itself. 311 00:32:37,900 --> 00:32:43,000 That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one's Paulas, not excluding oneself. 312 00:32:43,000 --> 00:32:48,550 Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, for example, 313 00:32:48,550 --> 00:32:55,240 over those of happiness, the human being who has become free and much more the spirit who has become free. 314 00:32:55,240 --> 00:33:09,560 Spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed up by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen and other than the free man is a worry. 315 00:33:09,560 --> 00:33:14,560 If my image is clean and we're going to come back to France. 316 00:33:14,560 --> 00:33:21,400 So assuming responsibility for oneself is of course not quite the same thing is actually being responsible for its actions. 317 00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:24,940 The former is an attitude, a disposition, namely that of a warrior. 318 00:33:24,940 --> 00:33:30,460 Find that there is no sense, ordinary philosophical, in which freedom means pleasure in warfare. 319 00:33:30,460 --> 00:33:35,080 The Warriors are, to be sure, usually thought to be big, brave and indifferent to suffering. 320 00:33:35,080 --> 00:33:38,400 This is quite clearly, I think, persuasive definition and sense. 321 00:33:38,400 --> 00:33:45,820 Stephensen identified many decades ago in Section forty, one of the same chapter from Twilight of the Idols. 322 00:33:45,820 --> 00:33:50,980 Nietzsche then describes the, quote, freedom, which I do not mean, namely. 323 00:33:50,980 --> 00:33:57,920 And here's his explanation. It to one. Instance today, the plane for independence or redevelopment for, let's say, 324 00:33:57,920 --> 00:34:03,680 L.A. is pressed most popular by the very people for whom no rains would be too strict. 325 00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:10,400 That is a symptom of decadence. Our modern conception of freedom is one more proof of the degeneration of the instinct. 326 00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:16,490 So in other words, nature renounces one of the colonial connotations of the idea of freedom, namely freedom from constraints. 327 00:34:16,490 --> 00:34:20,300 The point here is obviously of a piece with the concern and beyond the neval. 328 00:34:20,300 --> 00:34:25,580 This is Section one, a game where nature says, and I quote, everything there is or was a freedom. 329 00:34:25,580 --> 00:34:33,530 So people in this dance or masculine assurance on Earth, whether it thinking itself or in ruling or speaking in persuading inartistic, 330 00:34:33,530 --> 00:34:40,400 just as an ethical practises, has only developed by virtue of the tyranny of such arbitrary laws. 331 00:34:40,400 --> 00:34:45,060 Every artist knows how far removed from this feeling of letting go. 332 00:34:45,060 --> 00:34:53,690 Leslie Alé is from his most natural state. The free watering, placing, disposing and shaping in the moment of inspiration. 333 00:34:53,690 --> 00:34:59,240 He knows how strict and subtle wheelbase thousands of laws at this very moment. 334 00:34:59,240 --> 00:35:06,740 Laws that defy conceptual formulation precisely because of their hardness and determiners. 335 00:35:06,740 --> 00:35:14,690 So freedom and nature's sense does not mean freedom from constraint. But it's obviously being subject to hard and determinate laws. 336 00:35:14,690 --> 00:35:18,230 Section 213 of beyond would need continue this line of thought. 337 00:35:18,230 --> 00:35:25,380 And I quote again, artists are the ones who know only too well that their feeling of freedom to finesse and authority of creation, 338 00:35:25,380 --> 00:35:34,970 formation and control only reaches its apex when they have stopped doing anything voluntarily and instead do everything necessary. 339 00:35:34,970 --> 00:35:42,890 In short, they know that inside themselves a necessity. And quote, freedom of the will have become one. 340 00:35:42,890 --> 00:35:47,170 Notice that freedom of the will is placed in quotes by nature himself in this passage. 341 00:35:47,170 --> 00:35:52,370 It's not, after all, real freedom with Will, since it involves nothing voluntary. That's what he tells us. 342 00:35:52,370 --> 00:35:59,000 Only action which is necessary actions bound businesses in the earlier passage by far walls. 343 00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:07,520 These passages resonate in turn with the famous Section 335 of the gay signs, which appears to suggest that people can create themselves. 344 00:36:07,520 --> 00:36:14,690 Here is the bit of the passage emphasised by Homer and Myles in their exposition of nature's positive conception of freedom. 345 00:36:14,690 --> 00:36:25,760 And I quote, We want to become we are human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves was to create themselves. 346 00:36:25,760 --> 00:36:33,110 Yet this passage then continues as follows. And this is the continuation on which most scholars are less silent. 347 00:36:33,110 --> 00:36:35,660 But I am always full. Here it is. 348 00:36:35,660 --> 00:36:44,360 To that end of creating ourselves, we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world. 349 00:36:44,360 --> 00:36:53,630 We must become physicists in order to be creators. In this sense, while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics. 350 00:36:53,630 --> 00:37:00,080 Therefore, along with physics. So creation in this sense is a very special sense, 351 00:37:00,080 --> 00:37:07,190 deep for presupposes the discovery of what is lawful and necessary as revealed by the physical sciences. 352 00:37:07,190 --> 00:37:13,130 And this, of course, recalls the earlier theme about the acquittals of freedom in assessing in context. 353 00:37:13,130 --> 00:37:18,080 Nature has in mind becomes clearer for the preceding part of Section 335. 354 00:37:18,080 --> 00:37:23,840 He explains that while the particular cause of any action is in demonstrable, we do know that values are, 355 00:37:23,840 --> 00:37:28,730 quote, amongst the most powerful levers in the involved mechanisms of our action. 356 00:37:28,730 --> 00:37:35,450 Thus, the task for the sciences is to discover the laws of cause and effect governing particular values and particular actions. 357 00:37:35,450 --> 00:37:42,560 A more refined version of the task that nature later calls for in the note at the end of the first essay of the geneology, 358 00:37:42,560 --> 00:37:46,640 namely for the human sciences to examine the effects of different kinds of 359 00:37:46,640 --> 00:37:52,850 valuations on the good of the majority and the good the minority puts it there. 360 00:37:52,850 --> 00:37:58,070 So what textual evidence of nature's putative positive view of freedom remains? 361 00:37:58,070 --> 00:38:05,750 Section 348 of the gay science, which equates freedom with a will, with freedom, from the need for certainty, the need that drives people, 362 00:38:05,750 --> 00:38:14,840 Nietzsche says, to faith and fanaticism obviously tells us nothing about agency or freewill, but is a wholly revisionary usage of concept. 363 00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:22,760 There is, in addition to openly provisionary counter of freedom in the first chapter beyond Neval, according to which, quote, freedom of the will. 364 00:38:22,760 --> 00:38:29,620 Suppose that is the word for the multifaceted state of pleasure. One commands and at the same time identifies himself. 365 00:38:29,620 --> 00:38:31,820 The accomplished act will as such. 366 00:38:31,820 --> 00:38:39,500 He enjoys the triumph of the resistance's, but thinks of himself that it was his will alone that truly overcame the resistance. 367 00:38:39,500 --> 00:38:46,430 Now, as I've argued elsewhere, the analysis of the will and freedom in this chapter is fully of a piece with. 368 00:38:46,430 --> 00:38:53,340 That is the first chapter of Nonlegal is fully of a piece with his general denial of freewill and moral responsibility. 369 00:38:53,340 --> 00:39:01,530 That leaves them with just two passages in the published corpus that interpreters of his positive theory of freedom points towards in one passage, 370 00:39:01,530 --> 00:39:02,940 Section 10 of the third essay, 371 00:39:02,940 --> 00:39:10,800 the geneology in which nature considers how the ascetic ideal validates the conditions under which philosophers can flourish. 372 00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:16,620 He concludes by noting that even in the modern world, the obstacles to being a philosopher remain great. 373 00:39:16,620 --> 00:39:22,590 I quote, Is there even now enough prai daring, courage, self-confidence. 374 00:39:22,590 --> 00:39:27,350 Will the spirit will to take responsibility? Freedom in the middle. 375 00:39:27,350 --> 00:39:32,750 Puts in italics for the philosopher on earth to be really possible. 376 00:39:32,750 --> 00:39:37,820 His passing reference, the freedom of read of Wills revealing since it makes clear that nature views it as 377 00:39:37,820 --> 00:39:43,940 interchangeable with this positions of character like pride and courage and self-confidence, 378 00:39:43,940 --> 00:39:52,310 all traits one can possess without being responsible for having me with, in short, having development in any way free. 379 00:39:52,310 --> 00:39:56,050 That brings us to perhaps the most interesting chain passage mentioned. 380 00:39:56,050 --> 00:40:00,680 Freedom from Chapter eight of the Twilight of the Ideas, a passage unhurt. 381 00:40:00,680 --> 00:40:12,180 If Bears quoted at some length. This is Section 49, Gert's not a German event, but a European war. 382 00:40:12,180 --> 00:40:18,090 A magnificent attempt to overcome the 18th century by returning to nature, 383 00:40:18,090 --> 00:40:24,930 by coming towards the naturalists of the Renaissance, a type of self overcoming on the part of that century. 384 00:40:24,930 --> 00:40:28,590 He made use of history, science, antiquity and Spinoza, too. 385 00:40:28,590 --> 00:40:33,360 But above all, he's making some practical activity. He did not remove himself from life. 386 00:40:33,360 --> 00:40:40,680 He put himself squarely in the middle of it. He did not. Disparity took as much as he could want himself to himself in himself. 387 00:40:40,680 --> 00:40:45,840 What he wanted was totality. He fought against the separation of reasoned sensibility. 388 00:40:45,840 --> 00:40:52,320 Feeling will preached in the most forbiddingly scholastic way by Con Gerges Antipov. 389 00:40:52,320 --> 00:40:58,830 He disciplined himself the whole mess. He created himself in the middle of an age inclined to unreality. 390 00:40:58,830 --> 00:41:04,170 Gerta was a convinced real's. He said yes to everything relating to him. 391 00:41:04,170 --> 00:41:09,930 His greatest experience was that of the most real thing that went by the name of Napoleon. 392 00:41:09,930 --> 00:41:18,150 Gerta conceived of a strong, highly educated, self respecting human being skilled in all things physical and able to keep himself in cheque. 393 00:41:18,150 --> 00:41:25,980 Who could dare to allow himself the entire expanse and wealth of Naturaliste who was strong enough for this freedom. 394 00:41:25,980 --> 00:41:31,680 A spirit like this, who has become Creed's fans in the middle of the world with a cheerful and trusting 395 00:41:31,680 --> 00:41:37,380 fatalism in the belief that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the hope. 396 00:41:37,380 --> 00:41:43,410 He does not the game anymore, but a belief like this is the highest of all possible beliefs. 397 00:41:43,410 --> 00:41:50,970 I have presented with the name Dionysius. There are two striking motifs in this passage. 398 00:41:50,970 --> 00:41:58,580 First, the emphasis on an ideal of naturalism and realism, which is explicitly associated with hope. 399 00:41:58,580 --> 00:42:09,090 And secondly, the equation of commitment to this ideal with freedom, but also an attitude of fatalism and ultimately by a nice. 400 00:42:09,090 --> 00:42:14,340 So how are we to understand these motifs and their relation to the job? 401 00:42:14,340 --> 00:42:22,410 The immediately preceding section of Twilights Section forty eight, in fact, concerns Napoleon and his quote, high three. 402 00:42:22,410 --> 00:42:30,310 Even terrible nature and not indeed Napoleon is declared by nature to be a piece of return to nature, 403 00:42:30,310 --> 00:42:35,880 as I understand exactly the return, which also attributes to gurt. 404 00:42:35,880 --> 00:42:41,850 If we understand the sense in which Napoleon returns to nature and exemplifies the natural, 405 00:42:41,850 --> 00:42:46,320 we will understand something about the meaning of freedom in the following section. 406 00:42:46,320 --> 00:42:54,570 Now, Napoleon's return to nature in Section forty eight is explicitly contrasted with Roussos conception of man's natural state, 407 00:42:54,570 --> 00:43:01,500 which nature deems the idealistic fantasies of a rabbit, meaning in particular, their doctrines of quality. 408 00:43:01,500 --> 00:43:07,380 No poison is more poisonous than this as nature and Section forty eight concludes that, quote, 409 00:43:07,380 --> 00:43:15,720 Only one person perceives it this event of the 18th century correctly with disgust, namely guardian. 410 00:43:15,720 --> 00:43:18,720 Since this freedom for witchcraft, it is strong enough, 411 00:43:18,720 --> 00:43:24,810 is equated with the entire expanse of wealth and wealth of naturalness, of which Napoleon is the exemplar. 412 00:43:24,810 --> 00:43:31,620 It would seem to follow that the freedom of adverted is in part an acceptance of the reality of the natural inequality 413 00:43:31,620 --> 00:43:40,190 between people and a renunciation of the ME and illusions about what persons are like in a truly natural state. 414 00:43:40,190 --> 00:43:47,130 But guard. This kind of freedom is becoming free, as nature puts it is also explicitly equated with an attitude of, quote, 415 00:43:47,130 --> 00:43:54,810 cheering and trusting fatalism, which in turn is equated with the Dionysian attitude that is clearly recognisable as our mere. 416 00:43:54,810 --> 00:44:04,680 That is acceptance and affirmation. The way things really are, rather than falling prey to the fantasies of the idealist and rabble rolled into one. 417 00:44:04,680 --> 00:44:16,710 We move. So to be free in this sense, then, is to be free of the wish that reality being other than it is, that is unequal, terrible and cruel. 418 00:44:16,710 --> 00:44:23,880 Napoleon himself, because what it is not, however, to be a free agent, is conceived by con or human response. 419 00:44:23,880 --> 00:44:32,400 As I can tell by any other major figure in the philosophical tradition, nature would rather persuade select readers to the fatalism of a girth, 420 00:44:32,400 --> 00:44:39,000 my coopting the language of freedom itself to commend to them an attitude that is premised on its denial, 421 00:44:39,000 --> 00:44:43,050 on the most profound sense of denial, the Enlightenment ideal. 422 00:44:43,050 --> 00:44:49,070 That man from free will and their rational capacities can all be kamik like the liberal. 423 00:44:49,070 --> 00:44:58,680 I do idea that defined marriage is Creegan the free man is a war or that to be free is to be big, brave and indifferent to suffering. 424 00:44:58,680 --> 00:45:05,410 This key passage from Twilight persuasively redefines freedom in the service of the chain value. 425 00:45:05,410 --> 00:45:17,140 In this case, a liberal idea that to be truly fee free is to be not just reconciled to, but to affirm the essential inequality of a person's. 426 00:45:17,140 --> 00:45:24,550 So to conclude, if Meacher really says so little, that suggests he holds out the hope of a freedom or free will. 427 00:45:24,550 --> 00:45:30,310 That would be recognisable to the philosophical tradition or common sense. 428 00:45:30,310 --> 00:45:39,640 If his scepticism about freedom and responsibility is so resolute when he actually says about freedom and free will is often so clearly revisionist, 429 00:45:39,640 --> 00:45:48,730 so plainly an exercise in persuasive definition that needs to exploit his readers antecedent prejudices on behalf of very different chain ideals. 430 00:45:48,730 --> 00:45:54,570 Even quite the liberal ideals. Then how are we to explain the recent scholarly consensus? 431 00:45:54,570 --> 00:45:57,550 That is what it is with which we began. 432 00:45:57,550 --> 00:46:05,140 It is, I fear, a manifestation of default against which nature often railed on which we have seen so many times before in the nature literature, 433 00:46:05,140 --> 00:46:09,450 in hiders transformation reach into the last metaphysical philosopher. 434 00:46:09,450 --> 00:46:14,050 Calvin's rendering him of him as a harmless secular humanist in the Hey, Mrs. 435 00:46:14,050 --> 00:46:23,020 Defanging of him is in his statuses. In each case, I think the aim is to make each a less appalling, to be delicate modern readers than he really is. 436 00:46:23,020 --> 00:46:29,590 Furniture does not believe in freedom or responsibility. He does not think the exercise any meaningful control over our lives. 437 00:46:29,590 --> 00:46:33,490 He does not think that is revisionary sense of freedom. 438 00:46:33,490 --> 00:46:41,200 The long, protracted will, as he puts it in the passage of the sovereign individual, is reaching just anyone that anyone could choose to have. 439 00:46:41,200 --> 00:46:47,280 Indeed, the important passage from Twilight with which we concluded freedom is rather clearly invoked on behalf of beaches, 440 00:46:47,280 --> 00:46:51,820 a liberal vision of the inescapable reality of human equality. 441 00:46:51,820 --> 00:46:55,750 The resistance that these points and the recent scholarly literature, I conclude, 442 00:46:55,750 --> 00:47:00,340 reflects the continuing malign influence of moralising ratings, Meecham, 443 00:47:00,340 --> 00:47:05,410 of the failure to remember what he says about his conception of Renaissance virtue, 444 00:47:05,410 --> 00:47:11,710 namely that we understand it, that we should understand it and in moral line, freedom. 445 00:47:11,710 --> 00:47:22,238 Thank you.