So for those of us on UK time, good afternoon and welcome to Week for here at the University of Oxford.
That's week four of our autumn term. And this is the fourth seminar in modern South Asian Seminar series.
We in this series are very grateful to draw on support across the University of Oxford.
But I'd like to give special thanks to Professor Imray, banker who is the convenor of the series, and also to Clare Salter.
And Stephen, my need for that administrative support from the Asian Studies Centre at some Antony's College and
from the contemporary South Asian Studies Programme in the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies.
And the latter is the programme that I direct.
My name is Kate Sullivan De Strada and I am the Associate Professor in the International Relations of South Asia.
And today, I'm absolutely delighted to welcome Dr Happyland Jacob, who is Associate Professor.
I'm just getting a comment from somebody saying they can't hear me.
Could somebody else let me know if I'm if I'm audible? Thank give you.
OK. Well, Dr. Jacov, this one, though, if you can hear me, I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Happyland Jacob,
who is associate professor of diplomacy and disarmament at The Jawa.
How? Laurel Nehru University in New Delhi. Dr. Jacob teaches nuclear disarmament.
Indian foreign policy. And national security. And international relations.
And I think he's particularly well known for his work on the India Pakistan relationship,
where his books Line of Control and Line of Fire stand out as really unique contributions to our understanding of that bilateral.
I think what really strikes me about Dr. Jacobs work is that he's one of the few scholars of Indian foreign
policy who writes from the region for the region rather than for U.S. or Western European policy consumption.
And I think that really makes his work stand out just quite unique in its objectives and its arguments.
And, of course, the other really unique dimension to his work is his sort of very hands on fieldwork.
So travelling along the line of fire with both the Indian and the Pakistani armies as he writes in his book, The Line of Control.
So we're really excited to have you with us.
Dr. Jacob. We're also excited to be adding with this event another of your many videos, because,
of course, you are a prominent public intellectual, a columnist for The Hindu.
And also you have a very popular series hosted by The Wire under the rubric of national security conversation.
So carrying on a number of conversations you've been involved in in the past.
We'll hear from you today on domestic audience costs and firm policy making in India, recent shifts in the BJP strategy.
Dr. Jacob will speak for about 40 to 45 minutes and then we'll have time for just a small number of questions.
So if anybody wants to put their questions in the Q&A box, I will monitor those as Dr. Jacob speaks and select two,
two or three of the most hard hitting to raise at the end of his talk.
So without much further ado, Dr. Jacob Abati, you. Thank you, kid.
Thank you so much for that, for that very generous and kind introduction.
In fact, very delighted. Good afternoon to all of you. It's evening here.
Good afternoon, everyone. Joining me from from New Delhi, I'm delighted and honoured to speak at the South Asia.
Seven out of cities at the state got in his coatless. I'm grateful to Professor Gates Seventy-one and Ingrid Bonga for their very kind invitation,
how they've been focussed, where it might have been possible for me to be dead in person by those entirely.
So I the title suggests I should put my time or as well as the title suggests.
I going to focus on the interplay between India's foreign policy and audience course, of what the current government in India.
I will do so using two contemporary examples. So traditionally in India, foreign policy didn't really matter in domestic politics or put differently,
foreign policy pursuits were more or less kept aloof from domestic politics as a debate on foreign policy.
Gates did not get you any votes out of the way.
But major foreign policy losses would cost you what's traditionally foreign policy was
rarely used in election campaigns and really did not resonate with the public as it.
Also, the central of this, the political elite was not particularly focussed on esoteric topics such as foreign policy and defence policy.
This is traditionally, I would say, in Studio seven, and while all felt foreign policy kind of sort of went to some in the Indian political class.
Now, if you add this, add to this the small number of career bureaucrats in the country who by training and socialisation,
had not been particularly creative or proactive. What you get is even more foreign policy comes out of activism.
Having said that, I should also say that since the 1990s, constituent units of the Indian states have started to influence the Indian unions,
the central government, foreign policy, making them more sort of assertive about it.
I actually tried to clarify this.
It's that intervention was more prominent and pronounced in the foreign economic policy making than in the strategic or national security threat.
I spoke with CoverGirl in contrast to the intimacy of conditions under which say, for example,
the Canadian sweets and the gentleman constitutions where the provinces were
allowed to engage in foreign affairs with a certain amount of restrictions.
The Indian constitution does not provide for subnational engagement in foreign affairs at all, and it's pretty clear about that.
So despite the constitutionally sanctioned preponderance of the Indian Union, all our foreign policy matters.
The senator has often been restrained by states from making foreign policy unilaterally.
And I'm saying all of this by way of a back door ambassador with the added four or five reasons as to why.
The first is the 1990s. The states started playing a second.
I'm on the road in the country's foreign policy, making one because of the special constitutional status given to some of the states,
negative one because which, of course, doesn't exist anymore, as you know, the political weight of seven state leaders.
So they have a certain amount of indirect influence on the senator's foreign policy making.
And thirdly, the phenomenon of coalition politics, empowering, reaching of the parties outside.
We have also had a certain impact on the states dissenters, foreign policy making.
Then, of course, the globalisation induced changes because the investments were sought by United States and not necessarily always by the centre.
You had a situation where the states were able to influence the central government.
And finally, the border, the states of India, Jammu and Kashmir, the north and northeastern states, southern state like states like Iowa.
But we're also able to influence the central government's water policy since the 1990s.
But since that area,
all of this was done in a very informal way and also devotes very little strategic or national security content in such intervention.
It goes mostly at different economic policy making, never now.
So here I come to the set the last 10 years. Let's take a look at the last six to 10 years time.
I, unable to see things have changed over the years because of because of these two prominent reasons.
One despaired of Internet and access to information in various Indian languages.
So, for example, in the India 2020, India has nearly 700 million Internet users across the country, and that's a huge number.
So these people are now sort of in their position to understand, quote unquote, India's foreign policy engagements to some extent.
And secondly, the politicians today are increasingly keen on politicising foreign policy for their own domestic political gains.
So because foreign policy indeed figure in domestic politics,
domestic political calculations didn't really shape foreign policy calculations and pursuits.
And that's how the Senate audience scores. Did not matter. The.
That point earlier. But now that is changing. Today, you have audience course making a difference.
I've got it gets foreign policy making and contemplations outcome since.
So unlike ever before in India's history,
domestic political calculations and audience scores dictate the shaping of the country's foreign and security policy under the BJP government to date,
key foreign and security policy pursuits are often not undertaken.
If I put it that way. For their own sake. But to it. To domestic electoral outcomes and to speak convenient political Navitas.
So as a result of all the domestic politicisation of foreign policy,
there is today a breakdown of the broad foreign policy consensus that previously existed in the country.
Now, I don't know. I don't want to overstate that point, but I would say that on the one hand, the larger population,
the wider the population was not too concerned about foreign policy making.
I also asked that as a rule, as a general rule and on the other hand,
the Indian leaders were more focussed on winning the next elections are domestic political matters.
They were not really keen on focussing on the use of their affairs, such as foreign policy, defence policy, national security expert, terrorism.
There was a certain amount of consensus, broad political consensus that the country on political issues and that is clearly changing.
So the because of the domestic politicisation of instead foreign policy, you have this kind of census that is breaking down today.
So while traditionally foreign policy had the military impact on domestic political outcomes today,
given the manner in which external behaviour of the country has been domestically politicised, the leadership seems to raise the domestic cause.
Why are you making foreign policy decisions, as it were?
Now, the Indian diaspora also effectively utilised to bite the current government, the BJP led government as never before.
The party and the government speaks directly to the diaspora, especially in the United States and in Europe,
and national honour of the country is a major ingredient in that sort of conversation.
We often see the Indian leaders, the BJP leaders go abroad and talk to the diaspora, asked if they were Indian citizens with voting rights in India.
Many of these arguments that they make abroad are intended to sort of sort of appeal to the diaspora community abroad, but often enough.
Interestingly, the message is intended for a domestic audience that they are speaking to the diaspora communities.
But the message is for audience by cook. So the huge diaspora receptions where the host country's leaders, like said Barack Obama or Donald Trump,
are present at sort of the bike home in India, a major foreign policy achievement.
So what what is the possibility and all of what I'm trying to say.
So I think one of the one, you know, the brothers in.
So what I'm trying to say. One of the striking features of the Modi governments foreign policy is its appetite for risk taking.
So quite unlike the most of the previous governments fighting perhaps the exception of the DA Gandhi government.
You have a government that is involved that is keen on taking risks.
It has a clear majority and it seems to play it wants to play on the offensive
and at undoing sort of the decades or the different severe strategic behaviour.
So you at least actions, for example, at eat the these VSP tied up in surgical strikes against Pakistan in 2016 and the Audy after the Audy terror
attacks and the battle for air strikes last year in the wake of the Wal-Mart terror attacks are all examples.
In many ways of this new found offensive seek and risk taking tendency within the government today.
Now, the question is what? What is notable is that the this risk taking is sort of unprecedented in many ways
and without too much worry about the potential audience skorts associated with it.
How do you explain that? In my mind, that's to my mind that's that's a major puzzle that needs to be explained.
Secondly, traditionally, as I said earlier in deadliness, shied away from using foreign policy for domestic political purposes.
However, the BJP government has broken that tradition. What explains this breaking of that prediction?
13. How is it that Mr Modi's approval ratings soar despite major foreign policy and national security?
Yes. I mean, you know, I have written about in the past, but look at the look at India's neighbourhood policy today.
Look at the Elysee state line of actual control standoff with China today,
unsuccessful Kashmir policy and vision way with Pakistan on on bringing peace to Kashmir.
These are all, in my opinion, failures. And yet, Mr. Modi's and the BJP approval ratings are soaring and not going down.
What explains this? Now, here is where I am trying to bring in the audience.
Of course, argument sake,
roughly defined as audience goes to roughly defined as the domestic price leader would be for making foreign fisc and then backing down.
So the argument being that concern over a nation's reputation pushes the waters to sanction
leaders who make empty threats because they have tarnished the nation's order in the Indian case.
As I said, as I pointed out earlier, foreign policy did not play a huge role in domestic politics earlier.
But it does now stop playing a bit of role in the recent years and far more prominently under the BJP after the BJP came to power in 2014.
So to recap, foreign policy pursuits are undertaken by the BJP government with an eye on domestic politics.
Foreign policy achievements are used to for domestic political gains.
Now, why the theory of domestic courts talks about making threats and backing down by leaders.
Not so much attention is paid to how leaders and governments sometimes we fully award acknowledging external threats,
since doing so can cost, can be costly in some cases.
So in such situations, I thought I'm going to describe that in a minute.
In such situations, the government might simply refuse to acknowledge the presence of a of an imminent threat or an existing threat, as it were.
So let's look at the two cases that I have in mind.
The Wal-Mart terror attack last year in twenty nineteen and the India China military standoff on the line of control.
And what happened thereafter,
the even's is that the events that followed the twenty nine input WELLMARK that I can assure you showed that the BJP government adopted an aggressive
posture towards Pakistan in tandem with a carefully choreographed domestic political narrative to suit its forthcoming election campaign.
The ME election, the national election in India last year.
How about the recent Silow Indian military standoff on the line of actual control in 20, 2010?
A completely different story. The BJP led government, as I said earlier,
refused to acknowledge the extent of incursions made by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, all designed the Indian border.
Given how such an acknowledgement would have been particularly cost me for the ruling party.
So let's let's examine the first case in in somewhat detail.
So. This happened in the deep they put you on whatever attack happened in February 20,
20 close to the national election, and it would have been tough for the government not to do anything.
So that beat the gauntlet and grabbed the opportunity to carry out a strike against Pakistan.
A military strike against Pakistan. Much of what unfolded thereafter, including the release release of the captured pilot.
But did Pattakos, who was captured by the Pakistan.
By the Pakistanis that was released there after all of that was used astutely by the party for political gains?
That how we'd force the Brown government to hand him over to the Indian side?
What I would say that it made several trips and followed up with the proper action between February 20, 19 and June twenty nineteen.
If you actually do have been counting the key BJP leaders, cubie deputies involved last year between 20 19 February and 20 19 June,
then walk to Pakistan around 19 times in major election speeches.
Massive campaign speeches run by the national elections were forthcoming in May last year.
So they used Depok in what, the Pakistan 19 times.
Why, in the first case was on expected lines from a high court, from a type of nationalistic government.
The second worst case was curious. The second case, as I said, is the stand off on the Yellow Sea with China,
despite the widely reported loss of territory by India in the military standard with China.
In summer of this year, the Modi government and the deaths of nineteen sixty eight,
some forgetting that the more the government refused to acknowledge the extent of the threat,
Mr. Modi said, and I quote, No one entered into territory.
No Indian posts were taken over by anyone.
In fact, he did not even mention China by name in a speech.
So Mr Modi made sure that he made no military commitments against China so as to avoid commitment trap Freshway made by other leaders,
even twilly, but not followed up. But that didn't matter because the leader,
which is much better than what the prime minister did not make any commitments because
there was no and there was no question of therefore backing down from that threat.
So consider this between June again, bean counting between June and October of this year.
Shining. That was hardly used to by the BJP leaders in their public utterances, despite territory ID laws,
it was invoked just four times as opposed to 17, 19 times between February 20, 19 and June 20, 19 after the Rama terror attack.
What is even more interesting is that Pakistan was in, what,
seven times during the election campaign speeches by the BJP leaders in the mump in in the last month, the month of October 2020 alone.
So there is an ongoing situation with China. But China's name is taken four times.
There's a normal there is no ongoing situation with Pakistan. Nothing out of the ordinary.
And yet Pakistan's name is taken seven times this year.
The party also focussed party also used it set of diversity tactics to offset the audience, of course, audience calls in India.
And support, for example, focussing on other things. Catch me, Pakistan, anti nationalist, etc.
It's argued that those accusing the government of giving into China, giving that India gave in to China.
I said before China actually denigrating the memory of the slave.
So do you think this this is not a given that the BJP government has been using in its
campaign speeches in Bihar because the soldiers who accounted for the Bihar regiment?
But I think most importantly, it is not 80 was created to show that the reputation of the country was reputation of the country was not damaged.
China is, for example, the argument to end it like this.
China used a alone today.
The international community is with India and therefore at the end of the tussling with China, India has come out with Gordius.
There are also arguments that there are many Chinese Koshu, I think just on the Chinese side.
So at the end of the day and there Davis, of course, nobody has accepted into territory extracts.
So there is a certain number of narrative building and put it.
But this this sort of takes me to directly to the issue of narrative building and foreign policy by the part of the Democrat Party going on today.
So at the heart of it, I think if you actually look at the other half of the audience, core audience,
Kostina is the feeling of the citizens that their leader has damage to the nation's order by backing down.
Right. So if the feeling of the loss, feeling about the loss of all of these key,
what needs to be done is to manage the popular perception of corporate a feeling about what has happened, not to make it into facts on the ground.
That's exactly what the BJP has done so far. Won the loss of territory was denied, denied.
So they may have the facts on the ground, but completely denied that the supercurrent casualties on the Chinese side was played up.
The party's spinmeisters were deployed to argue that the government took up to the Chinese and that the communist leaders were close to the
Chinese and that the communist government had lost a lot more territory or had lost territory earlier while they were in power in 2013.
For Modi's strong man, image was played up in a major way goman to also ensure that the media reporting on the issue was skewed in a major way.
I'd find the opposition or the opposition's communication skills and narrative management simply couldn't match that of the government.
Now, briefly, about the framing of the threats as a do it,
it's a deadly strategic and national security decisions in India are increasingly taken based on their domestic audience calls in India,
decisions on how to frame threats, what to call it threat and how threats are to be addressed are dictated by domestic political considerations today,
not on the basis of material facts or objective evidence or strategic interests for that matter.
Framing and shaping the media narrative gave significance because much of the population
is not focussed on objective fact finding of fact based reporting or analysis,
but or how it is framed.
So friendly media tends to Paulson so sort of groups friendly, friendly social media platforms such as, say, allegedly the what's up?
Except a hint the government create such framing and narrative.
So you don't need to really focus on the material reality of the material objective facts on the ground,
but just focus on the framing of it, because that's what people are going to focus on at the end of the day.
So that can be securitisation.
Feherty, who does the framing and how work is done, are also important in the whole dynamics of the domestic politicisation of foreign policy.
For example, soon after the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, the caucus party went on to win the Maharashtra elections.
The opposition framing the narrative about Congress's failure in Mumbai did not succeed.
Put differently BJP, his use of Pakistan wasn't very successful in domestic electric films in twenty two thousand eight.
The leadership was not strong enough to do that.
But Mr Moore, is the use of Pakistan off by the BJP is used to Pakistan after Blackbaud was exceptionally successful.
So who does the framing or Salafist Modi's ability to undermine?
The opposition's framing of the debacle at the hands of the China at the hands of China has also been very successful.
So today it is widely recognised that India has lost territory.
But the passage of time and the absence of a narrative about its Trone narrative,
about the government's failure to have also ensured that there is no audience scores on the government.
So what really are some of the implications of the domestic politicisation of foreign policy?
I've I've sort of taken you to what I think are the tumours and the strategies used to by the current government
to offset domestic political cost or domestic political course when it comes to foreign policy decision making.
I used to one case to show that footwell mob of Black Hawk or the Pakistan case to show
that the case of Pakistan was used in order to make domestic political gains by the day.
I used to China example or the LSC example to show how the government used to framing and denial in
order to offset domestic political cause for not acting tough against an alleged intruder Askwith.
Now, what are the implications of all this sort of a really high amount of domestic politicisation of foreign policy in India?
I think it is to be fair, it is important to admit that in this age of social media and mass communication,
there is no way really to white domestic politicisation of foreign policy.
So being called,
Gandhi said to all of the domestic political implications of foreign policy behaving in the age of mass communication and social media is undecided.
So, no, not being honest. He's undecided. But, I mean, that's that's a fact that I think is something that we need to address.
Having said that,
I think it is important for us to try and tease out what the implications of such a domestic politicisation are even in a country like India.
May I also say that domestic politics can often be used to creatively to seek concessions while negotiating to use an insight to say,
for example, from Robert Putnam's to David Gates. Now,
let me give you an example of how domestic politics can be or was used to bind the
government to seek concessions while negotiating for and assisting Manmohan Singh.
Government during the 2000s had used domestic political course to seek and
gain concessions during negotiations with the Americans on the nuclear deal.
I woke up or even the hubbub with this has not happened in the case of Mr. Modi of the BJP government because.
Using domestic politics in order to seek concessions from your counterpart,
interlocutor requires that the negotiator playing with enquiries to negotiate
a plea on his domestic one notability now being one that a good or short one,
that ability is something that doesn't go with Mr. Morty's persona or to be give his political culture.
So why in domestic politics get to actually be used for national interests that require sustained an amount of playing it,
playing, playing once won that ability to one side. Right. But with a strong man image, if that is not something that you can do.
The current study of domestic politicisation of foreign policy also insists that this is one of the obligations
that I've been I've been talking about the current state of domestic politicisation of foreign policy.
Also, instead of, say, winner takes all mentality in the ruling dispensation, thereby straining the domestic space for consensus building.
What do I mean by winner takes all mentality now looking similar to the opposition?
Now, if you build a consensus with your opposition.
If you build a consensus of a consensus across party lines, then you have to look similar to the opposition.
You're going to look like. Your position, this difference between you and your opposition, that doesn't go.
That doesn't. Of the government in the eyes of its core support base, because the court up looks somewhat based.
Think that the things the things that the BJP said pocky that the different for that that can be one of their slogans,
but looking different makes a looking difference.
Dust's when the BJP some brownie points.
So BJP makes a point that it does not create a consensus based foreign policy agenda.
It makes sure that it sort of pushes you opposition to the corner and sort of takes all the credit for foreign policy, making us agree.
So why make consensus and look like the opposition when you can get to all the political advantage by pushing your your own partisan agenda?
So this kind of domestic politicisation of foreign policy makes kind of sense of building consensus,
building tough and democratisation, foreign policy making hard to achieve.
Now, whether or not democratisation of foreign policy making is a good thing.
He said something completely different debate altogether in it, in a deeply divided polity,
if one were to sort of have a referendum on foreign policy issues,
whether or not we should use military force against that Pakistan to liberate Pewaukee and give Pakistan,
you know, these deep stuttering might actually be ordered from debate to actually throw up surprises for you.
So it's a different debate. Talked with whether or not democratisation of foreign policy making is a good thing.
But in general, I think more discussion is more consensus. Building on foreign policy is a good idea.
But if this kind of weather skewed environment of domestic politicisation of foreign policy,
such consensus building stuff and such a Democratic senator,
foreign policy making is also that, if anything, this process makes the opposition Treleaven irrelevant and decision making more centralised.
Now, I did talk about the commitment drop earlier,
but I think this so-called fair foreign policy making that is domestically focussed or domestic investigative focus,
foreign policy making or domestic policy decision or foreign policy, you don't actually read out with its commitment traps.
This kind of domestic politics ization of foreign policy leads to the leadership trait, commitment trap, absoluteness.
It binds its hands when external circumstances demand a change in behaviour.
I mean, today you have a government in India that used us.
I said I get to see language when it comes to national security, when it comes to different policy, when it comes to foreign policy.
And to my mind, using that language, using that zero sum language, it's also engaging in a civil commitment,
dropped off a said kind of for instance, if there is an opportunity tomorrow to have a rapprochement with Pakistan.
Wouldn't the government be able to do it? Imagine this today.
India has a seven two front. Situation for a very long time.
The Indian strategic strategists have been talking about a two front situation that would eventually face today.
A debt prophecy has come true. You have a two front situation on the NSC and the on the NSC on the line of control.
So the national interest, in my opinion,
would demand that the government of India tries to isa one front and sort of reach out to reaching out to Pakistan on the Pakistani side.
Let us have a sense of proportion now. Is that possible under the current circumstances?
You have to fight Pakistan. You have created such a domestic political narrative about Pakistan today, intercompany that tomorrow it could be,
even if the situation demands, even international interest demands, even if there is an opportunity to create that rapprochement with Pakistan.
The Indian government would find it very, very difficult to do that.
Now, let me give you another example.
The prime minister Modi visited Pakistan on an impromptu visit to aim in December 2015 on his way back from Kabul and he visited Lahore.
I admit I was scheduled for a family function, etc.
Now, the amount of brickbats, brickbats that diplomats received for that visit from my case on article group in India, support base in India.
The BJP out of the support base in India was unbelievable. No.
If that's it to be the case in 2015, in 2020, thinks up things that will only become the domestic,
the Indian domestic discourse on Pakistan hasn't really vitiated.
So even if an opportunity presents itself tomorrow, it will be difficult for the more the government to take that opportunity.
So I think this is a major commitment trap that comes with the domestic policy politicisation of foreign policy.
And finally, I think if there is a certain UN wondered about Ingolf domestic politicisation of foreign policy, this also sort of sort of deep.
It leads to difficulties, major difficulties in conflict resolution and peace building that requires giving concessions.
Peace building requires long stressed out negotiations.
Now, you can't have such a long negotiations with Pakistan to also say, for example,
when they start a foreign policy issue with the cash media separatist,
you can't be seen as giving any concessions to anybody because he's being so rude.
You know, somehow the damage, the strongman image that has gotten more desperate.
So I think not just the issue of commitment track, but also there is the problem of, you know,
the sorts of land the government in a difficult spot as far as conflict resolution,
undertaking a process of conflict resolution and peace building is concerned within the country and with its neighbours.
I think I've taken enough time. I would leave it at that and I would be happy to take some questions.
Thank you so much. Thank you so much, harping on so I can't see any questions coming through at the moment.
It may be because the moderator needs to approve them. I'm not sure if that's you if you could.
I can't take any questions at all, but I do have one of my own. So you've set out wonderfully in this situation with China.
Of course. How? We have a leader or a ruling party with a strong man stance which then falls into a commitment trap, really,
whereby no action should in theory need to be taken if there is a serious threat to national security.
And it seems the way to solve this, as you very clearly laid out, is to create a narrative that suggests that there is no problem.
There is really no major national security issue. And in fact, I suppose, quote, a really large number of individuals into sustaining that narrative.
So it's not really just the media, is it? It must be also the armed forces.
It must be individuals in the bureaucracy, in a foreign service,
probably a number of individuals who for a very long time have been watching this happening and feeling quite frustrated by it.
So I suppose my question is, where are the weak points in this edifice which holds up this narrative?
And do you see any likelihood of anyone on the official side sort of breaking with this at breaking this edifice in any way?
I think I think that's an interesting question.
I mean, to us, too quickly pointed out that it is not in a country like India where you have a lot of profile agency institutions.
It's a vibrant democracy. You have a very, very activist media, as if the way a country like India to speak and not acting like this,
where you have a real situation with the Chinese, where, according to most reports,
the Chinese have occupied the what is considered to be the independent view on a contested line,
the fact that control is not easy to speak, that they do said that.
Think you saw what actually looks at this situation with a certain amount of surprise and disbelief to see how did this happen?
I mean, you know, usually when there is a cover up by a government in Delhi,
there are all kinds of leaks that are all kinds of for alternative of that I think is coming out.
But none whatsoever. I mean, at this point of time, what you basically have are a few leaks from I would say from the from the government
to media groups and some of the media groups are actually talking about it.
But the reality is that even the traditionally activist media groups in India are not very keen on taking
a line that we should not necessarily in line with the narrative that is funded by the government.
So I think if you look at the last six years, from 2014 onwards, you would see the dominos have fallen one after the other.
So it's you have the media. You have the judiciary to some extent.
You have the institutions, opinion makers, seemingly seemingly fantastic analysts who in the past have gone gone with evidence
that the facts on the ground have done a fantastic analysis off them very,
very carefully, all very scared. But perhaps to take a lie that is not in support of the governments.
I think I think this this is not easy to read.
It is not easy to be another thing of this kind and probably was more difficult during the first boom.
All the gall. But I think it's becoming far, far easier today.
I think it's only good to get more easy for the government to sort of create another one Senate, too.
It's sort of you know, you may have you may have an elite group in Delhi and in India.
Q Do you think that this is this is not the reality, but does this make any difference?
What matters is what the people believe and what what what people believe is what is carefully choreographed and sort of fit to the logical position.
Not well. Thank you very much. I've managed to have some questions, feed it through in the chat.
The Q&A box is not working for me. But the questions are with me nonetheless.
So I have a couple. I'll post to you. The first one is how is engine from policy likely to shift with Biden Harris administration?
Will it be a tougher road and how is that likely to play out? Perhaps we can link that to more to the subject matter of fuel talk tank.
Do you want to take me to take their Christmas? Yes. I know I'll get to.
But I'll leave that out. But I'm going to be changes to the duties of the duties concerned.
There is no question that the American establishment, the national security establishment,
the political establishment, that the Congress is there or positively disposed towards India in all in several ways.
There is a seven bipartisan consensus in the United States of improving its relationship with China.
There's no question about that. I think United States looks at India, especially with the golden age of Indo-Pacific and the re-emergence of.
Also to it, there's a lot more focus on India to improve defence ties.
And of course, it is. That is the sale of weapons that Bitstamp the other.
So I think I think that the there is no question that there will be a lot of continuity in delarge of national security, a political space.
But having said that, I would also say that there will also be because the fight and how this administration comes with the Democratic baggage about,
you know, quote unquote, baggage, about human rights, about the traditional focus on Kashmir, exit, drought and peace in the region, as it were.
I think there will be some focus on human rights and Kashmir and dealing with the Pakistanis in that indictment process that extracts a threat.
To my mind, the sort of see this for me, maybe get his consent, the bigger the threat, of course, that is China.
So the advice from the administration in Washington would be that, you know, Senator, differences with the Pakistanis,
but you don't bring you bring a certain amount of normalcy to Kashmir and focus on that.
That is the big threat. So I think I think much of this is going to remain the same.
But there will be some pushback on the question of, I think, Kashmir, Pakistan on human rights.
That's a fact. Thank you for that. Another question here from James since.
How is the border dispute with Nepal framed by the BJP?
And is this an issue that can score points domestically for them?
You know, interestingly, if it were to be the Congress government that had faced this kind of a situation with Nepal,
where Nepal is one that has clearly swung towards the Chinese side in many ways.
And secondly, there is a couple of, I think, aggression unilaterally.
You have the Nepalese government, at least from an Indian point of view,
the Nepalese government has changed to each its its map has included territories,
which, at least from an Indian point of view, I'm not really fighting.
So this would have been used by the BJP government, BJP opposition to denigrate the Congress government had the Congress been bought.
But unfortunately or rather interestingly, this is not really a big, big dispute at this point of time or major competition in India.
They didn't do much to stop this at this point of time. There is too much focus on what is happening between Nepal and India,
even if there is some focus on what's happening between Nepal and India over what is happening between India and this neighbourhood in general.
The BJP is able to simply ignore that who are, you know, as if to say that we have bigger issues to deal with, that we have China to deal with.
We have got, you know, Pasovic to deal with.
These are small issues and that will be taken care of for all the opposition that keeps crying foul at dartboard at all points of time.
So that if that is to be ignored, so there is this aggressive tendency to simply ignore the alternative narrative that together and move on.
That seems to be succeeding.
Did you see the strong, cultivated teeth to the BJP or there isn't a strong opposition to the government that its policies towards the neighbourhood,
Nipon in particular, and that is that is simply surprising.
So that's that's where we are, unfortunately. However. Thank you.
We have a question here asking what the drivers are for the domestic pilots politicisation of from policy.
But I think you actually covered that in the first sort of 10 minutes of your talk.
So we might tweak that question slightly and ask which kinds of foreign policy issues become domestic politicised and which ones don't?
And do you think that this has changed actually in the last sort of five or so years, five, six years?
Right. Right. You know, as I said, from the 1990s onwards, we have had a lot farm activist, some foreign policy activity,
some from the part of the Indian states that constitute an exotic way for a variety of reasons.
They said, again, the Indian constitution simply does not allow any formal activism by the United States.
The idea, the bid in six out money to play a certain amount of role in pushing the union to do their bidding.
But I think that that depends on a variety of factors. For example, if you have a coalition government in Delhi, they go back to 2000.
For example, when the India was you, it wasn't Paul India that got policy.
What's the great deal influenced by the dominant parties in Tamil Nadu, India?
Well, the policy towards United States,
especially the nuclear deal that was interfered with by the left left parties in India, got to that point of time.
In fact, the government was what most about before.
But the so much what the public came in office to the government that got the everybody.
Some of these exceptions, traditionally, you have had the Indian states dealing with foreign economic policy or border relations,
relations with neighbouring countries,
border states having good relations with neighbouring countries with very little strategic or security content, as it were.
Now, that is changed today. You are you are talking about domestic politicisation of foreign policy,
even in the sink in the national security and strategic Ophelia's outlook at the main national security and
strategic defeats where it serves the BJP purpose to get it sort of gave them a certain amount of support,
but particularly in their in their scope of job within the own support group.
But may also say that this is all this is a very selective.
You don't see that kind of mostly politicisation of, say, India U.S. relations,
except when there are high-Profile with offers to more the United States or Trump without biotics attacks that are all,
say, domestic politicisation of it. Do you guys or India I here?
No, it's basically Pakistan that we have about it sometimes, but mostly Pakistan.
So it's not a coup in that sense, even if you want to politicise.
Even if the opposition wants to politicise China and the standard,
which I doubt the ruling party would hit back and say that, you know, national security is being politicised by these guys.
So it's sort of a very careful strategy of picking and choosing what suits the government and the role of the opposition.
Thank you, sir. We'll finish with three last questions, if that's okay.
Bunched in Shenna, when you press them, that will conclude our session.
So we have a question here from Karen. She's asking.
She's saying that the nationalist narratives make sense for a party like the BJP.
But what she finds puzzling is the recent co-option of liberal Democratic narratives.
So, for example,
the Modi government is stressing support for France and the principles of secular liberalism and free speech in the wake of the terror attacks.
She's asking, is this another way of expressing Islamophobia through other means or are they domestic
audience benefits to feigning support for liberal principles on the international stage?
Packing no punches, Kara. We've got a question from Paul Fluvanna, which is asking whether these changes.
Presumably referring to the domestic politicisation of foreign policy,
whether these changes are embedded now or can that change the situation change somewhat after the strong man approach of Modi?
And then odd question from Sharon ejecta Yani asking whether the future of Indian foreign policy is likely to be
affected by the decline of democracy and the declining domestic cheques and balances on the current government.
That's quite a lot to do with. Great question.
Thank you. Thanks.
Kiran. Hi. I think that's that's a very interesting question.
The espousing of liberal causes by a hyper rightwing government in India.
So, in fact, I I tweeted the other day asking, you know, what is it that the government or the right wing party in India is trying to do?
Are they basically saying that it is all right to make cuts, create cartoons of gods and prophets or what?
What is the outlook of it? Because if the argument is that it is all right to create cartoons of gods and prophets,
then that is not something that would be acceptable within India.
Right? I mean, if someone and someone were to, for example, created the cartoon of Krishna or Rob in India,
I'm not so sure that's going to be taken very likely or favourably by the Indian right wing or the BJP, for that matter.
And yet this really garden meant to support the friends of governments, the actions of not.
So they're going against the the prophets, Scotland, as it were.
Now, what this tells me is that now is it Islamophobia?
I would say this is more like you are getting a stick to beat the Pakistanis with.
Right. I mean, because Imran Khan was very active on Twitter calling out the French government and sort of,
you know, calling the French, calling out the French president personally.
So here is here to say he is a veteran and that the BJP has or the Indian government has to sort of push you.
But I'm kind of for that, too. The call them number one. And number two, it is also adding to the gender narrative in India that the BJP has,
that, you know, that most things are backward, that Muslims need to be more liberal.
This is a bunch of people that I've got conservative and I'm not necessarily very secular.
But if the same yardstick were to be applied to the BJP, all to the Hindu right wing in India, I'm sure there would be very unhappy with that.
So it's a very, you know, opportunistic sort of argument.
This is not based on any liberal principle also because it is based on a liberal principle.
You'd be happy if this applies to you as well. If somebody made a couple of overarm.
Of course not. You did have a problem with that, but you'd have a problem with that. Right.
Remember, the IMF will say in zero five episodes earlier on.
So I don't think this is this is, technically speaking, espousing liberal cause.
This is basically using the stick to beat the Pakistanis and sort of push back the Muslim population within India.
So the second Christie is basically the domestic politicisation of India.
Will this continue in future or will this change if if there if there is a new
government and Liberal government there said Congress must left government in India?
I think I think there are seven fundamental changes that have already sort of happened.
Fundamental transformations happen, for instance. Let me give an example.
The let's take the Kashmir case. For instance, in August 2013, the government of India took two decisions.
What they would do, the special status that was given because mutilation, number nine, number two,
divided the state into two union territory that just brought to the states with as with if this had come,
this government tubercle, will that Congress government return the special status to Jammu and Kashmir?
I don't think so.
I think, you know, even the even even many, many members of the Congress party in August last year supported this particular decision.
Now, you could say that's technically domestic political issue and yet this has a certain foreign policy angle to it.
So I think the state of the relationship with Pakistan, for instance,
if the BJP government does not begin a conversation with Pakistan and if tomorrow that is a competent government,
will the Congress, Godman, be able to begin a new chapter, open a new chapter with the Pakistanis?
I'm not so I'm not so sure because the narrative so so domestically is so deeply entrenched in the domestic political space where it would.
For a new government to sort of say tomorrow that, you know, foreign policy is foreign policy,
domestic politics is domestic politics, be able to keep the two up. I'm not so sure that's possible.
Doubt. I think age is going up. So the only way out.
The only way out is sort of create alternative narratives.
The only way is just go for put facts forward,
put put fact based analysis and sort of create composite narratives too deep that if it's attacked by the ruling party, that's the only way out.
Reversing the domestic policy decision I don't think is an option.
Or the third question was basically the future of India in foreign policy,
given the decline of the traditional right used in the domestic political system, etc.
I don't think I think I seriously think it has several implications.
For example, you know, let me give an example. The recent research of the Indian foreign secretary, Army chief ex applied to Myanmar five years ago.
But if the Indian leaders should be secured in Myanmar, all the Myanmar leadership visited India.
There would have been questions in the media industry as a community about the thing.
Yes, about human rights issues in Myanmar, about democracy in Myanmar.
Not a question asked. In fact, I said that I did that programme for the wider audience online.
There was very little content about human rights or democracy in Myanmar, which was all about Myanmar.
China's Indo-Pacific and strategic issues.
So the focus, the tradition focus India has had on supporting democracy, as we are all say,
promoting human rights, giving refuge to the persecuted in the neighbourhood.
All of that is going to be a thing of the past. And that, I think, is directly related to the moral decline in the domestic space in India.
Now, the BJP could turn around and say, hey, the liberals are opposing the Citizenship Citizenship Citizenship Amendment law where
we are trying to give citizenship to the persecuted minorities in the neighbourhood.
But wait a minute, you are discriminating by doing that. So the political objective is very clear.
Muslims have to be kept out. That's the argument. So it's not about supporting the non-Muslims.
It's about more about keeping them to himself. So I think I think there is there is going to be the future of India's foreign policy,
which is deeply being backed by the quarter on moral decline in the domestic space.
And indeed, it's not difficult at all that. Thank you so much, Dr. Hoffman, Jacob, for this absolutely incredibly rich presentation.
I mean, I really appreciated personally your masterful analysis of the diversification
and the producers and consumers of India's foreign policy since the 1990s.
And you walked just through two great, powerful case studies.
And really, you've led us to quite a sobering prognosis for the future of India's national security.
Without these kinds of democratic cheques and balances, your camera is going to be blurred.
But I have been admiring your door handles behind you, which fit like a pair of dolphins swimming up the doors.
Why? OK. So when you speak, Modise winner takes all mentality.
I think you have definitely taken old in the context of door handles.
I mean psychological. Thank you so much. Thank you.
Such a pleasure. And we're looking forward to hearing from you again and again.
Thank you. Delighted to be here. Thank you so much. Thank you. Bye.