1 00:00:02,910 --> 00:00:12,970 OK, well, this is my first show in Egypt. I think your intelligence considered to begin with six claims first. 2 00:00:12,970 --> 00:00:21,510 There's no persisting of unit yourself. Second, there's no fundamental, real distinct object on the one hand and their properties on the other. 3 00:00:21,510 --> 00:00:29,000 Third, there's no fundamental or real secret between the basic faithful properties of things and power properties of things. 4 00:00:29,000 --> 00:00:36,780 Fourth, most fundamental real distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and the processes and the on the other. 5 00:00:36,780 --> 00:00:44,690 In reality isn't truly divisible into causes. In fact, six objects aren't governed by laws of nature. 6 00:00:44,690 --> 00:00:50,380 Once two of the cutest thing from them. But I think this change is central to metaphor, just metaphysics. 7 00:00:50,380 --> 00:00:55,060 He also holds seven doesn't have free will as a woman. 8 00:00:55,060 --> 00:01:02,800 Really understood, although I won't say much about this and that nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does. 9 00:01:02,800 --> 00:01:11,050 That's a position which is often called determinism, although the name isn't apt to Nietzsche's Kenneth. 10 00:01:11,050 --> 00:01:17,250 Finally, for a moment, it seems to me that he inclines towards the ancient but also very modern view. 11 00:01:17,250 --> 00:01:23,290 So there's a fundamental, non-trivial sense in which reality is one. 12 00:01:23,290 --> 00:01:30,480 And towards what seems to me to be the most plausible, though difficult, view of the nature of reality that is the heart, 13 00:01:30,480 --> 00:01:33,310 the really hard nosed modernist view, 14 00:01:33,310 --> 00:01:40,990 which is the Spinoza and alien receiving and Edmontonians and white headed view that this is number 10 on my list. 15 00:01:40,990 --> 00:01:49,690 Reality is suffused with even if it doesn't consist of mentality, that some form sense and it seems correct to attribute tend to them, 16 00:01:49,690 --> 00:01:55,610 if only because he famously holds the lead, but that everything is world power. 17 00:01:55,610 --> 00:02:01,810 Because to say this is already to endorse ten in some form, 18 00:02:01,810 --> 00:02:13,870 to say that everything is some respect for I am not just a matter of cruft that is false, considered or conceived of it, only not away. 19 00:02:13,870 --> 00:02:20,290 So I think we have the core of not just metaphysics. And I'm going to put aside let I'm neither, for example, 20 00:02:20,290 --> 00:02:25,840 points out that Nietzsche doesn't mention dimensional even when he surveys it at work and take him out of one to 10. 21 00:02:25,840 --> 00:02:34,060 I think the first seven negative claims are certainly true and that the final three positive category probably true, 22 00:02:34,060 --> 00:02:38,460 which is known as the perspective best, who's sceptical about truth, 23 00:02:38,460 --> 00:02:42,820 a word which he likes to put in inverted commas, and about our project metaphysics. 24 00:02:42,820 --> 00:02:47,980 And he has a rich variety of valid purposes in expressing himself in this way. 25 00:02:47,980 --> 00:02:54,850 But it's not seriously in doubt that he isn't as mature thought prepared as all of what age or beast. 26 00:02:54,850 --> 00:02:59,800 He doesn't think his views on these matters are only true in inverted commas or true only from the 27 00:02:59,800 --> 00:03:06,160 perspective of self-drive sort of clustering drives or not really about what he calls a quote, 28 00:03:06,160 --> 00:03:13,750 true being of things that in themselves are things. And I'm happy to leave the detailed defence of this last point to others. 29 00:03:13,750 --> 00:03:20,630 Jill Richardson, for one and this talk. I want to focus on two six pages endorsement of one. 30 00:03:20,630 --> 00:03:24,730 The view is that there's no persisting unitary self. I think needs no argument. 31 00:03:24,730 --> 00:03:31,010 And it's deeply bound up with the endorsements of two to five. No, this is separate is not a free will. 32 00:03:31,010 --> 00:03:35,440 The argument age is pretty, pretty tangled up with six. 33 00:03:35,440 --> 00:03:40,960 I will talk about it a bit, but I want to read essentially set to make one point now, 34 00:03:40,960 --> 00:03:47,400 which is that the reason the name determinism is inappropriate in each case is that although he makes 35 00:03:47,400 --> 00:03:54,290 free use of the motions of power because he purges the thesis that nothing can ever happen otherwise. 36 00:03:54,290 --> 00:04:01,120 It does of the notion of compulsion, the notion of necessity understood as some kind of compulsion. 37 00:04:01,120 --> 00:04:11,240 He treats it rather. And in my view, most deeply as a as a kind of tautology in a way that we can perhaps picture first by thinking of lightning, 38 00:04:11,240 --> 00:04:16,980 his causeless universe in which every true statement about anything is now that true. 39 00:04:16,980 --> 00:04:25,090 And then perhaps again, indirectly, the I mentioned block universe of relativity theory. 40 00:04:25,090 --> 00:04:31,270 What about nine? I'm just going through someone saying a few things about these people getting on to the main issue. 41 00:04:31,270 --> 00:04:35,500 The view that in some sense, always one. But I don't want to insist on this, Masaomi, 42 00:04:35,500 --> 00:04:42,370 that Nietzsche's criticisms of the two Mystikal cutting tendencies and the matching 43 00:04:42,370 --> 00:04:48,070 atavistic tendencies of human thought and language tend in this direction. 44 00:04:48,070 --> 00:04:53,920 Thinking, he says, takes apart what is really one. And this is one of his most constant themes. 45 00:04:53,920 --> 00:04:59,840 It's live. Less clear, perhaps on a subject for another time. That he's a an all out moaners. 46 00:04:59,840 --> 00:05:04,150 And I mean a thing about. Stockholders, but. 47 00:05:04,150 --> 00:05:12,640 So in line with communities that as many injured, plus first many modern physicists and cosmologists who hold that, 48 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:22,580 there is in the final analysis, only one thing, that space time, which is itself an object, a concrete spiritual. 49 00:05:22,580 --> 00:05:24,730 We'll meet his views, have a fine ancestry. 50 00:05:24,730 --> 00:05:30,960 They are, in a sense, traditional, and they're strongly in accord, as I've always said, as much in present day physics. 51 00:05:30,960 --> 00:05:38,320 The main elements are found in our clients in the Buddha and some of the work of the Buddhist near contemporary Plato. 52 00:05:38,320 --> 00:05:43,670 In early modern times. They connect strongly with the norms of politeness, at least. 53 00:05:43,670 --> 00:05:50,170 And more recently, with Whitehead in the later Russell amongst others, many more Connexions can be made, some of which I'll indicate. 54 00:05:50,170 --> 00:05:53,400 But I'm not particularly concerned with the questions of influence. 55 00:05:53,400 --> 00:06:01,460 There are fundamental points on which nature agrees with Descartes, and this is a point that pleases me stress. 56 00:06:01,460 --> 00:06:08,470 Descartes is a great genius, misunderstood, and also a point at which I agree with law and human can't Tripplehorn. 57 00:06:08,470 --> 00:06:17,740 And none of this is surprising. Truth tends to occur independently to different thinkers and to force its way up. 58 00:06:17,740 --> 00:06:25,620 Matt, I'm quoting William James, who says that metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly. 59 00:06:25,620 --> 00:06:32,290 And no one is more obstinate to nature. It seems to me the fact that he has this completely uncanny nose for truth, 60 00:06:32,290 --> 00:06:40,560 which seems to extend beyond the psychological to the physical evidence, is bewildering to me. 61 00:06:40,560 --> 00:06:42,990 And some of this, I think, came up earlier in the day. 62 00:06:42,990 --> 00:06:52,640 It the panel session that I attended where Connexions are made between just thought pleasant physics, but not all of you. 63 00:06:52,640 --> 00:06:57,460 Anyway, my present day is to give a brief explanation of part of what I take to be the right 64 00:06:57,460 --> 00:07:02,710 view about the fundamental nature of reality with some special reference to nature. 65 00:07:02,710 --> 00:07:07,720 So I'd be amazed and worried if there were anything new. What I have to say about Nietzsche. 66 00:07:07,720 --> 00:07:14,400 I simply want to provide a certain view of reality with one distinguished reference point amongst others. 67 00:07:14,400 --> 00:07:20,710 I'm going to use the late notebook's freely, even when there are equally good quotations from the word nature published in The Sun. 68 00:07:20,710 --> 00:07:28,150 So I also see this papers containing slots for supporting causations to be supplied by others. 69 00:07:28,150 --> 00:07:32,500 So that's the first thing to do reality as this as it is in itself. 70 00:07:32,500 --> 00:07:38,210 End. That's the first thing to do when it comes to a discussion reaches metaphysics and it should be unnecessary. 71 00:07:38,210 --> 00:07:42,910 But philosophy is, of course, a cesspit of misunderstanding. 72 00:07:42,910 --> 00:07:50,830 One of the things the first is to do is to note that nature isn't sceptical about the notion of reality as it is in itself. 73 00:07:50,830 --> 00:08:00,820 This is hardly surprising because such scepticism is incoherent. It's incoherent because on the hand of one to be is necessarily to be a certain way. 74 00:08:00,820 --> 00:08:10,760 But then you give them time to be somehow or other less and to the way that being is at any given time just is the way it is in itself. 75 00:08:10,760 --> 00:08:16,450 And if you don't like the reality of time, you can just drop the words at any given time. 76 00:08:16,450 --> 00:08:22,210 Someone might say that the point fails Nietzsche's case because he helps the beings becoming. 77 00:08:22,210 --> 00:08:27,800 But obviously, that's no good. Reality is a certain way as it is in itself, whatever the nature of reality is. 78 00:08:27,800 --> 00:08:33,670 So if reality is coming and I have no objection to his terminology, that I get to avoid it. 79 00:08:33,670 --> 00:08:38,590 For the most part, because it has ancient and tangled roots. 80 00:08:38,590 --> 00:08:45,070 So reality is coming and that's the way reality is in itself. And there is, of course, a certain way becoming a reality. 81 00:08:45,070 --> 00:08:55,960 Is it as it is in itself? I'm going to skip a few points objections based on the misunderstanding of quantum mechanics. 82 00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:59,860 Another possible objection is the teacher writes that I quote, There is no truth. 83 00:08:59,860 --> 00:09:05,220 And they pretend what can be thought up must surely be a fiction. 84 00:09:05,220 --> 00:09:11,620 The first one to make a reply to that, of course, is that there's no tension between holding the does it determine the truth about 85 00:09:11,620 --> 00:09:17,720 how things are themselves and scepticism about our ability to know what it is. 86 00:09:17,720 --> 00:09:23,980 Second, it's true that need to constantly stress is the point that the ordinary human thought or language 87 00:09:23,980 --> 00:09:30,040 is profoundly inadequate when it comes to the attempt to try to express the nature of reality. 88 00:09:30,040 --> 00:09:35,500 Given thought and language is in part essentially constituted by fortifying structures. 89 00:09:35,500 --> 00:09:43,300 fictionalisation Zobel errors about that reality still need to never for a moment thinks that there's anything insuperable 90 00:09:43,300 --> 00:09:53,530 difficulty in using language that builds in such areas to express truths about those very errors or indeed truth of other kinds. 91 00:09:53,530 --> 00:09:57,910 So we have to weigh remarks which seem to express global scepticism about the possibility 92 00:09:57,910 --> 00:10:02,830 of expressing the truth about anything against the vast mass of the rest of his work, 93 00:10:02,830 --> 00:10:09,820 which is everywhere premised on the assumption that it is possible to express the truth about things. 94 00:10:09,820 --> 00:10:17,560 After all, the vast body of his work consists almost entirely of truth claims of this sort. 95 00:10:17,560 --> 00:10:25,670 I guess maybe this is a dead issue. That's what I've been picking up. This occurred recently, but it is not to be. 96 00:10:25,670 --> 00:10:33,250 It's not as if it's hard to fit these highly general, duplicative remarks by nature into his work considered as a whole. 97 00:10:33,250 --> 00:10:39,020 It's easy. It's easy to understand that point in the context of his other views. 98 00:10:39,020 --> 00:10:47,320 It's no harder than understanding the intuitively natural Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth. 99 00:10:47,320 --> 00:10:53,330 I don't need to see the horrible amount of time has been wasted here has come, said. 100 00:10:53,330 --> 00:10:59,000 I'm quoting many historians of philosophy with all their intended prayers. 101 00:10:59,000 --> 00:11:02,970 A tribute to be a nonsense, to pop philosophers, past philosophers. 102 00:11:02,970 --> 00:11:08,900 They are incapable of recognising beyond what the philosophers actually said, what they really meant to say. 103 00:11:08,900 --> 00:11:15,560 And again, if we take a single pattern of is torn from their context and compare them with one another, 104 00:11:15,560 --> 00:11:21,320 contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in the work that is written with any freedom of expression. 105 00:11:21,320 --> 00:11:27,600 But they are cops as easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the hope. 106 00:11:27,600 --> 00:11:37,940 So maybe this is just banal. I mean, what each has no truth, no knowledge, no metaphysics remarks to teach us something about our region, 107 00:11:37,940 --> 00:11:41,550 both in his published books and in his notebooks. 108 00:11:41,550 --> 00:11:48,150 Take a simple example, when nature proposes the reality is best thought of as a continuum or unified process. 109 00:11:48,150 --> 00:11:53,790 Who's nature thought, human thought and language inevitably falsified by cutting it up, 110 00:11:53,790 --> 00:11:59,250 but especially in temporal distinct objects or individual causes and effects? 111 00:11:59,250 --> 00:12:05,700 He's claiming that this is how things actually are. So you're saying this sort of thing involves China syndrome? 112 00:12:05,700 --> 00:12:11,700 On the question of fact, that nature is certainly Chumstick, his arm and whether or not that's so. 113 00:12:11,700 --> 00:12:16,200 He certainly doesn't think that words like Continuum are condemned by belonging 114 00:12:16,200 --> 00:12:22,710 to human thought of the language to being ultimately and applicable to reality. 115 00:12:22,710 --> 00:12:29,760 I would qualify some of those remarks about continue in the light of the again session I just attended, 116 00:12:29,760 --> 00:12:36,040 which talked quite a lot about Nietzsche's commitment to some kind of quintal you agree on. 117 00:12:36,040 --> 00:12:41,330 I don't think it's necessary to do that now. Okay. 118 00:12:41,330 --> 00:12:47,170 Now, what about that question that I just mentioned, which concerns for my list of theses? 119 00:12:47,170 --> 00:12:56,100 Well, very roughly. Physics, I think it has sufficiently shown that all objects of processing that very clear well thought of this process. 120 00:12:56,100 --> 00:13:05,320 We've learnt that matter is astonishingly theory, but substance is almost inconceivable in substantial relative to our everyday conception. 121 00:13:05,320 --> 00:13:12,120 GRANEY Individual particles were already being treated as insubstantial as mathematical points 122 00:13:12,120 --> 00:13:17,100 and hands me a theoretical posits in the 18th century as something Nietzsche was aware of, 123 00:13:17,100 --> 00:13:24,570 in fact. And they lost to a particular punctuality long ago as they gave way to fields in post 1925. 124 00:13:24,570 --> 00:13:36,510 Quantum physics leading up to a popular phenomenon of entanglement, everyday objects and stones to brains, collocations patterns of energy, 125 00:13:36,510 --> 00:13:43,680 diaphanous process entities whose existence evokes a constant interchange with the quantum vacuum given, 126 00:13:43,680 --> 00:13:49,620 which is literally correct to say that that party constituted by the quantum vacuum. 127 00:13:49,620 --> 00:13:57,800 So the idea of the processes or events requires some sort of substance that is somewhat distinct from which they can go or occur, 128 00:13:57,800 --> 00:14:08,830 has really long collapsed. The whole object process, property, state event, conceptual cluster concepts is indeed hopelessly superficial. 129 00:14:08,830 --> 00:14:17,250 Noted, we need modern physics to see this any more than the ancient Indian Greek philosophers did. 130 00:14:17,250 --> 00:14:23,310 Some of the distinctions in the object process property of the state of the class to seem to us to mark real, 131 00:14:23,310 --> 00:14:31,920 irreducible, metaphysical, fundamental differences. They seem integral to almost basic discursive subject predicate forms of thought. 132 00:14:31,920 --> 00:14:37,350 And we can allow their very natural, practically indespensible in everyday life. 133 00:14:37,350 --> 00:14:44,130 But they are profoundly misleading because when taken up in metaphysics as a guide to the fundamental nature of reality, 134 00:14:44,130 --> 00:14:52,510 as of them constantly stresses, and it isn't actually particularly hard to see that this is all reality. 135 00:14:52,510 --> 00:14:57,510 This process is why Whitehead was moved to observe by his study of 20th century physics. 136 00:14:57,510 --> 00:15:08,770 And as Heraclitus remarked, nature's beings becomings because Richardson says so Ahmos matter is best thought of as process. 137 00:15:08,770 --> 00:15:12,810 The matter is essentially dynamic. Essentially temporal, 138 00:15:12,810 --> 00:15:24,030 essentially changeable object or matter can't be conceptualised as things whose existence can be crossed separately from the temporality to, 139 00:15:24,030 --> 00:15:30,620 quote, nature. Another familiar quotation is the separation of doing from the duer of what happens from us. 140 00:15:30,620 --> 00:15:38,730 Something that makes it happen. Process from something that's not process but is enduring substance, thing, body, soul, etc. 141 00:15:38,730 --> 00:15:44,610 The attempt to grasp what happens is a kind of displacement and repositioning of what he is. 142 00:15:44,610 --> 00:15:50,880 What persists that ancient mythology set down the belief in a cause and effect. 143 00:15:50,880 --> 00:15:56,640 Once this belief is found, a fixed form in the grammatical functions of language. 144 00:15:56,640 --> 00:16:04,770 Well, I thought I think that we should always call matter time matter as a matter of time so that we never for a moment forget 145 00:16:04,770 --> 00:16:14,160 it's a central temporality and a central change when you cross match has time as minimal given in its being at the time. 146 00:16:14,160 --> 00:16:24,750 And if it's through time, indeed is not given in to being absorbed insofar as it's considered at a time, but only when it's considered through time, 147 00:16:24,750 --> 00:16:31,260 except through is already wrong because it carries the false picture of maximum somehow travelling through time, 148 00:16:31,260 --> 00:16:41,430 which is false because matters kind of meaning as part of its B in such a way that it can't really be said to exist through time. 149 00:16:41,430 --> 00:16:48,640 When you see all this, then you see that to assess it, a third pieces hate that nothing can happen. 150 00:16:48,640 --> 00:16:52,450 Dance is just to say that matter. That's time. 151 00:16:52,450 --> 00:17:00,480 That is what he needs to say, that even to say the matter does certain things or behaves in a certain way. 152 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:11,990 He's already too fortified to reality metal and suggests, insofar as it suggests, that its behaviour could be distinguished from its nature. 153 00:17:11,990 --> 00:17:17,230 So far we have the negative version of four in place. 154 00:17:17,230 --> 00:17:20,860 And I'm not going to do positive for a fourth simply. 155 00:17:20,860 --> 00:17:27,600 Of course, it's just all objects, a process that's already said. So that's the first plank. 156 00:17:27,600 --> 00:17:32,160 All the things we naturally pick out as objects are just as well. 157 00:17:32,160 --> 00:17:37,380 And actually, with no great difficulty thought of this process as a fundamental metaphysics, 158 00:17:37,380 --> 00:17:46,410 given that we allow ourselves to go on talking of object to all of you, perhaps to consider very seriously whether to go on talking of objects at all. 159 00:17:46,410 --> 00:17:52,430 But it's undoubtedly convenient for many purposes as need to realise, and it isn't, in fact, 160 00:17:52,430 --> 00:17:59,700 that hard to suspend or suppress a potentially misleading implications of such talk. 161 00:17:59,700 --> 00:18:06,210 So his that was just one familiar and I think relatively clear sample of Nietzsche's metaphysical thinking and one simple 162 00:18:06,210 --> 00:18:15,840 way to frame his general metaphysical approaches is as a rejection of two doctrines we can call separatism aestheticism. 163 00:18:15,840 --> 00:18:24,450 Next thing on my hand, no one can state and criticise these doctrines again, making the point clear, using the language of and property. 164 00:18:24,450 --> 00:18:29,400 Again, it's not as if the statement and criticism are undermined by the fact that the language 165 00:18:29,400 --> 00:18:34,650 of object to property hidden in it can be used as the doctrines built into it. 166 00:18:34,650 --> 00:18:44,760 So separatism separates objects shot from an object against these five and nine and also against 167 00:18:44,760 --> 00:18:51,070 one third to separatism and separates an object from its property owners against spaces too. 168 00:18:51,070 --> 00:18:55,560 And that's a crucial doctrine, which I hate to discuss in some detail. 169 00:18:55,560 --> 00:19:02,100 It's separatism, combined with scepticism in separate matter from force against six pieces. 170 00:19:02,100 --> 00:19:07,370 Six put otherwise in the explicit terms of six separate things the laws of nature. 171 00:19:07,370 --> 00:19:17,400 And that, says separatist Hickley, the lanta governor, the former separatism and statism combined again against these four. 172 00:19:17,400 --> 00:19:24,210 That's remarkable section to separate basic existence from time to temporality or in more 173 00:19:24,210 --> 00:19:31,020 lenient in terms being from becoming in a way profoundly country to modern physics. 174 00:19:31,020 --> 00:19:35,700 Well, let's distinguish 10 slash eleven times the purposes of philosophical discussion. 175 00:19:35,700 --> 00:19:42,480 But this separation too is of course artificial. There are many internal connexions and redundancies amongst the claims. 176 00:19:42,480 --> 00:19:47,400 So, for example, theses three can be seen as dropping up to six. 177 00:19:47,400 --> 00:19:52,890 And I believe direct discussion of five. That is the views on causation to four, five and six. 178 00:19:52,890 --> 00:19:59,730 In fact, all up to six go very closely together. What should we opposed to statuses? 179 00:19:59,730 --> 00:20:06,180 Well, dynamicists on process metaphysics, Eric Clapton, the names don't matter to separatism. 180 00:20:06,180 --> 00:20:13,080 Well, Motus Holism, metaphysical relational ism, the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. 181 00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:18,270 Maybe an hour ago, Magaro, Jonah's formulation of the emptiness doctrine. 182 00:20:18,270 --> 00:20:23,190 Well, of names you can have, I gave the name Identity Metaphysics. 183 00:20:23,190 --> 00:20:28,710 Now the name may be thought to express only the rejection of separatism and also status ism. 184 00:20:28,710 --> 00:20:36,390 But this too is superficial. It depends on another full separation, the separation of separatism from scepticism, the separation, 185 00:20:36,390 --> 00:20:44,670 which is very useful for political purposes to which is to repeat metaphysically superficial or particularly it depends on the idea. 186 00:20:44,670 --> 00:20:51,240 There's a sharp distinction between space and time, and that's why there is radically an extraordinarily forth. 187 00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:58,020 Given what we know, the nature of space time, we don't speak freely of space time. 188 00:20:58,020 --> 00:21:03,870 Using the single word to mark the collapse of the idea of space and time are radically distinct from each other. 189 00:21:03,870 --> 00:21:14,670 But we might do well to add the word matter into that word, to get a single word space time matter. 190 00:21:14,670 --> 00:21:19,710 The Nobel Prise winner, Steven Weinberg, suggests that all the objects we take ourselves to have to. 191 00:21:19,710 --> 00:21:26,970 We have to do with in life are best conceived of guys like space time being itself a physical object. 192 00:21:26,970 --> 00:21:34,170 The only one there is an essentially substantial something that's a part of it. 193 00:21:34,170 --> 00:21:39,270 That may be what resource and vast tracts of metaphysics find distinctness, discreetness, 194 00:21:39,270 --> 00:21:46,950 numerical difference, identity, metaphysics, finds unity, continuity, identity, identity, metaphysics. 195 00:21:46,950 --> 00:21:57,850 After all, if indeed you take through those OWFI, Spinoza is one of its exemplary practitioners, followed by shelling Inventure of the term Hengel. 196 00:21:57,850 --> 00:22:04,590 Nature still lies in the same tradition. It lies there because it is true, because it's a tradition. 197 00:22:04,590 --> 00:22:11,360 And although it also lays a great stress on differences of force or power or rank, 198 00:22:11,360 --> 00:22:16,110 well, separatism and status as in my very deep in language with its Basle subject, 199 00:22:16,110 --> 00:22:26,180 pretty good form where we can see easily enough that this is so, and we can say so in language, find ways of putting things that avoid the problem. 200 00:22:26,180 --> 00:22:32,520 We have in language, words like process flow in flux that allow us to say what is wrong with conceptions of the nature of reality, 201 00:22:32,520 --> 00:22:38,010 which finds sharp separations, discrete existences where really there are none. 202 00:22:38,010 --> 00:22:51,010 We can say with Heraclitus in whose proximity nature writes, I quote, He feels warmer and better than anywhere else that everything flows. 203 00:22:51,010 --> 00:22:54,400 OK. Now consider two seemingly radical claims, 204 00:22:54,400 --> 00:23:00,880 there's no fundamental distinction between to be made between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other. 205 00:23:00,880 --> 00:23:06,980 Well, let's say the claim is radical and it may indeed be on Aristotelian, but it's hardly radical. 206 00:23:06,980 --> 00:23:12,490 If by radical we mean radically unorthodox, it seems to be relatively little known. 207 00:23:12,490 --> 00:23:18,910 But Descartes Spinoza aliveness and count amongst those who unite with nature in their endorsement, 208 00:23:18,910 --> 00:23:27,250 too, they all hold to use and slightly extend Descartes terms that there is no real distinction, 209 00:23:27,250 --> 00:23:36,400 only a conceptual distinction between an object considered at any given time and its properties, its attributes most. 210 00:23:36,400 --> 00:23:43,540 Well, there's no real distinction between two things. They be on takeoff's terms when they can't possibly exist apart. 211 00:23:43,540 --> 00:23:47,720 The clearest case in which A and B can't possibly exist apart. 212 00:23:47,720 --> 00:23:55,150 And it isn't. And perhaps the only case is the case in which A and B are identical. 213 00:23:55,150 --> 00:24:01,330 Because then there's only one thing and nothing can exist apart from itself striking me. 214 00:24:01,330 --> 00:24:09,700 For some, it striking the case of an object at any given time and its properties considered at that time as a case of this kind. 215 00:24:09,700 --> 00:24:16,600 So I came. So is true the claim that there's no real distinction between an object and its property? 216 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:25,510 That's because positive notion of two objects or substances are literally identical with their properties. 217 00:24:25,510 --> 00:24:32,770 Well, at first this claim seems plainly false, given the standard training and analytic philosophy and given the extreme naturalness, 218 00:24:32,770 --> 00:24:37,000 counterfactual thought which builds in so many of the metaphysical errors. 219 00:24:37,000 --> 00:24:45,880 Nietzsche's criticises. But not after a while. Well, I've argued for two in another place and here I'm just going to cite other people instead. 220 00:24:45,880 --> 00:24:48,580 So here's Descartes. It's concise. 221 00:24:48,580 --> 00:24:56,680 I quote the attributes of a substance when considered collectively, he says, are indeed identical with the substance. 222 00:24:56,680 --> 00:25:02,220 Nature is even more concise. I quote, A thing equals its qualities. 223 00:25:02,220 --> 00:25:07,780 Subtract that doing as he often says, and there's no doer left over. 224 00:25:07,780 --> 00:25:15,640 One might think that Descartes life and Spinoza want to hang onto a robust notion of substance in a way that need to dust. 225 00:25:15,640 --> 00:25:19,980 But there's a fundamental respect in which this isn't so much right one. 226 00:25:19,980 --> 00:25:26,410 The great rationalist, not less radical in nature and actually lock in who rules so fully in line, 227 00:25:26,410 --> 00:25:34,120 epistemologically speaking and holding that we have absolutely no legitimate idea of substance nor any indeed any legitimate 228 00:25:34,120 --> 00:25:43,390 reason to suppose it exists insofar as it's taken to be something that is in any way other than a more than particular qualities. 229 00:25:43,390 --> 00:25:47,800 So amongst the seven most well-known early modern philosophers, only Baqi is out of line. 230 00:25:47,800 --> 00:25:52,550 This issue excepted the British empiricists keep it epistemological. 231 00:25:52,550 --> 00:25:56,290 Don't go into logical thesis. 232 00:25:56,290 --> 00:25:58,520 This object is literally identical with its properties. 233 00:25:58,520 --> 00:26:05,080 This is indeed radical and initially difficult to think given the structure of human thought of the language given in 234 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:12,170 particular with the word property is an intrinsically relational word that asks for something for it to be a property of. 235 00:26:12,170 --> 00:26:19,180 But it's sufficiently understandable to that. And it's also hand again, right in line with modern physics. 236 00:26:19,180 --> 00:26:25,500 Does it seem hard to think? Well, actually, it's not that. And it's something that one can grow into deeply. 237 00:26:25,500 --> 00:26:30,280 And this is doing philosophy or indeed physics. 238 00:26:30,280 --> 00:26:34,690 Descartes is, as it were, missed a substance for most philosophers. 239 00:26:34,690 --> 00:26:43,230 But the popular version of early modern philosophy bears little resemblance to the true story, which is much, much more exciting. 240 00:26:43,230 --> 00:26:48,220 And Descartes was neither the first nor the last to think that the word substance is an empty word, 241 00:26:48,220 --> 00:26:54,670 a mere placeholder with no clear meaning other than existed for real. 242 00:26:54,670 --> 00:27:01,850 He did, though, very much want to be left in peace to get on with his work, and he really was most anxious not to annoy the church. 243 00:27:01,850 --> 00:27:08,170 And he used the word substance increasingly in communication with others who couldn't really think in other terms because 244 00:27:08,170 --> 00:27:16,210 he has all these famous comments to his friend Regis or his one time friend Regis about how he shouldn't annoy people, 245 00:27:16,210 --> 00:27:23,950 try and talk in their language. Actually, it's also as perhaps insufficiently well known that Descartes agreed with nature. 246 00:27:23,950 --> 00:27:29,870 As I understand it, that all is one, at least insofar as the material universe is concerned. 247 00:27:29,870 --> 00:27:34,780 Take up the universe is a single substance in one big extended thing. 248 00:27:34,780 --> 00:27:42,660 It just has these different sort of nappily gradients of texture, which we think of as trains and cars people. 249 00:27:42,660 --> 00:27:47,080 But it is only one thing you can't. 250 00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:55,350 It's also alongside Venus. When he says, and I quote, in their relation to substance accidents or properties are not really subordinated to it, 251 00:27:55,350 --> 00:27:59,760 but are the manner of existence of the substance itself. He gets the matter. 252 00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:03,390 Exactly right. It seems to me nothing more needs to be said. 253 00:28:03,390 --> 00:28:12,940 And as so often in philosophy, the mistake is to try to say more, put aside philosophy and consider an object in front of you in the fullness. 254 00:28:12,940 --> 00:28:19,320 That's reality. There's no ontological subordination. The object's properties to the object itself. 255 00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:25,800 There's no existential inequality or priority of any sort. No one geological dependent either on the other. 256 00:28:25,800 --> 00:28:35,010 No independence of either from the other. There is, in other words, no real problem of universals and particulars as traditionally understood. 257 00:28:35,010 --> 00:28:39,180 Only a number of philosophically habitual ways of understanding the terms, 258 00:28:39,180 --> 00:28:46,860 object and property that just can't survive a proper appreciation of the present point. 259 00:28:46,860 --> 00:28:53,430 The realisation that this can be is so can be uncomfortable if one's being habituated to the philosophical debate, 260 00:28:53,430 --> 00:28:56,850 but it settles out and matures powerfully in time. 261 00:28:56,850 --> 00:29:03,010 One looks at any ordinary object and it's deeply mysterious how they can be thought to be appropriate. 262 00:29:03,010 --> 00:29:09,840 It's it's Zozo in. It's being the way it is is identical to sign being. 263 00:29:09,840 --> 00:29:16,940 Well, what happens, of course, now is that objection is based on counterfactuals flood to the front of many philosophers minds. 264 00:29:16,940 --> 00:29:22,830 And I'll say something about this soon. The moment that we can, as David Armstrong says, and I'm quoting again here, 265 00:29:22,830 --> 00:29:27,450 on the hand of distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties. 266 00:29:27,450 --> 00:29:33,450 But he says the two factors are to intimately together to speak of a relation between them. 267 00:29:33,450 --> 00:29:38,700 The business and the nature are incapable of existing apart from each other. 268 00:29:38,700 --> 00:29:44,040 Better particulars are vicious abstractions from what may be called states of affairs. 269 00:29:44,040 --> 00:29:52,980 This is this nature. Well, this seems to be to be entirely Cartesian and Spinoza and mind that CNN comes human nature. 270 00:29:52,980 --> 00:29:58,560 We cannot, as Armstrong says, distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties. 271 00:29:58,560 --> 00:30:06,720 We can make this conceptual distinction, but we can't really speak of a relation of real distinction between the two is true. 272 00:30:06,720 --> 00:30:13,500 Objects are literally identical with their properties. This is entirely compatible with clay objects. 273 00:30:13,500 --> 00:30:24,180 Properties, including its intrinsic or non relational properties may do change through time while it remains the same object. 274 00:30:24,180 --> 00:30:30,150 Well, no. No, it isn't. Someone says and I've got I've got this almost verbatim on the hand. 275 00:30:30,150 --> 00:30:37,380 Because I thought it's a bit more complicated. If someone says to me, look, to hold the objects are identical with their properties is to hold. 276 00:30:37,380 --> 00:30:43,410 This is Broman one that objects necessarily have all the properties they have. 277 00:30:43,410 --> 00:30:49,130 But we know the object says we naturally say that Object X, for example, would still be the object. 278 00:30:49,130 --> 00:30:56,520 It is a time, even if its properties, the properties or properties and as P had been different. 279 00:30:56,520 --> 00:31:04,080 We naturally say we're still. But the object is, even if some of these of its properties were other than they are, in fact to which I reply. 280 00:31:04,080 --> 00:31:09,190 True. But nothing here forbids this way of talking about the non-factual. 281 00:31:09,190 --> 00:31:16,970 The fact that there is context in which we find it natural to say this is Roman to that X as properties might have been different from what they are. 282 00:31:16,970 --> 00:31:24,660 One, it remains the same object doesn't provide any support to the mistaken idea that Romit three an 283 00:31:24,660 --> 00:31:31,420 object has or must have some form or motive be independent of its having the properties it does. 284 00:31:31,420 --> 00:31:35,400 To think that it does is to build the whole metaphysics of object and property into 285 00:31:35,400 --> 00:31:40,810 counterfactual thought of metaphysics that it doesn't contain a licence as it stands. 286 00:31:40,810 --> 00:31:50,780 And that's simply incorrect. We can perfectly well say Roman for X might not have had the properties it does not have. 287 00:31:50,780 --> 00:31:56,130 It was supposing that determines it is false because this doesn't put to in question. 288 00:31:56,130 --> 00:31:58,860 It doesn't challenge the view that whatever happens, 289 00:31:58,860 --> 00:32:04,930 everything in which the being of X consists of any time is identical to everything in which the being of X is property. 290 00:32:04,930 --> 00:32:15,550 This consists of that time it's possible to read Arabic pieces to such a way that is challenged by Grobman four. 291 00:32:15,550 --> 00:32:21,960 But if one does one simply Mrs chooses to ignore the fundamental metaphysical truth expressed by two. 292 00:32:21,960 --> 00:32:26,100 I can't really go on about this. No, but you really need some people's equal. 293 00:32:26,100 --> 00:32:30,450 I'm just reiterating the Obando theory about objects or just collections of properties. 294 00:32:30,450 --> 00:32:39,780 But top of the task, as it's usually stated, is the word property, meaning a property has already have to have been transformed in your thought. 295 00:32:39,780 --> 00:32:47,700 Yo yo bundle theory is usually presented, is still making use of the notion of property that makes it seem grotesquely implausible thing to say. 296 00:32:47,700 --> 00:32:55,650 That's because the area is. Built into the word property. So it takes a bit of time. 297 00:32:55,650 --> 00:33:00,440 Another objection, someone says, I bought my property. 298 00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:05,040 This is not bald. Therefore, I'm not identical to my property. 299 00:33:05,040 --> 00:33:11,370 This is meant to be not like this is law. But the reply to that is this. 300 00:33:11,370 --> 00:33:16,410 This is language, not metaphysics. I think I don't can answer that with nature. 301 00:33:16,410 --> 00:33:25,370 It's childish to think such an appeal to Linus's law can refute identity metaphysics in this way to understand the present claim, 302 00:33:25,370 --> 00:33:30,090 except the sense in which the being of X is identical with the being proper. 303 00:33:30,090 --> 00:33:37,920 And that there is such a sense isn't in question is to say that this that objection has no force, simply bounces off its target. 304 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:40,350 It depends on what's being discarded. 305 00:33:40,350 --> 00:33:49,590 The standard language enshrined object property distinction that drives the interminable debate about particulars universalis. 306 00:33:49,590 --> 00:33:54,120 So I don't think Frank Ramsey exaggerates when he says, and I quote, 307 00:33:54,120 --> 00:34:03,170 The whole theory of universal is due to mistaking a characteristic of language for amongst fundamental character the of reality. 308 00:34:03,170 --> 00:34:06,940 And Whitehead only exaggerates a little, perhaps when he says, and I quote At home, 309 00:34:06,940 --> 00:34:12,480 modern philosophy hinges around the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, 310 00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:21,480 substance and quality, particular and universal and both, and of course, agree with nature whose entry I played in until now. 311 00:34:21,480 --> 00:34:25,830 That's just, as it were, an artefact of the fact that I had always stopped. 312 00:34:25,830 --> 00:34:35,100 And then I discovered the data could be recruited to the cause as her language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices we read 313 00:34:35,100 --> 00:34:43,560 Disharmonious and problems to fix because we think only in the form of language does believing in the eternal truth of reason e.g. subject, 314 00:34:43,560 --> 00:34:54,360 predicate, etc. because he comes first and then the historical order that nature often focuses on causation when making this point. 315 00:34:54,360 --> 00:35:01,080 Let me quote this that we have a right to distinguish between subject and predicate. He says, that is our strongest belief, fact bottom. 316 00:35:01,080 --> 00:35:06,200 Even the belief in cause and effect, self condition, condition, not him, 317 00:35:06,200 --> 00:35:12,960 is merely an individual case of the first and general belief in primaeval belief and subject to predict might not. 318 00:35:12,960 --> 00:35:21,450 This belief in the concept of subject completely gives me the great stupidity and claims to infer, 319 00:35:21,450 --> 00:35:28,530 in fact, deeply connected declaims three, five and six which are into thickly into work with each other. 320 00:35:28,530 --> 00:35:35,150 And it's to this trip that I now turn the subject, predicate the connexion of subsequent particles, 321 00:35:35,150 --> 00:35:39,840 cause factors, as it were, mediating the transition. 322 00:35:39,840 --> 00:35:45,420 Well, the first point is the quick one seems to be clear that nature's animate, animate versions of hands, 323 00:35:45,420 --> 00:35:54,810 talk causes and effects tantamount to any sort of scepticism about the reality of what we can well call causal processes. 324 00:35:54,810 --> 00:36:00,270 Nor do they amount to any qualification of this view that nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does. 325 00:36:00,270 --> 00:36:08,310 His belief is that this may cause dissent, his belief in what we can well call natural necessity. 326 00:36:08,310 --> 00:36:15,420 So long as we detach this term from any idea that anything in nature is forcing anything else but compelling it. 327 00:36:15,420 --> 00:36:25,170 What nature is objecting to in the classic Buddhist style is the substance, timeless separatism and talk about individual causes and effects. 328 00:36:25,170 --> 00:36:32,040 He's asserting five to claim that reality is not truly divisible into causes and effects. 329 00:36:32,040 --> 00:36:35,310 Here's a quotation that gave science concepts and of course, 330 00:36:35,310 --> 00:36:43,290 in effect the immediate effect of the image of becoming without reason, reaching a fountain or behind it cause and effect. 331 00:36:43,290 --> 00:36:54,060 There is probably never such little reality and truth. The continuum comprises part of which we isolate a couple of pieces. 332 00:36:54,060 --> 00:37:01,020 The area of dividing the reality continuum to becoming reality into discrete subsystem type of causes and 333 00:37:01,020 --> 00:37:08,100 effects is Anitra particularly salient because of the fundamental error in to the fundamental forward, 334 00:37:08,100 --> 00:37:12,180 discursive thought that is most centrally subject, predicate, 335 00:37:12,180 --> 00:37:23,490 form or noun work for which inevitably enacts the object property Harra and or being becoming ever well against as there are so far. 336 00:37:23,490 --> 00:37:29,030 We already have in place the positive versions of theses two and four objects of processes. 337 00:37:29,030 --> 00:37:36,270 There is no real distinguishing objects in their properties. The next thing to bring into line is the positive version three. 338 00:37:36,270 --> 00:37:42,450 As it stands, three and negative form states that there's no fundamental real distinction early at 339 00:37:42,450 --> 00:37:49,090 best conceptual distinction between a thing X's baseball properties and its powerful. 340 00:37:49,090 --> 00:37:53,780 Yes, put otherwise, and here I go to. 341 00:37:53,780 --> 00:37:59,780 I'm intentionally introducing an extremely unhelpful terminology because it's 342 00:37:59,780 --> 00:38:04,460 so widespread that it's worth trying to express the correct view in its terms. 343 00:38:04,460 --> 00:38:12,590 Although they resist the truth. So put it in these other terms, negative three states that there's no fundamental real distinction. 344 00:38:12,590 --> 00:38:20,750 Only the best conceptual distinction between access categorical properties and an ex is dispositional properties. 345 00:38:20,750 --> 00:38:31,110 Now, to consider three anything is again to separate up purposes of discussion, an aspect of what is in it, a single thesis, 346 00:38:31,110 --> 00:38:38,240 a single thesis of identity, metaphysics, which inevitably comes out as something complex, that human thought and language. 347 00:38:38,240 --> 00:38:42,980 So the separation is again, artificial, but one has of course, 348 00:38:42,980 --> 00:38:48,070 one has to do this sort of thing when doing human philosophy and one comparative well 349 00:38:48,070 --> 00:38:52,400 and using language and one compatibly well do it in the service of trying to show, 350 00:38:52,400 --> 00:38:58,310 as I am now trying to show how and why the separations are unofficial. 351 00:38:58,310 --> 00:39:03,770 So I'm not any good at all for the moment in terms of the categorical disposition distinction. 352 00:39:03,770 --> 00:39:12,050 I'm also going to continue to talk in terms of object properties. The separatists object property cannot be dispensed with, 353 00:39:12,050 --> 00:39:20,190 are now regularly also or simply a neutral of being in a way that doesn't divide reality into objects and properties. 354 00:39:20,190 --> 00:39:21,800 And by being, I just mean becoming. 355 00:39:21,800 --> 00:39:30,840 I'm not saying I'm not expecting that, but I have a special dialectical purpose in retaining the language of objects and property. 356 00:39:30,840 --> 00:39:36,230 I'm not retaining it because the Rosemann points flow more easily or looking more plausible. 357 00:39:36,230 --> 00:39:40,880 When we spoke to the opposite reason, because they look less plausible. 358 00:39:40,880 --> 00:39:43,070 We'll move on with pushing these terms. 359 00:39:43,070 --> 00:39:50,780 So the idea is that when one thinks that it points through in the more resistant object profits, one can see the points home. 360 00:39:50,780 --> 00:39:58,370 Even with these terms rigid. So that's meant to give extra force to be to the attempted demonstration. 361 00:39:58,370 --> 00:40:04,160 So this is the last argument to begin. It's generally agreed to talk about object taxes, 362 00:40:04,160 --> 00:40:09,110 dispositions or dispositional properties in context like the present one is to talk of its 363 00:40:09,110 --> 00:40:15,410 powers and about properties which actually we make up into local schools or property. 364 00:40:15,410 --> 00:40:21,800 It's less clear, much less clear to me at these about the term categorical standard and used to mean in this context. 365 00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:25,010 But the simplest or minimal way to understand it, I think, 366 00:40:25,010 --> 00:40:33,590 is as to X is basic or fundamental or intrinsic or primary qualities or properties, what ever they are. 367 00:40:33,590 --> 00:40:37,340 So X is categorical. Being, I suppose, is the totality of X. 368 00:40:37,340 --> 00:40:45,980 Is Paektu concretely existing? B whatever is nature now in this definition of categorical, doesn't exclude, 369 00:40:45,980 --> 00:40:56,180 doesn't exclude the possibility that the things dispositional properties should turn out to be amongst sceptical Kattegat, but nor should it. 370 00:40:56,180 --> 00:41:01,070 So far so, perhaps so good. The next thing to record is, is this commonly held? 371 00:41:01,070 --> 00:41:09,980 This is an issue that the categorical properties of X are the ground of X is dispositional or power properties, 372 00:41:09,980 --> 00:41:15,980 and the categorical properties of X on the whole ground of X is dispositional 373 00:41:15,980 --> 00:41:21,620 properties so that the dispositional properties are in no way ontologically above. 374 00:41:21,620 --> 00:41:29,240 The categorical properties of this view is most familiarly associated with lock in multiplicity. 375 00:41:29,240 --> 00:41:36,430 And it's plainly central to it that the distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is at best a conceptual distinction. 376 00:41:36,430 --> 00:41:44,720 It's not any sort of irreducible logical distinction. There's nothing more to the power properties or power beating of a thing than 377 00:41:44,720 --> 00:41:50,750 each category of properties or category competing according to what is right. 378 00:41:50,750 --> 00:41:55,190 If the things categorical big is in place, then it's power B is in place. 379 00:41:55,190 --> 00:42:05,740 First things Power B block is literally part of its actual contract, the existing B its capital being played. 380 00:42:05,740 --> 00:42:10,790 It doesn't exclude its part B given the present definition of the word categorical. 381 00:42:10,790 --> 00:42:13,910 Well, I think that so far is tilted the right to take that. 382 00:42:13,910 --> 00:42:22,960 And B often combined with the view c that the categorical properties of X are in some way ontologically over this position. 383 00:42:22,960 --> 00:42:28,630 Will power properties of X and Y C may seem natural enough at first. 384 00:42:28,630 --> 00:42:35,630 It is what's at issue here, because this to accept three as it does nature does and as I do, 385 00:42:35,630 --> 00:42:46,970 is to deny C that it is to deny that there is any there is or can be anything more to A things B than its powers. 386 00:42:46,970 --> 00:42:51,830 I agree with Nita that. See is a great mistake. 387 00:42:51,830 --> 00:42:53,950 However, management may seem at first. 388 00:42:53,950 --> 00:43:04,490 In fact, I think the point is effectively a priority once one accepts the reality of power B, to any serious loss of muscle. 389 00:43:04,490 --> 00:43:10,560 So let me try to explain. This will be the one to conclusion. 390 00:43:10,560 --> 00:43:15,240 Here is the raw power of people being stomping, which I take to be a YouTube officer. 391 00:43:15,240 --> 00:43:21,450 So most philosophers agree that they can get be dispositional being without categorical being. 392 00:43:21,450 --> 00:43:30,480 And they can be categorised as being without disposition. They accept that everything has both categorically and this position most. 393 00:43:30,480 --> 00:43:37,820 Some do reject parts of this tape holding. There's no categorical be only dispositional being magnanimous. 394 00:43:37,820 --> 00:43:46,440 D I've got two letters and numbers. D This is the there is only dispositional B. 395 00:43:46,440 --> 00:43:52,380 Well, I got to consider this horribly ill expressed suggestion later for that night instead of the 396 00:43:52,380 --> 00:43:56,970 following strengthened version of the claim that everything has both categorical and disposition. 397 00:43:56,970 --> 00:44:08,130 B. This is C, D one and C D do nothing could possibly have the total categorical B has not had the token dispositional poverty. 398 00:44:08,130 --> 00:44:13,930 And conversely, nothing can possibly have the time and disposition of being that has not out the total category. 399 00:44:13,930 --> 00:44:18,720 B I think this is just obvious on reflection, 400 00:44:18,720 --> 00:44:25,520 given that we can agree to use the dreaded categorical dispositional language of thought before I ask for 401 00:44:25,520 --> 00:44:31,710 this note that it's a very short step if it's a step total from that conjunction of those two theses, 402 00:44:31,710 --> 00:44:41,580 which are just called C D. So the seemingly stronger claim we've already encountered, that is the categorical dispositional formulation of three. 403 00:44:41,580 --> 00:44:45,420 That is, there is no real distinction, only a conceptual distinction between an object, 404 00:44:45,420 --> 00:44:49,860 categorical properties or B and its disposition properties will be. 405 00:44:49,860 --> 00:44:54,810 And a small set that to my preferred candidate is a positive for the three, 406 00:44:54,810 --> 00:44:59,680 which is the CBD stronger claim that things have to go to properties or being 407 00:44:59,680 --> 00:45:04,890 if dispositional properties being a reality are really the entity identical, 408 00:45:04,890 --> 00:45:07,170 which could be put more simply as three. 409 00:45:07,170 --> 00:45:16,370 Again, the things X is based will be cooperativeness is identical with its part B or publicness, which comes down in in effect. 410 00:45:16,370 --> 00:45:21,450 In the end of all being as part of B, 411 00:45:21,450 --> 00:45:28,570 I say seemingly stronger because I don't think the three the positive identity claim is really stronger than the negative. 412 00:45:28,570 --> 00:45:32,850 No real distinction. 413 00:45:32,850 --> 00:45:42,590 Well, look, all this may seem quite wrong, and I know it does seem quite wrong to a very large number of present day circumvented metaphysicians, 414 00:45:42,590 --> 00:45:50,090 routine thoughts about the multiple reliability of certain functional properties, which proves our disposition properties. 415 00:45:50,090 --> 00:45:55,310 Perhaps the following familiar linked objections to what I see D. 416 00:45:55,310 --> 00:46:01,340 Someone's going to say, look, two things can be this positionally or power identical without being Kattegat attached. 417 00:46:01,340 --> 00:46:10,700 And also a thing can be changed in respect of its categorical properties without being changed in respect of its disposition. 418 00:46:10,700 --> 00:46:15,200 So two thoughts about possible worlds may prompt the idea. 419 00:46:15,200 --> 00:46:22,850 Three things can be changed in respect of its disposition or properties without being changed in respect of its categorical properties. 420 00:46:22,850 --> 00:46:30,890 And the accompanying O for two things can be categorically identical without being dispositional apparent. 421 00:46:30,890 --> 00:46:37,140 In fact, good things can be solved. Nothing like searching. Certain things take out too big of an argument. 422 00:46:37,140 --> 00:46:44,190 Take three and four. First, huge numbers of recent philosophical thought experiments depend on those three and 423 00:46:44,190 --> 00:46:50,790 therefore they build in the profoundly separatist assumption that the material. 424 00:46:50,790 --> 00:46:56,720 Think think tanks can be thought of as retaining its intrinsic nature or basic categories 425 00:46:56,720 --> 00:47:02,420 will be unchanged across different economic environments while changing its disposition, 426 00:47:02,420 --> 00:47:12,890 being on account of its different genomic environment. But this idea is incoherent in nature, few as it is online. 427 00:47:12,890 --> 00:47:20,540 This is just the six fact as it is indeed, it seems to me on any take seriously. 428 00:47:20,540 --> 00:47:29,300 Presently, physics point of mass or maximum is just to manage machoism to passively sitting stuff that is then 429 00:47:29,300 --> 00:47:36,950 using what then is a sort of quasar terminal capacity should be stuff that is then regimented by laws. 430 00:47:36,950 --> 00:47:41,570 Laws of nature can't be supposed to be in any way not logically independent or rather than 431 00:47:41,570 --> 00:47:50,030 essentially constitute a part of the categorical or intrinsic nature of maximal energy. 432 00:47:50,030 --> 00:47:55,610 A matter of reality is forceable energy, regularity. 433 00:47:55,610 --> 00:47:57,350 No, I'm quoting nature. 434 00:47:57,350 --> 00:48:07,570 That is, the unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove a law, but a power of relation between two or several forces. 435 00:48:07,570 --> 00:48:15,500 To say this is him imagining someone speaking to say but precisely this relation remains the same. 436 00:48:15,500 --> 00:48:22,400 Means nothing more than one of the same. False cannot be a different force as well. 437 00:48:22,400 --> 00:48:27,350 I think this takes a little thinking about it first, but it's that it's exactly right. 438 00:48:27,350 --> 00:48:34,490 He had nature. Imagine someone thinking with the claim, but precisely in this relation remains the same. 439 00:48:34,490 --> 00:48:45,950 Requires or involves appealed to the law. There's an explanation of its truth, but that's to misunderstand what a force is, what reality is. 440 00:48:45,950 --> 00:48:50,760 When you understand that, you see that. But precisely, this relation remains the same. 441 00:48:50,760 --> 00:48:54,920 It's really nothing more than a tautology or necessary truth. 442 00:48:54,920 --> 00:49:01,210 A particular instance of the necessary truth that everything is what it is and not another thing. 443 00:49:01,210 --> 00:49:10,610 It may be open. Able Danger writes, quote, that in the end itself, there is nothing of causal connexions of necessity. 444 00:49:10,610 --> 00:49:19,780 Then the effect does not follow because there is something. 445 00:49:19,780 --> 00:49:23,600 And again, this is exactly right. Properly understood. 446 00:49:23,600 --> 00:49:34,490 There are no laws of nature, no objective laws of work, necessitating anything in addition to the material stuff of reality. 447 00:49:34,490 --> 00:49:41,090 The point acquires a special vividness, given the four dimensionally still block universe view of things. 448 00:49:41,090 --> 00:49:44,810 Insofar as this gives us a picture of reality laid out as a whole, 449 00:49:44,810 --> 00:49:53,200 as it were already containing all the phenomena that need us to talk of cause and necessity laws in a way. 450 00:49:53,200 --> 00:50:00,710 But before I mentioned, this picture shows up a superficial relative to the great given us of the four dimensional reality. 451 00:50:00,710 --> 00:50:04,040 So it does look very vivid in that we call it four dimensions. 452 00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:15,380 But the point holds just as well with a more conventional view of the flowing nature of time. 453 00:50:15,380 --> 00:50:19,970 So much for those three of four. Turning back now to, oh, one of them two. 454 00:50:19,970 --> 00:50:26,180 That's the objection, which is in effect, objection to three claims of all being as PABI. 455 00:50:26,180 --> 00:50:31,030 The objection is based on the fact that certain properties may be said to be multiple. 456 00:50:31,030 --> 00:50:38,810 Realisable. But this this objection doesn't deserve serious consideration because of this, 457 00:50:38,810 --> 00:50:45,300 the two differently constructed pocket calculators can be a function of the disposition to be identical in some respects. 458 00:50:45,300 --> 00:50:50,850 That is, mathematically speaking, say they can do the same things equally, obviously. 459 00:50:50,850 --> 00:50:56,370 The total disposition will be different if they're different being constructed. 460 00:50:56,370 --> 00:51:01,830 So they will melt differently or flip differently or smell different. 461 00:51:01,830 --> 00:51:11,460 It is the end, a trivial point, but if they are in any way categorically different, they will necessarily be dispositional, be different. 462 00:51:11,460 --> 00:51:15,840 I mean, suppose you go to Captain Calculator's off the same production line. 463 00:51:15,840 --> 00:51:21,390 One Athans difference between them makes a difference between their two positions. 464 00:51:21,390 --> 00:51:27,780 And so to no less tributed, if you change the categorical being one of them in any way, you heyo it. 465 00:51:27,780 --> 00:51:34,510 So change is total dispositional B. So perhaps no one would disagree with this. 466 00:51:34,510 --> 00:51:44,010 So let me now turn nearly five to D the claim that there's only dispositional B because someone thought this is the same view. 467 00:51:44,010 --> 00:51:51,630 Well the trouble lies in the word dispositional once again. 468 00:51:51,630 --> 00:52:00,450 And then the use of the categorical dispositional position. We really should have stopped talking of power because the powers we'd look, 469 00:52:00,450 --> 00:52:07,100 I'm a great historical majority keeping clear on the point that our properties are causing actual property. 470 00:52:07,100 --> 00:52:13,080 The substantive realities of this case, this term P. 471 00:52:13,080 --> 00:52:23,010 This tends to go for being this this being put into P or being a property, which of course is Creagan, 472 00:52:23,010 --> 00:52:28,830 as well as version six because they are all massive need to look at these pieces. 473 00:52:28,830 --> 00:52:30,900 P Is that the kinds of old being is copying. 474 00:52:30,900 --> 00:52:45,430 Obviously because it has no sort of reductive ad of the kind of clings so weird to D and drives D in fact, and incoherence in effect and again amount. 475 00:52:45,430 --> 00:52:51,900 So the goal being is energy forms of energy. I take this to the orthodoxy of physics. 476 00:52:51,900 --> 00:52:52,860 D, by contrast, 477 00:52:52,860 --> 00:53:03,510 is really extraordinarily confusing and certainly sort of refuted claims as the claims that reality is just a matter of federalist dispositions. 478 00:53:03,510 --> 00:53:12,930 We can say this too. This is just bad language, if you like, but it is very, very bad language and has caused horrible confusion. 479 00:53:12,930 --> 00:53:24,300 If we continue to take it that dispositional property of our property are equivalent to capital disposition Austronesians terms, 480 00:53:24,300 --> 00:53:29,940 then Kattegat, we must presumably mean no Parmar property. 481 00:53:29,940 --> 00:53:35,040 This has actually recently come up and this not been adopted as a definition. 482 00:53:35,040 --> 00:53:43,590 Some of the best to do on this DG biotics on the bird. But then we have the picture of things with nonparticipants and power properties. 483 00:53:43,590 --> 00:53:45,640 So we have a vitrification on top of it. 484 00:53:45,640 --> 00:53:53,230 And then papito parties that they have holy and virtue of having that on top of this really seems truly absurd. 485 00:53:53,230 --> 00:54:04,020 Reality and the proper target of Ockham's Razor. Apart from involving true while degree of separatism and yet the cult. 486 00:54:04,020 --> 00:54:11,400 So I'm saying it's terrible, but the consequences of rejecting it or something like it may still seem too problematic for some. 487 00:54:11,400 --> 00:54:23,480 Because the consequence is nothing less than this. The consequence is that it seems that any existing property must ipso facto to Heigh-Ho itself, be. 488 00:54:23,480 --> 00:54:28,810 That's what I'm saying. So there seems to be a power or I want to admit it. 489 00:54:28,810 --> 00:54:31,670 Is there such a thing as power tool? 490 00:54:31,670 --> 00:54:42,350 The only way to exist without being poacher's, without being disposed to have an effect on other things is not to exist. 491 00:54:42,350 --> 00:54:50,240 Well, obviously, it's a lie by its nature and I don't know who else. And I think we should we are welcome that reaction of helplessness. 492 00:54:50,240 --> 00:54:55,040 I do think it's important to see how undramatic, how boring does it were. 493 00:54:55,040 --> 00:55:04,400 The point is, in the end, although it seems so hard to put one point into writes that, quote, 494 00:55:04,400 --> 00:55:10,220 The absolute necessity of the same thing is happening in one course of the world, as in all others throughout eternity, 495 00:55:10,220 --> 00:55:17,840 not at determinism about what happens, but merely the expression of the fact that the impossible is not possible, 496 00:55:17,840 --> 00:55:23,210 that one particular force can't be anything other than precisely that particular force. 497 00:55:23,210 --> 00:55:33,640 And he concludes that by saying, I quote, that what happens and what necessarily happens is a tautology. 498 00:55:33,640 --> 00:55:37,370 Well, that obviously doesn't make sense as it stands. 499 00:55:37,370 --> 00:55:42,010 And, of course, it is only an entry in a notebook. But I think it's clear what need to means. 500 00:55:42,010 --> 00:55:49,760 The two phrase is what happens and what necessarily happens or in fact, equivalent, what happens just days, what necessarily happens. 501 00:55:49,760 --> 00:55:55,010 So clearly what happens is what necessarily happens is effectively totally logical, 502 00:55:55,010 --> 00:55:59,420 because it's just like saying that what happens is that what happens is what happens, 503 00:55:59,420 --> 00:56:03,830 which is, of course, the reverse tautology and the idea occurs again. 504 00:56:03,830 --> 00:56:13,520 Another note from the same year, he says regularity proves only that one and the same happening is not another happening as well. 505 00:56:13,520 --> 00:56:19,370 Here, it seems to me, all nature's thoughts about being becoming power or force. 506 00:56:19,370 --> 00:56:24,640 Will energy cause necessity and fate converge? 507 00:56:24,640 --> 00:56:30,050 Spinoza and lightness stand in the background of the past. 508 00:56:30,050 --> 00:56:37,430 The Middle East and Einstein and his theory of relativity in the foreshadowed future. 509 00:56:37,430 --> 00:56:41,570 Einstein is the one with nature when he writes, I quote, 510 00:56:41,570 --> 00:56:48,860 being endowed with higher insights and more perfect intelligence watching man and his doings would smile man's illusion. 511 00:56:48,860 --> 00:56:58,100 He was acting according to his own free will. Einstein writes that having just remarked that famously, I think quoting Einstein, 512 00:56:58,100 --> 00:57:04,070 if the mood in the ACT computing gets eternal way around the Earth were gifted with self-consciousness, 513 00:57:04,070 --> 00:57:19,185 it would feel thoroughly convinced that he was travelling its way of its own accord on the strength of the resolution taken once and for all.