Hello and welcome to what is the first episode of Almanac, the Oxford Middle East podcast.
My name Piotr Shulkes and today I'm joined by Frederic Brookhoven, and Michael Memari to discuss Netanyahu's threats to annexe the West Bank.
The normalisation of the relationship between the United Arab Emirates and Israel.
However, this leaves the Palestinians since the moment of its birth.
Israel has yearned for peace with our Palestinian neighbours and peace with the broader Arab world.
For decades, that piece has proved elusive peace transcends politics.
He is saying that he is giving legitimacy to a legal patronisation programme in the West Bank,
that this is the end of the notion of a two state solution and that any way young people across the Middle East are ready for a more hopeful future.
How do you have a Israeli-Palestinian peace deal if the Palestinians are not part of it?
We are two hundred thousand more than the Jewish Israelis. So Israel has to face the reality.
I'd like to begin bringing in Iran because until this normalisation,
the largest bit of news coming out of the Middle East was Trump's assassination of Customs Philharmonie in January.
And Iran has been the architect against which the UAE, Israel and a Trump administration have positioned themselves.
The statement itself says, and I quote, The three countries share a similar outlook regarding the threats in the region.
And while it does not mention Iran, the implication there is very strong.
Michael, what do you want to delve into that a little bit?
It's obvious that Iran is one of the biggest factors underlying the what is now called the Abrahamic chord,
because honestly, that has been the basis for Colvert relations between Gulf states and Israel for some time now.
Interestingly enough, however, very soon after the announcement of the Islamic Court, the UAE,
it's say that this was not in direct response to Iran and wanted to downplay the role
of the shared perceived threat of Iran as a factor going into this normalisation deal.
Iran obviously outright criticised a normalisation with Israel.
Iran has no no interest whatsoever in normalising relations with Israel, perhaps even teebs it as an existential threat, as does Israel.
These would be Iran and its whole basis is grounded in and pay Zionist policy and is very much intertwined
with the cause of the Palestinian states as as it sees itself as sort of a Han Islamic power,
safeguarding or championing the rights and the well-being of Islamic states or of of Muslims in the region.
And if you if you look at the Israeli perspective as well, it's very clear that for them,
security has been the overriding priority for pretty much everything they've done in the region recently.
And I think the best way to representatives in three different ways, in a more general aspect, I think the one which is most visible historically,
they've always wanted a degree of the times with the Arab powers in order to not be at war constantly.
And also deterrence through overwhelming strength has also been a central tenant in the offence.
More recently as as the news has shown, there have been a number of attacks which are very difficult to explain in Iran.
Explosions in sensitive sites and fires in sensitive sites.
And that fits with the Israeli priority of wanting to limit the capability, whatever capability that may be within Iran as much as they can.
And that obviously is much closer to home for Israel as well.
If you think of the Iranian relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon, with whom Israel has a long and difficult relationship,
and especially with Hamas as well in Gaza, with whom Iran has had a relationship.
The third aspect of the security is focussed on Palestine, where, again,
Israel's propensity for overwhelming power clearly plays a hand where they want to,
why they want to have a position of overwhelming power when they negotiate with the Palestinians.
And that is something we'll discuss later in the episode as well.
But there the peace deal negotiated by Trump said between the Palestinians and the Israelis,
although the Palestinians not participated in it, focuses very much on the security of Israel.
And it seems also through the politics that that is the overriding priority which they have.
However, though, despite Deery being possibly the most influential state in the region, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia,
it does not seem very likely that other states will follow its lead when it comes to normalising
relationships with Israel in terms of the reaction of other states in the Middle East.
It's been a mixed bag, to be honest.
There have been some states that have rejected and condemned the normalisation deal outright, such as Morocco or Tunisia as well as Turkey.
Iran has has threatened to expel the UAE ambassador, cut off diplomatic ties.
And this is tied in to the competition in the region between Turkey and the UAE.
Both have been vying for regional influence for a number of years now.
Interestingly enough, despite Turkey's condemnation of the Abraham accord, Turkey itself has extensive ties with Israel.
Both diplomat. As well as economic.
So it's very interesting, you know, this sort of cognitive dissonance when you when you hear the extreme nation that Turkey makes of the,
you know, the UAE decision and its own relations with Israel,
Lebanon, Bahrain and Oman have all reluctantly supported the deal and obviously say things like,
obviously, it's the UAE is sovereign, right to make this decision.
And they see it as a slightly positive development. However,
none of them and no other state in the Arab world has followed up with this normalisation deal by announcing
its own plans normalise relations with Israel very much to the disappointment of Secretary of State Pompeo,
who visited the region, went to Israel, went to Sudan,
went to the Bahrain and the UAE with the very blatant purpose of with them and convinced him to follow suit.
You know, you're completely correct.
And something which has also been very noticeable about this normalisation is where it leaves the Palestinians, because historically, of course,
there have been certain requirements from the Arab Peace Initiative for what relationships Arab states are going to have with the Palestinians.
It was interesting what Michael just said about this normalisation being seen as
something positive or like how it's been tacitly approved of by other Arab states.
Because if you think about this normalisation without the presence of the Palestinians,
if you completely disregard the Palestinians, I would say that for the region, this is a positive development.
However, there are Palestinians who obviously have been stabbed in the back to vote.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, he's called the deal despicable.
And the Palestinian Authority has recalled its ambassador to the UAE in protest.
And for the Palestinians who have not even there were not even consulted in the process of coming to this agreement at all.
The message is really clear, which is that they have no say and that their voice does not matter when it comes
to the annexation plans or just the general diplomacy in the region right now,
which obviously is only a formalisation of what they perhaps already knew.
But nonetheless, it's very disappointing for them.
Historically, Palestine has been the cause around which politicians around the Middle East have rallied in which they've used to rally their citizens.
But now it seems that their security views of Iran has become the new central rallying point.
Do you think that is why they've felt able or comfortable betraying the Palestinians?
Or is there another reason for it? I think definitely the existential threat that Iran poses to other actors in the region certainly
plays a role in the relations that Arab states have in fostering with Israel for some time now.
Now, these relations obviously have been more discreet,
and that obviously serves a dual purpose and a balancing act really between practical security in terms
of coordinating with Israel and the intelligence sharing in order to balance the threat of Iran.
But at the same time, by having them discreet in this ambiguous zone,
being able to play key, the domestic audience, therefore have their cake and eat it, too.
I will say, however, that perhaps this is not just about Iran.
And on one hand, Arab states might feel that there is just no momentum, for example,
with the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 calling for complete normalisation with Israel,
but with the caveats that Israel returns all lands that had been occupied since 67 and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
I mean, since that initiative, what has happened?
The Palestinian cause has not only stalled, but it's degraded.
I mean, Israel has continued with, you know, settlements.
And unfortunately, we haven't seen any leadership in the international realm, particularly from the US.
I mean, unfortunately, the EU is not in a position to fill the void of American leadership on this regard.
I mean, either it's unable to or it's been unwilling or both.
They just don't want to get their hands dirty because I think you raise something interesting that there's been a lack of international leadership.
And I do believe that a reason for that might be the total lack of no agency,
which the Palestinian Authority seems to have despite having a fledgling state.
They don't have the opportunity like Israel, like to do it, like other countries, to express their needs internationally.
And it's something which Fredricka hinted towards earlier,
both saying that they have recalled their ambassador from the area and that internationally is about as
much as they can do because they don't have the structures necessary to spread the voice any further.
What they've done within Israel, though, recently, especially since the peace plan from those amounts,
is quite interesting because what they have announced is that they have been absolved of all responsibilities,
which they have to both Israel and the US as part of that tape stopped security cooperation,
which has been probably the place where they have had the closest relationship with Israel,
where they exchange information about potential terrorist attacks, about potential reasons for unrest.
And they've done this in an effort to show Israel the burden Israel would have to carry,
should they annexe or should they move towards undermining the Palestinian Authority.
In addition to that, they also have rejected Texas, where they traditionally get from Israeli governments.
These are taxes collected in Palestine by the Israeli government to which the Israeli government then gives back to the Palestinian Authority.
And these Texas accounts for roughly 60 percent of the Palestinian Authority's budget.
So it is, in effect, torpedoing, doing themselves in order to put pressure on Israel.
And the goal here seems to be to create a degree of instability in the West Bank and Gaza,
because previous occasions where there broke off security partnerships with Israel have all led to spikes in violence.
And I think it's a very clear indication that they don't have many cards to play.
And because of that, they are doing what they can in order to create as much attention on the situation as possible.
And both for tough and Hamas have applauded this move also because it's very popular within Palestine to stop putting pressure
on Israel due to the anger at the annexation plan caused by Trump and now the normalisation under terms of the Muslim faith.
Many people have in the whole process, but also in in Israel, that's been a substantial amount of resistance to the annexation plan.
So Israel is generally quite divided about the annexation plans.
Only four percent of Israeli society says that annexation should be at the top of the Israeli national agenda,
which is obviously a really, really small percentage. Israel is dealing with a Korona crisis, which has hit it quite hard.
And even before that, the current crisis started, there was already an economic crisis, unemployment.
There are some shocking in the past few years already there are some shocking numbers about children living in poverty in Israel.
A lot of Israelis, even if they perhaps are not entirely against the idea of annexation or they have
some ideological they haven't a real ideological understanding of the annexation.
It doesn't mean that they actually support the annexation right now. That's only four percent. And actually,
50 percent of Israelis right now believe that annexation is bad for Israel as it is a really
costly project that Insteps says that should be spent on the well-being of Israeli citizens.
So there is a massive gap between government policies and what the majority of society wants.
That being said, those that four percent of Israeli society that believes that annexation should be the priority right now is mostly the far right.
These are mostly the settlers, which are over half a million.
Around six and eight thousand settlers are living in the West Bank right now.
And these are usually the hardliners on annexation believe that it is a really important next step for the Israeli state.
But even the settlers, interestingly, are divided about the annexation plans because some of them,
some of them see it as regarded as the opportunities that they've been waiting for for over 15 years,
while others rejected simply because the annexation plan as presented by Trump, it leaves the potential for a Palestinian state.
And for those settlers and far right Israeli citizens, the price of a Palestinian state entity is considered too high.
In the Yashar Council, which is an umbrella organisation made up of around 24 heads of settlements councils.
There were splits and a slight majority supported Trump's annexation plan.
But then again, they reject clauses like freezing construction in settlements or reaching an agreement with Palestinians.
And this is also means that even on the far, far right, who are the main proponents of the annexation funds, there have been protests in around June.
About 1000 settlers protested on a hilltop outside the Gush Etzion settlements,
vowing to build more settlements in the area this month for a Palestinian state by the peace plan.
And then on the other side, on the complete opposite end.
There have also been protests from Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens who believe that annexation jeopardises
all prospects for peace and is absolutely not what the Israeli state should be focussing right now.
So. Say that Israeli society is really split on the annexation plans and even within the far right.
Which is the small percentage of people who are the predominant force behind annexation plans.
Even there is not a unanimous support for the annexation. Yeah, I found something similar.
There's a lawmaker in Israel called the Bezalel Smokler.
And he said my quote, Either the settlements have a future or the Palestinian state does.
But not both. And it's in effect, highlights what you're saying,
which is that unless Netanyahu or a future Israeli government go all the way and settlement building and annexation,
there will always, interestingly enough, face resistance from the most far right parties within their governments.
But in addition to that, there's also more political costs for Netanyahu, because a major problem with the annexation is how expensive it is.
It's estimated that it would cost about twelve percent of the national budget to annexe even only parts of the West Bank.
In addition to that, the military establishment or the security establishment are not happy with the annexation plans because they feel not enough
preparation has been made for how they will deal with the potential uprisings and unrest which would happen to an annexation come.
So there have been a number of very high profile ex military individuals have expressed very strong
resistance to Netanyahu's annexation plan because they feel it would represent a danger to Israel,
which is bigger than the gains which would justify this, interestingly.
I've also spoken to a couple of Israelis who actually think that the annexation was never supposed to happen.
But there are, especially on the left wing, younger people who say the annexation.
No one in their right mind would embark on such a costly project.
It would threaten the lives of a lot of Israelis. Inevitably, violence would break out.
And there are Israelis who think that this is simply a project for leverage,
which the normalisation has been greatly facilitated by the threat of annexation.
And so there are Israeli citizens who are angry because they feel like this whole project is just a political game between Netanyahu,
Trump and other political leaders. We're trying to achieve something else and that the annexation is just leverage in this whole project.
And in addition to that, this is one of the strongest cards which Israel has, is their position as a reasonable act in the Middle East.
And they have always managed to portray the Palestinians.
They've always managed to, I'd argue, mis portray the Palestinians as the party ended the negotiations, which is unwilling to compromise.
And should Israel move towards annexation unilaterally, they would lose a lot of the goodwill who wish to have on the international scene.
And that would severely undermine their future capabilities to create goodwill in both Europe and in the U.S. over them.
I think what's really interesting is that for the first time in years and years and years,
we saw European leaders finally say, actually, if this annexation goes through, we have to put our foot down.
We can't accept this anymore.
I feel like Israel has finally reached the limits of what the democratically elected leaders in Europe can accept without losing face.
How can they support Israel and then condemn other countries and explain to their constituencies why they are still having relations with Israel?
And I think that the annexation would push European leaders to the point where they can no longer support Israel.
Without that leading to a political embarrassment, Merkel, it's something you hinted further as well.
Do you think the same applies to regional leaders within the Middle East?
Because you mentioned Tunisia and Morocco,
but I guess official annexation would be an indefensible step for very many leaders in the Arab world as well,
especially considering how much of a hot button issue Palestine has been historically with in the Middle East.
Yes. I mean, it's very interesting to see where the trajectory of Arab pain is going with regards to the Palestinian and Israeli issue and
perhaps the divergence of what the normal person on the street thinks about it and how their governments are going about it.
And there are several reasons behind this. One is just the motivation behind this.
And we sort of talked about this earlier. Part of it has to do with the perceived Iranian threat.
Another part of it, however, has to do with, as we said, the momentum of the issue on the ground,
the reality on the ground, as well as the motivation of states to use this for their own ends,
have been looking forward to attaining certain military technology, particularly the F-35,
which it was reported as a big reason why the UAE went into this normalisation of court in the first place.
And we are hearing the fallouts of it where Israel has reneg its approval for F-35 to be sold to the UAE.
And congressmen in Washington have also expressed their displeasure at this prospect and its
implications for the qualitative military edge that Washington has always tried to preserve for Israel.
Let's good to race Washington because I wanted to get there eventually because America is the most important ally Israel has.
And it was also in the poll I saw that 25 percent of Israelis would not want to participate in annexation if it wasn't with American support.
And it shows how central a close alliance between the two countries is.
However, there is also strong indications that the policies which we've seen from Israel and from you,
in all honesty, have only been possible with Trump in the White House.
And so the next thing I wanted to raise was the potential effects of Biden becoming president,
because, first of all, he doesn't have an as pro-Israel stance as Trump has had.
However, he is still by no means critical of Israel.
And he also has the left wing of the Democratic Party to deal with another poll in the U.S. show that only three percent of people in the U.S. are
self-described as liberal support Israel more than to support Palestine and the way the ascendancy of Congress people are killed on Omar RHOA column.
There are very strong opinions on American foreign policy. I'm curious what you guys think of what will happen there.
Should I become president? So while Biden has negatively expressed himself about the annexation, as has declared, he's against annexation.
I have not come across any statements or speeches by him or Kamala Harris that
made me believe that he will stand against Israel if it decides to annexe.
In fact, a few days ago, Harris, who would be Vice President Joe Biden were elected as president,
reiterated that Biden will not impose any conditions on U.S. aid to Israel,
saying that assistance would not be linked to any political decision made by the Israeli government.
So even if Biden himself does not support the annexation,
the three point a billion U.S. dollar that are in military aid that Israel receives
annually will not be impacted if they do decide to proceed with annexation.
While Biden is president, I think possibly related to that is for all the wrong content of the peace plan Trump made with Israel.
I do think it often said the quote part out loud because there is a sentence in there
which says that it is unrealistic to expect Israel to compromise on the security issues.
And while I don't think American presidents would say so.
It has been the unspoken basis of their relationship.
As Craig, would you say for the record, that the U.S. will probably never truly put pressure on on Israel the way we wanted to,
because even J Street, which is considered a very progressive think tank in the US,
and Bernie Sanders spoke there during his election campaign in twenty nineteen,
they still believe in a two state solution which will discuss the status.
But I don't think is you know, it's it's not up with the times to put it that way.
Also what you're saying, filter.
It's interesting that historically, if you look at the election cycle, which is obviously for every four years for the presidential elections,
that during the elections and when re-election is is about to happen.
So about the last year of the four year term, presidents have always been a lot more vocal about their support to Israel.
That's actually a really interesting pattern that you can see historically.
And so I think that Biden is all is also really afraid to say anything that might alienate voters who are still predominantly pro Israeli.
This is also an issue that I think is becoming more and more divisive in the U.S. right now.
The camp of people who are pro Palestinian is growing, but the camp of people who are pro Israel is growing as well at the cost.
The people in the middle, we don't really have an opinion about this. And so does that.
This is why I think that Biden is so quick to support Israel fully,
because he knows that it's a very dangerous political game to position yourself on the other end of that spectrum.
And I think there's actually been an episode recently,
which I think is extremely telling of this dynamic, which is the controversy concerning Linda Sarsour.
So Sarsour is a popular figure in progressive Muslim and Arab circles and as a supporter of the Bebe s movement,
which I think we'll discuss later on as well.
And she appears in a panel on the Democratic National Convention to discuss voter engagement amongst the Muslim constituency.
And Trump's campaign condemned her appearance, saying that Biden endorsed the bigotry against Jewish people.
So there's a very quick transition from the BDA movement and critical criticism of Israel to anti-Semitism,
which is also, I think is a historical pattern that we can see.
And by. His campaign immediately distanced itself and announced Sarsour and have interviews.
And in fact,
I'll quote the campaign spokesman who said Joe Biden has been a strong supporter of Israel and a vehement opponent of anti-Semitism his entire life.
And he obviously condemns her views and opposes PBS, as does the Democratic platform.
And so, interestingly, he does not only say that he uncritically supports Israel.
He also does not counter the idea that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitism.
They have apologised privately about this controversy because obviously Muslim
and Arab people quickly spoke out and said that this position was problematic.
But it's really it's a very telling episode because it shows an unshakeable posable Israel standpoint.
It shows that during the campaign, every presidential candidate is really keen on showing that they uncritically
support Israel and that we can equate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism,
I think related stuff. It's also something which has become very problematic with the Israel Palestine discourse,
and that is that overall the best is always assumed of Israeli actions, while the worst is assumed of the actions of Palestinians.
And this is especially clear if you read Trump's peace plan,
where Palestinians are regularly referred to as terrorists and Israel is regularly referred to as a nation under attack.
And while that is not a lie. It is also a very generous portrayal of the truth as it is,
because Israel is a country which has so much larger accept and vice versa, have been violent towards the Palestinians.
And the discourse has become corrupted to such an extent where support for the Palestinians equated to being,
as you said, an anti-Semite or a terrorist sympathiser. And a part of the corruption of the discourse has led to the rise and fall, unfortunately,
of the PBS movement, which has seen a growth in popularity in the last five years.
But after that, it has hit quite a lot of resistance. The issue of security is also at the individual level.
If you want to say, rather than this macro level with the beedis movement and the conflation of VVS
and tie Israeli sort of settlement and annexation policies with anti-Semitism.
Now we have seen this growing progressive clout within US politics.
And for example, just very recently, Congresswoman Betty McCollum from Minnesota introduced the Israeli annexation nonrecognition,
which aims to prohibit the US from formally recognising or providing U.S. aid to any of the areas occupied
in the West Bank and annexed by by Israel in violation of international laws and definitely putting,
you know, conditions on any U.S. aid and staking it to this issue.
But unfortunately, PBS is definitely a really interesting grassroots movement to apply pressure at the individual
level and sort of from the bottom up to put pressure not only on the Israeli government,
but also on companies, even governments, to really be selective in how you support Israel and really seeing where where the money goes.
And here we definitely see a reaction against A.D.s at the federal level.
We have seen A.D.s laws try to be implemented by members of Congress that would make it illegal to partake in the yes movement.
And this has definitely been followed up by I think 32 states have adopted laws,
executive orders or resolutions designed to discourage boycotts against history.
And the way that these initiatives work is that they require the creation of blacklists of activists,
non-profit organisations and companies engaged in boycotts of Israel.
They prohibit government contracts from being signed with people involved, A.D.s and also pension fund divestment.
So we definitely see this backlash against A.D.s, which is is very unfortunate, too.
This is a question for both of you. Do you think that there will also be a backlash to the backlash?
As the Post discussed earlier, show being proposed is becoming more common and more popular in Western Europe and America.
I guess the question I'm asking is, will there be a degree of growing global awareness about the situation which can put pressure on Israel?
I think the backlash against the U.S. and itself also shows its success, because the fact that people think,
that lawmakers think and politicians think that this grassroots movement needs to be addressed and that laws need to.
Prohibit participation in videos, shows the effects and the fear that they have for the effects of the media might move.
It might have. I also know that in Israel there's a lot of fear for the movement.
PBS activists have repeatedly been denied access to Israel. This is something part of the screen procedure.
If you tried to enter Israel, the people that the offices at the airport will sometimes look at your social media.
And if it becomes clear that you're involved in any previous activities, entry to Israel can be denied.
And I think that that this these policies, in combination with the laws and state level in the US,
just demonstrate how powerful these politicians believe that videos could be.
Which in itself shows the success and the power of PBS already.
I'll just add one thing that within interestingly enough, yes, we could see a backlash to the backlash against Petey's has.
Unfortunately, at least on the Democratic side, we actually see a backlash to PBS been preserved,
at least on a formal level in the official platform at the DNC.
You know, Biden, the Biden campaign did say that it was opposed to BD s and as well as any efforts to,
quote unquote, unfairly single out and delegitimize Israel either through s or at the United Nations.
So it will be interesting to see the momentum of the efforts to take down S and whether or not PBS has a movement itself,
has enough momentum to weather that storm and flourish more.
That brings me to the very last question. I wanted to ask something.
The episode has to select somebody building up because what we have seen so far is a degree of abdication of responsibility amongst Arab states,
especially the UAE in this case. But also Saudi Arabia has said they are interested in following a similar path.
Israel has shown that annexation has become a policy which is broadly acceptable.
America has also shown itself to not be an actor which can stop or will stop Israel doing it.
And because of that, I thought the two periods in the past where the Palestinians have had the most
attention from the world have been the two uprisings or intifadas and in Arabic.
And I was wondering,
considering the total lack of faith in the process and considering the lack of capacity the Palestinian Authority has to do anything,
has it laid the groundwork for potentially a third major intifada in Palestine?
I doubt it. I really doubt it. Although I know that this intifadas were moments when the Palestinians had the most international attention.
And in many ways, the first intifada was also quite successful. Limited success, but still right now, an intifada.
The Palestinians have a lot to lose right now.
They are currently struggling with a corona virus, which has an impact not only in terms of public health,
but is also predominantly an economic crisis in the West Bank and Gaza.
This is taking up a lot of effort and attention right now.
We've seen in Lebanon that after the explosion.
KORONA Kate, the cases of Korona are rising really rapidly because people are out on the street helping each other.
And an intifada would also be an absolute disaster for the public health of the Palestinians.
Plus, in June, when the annexation was still on the table,
only 31 percent or less than a third of Palestinians said that they potentially supported armed resistance.
So another father. That was when the annexation was still a possibility.
And that would be in the case of annexation, since annexation is off the table for now.
I think this percentage will be a lot lower. And so I think that the number of Palestinians that support armed struggle at this moment.
I think that percentage is extremely low. Well, taking that into consideration, too, is that if you don't think that peace has actually come closer,
thanks to the peace plan of Donald Trump and B, to normalisation of the relationship between the UK and Israel, I would say that no.
Obviously, I don't think peace is is any closer.
First of all, the efforts of the Trump administration have been, you know, if not one sided, extremely polarising to the actors involved.
The Trump administration has rarely, if at all, consulted authorities in Palestine and in a way have mimicked this maximum pressure campaign on Iran.
V, the Palestinian Authority, in terms of cutting off all aid part clearly to the P.A., to Palestinian security forces and to the UN relief.
Works agency really has just been pressuring the P.A. to sort of just give in to Israeli demands and expectations in Washington.
Now, in terms of the regional states, again, it's plagued by the the security issue, the v Iran and how the nuclear negotiations are going to be.
Also, in terms of the Arab states, as we have,
we've seen with the fallout of the announcement of the Abrahamic court know the Arab states are definitely not united on this issue.
There are some states that believe, yes, normalisation and sort of, you know, saying that annexations is definitely a red line.
But if you suspend that relations, this is not a strategy that is accepted by all the major members of the Arab League and in Washington.
Despite the obstacles that restive caucus have in terms of reframing U.S. policy to Israel,
it has shown itself to be a strong enough force to at least affect the conversation.
So even within the U.S., there is not a good idea or a unified out idea of how to address this situation and to achieve peace.
And what final peace is going to look like. My answer to that question would be that anyone who believes or says that peace is closer due
to the normalisation agreement between the UAE and Israel is fooling themselves because,
yes, from an Israeli perspective,
having good and peaceful relations with Arab neighbours seems to contribute to overall stability and peace in the region.
But as long as as you know, the Palestinians have just been blatantly ignored in this whole issue.
But as long as the Palestinian situation is not dealt with,
you cannot create a stable and lasting peace without having this ticking time bomb in the middle of Israel,
which other Palestinian people who are just being are being ignored.
And I think that any move towards peace that does not include the Palestinians is not lasting.
And I have one more question, and that is about the idea of a two state solution, because I feel it has always been a bit of a fudge dovish loan.
The historian has said that the two state solution never existed.
Last call, it is said in January of this year that it was dead.
But still, despite that,
it is something that certain people within Israeli politics and especially within European and American politics keep maintaining as possible.
My question, therefore is, is this simply a balance which Israel is making in order to continue with the status quo,
which is a very slow and unofficial annexation of Palestine?
And they only say we'll keep the two state solution alive for the benefit of politicians in the West.
I think that the one state solution is just something that needs a lot more thought.
And there is very little political will both in Israel as as it is amongst the Palestinians to embrace the one state solution.
And therefore, it's much easier to just continue down the path of the two state solution, which has been reformed and reused again, again, again.
But I believe that it might have existed one day.
But since the Oslo Accords and since the creeping annexation which is going on
because of the settlements which have been skyrocketing since the Oslo Accords,
the two state solution is dead and it is really important to look at alternatives.
However, the political will for this alternative is lacking. I will say that a two state solution or one state solution.
It's it's it's very hard to see a lasting peace.
And either way, it's going to be a messy process.
And I think one of the big issues at the heart of why it is part of the rhetoric is Israel as a democratic, but yet also a Jewish state.
So this focus on an identity of Jewish state is very exclusive.
It's hard to square a democratic state that treats its citizens equally, but also focus on this identity that is also exclusive in nature.
If you have a one state solution, how are Arabs, Palestinians and non Jews treated?
Are they even given citizenship?
This is a tricky point with regards to the two state solution, given the reality on the ground and the momentum of settlements.
My fear would be that we would see something akin to what happened with the Ottoman Empire and Greece,
where we then have population transfers in order to to meet certain expectations of what each.
It looks like and what their demographics look like.
I think the this topic of how what peace looks like for the ordinary citizen, for poor Jews, for Arab Palestinians.
Which of those solutions is best? Because I definitely agree with Federica.
I think what you were intimating killed that this phrase two state solution
really has just led to the status quo and a worsening reality on the ground.
Thank you for listening to the first episode of Dokes, a Middle East podcast.
Join us for the next episode. We'll discuss the history of the Catholicism, its impact on the Middle East and the challenges facing.
Almanack is a student run initiative from the Middle East Centre at the University of Oxford.
The opinions expressed within the course did not in any way represent the official opinions
of the University of Oxford or the Middle East until it's edited and hosted by myself.
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