1 00:00:00,390 --> 00:00:08,700 Hello and welcome to this second seminar in Michaelmas term series on the dictatorship syndrome in the Middle East. 2 00:00:08,700 --> 00:00:15,810 Today, we're moving from Egypt to Iran and we're meeting to talk about authoritarian or 3 00:00:15,810 --> 00:00:20,910 revolutionary reflections on the nature of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 4 00:00:20,910 --> 00:00:27,570 I'm delighted to be joined here today by two very good specialists on contemporary Iranian politics. 5 00:00:27,570 --> 00:00:33,570 One is Mariam Arms are there from Princeton. The other is sort of strange by her daughter, Amy. 6 00:00:33,570 --> 00:00:38,990 And we are going to be giving each of them 10 minutes roughly to give us a short presentation. 7 00:00:38,990 --> 00:00:44,160 Then we'll have another 10 minutes or so in which I'll engage in conversation with them. 8 00:00:44,160 --> 00:00:49,140 And then after that, we'll move on to the general Q&A for half an hour. 9 00:00:49,140 --> 00:00:53,760 We do need to end the session promptly at 6:00. We need to keep the time. 10 00:00:53,760 --> 00:01:04,190 So without more ado, I'd like to turn to Mariam Olivers all day and invite her to give us the first presentation of our seminar this afternoon. 11 00:01:04,190 --> 00:01:08,560 Hello, everyone. Thank you so much for having me in the seminar series. 12 00:01:08,560 --> 00:01:19,070 I'm really excited to be part of this programme. So we hear very frequently from the Islamic Republic officials about how the government in Iran, 13 00:01:19,070 --> 00:01:25,110 its institutions, its policies and even the nation itself is a revolutionary one. 14 00:01:25,110 --> 00:01:31,340 This marker revolutionary, even though we're 40 years, 40 plus years away from the 1979 revolution, 15 00:01:31,340 --> 00:01:37,490 is still very well alive in the governmental discourse on all levels of its operation. 16 00:01:37,490 --> 00:01:42,050 So the question I'd like to address today is what does this emphasis on this, 17 00:01:42,050 --> 00:01:47,780 on the revolutionary character mean in practise beyond just an ideological posture? 18 00:01:47,780 --> 00:01:54,590 Of course, there is one obvious function. It gives the authoritarian state the justification to repress any other voice as counter-revolutionary, 19 00:01:54,590 --> 00:02:04,790 to frame it very easily as counter-revolutionary. But beyond this ideological function, is there any veracity to the claim to a revolutionary nature? 20 00:02:04,790 --> 00:02:09,530 Does it mean anything with regard to actual everyday dynamics of governance? 21 00:02:09,530 --> 00:02:13,360 And I believe the answer is yes. 22 00:02:13,360 --> 00:02:19,300 I have done extensive research on the origins of what is arguably the most prominent state apparatus in contemporary Iran, 23 00:02:19,300 --> 00:02:26,080 and that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, also known as Sebel to Forces Speakers. 24 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:33,540 I think this early history tells us a lot about the nature of state and governance in Iran at large by showing us a certain, 25 00:02:33,540 --> 00:02:40,030 quote unquote, revolutionary characteristics that became a vital part of state institutions, including the IRGC. 26 00:02:40,030 --> 00:02:50,620 From early on. But not only limited to that early phase, it has left its footprint for the years to come on state institutions. 27 00:02:50,620 --> 00:02:59,230 So we know in the early history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there was incessant friction between the liberal minded, 28 00:02:59,230 --> 00:03:03,370 technocratic, provisional government led by me, and he was gone on the one hand. 29 00:03:03,370 --> 00:03:10,120 And the more radical clerics around Khomeini and their late followers who work within revolutionary institutions, 30 00:03:10,120 --> 00:03:17,890 largely the IRGC became an official entity only about two months after the February 1979 revolution. 31 00:03:17,890 --> 00:03:20,860 But in the first few years of its existence, 32 00:03:20,860 --> 00:03:30,790 its support came mostly from the radical clerical camp in the government and not the technocratic section which actually controlled the budgets. 33 00:03:30,790 --> 00:03:35,390 The technocratic provisional government. And later on, the first elected president, 34 00:03:35,390 --> 00:03:43,990 Hassan Rohani said were more fond of refurbishing the professional police and the army and not investing in the IRGC. 35 00:03:43,990 --> 00:03:53,080 This means that contrary to conventional wisdom, the IRGC did not receive comprehensive state support from the moment of the inception in April 1979. 36 00:03:53,080 --> 00:03:56,830 It took another two years approximately for that to happen. 37 00:03:56,830 --> 00:04:05,290 So before it acquired such support, before it had a proper organisation and enough funds or equipment or even minimal training for its volunteers, 38 00:04:05,290 --> 00:04:13,620 it was put to the test of straining situations such as the ethnic conflict in many border areas with the most intensive of them was in Kurdistan. 39 00:04:13,620 --> 00:04:24,000 I'm sure you know, and very soon after it engaged in a conventional war with Iraq when Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980. 40 00:04:24,000 --> 00:04:24,550 In my research, 41 00:04:24,550 --> 00:04:34,830 I try to understand what this early pre consolidation involvement in action meant for the future of the Earth to see and governance in Iran of large. 42 00:04:34,830 --> 00:04:42,490 One thing I found in my interviews with first generation IRGC veterans, as well as some active members of the organisation, 43 00:04:42,490 --> 00:04:50,970 was this that either an intensive battle situations or in everyday organisational work in like urban centres, 44 00:04:50,970 --> 00:04:59,130 they trusted one another's improvisation in the lack of any other structure, in the lack of any professional training and experience, as I mentioned. 45 00:04:59,130 --> 00:05:01,860 But they didn't do this just as a last resort. 46 00:05:01,860 --> 00:05:10,290 Relying on improvised direct action of supposedly dedicated volunteers was actually much more in line with the spirit of the revolutionary times. 47 00:05:10,290 --> 00:05:16,950 And it was credited as such by all levels of leaders and the peers as well. 48 00:05:16,950 --> 00:05:27,150 So volunteers, small group leaders and politicians in the radical camp all relied in this asset on this urge for direct action amongst volunteers, 49 00:05:27,150 --> 00:05:34,230 not just to get the job done when there was no other way to go, but because they also believe this was the right way of doing things. 50 00:05:34,230 --> 00:05:45,060 So to give you an example. You know that the IRGC was involved in action against Kurdish insurgency as early as 1979 alongside 51 00:05:45,060 --> 00:05:51,900 the regular army who was trying to defend its barracks there after one of the operations there, 52 00:05:51,900 --> 00:06:01,210 one of the joint operations, they the IRGC operations commander, Abu Shariff, said this in a press interview. 53 00:06:01,210 --> 00:06:05,090 Quote, The government and the army tied our hands in the past. 54 00:06:05,090 --> 00:06:11,940 We will not listen to them from now on, and we'll act directly when necessary if we need something that the government is not provided immediately. 55 00:06:11,940 --> 00:06:22,030 The people who will do that for us and then this is a very prominent sentiment going on on different grants and levels. 56 00:06:22,030 --> 00:06:27,760 But this is also not an uncommon incident in the first couple of years after any revolution. 57 00:06:27,760 --> 00:06:34,270 So how is the case of Iran different? I think it's rather unique, this case of state building in Iran, 58 00:06:34,270 --> 00:06:39,070 because the reliance on improvised direct action was institutionalised both within 59 00:06:39,070 --> 00:06:44,320 the IRGC and within the section of the more radical side of the government, 60 00:06:44,320 --> 00:06:51,250 mainly because it had to be deployed under intensive work conditions. So it was deployed in the lack of other resources. 61 00:06:51,250 --> 00:06:57,910 It paid off at least partially, and it was validated as true revolutionary dedication. 62 00:06:57,910 --> 00:07:08,260 So it became a modus operandi that was hard to let go of even after the first few years as current examples, contemporary examples. 63 00:07:08,260 --> 00:07:14,890 Think about, for instance, the encounters between the IRGC, small boats and U.S. Navy units in the Persian Gulf. 64 00:07:14,890 --> 00:07:23,740 That always creates friction or about the downing of a U.S. drone in twenty nineteen by the Iranians around the Iranian border. 65 00:07:23,740 --> 00:07:28,690 In such instances, talk to your commanders hardly involved. But regardless of how involved they are, 66 00:07:28,690 --> 00:07:34,690 they Iranian state and the military proudly present such instances as the act of a brave and 67 00:07:34,690 --> 00:07:42,720 dedicated soldier or a group of them firing at will and encourages this sort of action further. 68 00:07:42,720 --> 00:07:47,640 Now, how does this help us with understanding the nature of authoritarianism in Iraq? 69 00:07:47,640 --> 00:07:55,580 The question is also a good conduit to the theme of the seminar series, which he used after Out on us won his book, The Dictatorship Syndrome. 70 00:07:55,580 --> 00:08:03,340 I think the fact that many revolutionary conditions, including in Iran due to authoritarianism, is not simply caused by, 71 00:08:03,340 --> 00:08:13,090 as doctors, one suggests, good citizens who identify with authoritarianism or their code robust and chronic obedience, unquote. 72 00:08:13,090 --> 00:08:19,630 Or even it's not due to the fact that as he describes the Iranian case, I'm quoting, 73 00:08:19,630 --> 00:08:26,720 countries under the thumbs of men of religion are more receptive to dictatorship and cote. 74 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:36,440 These all do play a part for sure. Although I believe they are more effective, other structural forces and not causes of the rise of authoritarianism. 75 00:08:36,440 --> 00:08:45,560 But in addition to such factors, I believe more importantly, we have to remember that a revolution provides opportunities for direct action, 76 00:08:45,560 --> 00:08:50,930 which in turn give the participants a sense of having their own faith in their hands. 77 00:08:50,930 --> 00:08:55,370 It is this sense of participation rather than tame compliance or being good, 78 00:08:55,370 --> 00:09:01,730 obedient citizens that lures people into cooperating with the revolutionary apparatus. 79 00:09:01,730 --> 00:09:08,330 In the case of Iran, the continued availability of venues for direct action has preserved this attraction to some extent. 80 00:09:08,330 --> 00:09:17,150 The continued attraction for volunteers in organisations such as the Basij, which is the like demobilisation branch of the IRGC, 81 00:09:17,150 --> 00:09:26,210 has in turn created a system with flexible capillary control based on the participation of a good number of the people. 82 00:09:26,210 --> 00:09:29,760 So to wrap up, I'd like to suggest that behind the security apparatus, 83 00:09:29,760 --> 00:09:35,510 Panopticon and its power that is infused into the society lies a revolutionary institution, 84 00:09:35,510 --> 00:09:41,390 albeit in an organisational sense of the word, not in a radical ideological sense of the word. 85 00:09:41,390 --> 00:09:47,720 This revolutionary institution tolerates and encourages direct action that is ideologically in line with these nine republic models, 86 00:09:47,720 --> 00:09:52,550 of course, and thereby it sustains a sizeable popular base. 87 00:09:52,550 --> 00:09:59,420 Over the years, this popular base is not necessarily brainwashed, that is to say, to serve the state, 88 00:09:59,420 --> 00:10:06,200 rather institutions of power keep them committed and interested by authorising spontaneous direct action, 89 00:10:06,200 --> 00:10:10,130 even though revolutionary times are long past. Now, I'll stop here. 90 00:10:10,130 --> 00:10:22,010 Thank you very much. Thank you, Marianne, for this very interesting overview over the role and function of the IRGC over the decades. 91 00:10:22,010 --> 00:10:29,060 My remarks are going to be pretty much centred on the topic of my of my book, 92 00:10:29,060 --> 00:10:35,690 namely this whole issue regarding state institution building within the Islamic Republic. 93 00:10:35,690 --> 00:10:41,420 My contention is that the very construction of the state from the revolution onwards for the 94 00:10:41,420 --> 00:10:46,820 past four decades has really been a work in progress and that we can have a robust debate, 95 00:10:46,820 --> 00:10:56,520 obviously not on this occasion, on whether the Islamic Republic today really be defined as a state according to Western political theory canids. 96 00:10:56,520 --> 00:11:05,820 And one of the reasons why the debate and discussion within the Islamic Republic on the exact nature of the state are not on the exact limits, 97 00:11:05,820 --> 00:11:11,910 some boundaries or of the power and authority of each solution is still ongoing after 40 years. 98 00:11:11,910 --> 00:11:19,560 Also has to do with the fact that these state institutions are very varied and non-uniform origins. 99 00:11:19,560 --> 00:11:28,320 Suffice to note that both the Iranian post revolution constitution, both in its 1979 edition and its 1989 revision, 100 00:11:28,320 --> 00:11:33,480 is really a mixture between Western political traditions, particularly the French Fifth Republic, 101 00:11:33,480 --> 00:11:41,880 from which the current institution of the presidency was directly inspired and also fringed doctrines of Shiism such as the to Figi, 102 00:11:41,880 --> 00:11:50,160 but also ad hoc bodies that were brought about by various exigencies and crises in the management of the state, particularly throughout the 1980s. 103 00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:56,830 Cases in point here are the Masad Council and the Supreme National Security Council. 104 00:11:56,830 --> 00:12:05,170 And such an unwieldy arrangement has worked in quotes during the past decades for a number of reasons. 105 00:12:05,170 --> 00:12:08,800 One of the key reasons behind this was, of course, 106 00:12:08,800 --> 00:12:13,300 the fact that the political elite and the political class was configured in a way which 107 00:12:13,300 --> 00:12:19,210 allowed for competitive politics to determine the incumbents of several state institutions, 108 00:12:19,210 --> 00:12:22,060 particularly the parliament and, of course, the presidency. 109 00:12:22,060 --> 00:12:33,220 And this was a buttressed by factionalism, which was really the model around which everyday politics we organised in Iran. 110 00:12:33,220 --> 00:12:43,270 However, I would argue this aspect, namely a competitive form of politics within the precinct of the Islamic Republic's political class, 111 00:12:43,270 --> 00:12:53,590 has faded in recent years as the Islamic Republic has started to grapple with challenges from a new opposition, which I will discuss later. 112 00:12:53,590 --> 00:13:02,650 And also the vexing issue of generational change within its political class and the absence of suitable vehicles for implementing the same, 113 00:13:02,650 --> 00:13:08,040 such as structured political parties which have been absent in Iran for decades. 114 00:13:08,040 --> 00:13:16,080 Coupled to all of this, one thing that is really affecting the nature of the contemporary state and Islamic Republic 115 00:13:16,080 --> 00:13:22,350 is the deepening legitimacy crisis that the Islamic Republic has been facing since 2009. 116 00:13:22,350 --> 00:13:29,550 And since 2009, we've had different waves of of significant popular unrest and and protests. 117 00:13:29,550 --> 00:13:38,100 In 2009, we had a mainly urbane urban middle class protest against the electoral outcome of that year. 118 00:13:38,100 --> 00:13:44,610 But it has morphed into serious strife amongst the urban margins, 119 00:13:44,610 --> 00:13:53,670 the fringes of of society due to political and especially economic reasons in recent years. 120 00:13:53,670 --> 00:14:00,030 And the reaction of the state system as a whole to these challenges has been resort 121 00:14:00,030 --> 00:14:06,660 to violence and to a very informal control over over the means of violence, 122 00:14:06,660 --> 00:14:15,270 which has been endorsed by the entire gamut of ease in a regime, personalities and ference from those who are defined as reformists. 123 00:14:15,270 --> 00:14:24,780 Those are defined as conservatives. In the past, I would argue the political class had figures who could cater to such anger or do some to such 124 00:14:24,780 --> 00:14:30,240 desires for change from various strata of society and turned them into electoral capital. 125 00:14:30,240 --> 00:14:37,140 And that was one of the reasons why, for example, Mahmud Ahmadinejad managed to rise to the presidency in 2005. 126 00:14:37,140 --> 00:14:41,700 I believe that this potential has weakened considerably in recent times, 127 00:14:41,700 --> 00:14:46,350 with the political class entrenching being unable to offer a suitable response 128 00:14:46,350 --> 00:14:52,980 to these challenges beyond the aforementioned adoption of security discourse. 129 00:14:52,980 --> 00:15:01,500 So the other important factor that I mentioned previously consists of the Islamic Republic facing an evolving opposition. 130 00:15:01,500 --> 00:15:04,740 So in the 1980s and 1990s, 131 00:15:04,740 --> 00:15:13,110 what constituted the opposition to the Islamic Republic were mostly the remnants of secular forces from the monarchists or leftist, 132 00:15:13,110 --> 00:15:21,690 then the Mujahedeen HYG organisation, of course, which emerged as as as as the opposition in exile in Iraq and so forth. 133 00:15:21,690 --> 00:15:30,120 These were either people aligned to the junkyard regime or entities and personalities were taking part in the revolution, 134 00:15:30,120 --> 00:15:38,220 but then had fallen out progressively with the Khomeini's faction who grabbed control of state power in the Islamic Republic. 135 00:15:38,220 --> 00:15:41,850 However, now this has evolved considerably. It is mostly domestic. 136 00:15:41,850 --> 00:15:47,160 It is not exiles like the rest that the previous generations of opposition activists, 137 00:15:47,160 --> 00:15:50,640 personalities and entities not connected to the old political organisations. 138 00:15:50,640 --> 00:15:57,300 So examples are the spontaneous trade unions that have immersions more or less 2006. 139 00:15:57,300 --> 00:16:02,370 I believe the first one was the trade union of the workers of the bus company of Tehran. 140 00:16:02,370 --> 00:16:12,540 Now we have worker activism in the form of the half to pay workers and people who have rallied around their cause, like simply their union. 141 00:16:12,540 --> 00:16:18,270 These trade unions have led to some unprecedented developments. 142 00:16:18,270 --> 00:16:23,670 For example, in recent months we've seen the most serious industrial action in Iran in the past four decades, 143 00:16:23,670 --> 00:16:28,680 pretty much since the autumn and winter of 1978. 144 00:16:28,680 --> 00:16:35,820 Then we've had lawyers such as some elements of civil society, prominently lawyers, and here Nasserism today, 145 00:16:35,820 --> 00:16:38,240 the prison lawyer is that is a clear example of this, 146 00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:43,320 student leaders and then even relatives of those who are being imprisoned or repressed returning to work. 147 00:16:43,320 --> 00:16:49,800 The opposition activists themselves and this former opposition is home grown and has little or no ties to the veteran groups. 148 00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:57,870 So he said does not really subscribe to key milestone events which form the Islamic Republic, the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war. 149 00:16:57,870 --> 00:17:02,490 It doesn't really share the political classes reading of these. 150 00:17:02,490 --> 00:17:07,710 And so far has found really little in terms of the state's willingness to genuinely engage with it. 151 00:17:07,710 --> 00:17:12,110 So the state is not really opening up to this formal opposition. 152 00:17:12,110 --> 00:17:22,640 I'll finish with some consultations regarding what could happen in the transition from the current second Islamic Republic, 153 00:17:22,640 --> 00:17:29,600 if you can name it this way. The first one having been, of course, the one which was in place between 1979 and 1989. 154 00:17:29,600 --> 00:17:37,130 And this one, which has started in the post Khomeini, Iran and during the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 155 00:17:37,130 --> 00:17:43,970 So in my view, another constitutional revision following the passing of the current supreme leader appears inevitable. 156 00:17:43,970 --> 00:17:50,690 Ayatollah Khomeini's rule is strongly personalistic and shaped around his own 157 00:17:50,690 --> 00:17:54,650 personal authority and his own relationship with the rest of the world class. 158 00:17:54,650 --> 00:18:00,770 As to some extent, to a great extent, actually, if Khomeini's rule was prior to him. 159 00:18:00,770 --> 00:18:04,160 So this third Islamic Republic, if you can call it this way, 160 00:18:04,160 --> 00:18:12,860 is likely to present considerable differences with regards to previous ones, particularly in terms of popular participation. 161 00:18:12,860 --> 00:18:22,640 And I would argue elite dynamism and elasticity. So popular participation in in choosing in selecting some of the incumbents of the state institutions 162 00:18:22,640 --> 00:18:29,660 with also regards to the extent to which the elite will have diversity within its ranks. 163 00:18:29,660 --> 00:18:36,650 It is, of course, therefore, in my view, to be an evolution of the previous republics, 164 00:18:36,650 --> 00:18:42,940 the first and second one, and will not really be a revolution with regards to them, 165 00:18:42,940 --> 00:18:50,780 but will probably constitute a further drift towards the entrenchment of the new generation 166 00:18:50,780 --> 00:18:57,070 or the political class on on the state in ways in which we have to instil observance. 167 00:18:57,070 --> 00:19:01,650 Thank you. Thank you very much, Silverbush, and thank you both. 168 00:19:01,650 --> 00:19:08,570 I think your two presentations have, in a very nice way, pulled us in slightly different directions. 169 00:19:08,570 --> 00:19:14,800 And I work extremely well with with the title of today's seminar, which is authoritarian or revolutionary. 170 00:19:14,800 --> 00:19:16,650 And Mariam, it seems to me, 171 00:19:16,650 --> 00:19:26,930 in emphasising the institutionalisation of informality and spontaneity and the modus operandi of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. 172 00:19:26,930 --> 00:19:31,890 I suggested that that revolutionary aspect is still very much with us. 173 00:19:31,890 --> 00:19:37,530 Whereas Sale Bush has talked much more about the way that the system it is evolving. 174 00:19:37,530 --> 00:19:44,070 And as it loses its capacity to respond to societal moods and currents, 175 00:19:44,070 --> 00:19:50,520 it's actually becoming less revolutionary and more authoritarian in a traditional sense. 176 00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:56,010 So I'm going to sort of ask you to reflect a little bit on each other's arguments as my second question. 177 00:19:56,010 --> 00:19:59,730 But first, I've got a specific question to each of you. 178 00:19:59,730 --> 00:20:08,980 I'll start with you. Mariam. We've often read in some of the Western literature on the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and indeed it's not. 179 00:20:08,980 --> 00:20:16,210 It's a view that one often encounters in Iran as well, that the Revolutionary Guard Corps has become more and more a sort of power behind the throne, 180 00:20:16,210 --> 00:20:22,750 within the Islamic Republican system that it's in accruing more powers. 181 00:20:22,750 --> 00:20:31,960 It's been extending its activities into greater areas of life when it crosses horns with the organs of government. 182 00:20:31,960 --> 00:20:39,480 It's tending to emerge on top. So I just wonder whether you could tell us something about how you view those arguments. 183 00:20:39,480 --> 00:20:45,730 Do do you think that this kind of spontaneity and informality that you see in it in any way argues against that? 184 00:20:45,730 --> 00:20:51,670 Or is it something that could work perfectly well with that analysis? Thank you, Edmund. 185 00:20:51,670 --> 00:20:59,410 That's the great question. I just want to point out that it's quite impossible to get accurate data on how this, like, 186 00:20:59,410 --> 00:21:09,160 overarching influence of the IRGC is actually to measure it, because we all know it's a highly securitise apparatus. 187 00:21:09,160 --> 00:21:17,440 They're not even still letting out a lot of the documents that are like 30 year old, 40 years old. 188 00:21:17,440 --> 00:21:24,280 And I like sitting in their archives. They are like treating it as a matter of security and nothing else. 189 00:21:24,280 --> 00:21:29,780 So, yeah, a lot of what we say about it and what we hear about it are conjectures. 190 00:21:29,780 --> 00:21:36,490 That said, I think this proposition, which sounds like a reasonable one, 191 00:21:36,490 --> 00:21:43,480 does not go against the revolutionary nature that I'm in the particular sense that I'm talking about here. 192 00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:52,090 It's actually one of the strengths of the IRGC has been from the beginning, especially in the early years of the Iran-Iraq war. 193 00:21:52,090 --> 00:22:00,690 That's their power to recruit volunteers and allow them to feel in charge. 194 00:22:00,690 --> 00:22:08,850 Brought in more volunteers, and that was their winning card in their rivalry with the regular army. 195 00:22:08,850 --> 00:22:17,880 Of course, it faded with years, but I believe that because it was institutionalised to tolerate this kind of action, 196 00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:22,380 it still continues to exist, although to a lesser extent. 197 00:22:22,380 --> 00:22:31,350 So that being a part of their strength and the fact that they there actually are still a good number of very dedicated, 198 00:22:31,350 --> 00:22:39,360 ideologically committed leaders, commanders and volunteers like through all the ranks that are able to claim they. 199 00:22:39,360 --> 00:22:45,810 Are that true? What's the word that true supporters of the cause of the revolution? 200 00:22:45,810 --> 00:22:48,360 There is no argument against them. 201 00:22:48,360 --> 00:22:59,880 So when someone like Ghasem Soleimani goes out and devises a radical strategy of extending Iran's influence in the region, 202 00:22:59,880 --> 00:23:03,860 it's not just a political strategic move. 203 00:23:03,860 --> 00:23:09,480 Is that the way he is doing it? The current revolutionary way he's doing it, 204 00:23:09,480 --> 00:23:15,960 the way he is like down to earth with his person now and they either want volunteers or draughts 205 00:23:15,960 --> 00:23:24,810 still is the idealistic image that the Islamic Republic needs and has always promoted. 206 00:23:24,810 --> 00:23:34,080 So there is no arguing with that. So part of the influence and strength of so far comes from this very aspect, I believe. 207 00:23:34,080 --> 00:23:36,270 Thank you very much, Salvucci. 208 00:23:36,270 --> 00:23:44,430 The question would like to put to you as to do specifically with where you ended your presentation thinking about a third republic. 209 00:23:44,430 --> 00:23:51,570 And you you suggested that just as the transition from Khomeini to Harmony, that necessitated a, you know, 210 00:23:51,570 --> 00:23:57,960 a constitutional revision and a significant change in the character of the leadership, 211 00:23:57,960 --> 00:24:05,610 I would like to argue against that and say that Khomeini's leadership was very different. 212 00:24:05,610 --> 00:24:12,360 For many reasons that have to do with Khomeini's unique role in the revolution, unique charisma. 213 00:24:12,360 --> 00:24:18,930 And he could, in a way, carry that institution or his force of personality, harmony. 214 00:24:18,930 --> 00:24:26,010 The institution has clearly evolved massively. I mean, it's grown into a vast bureaucracy apart from anything else. 215 00:24:26,010 --> 00:24:31,650 But I wonder whether is really going to be the same need for any significant revision of it. 216 00:24:31,650 --> 00:24:35,520 Couldn't it be argued that this is actually now an institution that has gained 217 00:24:35,520 --> 00:24:43,360 so much momentum and so much of the shape that it's quite likely to continue? 218 00:24:43,360 --> 00:24:49,300 Thanks very much, Edmund. Very, very good question. And obviously, you know, it's very tough to predict the future. 219 00:24:49,300 --> 00:24:59,800 We don't have a crystal ball, but if we look at the past to gain some maybe insight on what the future might hold, you could argue that, first of all, 220 00:24:59,800 --> 00:25:08,170 comany took quite some time to build up the institutional leadership as it emerged in its stable sort of phase, 221 00:25:08,170 --> 00:25:13,850 if you want, which I would argue took hold from around the end of the 90s. 222 00:25:13,850 --> 00:25:20,020 And much of Harmony's modus operandi really rests in certain types of personal relations. 223 00:25:20,020 --> 00:25:29,170 He has worked with a variety of actors. So, you know, to step from moment into Mariam's patch and you could argue that the relationship that comany, 224 00:25:29,170 --> 00:25:35,330 as with the IRGC top brass, is a very unique and personalistic one. 225 00:25:35,330 --> 00:25:43,540 And then, you know, proof of this was in the sort of grief that we saw from the supreme leader during, for example, essentially Monday's funeral. 226 00:25:43,540 --> 00:25:51,850 That was rather unique, I think, in the history of of major funerals since 1989 for the new supreme leader to build up, 227 00:25:51,850 --> 00:25:55,570 again, such a personal web of connexions, 228 00:25:55,570 --> 00:26:05,230 which would eventually emerge into the sort of bureaucracy you mention and into the sort of Batur Rapini infrastructure that we that we saw emerge, 229 00:26:05,230 --> 00:26:18,460 in my view, takes time. And, of course, will be also really shaped by the extent to which the new leadership and the sort of its allies across 230 00:26:18,460 --> 00:26:25,150 this state structure will have shared personal experiences prior to that person becoming leader. 231 00:26:25,150 --> 00:26:26,650 So if you look at comany, 232 00:26:26,650 --> 00:26:34,480 it's Harmony's experience on the front in the 1980s and the sort of preliminary links he established with the IRGC leadership at the time, 233 00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:37,560 which became a constant and went on and on and on. 234 00:26:37,560 --> 00:26:46,840 And you see that now he's surrounded by people who who fought in the war really to various extends, the IRGC top brass, 235 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:53,320 but also people who really were with him in the thick and thin, even through some very testing times in the 1980s. 236 00:26:53,320 --> 00:26:57,550 And in my book, for example, I discussed the way he he defended Velayati, 237 00:26:57,550 --> 00:27:01,600 for example, in the 1980s, and then overnight he stalked them all the way as well. 238 00:27:01,600 --> 00:27:10,240 So so I think that this sort of characteristics, if the new leader has to has to rely on them, will take some time. 239 00:27:10,240 --> 00:27:12,760 And the other issue is, of course, 240 00:27:12,760 --> 00:27:23,500 that the process for the selection of the supreme leader in Iran is is more or less as opaque as as the one to select the pope in the Vatican. 241 00:27:23,500 --> 00:27:26,110 You could argue. I mean, it's it's very minor. 242 00:27:26,110 --> 00:27:32,590 It's very, very difficult to to get a good impression of who the next supreme leader might be beforehand. 243 00:27:32,590 --> 00:27:35,850 A lot depends on the moment in which the selection is made. 244 00:27:35,850 --> 00:27:44,350 So Harmony's rise to the supreme leadership also means he has to do with the exact moment to which that whole process happened, 245 00:27:44,350 --> 00:27:47,390 which was in the midst, by the way, of the constitutional revision. 246 00:27:47,390 --> 00:27:53,020 There were around a dozen sessions of the constitutional original council, which happened before his selection. 247 00:27:53,020 --> 00:27:55,450 And then the then things got a bit messy. 248 00:27:55,450 --> 00:28:02,470 He had to recuse himself, actually, from taking part in that council and discussed the June constitution and so on and so forth. 249 00:28:02,470 --> 00:28:07,180 So I think that the moment in which this will occur will also be important. 250 00:28:07,180 --> 00:28:15,760 So I agree with you to some extent, but I also think that that sort of personal characteristics beyond the definitions of these two Shandor 251 00:28:15,760 --> 00:28:22,180 definitions of the sort of impersonal definitions or for the supreme leader might be will have a major ring. 252 00:28:22,180 --> 00:28:29,590 Thank you very much. I want to prolong our conversation and monopolise you and make you answer the question that I said I was going to ask. 253 00:28:29,590 --> 00:28:35,740 I've also been watching the clock and I don't want to deprive many people in our audience has the opportunity to ask questions. 254 00:28:35,740 --> 00:28:43,240 So I'm actually going to move on now and hand over to Eugene Rogan, who going to moderate the Q&A session. 255 00:28:43,240 --> 00:28:48,010 Eugene, thank you very much. And I'm having a little bit of trouble with my video feed here. 256 00:28:48,010 --> 00:28:53,030 But if you could give me a thumbs up if you're hearing me clearly, please. Really? 257 00:28:53,030 --> 00:29:00,690 I don't want to shout at our audience either. The questions are coming in rather rapidly now, and I won't try and take them in quick order. 258 00:29:00,690 --> 00:29:06,010 And if our panellists could give me relatively quick answers to the questions we get through, 259 00:29:06,010 --> 00:29:10,150 as many of the audience is important questions that we as we can. 260 00:29:10,150 --> 00:29:13,720 I have one from you wanted to groups at your word to begin with. 261 00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:19,740 I actually thought you might want to weigh in on the answer to because you were involved in the title for this panel. 262 00:29:19,740 --> 00:29:28,330 But you want to ask. I'd like to prove the choice of the terms authoritarian and revolutionary as alternatives. 263 00:29:28,330 --> 00:29:33,720 She asks, Isn't there a convergence between the two so we can start there, please? 264 00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:37,990 I think I should start with this because I suggested the title really as a provocation. 265 00:29:37,990 --> 00:29:46,370 And I admitted to the process because that it was a provocation and that there clearly is no in combat incompatibility between these two. 266 00:29:46,370 --> 00:29:51,550 But I thought it would provoke stimulate their ideas and and also our conversation. 267 00:29:51,550 --> 00:30:02,180 And I think it's working in those terms. But no, I don't think any of us suppose these are mutually exclusive terms. 268 00:30:02,180 --> 00:30:08,630 Thank you, Ed. And again, viewers, if you put your name to your question, I assumed that you'd like your name made public. 269 00:30:08,630 --> 00:30:12,980 If you'd like to ask your question anonymously, just post Anonymous for your name. 270 00:30:12,980 --> 00:30:15,350 The next question comes from Talaal Muhammad, 271 00:30:15,350 --> 00:30:22,300 and he would like to question how our speakers view the role of the IRGC domestically and in foreign policy, 272 00:30:22,300 --> 00:30:31,520 and particularly what happens if a former member of the IRGC, such as Current, much less speaker called Boff, is elected as president. 273 00:30:31,520 --> 00:30:37,040 What would that mean for relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia? 274 00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:46,090 If I may answer first. That's a great question. As we know, the urgency has expanded its influence beyond Iran. 275 00:30:46,090 --> 00:30:54,520 And I think a an interesting fact here is that although this was on the agenda from the moment of the inception of the IRGC, 276 00:30:54,520 --> 00:31:04,270 the very first attempts to do so failed or was actually resisted from within the IRGC when a fraction of the IRGC 277 00:31:04,270 --> 00:31:11,890 under the leadership or under the kind of tutelage of Ayatollah Montazeri tried to expand their revolution, 278 00:31:11,890 --> 00:31:21,700 as they would say it in a very radical way. It faced resistance from within the IRGC and from within the clerical section of the state, 279 00:31:21,700 --> 00:31:30,130 and it was gradually crushed down with the execution of one of the important figures who was also related to it in the Motor City. 280 00:31:30,130 --> 00:31:40,960 It was later on after the Iran-Iraq war that another movement started, which operated not based on the radical liberation ideology, 281 00:31:40,960 --> 00:31:48,610 but on a like a area in from all kind of infusion of militias in the Middle East. 282 00:31:48,610 --> 00:31:58,030 And kind of building them in the IRGC image, which is a state sponsored militia and not an underground insurgent one. 283 00:31:58,030 --> 00:32:04,380 So that's something that I always found interesting in terms of what will happen if 284 00:32:04,380 --> 00:32:10,900 a party is it like Ghalibaf would be elected in the next presidential election? 285 00:32:10,900 --> 00:32:14,590 Does this establish, as it was, his field of expertise? 286 00:32:14,590 --> 00:32:18,100 I won't say much, but I agree with Silverbush. 287 00:32:18,100 --> 00:32:24,850 I think it goes along with his line of thinking that a more pragmatic mindset 288 00:32:24,850 --> 00:32:32,260 has gradually been instituted within at least a number of IRGC commanders. 289 00:32:32,260 --> 00:32:44,660 And yes, it will be interesting to see how they would tone down the ideological revolutionary discourse to be able to follow the pragmatic route. 290 00:32:44,660 --> 00:32:50,560 Yeah, I think Savage will be able to say sameway. Anybody on Qaboos could ask you to finish the answer to this question, please? 291 00:32:50,560 --> 00:32:55,360 Yes. Well, very briefly, a couple of points before I got to you both. 292 00:32:55,360 --> 00:32:57,220 I won't go over what Marianne was saying, 293 00:32:57,220 --> 00:33:03,580 but I would invite people will flag on the five of the urgency is really branching out and more and more fields. 294 00:33:03,580 --> 00:33:11,800 So one thing that has really caught my interest in recent times is the IRGC, whose activities in the cultural and arts fields, for example, 295 00:33:11,800 --> 00:33:20,800 it was founded a company called Saffir Fields, which is producing documentary after documentary covering every aspect of 20th century Iranian history. 296 00:33:20,800 --> 00:33:26,320 And they're doing so because the IRGC is involved in what I call generational change. 297 00:33:26,320 --> 00:33:32,500 It's trying to reach out to the generations, to the considerable amount, I would say the majority of the Iranian population, 298 00:33:32,500 --> 00:33:38,080 which doesn't have a living memory of the revolution, doesn't have a living memory of the war anymore. 299 00:33:38,080 --> 00:33:46,030 And therefore, it's trying to capture its attention and to steer its direction and to react its understanding of these seminal events. 300 00:33:46,030 --> 00:33:50,710 And, of course, the main challenge is from abroad. 301 00:33:50,710 --> 00:34:00,550 You see how, for example, the recent documentary by the BBC, which brought about details of a secret session of the IRGC and thirty, sixty three. 302 00:34:00,550 --> 00:34:03,790 I'm sorry, I don't know. The Gregorian calendar brought about a very, 303 00:34:03,790 --> 00:34:11,890 very lively debate inside Iran and and a lot of soul searching over how exactly to portray these histories. 304 00:34:11,890 --> 00:34:16,330 So the IRGC is actually becoming a competitor of myself and Mariam to of to the extent. 305 00:34:16,330 --> 00:34:23,020 Right. They're branching out not in the academic sphere, but they're branching out into and trying to interpret and trying to develop 306 00:34:23,020 --> 00:34:28,030 outputs on the past and in a way in which they can capture the attention range. 307 00:34:28,030 --> 00:34:29,170 So I think this is very important. 308 00:34:29,170 --> 00:34:38,650 I think and this is goes hand-in-hand with what you read in policy reports about the IRGC grab on the economy, about its role in politics, 309 00:34:38,650 --> 00:34:40,270 about the fact that, yes, 310 00:34:40,270 --> 00:34:48,550 we could we could be facing the next president to be somebody who comes out with a very clear and very prominent IRGC background. 311 00:34:48,550 --> 00:34:54,520 But to to finish, what will it mean for relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia? 312 00:34:54,520 --> 00:35:01,750 Well, I think that any new Iranian president has to wake up to a rather pronounced shifting sands in the Middle East. 313 00:35:01,750 --> 00:35:05,200 Right. And I don't think that a President Biden, if elected, 314 00:35:05,200 --> 00:35:15,370 would undo what's going on now in terms of Israel getting a toehold on the shores of the Persian Gulf right through Bahrain and and the UAE. 315 00:35:15,370 --> 00:35:20,920 And I think that if there is any pragmatism in the outlook of the new president, 316 00:35:20,920 --> 00:35:26,020 I would you see or not they'll have to adapt to this reality and to shifting sands elsewhere as well. 317 00:35:26,020 --> 00:35:29,670 I would say in Lebanon and Iraq. Thank you both very much, 318 00:35:29,670 --> 00:35:36,780 Yassmin mother asks how we can explain or even reconcile systematic corruption amongst leaders of the Islamic 319 00:35:36,780 --> 00:35:42,860 Republic and senior ranks of the Revolutionary Guards with the revolutionary character of the organisation. 320 00:35:42,860 --> 00:35:53,830 So coming back to the revolutionary word and your title. I take it upon me to answer first because I'm the revolutionary representative. 321 00:35:53,830 --> 00:36:01,420 I think this is this is a great question because it brings out what I wanted to say, but left out for the sake of time. 322 00:36:01,420 --> 00:36:11,530 And that is a part of this current old revolutionary modus operandi is informality and informality breeds corruption or makes it 323 00:36:11,530 --> 00:36:21,880 easier from the very get go of the formation of state institutions and or what became or transform it into state institutions. 324 00:36:21,880 --> 00:36:31,510 In the revolutionary days, the clerics and their followers, their life followers went about things as informally as possible. 325 00:36:31,510 --> 00:36:33,460 They did have organisations say, 326 00:36:33,460 --> 00:36:41,500 the committee for welcoming them on committee as well as a more Khamenei or the Revolutionary Council and many other councils, 327 00:36:41,500 --> 00:36:45,130 as I would suggest, that were just popping out. 328 00:36:45,130 --> 00:36:52,600 But any task that they faced, they went about the organisational settings they could meet and decide on something. 329 00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:58,330 And then right after one individual decided that he wanted to do things differently 330 00:36:58,330 --> 00:37:03,010 and he would go about and do it and he would be welcomed back within the community. 331 00:37:03,010 --> 00:37:06,640 It wasn't like he wouldn't be shunned because of that. 332 00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:14,410 It was just an accepted behaviour. And this continued over the years as against here was suggested, like if this organisation didn't work, 333 00:37:14,410 --> 00:37:19,530 another organisation would pop up more informally, like Shura Councils. 334 00:37:19,530 --> 00:37:26,730 But the more informal type of state institutions that are prevalent in Iran and even the shura, 335 00:37:26,730 --> 00:37:32,140 the council, are not like enforcing too much organisational constraint. 336 00:37:32,140 --> 00:37:41,750 And I think that is what like that's how the revolutionary ness and the corruption actually go hand-in-hand. 337 00:37:41,750 --> 00:37:45,650 So wish any follow up on that question very, very quickly. 338 00:37:45,650 --> 00:37:53,930 And then the thing that strikes me about corruption and of course, you know, corruption was something that in previous decades, the opposition, 339 00:37:53,930 --> 00:38:00,710 that opposition I mention outside the country would would keep going on about about the whole how the entire Islamic republic 340 00:38:00,710 --> 00:38:09,890 was corrupt and sometimes coming up with remarkable but not very verifiable documents to back it up by the recent periods. 341 00:38:09,890 --> 00:38:18,770 Corruption has become really a battleground. It has become a main tool for factional fighting, for personal fighting. 342 00:38:18,770 --> 00:38:22,700 And all the dirty linen regarding corruption has been aired very publicly. 343 00:38:22,700 --> 00:38:28,940 Now we are talking about the proceedings of trials in which remarkable figures 344 00:38:28,940 --> 00:38:33,980 that cannot really be imagined are aired out publicly by judicial officials. 345 00:38:33,980 --> 00:38:38,540 So in my view, it is quite interesting because obviously this has a very high opportunity cost. 346 00:38:38,540 --> 00:38:42,080 Right? It really leaves a dent in public opinion. 347 00:38:42,080 --> 00:38:51,290 People open newspapers in Tehran and read about all these incredible cases of corruption, truly incredible. 348 00:38:51,290 --> 00:38:58,540 But it is having an effect of thinning out the political elite and leaving and then sort of bringing about, I wouldn't say, 349 00:38:58,540 --> 00:39:08,900 a Darwinian evolution, but bringing about really a clash between between those who are really seeking to oust the rivals via corruption. 350 00:39:08,900 --> 00:39:17,790 So what was maybe electoral politics a few years ago has become corruption battles, if you want, in the present. 351 00:39:17,790 --> 00:39:29,010 And it is therefore interesting to see how corruption has been politicised and has sort of achieved this political function in recent times. 352 00:39:29,010 --> 00:39:33,450 Thank you very much. The ambush. Now the question from Jason Kelly. 353 00:39:33,450 --> 00:39:34,740 Up to now, 354 00:39:34,740 --> 00:39:43,380 the discussion has been centred almost exclusively inward or domestically in terms of this question of revolutionary versus authoritarian state. 355 00:39:43,380 --> 00:39:50,400 I'm curious about your thoughts on the export to the revolution, which is a key pillar of Khomeini's revolutionary vision, 356 00:39:50,400 --> 00:39:54,480 was to aggressively pursue a transnational pan Islamic movement. 357 00:39:54,480 --> 00:39:57,810 Of course, this project has evolved for various reasons. 358 00:39:57,810 --> 00:40:03,970 But as briefly alluded to with Mariam's comments about costumes with a Marni's efforts, Iraq and Syria, 359 00:40:03,970 --> 00:40:15,550 within this new thrust of exporting the revolution's ideology or spirit over the past decade or so suggest that this is still a revolutionary state. 360 00:40:15,550 --> 00:40:17,950 Thank you for this question, it's a great question. 361 00:40:17,950 --> 00:40:26,750 I want to emphasise that at least in this very later phase, maybe it was different in the first three to four years after the revolution. 362 00:40:26,750 --> 00:40:33,010 But after words, exporting the revolution is not equivalent of exporting the ideology. 363 00:40:33,010 --> 00:40:41,710 Maybe just like it. It's only as ideological as as far as it applies to promoting she ism against Sunni Islam. 364 00:40:41,710 --> 00:40:45,190 But it's not a radical revolutionary ideology. 365 00:40:45,190 --> 00:40:54,510 Rather, it's a revolutionary style of organising armed forces in the region, as we see in Hezbollah in Iraq. 366 00:40:54,510 --> 00:41:03,550 Hedged shabby. And in the organisation of Ephiny and Iranian forces on the ground in Iraq than in Syria. 367 00:41:03,550 --> 00:41:11,110 So it has been the exporting of the revolution less in a in an ideological sense or even the spirit. 368 00:41:11,110 --> 00:41:20,690 But in the underground modus operandi of working informally in the periphery of official states. 369 00:41:20,690 --> 00:41:27,320 Thank you very much. I do you have any rejoinder? I will. I will just say that again, a on a on a separate matter. 370 00:41:27,320 --> 00:41:32,690 If you look at exporting the Islamic Republic, if you look at exporting support for the Islamic Republic, 371 00:41:32,690 --> 00:41:40,140 creating soft power for the Islamic Republic, I think the most successful person in the recent times in this regard was I mean, 372 00:41:40,140 --> 00:41:41,570 Israel actually, because I mean, 373 00:41:41,570 --> 00:41:48,260 these are really managed to generate support for the Islamic Republic in very different quarters in Latin America, for example. 374 00:41:48,260 --> 00:41:56,540 Right. So for a while, he had built up all these strange alliances with people who were very different from the body politic of the Islamic Republic, 375 00:41:56,540 --> 00:42:02,960 you know, morally, socially, so on and so forth. Chavez, Moralez and even Lula, for that matter. 376 00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:08,990 But this window of opportunity really went away with with actually Rouhani becoming presidency president. 377 00:42:08,990 --> 00:42:13,940 And the Islamic Republic has gone back to exporting the revolution in very select locales. 378 00:42:13,940 --> 00:42:17,630 As Mariam was saying, it's Iraq, it's Syria, it's Lebanon. 379 00:42:17,630 --> 00:42:23,750 It's wherever there's a foothold of of sort of orthodox supporters who can assist the Islamic 380 00:42:23,750 --> 00:42:30,620 Republic and can act as the Islamic Republic's foreign policy non-state actor allies. 381 00:42:30,620 --> 00:42:36,290 I think that if you look back at the way I mean, his and his very controversial way, 382 00:42:36,290 --> 00:42:41,450 of course, at the cost of even some increased isolation between here in Greece crisis, 383 00:42:41,450 --> 00:42:52,100 if you on between Iran and West succeeded in developing some form of export of the Islamic revolution of the Islamic Republic's ideology, 384 00:42:52,100 --> 00:42:57,800 rather beyond the usual confines of these activities, 385 00:42:57,800 --> 00:43:04,280 it looks very difficult for Iran to before the Islamic Republic to be able to replicate this again. 386 00:43:04,280 --> 00:43:08,720 And certainly this hasn't happened during the Rowhani period when we went back 387 00:43:08,720 --> 00:43:15,790 to traditional forms of of attempts at ideological and soft power expansion. 388 00:43:15,790 --> 00:43:18,610 Thank you both very much. Staying in the international sphere, 389 00:43:18,610 --> 00:43:24,160 I have a question from Roger Higginson at the University of Sussex who wants to know within the context of 390 00:43:24,160 --> 00:43:32,440 sanctions against Iran and the desire in at least parts of the US political establishment for regime change. 391 00:43:32,440 --> 00:43:37,990 Do the speakers have views on regime stability in Iran? 392 00:43:37,990 --> 00:43:44,650 So would you like to begin with that one? Well, this goes back a bit to what I was saying in my main remarks. 393 00:43:44,650 --> 00:43:50,770 I think that the relationship between state and society is changing rather dramatically in recent years. 394 00:43:50,770 --> 00:44:00,340 Since 2009, we've we've had this ongoing on and off at times wild card at times organise the times more or less participated. 395 00:44:00,340 --> 00:44:07,000 But there is increasing difficulty by the state to find candidates who can go into regime figures, 396 00:44:07,000 --> 00:44:16,570 who can really cater to to these restless to these rather dissenting strata of society beyond the loyalist strata. 397 00:44:16,570 --> 00:44:24,430 You can go and have a look at the various evolution of the various protest 2017, 2018 last year, all the way back to 2009. 398 00:44:24,430 --> 00:44:29,020 And I think this tells you that in the last 10 years, the stability of the regime has changed. 399 00:44:29,020 --> 00:44:34,990 My view of the political system has changed and is quite different with regards to what it was previously. 400 00:44:34,990 --> 00:44:38,770 And of course, again, if you look at the parliamentary elections this year. 401 00:44:38,770 --> 00:44:46,330 Another form of non-violence sort of expression of dissatisfaction within the society at large is voter participation. 402 00:44:46,330 --> 00:44:49,690 This was the lowest voter participation, parliamentary elections. 403 00:44:49,690 --> 00:44:57,790 So if you look at state stability from this point of view, resume stability, I think things have waned in recent years. 404 00:44:57,790 --> 00:45:01,120 However, if you look at it from the barbarian point of view, 405 00:45:01,120 --> 00:45:06,700 the monopoly over the means of violence, and here Marie-Anne can discuss the IRGC position. 406 00:45:06,700 --> 00:45:15,250 I think there is still a commitment to ensure that this monopoly remains where it has been over the past few decades, 407 00:45:15,250 --> 00:45:19,690 namely in the hands of the state and the hands of the IRGC in the hands of the security forces. 408 00:45:19,690 --> 00:45:24,850 So there is also the state's continued ability to securitise, if needed, 409 00:45:24,850 --> 00:45:30,100 to chop off the Internet if needed, and then and then go back to the status quo. 410 00:45:30,100 --> 00:45:37,270 So until there is this sort of ability by the state to be to to engage in this limited, I would add, elasticity. 411 00:45:37,270 --> 00:45:45,230 We can talk about instability. But but it needs to be seen to what extent this instability becomes a danger. 412 00:45:45,230 --> 00:45:51,780 Marion. Any points drug? Yeah, I will just add quickly that I just brought it up. 413 00:45:51,780 --> 00:45:59,460 One aspect of regime stability is its repression potential and that repression potential does exist as well. 414 00:45:59,460 --> 00:46:02,670 As we're speaking. It has not waned. 415 00:46:02,670 --> 00:46:10,320 If you look at recent words like Ned Nagus budget book, Iran refrained on the generational gap actually, or the generational shift. 416 00:46:10,320 --> 00:46:13,020 That's what she was talking about. 417 00:46:13,020 --> 00:46:24,360 Even the new generation is even more prone to take on radical Islam, because to go back to my own work, the attraction of direct action comes through. 418 00:46:24,360 --> 00:46:33,330 When you're engaging in such activity for their rational needs, when they become more reasonable, they actually go elsewhere. 419 00:46:33,330 --> 00:46:42,450 The new generation of messages and the guards day, they detach themselves from the ideological commitment. 420 00:46:42,450 --> 00:46:53,640 So, yeah, I just wanted to add that there still is appeal amongst the younger generation volunteers or paid personnel to engage in acts of repression. 421 00:46:53,640 --> 00:46:58,740 And we still need to deal with that in the years to come, I believe. 422 00:46:58,740 --> 00:47:05,430 Thank you very much. I have a question from Frank Domani who wants to bring China into our international perspective, 423 00:47:05,430 --> 00:47:09,570 seeing you're gone as a major terminus on the New Silk Road. 424 00:47:09,570 --> 00:47:14,100 How does a revolutionary ethos operate in parallel with China's more stable, 425 00:47:14,100 --> 00:47:18,120 commercially focussed approach in the Middle East and Levant in particular? 426 00:47:18,120 --> 00:47:23,790 So if you have any reflections on China and Iran and the Silk Road, one bridge. 427 00:47:23,790 --> 00:47:29,060 One road. I can only say they won't go very well. 428 00:47:29,060 --> 00:47:35,120 Like, the Iran will not fare well if they they stick to their rebel revolutionary ideas. 429 00:47:35,120 --> 00:47:49,070 But Iran has also shown that they are seeking pragmatic roots when it comes to a few trusted allies or or like its last resort allies like China. 430 00:47:49,070 --> 00:47:53,780 And again, they might still activate the informality of the organisations, 431 00:47:53,780 --> 00:48:00,410 especially with the sanctions, pressuring them to find more ways to do business. 432 00:48:00,410 --> 00:48:11,510 But I don't think they will be emphasising or they have been relying on a radical revolutionary ethos when it comes down to business. 433 00:48:11,510 --> 00:48:16,730 Silverbush, anything to add to China, Iran relations? No, I defer to Mariyam and others. 434 00:48:16,730 --> 00:48:23,590 I'm not truly an expert on the fields. Well, I think one very brief final question. 435 00:48:23,590 --> 00:48:27,250 We have a question from Ed Pulse. 436 00:48:27,250 --> 00:48:32,420 Who? Again, question revolutionary or authoritarian? 437 00:48:32,420 --> 00:48:41,380 To what extent does the state apparatus of the Islamic Republic bear comparison to the Pahlavi monarchy, monarchies or authoritarian? 438 00:48:41,380 --> 00:48:44,510 In that case, does it do anything to the Assad regime? 439 00:48:44,510 --> 00:48:54,380 Is there any sense of a kind of evolution of the Islamic Republic in two ways that would bearer's resemblance to what had come before? 440 00:48:54,380 --> 00:49:00,640 Kind of go ahead. Thank you, Ed, and good to read your question, I think. 441 00:49:00,640 --> 00:49:07,680 Yeah, well, that's the question, right. To what extent was the revolution really a complete change in Iranian statecraft 442 00:49:07,680 --> 00:49:11,590 and the traditions of the Iranian state and the architecture of the Iranian state? 443 00:49:11,590 --> 00:49:17,410 Well, certain things have definitely changed. You know, we have actors such as the IRGC. 444 00:49:17,410 --> 00:49:21,190 We have this sort of presidential elections every four years, 445 00:49:21,190 --> 00:49:30,190 which are always some some sort of they always create some form of of dynamism and some form of motion within the Iranian political system. 446 00:49:30,190 --> 00:49:38,710 But at the same time, political parties were or at least state political parties or licenced or legitimate political parties. 447 00:49:38,710 --> 00:49:47,050 And the Pahlavi period were very weak. Factionalism or personalism and personal politics were were far more was far 448 00:49:47,050 --> 00:49:51,280 more powerful as as a form of political organisation and political interaction. 449 00:49:51,280 --> 00:49:55,510 This, to some extent, has been carried over, you could argue, an Islamic republic period. 450 00:49:55,510 --> 00:50:04,750 But most importantly, if you look at the helm of the state, we still have one institution on top which is endowed constitutionally actually 451 00:50:04,750 --> 00:50:10,060 in the Islamic Republic case and informally in the A&M in the MASHU to era, 452 00:50:10,060 --> 00:50:17,440 with a lot of power and authority and and defines really the power and authority of the rest of the state system. 453 00:50:17,440 --> 00:50:22,860 They are called very differently. But the function. There are commonalities in the function. 454 00:50:22,860 --> 00:50:29,140 I don't want to say that the supreme leader is a Shah or that the Shah is a is a is a value faggy, 455 00:50:29,140 --> 00:50:35,680 but the sort of similarities that we see in terms of the power and authority they wield, 456 00:50:35,680 --> 00:50:42,910 despite the fact that they're dished out in very different ways, should also make you think about the fact that they're are endemic, 457 00:50:42,910 --> 00:50:50,890 some endemic traits of Iranian statecraft, which I don't think have disappeared with the revolution of 1979. 458 00:50:50,890 --> 00:50:57,760 And that brings a continuum of sorts on the quest to build a modern state system which started 459 00:50:57,760 --> 00:51:02,700 in Iran since the constitutional revolution and in fits and starts has just been hurtling, 460 00:51:02,700 --> 00:51:09,750 gone, I think, for a century to the present day. I will just briefly, ditto what Ciobo said. 461 00:51:09,750 --> 00:51:15,430 I guess there are some similarities in that the very fact that authoritarianism exists. 462 00:51:15,430 --> 00:51:25,220 It's continued to exist. But maybe it is the form it has been imposed on the society that has differed because of the outburst of so many. 463 00:51:25,220 --> 00:51:31,610 The bursting of so many parallel institutions that have given people to manoeuvre 464 00:51:31,610 --> 00:51:39,990 around the like arms of authoritarianism or in some cases be more severely caught and. 465 00:51:39,990 --> 00:51:44,540 Eugene, I'm going to take back the microphone now. Our time is up. 466 00:51:44,540 --> 00:51:48,470 Sadly, there are more questions that people would like to put. 467 00:51:48,470 --> 00:51:57,590 I'm afraid we just haven't had time to put all of them. So I'm going to thank Marianne and Silvo Shagan very much for such stimulating 468 00:51:57,590 --> 00:52:01,400 presentations and for answering the questions in such an interesting way. 469 00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:03,680 Thank you all for your questions and for being here. 470 00:52:03,680 --> 00:52:13,970 Please join us next week when Daliah Fatmeh and Dhanush faculty will be talking about a liberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt. 471 00:52:13,970 --> 00:52:17,119 See you next week. Bye bye. Thank you.