1 00:00:07,690 --> 00:00:14,500 Welcome to you all to an Oxford event at the Middle East centre where we're hosting 2 00:00:14,500 --> 00:00:21,040 two wonderful scholars from across the Atlantic on the theme of dictatorship. 3 00:00:21,040 --> 00:00:33,430 Those of you who've been attending regularly will be familiar with the series that we've started this term on the basis of Allah as well in his book, 4 00:00:33,430 --> 00:00:35,800 The Dictatorship Syndrome. 5 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:47,920 And I'd like to welcome at this point our guests from across the Atlantic, Danish Farooqi and Dalia Vernae as welcome to you both. 6 00:00:47,920 --> 00:00:54,400 Just so that everyone can see you, although you have to unmount in order for people to go to see you, I think. 7 00:00:54,400 --> 00:00:59,470 My name is Sam Arseny. I am a department lecturer at Oxford. 8 00:00:59,470 --> 00:01:09,070 I am the department lecturer in contemporary seismic studies. And I it's it gives me great pleasure to welcome Dalia Fahmy and Danish Farooqi 9 00:01:09,070 --> 00:01:13,300 to talk about a liberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt. 10 00:01:13,300 --> 00:01:20,560 This, in a sense, serves as a counterpoint to the perspective presented by Allah as funny a couple of weeks ago, 11 00:01:20,560 --> 00:01:23,170 based on his book, The Dictatorship Syndrome. 12 00:01:23,170 --> 00:01:34,120 Both Danny Fahmy and Danish Farooqi are the authors of an edited volume with a title that is quite similar to the this week's presentation. 13 00:01:34,120 --> 00:01:40,560 The title is Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism A Liberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy. 14 00:01:40,560 --> 00:01:47,980 And in a sense, these two scholars have pointed out certain challenges that liberalism faces in Egypt in particular, 15 00:01:47,980 --> 00:01:55,750 that renders it a an illiberal form of liberalism. So I want to briefly introduce our two speakers and then I'll quickly hand over to them. 16 00:01:55,750 --> 00:02:00,930 They'll have a short period of about 10 minutes to give a presentation. 17 00:02:00,930 --> 00:02:06,910 And I think they'll take a slightly different tack on their presentations, as we will see shortly. 18 00:02:06,910 --> 00:02:12,310 And we welcome participants to ask questions immediately. 19 00:02:12,310 --> 00:02:16,930 We will pick up on the question is, you know, potentially midstream. 20 00:02:16,930 --> 00:02:26,170 For that, we have our colleague, Professor Walter Armbrust, who will be sort of waiting in the wings to read to us the questions that are 21 00:02:26,170 --> 00:02:31,990 coming in that can then be addressed by Professor Dalia Fatemi and Danish Farooqi. 22 00:02:31,990 --> 00:02:42,520 So let me very briefly introduce them both. And because we have sort of just one hour and we want to make this sort of short and sweet. 23 00:02:42,520 --> 00:02:47,980 I'm going to give brief introductions, both of these scholars, a very accomplished. 24 00:02:47,980 --> 00:02:50,260 And I could go on for a while. 25 00:02:50,260 --> 00:02:57,370 But Danny Fahmy is associate professor of political science at Long Island University, where she teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, 26 00:02:57,370 --> 00:03:05,230 world politics, international relations, military and defence policy, and much else besides, much of it focussed on the Middle East. 27 00:03:05,230 --> 00:03:10,720 And she is a senior fellow also at the Centre for Global Policy in Washington, DC. 28 00:03:10,720 --> 00:03:16,480 As I've mentioned already, she is the co-editor of a volume entitled Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism. 29 00:03:16,480 --> 00:03:21,190 And the other co-editor is with us, Danish Farooqi. 30 00:03:21,190 --> 00:03:25,410 Dalia has written a number of books and other edited volumes. 31 00:03:25,410 --> 00:03:29,260 She's sort of helped compile a number of academic journal articles. 32 00:03:29,260 --> 00:03:34,060 But of course, both of these scholars are quite well known to the media circuit. 33 00:03:34,060 --> 00:03:41,860 They very often contribute to media outlets, whether in the form of interviews or in the form of op ed pieces. 34 00:03:41,860 --> 00:03:47,260 Danish Farooqi, for his part, is currently a visiting scholar at the Centre for the Study of Genocide and Human 35 00:03:47,260 --> 00:03:54,000 Rights at Rutgers University and a doctoral candidate in history at Duke University. 36 00:03:54,000 --> 00:04:00,130 A scholar of the Middle East and Islamic history with a particular emphasis on Islamic political thought. 37 00:04:00,130 --> 00:04:05,740 He has spent several years in the Middle East as a researcher and a journalist, and as noted, 38 00:04:05,740 --> 00:04:15,520 he is also the co-editor of the work whose title informs our own title for today, namely illiberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt. 39 00:04:15,520 --> 00:04:25,270 Without further ado, I'd like to hand over to our speakers and I'd like to remind everyone that they are free to ask as many questions as they like. 40 00:04:25,270 --> 00:04:33,550 Beginning immediately and Walter Armbrust will kindly curate them and pass them on to the speakers once they're finished. 41 00:04:33,550 --> 00:04:38,700 So I think, Dalia, you are up first. If you'd like to go, please. 42 00:04:38,700 --> 00:04:42,650 Well, thank you so much and good evening to all of you out. 43 00:04:42,650 --> 00:04:43,590 Across the pond. 44 00:04:43,590 --> 00:04:50,310 And good afternoon to those here in the States and thank you to the Oxford Middle East centre for hosting us in this important moment, 45 00:04:50,310 --> 00:04:56,430 resee dictatorship and authoritarianism or authoritarian tendencies on the rise 46 00:04:56,430 --> 00:05:01,890 throughout the world and for including us in this theme framed by Dr. Aslan, 47 00:05:01,890 --> 00:05:05,910 his latest book, The Dictatorship Syndrome. And of course, thank you, Dr. Asmi. 48 00:05:05,910 --> 00:05:15,210 Or moderating the session. So the events that led up to the January 25th revolution and its power as a transformative moment in 49 00:05:15,210 --> 00:05:21,150 North Africa and move on demonstrated the strength that the strength of people from all walks of life, 50 00:05:21,150 --> 00:05:24,210 Muslim and Coptic, liberal and conservative, 51 00:05:24,210 --> 00:05:31,650 secular and Islamist, poor and wealthy, educated and illiterate, coming together calling for freedom, dignity, 52 00:05:31,650 --> 00:05:40,680 good governance and democracy present in this transformative moment where both the masses and the intellectual, the popular elite. 53 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:52,500 But as the uncertainty of post revolution took place, this decidedly non-democratic forces began to further consolidate power. 54 00:05:52,500 --> 00:06:00,900 And the elites or the intelligentsia, those that hold the most power independent of the state apparatus, grew increasingly silent. 55 00:06:00,900 --> 00:06:03,870 This group's silence and by extension, 56 00:06:03,870 --> 00:06:12,900 their complicity with what became a repressive military regime runs counter to what we know and democratic transition theory. 57 00:06:12,900 --> 00:06:17,280 Which begs the question of why was the elite silent? 58 00:06:17,280 --> 00:06:22,950 What caused them to turn on the population? They stood alongside Biden in Times Square. 59 00:06:22,950 --> 00:06:29,010 Now, this notion of complicity I want to focus on because Dr. US wante also focuses on it. 60 00:06:29,010 --> 00:06:38,250 And I want to beg the question of who's complicit here. So the impetus for us to put this book together came full circle after the aftermath 61 00:06:38,250 --> 00:06:45,120 of the horrific massacre of protesters in Rabaa and not the squares in 2013, 62 00:06:45,120 --> 00:06:54,990 which gave rise to a narrative of a Byford committed Egyptian society in which undesirables could be or needed to be outright eliminated 63 00:06:54,990 --> 00:07:05,130 to cleanse Egyptian society leading to a Human Rights Watch has called the largest single day massacre of protesters in modern history. 64 00:07:05,130 --> 00:07:09,720 Now the role of the intelligentsia in their silence and in some regards, 65 00:07:09,720 --> 00:07:17,220 promoting this exclusionary narrative remains the key motivating factor for us behind this project. 66 00:07:17,220 --> 00:07:22,110 Their complicity all gave rise to anti-democratic values, 67 00:07:22,110 --> 00:07:33,540 undermining the democratic process they purport it to uphold and the dismantling of the very civil society which years of their work was based. 68 00:07:33,540 --> 00:07:40,590 Well, Dennis is going to focus on the ideological foundation, but particularly individuals, on particular individuals. 69 00:07:40,590 --> 00:07:50,610 I'm going to focus on the few institutional structural dimensions owing that philosophical foundations do give rise to these institutions. 70 00:07:50,610 --> 00:07:56,040 Now, the book, because it's a it's a it's an edited volume, does go into the role of NGOs, 71 00:07:56,040 --> 00:08:01,350 student movements, civil society, the media, education and other aspects. 72 00:08:01,350 --> 00:08:11,430 But I'm going to focus on the parliament and perhaps in the Q&A, we can briefly talk about other institutions such as media and the judiciary. 73 00:08:11,430 --> 00:08:18,060 Now, these are institutions that are meant to safeguard democracy and foster a liberal society and liberalism, 74 00:08:18,060 --> 00:08:25,140 begging the question of do illiberal institutions foster a liberal society or vice versa? 75 00:08:25,140 --> 00:08:29,460 And what is the connexion now? Dr. Swannee does touch on this. 76 00:08:29,460 --> 00:08:38,850 I'll be coming at it in a very different way. Placing the onus of complicity on the population or people. 77 00:08:38,850 --> 00:08:46,230 And I'm going to focus on an alternative causal frame, which I will discuss later. 78 00:08:46,230 --> 00:08:52,950 So in looking at robust and strong political parties as being key tools for ensuring 79 00:08:52,950 --> 00:08:58,380 state political development and granting a structure to political participation, 80 00:08:58,380 --> 00:09:08,430 its organisation, its expansion. Political parties are meant to help ensure the overall stability of a liberal democratic process. 81 00:09:08,430 --> 00:09:17,220 Regrettably, however, this is not the case in Egypt, where weak institutions have considerably hampered democratic consolidation. 82 00:09:17,220 --> 00:09:20,520 In particular, the Egyptian Legislative Assembly. 83 00:09:20,520 --> 00:09:28,380 That is the bulk of my work as the site of cultivation of laws regulating political party formation have 84 00:09:28,380 --> 00:09:35,640 proven complicit in outright and feeling Egyptian political institutions rather than involving them, 85 00:09:35,640 --> 00:09:44,150 rather than being an outlet for civilian. Joyce's political parties in Egypt remain instead deeply circumscribed and ultimately ineffectual. 86 00:09:44,150 --> 00:09:51,320 Put another way, despite the key role of a multi-party system in the preservation of a liberal democratic political order, 87 00:09:51,320 --> 00:10:00,680 the dysfunctional nature of party politics in Egypt has instead promoted an illiberal political order in stride and perpetuated it. 88 00:10:00,680 --> 00:10:02,570 At the systemic level, 89 00:10:02,570 --> 00:10:12,620 the structural illiberalism in Egyptian politics elucidates how the failure of political mobilisation in Egypt to make significant gains 90 00:10:12,620 --> 00:10:21,140 in largely grounded in the systemic failure of party politics as a mouthpiece for the political aspiration of the Egyptian masses. 91 00:10:21,140 --> 00:10:27,320 And unfortunately, not only does this continue today. It is worse than it was pre revolution. 92 00:10:27,320 --> 00:10:35,750 Now, throughout modern history, Egypt has proven largely incapable of providing a meaningful outlet for political opposition. 93 00:10:35,750 --> 00:10:45,350 Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952 and the free officers movement, the Egyptian state has ushered a secular as as a secular republic. 94 00:10:45,350 --> 00:10:51,200 If the demands on a Republican government to wrest power in the government and through elected representatives, 95 00:10:51,200 --> 00:10:55,250 the Egyptian republic from its inception gave rise to a series of structural 96 00:10:55,250 --> 00:11:02,110 conditions that both undermine and suck circumscribe political contestation. 97 00:11:02,110 --> 00:11:08,920 The first deficit of democracy or a democratic consolidation in Egypt speaks to an equally pressing phenomenon. 98 00:11:08,920 --> 00:11:18,580 Democratic decay, hard won stability can be put in jeopardy by rapid social change, institutional rigidity and organisational complicity. 99 00:11:18,580 --> 00:11:24,760 And when considering the owners constraints under which the opposition parties in Egypt operate, 100 00:11:24,760 --> 00:11:33,520 working against the backdrop of the pendulum swing of democratic consolidation through formerly a wholly superficial elections and institutions, 101 00:11:33,520 --> 00:11:37,900 that potential for democratic decay becomes very much apparent. 102 00:11:37,900 --> 00:11:45,910 For these political institutions do not perform the same functions in an authoritarian context as they would under a democracy. 103 00:11:45,910 --> 00:11:55,030 The primary aim of political institutions under authoritarian regimes is to ensure the state society relations can be controlled, 104 00:11:55,030 --> 00:12:04,540 where demands can be revealed without appearing as acts of resistance, where issues can be hammered out without undue public scrutiny. 105 00:12:04,540 --> 00:12:12,850 And while resulting agreements can be addressed, a legitimate, legitimate form publicised by such accordingly. 106 00:12:12,850 --> 00:12:22,780 The function of such institutions under authoritarian regimes is not the cheque on authority of the executive, but rather to control society at large. 107 00:12:22,780 --> 00:12:29,920 By circumscribing formal avenues of participation now post revolution, 108 00:12:29,920 --> 00:12:38,320 there is this question of what is political pluralism and cannot function in Egypt now after the January 25th revolution. 109 00:12:38,320 --> 00:12:45,040 Within a few days, we saw the flourishing of the beginning of political parties. 110 00:12:45,040 --> 00:12:50,440 And it begs the question, why was this impossible under Mubarak and what has happened today? 111 00:12:50,440 --> 00:13:00,520 So under the Mubarak regime, we saw that there was a law that prevented political party formation because of redundancy. 112 00:13:00,520 --> 00:13:08,120 And so by design, political party formation leading to contestation and politics was by design eliminated. 113 00:13:08,120 --> 00:13:11,740 And this begs the question, and we can talk about it more in the Q&A. Why? 114 00:13:11,740 --> 00:13:19,360 When we think about opposition in Egypt or opposition parties in the Middle East, persay, are they Islamist in nature? 115 00:13:19,360 --> 00:13:30,400 Post revolution, when the law was changed, we saw a flourishing of political parties within the first few days of the change of the law. 116 00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:35,170 The first party to be registered was was the centre party. The loss of party. 117 00:13:35,170 --> 00:13:40,450 Another newly formed Egyptian Democratic Social Party by founded by Dr. Aamer Hamza, 118 00:13:40,450 --> 00:13:46,260 who is a contributor to our volume, who is an academic here in the States today. 119 00:13:46,260 --> 00:13:51,880 Tom Foreman, formerly with the Carnegie Foundation or the Carnegie Centre, 120 00:13:51,880 --> 00:13:56,740 forming a party comprised of hundreds of professionals and university professors. 121 00:13:56,740 --> 00:14:01,300 A few days later, the secular West Party hosted a symposium for all Egyptian secular parties, 122 00:14:01,300 --> 00:14:06,820 both old and new, to join the established the new established order. 123 00:14:06,820 --> 00:14:12,430 Very few days after that, 73 members of Egypt's oldest leftist party, Atigun Ma, 124 00:14:12,430 --> 00:14:17,920 walked out of party headquarters over contestation of what is their new party going to look like, 125 00:14:17,920 --> 00:14:21,190 ultimately leading to deeper discussions on party formation. 126 00:14:21,190 --> 00:14:28,180 But it wasn't just that moment of pluralism that existed within the Islamist network or the Islamist frame. 127 00:14:28,180 --> 00:14:36,550 We saw a flourishing of political parties where the Muslim Brotherhood no longer, for example, had a monopoly on religion and politics. 128 00:14:36,550 --> 00:14:41,350 The centre party was formed to other parties were formed. 129 00:14:41,350 --> 00:14:45,710 And for the sake of time, I won't go into detail. 130 00:14:45,710 --> 00:14:57,190 But what I want to focus on is that here we saw the flourishing of political party formations almost instantly after the revolution with 131 00:14:57,190 --> 00:15:05,560 political platform is being established with beginnings of contestation of the coming parliamentary election right after the revolution. 132 00:15:05,560 --> 00:15:16,390 And it begs the question of Dr. Aslan, his assumption of not just who is complicit, but who was pacifying this new order. 133 00:15:16,390 --> 00:15:25,210 And so what happened? And for the sake of time, I'm skipping over and possibly in the Q&A we can talk about what happened under SCAF, 134 00:15:25,210 --> 00:15:27,670 what happened during the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, 135 00:15:27,670 --> 00:15:36,850 the Muslim Brotherhood, or President Morsi's time in office and then the fall and how today we have a deeply entrenched military dictatorship, 136 00:15:36,850 --> 00:15:46,000 but in diagnosing the syndrome. Dr. Oz, when he talks about a set of symptoms that seem to appear together and how it happened, 137 00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:51,070 how they happened, and possibly now that we know what the symptoms are, we can offer a cure. 138 00:15:51,070 --> 00:15:57,730 Assuming that and the assumption is that the dictator, as an individual who controls society, 139 00:15:57,730 --> 00:16:07,240 is not just himself controlling society, but is controlling a complicit population that almost calls for this control. 140 00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:13,030 And so society are both victims and facilitators of dictatorship. 141 00:16:13,030 --> 00:16:14,680 And he captured this interestingly, 142 00:16:14,680 --> 00:16:25,750 in this story at the outset of the text of the narrative between him and his father as their standing in the wake of President Nasser's death. 143 00:16:25,750 --> 00:16:32,530 And he sees that the people are not accepting of the death. They're not accepting of the loss of the big man. 144 00:16:32,530 --> 00:16:36,610 Now, we know that this idea of the big man permeates throughout Dr. US. 145 00:16:36,610 --> 00:16:41,740 One is other works in The Yacoubian Building. There is a big man in the background. 146 00:16:41,740 --> 00:16:44,620 In Chicago, there is a big man, 147 00:16:44,620 --> 00:16:57,100 but it denies people the idea that maybe they're mourning the defeat of Pan Arabism or the humiliation of the 1967 defeat or the coming 148 00:16:57,100 --> 00:17:08,620 uncertainty or the lack of clear path or a constitution that has not enshrined democratic institutions and the representation on the larger scale. 149 00:17:08,620 --> 00:17:14,120 There's a saying in Egypt, and I'll say colloquially, the man who she could be that you should be. 150 00:17:14,120 --> 00:17:19,780 If you don't have a big man, you purchase a big man because you need a big man. 151 00:17:19,780 --> 00:17:26,380 And this is the kind of undercurrent of the theme in several of his works, but also here. 152 00:17:26,380 --> 00:17:35,530 And so the question remains, can we look at a complicit population as both facilitators and victims of the syndrome? 153 00:17:35,530 --> 00:17:40,990 Are there institutional factors that enshrine and ensure this? 154 00:17:40,990 --> 00:17:47,830 For example, institutions that I've mentioned briefly, why are oppositions always framed in Islamist terms? 155 00:17:47,830 --> 00:17:52,120 Are there institutional reasons? And the reason why a challenge is framings, 156 00:17:52,120 --> 00:17:58,390 because asking the right questions or the wrong questions may lead us down the road of constructing 157 00:17:58,390 --> 00:18:04,720 solutions that might seemingly be addressing what are symptoms or indicators of the syndrome. 158 00:18:04,720 --> 00:18:14,350 He he's he's alluding to of dictatorship, but not of the disease of oppression and the lack of democracy. 159 00:18:14,350 --> 00:18:17,620 So I'll I'll stop here because I've reached my time limit. 160 00:18:17,620 --> 00:18:23,690 But hopefully this is the beginning of a conversation that we can have a healthy discussion and then the Q&A. 161 00:18:23,690 --> 00:18:30,360 So thank you so much. Thank you so much. Dunia, that was, you know, giving you a very short period of time. 162 00:18:30,360 --> 00:18:36,400 But that was a wonderful and insightful insight, insightful look into the institutional challenge, 163 00:18:36,400 --> 00:18:46,180 the challenges on the historical challenges and in some respects, the sort of the cultural norms that had been instigated by certain historic. 164 00:18:46,180 --> 00:18:58,900 Phenomena in a place like Egypt that allow for, in a sense, the festering of this dictatorial system where political institutions, 165 00:18:58,900 --> 00:19:05,260 rather than being cheque some power and serving that power and being cheques on the populace. 166 00:19:05,260 --> 00:19:07,820 Cheques on the popular women and the rest of it. 167 00:19:07,820 --> 00:19:18,070 So know, thank you for, in a sense, that analytical insight into that in some respects as one these ideas, 168 00:19:18,070 --> 00:19:23,050 but also some of the problems that potentially ought to be found. 169 00:19:23,050 --> 00:19:31,660 And in a sense, I think Dennis Firkins recently in the past year or so, recent piece in foreign policy, 170 00:19:31,660 --> 00:19:45,010 looking quite incisively or presenting something of a trenchant critique and critique of Sweeney's work with respect to contemporary Egypt. 171 00:19:45,010 --> 00:19:50,760 And I think I expect that we'll get a taste of that in what follows. 172 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:55,030 And thank you for sort of starting to ask questions already. 173 00:19:55,030 --> 00:20:00,190 People are already asking questions. Please note, you do have the option of anonymizing your question. 174 00:20:00,190 --> 00:20:07,450 And so if you don't wish your name to be mentioned in the course of mentioning the question, please anonymize yourself. 175 00:20:07,450 --> 00:20:11,890 Other ones will assume that it's okay to mention your name. But without further ado. 176 00:20:11,890 --> 00:20:15,880 Please don't shoot me. The floor is yours. OK. Thank you very much. 177 00:20:15,880 --> 00:20:23,170 First, thanks for the Oxford Middle East centre. Two professors, Verhagen and Aissami and Armbrust for extending this invitation. 178 00:20:23,170 --> 00:20:30,130 And briefly, a special thanks to my collaborative partner, Professor Fathoming even several years after our book's completion. 179 00:20:30,130 --> 00:20:35,560 Working hand-in-hand with you on this project remains one of the biggest honours of my professional journey to date. 180 00:20:35,560 --> 00:20:38,920 So thank you very much. With that, I proceed. 181 00:20:38,920 --> 00:20:45,280 So I suppose my own reading of the dictatorship syndrome was already signposted for lack of a better term, 182 00:20:45,280 --> 00:20:47,530 not only because of the themes of our book more broadly, 183 00:20:47,530 --> 00:20:56,310 but Asama, as you mention, but because of my own writing since then, drawing on our book's critique to more directly address Dr. 184 00:20:56,310 --> 00:21:03,070 Swan, his political writings so that the doctor has already been my interlocutor on several occasions. 185 00:21:03,070 --> 00:21:05,740 Having said that, for the purposes of this presentation, 186 00:21:05,740 --> 00:21:15,310 I thought it best to rely as much as possible on the thematic agenda of the book under consideration and only augment when necessary. 187 00:21:15,310 --> 00:21:19,660 To that end, I want to focus on what I considered the three most edifying chapters. 188 00:21:19,660 --> 00:21:26,410 Book would seem to have the most global resonance in the phenomenon of dictatorship more broadly. 189 00:21:26,410 --> 00:21:33,340 First, the chapter concerning conspiracy theory. As Dr Aswini puts it, quote, Without exception, 190 00:21:33,340 --> 00:21:41,890 every dictator who has seised power in the modern era has ridden the crest of a conspiracy theory and quote as a basis both for 191 00:21:41,890 --> 00:21:50,350 subverting a dictator's accountability for his misdeeds or crimes and as a basis for outright circumventing democratic institutions. 192 00:21:50,350 --> 00:21:57,910 Conspiratorial thinking gives the atmosphere necessary to discard the rule of law, even if temporarily. 193 00:21:57,910 --> 00:22:04,330 Indeed, Dr. Aswang, his writings here almost portend the rise of anti science conspiracy theories about 194 00:22:04,330 --> 00:22:10,180 the covert Bentek pandemic being propagated by Donald Trump and his supporters. 195 00:22:10,180 --> 00:22:14,830 The atmosphere of misinformation is especially germane to allowing the US president 196 00:22:14,830 --> 00:22:19,570 to escape accountability for his mismanagement of the public health debacle. 197 00:22:19,570 --> 00:22:21,190 Similarly, from Hosseiny, 198 00:22:21,190 --> 00:22:28,390 Mubarak dismissing the entire protest movement as part of an international conspiracy to take down Egypt to his administration, 199 00:22:28,390 --> 00:22:33,850 suggesting the same of the 2011 protests that ultimately took down his administration. 200 00:22:33,850 --> 00:22:40,390 It's clear the conspiracy has been the bedrock of preserving Egypt's authoritarian atmosphere. 201 00:22:40,390 --> 00:22:46,090 Now the next chapter under consideration concerns the spread of the fascist mindset. 202 00:22:46,090 --> 00:22:50,200 Dovetailing with his insights on conspiracy theory here, 203 00:22:50,200 --> 00:22:55,540 A speaks at length about the role of media in furthering the ambitions of the 204 00:22:55,540 --> 00:23:01,720 dictatorship syndrome by forcibly branding the regime's critics as traitors to the state. 205 00:23:01,720 --> 00:23:10,470 Relying on the example of the Nasser error, Egyptian liberal journalists sent those whom our book actually addresses at some length. 206 00:23:10,470 --> 00:23:15,760 A Swannee aptly offers the cautionary tale that even otherwise respected journalistic 207 00:23:15,760 --> 00:23:22,060 figures can easily be tamed by authoritarian leadership and ultimately produced propaganda. 208 00:23:22,060 --> 00:23:31,540 In its service further, a co-opted media can and does serve as precisely the vehicle to disseminate conspiracy theories, 209 00:23:31,540 --> 00:23:40,870 thus offering a broader atmosphere of disinformation in which the dictator himself becomes the sole and ultimate arbiter of truth. 210 00:23:40,870 --> 00:23:45,780 These dual phenomena thus feature prominently in dictatorial regimes more broadly. 211 00:23:45,780 --> 00:23:51,870 And putting this broader campaign of disinformation to greater scrutiny is the necessary prerequisite. 212 00:23:51,870 --> 00:23:57,290 A swannee ends his book suggesting to prevent the dictatorship's syndrome more broadly, 213 00:23:57,290 --> 00:24:06,030 that this is all admirable and offers lessons well beyond the Egyptian case and get a more careful reading of a swamis writings more broadly, 214 00:24:06,030 --> 00:24:10,860 particularly as they pertain to the putative threat of political Islam. 215 00:24:10,860 --> 00:24:15,750 Regrettably, reveal a series of double standards that render it exceedingly difficult to read. 216 00:24:15,750 --> 00:24:24,300 The thesis of this book is altogether consistent. We see the seeds for his blind spots in his chapter on dictatorship and terrorism. 217 00:24:24,300 --> 00:24:33,960 A chapter that at face value seems somewhat misplaced with the rest of the book drawing a parallel between religious conviction and dictatorship. 218 00:24:33,960 --> 00:24:39,960 A Swannee claims both are united by an exclusive appeal to emotion rather than intellect. 219 00:24:39,960 --> 00:24:45,990 And on that basis, both presuppose a singular monopoly on the truth. 220 00:24:45,990 --> 00:24:53,460 From there, he attempts to offer a distinction between the politically neutral Muslim and the more insidious Islamist, 221 00:24:53,460 --> 00:24:57,750 the latter of whom is the bedfellow of dictatorship par excellence. 222 00:24:57,750 --> 00:25:05,490 Yet as he weaves his parallel aslant, he relies on defensive posturing not only of Islamists but of Islamic history more broadly. 223 00:25:05,490 --> 00:25:11,640 That is so caricatured and alarmist that it almost becomes a lost on his reader that the author 224 00:25:11,640 --> 00:25:18,660 only pages earlier cautioned excessively against the wilful adoption of conspiratorial thinking, 225 00:25:18,660 --> 00:25:23,850 chastising Islamists for indoctrinating their followers with the falsified version of history. 226 00:25:23,850 --> 00:25:29,430 Asani moves on to dismiss the totality of Muslim rulers throughout history as having been, 227 00:25:29,430 --> 00:25:35,160 quote, simply tyrants who Papeete perpetrated injustice plundered and killed. 228 00:25:35,160 --> 00:25:41,860 End quote. Relying on incidents from the lab at bested and Ottoman empires to make his case. 229 00:25:41,860 --> 00:25:45,870 To be clear, there is no historian of those empires worth their salt. 230 00:25:45,870 --> 00:25:52,730 Who would question the blood spilt by those empires or by Islamic civilisation more broadly? 231 00:25:52,730 --> 00:25:57,030 Noris sexual licentiousness under the ambassador, for instance. 232 00:25:57,030 --> 00:26:02,940 Much of a secret at this point. Yet Aswini offers these this alarmist reading of Islamic history, 233 00:26:02,940 --> 00:26:12,390 in effect to draw stark juxtaposition between political Islamists on the one hand and fascist dictatorship on the other hand. 234 00:26:12,390 --> 00:26:17,310 And in this context, a swamis broader writings about Islamists can be better understood as part of 235 00:26:17,310 --> 00:26:21,600 an established pattern in which his paranoia about the threat of political 236 00:26:21,600 --> 00:26:30,630 Islam makes him more than comfortable suspending his own judgement about the dictatorship syndrome and the tools it employs to further its agenda. 237 00:26:30,630 --> 00:26:36,030 Conspiracy theory and media disinformation campaigns is thus no longer appear in Citius, 238 00:26:36,030 --> 00:26:42,600 so long as they are directed against Islamists rather than dictators of a different persuasion. 239 00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:46,860 Indeed, as my colleague Mohammed al Masri argues very convincingly, 240 00:26:46,860 --> 00:26:52,800 the Egyptian media as an institution was quite unhinged in its reliance on conspiracy. 241 00:26:52,800 --> 00:27:00,390 During Mohammed Morsi's presidency, for instance, covering a speech Morsi gave in which he addressed his audience with the salutation. 242 00:27:00,390 --> 00:27:04,260 Yeah. Yeah. Assurity my people, my clan. 243 00:27:04,260 --> 00:27:13,110 Media figures of the highest persuasion in Egypt unanimously moved to accuse the president of using an Islamist dog whistle, 244 00:27:13,110 --> 00:27:19,080 in effect pledging his loyalty not to the people of Egypt, but only to his fellow Muslim brothers. 245 00:27:19,080 --> 00:27:22,350 Despite any sober reading of the rest of that speech, 246 00:27:22,350 --> 00:27:32,130 making painstakingly clear that Morsi was indeed referring to the Egyptian people more broadly and in his capacity as a political journalist. 247 00:27:32,130 --> 00:27:38,160 Dr. Aswani himself has been no stranger to being a purveyor of conspiracy. 248 00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:43,140 Here I'll refer to an article A had written following former President Morsi's mysterious death, 249 00:27:43,140 --> 00:27:51,360 which I also addressed in that article in Foreign Policy, to which I'll leave my colleagues to direct you more specifically. 250 00:27:51,360 --> 00:27:58,890 Granted, a Swannie does acknowledge the Sisi regime's culpability in the plane, medical neglect of an incarcerated inmate, 251 00:27:58,890 --> 00:28:05,670 but then shifts gears to once again rely on hackneyed caricatures of the Brotherhood as a traitorous terrorist outfit, 252 00:28:05,670 --> 00:28:12,750 implying that the blood spilt by the Brotherhood makes its share responsibility in the former president's demise. 253 00:28:12,750 --> 00:28:17,730 In the process, a swannee wholly suspends his hostility to conspiracy, 254 00:28:17,730 --> 00:28:21,960 claiming that Morsi was never a democratically elected president in the first place. 255 00:28:21,960 --> 00:28:27,810 Relying on the dubious charge that all elections previously won by the Brotherhood were 256 00:28:27,810 --> 00:28:33,470 a function of bribing poor voters with either cash or staples like oil and sugar, 257 00:28:33,470 --> 00:28:35,520 a charge of Swannie qualifies. 258 00:28:35,520 --> 00:28:45,460 With no evidence whatsoever as having been proven conclusively unsubstantiated innuendo of this sort then essentially means that Morsi. 259 00:28:45,460 --> 00:28:49,360 The Brotherhood had themselves to blame for the former president's death and 260 00:28:49,360 --> 00:28:54,430 incarceration in the same vein that the existential threat posed by the Brotherhood. 261 00:28:54,430 --> 00:29:05,110 Dr. Swansea's physicians suggest necessitated Morsi's forcible removal by a military coup and the rise of the hitherto unimagined dictatorial regime. 262 00:29:05,110 --> 00:29:11,470 Under Sisi and ultimately rendered the infamous massacre in Rabat actually a square, an unavoidable. 263 00:29:11,470 --> 00:29:12,650 Correct. 264 00:29:12,650 --> 00:29:21,250 To be clear, the purpose of this exercise is not to dismiss critique more broadly of the Brotherhood of political Islam or of Morsi's presidency. 265 00:29:21,250 --> 00:29:26,830 Anyone who has read our book would immediately recognise that we are no less harsh in our critiques of 266 00:29:26,830 --> 00:29:32,800 the Brotherhood than we are of the Egyptian liberal class to which the book is primarily directed. 267 00:29:32,800 --> 00:29:40,570 But in a political moment in which a dictatorship is on the rise globally, believers of freedom, 268 00:29:40,570 --> 00:29:51,540 democracy and the rule of law need every tool imaginable to properly push back against dictatorship and the mechanisms undergirding it. 269 00:29:51,540 --> 00:30:01,870 Dr. Aswani, to that end, has done a great service in outlining some of those mechanism mechanisms and subjecting them to a very worthy critique. 270 00:30:01,870 --> 00:30:09,520 But his own paranoid blindspots about political Islam blind spots that as our book assiduously documents, 271 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:15,490 are endemic to the project of Egyptian secular liberalism more broadly. 272 00:30:15,490 --> 00:30:19,840 Ultimately render his prescriptions of limited staying power. 273 00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:30,820 Standing up to dictatorship requires going beyond endlessly and impoverishing, critiquing its premises only when politically expedient or convenient. 274 00:30:30,820 --> 00:30:38,320 Rather, defeating the dictatorship syndrome requires the intellectual and indeed moral consistency. 275 00:30:38,320 --> 00:30:42,250 I hope the good doctor can take this into consideration moving forward. 276 00:30:42,250 --> 00:30:46,610 And with that, I think my time is up. Lantier. 277 00:30:46,610 --> 00:30:57,770 Thank you very much, Danish, for that very sort of thoughtful and sort of in many respects quite trenchant reflection on a lot less. 278 00:30:57,770 --> 00:31:10,700 One is dictatorship syndrome, I think. I mean, in many respects, the challenge that arises from your presentations, both of you, is is the, 279 00:31:10,700 --> 00:31:20,540 uh and it's articulated in the title of your book as well, a liberal and the title of this presentation, a liberal liberals, in a sense. 280 00:31:20,540 --> 00:31:26,000 What does it mean to be a liberal if you are a liberal at the same time? 281 00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:31,120 And I think this also ties in with the question that Walter will probably put to you from the audience. 282 00:31:31,120 --> 00:31:39,800 And I am sure Walter also may have questions of his own, and I would welcome him to sort of put them to you. 283 00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:47,270 But what does liberalism mean in a context like Egypt, 284 00:31:47,270 --> 00:32:00,110 where in many respects it's it's used to limit the sort of the voice of democratic sort of forces within the society. 285 00:32:00,110 --> 00:32:10,640 But at the same time, it is seen as legitimately doing that on the grounds that ultimately those who are not card-carrying 286 00:32:10,640 --> 00:32:17,930 liberals in these societies pose a threat to wider society and are not truly democratic. 287 00:32:17,930 --> 00:32:22,800 Yet at the same time, these figures sometimes appear to show that. 288 00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:26,910 Their own commitments to democracy have certain limits as well. 289 00:32:26,910 --> 00:32:31,110 And so this is this is a challenging sort of state of affairs in Egypt. 290 00:32:31,110 --> 00:32:37,080 And perhaps with that, if I can take this has prerogative and and begin the Q&A. 291 00:32:37,080 --> 00:32:45,780 I'll put that as a question to the two of you. And, you know, feel free to answer both of you or just one of you. 292 00:32:45,780 --> 00:32:51,380 And then I'm sure there are plenty of questions that Walter is ready to put to you. 293 00:32:51,380 --> 00:32:55,960 So who would like to take this, please, to me? 294 00:32:55,960 --> 00:33:03,560 Well, I'll take a really brief alive strath of how we think about liberalism as, you know, the basic political doctrine. 295 00:33:03,560 --> 00:33:08,150 That's about the protecting and enhancing of the freedom of the individual. 296 00:33:08,150 --> 00:33:16,310 And that is the central problem and role of politics and the role of government in ensuring and 297 00:33:16,310 --> 00:33:24,470 devising a system that gives government the power necessary to protect individual liberty, 298 00:33:24,470 --> 00:33:30,110 but prevents those from governing from abusing power. And so very loosely determined. 299 00:33:30,110 --> 00:33:36,060 That's how we define liberalism. And again, because there's so many contributors who talk about it differently. 300 00:33:36,060 --> 00:33:42,860 You know, the mechanisms of governance, the mechanisms of articulation could be different, referring to different theorists. 301 00:33:42,860 --> 00:33:49,820 However, the cornerstone here is the protecting and enhancing freedom and individual liberty, 302 00:33:49,820 --> 00:33:56,230 both for institutions and looking at the kind of democratic preconditions literature that requires 303 00:33:56,230 --> 00:34:03,020 the liberal intelligentsia to be the safeguard of this transition or the safeguard of this movement. 304 00:34:03,020 --> 00:34:09,440 And so the question for us continues to be their silence, their complicity. 305 00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:18,710 But even in the kind of recalling of the past to look for solutions towards the future, they are not just limited. 306 00:34:18,710 --> 00:34:30,480 They're actually missing the bulk of the levels of structural, political and ideological injustice that facilitate the moment we're in today. 307 00:34:30,480 --> 00:34:34,410 Thank you very much. I'm going to now hand over to Walter, if that's okay. 308 00:34:34,410 --> 00:34:38,400 And feel free to put forth the questions. 309 00:34:38,400 --> 00:34:48,380 OK. I'll start by. Well. I confess, I had had a similar question to the one that Osama has already put in, 310 00:34:48,380 --> 00:34:54,560 which was the very first question that we got, which was what do you mean by liberalism? 311 00:34:54,560 --> 00:35:01,580 But in my case, I'm just wondering why you're talking about a liberal liberalism rather than just talking 312 00:35:01,580 --> 00:35:08,530 about the failure of liberalism or the absence of it or the dysfunctionality of it. 313 00:35:08,530 --> 00:35:17,650 I'll throw that out to you, but I have not. I would like to get to questions that have been put to us by members in the audience. 314 00:35:17,650 --> 00:35:21,520 I'll let you answer. You've already addressed that to some extent. 315 00:35:21,520 --> 00:35:29,230 But let me let me throw out one of the other questions we got from the audience, which is from Danny Rhen. 316 00:35:29,230 --> 00:35:32,950 And the question is specifically addressed to Dalia. 317 00:35:32,950 --> 00:35:39,820 And it is can you speak a bit about the relationship between political parties and civil society groups, 318 00:35:39,820 --> 00:35:45,220 the degree of elite capture of NGOs or activist groups that takes place, 319 00:35:45,220 --> 00:35:56,800 and whether you feel any segment of Egyptian civil society can operate functionally and independently of ties and loyalties to political elites. 320 00:35:56,800 --> 00:36:02,230 So these are two questions, actually, and they're very important. And I'll start with the second one. 321 00:36:02,230 --> 00:36:10,810 And Yeo's have been historically extremely important as the kind of bull works or mechanism through which civil society is not just operating, 322 00:36:10,810 --> 00:36:16,840 but continuing to foster those democratic trends and democratic norms or attempting to. 323 00:36:16,840 --> 00:36:21,460 What we've seen in the past few years is not just an attack on, set on and Gio's, 324 00:36:21,460 --> 00:36:30,610 but the closure of many importance NGOs, the one of the primary cases that a lot of activists have been brought under, 325 00:36:30,610 --> 00:36:36,340 including people in the United States and throughout the academic west, 326 00:36:36,340 --> 00:36:43,930 have been the capture under NGO laws that these were ways with which there was infiltration to defame the government. 327 00:36:43,930 --> 00:36:50,680 But today, if you look at the role of NGOs, they've been extremely limited. 328 00:36:50,680 --> 00:36:55,750 There have been the closure of NGOs and many civil society organisations. 329 00:36:55,750 --> 00:37:03,610 For example, the shut down of the UN, the centre, an NGO that offers support to survivors of torture and violence. 330 00:37:03,610 --> 00:37:10,240 The particular Kozar and attacks on feminist NGOs and those for women's rights. 331 00:37:10,240 --> 00:37:21,010 The criminal investigation of the case one seven three against human rights defenders and NGO is the investigation that continues since 2013. 332 00:37:21,010 --> 00:37:26,650 Anyone who receives funding from those who wish to harm Egyptian national security 333 00:37:26,650 --> 00:37:33,610 under the Article 78 of the penal code carries a 25 year prison sentence. 334 00:37:33,610 --> 00:37:38,560 The freezing of many of the assets of NGOs continues until today. 335 00:37:38,560 --> 00:37:45,490 This bleeds into, I think, the bigger question of the of the terrorism laws that exist in Egypt today. 336 00:37:45,490 --> 00:37:53,320 Terrorism laws that are defined with a very large swath of their definition enacted in 2015, 337 00:37:53,320 --> 00:37:59,080 continuing until today, renewed earlier this year, and actually even more stringent term. 338 00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:04,720 And they're so broadly defined that if you look at any cases of activists today, 339 00:38:04,720 --> 00:38:09,820 any cases against Indio's members of the media, there's always a terrorism charge. 340 00:38:09,820 --> 00:38:17,020 In my latest article that looks at pre-trial detention as a method of suspending activists in 341 00:38:17,020 --> 00:38:22,840 this kind of pre-trial purgatory where you're no longer held for 45 days but up to two years, 342 00:38:22,840 --> 00:38:28,300 renewable tacking on more charges all under the terrorism clause. 343 00:38:28,300 --> 00:38:37,720 Anyone who's seen as speaking outside of the state narrative threatening the state narrative comes under this deep terrorism law. 344 00:38:37,720 --> 00:38:45,340 And so the closure of ndu yos begs the question of why are these institutions that formerly 345 00:38:45,340 --> 00:38:50,740 work outside of the structure of government but have a historically important role to play? 346 00:38:50,740 --> 00:38:55,330 Why have they become seen as a primary threat to which not only their clothes assets seised, 347 00:38:55,330 --> 00:39:01,840 but many of their leaders have been arrested under under the terrorism law? 348 00:39:01,840 --> 00:39:07,600 The first question was about, I think if I recall correctly, political party formation. 349 00:39:07,600 --> 00:39:12,220 And I think it might be referring to what I was hoping someone would ask you about it. 350 00:39:12,220 --> 00:39:17,350 Why is it in Egypt when we think of political opposition? 351 00:39:17,350 --> 00:39:22,240 We think about Islamist parties. We think about primarily the Muslim Brotherhood. 352 00:39:22,240 --> 00:39:28,630 If you look at that law that I was mentioning in my earlier presentation, the law was designed to actually undermine, 353 00:39:28,630 --> 00:39:33,550 undercut and prevent the establishment of secular and leftist parties, 354 00:39:33,550 --> 00:39:41,410 which were important in the 1952 revolution in the writing of the first constitution that's no longer there. 355 00:39:41,410 --> 00:39:50,080 And so secular leftist parties have always been seen as a threat, an underlying threat of the Egyptian regime. 356 00:39:50,080 --> 00:39:55,360 And so the establishment of secular and leftist parties has always been very difficult. 357 00:39:55,360 --> 00:40:02,110 It's difficult to establish and register a party, and the language of the political law was redundancy. 358 00:40:02,110 --> 00:40:06,100 They're all doing the same thing with similar political platforms. 359 00:40:06,100 --> 00:40:14,980 And so it's almost institutionally by design, the elimination of political pluralism within the secular and leftist camp. 360 00:40:14,980 --> 00:40:21,760 And so when you get to the Islamist camp, especially under so that when they were actually allowed to come into the first political opening. 361 00:40:21,760 --> 00:40:27,790 By extension, their political activity over time since the 19th. 362 00:40:27,790 --> 00:40:34,640 Well, historically, but really since the 1970s, flourishing up and in the night in the two thousand in the 1990s, 363 00:40:34,640 --> 00:40:39,910 but really in the 2000s established this as not just a movement, but a political party, 364 00:40:39,910 --> 00:40:42,070 even though they were still running as independents, 365 00:40:42,070 --> 00:40:52,270 but still with a structure and a framework allowed to work within the constraints that Mubarak had for them save the 2005 to 2007 political opening. 366 00:40:52,270 --> 00:40:56,050 And so post revolution. It's natural to think that well. 367 00:40:56,050 --> 00:41:02,680 When the authoritarian big man is gone. Be aware of the new Islamist incursion that's coming on the doorstep. 368 00:41:02,680 --> 00:41:09,610 And so if you recall. The public addresses that were played in Liberation Square or Tahrir Square. 369 00:41:09,610 --> 00:41:18,620 There was this constant from Mubarak. I know only I can protect you from what I know is coming behind us, which is the Muslim Brotherhood. 370 00:41:18,620 --> 00:41:24,910 Right. Again, the big men protecting from the impending threat. Now, this terrorism narrative now is everywhere. 371 00:41:24,910 --> 00:41:30,010 A rise of populism, simple solutions to very big problems. It's just the one people need to eliminate. 372 00:41:30,010 --> 00:41:36,040 We see them here in United States. President Trump just tweeted about the big Muslim threat again last night in 373 00:41:36,040 --> 00:41:41,590 the largest effort to kind of swing votes and in these three primary states. 374 00:41:41,590 --> 00:41:45,490 But but here, it's almost structurally by design, 375 00:41:45,490 --> 00:41:55,330 the elimination of real political pluralism and the relegating that the only viable option is an Islamist option and one version of it. 376 00:41:55,330 --> 00:42:01,600 Creates a public sentiment that political pluralism is maybe not what we need. 377 00:42:01,600 --> 00:42:10,000 And this has become entrenched in post revolution Egypt, especially when political, social and economic conditions have even deteriorated more. 378 00:42:10,000 --> 00:42:16,000 And so the safeguards of the transition to a consolidated democracy, intelligentsia, institutions, 379 00:42:16,000 --> 00:42:24,880 civil society, their erosion is almost by design the guarantee for an entrenched in a long gaited dictatorship. 380 00:42:24,880 --> 00:42:30,340 And unfortunately, today it is worse in Egypt than ever has been historically. 381 00:42:30,340 --> 00:42:40,510 I have a quick follow up to that. About Angelos. And either of you, perhaps both of you could respond to this, which is. 382 00:42:40,510 --> 00:42:48,420 Aren't our NGOs taking up the space that political parties should occupy and unwittingly acting as. 383 00:42:48,420 --> 00:42:56,100 An impediment to the formation of effective political parties that could that could actually function within a liberal sit, 384 00:42:56,100 --> 00:42:58,470 liberal system needs political parties. 385 00:42:58,470 --> 00:43:04,260 And instead, you have everybody who's interested in politics, whether you call them liberals or something else. 386 00:43:04,260 --> 00:43:11,420 Agreeing to the terms of its kind of NGO formation that set by the state. 387 00:43:11,420 --> 00:43:20,020 Maybe. Absolutely. And this the kind of coopting of NGO formation exists not just in Egypt, it exists in the Palestinian territories, 388 00:43:20,020 --> 00:43:25,540 it exists in Jordan, just in the Gulf countries where NGOs are becoming the vehicle for change. 389 00:43:25,540 --> 00:43:31,200 And so the suspicion of NGOs, especially those who accept foreign training, foreign funding, 390 00:43:31,200 --> 00:43:37,800 you know, then colours the entire swath as as non-democratic and not the interests of the state. 391 00:43:37,800 --> 00:43:49,510 But in the case of Egypt, the NGO that continuously attacked the most are the feminist NGO Gio's, those that are trying to uphold women's rights. 392 00:43:49,510 --> 00:43:59,110 And so there is one of my first publications was on the the the interesting marriage between feminists, 393 00:43:59,110 --> 00:44:07,120 NGOs and the Muslim Brotherhood in nineteen ninety nine to push for this is under Mubarak, the two thousand, 394 00:44:07,120 --> 00:44:14,890 the change and two thousand of the personal status laws where for the first time in two in the year 2000 and this the change in the process, 395 00:44:14,890 --> 00:44:24,760 Ansel's women were allowed for the first time to apply for a no fault divorce, were allowed to apply for not just child custody, but maintenance. 396 00:44:24,760 --> 00:44:30,190 Right. And then the evidence they had to produce was actually very basic elements of a love letter. 397 00:44:30,190 --> 00:44:32,590 It was enough to produce for them to produce. 398 00:44:32,590 --> 00:44:42,250 And so the marriage between the feminists who were using the language of these are deeply enshrined religious laws that we have been protected from. 399 00:44:42,250 --> 00:44:44,980 And so they should be pushed for in governance. 400 00:44:44,980 --> 00:44:52,240 And the Muslim Brotherhood being the ones with which they were working with, you know, opened up that doorway of NGOs are functioning. 401 00:44:52,240 --> 00:44:58,390 Yes. And the kind of pushing for political agendas that are meant to protect the 402 00:44:58,390 --> 00:45:05,560 people and give them that kind of liberal values that we're being prevented. 403 00:45:05,560 --> 00:45:10,690 But the interesting thing at that moment was the marriage between the feminists and Yeo's and the 404 00:45:10,690 --> 00:45:15,580 Muslim Brotherhood or members of the Muslim Brotherhood were that independents beg the question of, 405 00:45:15,580 --> 00:45:20,200 well, the threat is even getting deeper and the threat is even getting louder. 406 00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:26,530 And so here the elimination of both becomes extremely important. 407 00:45:26,530 --> 00:45:29,440 The only thing I'll add to that is that our call, 408 00:45:29,440 --> 00:45:36,280 our distinguished colleague and Leisz had written at length about the role of NGOs in Egyptian society. 409 00:45:36,280 --> 00:45:40,330 And just to kind of wedbush to the broader conversation about the dictatorships and drum, 410 00:45:40,330 --> 00:45:46,870 regrettably, conspiracy is very much used in service of discrediting NGOs, 411 00:45:46,870 --> 00:45:55,120 particularly, as Dalia had mentioned, NGOs that accept foreign funding of any kind as being de facto enemies of the state. 412 00:45:55,120 --> 00:46:02,440 And in Egypt, their ability to operate freely has never been more constrained for precisely that reason. 413 00:46:02,440 --> 00:46:07,540 Okay, I'm going to give you another question from the audience. This one is from Nesmith Sakib. 414 00:46:07,540 --> 00:46:15,160 And the question is, when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, there was an argument in many Western policymaking circles that the Muslim 415 00:46:15,160 --> 00:46:19,420 Brotherhood is illiberal and as the West should not only care about democracy, 416 00:46:19,420 --> 00:46:27,400 but also care about liberal values, it should pressure the Muslim Brotherhood to liberalise more when it has been to that. 417 00:46:27,400 --> 00:46:34,900 What has happened to that argument now since Egypt is now being dominated by a government that is neither democratic nor liberal? 418 00:46:34,900 --> 00:46:42,490 I think either. If you can take that. Sure. So let's unpack the question first. 419 00:46:42,490 --> 00:46:46,640 So here the Muslim Brotherhood coming into power was. 420 00:46:46,640 --> 00:46:48,430 Was was through those through elections, 421 00:46:48,430 --> 00:46:59,650 right through several rounds of elections and through a year previous where people lined up at the polls seven times for a constitutional referendum. 422 00:46:59,650 --> 00:47:06,070 And so you saw that the democratic process, just as I kind of was speaking to earlier, the political pluralism, 423 00:47:06,070 --> 00:47:13,490 people establishing political parties, that these were deeply entrenched and so people coming into the polls and voting for it for. 424 00:47:13,490 --> 00:47:18,400 For the Brotherhood. Isn't as a by-product of the democratic process. 425 00:47:18,400 --> 00:47:28,970 The Brotherhood coming into office. And again, word we're talking about 10 months, really 10 months of the Morsi administration. 426 00:47:28,970 --> 00:47:34,850 There is the kind of run up to the election. I started to do the kind of flagging of whoa! 427 00:47:34,850 --> 00:47:38,630 Something doesn't feel right here for it for a swath of the population. 428 00:47:38,630 --> 00:47:45,140 Historically, the Brotherhood never contested more than 20 to 30 percent of seats available. 429 00:47:45,140 --> 00:47:51,890 Right. It was never about getting powers, about getting a voice. And they upped it to 40 percent and then 50 percent. 430 00:47:51,890 --> 00:48:00,530 This is running for parliament before president in that parliament was ultimately cancelled and then running, contesting all hundred seats. 431 00:48:00,530 --> 00:48:11,000 And in my writings, I talk about that kind of the fear rising of what happened to trying to become a party of influence rather than a party in power. 432 00:48:11,000 --> 00:48:18,110 And so the logic behind that, they argue, is that not enough people willing to run for office. 433 00:48:18,110 --> 00:48:21,500 And so to safeguard democracy, they start increasing right now. 434 00:48:21,500 --> 00:48:28,370 Technically, there's nothing wrong with that. But you can start to see how public perception response to that as the usurpation of power. 435 00:48:28,370 --> 00:48:37,830 That parliament, of course, was cancelled. The next election is for for president, the presidential elections and many candidates are running. 436 00:48:37,830 --> 00:48:44,300 You know, we all know the history. And ultimately, in the second round, President Morsi is elected again, elected democratically. 437 00:48:44,300 --> 00:48:47,540 Now, what does the Brotherhood do in that 10 month time period? 438 00:48:47,540 --> 00:48:54,290 We can't we can't remove the and dodginess factors in a country that's just gone through evolution and 439 00:48:54,290 --> 00:49:01,280 the exoticness factors that needed the failure of an Islamist government or an Islamist president. 440 00:49:01,280 --> 00:49:05,690 And so here the Brotherhood. Yes. Did they make mistakes? Absolutely right. 441 00:49:05,690 --> 00:49:11,600 Not being able to win hearts and minds in the streets to a certain extent. 442 00:49:11,600 --> 00:49:16,460 President Morsi speaking on his own behalf, while some of the biggest, I think, 443 00:49:16,460 --> 00:49:21,890 ideological challenges he had in the street were from members of the upper echelon of the Brotherhood, 444 00:49:21,890 --> 00:49:26,720 speaking in language that created a level of uncertainty in the population. 445 00:49:26,720 --> 00:49:33,260 The constitutional referendum, there's a huge division on how that was read, what it was intended to. 446 00:49:33,260 --> 00:49:40,190 So, yes, absolutely. The Brotherhood and I and I've written about their constitution and even questions on the role of women's rights. 447 00:49:40,190 --> 00:49:50,370 But all of that does not. Mean that there should not be continuation of the democratic process to vote folks out of office. 448 00:49:50,370 --> 00:49:58,680 Right. And so we know that in constitution and democratic consolidation, democracies are considered consolidated when there's a turnover rule. 449 00:49:58,680 --> 00:50:04,170 Right. Books have been voted into office, out of office and half of office voted into office. 450 00:50:04,170 --> 00:50:10,680 And then within 10 months, being removed in a military coup because of the existential fear of what our Islamist going to do to us. 451 00:50:10,680 --> 00:50:15,720 And the fear narrative, as Denish alluded to, was coming from many, many factors, 452 00:50:15,720 --> 00:50:24,810 building on the level of conspiracy theory that they're going to sell the pyramids and the Sphinx and, you know, closed cinemas. 453 00:50:24,810 --> 00:50:31,320 And in my writing on their behaviour, for example, in Parliament pre revolution, they never took up these issues. 454 00:50:31,320 --> 00:50:32,760 It was bread and butter issues. 455 00:50:32,760 --> 00:50:42,690 So what is the role of, you know, the adherence to real structural liberalism, of using institutions of governance to protect civil society? 456 00:50:42,690 --> 00:50:57,420 And this really deep movements, both, both, both internally and externally, to ensure the failure of this government to almost welcome their removal. 457 00:50:57,420 --> 00:51:02,440 Ultimately leading to the enshrining of what we have today, which is a military dictatorship. 458 00:51:02,440 --> 00:51:05,890 Dennis, I know you have more to say on this. I see you nodding. I know. 459 00:51:05,890 --> 00:51:10,860 I think that was actually quite robust. So I'm kind of at loss for words, OK? 460 00:51:10,860 --> 00:51:19,810 But I actually want to come back to the last thing that Dalia just said, which was a question that we got from Eugene Rogan, of all people. 461 00:51:19,810 --> 00:51:24,370 And I confess, it was a question that had occurred to me as well. 462 00:51:24,370 --> 00:51:30,430 And I to more or less paraphrase Eugene's question, which is, shouldn't we be talking more about the military? 463 00:51:30,430 --> 00:51:32,660 I mean, his question was in the form of what if? 464 00:51:32,660 --> 00:51:39,760 A lot of sweating and focussing on the figure of the dictators overlooking the underlying problem of the deep state in San Diego, 465 00:51:39,760 --> 00:51:49,330 particularly in the military. And, you know, it occurs to me that perhaps all talk of a liberal order in a state with a military this powerful, 466 00:51:49,330 --> 00:51:53,230 which has been sustained by its foreign relations, 467 00:51:53,230 --> 00:51:56,740 particularly with the United States and through, you know, 468 00:51:56,740 --> 00:52:07,750 a series of kind of emergencies brought about by wars that entrenched military power more over the decades. 469 00:52:07,750 --> 00:52:09,180 Why are we talking about the military? Why? 470 00:52:09,180 --> 00:52:17,110 Well, why are we talking about the failure of a liberal order in a society that in a state that is, in fact, dominated by the military? 471 00:52:17,110 --> 00:52:17,960 OK, to that, 472 00:52:17,960 --> 00:52:27,850 and I think that Dr. Aswini at least alludes to the role of the military when he talks about his childhood memories in the context of the 1967 war. 473 00:52:27,850 --> 00:52:36,670 He was having conversations with an Italian neighbour of his who for whom he was translating the media correspondences, 474 00:52:36,670 --> 00:52:46,180 and then that Italian neighbour, after the latest correspondent suggested that Egypt had downed some 20 Israeli planes or something like that. 475 00:52:46,180 --> 00:52:50,290 And the Italian neighbour said, my boy, your government is lying to you. 476 00:52:50,290 --> 00:52:54,400 It's not. I lived through that the the Second World War. 477 00:52:54,400 --> 00:52:56,890 It's not possible for that make plans to be down to today. 478 00:52:56,890 --> 00:53:04,930 So I think he does allude to the power and the strength of the military in falsifying narratives. 479 00:53:04,930 --> 00:53:08,980 This goes into his broader conversations about conspiracy theories. 480 00:53:08,980 --> 00:53:12,460 So the deep state is on his mind. 481 00:53:12,460 --> 00:53:22,210 But once again, I don't think that it's really he doesn't view the deep state of the military as the penultimate threat. 482 00:53:22,210 --> 00:53:25,960 He views Islamists excessively, take up that role. 483 00:53:25,960 --> 00:53:32,170 And I think that's really what leads to the good doctor to kind of shift gears and his attention and focus. 484 00:53:32,170 --> 00:53:42,310 That's a wonderful question. When we look at the role of military today, we used to say that the Egyptian military controls 20 percent of the economy. 485 00:53:42,310 --> 00:53:51,890 Today, it's it's upwards of 80 percent of the economy. If we look at the role of military in politics, the military is politics today. 486 00:53:51,890 --> 00:53:57,150 There's there's there's really no getting around the military. I remember just as the revolution and, you know, 487 00:53:57,150 --> 00:54:06,580 the Friday where president President Mubarak stepped down and there was announcement that it's over and everyone is celebrating. 488 00:54:06,580 --> 00:54:10,680 And I remember looking around saying, OK, well, this was a soft coup. 489 00:54:10,680 --> 00:54:16,750 Remember, the military stepped aside and let this happen. Right. There are soldiers and tanks in the streets. 490 00:54:16,750 --> 00:54:18,820 And it was, you know, one hand. 491 00:54:18,820 --> 00:54:26,380 And I remember saying this is a soft coup because in politics there are winners and losers in an order for the people to win. 492 00:54:26,380 --> 00:54:35,200 We had to recognise that, well, the military had to let go of a level of constraint and control on society, the economy and politics. 493 00:54:35,200 --> 00:54:35,500 Now, 494 00:54:35,500 --> 00:54:45,070 the military started to see Mubarak during the revolution and pre revolution as a threat because they were about to go into that kind of headed tear, 495 00:54:45,070 --> 00:54:52,840 hereditary rule of his son. And so they stepped by and in some of their own kind of public statements that were made of, 496 00:54:52,840 --> 00:54:55,780 you know, telling young people, you didn't do this revolution. 497 00:54:55,780 --> 00:55:01,630 We actually let it happen because we needed the removal of Mubarak very quickly thereafter. 498 00:55:01,630 --> 00:55:09,370 And in 2013, it became very apparent that President Morsi was a threat to the military, needed to be removed. 499 00:55:09,370 --> 00:55:15,520 And unfortunately, today, the military of today is very different than the military of Mubarak. 500 00:55:15,520 --> 00:55:25,150 President Sisi has purged the top three layers of the military out of fear of his own, his own future. 501 00:55:25,150 --> 00:55:29,800 And so there is going to be a coming moment, I believe, 502 00:55:29,800 --> 00:55:36,760 where he will be a threat to the power of the military because of really poor economic and political positions. 503 00:55:36,760 --> 00:55:42,550 Today, Egypt is strategically weak. One of the weakest countries in the Middle East on several fronts of its border. 504 00:55:42,550 --> 00:55:48,150 And so, however, he has very efficiently purged the military Randi. 505 00:55:48,150 --> 00:55:49,300 Alternate voices. 506 00:55:49,300 --> 00:55:56,830 The presidential election that occurred a little over a year ago or a year and a half ago, much of the viable candidates were ex military officers. 507 00:55:56,830 --> 00:56:00,850 And so that signal that there is an internal rift. And so you're absolutely right. 508 00:56:00,850 --> 00:56:06,970 We can't be talking about illiberalism in an Egyptian society without talking about 509 00:56:06,970 --> 00:56:13,720 the deep entrenchment of the military and politics and the economy and civil society. 510 00:56:13,720 --> 00:56:18,760 It stems from the idea that every family has a military officer. 511 00:56:18,760 --> 00:56:21,690 These are sons of the nation. They have our best interests. 512 00:56:21,690 --> 00:56:29,320 And the begs goes back to that question of complicity, of not being able to see the military as a threat to the political order. 513 00:56:29,320 --> 00:56:34,410 But absolutely, the military in power is a threat to liberal ideals. 514 00:56:34,410 --> 00:56:36,850 I could bring out one more question from an audience member, 515 00:56:36,850 --> 00:56:41,620 but actually I wanted to ask the Sammeth, perhaps he has a really good chance to ask the question. 516 00:56:41,620 --> 00:56:50,570 Do you have a question, Osama? I would feel guilty taking the opportunity away from some excellent questions that come through the audience. 517 00:56:50,570 --> 00:56:55,570 OK. So I have a question for Monica Marks, who is one of our own graduates with the detail. 518 00:56:55,570 --> 00:57:00,910 And her question is, to what extent do you feel that fears regarding what the Muslim Brotherhood would 519 00:57:00,910 --> 00:57:06,280 do to women's rights and the potential for Sisi to protect women and feminists 520 00:57:06,280 --> 00:57:11,080 against the spectre of Muslim Brotherhood repression proved to be a pivotal 521 00:57:11,080 --> 00:57:16,600 factor in consolidating so-called liberal support for Sisi has ruled Egypt. 522 00:57:16,600 --> 00:57:21,930 It wasn't addressed to anybody in particular. So either one of you or both of you could respond. 523 00:57:21,930 --> 00:57:28,660 I can take this, although I feel I've been talking too much Spanish. If you want to feel free to go ahead. 524 00:57:28,660 --> 00:57:31,410 You know, that was one of the narratives that was promoted. Right. 525 00:57:31,410 --> 00:57:40,820 If if the Morsi administration continues, you know, women will be moving outside of the public sphere to be forced to cover. 526 00:57:40,820 --> 00:57:46,890 And again, this this hysteria, this is covered in our in our book under Mohammed Mastery's chapter. 527 00:57:46,890 --> 00:57:53,190 And I remember having conversations with folks and saying, you know, what exactly is it that you're afraid of? 528 00:57:53,190 --> 00:57:59,670 Like, what is the steep fear? And it's that I won't be able to go to a resort and wear a bathing suit. 529 00:57:59,670 --> 00:58:06,720 And I said, what indicators do you have that this will be eliminated under under this presidency? 530 00:58:06,720 --> 00:58:13,620 And they're not there. They're absent. The conversation on that used to occur in the year. 531 00:58:13,620 --> 00:58:18,270 I think it was 1995 of should Egypt be part of the Miss World pageant? 532 00:58:18,270 --> 00:58:26,250 Right. These kind of symbolic curtailing of women's visibility in the public were not happening in the 2000s. 533 00:58:26,250 --> 00:58:31,740 And there weren't conversations on this in terms of the Constitution written under or 534 00:58:31,740 --> 00:58:36,910 beginning to write big written under under under President Morsi's administration. 535 00:58:36,910 --> 00:58:40,800 Constitution was very similar to the Constitution before it. 536 00:58:40,800 --> 00:58:45,360 One of the primary differences, it actually removed Sharia as the law of the land. 537 00:58:45,360 --> 00:58:50,190 Right. So if you think about the Mubarak constitution included the language of Sharia as 538 00:58:50,190 --> 00:58:53,940 the law of the land was under the Mubarak constitution that personal status laws, 539 00:58:53,940 --> 00:58:59,280 limited women's women's rights, women's inheritance, child custody laws. 540 00:58:59,280 --> 00:59:04,710 And so here you had a constitution that was was going to be more progressive in that regard. 541 00:59:04,710 --> 00:59:11,070 But in my my opinion, not progressive enough. But the current constitution is worse. 542 00:59:11,070 --> 00:59:17,880 And so the idea that Islamists are out to get women's rights and women's representation and women's visibility 543 00:59:17,880 --> 00:59:24,780 doesn't technically have evidence when it comes to the last at least 15 years of Muslim Brotherhood attempt, 544 00:59:24,780 --> 00:59:34,770 attempted legislation and parliament. But the narrative of hysteria around what they would do to society is still very deep. 545 00:59:34,770 --> 00:59:46,500 Right. Again, from selling the pyramids to the wife of President Morsi, a woman who not just veiled or Humar longer a veil. 546 00:59:46,500 --> 00:59:50,740 How could she be the first lady of our country? It's so regressive, right. 547 00:59:50,740 --> 00:59:54,930 That kind of symbolic language still exists in Egypt. 548 00:59:54,930 --> 00:59:56,160 And there there, again, 549 00:59:56,160 --> 01:00:06,840 are very long institutional reasons and historical reasons why controlling the body politic of politics on the bodies of women's continues. 550 01:00:06,840 --> 01:00:11,400 The authoritarian nature of this is very gendered. 551 01:00:11,400 --> 01:00:19,740 Mubarak would not have gone into the streets and said, those women into your square, those are the ones fighting for your rights. 552 01:00:19,740 --> 01:00:26,250 Those of the daughters of the nations, the ones sleeping in the streets. We have to remember there were virginity tests on these protesters. 553 01:00:26,250 --> 01:00:32,910 Right. Some of the first images we saw of protests were women coming face to face with the security apparatus. 554 01:00:32,910 --> 01:00:35,370 And what happened to them? They were stripped of their clothing. Right. 555 01:00:35,370 --> 01:00:40,740 It's a very gendered nature to the to the revolution, to the state's response to the revolution. 556 01:00:40,740 --> 01:00:48,180 And so all of this has to be taken together. And we can't take one aspect of this area on what these so-called Islamists would 557 01:00:48,180 --> 01:00:54,600 do to the state without looking at Egypt's long history of authoritarianism, 558 01:00:54,600 --> 01:00:59,330 being in student enshrined on the bodies of women. Thank you very much earlier. 559 01:00:59,330 --> 01:01:03,090 And I'm sorry to say that we've really run out of time at this point. 560 01:01:03,090 --> 01:01:08,700 And I feel that you've not had the opportunity to say very much to I as the chair. 561 01:01:08,700 --> 01:01:16,620 I would like to give you maybe a minute you'd like to say anything but otherwise and at this point going to wrap up. 562 01:01:16,620 --> 01:01:23,640 So would you like to add anything or a reflection, Pops? I don't really have any specific concluding remarks as such. 563 01:01:23,640 --> 01:01:28,770 I mean, I know you and I are really speaking in one voice here at all. 564 01:01:28,770 --> 01:01:33,540 I don't really feel like there's anything more that I need to add at this point. 565 01:01:33,540 --> 01:01:43,110 That's that's perfectly OK. And of course, in some respects, you did speak in one voice because you co-wrote and co edited a work. 566 01:01:43,110 --> 01:01:49,380 And that's the work we're talking about in some respect. So I'd like to thank everyone who's attended. 567 01:01:49,380 --> 01:01:55,620 I do apologise that we didn't get to all the questions, but these are sort of short and sweet sessions, hopefully. 568 01:01:55,620 --> 01:02:07,050 And I'd like to thank Walter for really sort of managing questions very well and giving plenty of sort of opportunity to those who had ask questions. 569 01:02:07,050 --> 01:02:13,890 But finally, I'd really like to thank both Duniya and Dunnage for really giving us some food 570 01:02:13,890 --> 01:02:20,850 for thought with respect to thinking about the place of liberalism in Egypt and. 571 01:02:20,850 --> 01:02:26,790 The way in which ideology is very often used to subvert an ideology that 572 01:02:26,790 --> 01:02:30,420 ostensibly is about promoting democracy is very often used to subvert democracy, 573 01:02:30,420 --> 01:02:34,680 unfortunately, in these very unusual contexts. 574 01:02:34,680 --> 01:02:42,510 And to echo what is sort of remarked, in a sense, it's not liberal liberalism, but it's kind of failed liberalism. 575 01:02:42,510 --> 01:02:50,670 But we can also sort of reflect on critiques of liberalism that you that you sort of treat in your introduction to the work 576 01:02:50,670 --> 01:02:58,830 that showed that liberalism is such a vast tradition and quite a capacious tradition that it has traditions of colonialism. 577 01:02:58,830 --> 01:03:04,830 And, you know, recognising that there are millions of people is that place is a part is about the liberal tradition as well. 578 01:03:04,830 --> 01:03:07,290 So it's it's a complex history. 579 01:03:07,290 --> 01:03:17,400 And I hope that those of you who are attending and there's I certainly learnt more about this tradition as it applies to the Egyptian context. 580 01:03:17,400 --> 01:03:20,370 And with that, I'd like to thank you all again. 581 01:03:20,370 --> 01:03:28,950 I can make one one and I just I wanted to say I very much hope the doctor is finding himself either is in attendance or that 582 01:03:28,950 --> 01:03:36,510 he ultimately does have the opportunity to watch this free presentation and would be extremely honoured to hear his thoughts. 583 01:03:36,510 --> 01:03:41,550 I will try to convey that to to Dr. Wendy, who I do not know personally. 584 01:03:41,550 --> 01:03:46,110 But, you know, I will do what I can to do that. But thank you again. 585 01:03:46,110 --> 01:03:54,900 And I look forward to sort of what we can at least and to look forward to welcoming you again next week to another session. 586 01:03:54,900 --> 01:04:03,090 It's actually a one that I will again be running. So literally I will be looking forward to welcoming you on the Gulf specifically. 587 01:04:03,090 --> 01:04:08,250 And we're having to, you know, an amazing scholar and an amazing journalist. 588 01:04:08,250 --> 01:04:15,120 The Middle East bureau chief of The New York Times, Ben Hubbard, alongside Mordovia Rashid, 589 01:04:15,120 --> 01:04:18,780 who is an extremely prolific author on Saudi Arabia, on the Middle East, more generally. 590 01:04:18,780 --> 01:04:23,490 So please do join us next week. And until then, have a good weekend. 591 01:04:23,490 --> 01:04:27,050 Take care. Bye bye. Thank you all. 592 01:04:27,050 --> 01:04:38,609 Thank you very much for having us. Thank you.