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So this is how we're going to go. So introductions,

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talk briefly about brain machine interfaces and then the kind of scope of the talk is to see to what extent brain machine interfaces,

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when we think of them, conform to kind of what may be called traditional theories of action within philosophy and whether they do or not,

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maybe a good or a bad thing. So we'll talk about, of course, the theory of action, what's called a common causal deviance, not causal theory.

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And then we have this disjunctive theory at the end of it.

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So the kind of key questions that I'm interested in and I certainly think I've got close to answering them, is firstly, what is an action?

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So again, I'm still broadly within the philosophical framework.

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And then secondly,

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the bit that really interests me is this question under what conditions does brain machine interface enable behaviour called qualifying as action?

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So I'm kind of generated by thinking about brain machine interface, etc. for a lot of different types of interfaces,

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a variety of different types of neurological device that can aid behaviour.

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I mean the most typical one is cochlear implants, but perhaps the most extraordinary, remarkable stuff.

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And if you're not familiar with Google brain machine interfaces and see the remarkable technology that we have now in Japan,

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and one of the most extraordinary developments is how these devices can help for those who've suffered spinal cord injury,

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particularly those who have become a quadriplegic. So the most vivid image for me when I think about this is Christopher Reeve.

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Who as Superman had this image of being Superman, of being this extraordinary superhuman strength and ability.

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And he's an extraordinary, tragic accident who was a quadriplegic.

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And I remember seeing an interview, I think was that show in the States.

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And he said confidently that he expected within his lifetime that he would be able to walk again, saying that wasn't the case.

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But we have made extraordinary progress in this regard since spinal cord injury is a considerable number of people who've suffered,

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who are rendered quadriplegic or have have a disease.

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Most of the injuries, a lot of the injuries, 33%, motor vehicle accidents and other accidents like that.

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And so what is a brain machine interface? So I'm particularly interested in what we call user interfaces.

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So they work like this. So if you somebody like Chris Reeve, except in this case,

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the injury that caused these kind of things just leaves the kind of cognitive functions intact.

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I mean, what makes it perhaps so vividly disturbing?

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So his thoughts, his movement intentions in that sense relate to famous roles in life celebration interfaces.

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This conceptual is extraordinary.

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Now, practical thing, if we could just connect these internal mental process, cognitive processes to a device, we could reach and have a clue.

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So if BMI works its way, decodes new signals to extract voluntary movement commands that reflect intention.

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So somebody with a brain machine interface, if they say she wants to move around,

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she's able to do this because the device decodes certain movement parameters,

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like the goal that she's reaching for the direction, the torque, the force.

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So those elements we can decode.

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So in March of last year, there was a story that was in The Guardian and then picked up elsewhere this remarkable by guy Bill Kercheval.

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And that was just the headline from The Guardian. It says Paradise Man Moves On Using Power of 14 World First.

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So what's unique in this is that this is crucial.

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Robert was able to use. It wasn't a prosthetic limb.

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This is anybody that with the brainwashing interface to what's called function that electronic stimulation was able to move his own body,

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which had become paralysed after a bypass.

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And the exploring part, the first part is that he was able to move his arm again, but was paralysed by technology.

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And he was now able, as the Guardian says, to dream, concede himself something that he'd been unable to do ahead of time.

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So, again, it's not from the stand brain machine facing this.

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He said, no, no, the robotic arm. But if you're like me, that technology is quite extreme.

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So as The Guardian said in the text of The Guardian.

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So he was paralysed from below the neck of crushing his bike,

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had electrical implants implanted in the motor cortex in the standard area of the brain for motor brainwashing interfaces.

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Then he has sensors inserted in his forearm, which allows the muscles and hand to be stimulated in response to signals from his brain.

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So after eight years, he can do these remarkable things.

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So when you look at that, when we think about the kind of what the thought that he could be, somebody could say, well, yes, he's just like us.

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He's just like us in the sense of if you have got to kind of with you, we are physical systems.

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The brain connects to the body when I move my arm. It's really just the same feel kosher problem.

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So it's a different type type of technology, but essentially the same type of thing.

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So if you think about the concept of action,

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you think about the concept of ancient in making these movements feel kosher farmers acting in the same way that I'm acting,

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if I raise my arm, he's an agent.

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He's somebody who's interacting with the world. So if you imagine that kind of invention, then imagine a completely different thing.

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Let's say that you use cinema to turn off on the projector.

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It would be interesting. But all I'm to say that the projector is part of me, even though I can control it.

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We tend not to think that we will coach over the weekend.

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Once we see him move, we can think of the the heaving body renovating that project to add something different to.

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It's now integrated enough to think that he's performing actions with that.

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So somebody could say, you know, there's really nothing.

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This is just a technological question. So just like hunting my favourite ones, you know,

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the Empire Strikes Back when they produced I want to get some you all from me and the economy just like this.

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So you might you know, you could say, look, it's there's no philosophical problem here, but having a newborn is just like having an old body.

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Well, Kosovars actions are examples of intentional action.

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He wants to feed himself. He wants to move the cup to his mouth.

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That is, lose the cup to his mouth. It's just the same as anybody in this room.

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More clearly, it seems that he's always keep doing something.

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And again, one might look at that. If you can get you put video on online, you can say, look, he's obviously doing something.

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He's guiding and controlling his body in a way that reflects his intentions.

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So to think about this in front of you, have we talked a couple weeks ago.

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So here's an example of food in action, most exquisite footwear, and then contrast or compare that with this.

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So this is a guy so he's wearing I'm sorry in pictures up pretty good an exoskeleton.

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So this is before the last president of the World Cup,

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an individual against spinal cord injury with the use of in cuffs is able to walk using this exoskeleton.

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So again and again, the question is, should we think of this as an action?

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On what grounds is it? Actually, you might even be interested to ask whether we think this is the body and why or why not.

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So briefly to talk about brain machine interfaces.

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So it's a very, very brief. So you maybe can be categorised in the following ways, said that, broadly speaking, are they feasible,

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non-invasive, non-invasive, non-invasive devices, EEG devices that rest on top of the scope of the devices.

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The cortical micro stimulation devices are inserted into the brain to take different types of signals that you can

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detect on the far end of individual neurones or sound electrical electrical activity across a variety of neurones,

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so that you get greater accuracy, greater. If you go further into the brain, then obviously you pay the price of the interface.

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And then what I think is, I hope interesting to you as well as to make this distinction between direct and indirect devices.

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So direct devices in a way, in principle,

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if I feel kosher about the news of events that are detected or used on those that are intrinsically related to you, can you do something simple?

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Speed The movement of my arm is enabled by my attention to move my SO wherever you want to cash that out.

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So when you when I move my arm, if you are physically you're going to say that's caused by the neural status of wanting to move like.

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And again, if you're physically sick, you want to say that broadly speaking,

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to fudge on that actions, of course, are related to specific time to new event.

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So this is what we mean by the intrinsic relationship. In contrast, there are movements that have no intrinsic relationship.

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So for example, you could learn in principle, I think you could learn to stop the car by controlling your heart rate.

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So then and all. And again, in principle, you could learn to walk by changing your heart rate.

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If we had some device that connected regularly with heart rate, you could do that.

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But there's no it's what we call we simply co-opting a neural event in that case.

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So the information, again, as far as I know in broad terms, this is the information that brainwashing interfaces can generally detect.

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Position. Direction of force and reach.

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So when I move my arm, as I understand it, the brain machine interface can detect that information.

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It can detect goals where I want to go in the sense of if the movement is over there, it can detect the movement.

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It can detect what we call these movement parameters.

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So if I have it, if I feel Koskoff is off for a drink of water.

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It's in one sense not detecting the desire to say.

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It's detecting the movements that are going to enable and BMI in standardly they involve include visual feedback.

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So when we're training both humans and non-human primates, training for this historically involves facial feedback.

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So training consists of two things the individual hyper imagines moving it.

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So one way that we can train the system is when I imagine in my home the device records the neural activity for that imaginary movement,

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because maybe they're surprised the imaginary movement due process is very similar to what actually occurs if you move your.

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So there's that. And there's also in terms of yes.

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Training and then then performing the movement itself. Certainly in trials, somebody like Bill Kosovar is moving his arm.

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The system is recording the information and then film of trials and making detection in the second more accurate.

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Finally, present brain machine interfaces tend of standardly aphorism of effort.

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That is to say, we've made substantial progress in in enabling body movement, but we've made less progress in providing sensory feedback.

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So in Kosovo's case, he can move on, but he's not receiving any tactile feedback.

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So using these distinctions,

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this distinction again between brain machine interfaces that I direct and brain machine interfaces that have indirect signals.

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So the indirect ones, which we'll talk about.

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So you can cause movement by the suppression of cortical regions, controlling cortical women's detection of amplitude differences.

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So let's say that you want to spell out a word using a computer and you want to spell out the word can.

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Well, given that you won't see, there will be a difference in the neural signal whether the cursor is on C, I suppose it's on another word.

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So given that difference, we can make that difference and using it control.

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And then a movement related calls for protection.

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The phone call. So every time when you move or intend to move, there's a stigma with a course about standing.

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We just before the intended movement which again can be used to control the device.

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Okay. So what we have so far is maybe something about brain machine interfaces, something about spinal cord injury.

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So what we're going to do now is this first kind of theory of causal theory of action,

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which is a theory about kind of standard philosophical theory about what it means to act.

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So they decide what is appropriate to the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raised my arm.

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Geography and one.

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What is the code in the literature? The standard view? The orthodoxy?

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Perhaps. The causal theory of action. So we start with the notion of poverty.

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That's our basic top level category.

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And in poverty, movements are distinguished into two parts.

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Two types. There are either actions on there happening.

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It's said actions identified the following events, body movements and codes related to the person's beliefs indicated.

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In contrast, may Hackney's body movements with a different aetiology.

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So standardly. The Causal Theory of action. Joe wants another sip of coffee.

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She reaches out a hand to pick up a cup. That's an action.

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Because the bodily movement is caused by beliefs and desires of the class by intention.

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It's simply a happening if it's not an autonomous action, if it's a reflex, or perhaps bizarrely, somebody moves around.

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So according to the causal theory, a necessary sufficient condition of physical action.

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Bodily movement is causal related to a person's beliefs and desires.

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So he's put in the case and this is maybe rightly or wrongly what got me to think about this.

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So the pieces from a greater and more correct chair,

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which had a device implanted in his brain that allows a neuroscientist to detect whenever its heroes are called in action,

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triggering intention to perform an overt action. Unknown to him, two things are true.

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He's moved areas and efferent pathways to unresponsive response with two proximate intentions.

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Second, the neuroscientist, upon detecting the present presence of the intention,

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stimulates his move to areas in efferent pathways, thereby causing movement.

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To this case isn't typical to what's called the problem, of course, will be.

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And the problem is this the CTA says that actions of bodily movements caused by intentional.

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In the case of according to least in part caused by his intention.

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But there's something creepy about this. You might think there's nothing to it, and that's fine.

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But you alternatively, you might think, wait a minute, he's not Ed Sheeran isn't really acting.

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So you can dress yourself how you want. So maybe the body movement includes because I've been watching the crown includes flipping off the queen.

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So somebody might say why he did, sharing that it sounded like it wasn't a terror attack.

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So surely the presence of the nefarious nuclear scientist takes some of that responsibility away.

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So if that's your intuition in that case, then we can finish the case to have this file.

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So now, to be clear, Isabel has had a devout quality in her brain, detects whenever she's acquired an action triggering intention to form an event.

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Action? Isabelle is aware, unlike the cue, but she's aware of both areas, always unresponsive to approximate intentions.

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This device causes harm.

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So at first glance, if you're interested in the first case, well, we don't have a bona fide course of action or maybe something slightly greasy.

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We should have a slight, creaky reaction, and that means just an in-principle theoretical case.

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There's nothing empirical about it, but it seems that something here is enough to make us think, Oh, maybe she's not in control.

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But this is just very broad. He put one of the Americans.

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So one way the causal theorists kind of respond to this in the literature is in the kind of standard responses.

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So just to say she for the causal theories, she can handle what's called a sensitivity condition,

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which is a kind of counterfactual condition such that if Isabel had had different intentions, what would have been different?

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So causation in this sense is to a degree contingent upon how sensitive the device or the system understood broadly is to counterfactual conditions.

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Secondly, what seems to be important in both cases is the presence of a causal intermediary.

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Thirdly, what Christopher Peacock calls differentiate explanation fish and aquarium quotas from says

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regularities in the world we certain properties function things the properties of our.

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So if we have regular what we might call world based properties, that would lead us more to think that we have a case of bona fide causation.

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And finally, for basic actually defined, it's something that you don't have to do something else to.

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So using the remote to turn off the TV is not the basic action, because in order to do that, I have to do something else.

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Moving or raising your arm is a basic action. You don't have to burn or do anything to do that.

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So how would this apply to Internet devices?

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Well, briefly, it seems that these. Questions or reasons you might have been worried about the unions would apply in the direct case.

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So here's the way I suppose I understand this is to see if there's a spectrum.

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Such that if you again see very bright devices of to things,

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the less reliable or the more co-opt it will have an impact on reliability, sensitivity and differential exploration.

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So if we're co-opting something that is only really has no relationship to the person's intentions or the behaviour,

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that will suggest that it's likely to be perhaps not particularly reliable.

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Again, a reliable system. You'd want it so that if I want to or not, she's going to get short like she.

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But you know, if my movements are very, very negative and don't respond, then they're not particularly good enough.

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Secondly, you want a system that's sensitive, defined here. If I had different desires, beliefs or intentions, the system would do very well.

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Given the specificity of indirect advice to each base.

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It may be less likely that that's going to occur.

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So they again, this is not a knockdown argument by any means, but it seems that if you think what is an action,

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one of the reasons, one of the ways you might think it's not an action of these these factors would come into play.

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The greater the BMI plays a role or as a causal intermediary, the next, we're likely to think it's an action.

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What is? Six to how much longer?

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Well, typically people would go for 45 or 50 minutes.

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So 15 to 20 minutes, we can see what they want.

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So we direct devices. The message is they pass here because again, we what is causing the movement is the neural state that is known to correlate.

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So it's not the case that the broad electrical signals are being used to control my arm,

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but this direct EMI is detecting the neural processes that we know underlie all of them.

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How do we know that? Well, because if every neuroscientist could help detect that.

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So, again, on a physically naturalistic perspective, we have detected, we can say this is what occurs in the brain.

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We need to be aware of something like that, but probably not.

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So you might say, well, look, the problem of co-opting and reliability shouldn't be that because direct devices use the real signal recurrently.

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So but one concern we might have here is that, again, as I mentioned before, what exactly is being detected?

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So like me, you might think there's a difference between these two things.

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So a system that when I want to move my arm detects the movement parameters and a system that when I want to move, my arm detects my attention to.

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No. It seems one could plausibly say the causal theory of actions tended to want intentional content.

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What they want to say is that Jones bodily movement was caused by her intention to.

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Now. Again, if you're a physicist, presumably there is a neutral colour that the group of type identifies with psychological types.

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So that's what we would be looking for, not colour.

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That's the colour need to be movement parameters.

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And so somebody might object, he said, which I think is a very good objection.

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Wait a minute, Tom. How is this different to normal? Because when I move my arms, it's not as though the intentional content is used by the signals.

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But it seems that there is still that intentional content that's playing some causal role.

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So this is last part. So in the literature, a ballistic course is a cause that just brings an event about.

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And so one might say, look, brain machine interfaces, direct,

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indirect or both are really ballistic causes because what's doing the causal work is

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not the current intentional psychological states have such a role in causal theory.

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Okay. So just quickly. So let's not do that.

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So let's move on to this. Is this the first a kind of causal theory of action?

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So here's a second account, a non causal account.

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So. Harry Frank has a lovely article on this, which I'm referring to here.

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So the non causal account of causation is irrelevant.

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It's a relief when you see what is an action. It's got nothing to do with what caused Buckingham.

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And using Frankfurt. Frankfurt's kind of main claim is that, look, we're interested in what happened a moment ago.

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We're not interested in the state of your brain before.

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I mean, if you accept the causes and precede defects,

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then a causal account is always an historical account which tells you what causes bodily movement, not body movement itself consistent.

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So Frankfurt says, look, what matters is what's going on during the time the person is performing the action.

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If I'm interested in the concept of action, I want to know what's going on.

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When you read about what happened before, whether before is a nanosecond or 4 hours.

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Rather, action seems to be a matter of guidance and control.

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The difference between their happenings and actions are what the system is doing currently to guide and control.

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But as Frank said, since the vote, lots of systems or some systems are guided in control, like, for example, the donation of the people.

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But we don't think of that in action. So what differentiates the donation of the people from action robustly for

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Frankfurt is the degree to which the agent identifies with the causal mechanism.

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As he puts it succinctly, our sense of our own agency when we act is nothing more than the way it feels to us,

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whom we are somehow in touch with the operation of the mechanisms of the kind of which our movements are guided in that course guaranteed.

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So what does it mean to be aware of your actions?

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It's just that you have this sense of guidance and control.

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So obviously it's a great place to go.

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How would this apply to brain machine interfaces?

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So in case they don't cause an account. So she'll get a lot of people who have used.

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Control of the mind. I think she had a chapter to he talks about the missing body schema.

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So the body schema is this generally nearly always unconscious representation.

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We have all the kind of spatial orientation of our bodies.

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So it's kind of hard to distinguish between between a body image, which tends to be a conscious thing and how you see yourself and the body schema,

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which is so like a sensory appropriate setting, which is this whole conscious sense of your body space.

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And this seems to be the integral part of action.

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In order to move my arm, I must have some sense, some physical spatial orientation,

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if not my food overall, couldn't couldn't move my arm because I need some spatial reference to do so.

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And the governor talks about this famous case in Waterloo.

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I got you. And I don't want you to suffer this acute sense of neuropathy since you lost all sense of sensation from the neck down.

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So you can feel any. If you touch me.

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The only way you know you touch me. I see you do that.

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So. So A.W. loses his book. Remarkably enough, he learned to control his body movements through conscious control.

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So if you mentioned that, what's that like? Imagine you're walking and you have to concentrate on positioning your body and moving your legs.

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But he was adept at this. So I think he's still alive, has a regular job in life.

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His name is normal to the ones that you or I do.

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But he lacks that proprioception. So again, in this case.

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You know, one might say, well, I think W has these.

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These differences, this radical lack of body awareness, this lack of so lack of sensation.

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But he's managed to accommodate this by learning.

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The movements have become reliable. The alienates in the sense of his connection with his body.

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But you could say, well, look. But although he lacks the body schema, he meets Frankfurt's notion because he's in touch with body.

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You mean it's not what you or I?

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He's not in touch with his body in the same way that I am.

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I know the positions of my arms. But what could be generous do not simply rule out the principle that he fails to meet Frankfurt's conditions.

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But this is very, very different in the case of the BMI case.

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So in this type of case, you get proprioceptive information.

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So there's very, very interesting literature about individuals with neuro prosthetic limbs, perhaps not as severe as those who were coachable,

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but they're still receiving proprioceptive information, information about where the body is, but not conscious awareness of what they produce.

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There's also evidence of neural fast. Typically, the brain learns to rewire itself to accommodate a new prosthetic.

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And you have official feedback. But here, the level of control is so much worse than in the RW case.

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So if your intuition tonight. Yes, look, we have got action because we've got conscious control movement to a sophisticated degree.

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We lack that in this case. Okay.

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So where are we so far? And just thinking about action, the causal theory seems to have this problem of causal deviance, which perhaps sweet stuff,

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brain machine interfaces in subjection and non causal theory that emphasises a current movement.

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And this notion, Frankfurt's notion of being in touch again would seem perhaps too extreme.

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So the last part is just from. He briefly suggested another option.

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So the disjunctive theory of action goes back to the beginning.

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Beginning is the way that we cast action.

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Between. Sorry, the way we pass body immigrants.

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The connections and. So the disjunctive is on her account.

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You start with the concept of action. And actions are sanctioned by the movements.

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So can think about this and I if this is helpful if we think about the notion of gender.

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And you could say certainly could pass the world this way.

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And you could say that in order to understand or explain the difference between men and women, we have to appeal to the concept of gender.

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And you might say he's happy, too.

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I mean, what is this gender that's not male or female and not in a social political sense, but it's a conceptual thing.

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Surely. To understand the notion of gender is to understand the difference between male and female.

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We don't make any explanatory move by looking at this broader notion.

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So on this notion.

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Actions in Manhattan. These are essentially different things.

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They're not subclasses of a normal primary concept called On the Move.

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So as it says here, actions are bodily movements, minus intentions.

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So if you were old enough to frame it this way, the notion of bodily movement is the exquisite notion where you abstracted something essential from.

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And this disjunctive view is that it's this notion that standardly when we're interested in action.

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I'm going to get. Perhaps anecdotal that we rarely in our lives want to know whether somebody is actually or it was a reasonable.

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In the sense that we need to actively identify actions.

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We don't intuitively identify multi body movements and then say, gosh, it wasn't an action or anything.

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No, we intuitively see actions.

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The world is framed for certain human action made more broadly.

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It's framed in terms of action. So the question is not what is an action?

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Oh, we know it was an action. We were interested in why somebody did that.

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So the initial reaction, if you're like me, when you see pictures of in Kosovo,

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when you look all them, you see vehicles of individuals using green machine interfaces.

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Neuroprosthetics. Intuitively, we don't we don't doubt that the individual in this case believes doing something.

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Again. It would be odd if you thought what you're doing.

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Is that a reflex that we know intuitively recognised that fact and we do so because of context,

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how we frame certain movements within this kind of broader environment.

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But secondly, because of the complexity. And these are the factors that identify something as a match in the game.

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We can say, why is it that it's clear to us that. Exactly.

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And Keller has this phrase reinventing movement.

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So if you think of the cases they talked about, so Callahan talks about in walks and in a way, Waterman has reinvented movement.

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He's moving in a radically different way through conscious control.

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So if you think that movement relies upon so much a sensation, then this is a radical departure.

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Secondly, Bill Kosovars, you might say he's acting, he's controlling bodily movement, although that's one of the quotes.

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He's got no idea how it happens.

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He may have others in the room of reason he may feel alienated from this book movement is because he doesn't know what's going on.

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But in a way, you might say he doesn't have to. That pragmatically he can do these things.

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So we get into this disjunctive theory of thinking that actions the same person.

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This essential intentional element exists the notion of agency that may be different from the ones that we had before,

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where it's not necessary that somebody who is acting should feel commensurate or aware of the human body in the way that we did to make,

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you know, maybe the next generation of brain machine interfaces don't feel anything like human body movements,

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but maybe they don't have to in order for action to occur.

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So in terms of adaptation, one of the kind of things talk about in terms of brain machine interfaces is in one sense,

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why should we attempt to replicate what we have right now?

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I mean, somebody could say, look, if we could just design a system that works like the human body that we create,

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or maybe we can design a system where phenomenological needs could be different,

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where somebody can manipulate his body that feels perhaps even radically different from the way that you or I do.

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It has a very, very different causal history or commensal of feeding, but maybe that's just lot technology.

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And then lastly, this notion of promiscuous embodiment me has come about.

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So again, to think that in order to think about human action or physical action, intention or physical action.

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This may be something that can be done in a variety of different ways.

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So a standard view, he said. Action involves body language, but in order to make progress,

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we don't want to define action in terms of whether we're moving the body because what defining what counts as a body often intermixed,

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is with what counts as an action. So they mean we can imagine cases where it's an open question whether what you are moving is your physical body.

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So if you think about it, very novel technologies or or coupled systems or kind of cyborgs,

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we might not be able to answer the question whether this is part of the body or part of the world,

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but it doesn't follow that that won't put all that prevents us from noticing the question whether that person is right.

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Thank you very much.