Hello and welcome to this second seminar in Michaelmas series on the dictatorship syndrome in the Middle East.
Today, we're moving from Egypt to Iran and we're meeting to talk about authoritarian or
revolutionary reflections on the nature of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
I'm delighted to be joined here today by two very good specialists on contemporary Iranian politics.
One is Mariam Arms All Day from Princeton. The other is sort of strange Baradi, Amy.
And we're going to be giving each of them 10 minutes roughly to give us a short presentation.
Then we'll have another 10 minutes or so in which I'll engage in conversation with them.
And then after that, we'll move on to the general Q&A for half an hour.
We do need to end the session promptly at 6:00. We need to keep the time.
So without more ado, I'd like to turn to Mariam Olens all day and invite her to give us the first presentation of our seminar this afternoon.
Hello, everyone. Thank you so much for having me in the seminar series.
I'm really excited to be part of this programme. So we hear very frequently from the Islamic Republic officials about how the government in Iran,
its institutions, its policies and even the nation itself is a revolutionary one.
This marker revolutionary, even though we're 40 years, 40 plus years away from the 1979 revolution,
is still very well alive in the governmental discourse on all levels of its operation.
So the question I'd like to address today is what does this emphasis on this,
on the revolutionary character mean in practise beyond just an ideological posture?
Of course, there is one obvious function. It gives the authoritarian state the justification to repress any other voice as counter-revolutionary,
to frame it very easily as counter-revolutionary. But beyond this ideological function, is there any veracity to the claim to a revolutionary nature?
Does it mean anything with regard to actual everyday dynamics of governance?
And I believe the answer is yes.
I have done extensive research on the origins of what is arguably the most prominent state apparatus in contemporary Iran,
and that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, also known as Sebel two forces speakers.
I think this early history tells us a lot about the nature of state and governance in Iran at large by showing us a certain,
quote unquote, revolutionary characteristics that became a vital part of state and state institutions, including the IRGC from early on.
But not only limited to that early phase, it has left its footprint for the years to come on state institutions.
So we know in the early history of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
there was incessant friction between the liberal minded, technocratic, provisional government led by me.
It was gone on the one hand, and the more radical clerics around Khomeini and their left foot followers who work within revolutionary institutions,
largely the IRGC became an official entity.
Only about two months after the February 1979 revolution.
But in the first few years of its existence,
its support came mostly from the radical clerical camp in the government and not the technocratic section which actually controlled the budgets.
The technocratic provisional government. And later on, the first elected president,
I won't have somebody said were more fond of refurbishing the professional police and the army and not investing in the IRGC.
This means that contrary to conventional wisdom, the IRGC did not receive comprehensive state support from the moment to the inception in April 1979.
It took another two years approximately for that to happen.
So before it acquired such support, before it had a proper organisation and enough funds or equipment or even minimal training for its volunteers.
It was put to the test of straining situations such as the ethnic conflict in many border areas that the most intensive of them was in Kurdistan.
I'm sure you know, and very soon after it engaged in a conventional war with Iraq when Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980.
In my research, I tried to understand what this early pre consolidation involvement in action
meant for the future of the Earth to see and governance in Iran of large.
One thing I found in my interviews with first generation IRGC veterans, as well as some active members of the organisation,
was this that either an intensive battle situations or in everyday organisational work in like urban centres,
they trusted one another's improvisation in the lack of any other structure, in the lack of any professional training and experience, as I mentioned.
But they didn't do this just as a last resort.
Relying on improvised direct action of supposedly dedicated volunteers was actually much more in line with the spirit of the revolutionary times.
And it was credited as such by all levels of leaders and the peers as well.
So volunteer a small group, leaders and politicians in the radical camp all relied in this asset on this urge for direct action amongst volunteers,
not just to get the job done when there was no other way to go, but because they also believed this was the right way of doing things.
So to give you an example. You know that the IRGC was involved in action against the Kurdish insurgency as early as 1979 alongside
the regular army who was trying to defend its barracks there in after one of the operations there,
one of the joint operations, the the IRGC operations commander, Abu Sharif, said this in a press interview.
Quote, The government and the army tied our hands in the past.
We will not listen to them from now on and we'll act directly where necessary if we need something that the government is not provided immediately.
The people who will do that for us. And then this is a very prominent sentiment going on on different grandson levels.
But this is also not an uncommon incident in the first couple of years after any revolution.
So how is the case of Iran different? I think it's rather unique, this case of state building in Iran,
because the reliance on improvised direct action was institutionalised both within
the IRGC and within the section of the more radical side of the government,
mainly because it had to be deployed under intensive work conditions. So it was deployed in the lack of other resources.
It paid off at least partially. And so and it was validated as true revolutionary dedication.
So it became a modus operandi that was hard to let go of even after the first few years to as as current examples, contemporary examples.
Think about, for instance, the encounters between the IRGC, small boats and U.S. Navy units in the Persian Gulf.
That always creates friction or about the downing of a U.S. drone in twenty nineteen by the Iranians around the Iranian border.
In such instances, talk to your commanders who are involved. But regardless of how involved they are,
they run in state and the military proudly presents them presents such instances as the act of a brave
and dedicated soldier or a group of them firing at will and encourages this sort of action further.
Now, how does this help us with understanding the nature of authoritarianism in Iraq?
The question is also a good conduit to the theme of the seminar series, which used after.
One, his book, The Dictatorship Syndrome.
I think the fact that many revolutionary conditions, including in Iran, lead to authoritarianism is not simply caused by doctors.
One who suggests good citizens who identify with authoritarianism or their, quote,
robust and chronic obedience, unquote, or even due to the fact that it's not due to the fact that,
as he describes the Iranian case, I'm quoting, countries under the thumbs of men of religion are more receptive to dictatorship and quote.
These all do play a part for sure. Although I believe they are more effective, other structural forces and not causes of the rise of authoritarianism.
But in addition to such factors, I believe more importantly, we have to remember that a revolution provides opportunities for direct action,
which in turn give the participants a sense of having their own faith in their hands.
It is the sense of participation rather than tame compliance or being good,
obedient citizens that lures people into cooperating with the revolutionary apparatus.
In the case of Iran, the continued availability of venues for direct action has preserved this attraction to some extent.
The continued attraction for volunteers in organisations such as the Basij, which is the demobilisation branch of the IRGC,
has in turn created a system with flexible capillary control based on the participation of a good number of the people.
So to wrap up, I'd like to suggest that behind the security apparatus,
Panopticon and its power that is infused into the society lies a revolutionary institution,
albeit in an organisational sense of the word, not in a radical ideological sense of the word.
This revolutionary institution tolerates and encourages direct action that is ideologically in line with Islamic Republic models,
of course, and thereby it sustains a sizeable popular base.
Over the years, this popular base is not necessarily brainwashed, that is to say, to serve the state.
Rather, institutions of power keep them committed and interested by authorising spontaneous direct action,
even though revolutionary times are long past. Now, I'll stop here.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Marianne, for this very interesting overview over the role and function of the IRGC over the decades.
My remarks are going to be pretty much centred on on the topic of my of my book,
namely this whole issue regarding state institution building within the Islamic Republic.
My contention is that the very construction of the state from the revolution onwards for the past decade,
for the past four decades, has really been a work in progress and that we can have a robust debate,
obviously not on this occasion, on whether the Islamic Republic can today really be defined as a state, according to Western political theory canids.
And one of the reasons why the debate and discussion within the Islamic Republic on the exact nature of the state are
not on the exact limits and boundaries or of the power and authority of each solution is still ongoing after 40 years.
Also has to do with the fact that these state institutions are very varied and non-uniform origins.
Suffice to note that both the Iranian post revolution constitution, both in its 1979 edition and its 1989 revision,
is really a mixture between Western political traditions, particularly the French Fifth Republic,
from which the current institution of the presidency was directly inspired and also fringed doctrines of Shiism, such as the right to Figi,
but also ad hoc bodies that were brought about by various exigencies and crises in the management of the state, particularly throughout the 1980s.
Cases in point here are the Masad Council and the Supreme National Security Council.
And such an unwieldy arrangement has worked in quotes during the past decades for a number of reasons.
One of the important one of the key reasons behind this was, of course,
the fact that the political elite and the political class was configured in a way which
allowed for competitive politics to determine the incumbents of several state institutions,
particularly the parliament and, of course, the presidency.
And this this was a buttressed by factionalism, which was really the the model around which everyday politics really organised in Iran.
However, I would argue this aspect, namely a competitive form of politics within the precinct of the Islamic Republic's political class,
has faded in recent years as the Islamic Republic has started to grapple with challenges from a new opposition, which I will discuss later.
And also the vexing issue of generational change within its political class and the absence of suitable vehicles for implementing the same,
such as structured political parties which have been absent in Iran for decades and coupled to coupled to all of this.
One thing that is really affecting the nature of the contemporary state and Islamic Republic is the
deepening legitimacy crisis that the Islamic Republic has been facing since 2009 and since 2009.
We've had different waves of of significant popular unrest and protest.
In 2009, we had a mainly urbane urban middle class protest against the electoral outcome of that year.
But it has morphed into serious strife amongst the urban margins,
the fringes of of society due to political and especially economic reasons in recent years.
And the reaction of the state system as a whole to these challenges has been to resort
to violence and to our very own form of control over over the means of violence,
which has been endorsed by the entire gamut of East in a regime personalities and
ference from those who are defined as reformers to those are defined as conservatives.
In the past, I would argue the political class had figures who could cater to such anger or to some two such
desires for change from various strata of society and turned them into electoral capital.
And that was one of the reasons why, for example, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad managed to rise to the presidency in 2005.
And I believe that this potential has has has has weakened considerably in recent times,
with the political class entrenching and being unable to offer a suitable response to these
challenges beyond the aforementioned adoption of of of a security discourse and scooty discourse.
So the other important factor that I mentioned previously consists of the Islamic Republic facing an evolving opposition.
So in the 1980s and 1990s,
what constitute the opposition to the Islamic Republic were mostly the remnants of secular forces from the monarchists leftist,
then the Mujahadeen HYG organisation, of course, which emerged as as as as the opposition in exile in Iraq and so forth.
These were either people aligned to the junkyard regime or entities and personalities were taking part in the revolution,
but then had fallen out progressively with the Khomeini's faction who grabbed control of state power in the Islamic Republic.
However, now this has evolved considerably. It is mostly domestic.
It is not exiles like the rest.
The previous forms of the previous generations of opposition activists, personalities and entities not connected to the old political organisations.
So examples are the spontaneous trade unions that have immersions more or less 2006.
I believe the first one was the trade union of the workers of the boss company of Tehran.
Now we have worker activism in the form of they half to pay workers and and people who have rallied around her cause like Stampeder Union.
These. Trade unions have led to some unprecedented developments, for example, in recent months.
We've seen the most serious industrial action in Iran in the past four decades, pretty much since the autumn and winter of 1978.
Then we've had lawyers such as some elements of civil society, prominently lawyers,
and here Nasserism today, the imprisoned lawyer is that is a clear example of this,
student leaders and then even relatives of those who are being imprisoned or repressed returning talk to opposition activists themselves.
And this form of opposition is home grown.
It has little or no ties to the veteran groups that he said does not really subscribe to key milestone events which form the Islamic Republic,
the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war. It doesn't really share the political classes reading of these.
And so far has found really little in terms of the state's willingness to genuinely engage with it.
So the state is not really opening up to this form of opposition.
And I'll finish with some concentrations regarding what could happen in the in the transition from the current second Islamic Republic,
if you can name it this way. The first one having been, of course, the one which was in place between 1979 and 1989.
And this one, which has started in the post, Khomeini, Iran undoing the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
So in my view, another constitutional revision following the passing of the current supreme leader appears inevitable.
Ayatollah Khomeini's rule is strongly personalistic and shaped around his his is his
own personal authority and his own relationship with the rest of the political class.
As to some extent, to a great extent, actually, Khomeini's rule was prior to him.
So this third Islamic Republic, if you can call it this way,
is likely to present considerable differences with regards to previous ones, particularly in terms of popular participation.
And I would argue elite dynamism and elasticity. So popular participation in in in choosing in selecting some of the incumbents of the state
institutions with also regards to the extent to which the elite will have diversity within its ranks.
It is uncaused, therefore, in my view, to be an evolution of the previous republics,
the first and second one, and will not really be a revolution with regards to them,
but will probably constitute a further drift towards the entrenchment of the new generation
or the political class on on the state in ways in which we have to still observance.
Thank you. Thank you very much, Silverbush, and thank you both.
I think your two presentations have in it a very nice way, pull this in slightly different directions.
And, you know, I work extremely well with with the title of today's seminar, which is authoritarian or revolutionary.
And Mariam, it seems to me,
in emphasising the institutionalisation of informality and spontaneity and the modus operandi of the Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Suggested that that revolutionary aspect is still very much with us.
Whereas still, Bush has talked much more about the way that the system is evolving.
And as it loses its capacity to respond to societal moods and currents,
it's actually becoming less revolutionary and more authoritarian in a traditional sense.
So I'm going to ask you to reflect a little bit on each other's arguments.
My second question. But first, I've got a specific question to each of you.
I'll start with you. Mariam. We we've often read.
In some of the Western literature on the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and indeed it's not it's a view that one often encounters in Iran as well,
that the Revolutionary Guard Corps has become more and more a sort of power behind the throne,
within the Islamic Republican system, that it's been accruing more powers.
It's been extending its activities into greater areas of life when it crosses horns with the organs of government.
It's tending to emerge on top. So I just wonder whether you could tell us something about how you view those arguments.
Do do you think that this kind of spontaneity and informality that you see in it in any way argues against that?
Or is it something that could could work perfectly well with without it?
With that analysis? Thank you, Edmund.
That's the great question. I just want to point out that it's quite impossible to get accurate data on how this, like,
overarching influence of the IRGC is actually to measure it, because we all know it's a highly securitise apparatus.
They're not even still letting out a lot of the documents that are on like 30 year old, 40 years old.
And I like sitting in their archives day or like treating it as a matter of security and nothing else.
So, yeah, a lot of what we say about it and what we hear about it are conjectures.
That said, I think this proposition, which sounds like a reasonable one.
One does not go against the revolutionary nature that I'm in the particular sense that I'm talking about here.
It's actually one of the strengths of the IRGC has been from the beginning, especially in the early years of the Iran-Iraq war.
That's. That their power to recruit volunteers and allow them to feel in charge.
Brought in more volunteers, and that was their winning card in their ribaldry with the regular army.
Of course, it faded with years, but I believe that it because it was institutionalised to tolerate such this kind of action.
It still continues to exist, although to a lesser extent.
So that being a part of the power, part of their strength and the fact that they there actually are still a good number of very dedicated,
ideologically committed leaders, commanders and volunteers like through all the ranks that are.
That are able to claim they are that true? What's the word?
Actually, supporters of the cause of the revolution. There is no argument against them.
So when someone like Ghasem Sulaimani goes out and devises a radical strategy of extending Iran's influence in the region,
it's not just a political strategic move.
Is that the way he is doing it? The current revolutionary way he's doing it, the way he is like down to earth with his person now.
And and they either what volunteers or draughts still.
Is the idealistic image that the Islamic Republic needs and has always promoted.
So there is no arguing with that. So part of that is the influence and strength of so far comes from this very aspect, I believe.
Thank you very much, unsalable.
The question I would like to put to do to you has to do specifically with where you ended your presentation and thinking about a third republic.
And you you suggested that just as the transition from Khomeini to a holiday that necessitated a,
you know, a constitutional revision and a significant change in the character of the leadership,
I would like to argue against that and say that Khomeini's leadership was very different for
many reasons that have to do with Khomeini's unique role in the revolution and unique charisma.
And he could, in a way, carry that institution by his force of personality, Hogmanay.
The institution has clearly evolved massively. I mean, it's grown into a vast bureaucracy apart from anything else.
But I wonder whether they're really going to be the same need for any significant revision of it.
Couldn't it be argued that this is actually now an institution that has gained
so much momentum and so much of the shape that it's quite likely to continue?
Thanks very much, Edmund. Very, very good question. And obviously, you know, it's very tough to predict the future.
We don't have a crystal ball, but if we look at the past to gain some maybe insight on what the future might hold, you could argue that, first of all,
comany took quite some time to build up the institutional leadership as it emerged in its stable sort of phase,
if you want, which I would argue was, you know, took hold from around the end of the 90s.
And much of Harmony's modus operandi really rests in certain types of personal relations.
He has worked with a variety of actors.
So, you know, to a two step from home and into Mariam's patch, you could argue that the relationship that comany,
as with the IRGC top brass, is a very unique and personalistic one.
And, you know, proof of this was in the sort of grief that we saw from the supreme leader during, for example, essentially Monday's funeral.
That was a that was rather unique, I think,
in the history of of major funerals since 1989 for the new supreme leader to build up again, such such a personal web of connexions,
which would eventually, you know,
emerge into the sort of bureaucracy you mention and into the sort of batur rapidly infrastructure that we that we saw emerge.
In my view, takes time. And, of course, will be also really shaped by the extent to which the new leadership and the sort of its allies across
this state structure will have shared personal experiences prior to that person becoming leader.
So if you look at comany, it's Commenee,
his experience on the front in the 1980s and the sort of preliminary links he established with the IRGC leadership at the time,
which became a constant and and went on and on and on.
And you see that now he's surrounded by people who who fought in the war really to various extends,
the IRGC top brass and and but also people who are really were with him in the thick and thin, even through some very testing times in the 1980s.
And in my book, for example, I discussed the way he he defended Velayati, for example, in the 1980s and 90s stock all the way as well.
So so I think that this sort of this sort of characteristics, if the new leader has to has to rely on them, will take some time.
And and the other issue is, of course,
that the process for the selection of the supreme leader in Iran is is more or less as opaque as as the one to select the pope in the Vatican.
You could argue I mean, it's it's very minor.
It's very, very difficult to to get a good impression of who the next supreme leader might be beforehand.
A lot depends on the moment in which the selection is made.
So Harmony's a rise to the supreme leadership also means he has to do with the exact moment to which that whole process happened,
which was in the midst, by the way, of the constitutional revision.
There were around a dozen sessions of the constitutional original council, which happened before his selection.
And then the then things got a bit messy.
He had to recuse himself, actually, from taking part in that council and discussed the June constitution and so on and so forth.
So so I think this is the moment in which this will occur will also be important.
So I agree with you to certain extent.
But I also think that that that that sort of personal characteristics beyond beyond the definitions of of these two,
the definitions of the sort of impersonal definitions of who the supreme leader might be will have a major.
Thank you very much. I want to prolong our conversation and monopolise you and make you answer the question that I said I was going to ask.
I've also been watching the clock, and I don't want to deprive many people in our audience has the opportunity to ask questions.
So I'm actually going to move on now and hand over to Eugene Rogan, who is going to moderate the Q&A session.
Eugene? Thank you very much.
And I'm having a little bit of trouble with my video feed here, but if you could give me a thumbs up if you're hearing me clearly, please.
Brilliant. I don't want to shout at our audience either. The questions are coming in rather rapidly now, and I won't try and take them in quick order.
And if our panellists could give me relatively quick answers to the questions we can get through,
as many of the audience is important questions that we as we can.
I have one from you wanted to groups at York. To begin with.
And I actually thought you might want to weigh in on the answer to because you were involved in the title for this panel.
But you want to ask. I'd like to prove the choice of the terms authoritarian and revolutionary as alternatives.
She asked. Isn't there a convergence between the two? So we can start there, please?
I think I should start with this because I suggested the title really as a provocation, and I admitted to that too,
because that it was a provocation and that there clearly is no in combat incompatibility between these two.
But I thought it would provoke it, stimulate their ideas and and also our conversation.
And I think it's working in those terms. But no, I don't think any of us suppose it is a these are mutually exclusive terms.
Thank you, Ed. And again, viewers, if you put your name to your question, I assume that you'd like your name made public.
If you'd like to ask your question anonymously, just post Anonymous for your name.
The next question comes from Talaal Mohammed,
and he would like to question how our speakers view the role of the IRGC domestically and in foreign policy,
and particularly what happens if a former member of the IRGC, such as Current, much less Speaker Cordie Boff is elected as president.
What would that mean for relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia?
If I may answer first. That's a great question. As we know, the urgency has expanded its influence beyond Iran and.
I think an interesting fact here is that although this was on the agenda from the moment of the inception of the IRGC,
the very first attempts to do so in the failed or was actually resisted from within the IRGC when a fraction of the IRGC under the
leadership or under the kind of tutelage of Ayatollah Montazeri tried to expand the revolution as they would say it in a very radical way.
It faced resistance from within the IRGC and from within the clerical section of the state.
And it was gradually crushed down with with the execution of that.
One of the important figures who was also related to our two ties.
It was later on after the Iran-Iraq war that another movement started, which operated not based on the radical liberation ideology,
but on a like a very in from all kind of infusion of militias in the Middle East and kind of building them in the IRGC.
His image, which is a state sponsored, state sponsored militia and not a not an underground insurgent one.
So that's something that I always found interesting in terms of what will happen
if a Safavi set like Golubev would be elected in the next presidential election.
This this is the Bush as it was his field of expertise.
I won't say much, but I agree with Silverbush.
I think it goes along with his line of thinking that a more pragmatic.
Mindset has gradually been instituted within at least a number of IRGC commanders and.
Yes. It will be interesting to see how they would tone down the ideological revolutionary discourse to be able to follow the pragmatic ground.
I think Savage will be able to say, well, anybody on subways could ask you to finish the answer to this question, please.
Yes. Well, very briefly, a couple of points before I get to Ghalibaf.
I won't go over what Marianne was saying,
but I would invite people to reflect on the fact that the RJC is really branching out in in more and more fields.
So one thing that has really caught my interest in recent times is the IRGC, whose activities in the cultural and arts fields, for example,
it has funded a company called Saffire Fields, which is producing documentary after documentary coving,
covering every aspect of 20th century Iranian history. And they are doing so because the IRGC is involved in what I call generational change.
It's trying to reach out to the generations, to the considerable amount,
I would say the majority of the Iranian population, which doesn't have a living memory of the revolution,
doesn't have a living memory of the war anymore,
and therefore it's trying to capture its attention and to steer its direction and orient its understanding of these seminal events.
And, of course, the main challenge is from abroad.
You see how, for example, the recent documentary by the BBC, which brought about details of a secret session of the IRGC in thirty sixty three.
I'm sorry, I don't know. The Gregorian calendar brought about a very,
very lively debate inside Iran and and a lot of soul searching over how exactly to portray these histories.
So the IRGC is is actually becoming a competitor of myself and Mariam to some extent.
Right. They're branching out not in the academic sphere, but they're branching out into and trying to interpret and trying to develop outputs
on the past in a way in which they can capture the potential range society.
This is very important, I think,
and this is goes hand-in-hand with what you read in policy reports about the agency's grab on the economy, about its role in politics,
about the fact that, yes,
we could we could be facing the next president to be somebody who comes out with a very clear and very prominent IRGC background.
But to to finish, what will it mean for relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia?
Well, I think that any new Iranian president has to wake up to two rather pronounced shifting sands in the Middle East.
Right. And I don't think that a President Biden, if elected,
would would would undo what's going on now in terms of Israel getting a toehold on the shores of the Persian Gulf,
right through Bahrain and and the UAE. And and I think that if there is any pragmatism in the outlook of the new president,
I would you see or not they'll have to adapt to this reality and to shifting sands elsewhere as well, I would say, in Lebanon and Iraq.
Thank you both very much. Yassmin, mother asks how we can explain or even reconcile systematic corruption amongst leaders of the Islamic
Republic and senior ranks of the Revolutionary Guards with the revolutionary character of the organisation.
So coming back to the revolutionary word and your title.
I take it upon me to answer first, because I'm the revolutionary representative, I think I mean,
this is this is a great question because it brings out what I wanted to say, but left out for the sake of time.
And that is a part of this current old revolutionary modus operandi is informality and informality breeds corruption or makes it easier.
From the very get go of the formation of state institutions and or what became or transforming into state institutions in the revolutionary days,
the clerics and their followers, their life flock followers went about things as informally as possible.
They did have organisations say, the Committee for Welcoming their mom committed,
as well as a mock nominee for the Revolutionary Council and many other councils, as I would suggest, that were just popping out.
But any task that they faced, they went about the organisational settings they could meet and decide on something.
And then right after one individual decided that he wanted to do things differently
and he would go about and do it and he would be welcomed back within the community.
It wasn't like he wouldn't be shunned because of that.
It was just an accepted behaviour. And this continued over the years as against your was it like if this organisation didn't work,
another organisation would pop up more informally, like Shura Councils?
But the more informal type of state institutions that are prevalent in Iran and even the Shura,
the council do not are not like enforcing too much organisation or constraint.
And I think that is what I like. That's how the revolutionary ness and the corruption actually go hand-in-hand.
So watch any follow up on that question very, very quickly.
And then the thing that strikes me about corruption and of course, you know, corruption was something that in previous decades, the opposition,
that opposition I mentioned outside the country would would keep going on about about the whole how the entire Islamic republic
was corrupt and sometimes coming up with remarkable but not very verifiable documents to back it up by the recent periods.
Corruption has become really a battleground.
It has become a main tool for factional fighting, for personal fighting.
And all the dirty linen regarding corruption has been aired very publicly.
Now we are talking about the proceedings of trials in which remarkable figures
that cannot ever really be imagined are aired out publicly by judicial officials.
So in my view, it is quite interesting because obviously this has a very high opportunity cost.
Right? It really leaves a dent in public opinion.
People open newspapers in Tehran and read about all these incredible cases of corruption, truly incredible.
But it is it is having an effect of thinning out the political elite and leaving and sort of bringing about, I wouldn't say a Darwinian evolution,
but bringing about will be a clash between between those who are really seeking to oust the rivals via corruption.
So, you know, what was maybe electoral politics a few years ago has become corruption battles, if you want, in the present.
And it is therefore interesting to see how corruption has been politicised and has
turned into and has sort of achieved this political function in recent times.
Thank you very much, the ambush. Now the question from Jason Kelly.
Up to now,
the discussion has been centred almost exclusively inward or domestically in terms of this question of revolutionary versus authoritarian state.
I'm curious about your thoughts on the export to the revolution, which is a key pillar of Khomeini's revolutionary vision,
was to aggressively pursue a transnational pan Islamic movement.
Of course, this project has evolved for various reasons.
But as briefly alluded to with Mariam's comments about costumes with a Marni's efforts, Iraq and Syria,
within this new thrust of exporting the revolution's ideology or spirit over the past decade or so suggest that this is still a revolutionary state.
Thank you for this question, it's a great question.
I want to emphasise that at least in this very later phase, maybe it was different in the first three to four years after the revolution.
But afterwords, exporting the revolution is not equivalent of exporting the ideology.
Maybe just the like it.
It's only as ideological as far as far as it applies to promoting she ism against Sunni Islam.
But it's not a radical revolutionary ideology.
Rather, it's a revolutionary, revolutionary style of organising armed forces in the region,
as we see in Hezbollah, in Iraqiya hedged a shabby and in the organisation of Ephiny and Iranian forces in this.
On the on the ground in Iraq and in Syria. So it has been the exporting of the revolution less in a in an ideological sense or even the spirit,
but in a the underground modus operandi of working informally in the periphery of official states.
Thank you very much. I hope you have a new rejoinder. I will. I will just say that again.
On a separate matter, if you look at exporting the Islamic Republic,
if you look at exporting support for the Islamic Republic, creating soft power for the Islamic Republic,
I think the most successful person in the recent times in this regard was Ahmadinejad, actually, because, I mean,
he's not really managed to generate support for the Islamic Republic in very different quarters in Latin America, for example.
Right. So for a while, he had built up all these strange alliances with people who were very different from the body politic of the Islamic Republic,
you know, morally, socially, so on and so forth. Chavez, Morales and even Lula, for that matter.
But this window of opportunity really went away with with actually Rouhani becoming presidency president.
And the Islamic Republic has gone back to exporting the revolution in very select locales, as Mariam was saying.
It's Iraq. It's Syria, it's Lebanon. It's wherever there's a foothold of of sort of orthodox supporters which can who can assist the
Islamic Republic and can act as the Islamic Republic's foreign policy non-state actor allies.
I think that if you look back at the way mean jobs, it is very controversial and his very controversial way,
of course, at the cost of even some increased isolation between here in Greece crisis.
If you on between Iran and West succeeded in developing some form of export of the Islamic revolution of of the Islamic Republic's ideology,
rather beyond the usual confines of these activities.
It looks very difficult for Iran to before the Islamic Republic to be able to replicate this again.
And certainly this hasn't happened during the Rowhani period when we went back
to traditional forms of of attempts at ideological and soft power expansion.
Thank you both very much. Staying in the international sphere,
I have a question from Roger Higginson at the University of Sussex who wants to know within the context of
sanctions against Iran and the desire in at least parts of the US political establishment for regime change.
Do the speakers have views on regime stability in Iran?
So would you like to begin with that one? Well, this goes back a bit to what I was saying in my main remarks.
I think that the relationship between state and society is changing rather dramatically in recent years.
Since 2009, we've we've had this this ongoing on and off at times wildcard.
The Times organise the times more or less participated.
But there is there is increasing difficulty by the state to find to find candidates who can go into regime figures,
who can really cater to to these restless to these rather dissenting strata of society beyond the loyalist strata.
You can go and have a look at the various evolution of the various protest, 2017, 2018 last year, all the way back to 2009.
And I think this tells you that in the last 10 years, the sort of the stability of the regime has changed.
My view of the political system has changed and is quite different.
With regards to what it was previously and of course, again, if you look at the parliamentary elections this year,
another form of non-violence sort of expression of dissatisfaction within the society, the largest voter participation.
This was the lowest voter participation, parliamentary elections.
So if you look at state stability from this point of view, resume stability, I think things have waned in recent years.
However, if you look at it from the barbarian point of view,
the monopoly over the means of violence, and here Marie-Anne can discuss the IRGC position.
I think there is still a commitment to ensure that this monopoly remains where it has been over the past few decades,
namely in the hands of the state and the hands of the IRGC in the hands of the security forces.
So there is also the state's continued ability to securitise, if needed,
to chop off the Internet if needed, and then and then go back to the status quo.
So until there is this sort of ability by the state to be to to engage in this limited, I would add,
elasticity sort of we can talk about instability, but but it needs to be seen to what extent this instability becomes a danger.
Maria, any points drug? Yeah, I will just add quickly that just as I was brought it up, one aspect of regime stability is its repression potential,
and that repression potential does exist as well as we're speaking.
It has not waned. If you look at recent words like Ned Nagus budget, please book Iran refrained on the generational gap actually,
or the generational shift that's here, which was talking about even the new the new generation is even more prone to take on radical Islam,
because to go back to my own work, the attraction of direct action comes through when you're engaging in such activity for their rational needs,
when they become more reasonable, they actually go elsewhere.
The new generation of messages and the guards day, they detach themselves from the ideological commitment.
So, yeah, I just wanted to add that there still is appeal amongst the younger generation volunteers or paid personnel to engage in acts of repression.
And we still need to deal with that in the years to come, I believe.
Thank you very much. I have a question from Frank Demona.
Who wants to bring China into our international perspective, seeing you're gone as a major terminus on the New Silk Road?
How does a revolutionary ethos operate in parallel with China's more stable,
commercially focussed approach in the Middle East and Levant in particular?
So if you have any reflections on China and Iran and the Silk Road Bridge One Road.
But I can only say they won't go very well.
Like, the Iran will not fare well if they they stick to their rebel revolutionary ethos.
But Iran has also shown that they are. Seeking pragmatic roots when it comes to a few trusted allies or or like last resort allies like China.
And again, they might still activate the informality of the organisations, especially with the sanctions, pressuring them to.
To find more ways to do business.
But, yeah, I don't think they will be emphasising or they have been relying on a radical revolutionary ethos when it comes down to business.
Silverbush, anything to add to China, Iran relations? No, I defer to Mariyam and others.
I'm not truly an expert on the fields. Well, I think one very brief final question.
We have. A question from.
And pulse, sue. Again, question revolutionary or authoritarian?
To what extent does the state apparatus of the Islamic Republic, their comparison to the part of the monarchy, monarchies or authoritarian?
In that case, does it do anything to the Assad regime?
Is there any sense of a kind of evolution of the Islamic Republic in two ways that would bearer's resemblance to what had come before?
Kind of go ahead. Thank you, Ed, and good to read your question, I think.
Yeah, well, that's the question, right.
To what extent was the revolution really a complete change in Iranian statecraft and the traditions of the Iranian state in the end,
the infrastructure and the architecture of the Iranian state?
Well, certain things have definitely changed.
You know, we have actors such as the IRGC, you we have this sort of presidential elections every four years,
which are always some some sort of they always create some form of dynamism and some form of motion within the Iranian political system.
At the same time,
political parties were or at least state political bodies or a licenced or legitimate political parties in the parliament period were very weak.
Factionalism or personalism and personal politics were were far more was far
more powerful as as a form of political organisation and political interaction.
This, to some extent, has been carried over, you could argue, an Islamic republic period.
But most importantly, if you look at the helm of the state, we still have one institution on top which is endowed constitutionally actually
in the Islamic Republic case and informally in the A&M in the MASHU to era,
with a lot of power and authority and and defines really the power and authority of the rest of the state system.
They are called very differently. But the function. There are commonalities in the function.
I don't want to say that the supreme leader is a Shah or that the Shah is is a is a value faggy,
but the sort of similarities that we see in terms of the power and authority they wield,
despite the fact that they're dished out in very different ways, should also make you think about the fact that they are endemic,
some endemic traits of Iranian statecraft, which I don't think have disappeared with the revolution of 1979.
And that brings a continuum of sorts on the quest to build a modern state system which started
in Iran since the constitutional revolution and in fits and starts has just been hurtling,
gone, I think, for a century to the present day. I will just briefly, ditto what Sayable said.
I guess there are some similarities in that the very fact that authoritarianism exists.
And that's continue to exist. But maybe it is the forum. It has been imposed on the society that has deferred because of the outburst of so many.
The bursting of so many parallel institutions that have given people to manoeuvre
around the the like arms of authoritarianism or in some cases be more severely cut.
And in Eugene, I'm going to take the microphone now.
Our time is up. Sadly, there are more questions that people would like to put.
I'm afraid we just haven't had time to put all of them. So I'm going to sink Mariyam and Schiavo again,
very much for such stimulating presentations and for answering the questions in such an interesting way.
Thank you all for your questions and for being here.
Please join us next week when Dalia Fatmeh and Danish faculty will be talking about illiberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt.
See you next week. Bye bye. Thank you.