1 00:00:00,180 --> 00:00:06,780 Good evening from a chilly Oxford and the Middle East centre, my name is Eugene Rogan and it's my great pleasure to welcome you all to the seventh 2 00:00:06,780 --> 00:00:11,940 in our webinar series addressing the dictatorship syndrome in the Middle East. 3 00:00:11,940 --> 00:00:18,420 Our subject tonight will be addressed by two of the best people you could hope to hear speak on the subject. 4 00:00:18,420 --> 00:00:24,720 We're very pleased to be welcoming Dr. Lina TEEB, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House. 5 00:00:24,720 --> 00:00:33,090 Dina's joining us from Beirut tonight. And Jeremy Bowen, Middle East editor of the BBC, who will be speaking to us from Wales. 6 00:00:33,090 --> 00:00:38,150 Their subject, why Syria still matters, why Assad is still there. 7 00:00:38,150 --> 00:00:43,810 Lina, get us started on tonight's conversation. Thank you so much for having me. 8 00:00:43,810 --> 00:00:53,290 And thanks to well, I can see one hundred people so far on a Friday afternoon joining to hear about Syria. 9 00:00:53,290 --> 00:00:58,390 A few people have heard me say this over the last few years whenever there are events in Syria. 10 00:00:58,390 --> 00:01:04,420 I'm off to speak up with very good turnout. I say thank you for remaining interested. 11 00:01:04,420 --> 00:01:11,140 A lot of people seem to think that Syria is just a conflict that is running in the background that doesn't deserve attention, 12 00:01:11,140 --> 00:01:14,050 what we're saying today is serious still matters. 13 00:01:14,050 --> 00:01:23,540 It is whether we like it or not, a shared responsibility for the West and for the regional powers, as well as, of course, all kinds of Syrian actors. 14 00:01:23,540 --> 00:01:34,720 And if I were to say who I would regard as being my top priority when it comes to responsibility for Syria amongst all international actors, 15 00:01:34,720 --> 00:01:40,080 I am not going to pick Russia or Iran. I am actually going to pick the United States. 16 00:01:40,080 --> 00:01:46,250 So it's a pleasure to be hosted tonight. Shortly after the US election are announced. 17 00:01:46,250 --> 00:01:55,600 After a bit of a delay, just shed some light on what I've perceived when it comes to the Syrian conflict and U.S. foreign policy. 18 00:01:55,600 --> 00:02:01,920 I think for me, as someone who has been working on Syria for over a decade, 19 00:02:01,920 --> 00:02:12,070 there was a missed opportunity during the Obama administration for the United States to play a seminal role in steering what was then a mere crisis, 20 00:02:12,070 --> 00:02:20,290 not a conflict. We're talking early days in 2011 when the Assad regime was starting to use violence against its own people. 21 00:02:20,290 --> 00:02:25,660 There was an opportunity for the United States to try to exert diplomatic pressure 22 00:02:25,660 --> 00:02:31,210 to steer that crisis towards some sort of resolution of what we saw was different. 23 00:02:31,210 --> 00:02:38,230 We saw lots of good rhetoric on the part of President Barack Obama saying Assad must go. 24 00:02:38,230 --> 00:02:43,810 Later on saying the use of chemical weapons would be a red line for the Obama administration. 25 00:02:43,810 --> 00:02:48,550 But unfortunately, that was not coupled with action. 26 00:02:48,550 --> 00:02:56,800 We know that the threat to use force were chemical weapons to be used, was not materialising any time soon. 27 00:02:56,800 --> 00:03:01,630 During Obama's term, and even under Trump's administration, 28 00:03:01,630 --> 00:03:11,170 similar threats only materialised and the launch of a handful of missiles that did not really do much to change the course of the conflict. 29 00:03:11,170 --> 00:03:17,740 So while I go back to the days of the Obama administration to put primary diplomatic blame on the United 30 00:03:17,740 --> 00:03:25,870 States for not having the political will to try to steer the Syrian crisis toward some sort of settlement, 31 00:03:25,870 --> 00:03:31,870 I will also say the Trump administration did not really diverge greatly from 32 00:03:31,870 --> 00:03:36,700 that of the Obama administration when it comes to handling the Syrian conflict. 33 00:03:36,700 --> 00:03:46,540 What we've seen in both administrations is a path of disengagement on part of the United States and towards the end of Trump's administration, 34 00:03:46,540 --> 00:03:50,110 meaning, you know, let's say the last two years or so, 35 00:03:50,110 --> 00:03:59,440 we have seen this engagement materialise in having Syria become a component of the United States Iran strategy, 36 00:03:59,440 --> 00:04:06,610 rather than having a distinct stand alone policy on Syria on part of the United States. 37 00:04:06,610 --> 00:04:10,060 Whenever I spoke to policymakers in Washington about this, 38 00:04:10,060 --> 00:04:17,410 they mentioned the maximum pressure strategy on Iran as being one of the things that are done about Syria. 39 00:04:17,410 --> 00:04:25,030 Of course, that doesn't mean that it's all doom and gloom when it comes to U.S. behaviour regarding the Syrian conflict. 40 00:04:25,030 --> 00:04:32,620 One of the positives, in my view, under the Trump administration is the Caesar Act, which is the act about sanctions. 41 00:04:32,620 --> 00:04:37,900 And these sanctions are not just about Syrian entities involved with the Assad regime, 42 00:04:37,900 --> 00:04:42,790 but anyone, Syrian or not, who is basically doing business with the Assad regime. 43 00:04:42,790 --> 00:04:44,980 And I think this is very important. 44 00:04:44,980 --> 00:04:55,780 And it's it's part of the reason why these sanctions, though, you know, the Assad regime tries to spin them as hurting the people of Syria. 45 00:04:55,780 --> 00:04:59,680 Ultimately, it is the Assad regime that is hurting the people of Syria. 46 00:04:59,680 --> 00:05:04,990 The sanctions may have played a very, very small role, but the devastation was already there. 47 00:05:04,990 --> 00:05:11,050 And Assad is responsible for the financial crisis in Syria is not really because of sanctions. 48 00:05:11,050 --> 00:05:15,940 And even Assad himself admitted that not too long ago, around two weeks ago. 49 00:05:15,940 --> 00:05:21,790 So the Chesire act is a positive step, but this is their act. And sanctions anyway, do not end conflict. 50 00:05:21,790 --> 00:05:25,600 What you need is diplomatic engagement with Russia. 51 00:05:25,600 --> 00:05:32,460 So although I say the United States could have been a change maker in the course of the crisis, unfortunately, 52 00:05:32,460 --> 00:05:42,640 us this engagement over the years paved the way for Russia to enter the Syrian domain and become the power broker in the spotlight. 53 00:05:42,640 --> 00:05:50,260 So 2015 onwards on the ground, Russia is the most influential foreign actor in Syria. 54 00:05:50,260 --> 00:05:59,080 And it did this because it saw an opportunity to assert itself, could be be the international community and visibly the United States in particular. 55 00:05:59,080 --> 00:06:03,930 So today we are in a situation in which I look at the United Nations. 56 00:06:03,930 --> 00:06:13,480 And I see a peace process that is really not going anywhere, but that the United States and its allies are interested in keeping alive. 57 00:06:13,480 --> 00:06:19,000 And that is, of course, important, because even if the U.N. cannot steer the conflict towards a resolution, 58 00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:26,830 you still need the U.N. peace process for when there is international political will to steer the conflict into a resolution. 59 00:06:26,830 --> 00:06:32,410 You need the U.N. so that there can be a mechanism for implementing whatever deal is broken. 60 00:06:32,410 --> 00:06:38,680 So that is important. And it's important that the United States is supportive of that when it comes to military intervention. 61 00:06:38,680 --> 00:06:46,630 Those days are long gone. I don't think there's going to be any appetite even under the new incoming Biden administration, 62 00:06:46,630 --> 00:06:54,270 which is widely seen as being perhaps more into interventionism than the Trump administration. 63 00:06:54,270 --> 00:07:02,620 But we can see indications of this with the selection of the foreign policy team, mainly the incoming secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, 64 00:07:02,620 --> 00:07:10,270 who spoke in May about failure on part of the Obama administration to steer the Syrian conflict towards a 65 00:07:10,270 --> 00:07:16,360 resolution and failing basically that the Syrian people resulting in the refugee crisis and other things. 66 00:07:16,360 --> 00:07:21,610 But that doesn't mean that the incoming administration is going to be interested in military intervention. 67 00:07:21,610 --> 00:07:30,680 Another thing that is important is that the incoming U.S. administration, mainly Biden, is not really enamoured with Russia. 68 00:07:30,680 --> 00:07:40,720 And this is a positive step because under President Trump, we've seen, let's say, not much of a strong stance regarding Russia's activities in Syria. 69 00:07:40,720 --> 00:07:45,610 And I don't think President Biden would take the same line. 70 00:07:45,610 --> 00:07:50,110 So what I'm saying is, despite the criticisms, despite this engagement, 71 00:07:50,110 --> 00:07:58,640 there are things that could be built on what the new administration coming into power in January and the United States sanctions. 72 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:01,270 Yes, they would not end the conflict, but they are hurting. 73 00:08:01,270 --> 00:08:09,740 They are hurting Iran, actually, because some of Iran's allies and proxies are obviously doing business with the Syrian regime here. 74 00:08:09,740 --> 00:08:12,910 I'm talking, for example, about Hezbollah in Lebanon. 75 00:08:12,910 --> 00:08:20,110 Syrian business people and profiteers are also, you know, are used by the regime to circumvent sanctions. 76 00:08:20,110 --> 00:08:24,920 And the more than that, it's cost widely, the more people are killed. 77 00:08:24,920 --> 00:08:29,470 And which makes things a bit difficult for the regime financially, 78 00:08:29,470 --> 00:08:36,240 which can be used as leverage by the international community to try to push for a political transition. 79 00:08:36,240 --> 00:08:42,160 The U.N. process, despite all the difficulties, is not that it is still, you know, kind of there. 80 00:08:42,160 --> 00:08:45,940 This is important. But I think the key question for me, 81 00:08:45,940 --> 00:08:56,620 if I were to be a Washington watcher regarding Syria is will the U.S. finally take that step to engage Russia in a bilateral discussion on Syria? 82 00:08:56,620 --> 00:09:03,820 Because unfortunately, the solution to the Syrian conflict is not on the ground in Syria. 83 00:09:03,820 --> 00:09:08,740 It is international. And why this matters, why resolving the conflict matters? 84 00:09:08,740 --> 00:09:11,920 It's because the refugee crisis around the world. 85 00:09:11,920 --> 00:09:21,190 The rise of ISIS, the issues like terrorism, you know, that the West is concerned with are symptoms and outcomes of the conflict. 86 00:09:21,190 --> 00:09:28,480 And so I've seen a lot of resources being spent to tackle the refugee issue and terrorism. 87 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:34,210 But unless you tackle the source of the problem, you're just going to put a Band-Aid on the situation. 88 00:09:34,210 --> 00:09:41,080 And that's not going to work long term. And we're only going to just repeat the same cycle of violence and grievances. 89 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:52,150 And so Syria does matter. And the failure on part of the international community has played a huge role in letting Assad stay in power. 90 00:09:52,150 --> 00:09:56,800 So this is just what I have to say for now. And I look forward to the rest of the conversation. 91 00:09:56,800 --> 00:10:01,210 Thank you. Leader, thank you so much. You got us off to a brilliant start. 92 00:10:01,210 --> 00:10:04,080 We clearly are in a moment of transition and change. 93 00:10:04,080 --> 00:10:09,430 And I think everyone's first question when it comes to the new administration of the U.S. and their policies 94 00:10:09,430 --> 00:10:14,950 towards the Middle East is how they're going to respond to the newly assertive position of Russia. 95 00:10:14,950 --> 00:10:18,850 You've given us some vision that there could be a hopeful outcome to this. 96 00:10:18,850 --> 00:10:24,400 And I'd like to cling to any straw of hope that I could get. But before I leap on straws of hope. 97 00:10:24,400 --> 00:10:29,410 I'd like to invite Jeremy Bowen to give us his views and then we'll come back to discuss further. 98 00:10:29,410 --> 00:10:33,340 Jeremy, over to you. Thanks. Usually I'm a journalist. I didn't do it. 99 00:10:33,340 --> 00:10:37,600 At least not easily masterly, Lena, of course. 100 00:10:37,600 --> 00:10:44,140 So I'm not going to try to repeat those great points, particularly those ones at the end, about why it still matters. 101 00:10:44,140 --> 00:10:49,270 So I could talk a little bit about my experiences in Syria since the war started. 102 00:10:49,270 --> 00:10:58,000 I've been a pretty regular visitor, which hopefully I'll try and throw some light on the theme of a lot of this is dictatorship, 103 00:10:58,000 --> 00:11:02,770 the appeal, the continuing appeal of the dictator, despite everything. 104 00:11:02,770 --> 00:11:14,210 So let me start. Well, with a flashback, 2006, the the war in which Hezbollah in Lebanon fought the Israelis to a standstill. 105 00:11:14,210 --> 00:11:19,790 Now, if you think back to that time, those were those of you old enough to remember. 106 00:11:19,790 --> 00:11:29,420 You'll know that. You'll remember that Nasrallah became the rock star of the whole region as a result of that Arab countries, 107 00:11:29,420 --> 00:11:34,370 but not too far behind because he had helped him out an awful lot. 108 00:11:34,370 --> 00:11:39,200 Was Bashar al Assad not long after I was in Lebanon for that war. 109 00:11:39,200 --> 00:11:47,030 But then not long afterwards, I was in the West Bank. I was in Ramallah. And there's a sketch artist in the main square in the middle of the town. 110 00:11:47,030 --> 00:11:56,300 And his face, you know, his hit sketches the whole time, four years have been Arafat, of course, and NASA. 111 00:11:56,300 --> 00:12:03,680 They had a big new hit that year, which was Nasrallah, but not far behind was Bashar al-Assad. 112 00:12:03,680 --> 00:12:08,490 Assad was a man who had credibility. He seemed to be. 113 00:12:08,490 --> 00:12:15,110 He stood up against Israel. He was the the leader of a new generation people were talking about. 114 00:12:15,110 --> 00:12:24,210 The old guys were getting out. And while he hadn't quite delivered any of the reforms that he talked about a lot, he still he talked a good game. 115 00:12:24,210 --> 00:12:31,970 And, yeah, they'd be coming along, but not just yet. You know, at that time, getting to Damascus was not difficult. 116 00:12:31,970 --> 00:12:39,100 You could from my point of view, I could get visas. I saw Assad a couple of times whenever I spoke to Assad. 117 00:12:39,100 --> 00:12:45,530 There always be some private time in advance. You'd sit in a room in a. room before the interview with the cameras. 118 00:12:45,530 --> 00:12:49,160 And so you sit without cameras, without his guys. 119 00:12:49,160 --> 00:13:00,650 And the way he always came over, because, of course, his slightly, you know, geeky look belied the fact that he really believed, 120 00:13:00,650 --> 00:13:08,270 I think all was working very hard to believe that he was like his father, that he was sitting in the middle of the web. 121 00:13:08,270 --> 00:13:13,310 That he was he understood what was going on. And he kept saying, I am pragmatic. 122 00:13:13,310 --> 00:13:18,050 I will do what is best for Syria. I will do what is best for the Syrian people. 123 00:13:18,050 --> 00:13:22,250 Damascus was, of course, the police state. Was it as muscular as ever. 124 00:13:22,250 --> 00:13:24,620 But people could have fairly decent lives. 125 00:13:24,620 --> 00:13:31,820 It was full of Iraqi refugees who were coming in from at the time was a horrendous situation over the border. 126 00:13:31,820 --> 00:13:41,570 And Assad was there and promising what was going on. So let's fast forward a little bit to the beginning of the uprisings, 2011. 127 00:13:41,570 --> 00:13:52,340 Now, again, there was an assumption that that perhaps after those first incidents and those terrible first scenes in Daraa in the south, 128 00:13:52,340 --> 00:13:56,480 that Assad this will be the moment and there was a key speech as well that he was going to make. 129 00:13:56,480 --> 00:14:01,550 And lots of Syrians said to me, you know, he's been yeah, he's a flawed character, but he's the best we've got. 130 00:14:01,550 --> 00:14:11,390 And he's and this is his chance. But he didn't say he'd double down on troubled down on the the assaults on his own people. 131 00:14:11,390 --> 00:14:14,060 And, you know, we know what happened after that. 132 00:14:14,060 --> 00:14:22,340 But it was a time that the say in Damascus, I'm one of the few journalists who is able to go to both sides, 133 00:14:22,340 --> 00:14:25,970 both the regime's side and the rebel side in Damascus, 134 00:14:25,970 --> 00:14:33,980 particularly in the early years when it was possible across the frontlines to go cross into Duma at the very beginning, 135 00:14:33,980 --> 00:14:39,230 2012, you just drive down the road and leave behind the final regime checkpoint. 136 00:14:39,230 --> 00:14:48,380 And then after about half a mile, there would be guys with the other flag, with the other Syrian flag and guns and big demos. 137 00:14:48,380 --> 00:14:53,230 And, you know, this was not far from the centre of Damascus. 138 00:14:53,230 --> 00:14:55,120 So that was there was a feeling, you know, 139 00:14:55,120 --> 00:15:04,390 we all had this assumption that he would get that extra push and he would go the way of his predecessors in Tunisia and in Egypt. 140 00:15:04,390 --> 00:15:08,920 But, you know, Gadhafi was fighting back at the time. And what was the acid test there? 141 00:15:08,920 --> 00:15:18,330 What really changed it? NATO and some of the Gulf countries gave the rebels an air force and the rebels in Syria at that time, 142 00:15:18,330 --> 00:15:27,220 what things might have been different had they had an air force, but they didn't. And of course, I said senior had created a much stronger regime. 143 00:15:27,220 --> 00:15:37,600 I think as well, an anti coup regime, Alawi's and other minorities didn't like the alternatives that they were being presented with. 144 00:15:37,600 --> 00:15:45,460 And and I was trolled every time I put this on the BBC or on social media, on Twitter. 145 00:15:45,460 --> 00:15:56,950 Assad had throughout genuine support from important groups in that country without which his regime, 146 00:15:56,950 --> 00:16:04,900 no matter how how cleverly allies from the home village had been put into positions of power or families that they knew. 147 00:16:04,900 --> 00:16:12,700 The fact is that without people who were prepared to fight for him, he wouldn't have survived. 148 00:16:12,700 --> 00:16:23,660 And this is before the big foreign interventions. I've spent quite a bit of time with the Syrian Arab army in various places. 149 00:16:23,660 --> 00:16:32,230 I always felt that the narrative that they were collapsing when the Russians invaded was a bit overdone and later invited in. 150 00:16:32,230 --> 00:16:38,710 A bigger problem was rather overdone. They weren't big and they weren't very powerful, 151 00:16:38,710 --> 00:16:46,480 but they were prepared to fight and they retain their cohesion and they still have which after that many years of war, 152 00:16:46,480 --> 00:16:51,660 they were still a disciplined force. You go to their positions and they wouldn't be, you know, with armies. 153 00:16:51,660 --> 00:16:56,140 These things matter. You know, they were well-run. They were clean. They weren't piles. 154 00:16:56,140 --> 00:17:00,880 They'd be burning their garbage. They weren't using the next room as a latrine. 155 00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:05,140 The way that many of the rebels I've been with over the years and different countries behave. 156 00:17:05,140 --> 00:17:08,110 They were behaving like an army. And that I think. 157 00:17:08,110 --> 00:17:15,700 And yeah, of course, it's well documented that plenty of people did not want to be conscripted and did a great deal to escape that. 158 00:17:15,700 --> 00:17:20,480 But there were enough people who had to carry a gun for him. 159 00:17:20,480 --> 00:17:29,230 And I went to a few funerals in Alawi villages on the coast and it reminded me very, 160 00:17:29,230 --> 00:17:34,840 very much of the atmosphere in visit villages in Croatia and in Montenegro and Croatia, 161 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:41,160 particularly actually during the Yugoslav wars, these people on the coast of the Mediterranean. 162 00:17:41,160 --> 00:17:47,380 Tight knit village communities, everybody turning out, everybody crying. 163 00:17:47,380 --> 00:17:54,250 And I felt the these and these were not educated people, genuine support for the dictator. 164 00:17:54,250 --> 00:17:58,090 The guy who they were prepared to bleed for. Of course, later on. 165 00:17:58,090 --> 00:18:00,650 There was resentment that, you know, 166 00:18:00,650 --> 00:18:10,370 if you ever I don't vintage you ever looked at Instagram on the extraordinary photographs that running actually sun used to post from Dubai. 167 00:18:10,370 --> 00:18:18,220 My God, you know, his abs, the oil he put on them, his Ferrari's private jets girls. 168 00:18:18,220 --> 00:18:23,440 Yeah. I mean, you name it. And these guys were fighting and dying for his family. 169 00:18:23,440 --> 00:18:29,410 Yet they continue to do it. And I think a lot of them felt it was a genuine fight for survival. 170 00:18:29,410 --> 00:18:36,370 And there was a guy called Moxa Lamani, who was a U.N. official who was part of their team, their senior. 171 00:18:36,370 --> 00:18:41,230 And one of his main jobs was to talk to a lot of the rebel groups from Damascus. 172 00:18:41,230 --> 00:18:48,820 He was online the whole time with them. And I remember talking to him and he was he said he said on the record, I'm not spilling anything, 173 00:18:48,820 --> 00:18:59,080 that he used the word genocide to describe what he felt was the risk that those communities on the coast risked if the jihadi groups got to them. 174 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:03,460 That's why they fought. They fought because they thought that they didn't fight. They'd die. 175 00:19:03,460 --> 00:19:09,370 Of course, things became you became a mini world war, didn't it? And we've got plenty of time to go into all of this. 176 00:19:09,370 --> 00:19:14,440 But for these opening remarks, I just want to tell you what it was like at that big turning point. 177 00:19:14,440 --> 00:19:23,920 And I absolutely agree, Lina, with the fact that the the US had its chances and it chose the Obama administration chose not to take it. 178 00:19:23,920 --> 00:19:29,320 Of course, international diplomacy was deadlocked. The Security Council was deadlocked. 179 00:19:29,320 --> 00:19:36,970 That's why they're at that dialogue. If it ever happens between the US and Moscow is really, really important. 180 00:19:36,970 --> 00:19:47,350 But after those chemical attacks and the red line comment was much talked about. 181 00:19:47,350 --> 00:19:52,050 Then I was. I found my husband to have a visa and I went to say I went to Damascus. 182 00:19:52,050 --> 00:19:58,440 And we were waiting to get bombed. And I had a call in our office in the. 183 00:19:58,440 --> 00:20:04,250 We get a room. Get rooms at the at the Four Seasons Hotel where the U.N. is based. 184 00:20:04,250 --> 00:20:09,790 Is good security there, principally in that period. I was always worried some would try and drove a truck into the front lobby. 185 00:20:09,790 --> 00:20:15,110 So the fact that they had good security to stop that sort of thing happening was a definite plus. 186 00:20:15,110 --> 00:20:20,650 Anyway, the phone went and I thought it was a very senior member of the regime inviting 187 00:20:20,650 --> 00:20:26,110 me to the working palace that they had in the centre of the city for a talk. 188 00:20:26,110 --> 00:20:29,710 And I thought it's got to be that asset into we've been asking for so long. 189 00:20:29,710 --> 00:20:37,400 In fact, we dig out one that is two years later. And this person got me in and said. 190 00:20:37,400 --> 00:20:42,470 Really nervously said, Jeremy, are you following on TV for years? 191 00:20:42,470 --> 00:20:46,850 You have been bombed by the Americans in various different cities. 192 00:20:46,850 --> 00:20:52,670 What's it like? What's it going to be like? And this person was really nervous. 193 00:20:52,670 --> 00:20:58,340 So I said, well, first of all, don't don't be in this building because this is one they might well destroy. 194 00:20:58,340 --> 00:21:03,680 And they were already they aren't stupid. They were emptying their bases of troops. 195 00:21:03,680 --> 00:21:11,510 They were expecting to be hammered. And this official, really senior very close to Asad was really nervous. 196 00:21:11,510 --> 00:21:17,750 And after it didn't happen, the relief was incredible. 197 00:21:17,750 --> 00:21:22,550 They thought that they had that basically that Obama had blinked. 198 00:21:22,550 --> 00:21:27,650 They'd stared him out. And after that, I really felt that their attitude changed. 199 00:21:27,650 --> 00:21:35,300 No. And that, of course, you know, I'm going to shut up in a minute, but not to go through this sorry history of what happened ever since then. 200 00:21:35,300 --> 00:21:39,050 But it was a moment that could have happened. 201 00:21:39,050 --> 00:21:45,890 And as a former U.S. defence secretary said to me, he said, look, I said I worked for a number of different presidents. 202 00:21:45,890 --> 00:21:51,030 And he said, and as the US president, I gave Obama this message. 203 00:21:51,030 --> 00:21:54,560 And I said, as as U.S. president, you carry a very big gun. 204 00:21:54,560 --> 00:22:01,390 And if you pull that gun out of your holster and you load the gun and you point the gun, you've got to be able to prepare to fire the gun. 205 00:22:01,390 --> 00:22:09,770 He wasn't prepared to fire the gun, wouldn't have ended the war. But there were certainly groups who were not extremists in the jihadi sense in the 206 00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:15,260 suburbs of Damascus who were planning to follow up those attacks with their own attacks. 207 00:22:15,260 --> 00:22:22,960 And things would have been different. I not saying they even would have been better, but they would have been different if that had happened. 208 00:22:22,960 --> 00:22:27,970 What ifs. Well. Listen, that's that's my opening spiel done. 209 00:22:27,970 --> 00:22:32,560 I think I think my time's running out for that. So let's open it up to two questions. 210 00:22:32,560 --> 00:22:37,270 Thank you very much. Jeremy. And I don't think you deserve to be trolled for stating the obvious, 211 00:22:37,270 --> 00:22:45,250 which is one of the reasons why Assad survived for so long, is because there was actually a broad base of support for the man. 212 00:22:45,250 --> 00:22:52,060 But I'd like to interrogate that a little further, because looking at Syria from the perspective of 2020, 213 00:22:52,060 --> 00:23:00,100 it would seem that Syrians were either loyal or opposition out of fear either way, that if you were of a certain demographic, 214 00:23:00,100 --> 00:23:04,090 if you were from the Baath Party, if you are Alawi, if you are Christian, 215 00:23:04,090 --> 00:23:07,930 your biggest fear was that with the fall of the regime would come a kind of 216 00:23:07,930 --> 00:23:14,650 hypercharged jihadi insurgents army that would take the government and victimise you. 217 00:23:14,650 --> 00:23:21,100 And so it wasn't necessarily that it was out of conviction for Bashar, his methods. 218 00:23:21,100 --> 00:23:23,290 It was out of fear of the opposition. 219 00:23:23,290 --> 00:23:30,910 And of course, the opposition was in desperate fear of the horrendous treatment that the state meted out to those who opposed it, 220 00:23:30,910 --> 00:23:34,720 whether it was what went on in Daraa, what went on in jails, 221 00:23:34,720 --> 00:23:41,500 what went on with children like Hamza, you know, across the 10 years of this conflict or nearly 10 years of this conflict, 222 00:23:41,500 --> 00:23:44,950 a catalogue of horrors that agenda, tremendous fear in the hearts of everyone. 223 00:23:44,950 --> 00:23:49,120 One of the themes running through the dictatorship syndrome analyst Rani's 224 00:23:49,120 --> 00:23:54,670 essay is this notion of a complicity between a society enabling its dictators. 225 00:23:54,670 --> 00:24:00,820 And I wonder whether Syria in that sense is the exception, that it's not society that is enabling so much of society, 226 00:24:00,820 --> 00:24:05,680 either fearful of the dictator or fearful of the opposition being absent, neutralised. 227 00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:10,360 I wonder if you would need to both reflect on that. Yeah, well, if I just pick up if you like the. 228 00:24:10,360 --> 00:24:15,520 I absolutely agree. I couldn't agree more. The nexus of fear that is extraordinary. 229 00:24:15,520 --> 00:24:23,590 And there are people who people I would speak to regular in Damascus who'd say, look, I'm just going to try and ride this one out. 230 00:24:23,590 --> 00:24:30,550 Christians, for example, who'd say, of course, the thought of some of these guys coming into the city terrifies me. 231 00:24:30,550 --> 00:24:35,440 But I hate Bashar and I hate his regime. I wanted to go. 232 00:24:35,440 --> 00:24:40,150 But for the time being, we're just going to try and have to survive here and see what we can do. 233 00:24:40,150 --> 00:24:46,750 And yes, on the other side, there was enormous fear of of what the regime was capable of doing. 234 00:24:46,750 --> 00:24:51,280 I was at the aftermath of some barrel bombs in the Damascus suburbs. 235 00:24:51,280 --> 00:24:57,780 The destruction was phenomenal. You know, buildings still on fire. 236 00:24:57,780 --> 00:25:06,680 Bodies. I mean, you name it. I saw all of that while I interviewed, I said on the subject an interview that was carried in its entirety. 237 00:25:06,680 --> 00:25:11,400 I was part of the deal on twenty three minutes on Syrian TV. 238 00:25:11,400 --> 00:25:15,660 I said, look, this is Homs. This is documented. 239 00:25:15,660 --> 00:25:20,640 You know, this video of them landing. I've seen them myself. And he absolute denied it. 240 00:25:20,640 --> 00:25:24,360 Barrel bombs. He said we have bombs with bullets. 241 00:25:24,360 --> 00:25:30,900 We don't have barrel bombs. Nothing like that. So, yeah, I think that there was this idea. 242 00:25:30,900 --> 00:25:35,900 I suppose there are people there in the regime who benefited from the regime, who, of course, 243 00:25:35,900 --> 00:25:47,460 are complicit in its continuation and in the way that the the Assad clan have made Syria their family business for 50 years. 244 00:25:47,460 --> 00:25:51,330 But why have so many Syrians try to get out of the country? 245 00:25:51,330 --> 00:25:57,970 Because they thought that whatever was waiting for them was not going to be as bad as what it was they were they were getting away from at home. 246 00:25:57,970 --> 00:26:07,140 Yeah, that nexus of fear is absolutely a driver of people's views, of the power of the state. 247 00:26:07,140 --> 00:26:13,580 And the barrier of fear did fall for a while, but they did a great deal to redirect it. 248 00:26:13,580 --> 00:26:22,130 Lynn, I got to actually divert you to the sort of great power scenarios that you were dealing with of a new administration, putting America back. 249 00:26:22,130 --> 00:26:31,070 Set a stage into the discussion of Syria's future. And the question here really is imagine a Biden administration that has learnt the lessons of what 250 00:26:31,070 --> 00:26:37,730 Obama got wrong and that was willing to engage and was actually willing to engage with Russia, 251 00:26:37,730 --> 00:26:44,330 not in the kind of sycophantic way that Trump has done, but as a kind of hard player. 252 00:26:44,330 --> 00:26:51,710 You're still dealing with a Syria in which there is no prospect of a post Bashar post Baathist government. 253 00:26:51,710 --> 00:27:01,050 How can even America under Biden, working with Russia, under Putin, try to move towards a meaningful resolution of the conflict under the status quo? 254 00:27:01,050 --> 00:27:05,780 Well, I mean, conflicts like this do not have one. 255 00:27:05,780 --> 00:27:12,810 Victor. The thing is, the Assad regime has been trying to present itself as the sole victor in the conflict. 256 00:27:12,810 --> 00:27:17,940 Of course, with Russia by its side and also maybe to a lesser degree, Iran. 257 00:27:17,940 --> 00:27:26,160 But it's a situation in which the only way out is going to have to be a political transition based on compromise. 258 00:27:26,160 --> 00:27:30,000 And that compromise does not mean Assad himself staying in power. 259 00:27:30,000 --> 00:27:39,420 The compromise means, as Jeremy said, recognising that there are some elements in Syria that are supportive of this regime, 260 00:27:39,420 --> 00:27:44,160 whether out of conviction or coercion or fear. But they are that. 261 00:27:44,160 --> 00:27:48,540 And without them, I think the regime would have fallen. But they contributed. 262 00:27:48,540 --> 00:27:51,450 They are not the primary factor. Why the regime is still in place. 263 00:27:51,450 --> 00:27:57,390 I think on the ground, the Russian military intervention is why the regime did not collapse militarily. 264 00:27:57,390 --> 00:28:02,580 But they are there. There is segment of the population and their voices need to be represented. 265 00:28:02,580 --> 00:28:10,980 So there's, you know, no denying that any future peace scenario has to include elements from the opposition, 266 00:28:10,980 --> 00:28:17,790 the broad spectrum of political opposition and these elements that are currently perhaps in power in Syria. 267 00:28:17,790 --> 00:28:23,310 So what I'm saying is a deep ossification scenario, like the one we saw in Iraq, 268 00:28:23,310 --> 00:28:29,550 is not going to be the best path forward for Syria because we've seen what that does and other contexts. 269 00:28:29,550 --> 00:28:31,020 So you have this compromise? 270 00:28:31,020 --> 00:28:39,260 I personally think Russia would accept such a compromise because Russia ultimately cares more about its own influence in Syria, 271 00:28:39,260 --> 00:28:45,180 and that is not something that is really completely antagonistic to U.S. interests. 272 00:28:45,180 --> 00:28:52,260 Believe it or not, I don't think the United States will mind Russia having a naval base in Syria. 273 00:28:52,260 --> 00:28:58,740 I don't think the United States minds, if Russia continues to have influence in Syria on the ground. 274 00:28:58,740 --> 00:29:05,190 And let's not forget that Russia had political influence in Syria even before the conflict. 275 00:29:05,190 --> 00:29:10,440 But it just used the conflict to increase its own profile. I mean, relations between the Assad regime. 276 00:29:10,440 --> 00:29:16,140 On the opposite side of the Shah's father and the Soviet Union back in the day, go way back. 277 00:29:16,140 --> 00:29:20,490 And this relationship does not stop when Bashar al-Assad took over. And it continues. 278 00:29:20,490 --> 00:29:26,130 So you can't reverse that. Just like with Iran, you can't just say, let's kick the Iranians out of Syria. 279 00:29:26,130 --> 00:29:30,360 That's impossible. The influence is grassroots and long. 280 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:34,020 So this is what I imagine happening, a compromise solution. 281 00:29:34,020 --> 00:29:39,360 I think as long as Russia feels it has maintained its influence, it would be acceptable to it. 282 00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:47,280 But the issue right now is there's nothing that incentivises Russia or the Assad regime, for that matter, to compromise. 283 00:29:47,280 --> 00:29:51,600 Why would they when they feel that things are kind of going relatively well? 284 00:29:51,600 --> 00:29:59,190 Of course, they financial situation now. And Syria is getting to, as I said, put some pressure which can be used as leverage. 285 00:29:59,190 --> 00:30:03,270 But that alone is not going to be the leverage you need to use it as leverage, 286 00:30:03,270 --> 00:30:08,280 meaning the international community, mainly the US needs to instrumentalise this leverage. 287 00:30:08,280 --> 00:30:12,810 You can't just get out of economic pressure and let things run their course. 288 00:30:12,810 --> 00:30:18,390 That's not how it works. So let's see if the new administration is going to use these available tools. 289 00:30:18,390 --> 00:30:22,710 They all that, but they have not been used strategic. The thing is, 290 00:30:22,710 --> 00:30:30,420 it's very hard to see what's going to be in it for the Americans if they use their diplomatic capital to try and broker a resolution to a 291 00:30:30,420 --> 00:30:37,320 country like Syria where they don't actually have any interests in order to enhance Russia at Iran's position in a country where they do. 292 00:30:37,320 --> 00:30:43,410 It may actually be just a formula that has the Biden administration say, we'd rather not go there. 293 00:30:43,410 --> 00:30:44,370 Well, to be honest, 294 00:30:44,370 --> 00:30:54,330 the fines show that the Middle East in general is rather low on the list of priorities for the U.S. administration and even for us and the UK. 295 00:30:54,330 --> 00:31:02,850 I mean, if you look at the letter that Dominic Raab just and the Sharia champion doesn't even really mention the Middle East. 296 00:31:02,850 --> 00:31:08,970 And so I think, unfortunately for people like myself who want the Middle East to be central, you know, 297 00:31:08,970 --> 00:31:15,960 to foreign policy agendas all over the world, we are seeing China becoming more of a pressing issue, for example. 298 00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:19,650 However, that doesn't mean that the Middle East is going to be completely ignored. 299 00:31:19,650 --> 00:31:23,970 And that's because these outside players are there in the region. 300 00:31:23,970 --> 00:31:29,600 I'm just saying we have to be also a bit modest in terms of our expectations. 301 00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:33,210 There's potential. They can do it whether they will do it. 302 00:31:33,210 --> 00:31:38,040 It's a whole other story. I can add something to that, if you like. 303 00:31:38,040 --> 00:31:44,040 You know, the only power that can remove Assad are the Russians. 304 00:31:44,040 --> 00:31:52,110 They have an intimate relationship with the Syrian military, as Lina said, going back generations. 305 00:31:52,110 --> 00:32:03,580 If you go into, as I've done quite a lot of times, into the offices of generals in the Ministry of Defence in Damascus, 306 00:32:03,580 --> 00:32:14,190 you see military textbooks in Russian momentos of the time that they spent training as young lads in terms of the skies and on the either side, 307 00:32:14,190 --> 00:32:18,330 a 60 or in senior positions in the days of the Soviet Union. 308 00:32:18,330 --> 00:32:21,930 And more recently, you see the badges of the unit. 309 00:32:21,930 --> 00:32:31,200 Senior military people love to give each other souvenirs, batches of Russian units and a ceremonial vodka bottles probably as well in the desk drawer. 310 00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:39,000 And so what I'm saying is the Russians know intimately who's who in the Syrian military. 311 00:32:39,000 --> 00:32:48,000 So here's a scenario. If they decided that things were unravelling in a way that didn't help them in Syria, 312 00:32:48,000 --> 00:32:57,600 maybe some kind of a continuing resurgence or reconstitution of ISIS, that continuing trouble in the south. 313 00:32:57,600 --> 00:33:01,860 They might say, well, maybe we need another guy at the top and they're capable of doing it. 314 00:33:01,860 --> 00:33:11,760 And if that person then appealed to those constituencies that support the Assad clan, the Assad regime, then you never know it's possible. 315 00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:20,550 But there's another scenario, which is that all of those things become a running sore for the Russians and for Iran, 316 00:33:20,550 --> 00:33:26,620 that Syria is not an asset for them, that it becomes complicated and difficult. 317 00:33:26,620 --> 00:33:31,260 And it could well be that the Americans who got their hands full, as we know, in loads of places, 318 00:33:31,260 --> 00:33:37,190 and not least in the Middle East, you know, we've seen Iran taking another little ratchet up today. 319 00:33:37,190 --> 00:33:43,260 They may say, well, let them stew for a while, then we'll see what happens. 320 00:33:43,260 --> 00:33:48,000 We're reaching the point now where I'm going to have to yield the floor because I can see the questions piling. 321 00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:53,790 We promised our audience that we're going to give them a good twenty five minutes of the session where they get to put the questions to you. 322 00:33:53,790 --> 00:33:58,350 So I have a lot of rejoinders to come back on, but out of great self-control, 323 00:33:58,350 --> 00:34:03,090 I hand over to my colleague Osama Lousily, who will now be sharing the questions from the question board. 324 00:34:03,090 --> 00:34:05,190 Osama, over to you. Thank you, Eugene. 325 00:34:05,190 --> 00:34:12,090 And thank you both, Lena and Jeremy for really an eye opening reflections from people who are very deeply involved, 326 00:34:12,090 --> 00:34:17,070 in some cases actually calling in from the region. There are going to be lots of questions there. 327 00:34:17,070 --> 00:34:23,670 Over over 120 people in attendance. I apologise to a number of you in advance because you're bringing in lots, 328 00:34:23,670 --> 00:34:28,440 lots of interesting questions, and I'm pretty sure when I'm going to get to all of them. 329 00:34:28,440 --> 00:34:33,120 But let me begin with two questions, which are, in a sense a counterpoint to one another. 330 00:34:33,120 --> 00:34:39,630 This is a very polarising topic, as we can imagine. So these come from two kind of polar opposites. 331 00:34:39,630 --> 00:34:48,990 One is from Damon Loveless, who I understand is a commander in the US Navy and a fellow at Antony's college. 332 00:34:48,990 --> 00:34:55,620 He asks, Why do regional partners take more responsibility to resolve the conflict that is having impacts on their countries, 333 00:34:55,620 --> 00:35:00,780 refugees, trade issues, terrorism, spill-over, etc.? As a counterpoint to that. 334 00:35:00,780 --> 00:35:07,560 I have Yassmin mother saying the dictatorship didn't come to come to power in the Middle East in a vacuum. 335 00:35:07,560 --> 00:35:09,930 There is a history of colonialism, arbitrary borders. 336 00:35:09,930 --> 00:35:16,320 The idea of the U.S. military intervention could solve problems created by foreign intervention is a novel idea. 337 00:35:16,320 --> 00:35:20,550 Question what do speakers think of Unan Capones views? 338 00:35:20,550 --> 00:35:24,720 Who uses a materialist approach to the development of the Arab Spring and the Syrian 339 00:35:24,720 --> 00:35:29,280 uprising focussing on change and changing class dynamics in Middle Eastern society? 340 00:35:29,280 --> 00:35:33,690 So two very different perspectives, I think. And I'd leave it to either of you to begin. 341 00:35:33,690 --> 00:35:37,920 Really? Or perhaps I should nominate you again. 342 00:35:37,920 --> 00:35:45,600 Don't worry. Yes. Thank you. Here we are. OK. Why don't regional partners take more responsibility to resolve the conflict? 343 00:35:45,600 --> 00:35:48,750 Well, who are we talking about when we say regional partners? 344 00:35:48,750 --> 00:35:55,140 I mean, if we're thinking about who has been affected, according to the question, in terms of refugees, 345 00:35:55,140 --> 00:36:01,890 trade issues, et cetera, we're talking Jordan, Lebanon, really these two plus Turkey? 346 00:36:01,890 --> 00:36:08,550 Well, Turkey is one of the active actors in the conflict itself. 347 00:36:08,550 --> 00:36:16,020 It approaches the Syrian conflict from my perspective, from the prism of the Kurdish question. 348 00:36:16,020 --> 00:36:26,870 This is its primary motivation. And therefore, resolving the conflict actually is not necessarily in Turkey's interest because it's not yet done. 349 00:36:26,870 --> 00:36:35,580 Its business would be with the Kurdish issue. It is still very concerned that the Kurds are being given privileges by the international 350 00:36:35,580 --> 00:36:41,580 community because of the involvement of Kurdish militias in the fight against ISIS, 351 00:36:41,580 --> 00:36:45,930 for example, alongside the International and Chadash coalition. 352 00:36:45,930 --> 00:36:55,260 Turkey is concerned that the Kurds might have an autonomous region near its border, which is Turkey's southern border, obviously on Syria. 353 00:36:55,260 --> 00:37:00,210 So Turkey is not going out on its own trying to resolve the conflict when it comes to Jordan. 354 00:37:00,210 --> 00:37:08,850 Jordan really is a country that bases its foreign policy on trying to stave off instability rather than being proactive. 355 00:37:08,850 --> 00:37:13,320 It has its national stability as a key priority. 356 00:37:13,320 --> 00:37:17,460 But at the same time, it knows that it cannot step on the toes of, say, 357 00:37:17,460 --> 00:37:25,020 Saudi Arabia to try to play a more active, proactive, interventionist role in Middle East conflicts. 358 00:37:25,020 --> 00:37:33,180 And therefore, it's not likely to, you know, take any proactive measures on its own when it comes to Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 359 00:37:33,180 --> 00:37:39,960 They were two countries that for a long time tried to steer the conflict towards a path that 360 00:37:39,960 --> 00:37:46,530 would support their own interests and failed both of them because Assad is still there. 361 00:37:46,530 --> 00:37:54,180 They felt they could topple him by supporting all kinds of armed groups and also by supporting the political opposition in Syria. 362 00:37:54,180 --> 00:38:01,230 Sadly, neither of these tracks worked for them. And so, you know, there's not much they can do. 363 00:38:01,230 --> 00:38:06,300 And so when it comes to, you know, these regional partners, we have to remember at the end of the day, 364 00:38:06,300 --> 00:38:13,980 all these actors got involved in Syria, not because they care so much about the well-being of the Syrian people, 365 00:38:13,980 --> 00:38:19,650 but because they saw in the Syrian situation an opportunity to increase their 366 00:38:19,650 --> 00:38:26,370 own regional influence or to support their own national interests and agendas. 367 00:38:26,370 --> 00:38:32,460 And in a way, the refugees and terrorism, et cetera, are things, you know, 368 00:38:32,460 --> 00:38:38,480 they have been dealing with, but they're not enough for them to completely change the track. 369 00:38:38,480 --> 00:38:42,790 Plus, even if they did try, it is not an. 370 00:38:42,790 --> 00:38:47,200 Hands to steer this conflict to a resolution. And then as an example here, 371 00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:56,020 we have to think that Saudi Arabia and Iran 2015 was trying to set up something called the yard conference to bring 372 00:38:56,020 --> 00:39:02,830 together elements of the political opposition in Syria that at the time had been in disagreement with one another. 373 00:39:02,830 --> 00:39:10,090 It tried to have a unified platform. And as soon as it announced around spring time that it was going to do that. 374 00:39:10,090 --> 00:39:18,370 Russia intervenes militarily in Syria in September 2015 and completely derailed Saudi Arabia's plans. 375 00:39:18,370 --> 00:39:26,820 So they don't have the leverage, they don't have the ability. And as I said, ultimately they care about their national interests. 376 00:39:26,820 --> 00:39:28,590 I'll chip in on the other side of the question. 377 00:39:28,590 --> 00:39:40,040 And if you're right, I absolutely agree that the Western interventions in the region over well more than a century have been absolutely destructive. 378 00:39:40,040 --> 00:39:49,750 There is a long, long charge sheet in terms of what Western countries have done, you know, starting with our own Britain and then moving on. 379 00:39:49,750 --> 00:40:02,480 But in a sense, where we are, where we are and in terms of the idea that American intervention could help deal with a mess that overall in the region, 380 00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:07,340 American intervention has helped to create. Yeah, it doesn't make much sense when you put it that way. 381 00:40:07,340 --> 00:40:16,470 But. The kinds of things that in those early years of the war in Syria, that rebel fighters who weren't jihadists, 382 00:40:16,470 --> 00:40:23,730 who weren't jihadi groups, who would probably be beheaded and would say things like, look. 383 00:40:23,730 --> 00:40:27,900 We are not international. We don't want an international jihad. 384 00:40:27,900 --> 00:40:35,820 What we want is a country that looks a bit like Turkey is the kinds of things I would say spend a lot of time talking to these guys. 385 00:40:35,820 --> 00:40:40,710 And what they would say was, we just like America. Give us some weapons, please. 386 00:40:40,710 --> 00:40:47,650 And of course, in 2011, there was a precedent, which was Libya, and they saw what had happened in Libya and Libya, 387 00:40:47,650 --> 00:40:53,100 of course, at that point had not descended deep into the pit that it's in. 388 00:40:53,100 --> 00:41:00,810 There was still some hope there. And there was a feeling that, you know, with a push, maybe these guys might go on. 389 00:41:00,810 --> 00:41:06,670 The other part of the question to the point that was made about the Arab uprisings 2011. 390 00:41:06,670 --> 00:41:12,300 I am not familiar with the go polls work, so I can't comment directly on that. 391 00:41:12,300 --> 00:41:20,610 But I did spend an awful lot of time talking to people and writing about it and actually being there in 2011. 392 00:41:20,610 --> 00:41:27,450 And subsequently, I was every day of the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo. 393 00:41:27,450 --> 00:41:33,870 I was spent months in Libya on the regime side, actually, but also talking to people who don't like the regime, 394 00:41:33,870 --> 00:41:38,520 of course, which they were legions, Bahrain and Tunisia. 395 00:41:38,520 --> 00:41:45,750 And I felt that one of the strongest motivations for what was going on, the strongest drive, 396 00:41:45,750 --> 00:41:51,650 I should say, was the demographic one, which is a lot of young people. 397 00:41:51,650 --> 00:42:00,290 Very high proportion of the population is under the age of 30 who saw a system which might have been able to give their fathers or 398 00:42:00,290 --> 00:42:09,620 grandfathers something but couldn't give them anything and everything they wanted and was enriching systems that were enriching themselves, 399 00:42:09,620 --> 00:42:22,160 that were repressive. And they wanted something different because they felt that at a time when the national Kate was shrinking, 400 00:42:22,160 --> 00:42:30,080 more and more of it was being taken by corrupt oligarchic structures and their slice 401 00:42:30,080 --> 00:42:35,690 was going and they could see their eyes have been opened to the outside world. 402 00:42:35,690 --> 00:42:38,420 You know, for reasons we well know, the world has changed. 403 00:42:38,420 --> 00:42:46,370 Digital communications, social media was starting, though I think TV was more influential than the likes of Facebook. 404 00:42:46,370 --> 00:42:48,650 I think they wanted better lives. 405 00:42:48,650 --> 00:42:56,960 And I think that what is interesting of the protests that we've seen in the last couple of years is that those factors are still very much there. 406 00:42:56,960 --> 00:43:02,450 But it's a little bit of a new generation, of course, because those people have been on the streets in Baghdad, 407 00:43:02,450 --> 00:43:07,180 Beirut, where kids in 2011, hard to believe, are true. 408 00:43:07,180 --> 00:43:16,280 Thank you. I mean, there are so many sort of questions, a lot of them very, very thoughtful and coming from eminent scholars in some cases. 409 00:43:16,280 --> 00:43:22,300 And I'm going to ask you to forgive me for asking you to consider even 10. 410 00:43:22,300 --> 00:43:27,130 So the next question, I'm going to give a question to Lina and then I'll give a question to. 411 00:43:27,130 --> 00:43:35,570 Because he's right. He explicitly addressed to you, sir. So Diana Gilliver asks and she's a Russian sort of academic based. 412 00:43:35,570 --> 00:43:39,350 Its intentness here. She has a two part question. So I'm going to ask the second part of question, 413 00:43:39,350 --> 00:43:46,940 because I think this is something which is a Russian perspective, which is not always seen in your presentation. 414 00:43:46,940 --> 00:43:54,440 You explained why Syria is important because the terrorism threat faced by the West as one of those sort of concerns. 415 00:43:54,440 --> 00:43:56,900 What about the threat of radicalism in Russia? 416 00:43:56,900 --> 00:44:03,500 So this is, you know, a perspective we don't hear very often, given that Russian Muslim still giant radicals in Syria and so on. 417 00:44:03,500 --> 00:44:08,630 And I'm just going to take this opportunity also to ask Jeremy a question which is directed at you. 418 00:44:08,630 --> 00:44:13,340 How much Obama not taking action in Syria was or how much of Obama not taking action in 419 00:44:13,340 --> 00:44:19,550 Syria was a post Iraq war syndrome a situation rather than any careful calculation? 420 00:44:19,550 --> 00:44:25,760 And what would have been, you know, the destruction and devastation if he had acted in your estimation? 421 00:44:25,760 --> 00:44:30,350 So, Lena, if you can go first, please. On the Russia question, yes, sure. 422 00:44:30,350 --> 00:44:36,200 I mean, there's no denying that there are Russian fighters joining jihadist groups in Syria, 423 00:44:36,200 --> 00:44:41,510 like many other fighters who have come from all over the world to do the same thing. 424 00:44:41,510 --> 00:44:44,810 However, we have to also qualify. 425 00:44:44,810 --> 00:44:55,040 This is not the case that Russia intervened in Syria because it wants to protect itself from these jihadists at home. 426 00:44:55,040 --> 00:44:58,940 If anything, let them go to Syria and die. 427 00:44:58,940 --> 00:45:07,430 If is the way I see the Russian government dealing with the situation, they are allowing them to go and fight in Syria. 428 00:45:07,430 --> 00:45:17,150 And so here we have further instruments of ization of the Syrian conflict as a way for Russia to deal with this domestic radicalisation issue. 429 00:45:17,150 --> 00:45:21,090 However, not on Russian land. Thank you for that very brief. 430 00:45:21,090 --> 00:45:24,500 And Jeremy. Right. I'll do I'll be brief as well. Yes. 431 00:45:24,500 --> 00:45:34,310 The Iraq hangover was a very, very marked reason for their reluctance to get involved, not just in the White House, but in the U.S. Congress. 432 00:45:34,310 --> 00:45:38,330 And, of course, don't forget, there was a crucial vote in the House of Commons. 433 00:45:38,330 --> 00:45:46,670 It's ironic that on the eve of the 2003 invasion, the Americans said to Blair, you know, it it's tough stuff is tough for you. 434 00:45:46,670 --> 00:45:52,670 We don't need you can go. We go without you. But when Britain wasn't there cheering them on. 435 00:45:52,670 --> 00:46:02,330 Suddenly Obama was starting to feel lonely, knowing that he, too, had agreed to a political process in the in the US Congress about that. 436 00:46:02,330 --> 00:46:07,880 So, you know, and his heart wasn't in it. And of course, why was it politically unpopular? 437 00:46:07,880 --> 00:46:12,830 Because of the legacy. People said, well, look, Iraq is just next door. 438 00:46:12,830 --> 00:46:18,980 We don't get involved in that kind of thing. Again, in terms of the destructive power of the Americans is remarkable. 439 00:46:18,980 --> 00:46:22,040 They can break a lot of things if they want to. 440 00:46:22,040 --> 00:46:29,390 And even their idea of the time it was talked about some kind of fairly lightweight series of operations. 441 00:46:29,390 --> 00:46:34,640 But I don't think those really do lightweight. Their idea of lightweight is most people a day of heavy weight. 442 00:46:34,640 --> 00:46:44,360 And had they chosen to really punish and damage the military infrastructure of of Asad, they could have done it in a couple of nights. 443 00:46:44,360 --> 00:46:51,210 Thank you again, Jeremy, for sort of being very concise. And I'm going to switch gears and ask a question which has come a. 444 00:46:51,210 --> 00:46:57,390 In about Libya's connexion to this, either of you are welcome to sort of take this. 445 00:46:57,390 --> 00:47:02,790 How has the NATO intervention in Libya impacted the action taken by the U.S. and Turkey and Syria? 446 00:47:02,790 --> 00:47:09,330 Is this directly related to the principle of R to P.? I'm not actually familiar with the terminology. 447 00:47:09,330 --> 00:47:18,750 Well, I'll take it RTP, its responsibility to protect, which is basically to authorise military intervention for the sake of protecting civilians. 448 00:47:18,750 --> 00:47:22,650 Ultimately, if you don't intervene, things would be worse. 449 00:47:22,650 --> 00:47:28,800 And this is a big moral dilemma and a policy dilemma because it comes with great costs. 450 00:47:28,800 --> 00:47:35,070 And the Libyan intervention is a factor that did play out in the U.S. decision 451 00:47:35,070 --> 00:47:41,250 to intervene because the Libyan intervention was authorised internationally. 452 00:47:41,250 --> 00:47:46,130 It was not like the Iraq invasion of 2003. 453 00:47:46,130 --> 00:47:52,710 It was there. The problem with it, though, is that, yes, it got rid of Gadhafi. 454 00:47:52,710 --> 00:47:58,620 However, it was not coupled with a comprehensive stabilisation strategy for Libya. 455 00:47:58,620 --> 00:48:06,420 So it ended up closing. In my view, devastation in Libya, which, of course, local Libyan factors played a role. 456 00:48:06,420 --> 00:48:17,070 And however, this led to what I see as an erroneous framework through which many policymakers in the West view Middle East conflicts. 457 00:48:17,070 --> 00:48:20,760 In general, they say it's the Middle East. Damned if you do. 458 00:48:20,760 --> 00:48:25,020 Damned if you don't. It's a quagmire. And look at Iraq. 459 00:48:25,020 --> 00:48:28,830 Look at Libya. Look what military intervention does. 460 00:48:28,830 --> 00:48:38,310 It does not work. And they use it as if to say or imply that Libya and Syria and Iraq are all basically the same. 461 00:48:38,310 --> 00:48:45,960 And I always try to remind these policymakers that there are very different circumstances in each of these scenarios. 462 00:48:45,960 --> 00:48:50,070 And you can't use just because it happens to be the Middle East. 463 00:48:50,070 --> 00:48:56,670 You can't use one country to make an assumption about how things will play out in another country. 464 00:48:56,670 --> 00:49:05,550 And you can't say, see, military intervention doesn't work when you have not planned any strategy beyond just military action. 465 00:49:05,550 --> 00:49:13,930 And this is something that I keep reminding people about when it comes to ISIS right now, that, yes, ISIS is militarily largely defeated. 466 00:49:13,930 --> 00:49:21,480 But you have not addressed the full picture, the economic and political and social drivers that lead people to embrace such a thing. 467 00:49:21,480 --> 00:49:29,430 So we're not done yet with a phenomenon like ISIS because we have not yet addressed the big picture comprehensively and strategically. 468 00:49:29,430 --> 00:49:33,330 So this is the key issue when it comes to military intervention. 469 00:49:33,330 --> 00:49:37,260 It is never enough on its own. And sadly, in the context of the Middle East, 470 00:49:37,260 --> 00:49:44,340 it has largely failed because it has never been part of a wider comprehensive strategy for stabilisation. 471 00:49:44,340 --> 00:49:50,830 Thank you. I mean, I suspect this is quite a challenging conversation to have because there's so much bipartisan theatre left and right, 472 00:49:50,830 --> 00:50:00,630 almost agreement on the in a sense, quasar Orientalist decentralising of the entire Middle East is following this quagmire theory, so to speak. 473 00:50:00,630 --> 00:50:06,960 And I think there needs to be a lot of Soul-Searching, in a sense, in policymaking circles about these sorts of questions as well. 474 00:50:06,960 --> 00:50:15,110 I'm going to ask a question specifically directed at Jeremy, actually, from someone by the name of Milans sets me as far as I can. 475 00:50:15,110 --> 00:50:19,110 I hope I pronounce it correctly. So do you think that, again, we're coming back to Russia? 476 00:50:19,110 --> 00:50:25,830 Do you think that Russia has not got enough control over Iran to be able to remove Assad even if it chooses to? 477 00:50:25,830 --> 00:50:28,520 This is at least the perception of many Russian experts, 478 00:50:28,520 --> 00:50:35,610 and Russia's interventions have been driven in part from ideological factors and the will to showcase its reliability as an ally. 479 00:50:35,610 --> 00:50:41,610 So taking into these into account, how does the US engage with Russia on Syria? 480 00:50:41,610 --> 00:50:45,900 Well, let me just say on one thing on that on the to the Libya hangover, 481 00:50:45,900 --> 00:50:51,030 one thing the Russians are really irked about was the fact that they felt that the Security 482 00:50:51,030 --> 00:50:58,380 Council rubber stamp they gave the consent on the Security Council to action in Libya was over, 483 00:50:58,380 --> 00:51:03,000 interpreted and taken too far by Western countries. 484 00:51:03,000 --> 00:51:06,360 There's real anger about that. And they were well, I was in Tripoli. 485 00:51:06,360 --> 00:51:17,190 They had various diplomatic missions of their own, quite impressive people on them, trying to ply their amphora unsuccessfully in terms of the eye. 486 00:51:17,190 --> 00:51:23,850 It's so difficult to know just where subtle things like relations or the deep 487 00:51:23,850 --> 00:51:29,640 level between Russia and Iran are that I can only speculate about all of that. 488 00:51:29,640 --> 00:51:33,750 I certainly think it would be very hard to do things like that without the consent of of Iran. 489 00:51:33,750 --> 00:51:39,840 But I think those two countries are quite capable, even though they don't see eye to eye on loads of things. 490 00:51:39,840 --> 00:51:46,110 Russia and Iran are capable clearly of working together because they do de facto in Syria. 491 00:51:46,110 --> 00:51:51,510 So, no, I doubt that if the Russians wanted to remove Assad, I don't see why they would want to at the moment. 492 00:51:51,510 --> 00:51:56,520 But if they wanted to do, they would probably have to make a case to the Iranians. 493 00:51:56,520 --> 00:52:03,960 And I'm strongly of the belief that I'm quite a realist on these things and my particular beliefs. 494 00:52:03,960 --> 00:52:08,500 And I do think that those countries will be pushing to uphold their own. 495 00:52:08,500 --> 00:52:11,980 And if Iran felt it was in their own interests, I. 496 00:52:11,980 --> 00:52:16,620 They are in love with the Assads in the same way that the Russians, are they useful? 497 00:52:16,620 --> 00:52:21,760 Thank you very much. A little conscious of the time and we are sort of coming to the end. 498 00:52:21,760 --> 00:52:28,680 And more questions as tends to happen in these cases with each of your responses, your eliciting further questions. 499 00:52:28,680 --> 00:52:34,020 I'm going to read a question from an anonymous attendee. Perhaps, Lena, you could start with this. 500 00:52:34,020 --> 00:52:39,990 Why are questions of Syrian state of state formation, sorry, and institution building not being asked in Syria? 501 00:52:39,990 --> 00:52:43,710 And instead, we only focus on how to resolve the conflict internationally. 502 00:52:43,710 --> 00:52:49,920 What is the form of political institutions that we can create in case a compromise happens? 503 00:52:49,920 --> 00:52:58,490 Given the political, ethnic, religious polarisation of Syria of the Syrian people because of the conflict and primarily because of the Assad regime? 504 00:52:58,490 --> 00:53:03,000 Such a good question. I have to say. Unfortunately, look at Iraq. 505 00:53:03,000 --> 00:53:07,320 The question of state building is only just beginning. 506 00:53:07,320 --> 00:53:14,280 Even, you know what, a decade and a half or more since the invasion and the regime change. 507 00:53:14,280 --> 00:53:20,040 Unfortunately, state building, which, as you know, the question said is very crucial, 508 00:53:20,040 --> 00:53:27,960 is a long term thing that requires policymakers to think beyond six months, one year, even five years. 509 00:53:27,960 --> 00:53:36,000 And unfortunately, in general, policy internationally is never really based on long term planning like that. 510 00:53:36,000 --> 00:53:42,480 And so this is one of the huge shortcomings. I think when it comes to Western policymaking in particular, 511 00:53:42,480 --> 00:53:48,240 that these are questions that are really crucial, are just overlooked because they just take too long. 512 00:53:48,240 --> 00:53:55,770 And in general policy, it seems to be tied to the term in which someone is serving or the objectives of a particular 513 00:53:55,770 --> 00:54:01,680 project that is being funded by X Development Department or whatever where in the world. 514 00:54:01,680 --> 00:54:06,570 So, yes, it is absolutely the elephant in the room. Thank you. 515 00:54:06,570 --> 00:54:14,850 I mean, I unfortunately, I think we have come to an end. I I guess, Jeremy, if you wanted to comment a little on this from a realist perspective, 516 00:54:14,850 --> 00:54:20,130 as you were saying, you can feel free to kind of have the last word before handing over to you. 517 00:54:20,130 --> 00:54:22,900 If that's right. I'm very reluctant. 518 00:54:22,900 --> 00:54:30,010 I shouldn't use words like that in front of people who deal with the currency of these things in academia every day. 519 00:54:30,010 --> 00:54:35,560 My son is in the process of applying for university, so. For history. So I've been talking about things like that with him. 520 00:54:35,560 --> 00:54:43,390 I think it's very contaminated, my brain waves. Listen, I just thank you very much for these brilliant questions and for inviting me on llena. 521 00:54:43,390 --> 00:54:50,800 Fantastic contributions. One thing I yeah. One thing I would end with, actually, sometimes I do hear regarding, you know, 522 00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:57,010 the villainous mainstream media and their baleful role in the region that the. 523 00:54:57,010 --> 00:55:00,650 Why have they forgotten about Syria? Why don't they do more about Syria? 524 00:55:00,650 --> 00:55:04,870 Do they realise that? I would love to do more about Syria. 525 00:55:04,870 --> 00:55:12,100 But guess what? They won't let us in. On the regime side, we used to able to get visas and now they won't give us visas. 526 00:55:12,100 --> 00:55:17,980 Partly things we've done, partly things that they they feel later that we'd just be too much of a pain, I think. 527 00:55:17,980 --> 00:55:28,150 And on the those other areas, you know, in the north, it's much, much harder now with Turkey moving around the area. 528 00:55:28,150 --> 00:55:34,240 Regime troops moving around the area. There were people who regularly went across and there have been people. 529 00:55:34,240 --> 00:55:38,080 Are there ways of getting into it? But it's really quite difficult. 530 00:55:38,080 --> 00:55:46,470 And, you know, negotiations with East. Yes. Not easy. So, you know, believe you me, we would like to do more. 531 00:55:46,470 --> 00:55:54,630 I would do stuff the whole time. But we we can't and this is one of the awful things at the moment about actually trying to cover the region. 532 00:55:54,630 --> 00:55:59,040 There are loads of countries where we just physically can't get in. And that's a problem. 533 00:55:59,040 --> 00:56:06,610 And it's not because we don't want to. Well, I think on that note, in the hope that you will be able to get back in, 534 00:56:06,610 --> 00:56:16,030 you and the diplomats and the academics and the aid agencies and most of all the Syrian people themselves will be able to get back in. 535 00:56:16,030 --> 00:56:22,090 I'd like to thank our speakers Jeremy Bowen and Lina TEEB for truly an enlightened discussion tonight. 536 00:56:22,090 --> 00:56:29,170 It's been such a pleasure to be with you. I'd like to thank all Simon Azami for it is very deft handling of tonight's questions. 537 00:56:29,170 --> 00:56:32,740 I'd like to thank Stacey Churcher for managing all the technology for us. 538 00:56:32,740 --> 00:56:37,000 And I'd like to invite all of you to come back next week when we welcome Edgett General Kunlun, 539 00:56:37,000 --> 00:56:44,080 who will finish our survey of the dictatorship syndrome with the logic of chaos, the pattern of dictatorships. 540 00:56:44,080 --> 00:56:48,087 Join us next week here from Oxford. Good night.