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Good evening from a chilly Oxford and the Middle East centre, my name is Eugene Rogan and it's my great pleasure to welcome you all to the seventh

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in our webinar series addressing the dictatorship's syndrome in the Middle East.

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Our subject tonight will be addressed by two of the best people you could hope to hear speak on the subject.

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We're very pleased to be welcoming Dr. Lina Khateeb, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House.

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Dina's joining us from Beirut tonight. And Jeremy Bowen, Middle East editor of the BBC, who will be speaking to us from Wales.

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Their subject, why Syria still matters, why Assad is still their leader.

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Get us started on tonight's conversation. Thank you so much for having me.

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And thanks to well, I can see one hundred people so far on a Friday afternoon joining to hear about Syria.

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A few people have heard me say this over the last few years whenever there are events in Syria.

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I'm off to speak out with very good turnout. I say thank you for remaining interested.

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A lot of people seem to think that Syria is just a conflict that is running in the background that doesn't deserve attention.

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What we're saying today is serious still matters.

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It is whether we like it or not, a shared responsibility for the West and for the regional powers, as well as, of course, all kinds of Syrian actors.

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And if I were to say who I would regard as being my top priority when it comes to responsibility for Syria amongst all international actors,

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I am not going to pick Russia or Iran. I am actually going to pick the United States.

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So it's a pleasure to be hosting tonight. Shortly after the U.S. election are announced,

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after a bit of a delay to just shed some light on what I've perceived when it comes to the Syrian conflict and U.S. foreign policy.

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I think for me, as someone who has been working on Syria for over a decade,

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there was a missed opportunity during the Obama administration for the United States to play a seminal role in steering what was then a mere crisis,

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not a conflict. We're talking early days in 2011 when the Assad regime was starting to use violence against its own people.

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There was an opportunity for the United States to try to exert diplomatic pressure

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to steer that crisis towards some sort of resolution of what we saw was different.

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We saw lots of good rhetoric on the part of President Barack Obama saying Assad must go.

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Later on saying the use of chemical weapons would be a red line for the Obama administration.

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But unfortunately, that was not coupled with action.

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We know that the threat to use force were chemical weapons to be used, was not materialising any time soon.

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During Obama's term, and even under Trump's administration,

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similar threats only materialised and the launch of a handful of missiles that did not really do much to change the course of the conflict.

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So while I go back to the days of the Obama administration to put primary diplomatic blame on the United

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States for not having the political will to try to steer the Syrian crisis toward some sort of settlement,

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I will also say the Trump administration did not really diverge greatly from

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that of the Obama administration when it comes to handling the Syrian conflict.

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What we've seen in both administrations is a path of this engagement on part of the United States and towards the end of Trump's administration,

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meaning, you know, let's say the last two years or so,

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we have seen this engagement materialise in having Syria become a component of the United States Iran strategy,

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rather than having a distinct stand alone policy on Syria and part of the United States.

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Whenever I spoke to policymakers in Washington about this,

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they mentioned the maximum pressure strategy on Iran as being one of the things that are done about Syria.

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Of course, that doesn't mean that it's all doom and gloom when it comes to U.S. behaviour regarding the Syrian conflict.

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One of the positives, in my view, under the Trump administration is the Caesar Act, which is the act about sanctions.

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And these sanctions are not just about Syrian entities involved with the Assad regime,

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but anyone, citizen or not, who is basically doing business with the Assad regime.

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And I think this is very important.

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And it's it's part of the reason why these sanctions, though, you know, the Assad regime tries to spin them as hurting the people of Syria.

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Ultimately, it is the Assad regime that is hurting the people of Syria.

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The sanctions may have played a very, very small role, but the devastation was already there.

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And Assad is responsible for the financial crisis in Syria is not really because of sanctions.

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And even Assad himself has admitted that not too long ago, around two weeks ago.

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So the Chesire act is a positive step, but this is their act. And sanctions anyway, do not.

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And what you need is diplomatic engagement with Russia.

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So although I say the United States could have been a changed.

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And the cause of the crisis.

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Unfortunately, U.S. disengagement over the years paved the way for Russia to enter the Syrian domain and become the power broker in this conflict.

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So 2015 onwards on the ground, Russia is the most influential foreign actor in Syria.

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And it did this because it saw an opportunity to assert itself vis a vis the international community and vis a vis the United States in particular.

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So today we are in a situation in which I look at the United Nations and I see a peace process that is really not going anywhere,

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but that the United States and its allies are interested in keeping alive.

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And that is, of course, important, because even if the U.N. cannot steer the conflict towards a resolution,

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you still need the U.N. peace process for when there is international political will to steer the conflict into a resolution.

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You need the U.N. so that there can be a mechanism for implementing whatever deal is brokered.

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So that is important. And it's important that the United States is supportive of that when it comes to military intervention.

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Those days are long gone. I don't think there's going to be any appetite even under the new incoming Biden administration,

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which is widely seen as being perhaps more into interventionism than the Trump administration.

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We can see indications of this with the selection of the foreign policy team, mainly the incoming secretary of state, Anthony Blinken,

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who spoke in May about failure on part of the Obama administration to steer the

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Syrian conflict towards a resolution and failing basically to the Syrian people,

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resulting in the refugee crisis and other things.

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But that doesn't mean that the incoming administration is going to be interested in military intervention.

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Another thing that is important is that the incoming U.S. administration, mainly by Biden, is not really enamoured with Russia.

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And this is a positive step because under President Trump, we've seen, let's say, not much of a strong stance regarding Russia's activities in Syria.

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And I don't think President Biden would take the same line.

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So what I'm saying is, despite the criticisms, despite the engagement,

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there are things that could be could be built on with the new administration is coming into power in January in the United States.

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The sanctions, yes, they would not end the conflict, but they are hurting.

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They are hurting Iran, actually, because some of Iran's allies and proxies are obviously doing business with the Syrian regime here.

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I'm talking, for example, about Hezbollah in Lebanon.

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This Syrian business people and profiteers are also, you know, used by the regime to circumvent sanctions.

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And the more than that, it's cost widely, the more people are killed.

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And which makes things a bit difficult for the regime financially,

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which can be used as leverage by the international community to try to push for political transition.

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The U.N. process, despite all the difficulties, is not that it is still, you know, kind of there.

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This is important. But I think the key question for me,

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if I were to be a Washington watcher regarding Syria is will the U.S. finally take that step to engage Russia in a bilateral discussion on Syria?

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Because unfortunately, the solution to the Syrian conflict is not on the ground in Syria.

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It is international. And why this matters, why resolving the conflict matters?

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It's because the refugee crisis around the world, the rise of ISIS, the issues like terrorism,

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you know, that the West is concerned with are symptoms and outcomes of the conflict.

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And so I've seen a lot of resources being spent to tackle the refugee issue and terrorism.

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But unless you tackle the source of the problem, you're just going to put a Band-Aid on the situation.

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And that's not going to work long term. And we're only going to just repeat the same cycle of violence and grievances.

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And so Syria does matter. And the failure on part of the international community has played a huge role in letting Assad stay in power.

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So this is just what I have to say for now. And I look forward to the rest of the conversation.

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Thank you. Leader, thank you so much. You got us off to a brilliant start.

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We clearly are in a moment of transition and change.

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And I think everyone's first question when it comes to the new administration of the U.S. and their policies

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towards the Middle East is how they're going to respond to the newly assertive position of Russia.

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You've given us some vision. There could be a hopeful outcome to this.

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And I'd like to cling to any straw of hope that I can get. But before I leap on straws of hope.

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I'd like to invite Jeremy Bowen to give us his views and then we'll come back to discuss further.

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Jeremy, over to you. Thanks. Usually. And I'm a journalist. I don't do hope, at least not easily.

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Masterly. Leaner. Of course. So I'm not going to try to repeat those great points, particularly those ones at the end, about why it still matters.

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So I could talk a little bit about my experiences in Syria since the war started.

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I've been a pretty regular visitor, which hopefully I'll try and throw some light on the the you know,

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the theme of a lot of this is dictatorship, the appeal, the continuing appeal of the dictator, despite everything.

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So let me start, first of all, with the flashback. 2006, the the war way in which Hezbollah in Lebanon fought the Israelis to a standstill.

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Now, if you think back to that time, those were those of you old enough to remember.

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You'll know that you'll remember that Nasrallah became the rock star of the whole region as a result of that Arab countries,

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but not too far behind because he had helped him out an awful lot was Bashar al Assad not long after I was in Lebanon for that war.

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But then not long afterwards, I was in the West Bank. I was in Ramallah. And there's a sketch artist in the main square in the middle of the town.

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And his face, you know, his hit sketches the whole time, four years have been Arafat, of course, and NASA.

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They had a big new hit that year, which was Nasrallah, but not far behind was Bashar al Assad.

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Assad was a man who had credibility. He seemed to be.

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He stood up against Israel. He was the the leader of a new generation people were talking about.

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The old guys were getting out. And while he hadn't quite delivered any of the reforms that he talked about a lot, he still he talked a good game.

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And, yeah, they'd be coming along, but not just yet. You know, at that time, getting to Damascus was not difficult.

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You could from my point of view, I could get visas. I saw Assad a couple of times whenever I spoke to Assad.

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There always be some private time in advance. You'd sit in a room in a. room before the interview with the cameras.

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And so you sit without cameras, without his guys.

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And and what the way he always came over, because, of course, his slightly, you know, geeky look belied the fact that he really believed,

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I think all was working very hard to believe that he was like his father,

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that he was sitting in the middle of the web, that he was he understood what was going on.

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And he kept saying, I am pragmatic. I will do what is best for Syria.

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I will do what is best for the Syrian people. And Damascus was was of course, the police state was as muscular as ever.

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But people had to have fairly decent lives.

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It was full of Iraqi refugees who were coming in from at the time was a horrendous situation over the border.

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And and Assad was there and promising what was going on.

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So let's fast forward a little bit to the beginning of the uprisings, 2011.

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Now. Again, there was an assumption that you that perhaps after those first incidents and those terrible first scenes in Deraa,

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in the South, that Assad, this will be the moment and there was a key speech as well that he was going to make.

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And lots of Syrians said to me, you know, he's been yeah, he's a flawed character, but he's the best we got.

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And he's and this is his chance. But he didn't say he doubled down on troubled down on the the assaults on his own people.

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And, you know, we know what happened after that.

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And but it was a time that the say in Damascus, I'm one of the few journalists who is able to go to both sides.

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Both the regime side and the rebels side in Damascus, particularly in the early years when it was possible across the frontlines.

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You could go cross into Duma at the very beginning, 2012.

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You just drive down the road and leave behind the final regime checkpoint.

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And then after about half a mile, there would be guys with the other flag, with the other Syrian flag and guns and big demos.

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And, you know, this was not far from the centre of Damascus.

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So that was there was a feeling, you know,

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we all had this assumption that he would go he would get that extra push and he would go the way of his predecessors in Tunisia and in Egypt.

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But, you know, Gadhafi was fighting back at the time. And what was the acid test there?

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What really changed it? NATO and some of the Gulf countries gave the rebels an air force and the rebels in Syria at that time,

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things might have been different had they had an air force, but they didn't. And of course, I said senior had had had created a much stronger regime.

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I think as well an anti coup regime, Alawi's and other minorities didn't like the alternatives that they were being presented with.

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And and I was trolled every time I put this on the BBC or on social media, on Twitter.

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Assad had throughout. Genuine support from important groups in that country without which is regime.

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No matter how clever, how cleverly allies from the home village had been put into positions of power or families that they knew.

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The fact is that without people who were prepared to fight for him, he wouldn't have survived.

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And this is before the big foreign interventions.

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I spent I've spent quite a bit of time with the Syrian Arab army in various places.

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I always felt that the narrative that they were collapsing when the Russians invaded was a bit overdone and later invited in.

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A bigger problem was rather overdone. They weren't big and they weren't very powerful,

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but they were prepared to fight and they retain their cohesion and they still have which after that many years of war,

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they were still a disciplined force. You go to their positions and they wouldn't be, you know, with armies, these things matter.

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You know, they were well-run, they were clean, they weren't piles.

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They'd be burning their garbage. They weren't using the next room as a latrine.

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The way that many of the rebels I've been with over the years in different countries behave, they were behaving like an army.

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And that I think and yeah, of course, it's well documented that plenty of people did not want to be conscripted and did a great deal to escape that.

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But there were enough people who were there to carry a gun for him and.

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I went to a few funerals and Alawi villages on the coast.

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And it reminded me very, very much of the atmosphere in the villages in Croatia and in Montana,

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in Croatia, particularly actually during the Yugoslav wars. These people on the coast of the Mediterranean.

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Tight knit village communities, everybody turning out, everybody crying.

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And I felt these these were not educated, be genuine support for the dictator.

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The guy who they were prepared to bleed for. Of course, later on, there was resentment that, you know,

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few ever I I you have looked at Instagram on the extraordinary photographs that Rami Makhluf son used to post from from Dubai.

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My God, you know, his abs, the oil he put on them, his Ferrari's private jet girls.

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Yeah. I mean, you name it. And these guys were fighting and dying for his family.

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Yet they continue to do it. And I think a lot of them felt it was a genuine fight for survival.

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And there was a guy called Moxa Lamani who was a U.N. official.

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Who was part of their team there? A senior. And one of his main jobs was to talk to a lot of the rebel groups from Damascus.

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He was online the whole time with them. And I remember talking to him and he was he said he said on the record, the monks believe anything,

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that he used the word genocide to describe what he felt was the risk that those communities on the coast risked if the jihadi groups got to them.

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That's why they fought. They fought because they thought that they didn't fight. They'd die.

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Of course, things became you became a mini world war, didn't it? And we've got plenty of time to go into all of this.

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But for these opening remarks, I just want to tell you what it was like at that big turning point.

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And I absolutely agree, Lena, with the fact that the U.S. had its chances and it chose the Obama administration chose not to take in.

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Of course, international diplomacy was deadlocked. The Security Council was deadlocked.

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That's why that dialogue never happens between the US and Moscow is really, really important.

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But after those chemical attacks and the red line comment was much talked about.

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Then I was. I found I have to have a visa and I went to say I went to Damascus and excuse me.

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We were waiting to get bond, and I had a call in our office in the.

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We get a room. Get rooms at the at the Four Seasons Hotel where the U.N. is based.

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Good security there. Principally in that period. I was always worried some would try and drove a truck into the front lobby.

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So the fact that they had good security to stop that sort of thing happening was a definite plus.

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Anyway, the phone went and I thought it was a very senior member of the regime inviting

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me to the working palace that they had in the centre of the city for a talk.

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And I thought, it's got to be that I into. We've been asking for so long.

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In fact, we did get one that those two years later. And this person got me in and said.

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Really nervously, said Jeremy, I'll be following on TV for years.

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You have been bombed by the Americans in various different cities.

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What's it like? What's it going to be like? And this person was really nervous.

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So I said, well, first of all, don't don't be in this building because this is one they might well destroy.

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And they were already they aren't stupid. They were emptying their bases of troops.

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They were expecting to be hammered. And this official, really senior very close to Asad was really nervous.

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They thought that and after it didn't happen, the relief was incredible.

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They thought that they had that basically that Obama had blinked.

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They'd stared him out. And after that, I really felt that their attitude changed.

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No end that. Of course, you know, I'm going to shut up in a minute.

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But not to go through this sorry history of what happened ever since then.

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But it was a moment that could have happened.

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And as a former U.S. defence secretary said to me, he said, look, I said I work for a number of different presidents.

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And he said, and as the US president. I gave Obama this message.

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I said, as as US president, you carry a very big gun and if you pull that gun out of your holster and you load the gun and you point the gun,

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you've got to be able to prepare to fire the gun. He wasn't prepared to fire the gun, wouldn't have ended the war.

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But there were certainly groups who were not extremists in the jihadi sense in the

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suburbs of Damascus who were planning to follow up those attacks with their own attacks.

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And things would have been different. I not saying they even would have been better, but they would have been different if that had happened.

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What ifs. Well, listen, that's that's my opening spiel done.

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I think I think my time's running out for that. So let's open it up to questions.

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Thank you very much. Jeremy. And I don't think you deserve to be trolled for stating the obvious,

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which is one of the reasons why Assad survived for so long, is because there was actually a broad base of support for the man.

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But I'd like to interrogate that a little further, because looking at Syria from the perspective of 2020,

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it would seem that Syrians were either loyal or opposition out of fear either way,

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that if you were of a certain demographic, if you were from the Baath Party, if you are Alawi, if you are Christian,

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your biggest fear was that with the fall of the regime would come a kind of hypercharged jihadi.

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Insurgent army that would take the government and victimise you.

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And so it wasn't necessarily that it was out of conviction for Bashar, his methods.

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It was out of fear of the opposition.

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And, of course, the opposition was in desperate fear of the horrendous treatment that the state meted out to those who opposed it,

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whether it was what went on in Deraa, what went on in jails,

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what went on with children like Hamza, you know, across the 10 years of this conflict or nearly 10 years of this conflict,

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a catalogue of horrors that's engender tremendous fear in the hearts of everyone.

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One of the themes running through the dictatorship syndrome analyst when his

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essay is this notion of a complicity between a society enabling its dictators.

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And I wonder whether Syria in that sense is the exception, that it's not society that is enabling so much of society,

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either fearful of the dictator or fearful of the opposition being absent, neutralised.

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I wonder if you would mean I could both reflect on that. Yeah, well, if I just pick up, if you like.

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I absolutely agree. I couldn't agree more. The nexus of fear that is extraordinary.

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And there are people who people I would speak to regularly in Damascus who'd say, look, I'm just going to try and ride this one out.

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I'm not Christians, for example, who would say, of course, the thought of some of these guys coming into the city terrifies me.

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But I hate Bashar and I hate his regime. I wanted to go.

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But for the time being, we're just going to try and have to survive here and see what we can do.

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And yes, on the other side, there was enormous fear of of what the regime was capable of doing.

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I was at the aftermath of some barrel bombs in the Damascus suburbs.

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The destruction was phenomenal. You know, buildings still on fire, bodies.

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I mean, you name it. I saw all of that while I interviewed Assad on the subject, an interview that was carried in its entirety.

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I was part of the deal on 23 minutes on Syrian TV.

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I said, look, this is this is these bombs. This is documented.

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You know, this video of them landing. I've seen them myself. And he absolute denied it.

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Barrel bombs. He said, we have bombs. We have bullets.

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We don't have barrel bombs. Nothing like that. So, yeah, I think that that.

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There was this idea, I suppose there are people there in the regime who benefited from the regime,

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who, of course, are complicit in its continuation and in the way that the Assad clan have.

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Made Syria their family business for 50 years. But most wives,

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so many Syrians try to get out of the country because they thought that whatever was waiting for

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them was not going to be as bad as what it was they were they were getting away from at home.

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Yeah, that nexus of fear is is absolutely a driver of people's views of the the power of the state.

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And the barrier of fear did fall for a while, but they did a great deal to re-erect it.

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Lynn, I got to actually divert you to the sort of great power scenarios that you were dealing with of a new administration,

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putting America back sort of stage into the discussion of Syria's future.

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And the question here really is imagine a Biden administration that had learnt the lessons of what Obama got wrong.

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And that was willing to engage and was actually willing to engage with Russia,

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not in the kind of sycophantic way that Trump has done, but as a kind of hard player.

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You're still dealing with a Syria in which there is no prospect of a post Bashar post Baathist government.

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How can even America, by working with Russia under Putin, try to move towards a meaningful resolution of the conflict onto the status quo?

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Well, I mean, conflicts like this do not have one, Victor.

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The thing is, the Assad regime has been trying to present itself as the sole victor in the conflict,

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of course, with Russia by its side and also maybe to a lesser degree, Iran.

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But it's a situation in which the only way out is going to have to be a political transition based on compromise.

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And that compromise does not mean Assad himself staying in power.

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The compromise means, as Jeremy said, recognising that there are some elements in Syria that are supportive of this regime,

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whether out of conviction or coercion or fear. But they are there.

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And without them, I think the regime would have fallen. What they contributed, they are not the primary factor.

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Why the regime is still in place. I think on the ground, the Russian military intervention is why the regime did not collapse militarily.

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But they are that there a segment of the population and their voices need to be represented.

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So there's, you know, no denying that any future peace scenario has to include elements from the opposition,

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the broad spectrum of political opposition and these elements that are currently perhaps in power in Syria.

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So what I'm saying is a deep ossification scenario, like the one we saw in Iraq,

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is not going to be the best path forward for Syria because we've seen what that does and other contexts.

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So you have this compromise?

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I personally think Russia would accept such a compromise because Russia ultimately cares more about its own influence in Syria,

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and that is not something that is really completely antagonistic to U.S. interests.

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Believe it or not, I don't think the United States will mind Russia having a naval base in Syria.

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I don't think the United States minds, if Russia continues to have influence in Syria on the ground.

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And let's not forget that Russia had political influence in Syria even before the conflict.

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But it just used the conflict to increase its own profile.

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I mean, relations between the Assad regime on the top of the Shah's father and the Soviet Union back in the day go way back.

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And this relationship does not stop when Bashar al-Assad took over. And it continues.

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So you can't reverse that. Just like with Iran, you can't just say, let's kick the Iranians out of Syria.

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That's impossible. The influence is grassroots and Long-Term.

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So this is what I imagine happening, a compromise solution.

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I think as long as Russia here feels it has maintained its influence, it would be acceptable to it.

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But the issue right now is there's nothing that incentivises Russia or the Assad regime, for that matter, to compromise.

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Why would they when they feel that things are kind of going relatively well?

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Of course, they financial situation now and Syria is getting to, as I said, put some pressure which can be used as leverage.

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But that alone is not going to be the leverage you need to use it as leverage, meaning the international community.

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Many of us needs to instrumentalise this leverage. You can't just get out, help economic pressure and let things run their course.

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That's not how it works. So let's see if the new administration is going to use these available tools.

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They are. But they have not been used strategic. The thing is,

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it's very hard to see what's going to be in it for the Americans if they use their diplomatic capital to try and broker a resolution to a

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country like Syria where they don't actually have any interests in order to enhance Russia at Iran's position in a country where they do.

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It may actually be just a formula that has the Biden administration say, we'd rather not go there.

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Well, to be honest, the fines show that the Middle East in general is rather low on the list of priorities for the U.S. administration.

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And, you know, even for us in the UK, I mean,

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if you look at the letter that Dominic Raab just penned to Sara Champion been mentioned, the Middle East.

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And so I think, unfortunately for people like myself who want the Middle East to be central, you know,

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to foreign policy agendas all over the world, we are seeing China becoming more of a pressing issue, for example.

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However, that doesn't mean that Middle East is going to be completely ignored.

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And that's because these outside players are there in the region.

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I'm just saying we have to be also a bit modest in terms of our expectations.

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There's potential. They can do it. Whether they will do it is a whole other story.

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Well, I can add something to that, if you like. You know, the only power that can remove Assad are the Russians.

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They have an intimate relationship with the Syrian military, as Lina said, going back generations.

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If you go into, as I've done quite a lot of times, into the offices of generals in the Ministry of Defence in Damascus,

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you see military textbooks in Russian momentos of the time that they spend training as young lads.

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In terms of this, guys who are on, you know, either side is 60 or in senior positions in the days of the Soviet Union.

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And more recently, you see the badges of units.

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You know, military people love to give each other souvenirs,

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badges of Russian units and in a ceremonial vodka bottles probably as well in the desk drawer.

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And so what I'm saying is the Russians know intimately who's who in the Syrian military.

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So here's a scenario. If they decided that things were unravelling, too, in a way that didn't help them in Syria,

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maybe some kind of a continuing resurgence or reconstitution of ISIS, that continuing trouble in the south.

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They might say, well, maybe we need another guy at the top and they're capable of doing it.

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And if that person then appealed to those constituencies that support the Assad clan, the Assad regime, then you never know it's possible.

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But there's another scenario, which is that.

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All of those things become a running sore for the Russians and for Iran that Syria is not an asset for them,

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that it becomes complicated and difficult.

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And it could well be that the Americans who've got their hands full, as we know, in loads of places and not least in the Middle East.

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You did the you know, we've seen Iran taking another little ratchet up today.

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They may say, well, let them stew for a while, then we'll see what happens.

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We're reaching a point now where I'm going to have to yield the floor because I can see the questions piling up.

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We promised our audience that we're going to give them a good twenty five minutes of the session where they get to put the questions to you.

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So I have a lot of rejoinders to come back on, but out of great self-control, I hand over to my colleague saw,

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although he will now be sharing the questions from the question board OSAT over to you.

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Thank you, Eugene. And thank you both, Lena and Jeremy for really some sort of Eye-Opening reflections from people who are very deeply involved,

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in some cases actually calling in from the region. I there are going to be lots of questions there.

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Over over 120 people in attendance. I apologise to a number of you in advance because you're bringing in lots,

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lots of interesting questions, and I'm pretty sure we're not going to get to all of them.

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But let me begin with two questions, which are, in a sense a counterpoint to one another.

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This is a very polarising topic, as we can imagine. And so these come from two kind of polar opposites.

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One is from Damon Loveless, who I understand is a commander in the U.S. Navy and a fellow at St Antony's College.

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He asks, Why do regional partners take more responsibility to resolve the conflict that is having impacts on their countries,

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refugees, trade issues, terrorism, spill-over, etc.? As a counterpoint to that.

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I have Yassmin mother saying dictatorship didn't come to come to power in the Middle East in a vacuum.

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There is a history of colonialism, arbitrary borders.

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The idea of the U.S. that U.S. military intervention could solve problems created by foreign intervention is a novel idea question.

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What do speakers think of Unan Capones views? Who uses a materialist approach to the development of the Arab Spring and the Syrian uprising?

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Focussing on change? Changing class dynamics in the Middle East, in Middle Eastern society.

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So two very different perspectives, I think. And I leave it to either of you to begin.

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Really. Or perhaps I should nominate you again.

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Don't worry. Yes. Keep your rate up. Here we are. OK.

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Why don't regional partners take more responsibility to resolve the conflict?

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Well, who are we talking about when we say regional partners?

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I mean, if we're thinking about who has been affected, according to the question, in terms of refugees,

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trade issues, et cetera, we're talking Jordan, Lebanon, really these two plus Turkey?

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Well, Turkey is one of the active actors in the conflict itself.

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It approaches the Syrian conflict from my perspective, from the prism of the Kurdish question.

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This is its primary motivation. And therefore, resolving the conflict actually is not necessarily in Turkey's interest because it's not yet done.

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Its business would be with the Kurdish issue. It is still very concerned that the Kurds are being given privileges by the international

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community because of the involvement of Kurdish militias in the fight against ISIS,

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for example, alongside the International Chadash Coalition.

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Turkey is concerned that the Kurds might have an autonomous region near its border, which is Turkey's southern border, obviously on Syria.

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So Turkey has not gone out on its own, try to resolve the conflict when it comes to Jordan.

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Jordan really is a country that bases its foreign policy on trying to stave off instability rather than being proactive.

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It has its national stability as a key priority.

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But at the same time, it knows that it cannot step on the toes of, say,

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Saudi Arabia to try to play a more active, proactive, interventionist role in Middle East conflicts.

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And therefore, it's not likely to to, you know, take any proactive measures on its own when it comes to Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

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They were two countries that for a long time tried to steer the conflict towards a path that

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would support their own interests and failed both of them because Assad is still there.

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They felt they could topple him by supporting all kinds of armed groups and also by supporting the political opposition in Syria.

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Sadly, neither of these tracks worked for them. And so, you know, there's not much they can do.

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And so when it comes to, you know, these regional partners, we have to remember at the end of the day,

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all these actors got involved in Syria, not because they care so much about the well-being of the Syrian people,

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but because they saw in the Syrian situation an opportunity to increase their own

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regional influence or to support their own national interests and and agendas.

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And in a way, the refugees and terrorism, et cetera, are things, you know,

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they have been dealing with, but they're not enough for them to completely change track.

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Plus, even if they did try, it is not in their hands to steer this conflict to a resolution.

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And then as an example here,

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we have to think that Saudi Arabia and around 2015 was trying to set up something called the yard conference to bring together elements

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of the political opposition in Syria that at the time had been in disagreement with one another and tried to have a unified platform.

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And as soon as it announced around spring time that it was going to do that,

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Russia intervenes militarily in Syria in September 2015 and completely derailed Saudi Arabia's plans.

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So so they don't have the leverage. They don't have the ability.

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And as I said, ultimately they care about their national interests.

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I'll chip in on the other side of the question, and you're right.

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I absolutely agree that the Western interventions in the region over well more than a century have been absolutely destructive.

380
00:42:17,530 --> 00:42:23,320
There is a long, long charge sheet in terms of what Western countries have done.

381
00:42:23,320 --> 00:42:31,150
You know, starting with our own Britain and then moving on. But in a sense, where we are, where we are.

382
00:42:31,150 --> 00:42:41,890
And in terms of the idea that American intervention could help deal with a mess that overall in the region,

383
00:42:41,890 --> 00:42:47,230
American intervention has helped to create. Yeah, it doesn't make much sense when you put it that way.

384
00:42:47,230 --> 00:42:58,990
But. The kinds of things that in those early years of the war in Syria, that rebel fighters who weren't jihadists, who weren't jihadi groups,

385
00:42:58,990 --> 00:43:08,710
who would probably be beheaded and would say things like, look, we are not international, we don't want an international jihad.

386
00:43:08,710 --> 00:43:13,890
What we want is a country that looks a bit like Turkey is the kinds of things I would say.

387
00:43:13,890 --> 00:43:20,150
I spend a lot lot of time talking to these guys. And what they would say was.

388
00:43:20,150 --> 00:43:22,730
We just let the Americans give us some weapons, please.

389
00:43:22,730 --> 00:43:30,840
And of course, in in 2011, there was a precedent, which was Libya, and they saw what had happened in Libya and Libya.

390
00:43:30,840 --> 00:43:37,130
The cause of that point had not descended deep into the pit that it's in.

391
00:43:37,130 --> 00:43:45,350
There was still some hope there. And there was a feeling that, you know, with a push, maybe these guys might go on.

392
00:43:45,350 --> 00:43:51,640
The other part of the question to the point that was made about the Arab uprisings 2011.

393
00:43:51,640 --> 00:43:57,200
I'm not familiar with the go polls work, so I can't comment directly on that.

394
00:43:57,200 --> 00:44:05,540
But I did spend an awful lot of time talking to people and writing about it and actually being there in 2011.

395
00:44:05,540 --> 00:44:13,040
And subsequently, I was every day of the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo.

396
00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:18,970
I was spent months in Libya on the regime side, actually.

397
00:44:18,970 --> 00:44:27,140
But also talking to people who don't like the regime, of course, which they were legions in Bahrain and and Tunisia.

398
00:44:27,140 --> 00:44:35,310
And I felt that one of the strongest motivations for what was going on, the strongest drive,

399
00:44:35,310 --> 00:44:41,980
as I should say, was the demographic one, which is a lot of young people.

400
00:44:41,980 --> 00:44:50,890
Very high proportion of the population is under the age of 30 who saw a system which might have been able to give their fathers or

401
00:44:50,890 --> 00:45:01,120
grandfathers something but couldn't give them anything and everything they wanted and was enriching systems that were enriching themselves,

402
00:45:01,120 --> 00:45:14,380
that were repressive. And they wanted something different because they felt that at a time when the national cake was shrinking,

403
00:45:14,380 --> 00:45:19,620
more and more of it was being taken by corrupt oligarchic.

404
00:45:19,620 --> 00:45:25,680
Structures and. Their slice was going and they.

405
00:45:25,680 --> 00:45:33,240
And they could see their eyes have been opened to the outside world, you know, for reasons we well know, the world has changed.

406
00:45:33,240 --> 00:45:43,390
Digital communication, social media was starting, though. I think TV was more influential than than the likes of Facebook.

407
00:45:43,390 --> 00:45:45,700
I think they wanted better lives.

408
00:45:45,700 --> 00:45:54,010
And I think that what is interesting is the protests that we've seen in the last couple of years is that those factors are still very much there.

409
00:45:54,010 --> 00:45:59,680
But it's a little bit of a new generation, of course, because those people have been on the streets and in Baghdad.

410
00:45:59,680 --> 00:46:03,400
Beirut were kids in 2011. Hard to believe.

411
00:46:03,400 --> 00:46:08,740
True. Thank you. I mean, there are so many sort of questions.

412
00:46:08,740 --> 00:46:14,230
A lot of them very, very thoughtful and coming from eminent scholars in some cases.

413
00:46:14,230 --> 00:46:21,310
And I'm going to ask you to forgive me for asking you to be concise, easy can.

414
00:46:21,310 --> 00:46:22,620
But.

415
00:46:22,620 --> 00:46:30,590
So the next question, I'm going to give a question to Lina and then I'll give a question to because these are actually explicitly addressed to you.

416
00:46:30,590 --> 00:46:38,220
So Diana Gilliver asks and she's a Russian sort of academic based at St Antony's here.

417
00:46:38,220 --> 00:46:40,540
She has a two part question. So I'm going to ask the second part of the question,

418
00:46:40,540 --> 00:46:48,430
because I think this is something which is a Russian perspective, which is not always seen in your presentation.

419
00:46:48,430 --> 00:46:56,080
You explained why serious is important because the terrorism threat faced by the West as one of those sort of concerns.

420
00:46:56,080 --> 00:46:59,380
What what about the threat of radicalism in Russia?

421
00:46:59,380 --> 00:47:08,170
So this is, you know, perspective we don't hear very often giving, given that Russian Muslims still joint radicals in Syria and so on.

422
00:47:08,170 --> 00:47:14,770
And I'm just going to take this opportunity also to ask Jeremy a question which is being asked directed at you.

423
00:47:14,770 --> 00:47:22,810
How much did oh, sorry. How much Obama not taking action in Syria was or how much of Obama not taking question in

424
00:47:22,810 --> 00:47:31,120
action in Syria was a post Iraq war syndrome situation rather than any careful calculation?

425
00:47:31,120 --> 00:47:38,110
And what would have been, you know, the destruction and devastation if he had acted in your estimation?

426
00:47:38,110 --> 00:47:42,130
So, Lena, if you can go first, please, on the Russia question.

427
00:47:42,130 --> 00:47:49,260
Yes, sure. I mean, there's no denying that there are Russian fighters are joining jihadist groups in Syria,

428
00:47:49,260 --> 00:47:55,540
like many other fighters who have come from all over the world to do the same thing.

429
00:47:55,540 --> 00:48:01,250
However, we have to also qualify this.

430
00:48:01,250 --> 00:48:11,620
It's not the case that Russia intervened in Syria because it wants to protect itself from these jihadists at home.

431
00:48:11,620 --> 00:48:15,530
If anything, let them go to Syria and die.

432
00:48:15,530 --> 00:48:24,310
If is the way I see the Russian government dealing with the situation, they are allowing them to go and fight in Syria.

433
00:48:24,310 --> 00:48:34,030
And so here we have further instruments of ization of the Syrian conflict as a way for Russia to deal with this domestic radicalisation issue.

434
00:48:34,030 --> 00:48:37,570
However, not on Russian land. Thank you for that very brief.

435
00:48:37,570 --> 00:48:40,990
And Jeremy. Right. I'll do I'll be brief as well. Yes.

436
00:48:40,990 --> 00:48:51,160
The Iraq hangover was a very, very marked reason for their reluctance to get involved, not just in the White House, but in the U.S. Congress.

437
00:48:51,160 --> 00:48:55,180
And, of course, don't forget, there was a crucial vote in the House of Commons.

438
00:48:55,180 --> 00:49:02,460
It's ironic that on the eve of the 2003 invasion, the Americans said to Blair, you know, it's tough.

439
00:49:02,460 --> 00:49:09,200
This is tough for you. We don't need you can go. We go without you. But when Britain wasn't there.

440
00:49:09,200 --> 00:49:10,190
Cheering them on.

441
00:49:10,190 --> 00:49:20,480
Suddenly, Obama was starting to feel lonely, knowing that he, too, would agree to a political process in the in the U.S. Congress about that.

442
00:49:20,480 --> 00:49:26,000
So, you know, and his heart wasn't in it. And, of course, why was it politically unpopular?

443
00:49:26,000 --> 00:49:30,980
Because of the legacy. People say, well, look, Iraq is just next door.

444
00:49:30,980 --> 00:49:37,130
We don't get vote in that kind of thing. Again, in terms of the destructive power of the Americans is remarkable.

445
00:49:37,130 --> 00:49:40,190
They can break a lot of things if they want to.

446
00:49:40,190 --> 00:49:48,020
And even their idea of at the time it was talked about some kind of fairly lightweight series of operations.

447
00:49:48,020 --> 00:49:53,270
But I don't think those really do lightweight, their idea of lightweight as most people that have heavy weight.

448
00:49:53,270 --> 00:50:03,650
And had they chosen to really punish and damage the military infrastructure of of us, said they could have done it in a couple of nights.

449
00:50:03,650 --> 00:50:07,280
Thank you again, Jeremy, for sort of being very concise.

450
00:50:07,280 --> 00:50:14,650
And I'm going to switch gears and ask a question which has come in about Libya's connexion to this.

451
00:50:14,650 --> 00:50:19,340
So either of you are welcome to sort of take this.

452
00:50:19,340 --> 00:50:24,950
How has the NATO intervention in Libya impacted the action taken by the U.S. and Turkey and Syria?

453
00:50:24,950 --> 00:50:29,000
Is this directly related to the principle of R to P.?

454
00:50:29,000 --> 00:50:33,750
I'm not actually familiar with the terminology.

455
00:50:33,750 --> 00:50:42,500
I'll take it RTP, its responsibility to protect, which is basically to authorise military intervention for the sake of protecting civilians.

456
00:50:42,500 --> 00:50:46,400
Ultimately, if you don't intervene, things would be worse.

457
00:50:46,400 --> 00:50:52,550
And this is a big moral dilemma and a policy dilemma because it comes with great costs.

458
00:50:52,550 --> 00:50:59,450
And the Libyan intervention is a factor that did play out in the U.S. decision

459
00:50:59,450 --> 00:51:06,560
to intervene because the Libyan intervention was authorised internationally.

460
00:51:06,560 --> 00:51:13,650
It was, you know, not like the Iraq intervention of the invasion of 2003.

461
00:51:13,650 --> 00:51:21,050
It was. The problem with it, though, is that, yes, it got rid of Gadhafi.

462
00:51:21,050 --> 00:51:26,990
However, it was not coupled with a comprehensive stabilisation strategy for Libya.

463
00:51:26,990 --> 00:51:35,270
So it ended up closing, in my view, the devastation in Libya, which, of course, local Libyan factors played a role.

464
00:51:35,270 --> 00:51:45,920
And however, this led to what I see as an erroneous framework through which many policymakers in the West view Middle East conflicts.

465
00:51:45,920 --> 00:51:49,610
In general, they say it's the Middle East. Damned if you do.

466
00:51:49,610 --> 00:51:53,870
Damned if you don't if it's a quagmire. And look at Iraq.

467
00:51:53,870 --> 00:51:57,680
Look at Libya. Look what military intervention does.

468
00:51:57,680 --> 00:52:07,160
It does not work. And they use it as if to say or imply that Libya and Syria and Iraq are all basically the same.

469
00:52:07,160 --> 00:52:14,810
And I always try to remind these policymakers that there are very different circumstances in each of these scenarios.

470
00:52:14,810 --> 00:52:18,920
And you can't use just because it happens to be the Middle East,

471
00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:25,520
you can't use one country to make an assumption about how things will play out in another country.

472
00:52:25,520 --> 00:52:34,400
And you can't say, see, military intervention doesn't work when you have not planned any strategy beyond just military action.

473
00:52:34,400 --> 00:52:42,780
And this is something that I keep reminding people about when it comes to ISIS right now, that, yes, ISIS is militarily largely defeated.

474
00:52:42,780 --> 00:52:50,330
But you have not addressed the full picture, the economic and political and social drivers that lead people to embrace such a thing.

475
00:52:50,330 --> 00:52:58,580
So we're not done yet with a phenomenon like ISIS because we have not yet addressed the big picture comprehensively and strategically.

476
00:52:58,580 --> 00:53:02,480
So this is the key issue when it comes to military intervention.

477
00:53:02,480 --> 00:53:06,410
It is never enough on its own. And sadly, in the context of the Middle East,

478
00:53:06,410 --> 00:53:13,490
it has largely failed because it has never been part of a wider comprehensive strategy for stabilisation.

479
00:53:13,490 --> 00:53:17,600
Thank you. I mean, I suspect this is quite a challenging conversation to have because there's

480
00:53:17,600 --> 00:53:23,960
so much bipartisan centre left and right almost agreement on the in a sense,

481
00:53:23,960 --> 00:53:29,780
quasar Orientalist decentralising of the entire Middle East is following this quagmire theory, so to speak.

482
00:53:29,780 --> 00:53:39,200
And I I think that there's there needs to be a lot of soul searching, in a sense in policymaking circles about these sorts of questions as well.

483
00:53:39,200 --> 00:53:47,930
I'm going to ask a question specifically directed at Jeremy, actually, from someone by the name of Milans sets me as far as I can.

484
00:53:47,930 --> 00:53:51,890
I hope I pronounce it correctly. So do you think that again, we're coming back to Russia?

485
00:53:51,890 --> 00:53:59,390
Do you think that Russia has not got enough control of Iran to be able to remove Assad even if it chooses to?

486
00:53:59,390 --> 00:54:02,080
This is at least the perception of many Russian experts,

487
00:54:02,080 --> 00:54:08,660
and Russia's interventions have been driven in part from ideological factors and will and the will to showcase it.

488
00:54:08,660 --> 00:54:17,540
Reliability as an ally. So taking into these into account, how do how does the U.S. engage with Russia on Syria?

489
00:54:17,540 --> 00:54:22,130
Well, let me just add on one thing on that. On the to the the Libya hangover.

490
00:54:22,130 --> 00:54:31,310
One thing the Russians are really irked about was the fact that they felt that the Security Council rubber stamp,

491
00:54:31,310 --> 00:54:43,890
they gave all the the their consent in the Security Council to action in Libya was was over, over interpreted and taken too far by Western countries.

492
00:54:43,890 --> 00:54:50,520
There's real anger about that. And they were. Well, I was in Tripoli. They had various.

493
00:54:50,520 --> 00:55:03,450
Diplomatic missions of their own, quite impressive people on them trying to ply their own Furrer unsuccessfully in terms of the eye.

494
00:55:03,450 --> 00:55:10,110
It's so difficult to know just where subtle things like relations or the deep

495
00:55:10,110 --> 00:55:15,900
level between Russia and Iran are that I can only speculate about all of that.

496
00:55:15,900 --> 00:55:20,760
I certainly think it would be very hard to do things like that without the consent of Iran.

497
00:55:20,760 --> 00:55:25,740
But I think those two countries are quite capable, even though they there's.

498
00:55:25,740 --> 00:55:35,610
They don't see eye to eye on loads of things. Russia and Iran are capable clearly of working together because they do de facto in Syria.

499
00:55:35,610 --> 00:55:39,210
So no idea if the Russians wanted to remove Assad.

500
00:55:39,210 --> 00:55:46,350
I don't see why they would want to at the moment. But if they wanted to, I think they would probably have to make a case to the Iranians.

501
00:55:46,350 --> 00:55:52,040
And I am strongly of the belief that.

502
00:55:52,040 --> 00:56:00,110
I'm quite a realist on these things and my particular beliefs, and I do think that those countries will be pushing to uphold their own interests.

503
00:56:00,110 --> 00:56:03,550
And if Iran felt it was in their own interests, I didn't.

504
00:56:03,550 --> 00:56:10,260
They are in love with the Assads in the same way that the Russians. Are they useful?

505
00:56:10,260 --> 00:56:17,290
Thank you very much. I I'm a little conscious of the time and we are sort of coming to the end.

506
00:56:17,290 --> 00:56:24,660
And more questions as tends to happen in these cases with each of your responses, your eliciting further questions.

507
00:56:24,660 --> 00:56:32,820
I'm going to read a question from an anonymous attendee. And perhaps, Lena, you could start with this.

508
00:56:32,820 --> 00:56:38,790
Why are questions of Syrian instead of state formation, sorry, and institution building not being asked in Syria?

509
00:56:38,790 --> 00:56:42,510
And instead, we only focus on how to resolve the conflict internationally.

510
00:56:42,510 --> 00:56:50,370
What is the form of political institutions that we can create in case a compromise happens, given the political, ethnic,

511
00:56:50,370 --> 00:56:58,590
religious polarisation of Syria of the Syrian people because of the conflict and primarily because of the Assad regime?

512
00:56:58,590 --> 00:57:07,430
Such a good question. I have to say, unfortunately, look at Iraq, the question of state building is only just beginning.

513
00:57:07,430 --> 00:57:14,390
Even, you know what, a decade and a half or more since the invasion and the regime change.

514
00:57:14,390 --> 00:57:20,150
Unfortunately, state building, which, as you know, the question said is very crucial,

515
00:57:20,150 --> 00:57:28,070
is a long term thing that requires policymakers to think beyond six months, one year, even five years.

516
00:57:28,070 --> 00:57:36,530
And unfortunately, in general, policy internationally is never really based on long term planning like that.

517
00:57:36,530 --> 00:57:43,310
And so this is one of the huge shortcomings. I think when it comes to Western policymaking in particular,

518
00:57:43,310 --> 00:57:49,070
that these questions that are really crucial are just overlooked because they just take too long.

519
00:57:49,070 --> 00:57:56,630
And in general policy, it seems to be tied to the term in which someone is serving or the objectives of a particular

520
00:57:56,630 --> 00:58:03,140
project that is being funded by X Development Department or whatever somewhere in the world.

521
00:58:03,140 --> 00:58:08,000
So, yes, it is absolutely the elephant in the room. Thank you.

522
00:58:08,000 --> 00:58:16,310
I mean, I unfortunately, I think we have come to an end. I I guess, Jeremy, if you wanted to comment a little on this from a realist perspective,

523
00:58:16,310 --> 00:58:21,810
as you were saying, you can feel free to kind of have the last word before handing over to you.

524
00:58:21,810 --> 00:58:28,480
If that's right. So I just need to a mute.

525
00:58:28,480 --> 00:58:36,470
I'm very reluctant. I shouldn't use words like that in front of people who deal with the currency of these things in academia every day.

526
00:58:36,470 --> 00:58:42,050
My son is in the process of applying for university, so. For history. So I've been talking about things like that with him.

527
00:58:42,050 --> 00:58:49,880
I think it's very contaminated, my brain waves. Listen, I just thank you very much for these brilliant questions and for inviting me on llena.

528
00:58:49,880 --> 00:58:59,850
Fantastic contributions because. One thing I yeah, one thing I would end with, actually, sometimes I do hear regarding the,

529
00:58:59,850 --> 00:59:07,830
you know, the villainous mainstream media and their baleful role in the region that the.

530
00:59:07,830 --> 00:59:11,460
Why are they forgotten about Syria? Why don't they do more about Syria?

531
00:59:11,460 --> 00:59:15,690
Do they realise it? I would love to do more about Syria.

532
00:59:15,690 --> 00:59:23,520
But guess what? They won't let us in. On the regime side, we used to be able to get visas and now they won't give us visas.

533
00:59:23,520 --> 00:59:29,870
Partly things we've done, partly things that they feel later that we'd just be too much of a pain, I think.

534
00:59:29,870 --> 00:59:40,020
And on the those other areas, you know, in the north, it's much, much harder now with Turkey moving around the area.

535
00:59:40,020 --> 00:59:48,180
Regime troops moving around the area. There were people who regularly went across and there have been people are there ways of getting into Idlib.

536
00:59:48,180 --> 00:59:51,790
But it's really quite difficult. And, you know, negotiations with AIST.

537
00:59:51,790 --> 00:59:56,400
Yes, not easy. So you believe you me?

538
00:59:56,400 --> 01:00:01,290
We would like to do more. I would do stuff the whole time.

539
01:00:01,290 --> 01:00:07,230
But we we can't and this is one of the awful things at the moment about actually trying to cover the region.

540
01:00:07,230 --> 01:00:12,210
There are loads of countries where we just physically can't get in. And that's a problem.

541
01:00:12,210 --> 01:00:19,790
And it's not because we don't want to. Well, I think on that note, in the hope that you will be able to get back in,

542
01:00:19,790 --> 01:00:29,210
you and the diplomats and the academics and the aid agencies and most of all the Syrian people themselves will be able to get back in.

543
01:00:29,210 --> 01:00:35,270
I'd like to thank our speakers Jeremy Bowen and Lida TEEB for truly an enlightened discussion tonight.

544
01:00:35,270 --> 01:00:42,380
It's been such a pleasure to be with you. I'd like to thank Osama Nazari for his very deft handling of tonight's questions.

545
01:00:42,380 --> 01:00:45,930
I'd like to thank Stacey Chirchir for managing all the technology for us.

546
01:00:45,930 --> 01:00:50,180
And I'd like to invite all of you to come back next week when we all welcome Edgett General Kunlun,

547
01:00:50,180 --> 01:00:57,260
who will finish our survey of the dictatorship syndrome with the logic of chaos, the pattern of dictatorships.

548
01:00:57,260 --> 01:01:10,596
Join us next week here from Oxford. Good night.