1 00:00:06,720 --> 00:00:13,590 Good evening and welcome to our third session of the webinar series for this term. 2 00:00:13,590 --> 00:00:19,680 Hillary Tan at the Oxford Centre for Middle East Centre. And my name is Sam Azami. 3 00:00:19,680 --> 00:00:26,820 And it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to our third session on religion and secularism in the context of the Arab uprisings. 4 00:00:26,820 --> 00:00:35,670 And this is an opportunity for us to reflect ten years on on the way in which religion has featured as a prominent part of the Arab uprisings, 5 00:00:35,670 --> 00:00:45,360 but also secular voices. And we have two speakers, two wonderful speakers to kind of give us the two perspectives on this question. 6 00:00:45,360 --> 00:00:50,760 Both theming. And we're really happy to sort of be able to welcome Nadia away. 7 00:00:50,760 --> 00:00:57,930 Dutt and Shadi Hamid both beaming in from across the Atlantic in Washington, D.C., as I understand. 8 00:00:57,930 --> 00:01:04,560 And these are we're also very proud to have them here because they're both graduates of the Middle East centre. 9 00:01:04,560 --> 00:01:10,950 And Nadia is also a sort of class of 2017. 10 00:01:10,950 --> 00:01:14,820 Richard Soni and fellow. So Richardson, fellow at New America. 11 00:01:14,820 --> 00:01:19,260 She holds a deep faith in Oriental studies from the University of Oxford. 12 00:01:19,260 --> 00:01:24,120 She's currently working on a book on social media and positive change amongst Arabic speakers. 13 00:01:24,120 --> 00:01:29,310 And her doctoral research focussed on the challenges facing liberal Muslim intellectuals who attempt to update 14 00:01:29,310 --> 00:01:34,200 Islamic thought and bridge the gap between modern values such as secularism and women's rights in Islam. 15 00:01:34,200 --> 00:01:37,970 Prior to her doctoral studies Doctoral Way that featured, 16 00:01:37,970 --> 00:01:44,070 Sari worked as a research associate at Rand Corporation, where she has led several research projects. 17 00:01:44,070 --> 00:01:51,390 And our second speaker, again, sort of a graduate of the Middle East centre and the University of Oxford. 18 00:01:51,390 --> 00:02:00,480 Shadi Hamid, a senior fellow at the Centre for Middle East Policy and a prolific author and author of Islamic Exceptionalism, 19 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:07,770 most recently How to How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World by St. Martin's Press. 20 00:02:07,770 --> 00:02:12,930 And this was shortlisted in 2017 for the Allina Gober prise. 21 00:02:12,930 --> 00:02:16,260 I see. Most recently, because he has actually I should correct that. 22 00:02:16,260 --> 00:02:23,130 He's he's published coedited volumes since then, including a coedited volume entitled Rethinking Political Islam, 23 00:02:23,130 --> 00:02:27,720 published with Will McCants and published by Oxford University Press. 24 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:36,750 And we're delighted to have the two of you here to talk really about what it is that we can learn from the past 10 years and what 25 00:02:36,750 --> 00:02:45,420 we perhaps could expect going forward with respect to the question of religion and the question of secularism in the Middle East. 26 00:02:45,420 --> 00:02:51,750 And as I should say right now, please feel free to put in your questions. 27 00:02:51,750 --> 00:02:56,400 Those who are joining us, your sort of more than welcome to put in questions and comments. 28 00:02:56,400 --> 00:03:01,630 And they will be done by my colleague Michael Willis around the midpoint. 29 00:03:01,630 --> 00:03:07,920 Chaddy and Nadia will begin by speaking for about ten to twelve minutes, followed by Shaddy for about another ten to twelve minutes. 30 00:03:07,920 --> 00:03:17,670 And then we will go into sort of a discussion mode and allow you all to interrogate and learn from our two distinguished speakers. 31 00:03:17,670 --> 00:03:24,670 So with without further ado, I'd like to welcome Nadia. Thank you very much, Asama. 32 00:03:24,670 --> 00:03:32,710 Wonderful to be with some of my favourite people in the world. Eugene Rogan, Michael Wallace, former shadow economy. 33 00:03:32,710 --> 00:03:38,950 Also, like Osama said, went to Oxford as well. So we shared that love of our alma mater. 34 00:03:38,950 --> 00:03:44,170 So it's the subject of religion. 35 00:03:44,170 --> 00:03:55,280 I mean, if we talk about the Middle East, not just in the past 10 years, but in fact in the past 15 years or even much older. 36 00:03:55,280 --> 00:04:02,630 There is not another topic that have impacted the region more profoundly than religion. 37 00:04:02,630 --> 00:04:07,940 It has changed the geography of the region. It has changed its language. 38 00:04:07,940 --> 00:04:16,440 It has changed its culture. So it has been shaping the region for thousands of years, without exaggeration. 39 00:04:16,440 --> 00:04:25,290 But if you look at the Muslim world and in the Arab world in particular. A shift has been taking place, especially in the last. 40 00:04:25,290 --> 00:04:33,090 I mean, this shift has been happening in the last maybe 20 years. But the Arab Spring witnessed a tipping point in this shift. 41 00:04:33,090 --> 00:04:37,200 But let's go back a little bit to the beginning of this shift. 42 00:04:37,200 --> 00:04:49,440 So the Muslim world was very confident, actually certain in its cultural and moral, if you would, and even political superiority. 43 00:04:49,440 --> 00:04:54,570 It had nothing to learn from anywhere in the world, nothing at all. 44 00:04:54,570 --> 00:04:59,540 But it just wanted to take what's been agreed technology from the West. 45 00:04:59,540 --> 00:05:06,150 And, you know, it had because the West advanced so quickly. I need to tell you that it had a moment of like where they are advancing. 46 00:05:06,150 --> 00:05:13,110 What's wrong? Why have we missed out? Because we are supposed to be the one that, as we said, and Muslim woman. 47 00:05:13,110 --> 00:05:26,490 Oh, leftward. It should have been ours. But along with the borrowing of this technology, ideas, modern ideas of separation of state, church and state, 48 00:05:26,490 --> 00:05:30,690 personal liberties like freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, 49 00:05:30,690 --> 00:05:37,290 freedom of enquiry, all of these moral values were introduced to the Muslim world. 50 00:05:37,290 --> 00:05:45,230 And they have been causing a rift really because some believe they are irreconcilable with Islamic culture. 51 00:05:45,230 --> 00:05:50,190 They're very different. It's a very different paradigm. Can these two paradigms exist? 52 00:05:50,190 --> 00:05:59,970 And what happened is at the beginning, we see that these ideas have, in fact, champions from within the intellectual class of the Muslim world. 53 00:05:59,970 --> 00:06:05,120 That starts with the Abderrazak, for example, and the and Kokabee, you know, 54 00:06:05,120 --> 00:06:09,780 Abderrazak essentially said the caliphate it is is not really mandated by Islam. 55 00:06:09,780 --> 00:06:17,250 In fact, the caliphate has brought nothing but grief to Muslims. The masses have been suffering under dictatorships in the name of counterfeits. 56 00:06:17,250 --> 00:06:21,930 But there's absolutely nothing in the Koran that mandates that we need a caliphate. 57 00:06:21,930 --> 00:06:29,370 In fact, we need these modern European essentially ways of governance. 58 00:06:29,370 --> 00:06:33,690 And of course, that was an accepted by a lot of traditional conservative voices. 59 00:06:33,690 --> 00:06:40,830 And he was tried for apostasy. He was fired from his job as a Azeri scholar. 60 00:06:40,830 --> 00:06:44,770 He was forbidden from ever holding any position. 61 00:06:44,770 --> 00:06:55,500 When you have a second wave of intellectuals taking on the subject of modernity and modern values and religion because again, religion. 62 00:06:55,500 --> 00:07:03,040 Controls every aspect of people who live in the Arab world. Every aspect, really, and especially as a woman, I know this firsthand. 63 00:07:03,040 --> 00:07:11,830 And so then you have a second generation of reformers like Nasser Hameed Abuzaid, who not only argued you most. 64 00:07:11,830 --> 00:07:21,100 I was so excited to see that at Yale University Press published his book and set up a detailed critique of religious thought for our discourse. 65 00:07:21,100 --> 00:07:30,920 And he not only critique this marriage between politics and religion, but even religion and even business, giving us an example that a lot of, 66 00:07:30,920 --> 00:07:37,780 you know, average Egyptians lost their retirements because they invested in so-called Islamic investments. 67 00:07:37,780 --> 00:07:43,180 And as if if something has delivered Islamic, it automatically means that it will quadruple in profit. 68 00:07:43,180 --> 00:07:48,700 And there is no chance at all of it. You know, it doesn't apply to the rules of finance. 69 00:07:48,700 --> 00:07:55,180 It applies to the defined rules of Islam. So and he basically Abuzaid, again, 70 00:07:55,180 --> 00:08:03,610 he represents a large number of intellectuals that want to separate their religion from politics and the public sphere in general. 71 00:08:03,610 --> 00:08:11,710 But all of this we're still at the intellectual level and the masses, you know, the very traditional in their in their outlooks to life. 72 00:08:11,710 --> 00:08:18,610 And, you know, Islam and spirituality in general plays a huge role in all of humanity's daily life. 73 00:08:18,610 --> 00:08:25,510 But Islam was very much intermingled with the state, even as many states modernised. 74 00:08:25,510 --> 00:08:33,520 So what happened is in a culture where there is really no critique of free enquiry, free exchange of ideas. 75 00:08:33,520 --> 00:08:42,160 I mean, I can if I may have the liberty to say, look, somebody you grew up in in in in Jordan, in the Arab world, went to Islamic schools, 76 00:08:42,160 --> 00:08:49,180 went to Koranic memorisation schools, went all the way up until I finished my university at the University of Jordan. 77 00:08:49,180 --> 00:08:58,710 Everybody had to take Shariah class and. There is no debate on anything that is even a little bit critical, but it's a one way street. 78 00:08:58,710 --> 00:09:02,590 You either praise or you you're silent. There is. 79 00:09:02,590 --> 00:09:06,750 So what happened is. And it was easy. 80 00:09:06,750 --> 00:09:10,330 Like, everybody's doing this. Like classes are a one way street. 81 00:09:10,330 --> 00:09:17,490 It was easy to maintain a common culture common. 82 00:09:17,490 --> 00:09:25,530 What happened is the mid 90s, the Internet came about and something we've never had in such volume started to happen, 83 00:09:25,530 --> 00:09:31,140 which I believe led to the Arab Spring. One reason, but it's cause there is this is a very complex issue. 84 00:09:31,140 --> 00:09:37,510 Is that on the Internet. If somebody if people are debating very taboo issues. 85 00:09:37,510 --> 00:09:41,850 There is not the ability to immediately intimidate them and silence them. 86 00:09:41,850 --> 00:09:43,260 There is not that ability. 87 00:09:43,260 --> 00:09:53,970 So if somebody asked very controversial questions and very taboo questions like how could how could the concept of Subi be divinely inspired, 88 00:09:53,970 --> 00:09:58,680 like it's rounding up people's daughters to be sexual slaves? 89 00:09:58,680 --> 00:10:03,120 How could I how could a prophet practise? How could how could this be in the Koran? 90 00:10:03,120 --> 00:10:12,900 How could I mean, again, like most people are a product of the 21st and 20 and and 20th century environment. 91 00:10:12,900 --> 00:10:19,500 They they take for granted human rights and a lot of individual rights and a lot of even Islamists. 92 00:10:19,500 --> 00:10:24,570 And my my colleague, you will cover that voice. 93 00:10:24,570 --> 00:10:31,320 But all of a sudden we start to see incredibly audacious voices and all that. 94 00:10:31,320 --> 00:10:33,600 So I was noticing before the Arab Spring, 95 00:10:33,600 --> 00:10:40,080 I was seeing like there's definitely something unprecedented in the Arab world because these debates, I had questions. 96 00:10:40,080 --> 00:10:47,640 I couldn't. There's no way I could. You ask a question, even in the most respectful way, you're inviting abuse, if not more. 97 00:10:47,640 --> 00:10:57,780 So even scholars didn't escape sometimes. So. So all of a sudden that that space unleashed an avalanche of debates? 98 00:10:57,780 --> 00:11:05,200 Unprecedented. So in 2000, I kept agitating about wanting to really study that space, 99 00:11:05,200 --> 00:11:09,630 and as an intellectual historian, I wanted to see how was it this virtual space? 100 00:11:09,630 --> 00:11:15,060 How is it impacting the way the Arab world is processing these ideas? 101 00:11:15,060 --> 00:11:19,770 Because it definitely, my opinion, causing a shift in consciousness, without a doubt. 102 00:11:19,770 --> 00:11:30,000 And you know how I know that for certain. If you look at the Arab Spring and that that really was the epitome of of how we see that change. 103 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:37,490 The cold where for Medina, though, Lemonnier, a civic state. 104 00:11:37,490 --> 00:11:40,470 And if you know, like about the Middle East, 105 00:11:40,470 --> 00:11:49,020 a civic state is as close as you can come to saying we don't want Shariah or a religious state or an Islamic state. 106 00:11:49,020 --> 00:11:52,680 We want a state where the laws are written by people. 107 00:11:52,680 --> 00:11:56,730 We can challenge them. We can change them. We can adjust them. 108 00:11:56,730 --> 00:12:02,040 It's not, you know, God's law. It's Medina. It's people's law. 109 00:12:02,040 --> 00:12:09,150 So that is as close as this is unprecedented. It was never a debate that we haven't Islamic. 110 00:12:09,150 --> 00:12:19,110 I mean, again, anybody who came even close before that is essentially inviting and inviting violence. 111 00:12:19,110 --> 00:12:23,430 So how did that happen? Like to go all the way to an Islamic state? 112 00:12:23,430 --> 00:12:34,800 And again, I don't want to I'm sorry, a civil state. And I don't want to negate the importance or the or the potency of the Islamist voice as well. 113 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:41,430 But again, electrodes cover that. And this doesn't mean that Islam will disappear or. 114 00:12:41,430 --> 00:12:48,510 But the shift is I think it really is amazing. And it is worthy of study, of being studied. 115 00:12:48,510 --> 00:12:56,610 So what happened is a lot of former Muslims also started to have YouTube channels to go good. 116 00:12:56,610 --> 00:13:03,470 They rectally to the heart of these controversial issues like slavery, like a lot of a lot of the heritage. 117 00:13:03,470 --> 00:13:09,120 In fact, a lot of us, I myself can speak again from experience. 118 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:13,080 We discovered discovered our history by these banned books. 119 00:13:13,080 --> 00:13:17,280 I mean, the Internet all of a sudden allowed an avalanche of knowledge. 120 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:23,400 We didn't even know existed. All the pardon books, like, for example, the books of. 121 00:13:23,400 --> 00:13:32,100 They look the same. So to say he is the father of Arab Effie's and I was hearing his voice from former, I could unite former imams. 122 00:13:32,100 --> 00:13:38,880 I mean, no, actually, former imams. Some of them are still in their positions, but who no longer believe in Islam. 123 00:13:38,880 --> 00:13:47,370 But I was really intrigued by them because, wow, I mean, I was interviewing them to get the moderate Islam version and they're like at Doctora. 124 00:13:47,370 --> 00:13:51,480 By the way, you know, I really don't believe what happened is like. 125 00:13:51,480 --> 00:13:55,380 And then I asked if I can record them just for me and have hours and hours. 126 00:13:55,380 --> 00:14:02,260 No, I am going to publish an article of the intellectual journey of these former imams. 127 00:14:02,260 --> 00:14:08,770 But even people who like this are not lay people, one up, one of them talks at an Emman University in Yemen. 128 00:14:08,770 --> 00:14:14,290 One was with was ousted in Jordan for 16 years. 129 00:14:14,290 --> 00:14:18,040 And I was seeing this everywhere. My travel. 130 00:14:18,040 --> 00:14:22,240 I said, I'm going to share with you just a screen for a split second, and that would be eight. 131 00:14:22,240 --> 00:14:31,750 I was looking at The Economist and I saw an article about the number of Muslims in America actually is also in the Arab world increasing. 132 00:14:31,750 --> 00:14:39,430 And the number is, according to Pew Research, at 23 percent, which is this is almost a quarter. 133 00:14:39,430 --> 00:14:46,360 Basically, almost a quarter of Muslims are no longer identifying as Muslims when the punishment for apostasy is death. 134 00:14:46,360 --> 00:14:50,380 So what I'm saying in conclusion, is that there is a shift happening. 135 00:14:50,380 --> 00:14:52,870 It's no longer just the Islamist and traditional. 136 00:14:52,870 --> 00:15:01,220 There's a very potent voice as well and a minority that once will really do to be a private matter, just like it is in the West. 137 00:15:01,220 --> 00:15:06,160 And let's talk about another important voice. Q Thank you so much, Nadia. 138 00:15:06,160 --> 00:15:07,730 Really fascinating perspectives. 139 00:15:07,730 --> 00:15:15,830 And, you know, it's not every day that we also get a bit of action on the screen by looking at The Economist or something like that, sir. 140 00:15:15,830 --> 00:15:25,330 It's wonderful to have a video. If anybody wants to see. But if you have a Web site or anything like that, I'm sure people would be very interested. 141 00:15:25,330 --> 00:15:32,650 Very interesting perspective, very interesting reading of the sort of the rise of modernity and the way in which sort of secularism is coming, 142 00:15:32,650 --> 00:15:39,910 as you put it, kind of liberated, sort of the wit, the rigidity of thinking in a place like the Middle East. 143 00:15:39,910 --> 00:15:44,690 And I think what will be interesting here is to see the way in which Chaddy, 144 00:15:44,690 --> 00:15:52,270 who's obviously someone who studies Islamists very closely and also will be very familiar with the US Hurn and traditionalist institutions as well, 145 00:15:52,270 --> 00:15:55,870 will potentially give us an interesting counterpoint to what you've just said. 146 00:15:55,870 --> 00:16:01,180 And I really look forward to sort of the dynamic discussion, which I'm sure would ensue from this. 147 00:16:01,180 --> 00:16:05,450 So without further ado, I'd like to hand over to you, Shaddy. Thank you. 148 00:16:05,450 --> 00:16:11,320 Right. Well, first of all, it's great to be back virtually at Oxford, man. 149 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:15,880 Thank you, Sam. Michael and Eugene, for having me. It's a pleasure. 150 00:16:15,880 --> 00:16:25,360 So when we're when we're talking about the Arab Spring and I should be more specific, they're of spring and then the failure of the Arab Spring. 151 00:16:25,360 --> 00:16:30,190 The problem, in my view, isn't Islam. The problem wasn't Islam. 152 00:16:30,190 --> 00:16:34,990 The problem wasn't even Islam's outsized role in public life. 153 00:16:34,990 --> 00:16:38,950 I would argue instead that the problem or if you will. 154 00:16:38,950 --> 00:16:46,900 The dilemma was the inability to accommodate Islam's role in public life. 155 00:16:46,900 --> 00:16:53,050 And really the failure ultimately to accommodate Islam's outsized role in public life. 156 00:16:53,050 --> 00:17:00,280 Islam does play. I would again, I would argue, an outsized role in public life and in any a number of ways. 157 00:17:00,280 --> 00:17:05,770 And I think that NATO has sort of discussed aspects of that. 158 00:17:05,770 --> 00:17:12,730 So if we take that as a given that there is still a large majority of Muslims in various countries. 159 00:17:12,730 --> 00:17:18,340 So we can take Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, so on. Tunisia is a little bit lower because of the secular background. 160 00:17:18,340 --> 00:17:25,480 We still see large majorities saying that they want Islam to play a prominent or central role in public life. 161 00:17:25,480 --> 00:17:31,780 So if that's a given, then the question is, what do we do with that? And that's part of what I want to address here. 162 00:17:31,780 --> 00:17:38,650 Now, this inability to accommodate Islam's public role, it's not a new problem. 163 00:17:38,650 --> 00:17:47,380 This has been a and in many cases, these foundational divides since independence and even before independence. 164 00:17:47,380 --> 00:17:50,770 And let me just backtrack a little bit here. 165 00:17:50,770 --> 00:18:04,630 If we're looking at the premodern era, Islam provided an overarching moral and legal and religious architecture for the better part of 14 centuries. 166 00:18:04,630 --> 00:18:14,110 It went without saying. So it wasn't said. So what that meant in practise is that Islamists didn't exist in the premodern era. 167 00:18:14,110 --> 00:18:20,650 It wouldn't have made sense for Islamists to exist because the very idea of Islamism would be redundant. 168 00:18:20,650 --> 00:18:24,370 No one questioned Islam's role in public life. 169 00:18:24,370 --> 00:18:32,500 Of course, there was diversity in various levels of practise. And, you know, Kalis themselves weren't always known as being very observant themselves. 170 00:18:32,500 --> 00:18:41,350 But everyone upheld the notion that there was an overarching legal and moral architecture. 171 00:18:41,350 --> 00:18:50,320 Now, then then something happened. And this is where the story overlaps with some of what Nadia said, that we have, first of all, 172 00:18:50,320 --> 00:19:01,550 secular ideologies being introduced in the 19th century and then in the first half of the 20th century and then nationalist regimes posten to. 173 00:19:01,550 --> 00:19:11,720 Pendants. They wanted to dominate their societies. They wanted to centralise power, so they felt the need to control and regulate Islam. 174 00:19:11,720 --> 00:19:22,070 So in some ways, it was ostensibly secular regimes that ended up further politicising Islam through their efforts to domesticate Islam. 175 00:19:22,070 --> 00:19:23,360 Visa v the state. 176 00:19:23,360 --> 00:19:31,880 Because if there's some tension between Islam's sort of sort of power and resilience on the one hand and the nation state on the other. 177 00:19:31,880 --> 00:19:36,920 If you're an authoritarian post independence leader, the solution is obvious. 178 00:19:36,920 --> 00:19:45,880 You have to find a way to cut Islam down to size in terms of how it can challenge power and your rule. 179 00:19:45,880 --> 00:19:55,160 So eventually, in most Arab and most Arab countries, I mean, really over the past process, over the past century, 180 00:19:55,160 --> 00:20:02,660 the primary cleavage became one around the role of religion and and Islam's relationship to the state. 181 00:20:02,660 --> 00:20:06,080 The state's relationship to Islam. 182 00:20:06,080 --> 00:20:14,060 And this is obviously different in many other regions where, you know, for for many decades, the primary cleavage would tend to be economic in nature. 183 00:20:14,060 --> 00:20:21,320 And that's how we saw the left right spectrum. Generally, the Middle East has had a different left right spectrum, if you will. 184 00:20:21,320 --> 00:20:29,000 And this isn't to say that there's just Islamists and non Islamists. There's there's various shades in between. 185 00:20:29,000 --> 00:20:37,430 A minority of secular elites, liberals, FOSE, secularists, Islamists, lite, different strains of Islamism. 186 00:20:37,430 --> 00:20:44,540 So it's a very diverse, very diverse framework and a very diverse array of actors and characters. 187 00:20:44,540 --> 00:20:49,310 But what distinguishes them from each other is their differing approaches to religion, 188 00:20:49,310 --> 00:20:56,150 not so much their differing approaches to economics or unemployment or whatever else it might be. 189 00:20:56,150 --> 00:21:02,360 So this is the cleavage that we have. This is the fundamental divide in not all Arab countries, 190 00:21:02,360 --> 00:21:09,500 but in many Arab countries and certainly in the ones that I tend to focus on more Egypt being the telling example. 191 00:21:09,500 --> 00:21:15,410 Now, these this this divide isn't necessarily something to lament. 192 00:21:15,410 --> 00:21:24,110 It's hard to imagine it being any other way, because with mass literacy, mass education and access to different sources of information, 193 00:21:24,110 --> 00:21:32,300 inevitably you're going to have a diversity of perspectives on politics and religion, which Nadia touched on. 194 00:21:32,300 --> 00:21:42,500 And in some ways, this is the natural condition of any modern society, is growing levels of ideological, ethnic and religious diversity. 195 00:21:42,500 --> 00:21:46,700 So then the question is, what do we do with this diverse reality? 196 00:21:46,700 --> 00:21:53,120 Because Islamists are not going to be able to defeat non Islamists and non Islamists 197 00:21:53,120 --> 00:22:00,200 or secularists in quotation marks will not be able to defeat or a race Islamism. 198 00:22:00,200 --> 00:22:05,150 These are ideas that are now entrenched in these respective societies. 199 00:22:05,150 --> 00:22:10,200 The Arab Spring. Then if we look at it from this perspective, what what didn't happen? 200 00:22:10,200 --> 00:22:15,260 The Arab Spring was accommodating these two perspectives in a peaceful way. 201 00:22:15,260 --> 00:22:26,060 And that's why we see a resort to violence. So this is why I've laid out here is a different conceptualisation of the problem of Islam. 202 00:22:26,060 --> 00:22:31,160 And if we take this as the problem, then there's really only one solution. 203 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:35,360 And I would say that solution is democracy, but not just any kind of democracy. 204 00:22:35,360 --> 00:22:41,600 Not even not even the virgin. Not even not liberal democracy that most Westerners favour. 205 00:22:41,600 --> 00:22:48,260 So I'm not talking here about specifically Western style liberal conception of Dymock democracy, 206 00:22:48,260 --> 00:22:57,020 because part of the issue here in these Arab societies is that citizens can't agree on their conception of the good life. 207 00:22:57,020 --> 00:23:04,760 And that's why you can't come in and say, oh, liberalism or distinctly liberal version of democracy is the solution, 208 00:23:04,760 --> 00:23:10,400 because then you're basically imposing a particular understanding of the good life. 209 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:18,770 And that's also why secularism isn't the answer. And one thing I talk about in my work is a minimalistic conception of democracy. 210 00:23:18,770 --> 00:23:23,270 And in this reading of the word democracy, democracy isn't a means to an end. 211 00:23:23,270 --> 00:23:32,240 It's not about starting with democracy and getting to liberalism or getting to rationality or other things that we hold dear. 212 00:23:32,240 --> 00:23:35,030 No, in this minimalistic conception, 213 00:23:35,030 --> 00:23:45,980 democracy is a way to manage and regulate conflict between opposing sides that don't like each other or perhaps even hate each other. 214 00:23:45,980 --> 00:23:51,590 So we don't want to ask for too much here. So when you have this teleological scenarios that, oh, 215 00:23:51,590 --> 00:24:01,750 one day the Middle East will become like other regions and people will become less religious and people will secularise like they. 216 00:24:01,750 --> 00:24:05,680 Generally in certainly in Europe and to various degrees in the US. 217 00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:12,520 I mean, my response would be this teleological scenario is maybe not the most helpful way of looking at it, 218 00:24:12,520 --> 00:24:19,450 because it proof presumes a lot of things that may not necessarily happen and very long into the future. 219 00:24:19,450 --> 00:24:24,670 The last thing I'll say is I just close up here is that the calm? 220 00:24:24,670 --> 00:24:33,880 So we have one option of accommodation. The other option is to say basically that we should insist, especially as westerner's in here, you know, 221 00:24:33,880 --> 00:24:41,830 speaking as an American, you think about the policy implications and how the U.S. should relate to the Middle East. 222 00:24:41,830 --> 00:24:52,810 Sometimes there is this desire to encourage secularism or to put pressure or to assume and the danger with this is that it might sound fine in theory, 223 00:24:52,810 --> 00:25:01,070 but in practise, any time you see, you kind of elevate secularism as the end goal in the Middle East, you end up with coercion. 224 00:25:01,070 --> 00:25:05,080 And we've seen this time and time again because the vast majority of citizens in these 225 00:25:05,080 --> 00:25:11,310 countries are not secular in the sense of wanting to separate religion from politics. 226 00:25:11,310 --> 00:25:17,050 There is there is no survey that I've been aware of where there is any significant PLR 227 00:25:17,050 --> 00:25:23,800 support coming close to anything close to a majority for separating religion from politics. 228 00:25:23,800 --> 00:25:33,280 People say they don't want clerics to play too much of a role or they don't want Islamic law to be implemented in a very strict literalist way. 229 00:25:33,280 --> 00:25:37,360 But that's a different issue than this kind of strict separation of saying 230 00:25:37,360 --> 00:25:42,690 religion is something private that has no implications for the public sphere. 231 00:25:42,690 --> 00:25:52,150 So so the problem is you have you have masses of people who really aren't on on board with the secular project. 232 00:25:52,150 --> 00:26:01,960 And then if you want secularism, then you basically have to you have to coerce and force people to get with the programme and taken to extremes. 233 00:26:01,960 --> 00:26:07,870 This can lead to something like Rahbar, the massacre that happened in August 2013. 234 00:26:07,870 --> 00:26:10,660 The Sisi regime isn't secular, persay, 235 00:26:10,660 --> 00:26:20,110 but I think it's fair to call Sisi anti Islamist and he and his supporters saw the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the identity of the nation. 236 00:26:20,110 --> 00:26:24,730 So their response, which is very different than mine, mine is accommodation. 237 00:26:24,730 --> 00:26:34,270 Their response was brute force. And we don't just see this in Egypt, but any time there has been a perception of an Islamic or Islamist threat. 238 00:26:34,270 --> 00:26:42,640 We've had regimes basically resorting to coercion. They're not trying to convince people to not be Islamist or to do so through peaceful means. 239 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:46,900 They say these people have too much influence and electoral support. 240 00:26:46,900 --> 00:26:54,160 They must be destroyed. So that's why I worry that once we start along, this path of secularism is good. 241 00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:56,110 Secularism is the answer. 242 00:26:56,110 --> 00:27:06,150 We inevitably come to a set of conclusions that is contrary to democracy and morally objectionable because it leads to coercion. 243 00:27:06,150 --> 00:27:14,070 Thank you so much, Chad. That's that's a fascinating sort of another counterpoint in many respects. 244 00:27:14,070 --> 00:27:17,220 I mean, you've both presented, I think, you know, 245 00:27:17,220 --> 00:27:24,090 fascinating perspectives on the region and on specifically what's happened in the India in the case of the Arab uprisings, 246 00:27:24,090 --> 00:27:29,350 but also in terms of your prescriptions are very different about the future. 247 00:27:29,350 --> 00:27:34,140 And, of course, Shadi, you're coming from the Brookings Institution and you're thinking like a policy man, as you should. 248 00:27:34,140 --> 00:27:38,040 But I want to actually take this opportunity to do two things. 249 00:27:38,040 --> 00:27:41,760 One is to encourage people where have we have quite a few questions coming in. 250 00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:45,660 And Michael will be kindly taking that on in just a moment. 251 00:27:45,660 --> 00:27:52,740 But I wanted to actually ask you both questions, drawing on each other's sort of presentations. 252 00:27:52,740 --> 00:28:03,540 So for Nadia, I'm just sort of wondering about if you can reflect on Qaddafi's these comments about coercion that he's suggesting, actually. 253 00:28:03,540 --> 00:28:10,080 You said that there's a huge groundswell of interest in secular perspectives that are critical to the sort of really 254 00:28:10,080 --> 00:28:16,800 homogenous religious outlook that you read in the region and you lived and experienced yourself in the region, 255 00:28:16,800 --> 00:28:28,020 probably more so than myself or Chaddy. But Shadi, presenting statistics that suggest that there's not enough popularity of those perspectives, 256 00:28:28,020 --> 00:28:36,170 and ultimately, when states want to assert themselves, they use coercion and crush people who are Islamists. 257 00:28:36,170 --> 00:28:43,520 So that would be my question for yourself and for Shadi drawing on Nadja's, if it's around a bunch of both together, 258 00:28:43,520 --> 00:28:50,640 Ali up there, as it is obviously an extremely influential figure in terms of like the discourse that he inaugurated. 259 00:28:50,640 --> 00:28:57,660 And that is a powerful force. And there are forms of secular discourses that result in the sorts of people like Nasser Abuzaid, 260 00:28:57,660 --> 00:29:02,430 who are driven out by an ostensibly sort of secular modern nation state. 261 00:29:02,430 --> 00:29:08,070 So I think you made the point that Sisi isn't really a secular sort of figure, 262 00:29:08,070 --> 00:29:15,250 but does that not indicate a kind of problem in terms of the kinds of things that can be tolerated within within a state? 263 00:29:15,250 --> 00:29:19,680 So it's all right. I'll start with Nadia and then Shadi, if you could take him from there. 264 00:29:19,680 --> 00:29:23,740 And we welcome your questions as ever. If you want to ask questions, please do. 265 00:29:23,740 --> 00:29:26,990 And Michael, we'll take that in just a moment. Thank you. 266 00:29:26,990 --> 00:29:39,810 So I agree with Chaddy that there needs to be a system that allows both these voices to coexist and to compete for people's hearts and minds. 267 00:29:39,810 --> 00:29:45,810 The thing is, I mean, if I may show the eye here and maybe I'm not hearing this right, 268 00:29:45,810 --> 00:29:53,250 that Islamists are very I'm sorry, regimes are very coercive and there's no question about it. 269 00:29:53,250 --> 00:30:02,730 Nobody will argue that regimes are coercive, but Islamists are just as equally, I would even argue, as just as equally coercive as regimes. 270 00:30:02,730 --> 00:30:16,140 And in fact, I even believe that it was because a lot of people have seen multiple versions and reiterations of an Islamic state, whether etc., Libya, 271 00:30:16,140 --> 00:30:24,490 Iran, the Islamic State, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Muslim mother in Egypt were anything but inclusive in writing the constitution of Egypt. 272 00:30:24,490 --> 00:30:29,520 There was so they were arresting journalists. They were trying to coerce. 273 00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:36,880 So they had the same exact methodology there. I was watching a lot of their television stations. 274 00:30:36,880 --> 00:30:44,590 They were inciting violence. Truly, I I really believe that a lot of the people who felt Chir that, oh my goodness, 275 00:30:44,590 --> 00:30:49,720 these people were just going to sit down so so that the regimes and Islam is to have a lot of that violence. 276 00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:57,400 In fact, in common and that exclusivity, the regime is just pure authoritarianism and Islam in Islam is Islamist. 277 00:30:57,400 --> 00:31:06,130 In addition to the authoritarian trend, they're holier than thou because they are they represent God versus know others representing the devil. 278 00:31:06,130 --> 00:31:10,660 So so I don't think that the. 279 00:31:10,660 --> 00:31:19,870 However. But from my reading of the voices that want separation, it is like Shaddy said, 280 00:31:19,870 --> 00:31:25,470 there's anticlerical and because they've seen all sorts of political interpretations. 281 00:31:25,470 --> 00:31:34,410 But they I would not say that those who are calling for separation between politics and religion, they actually want to coerce against religion. 282 00:31:34,410 --> 00:31:39,990 In fact, the opposite. Like, if you read again, this rabbi said he believes they should be able to rule, 283 00:31:39,990 --> 00:31:44,610 but there should be a mechanism for them to be voted out if they don't deliver. 284 00:31:44,610 --> 00:31:48,540 I mean, that's a problem. Islam is don't want to be voted out. They just want to be voted in. 285 00:31:48,540 --> 00:31:55,230 So I think the region does need a democracy that allows for these two very 286 00:31:55,230 --> 00:32:00,210 important voices in the Muslim majority countries to compete and others as well. 287 00:32:00,210 --> 00:32:06,910 But definitely sharing of power. This is good. 288 00:32:06,910 --> 00:32:12,880 I think we have we'd have planned some contrasting perspectives here. So let's let's get into this. 289 00:32:12,880 --> 00:32:17,140 So I think if we're talking about Egypt for a moment, 290 00:32:17,140 --> 00:32:27,400 what we know about secularists or liberals is that the vast majority of them supported the 2013 military coup. 291 00:32:27,400 --> 00:32:33,460 Not only that, the vast majority of them supported the worst mass killing in modern Egyptian history. 292 00:32:33,460 --> 00:32:46,810 What this tells us is that, again, so-called these liberals or anti Islamists or whatever, they were not willing to play play by the electoral rules. 293 00:32:46,810 --> 00:32:54,100 They weren't willing to wait for another election and to try to beat Mohammed Morsi and the Brotherhood through electoral means. 294 00:32:54,100 --> 00:32:59,500 And we used to play a game. It's actually a pretty dark game. And I'm not even sure the game is quite the right word. 295 00:32:59,500 --> 00:33:05,140 But after the coup, me and a few friends who were like, you know, watching what was happening in Egypt, 296 00:33:05,140 --> 00:33:13,510 we would try to count on one hand how many prominent liberals in an entire country of 100 million oppose the coup. 297 00:33:13,510 --> 00:33:21,940 We usually got to two or three individuals. That's how rare it was for liberals to actually uphold the democratic process. 298 00:33:21,940 --> 00:33:32,980 Now we have to ask ourselves why. Why do people who claim to believe in enlightenment principles and liberal ideals of tolerance and diversity? 299 00:33:32,980 --> 00:33:38,920 They claim they believe in these ideas, but then they tend to end up supporting military coups. 300 00:33:38,920 --> 00:33:44,070 I don't think this is a coincidence. I think the two are just OK. 301 00:33:44,070 --> 00:33:51,580 But I just finished on the other point on the Brotherhood, and there might be a little bit of a gap in how we perceive the Brotherhood. 302 00:33:51,580 --> 00:33:57,610 Look, I think Iran and Saudi Arabia don't really fit in the rubric because in those 303 00:33:57,610 --> 00:34:03,070 cases we didn't have Islamist parties coming to power through democratic means. 304 00:34:03,070 --> 00:34:07,690 So I wouldn't want to put the Brotherhood or other Islamist parties that participate 305 00:34:07,690 --> 00:34:15,910 in the parliamentary process in the same bucket as a revolutionary context where. 306 00:34:15,910 --> 00:34:19,480 And also a Shia context, which is different for a number of reasons. 307 00:34:19,480 --> 00:34:29,470 Now, the Brotherhood, I don't want to relitigate what happened in 2011 to 2013 when the Brotherhood was rising to power. 308 00:34:29,470 --> 00:34:39,220 Yes, the Brotherhood was Farve was did not govern inclusively or as inclusively as it should have in the constitutional process. 309 00:34:39,220 --> 00:34:43,480 There was certainly overreach from Morsi and Morsi was the wrong person at the wrong time. 310 00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:49,810 And as someone who got to know Morsi, you know, individually and spend time with him before he became president, 311 00:34:49,810 --> 00:34:52,510 he's not exactly the person I would have gone for. 312 00:34:52,510 --> 00:35:01,540 That said, if we look at Egypt's modern history, 2011 to 2013 was the most democratic Egypt has ever been. 313 00:35:01,540 --> 00:35:04,810 It was a flawed experiment. It was a scary experiment. 314 00:35:04,810 --> 00:35:14,590 And I know because many of my friends and family in Egypt, I mean, born and raised here in the US, but my most my relatives are still in Egypt. 315 00:35:14,590 --> 00:35:19,570 They are pretty anti brotherhood and pro Sisi. 316 00:35:19,570 --> 00:35:25,330 And they would they would see me as a kind of interloper like, oh, now you're you're American. 317 00:35:25,330 --> 00:35:30,940 You're coming back to the country of your parents and you're trying to tell us how to live democratically. 318 00:35:30,940 --> 00:35:35,650 These people are dangerous. We want to get rid of them. And if that means through a coup, so be it. 319 00:35:35,650 --> 00:35:40,390 But I think that we still have to try to look objectively at this moment. 320 00:35:40,390 --> 00:35:50,440 And I think that the case is very strong, that this was a relative high point, despite its flaws or with all of its flaws. 321 00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:56,890 And my preference by very strong preference would have been that instead of supporting military coups, 322 00:35:56,890 --> 00:36:00,860 some of these liberals would have said, let's try to convince our fellow Egyptians. 323 00:36:00,860 --> 00:36:05,530 So next time around, we can get the Brotherhood's percentage in the polls down. 324 00:36:05,530 --> 00:36:09,820 But that's not what happened. And I don't know when Egypt will be able to recover from this. 325 00:36:09,820 --> 00:36:12,560 It could quite literally be decades. 326 00:36:12,560 --> 00:36:21,130 You know, if I may just say one point, you ask why I agree with you that it was the most democratic Egypt has been since early 20th century. 327 00:36:21,130 --> 00:36:27,220 And judging from what I've seen myself in the discourse that was coming out of Islamists, 328 00:36:27,220 --> 00:36:33,310 there was a lot of threat of violence that would terrify anybody, honestly. 329 00:36:33,310 --> 00:36:37,350 So the discourse. Terrorised people. 330 00:36:37,350 --> 00:36:46,110 I mean, this is the thing about a lot of Islam is they do not recognise how this threat of violence and terrorises people. 331 00:36:46,110 --> 00:36:51,480 That makes people think, OK, we'll take that, we'll take the army in it rather than have ISIS coming next. 332 00:36:51,480 --> 00:36:54,620 So even if Morsi himself maybe was not doing this, 333 00:36:54,620 --> 00:37:03,600 but there were a lot of his supporters that were really threatening ISIS like treatment of liberals, which make people basically it's it's survival. 334 00:37:03,600 --> 00:37:11,070 It's it's existential. And that's a problem of the discourse because the discourse is not civil. 335 00:37:11,070 --> 00:37:16,320 Discourse is not. Hey, let's let the best idea when let us talk about issues. 336 00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:22,440 How do we we have serious issues in the Arab world. We have issues of economy, issues of environment. 337 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:28,440 The discourse was not on what's the best idea. The discourse, especially with Islamists, is very quickly. 338 00:37:28,440 --> 00:37:31,350 Are we going to show these people we're going to essentially gun them down? 339 00:37:31,350 --> 00:37:37,290 So if you have I mean, I've seen this I'm sure you have seen a lot of videos of Islamists. 340 00:37:37,290 --> 00:37:41,610 It's very it's very quickly turns. Threats of violence. 341 00:37:41,610 --> 00:37:50,160 And, of course, you know, then the regimes use that fear to do exactly what the Islamists say they would do to their opponents. 342 00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:56,580 But they're both, you know, using violence and there's no justification at all to violence. 343 00:37:56,580 --> 00:38:06,420 And the discourse I'm interested in actually is one that discredits violence as a mechanism in any shape or form to engage with any issue politically, 344 00:38:06,420 --> 00:38:14,400 socially, religiously, et cetera. Nutty, I would just say very quickly. 345 00:38:14,400 --> 00:38:22,020 I know that we want to move on to Q&A and all that. But the test of the Brotherhood's position on violence versus non-violence. 346 00:38:22,020 --> 00:38:29,250 We had that with the Sisi regime's repression. I think a lot of us fear that we could have at Algeria like situation the Brotherhood 347 00:38:29,250 --> 00:38:35,090 as hundreds of thousands of members and supporters and sympathisers in Egypt. 348 00:38:35,090 --> 00:38:42,120 It's what it is, the largest mass movement in the country. But we didn't see a mass turn to violence. 349 00:38:42,120 --> 00:38:46,290 Why? I think one of the reasons is the Brotherhood, you know, 350 00:38:46,290 --> 00:38:53,820 counselled its members to the extent possible to not take up arms and start some kind of endless insurgency. 351 00:38:53,820 --> 00:38:58,830 Yes. Were there outbreaks of violence from people who left the Brotherhood fold and said enough is enough? 352 00:38:58,830 --> 00:39:05,430 Yes, but it's it's also, I think, a relief that when we might have expected a mass turn to violence, 353 00:39:05,430 --> 00:39:10,230 that's not actually what we saw despite very high levels of repression. 354 00:39:10,230 --> 00:39:13,950 I would just note that. OK, thank you. 355 00:39:13,950 --> 00:39:19,250 Thank you both very much. We're going to now move to questions coming from the audience. 356 00:39:19,250 --> 00:39:27,570 They're coming in. They can fast. So a number of them, both of you and individually, the first one is going to both of you. 357 00:39:27,570 --> 00:39:31,520 It comes from Metgasco here. Very nice of you to join us. 358 00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:38,710 And that is really interesting to see. To what extent has is this debate on the pace of religion in the Arab world, 359 00:39:38,710 --> 00:39:45,790 certainly since the Arab Spring been influenced what happened in Iran, particularly with the revolution and thereafter? 360 00:39:45,790 --> 00:39:49,220 So that's for both of you. Go ahead, Jenny. No, no, not. 361 00:39:49,220 --> 00:39:51,520 Nadia, please. 362 00:39:51,520 --> 00:40:01,990 You know, I actually would be interested what you think, but from what I've been monitoring, so you had almost almost a spring before the Arab Spring. 363 00:40:01,990 --> 00:40:11,140 And so when when the Arab Spring started, there was a lot of Facebook pages and Twitter accounts basically carrying the sentiment. 364 00:40:11,140 --> 00:40:15,820 We're not gonna be like Iran. So there's a lot that was at the beginning of the Arab Spring. 365 00:40:15,820 --> 00:40:24,850 But I don't know honestly, because most of the outlets, media outlets in the Arab world are controlled by the regimes. 366 00:40:24,850 --> 00:40:35,050 So the very polarised, whether they are pro Iran or against Iran, is there's a huge polarisation that I think the average people are lost in in that. 367 00:40:35,050 --> 00:40:38,300 Like, I don't know if I would think that there is. 368 00:40:38,300 --> 00:40:46,490 I haven't seen any, you know, that reach between people or intellectuals upset that polarisation in politics. 369 00:40:46,490 --> 00:40:49,790 I haven't seen much of that myself. 370 00:40:49,790 --> 00:40:59,570 So on this, I would say that, you know, having spent a lot of time with Brotherhood leaders and ordinary members in various countries, 371 00:40:59,570 --> 00:41:06,020 but mostly Egypt and Jordan, but also in Nahda, which is not technically brotherhood in Tunisia. 372 00:41:06,020 --> 00:41:12,050 Very rarely. And I started doing my my interviews in, I guess, 2004, 2005. 373 00:41:12,050 --> 00:41:22,460 So over this long period of time, it's been remarkable to me how how rarely Iran has been brought up as a model to emulate. 374 00:41:22,460 --> 00:41:26,360 If anything, it tends to come up as a cautionary note of going too far. 375 00:41:26,360 --> 00:41:31,700 Now, there was a period in the 80s, you know, more recently after the revolution, 376 00:41:31,700 --> 00:41:38,220 where some brotherhood linked individuals saw Iran in a positive light and rushed on. 377 00:41:38,220 --> 00:41:45,410 Nucci is one example of this. So a Nucci and is more kind of his more confrontational phase in the 80s. 378 00:41:45,410 --> 00:41:51,710 He liked the language of Khomeini and others and share yachtie of fighting for 379 00:41:51,710 --> 00:41:58,130 the dispossessed and the kind of anti imperialism narrative and all of that. 380 00:41:58,130 --> 00:42:03,920 But then a new series switches in the 90s and distances himself from the Iranian model. 381 00:42:03,920 --> 00:42:11,330 When he sees that, you can't really say Iran is moving towards democracy and we can have a debate about double discourse, 382 00:42:11,330 --> 00:42:18,260 to what extent Islamists are sincere when they say they believe in procedural democracy. 383 00:42:18,260 --> 00:42:21,850 I don't want to get into that too much, but. 384 00:42:21,850 --> 00:42:31,010 But even when people aren't even ordinary members so, one, can you maybe expect that even if I even if one gets to know Islamist leaders, 385 00:42:31,010 --> 00:42:37,100 there's still kind of trying to present themselves as moderate, but even but on the grassroots level, 386 00:42:37,100 --> 00:42:44,270 I just I didn't I never saw much evidence that Iran had any hold on the Brotherhood's imagination. 387 00:42:44,270 --> 00:42:48,980 Also, it's a little bit of a tough fit because there are major differences. 388 00:42:48,980 --> 00:42:53,270 I mean, Iranian Islamists are very clerical in their orientation. 389 00:42:53,270 --> 00:43:02,450 As is obvious, I think I've generally seen the Brotherhood, at least in Egypt, as being maybe not anticlerical, but non-clerical. 390 00:43:02,450 --> 00:43:08,180 If you look at their senior leadership, there are very few clerics who play any real role. 391 00:43:08,180 --> 00:43:13,160 It's primarily doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers and so on. 392 00:43:13,160 --> 00:43:19,040 So this is not a movement that's known for deep theological insight coming from clerics, 393 00:43:19,040 --> 00:43:26,490 which is very different to the clerical deference model that we see in Iran. 394 00:43:26,490 --> 00:43:33,030 Thank you very much. There's a question specifically the Shaadi, but I'd be interested to see both of yours response to. 395 00:43:33,030 --> 00:43:36,300 It's a very interesting question coming from Christopher Wheeldon. 396 00:43:36,300 --> 00:43:42,780 Christopher asks, We have heard about how religion affects politics in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. 397 00:43:42,780 --> 00:43:50,940 But how has how how the politics of the last 10 to 20 years changed political Islam and Islamism over the same period, 398 00:43:50,940 --> 00:43:53,150 particularly in terms of its methods and ideas? 399 00:43:53,150 --> 00:43:58,950 It's almost like not religion in politics or what is politics done for religion, in particular, Islamism. 400 00:43:58,950 --> 00:44:04,280 So shoddy. First of all, if if you wanted to weigh in on that nardy, I'd be most welcome. 401 00:44:04,280 --> 00:44:10,140 So sometimes I use a conceptual definition for mainstream Islamism, which gets at this tension, 402 00:44:10,140 --> 00:44:18,650 sometimes I describe it as the attempt to reconcile premodern Islamic law with the modern nation state. 403 00:44:18,650 --> 00:44:25,340 Now, the problem is they're hard to reconcile. Islam was not revealed in a time of nation states. 404 00:44:25,340 --> 00:44:32,840 So naturally, Islam is not going to speak to our Westphalian dilemmas. 405 00:44:32,840 --> 00:44:36,530 And there is not a whole lot we can do about that in the corpus of Islamic law. 406 00:44:36,530 --> 00:44:42,500 Also developed in a premodern period where, again, nation states were not the primary unit. 407 00:44:42,500 --> 00:44:46,520 What is what mainstream Islamist and I use this term mainstream Islamists. 408 00:44:46,520 --> 00:44:52,370 I'm referring primarily to brotherhood or Brotherhood inspired organisations. 409 00:44:52,370 --> 00:45:00,880 They tried to square the circle. Now, the problem when you're trying to square the circle with something as powerful as the state. 410 00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:11,950 The state might end up changing you. And I think that one one critique of Brotherhood movements is that they become too enamoured by the nation state. 411 00:45:11,950 --> 00:45:13,870 They can't see beyond the state. 412 00:45:13,870 --> 00:45:23,680 And I think this was very clear during the Arab Spring when despite maybe their earlier and better judgement of not contesting the presidency, 413 00:45:23,680 --> 00:45:26,350 they became obsessed with capturing the state. 414 00:45:26,350 --> 00:45:35,170 And they saw the state as the means to achieve their Islamic project, which, of course, was rather vague and undefined. 415 00:45:35,170 --> 00:45:41,830 And this obsession with state power is something that I think has hurt Islamists quite a bit. 416 00:45:41,830 --> 00:45:50,320 And it is, I think, encouraging to see some younger Brotherhood members in exile, whether in Europe or in Turkey or Doha, 417 00:45:50,320 --> 00:45:56,410 understanding that this was a mistake that Morsi and other senior Brotherhood leaders made. 418 00:45:56,410 --> 00:46:01,930 They rushed. They what they saw this state as a prise and they started to have tunnel vision. 419 00:46:01,930 --> 00:46:08,560 And I think also another example of this is when so Brotherhood movements use Moslehi 420 00:46:08,560 --> 00:46:13,420 arguments or lots of public interest arguments where they can basically be like, 421 00:46:13,420 --> 00:46:20,350 oh, well, this would technically violate Islamic law, like taking a loan from the World Bank or the IMF. 422 00:46:20,350 --> 00:46:26,530 But they can get around that theologically by using these very general, vague Moslehi arguments. 423 00:46:26,530 --> 00:46:28,060 And this goes back to the point I made, 424 00:46:28,060 --> 00:46:35,680 that because they don't have a strong clerical role in their movements and because they're not very theologically or legally strong, 425 00:46:35,680 --> 00:46:42,790 you don't you don't go to the Brotherhood for advice on Islamic law. You go to the Brotherhood for getting out the vote. 426 00:46:42,790 --> 00:46:51,100 That's what the Brotherhood Brotherhood does really well. Internal discipline organisation, hierarchy, leadership delegation. 427 00:46:51,100 --> 00:46:59,200 So on and so forth. So I think this has become the major intellectual deficit with Brotherhood movements is that they're not 428 00:46:59,200 --> 00:47:05,710 theoretically rich and they're not theologically rich and they deferred too much to the nation state. 429 00:47:05,710 --> 00:47:17,410 You know, it's very interesting. Ironically, intellectually speaking, both liberal thinkers like Abuzaid, like his whole class side to be heard. 430 00:47:17,410 --> 00:47:25,540 And a lot of them also like look down upon the whole political class because they want modernity in some ways. 431 00:47:25,540 --> 00:47:30,010 But the Islamists a lot harder because they actually have an Islamic model. 432 00:47:30,010 --> 00:47:35,260 And yet a lot of it's very hard core pillars, really. 433 00:47:35,260 --> 00:47:39,950 They do not, like you said, that you're trying to square a circle. They don't quite fit. 434 00:47:39,950 --> 00:47:45,660 And this is what the impossible state by Hallak. 435 00:47:45,660 --> 00:47:52,120 What do you try to argue that basically it's an impossibility to have an Islamic state with a nation state. 436 00:47:52,120 --> 00:48:00,790 It's based on a different paradigm. It's based on the nation state is is based on every individual as a participant. 437 00:48:00,790 --> 00:48:05,410 So as an individual, I have rights. I have duties as well. 438 00:48:05,410 --> 00:48:10,720 But inverses the rights of the religion, Islam. 439 00:48:10,720 --> 00:48:17,740 So it's a very different to different paradigms. One puts men, if you would, at the centre and the other puts a lot centre. 440 00:48:17,740 --> 00:48:22,810 So it was more important to allow women. So with the nation state is very clear its people. 441 00:48:22,810 --> 00:48:30,470 I cannot just get rid of Saudi because I don't like how it's not like so. 442 00:48:30,470 --> 00:48:35,250 You. Thank you very much. I'm going to combine a couple of questions on a similar theme. 443 00:48:35,250 --> 00:48:43,170 Really looking at the extent to which we may have seen Islamism decline since the Arab Spring. 444 00:48:43,170 --> 00:48:48,360 I mean, in Egypt, effectively, the Mubarak Muslim Brotherhood had been decimated. 445 00:48:48,360 --> 00:48:53,190 And whether that's a sort of reality or just the over the power state has led to, 446 00:48:53,190 --> 00:49:00,300 it has actually been a decline in support for that which brotherhood, as Shadi said, didn't fight back in quite the same way. 447 00:49:00,300 --> 00:49:04,900 But you've also seen in other countries. And it comes with Catherine Adella. 448 00:49:04,900 --> 00:49:11,370 Caller's question about. We've seen in somewhere like Tunisia whether or not a movement, again, as Qaddafi said, not quite a Brotherhood party, 449 00:49:11,370 --> 00:49:19,530 but certainly a much broader family and related has seen its support shrink at successive elections in Tunisia. 450 00:49:19,530 --> 00:49:26,800 So, first of all, is there this decline in support, particularly for Brotherhood parties? 451 00:49:26,800 --> 00:49:30,630 And what does that say about the role, the place of religion? 452 00:49:30,630 --> 00:49:32,430 Does it mean people are moving away from that? 453 00:49:32,430 --> 00:49:40,110 Or is it the sort of thing Brotherhood Islamist parties are offering is no longer as attractive as it once was before on the eve of the Arab Spring? 454 00:49:40,110 --> 00:49:45,120 So to both of you, if I may start. So there are two kinds. 455 00:49:45,120 --> 00:49:47,880 Two reasons for the decline of Islamists. 456 00:49:47,880 --> 00:49:58,170 One is because of the authoritarian practises of regimes, which goes in cycles like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, is a very good examples. 457 00:49:58,170 --> 00:50:06,600 Every time the Mubarak regime, for example, would would really come down on the Islamists, on the Brotherhood, they would have a decline temporarily. 458 00:50:06,600 --> 00:50:10,260 And that that decline I'm not worried about in this. 459 00:50:10,260 --> 00:50:17,790 If I was an Islamist, I wouldn't worry about it because oppression. There's something else that pushes the the party underground. 460 00:50:17,790 --> 00:50:29,640 And it actually furthers a lot of the old hoax in the basically that the hard liners to to really just follow the blindly. 461 00:50:29,640 --> 00:50:33,840 I mean, that there was a crisis within the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring. 462 00:50:33,840 --> 00:50:37,350 And a lot of former Brotherhood wrote books like I read seven of them. 463 00:50:37,350 --> 00:50:41,770 So there must have been a whole other line to them. 464 00:50:41,770 --> 00:50:52,020 But the other decline, which I think has the most significance going forward, is a decline, again at the level of ideas. 465 00:50:52,020 --> 00:51:00,790 So at the level a decline because of persuasion, a decline because they weren't able to put forth a persuasive model. 466 00:51:00,790 --> 00:51:10,960 And I think it's, again, fascinating that Tunisia was able to have a constitution that has no Sharia. 467 00:51:10,960 --> 00:51:15,820 It's based on the rule, human rights. Women can marry infidels, for example. 468 00:51:15,820 --> 00:51:19,510 They're Muslim without their their husbands converting to Islam. 469 00:51:19,510 --> 00:51:27,190 I mean, the freedom of thought, freedom of conscience. 470 00:51:27,190 --> 00:51:32,800 I mean, it's it's a very unprecedented kind of constitution in Tunisia. 471 00:51:32,800 --> 00:51:41,710 We see even like those headlines in in Sudan after 30 years of Islamist rule, there's a separation between politics and religion. 472 00:51:41,710 --> 00:51:50,620 I mean, again, it's in the early stages. But I think that idea of civic state and the idea of that. 473 00:51:50,620 --> 00:52:03,100 I think there is a growing. Circulation of debates that Islamists are not really an Islamic state cannot really 474 00:52:03,100 --> 00:52:08,410 address the challenges of the 21st century because they're too outdated there. 475 00:52:08,410 --> 00:52:17,350 It doesn't mean, again, Islam will. Well, we've begun far from it. I mean, even in the US or Europe, there's still very strong religious people. 476 00:52:17,350 --> 00:52:25,630 But. It does mean that there is a growing and growing minority and a minority doesn't have to be ineffective. 477 00:52:25,630 --> 00:52:29,770 I mean, the Middle East has been ruled by minorities for centuries. 478 00:52:29,770 --> 00:52:33,760 So I wonder where that debate will take the Middle East. 479 00:52:33,760 --> 00:52:40,920 I'm not sure that Islamism has as much promise as it used to before. 480 00:52:40,920 --> 00:52:47,500 It has multiple reiterations that people could see in the Middle East. 481 00:52:47,500 --> 00:52:49,420 So I actually agree with Nadia on this, 482 00:52:49,420 --> 00:53:00,580 that I definitely think that there is some souring towards Islamist models of various sorts and certainly towards the Brotherhood model, 483 00:53:00,580 --> 00:53:05,560 because ultimately the Brotherhood model didn't work out so well and people feel burned by it. 484 00:53:05,560 --> 00:53:12,460 And even former Brotherhood members and I've been trying to interview some sort of brotherhood, 485 00:53:12,460 --> 00:53:17,170 but also X Brotherhood folks in east in Istanbul, where many of them currently are. 486 00:53:17,170 --> 00:53:19,510 And many of them have decided to leave the Brotherhood. 487 00:53:19,510 --> 00:53:26,080 And some of them have even become, you know, secular in certain ways or liberal and so on and so forth. 488 00:53:26,080 --> 00:53:32,380 I wouldn't want to overstate how big that group is, but there's certainly a sense that something didn't go right. 489 00:53:32,380 --> 00:53:39,430 That said, I think what we've learnt from previous iterations of this is that even if you decimate Islamists and they 490 00:53:39,430 --> 00:53:46,120 have no organisational structures and you have a strong secular culture like in Tunisia in the 1990s, 491 00:53:46,120 --> 00:53:52,510 Islamist groups can bounce back very quickly because of their built in advantage when it comes to organising. 492 00:53:52,510 --> 00:53:58,210 And they know how to run elections. Liberals might have some interesting intellectual ideas. 493 00:53:58,210 --> 00:54:05,290 They're not great at like knocking on doors. And sometimes that can really make the difference. 494 00:54:05,290 --> 00:54:09,560 Internal discipline matters a lot. The brother you know, the Brotherhood leadership. 495 00:54:09,560 --> 00:54:14,380 It can say to its supporters and followers, hey, vote for these candidates. 496 00:54:14,380 --> 00:54:19,300 But with liberals, you have a very fragmented space. They compete with each other. 497 00:54:19,300 --> 00:54:26,800 And that's one reason that even though A not has gone down in its support in Tunisia, it's still the largest single party in parliament. 498 00:54:26,800 --> 00:54:32,410 There's an interesting debate in Tunisia now inside of Islamist circles. 499 00:54:32,410 --> 00:54:42,940 That is the reason that Anada has lost support because they're Islamist or because they they've deemphasizes their Islamist origins. 500 00:54:42,940 --> 00:54:50,560 And now it's harder to distinguish between them and other parties because I know she doesn't talk that much about Islam or Sharia. 501 00:54:50,560 --> 00:54:59,170 Definitely not Sharia anymore. And this wing of the party, if we want to call them doves versus hawks or something like that, the doves, 502 00:54:59,170 --> 00:55:06,760 which is now the vast majority of the party, they have dominated and they've moved in a very particular direction. 503 00:55:06,760 --> 00:55:14,140 So you might have voters who say, well, what's the point of voting for ANADA if they're not even that Islamist anymore? 504 00:55:14,140 --> 00:55:21,280 Because part of the trick in voting or elections is that you've got to have differentiation between parties. 505 00:55:21,280 --> 00:55:26,170 And the question is, is it not, that doing a great, good job of that now? 506 00:55:26,170 --> 00:55:32,440 You know, I want to point out something that I think is is missing and we need to take it into consideration 507 00:55:32,440 --> 00:55:39,160 in looking at the secularists versus Islamists is that Islam has to have tremendous, 508 00:55:39,160 --> 00:55:47,050 tremendous funding to have schools and to have clinics and to have whereas liberals, they don't have the funding. 509 00:55:47,050 --> 00:55:50,650 And liberals, you know, Islamists can can take money from the Gulf states, 510 00:55:50,650 --> 00:55:55,960 can take money from wealthy Gulf people that whereas liberals do not have that advantage so 511 00:55:55,960 --> 00:56:02,180 that they are really the winning up to a quarter of people that are identifying as basically, 512 00:56:02,180 --> 00:56:05,070 you know, I do not even identify anymore. 513 00:56:05,070 --> 00:56:16,390 And that is entirely made and and accomplished through persuasion with AACTA clinics and schools and funding and satellite channels night and day. 514 00:56:16,390 --> 00:56:26,680 And so so given the disparity in support, it really is, you know, where will it be if they had even support? 515 00:56:26,680 --> 00:56:34,750 I'm not so sure. Right. We have time for one last question, and it comes to both of you from Ngoma. 516 00:56:34,750 --> 00:56:41,780 And no more would also be interested in knowing how she how to access your your work. 517 00:56:41,780 --> 00:56:46,780 Your asserts no mother nowhere asks basically about. We've talked a lot, mainly about the Brotherhood. 518 00:56:46,780 --> 00:56:50,280 But is the future now? What about the Salafi movement? 519 00:56:50,280 --> 00:56:56,150 Is this where things are moving? Is this a future? Is this a new development or is it or is it something else? 520 00:56:56,150 --> 00:57:00,450 So briefly, if you could both with you, Michael, I'm sorry. Would you please say that again? 521 00:57:00,450 --> 00:57:07,560 The I see the role of Salafis in. And we've seen you just mentioned about the Brotherhood possibly being decline. 522 00:57:07,560 --> 00:57:15,090 Is Salafis are actually the new the new in an interesting and dynamic part of Islamism, or is it something else? 523 00:57:15,090 --> 00:57:21,060 So I assume what you mean. Salafism is basically the piety without religion that there's there's multiple. 524 00:57:21,060 --> 00:57:25,080 I mean, when we come to the categories, they are very, 525 00:57:25,080 --> 00:57:32,880 very diverse and very one run of Salafism is basically let us just let us not participate 526 00:57:32,880 --> 00:57:37,770 in politics and wait until the environment is conducive to us having an Islamic state. 527 00:57:37,770 --> 00:57:43,590 Until then, we stay away from politics. So it's very personal religiosity, if you would. 528 00:57:43,590 --> 00:57:50,130 I don't think that personal religiosity in Islam or other faiths will go anywhere any time soon in humanity. 529 00:57:50,130 --> 00:57:58,500 In fact, even those interestingly, even those that are leaving the faith altogether are having a different kind of spirituality. 530 00:57:58,500 --> 00:57:59,820 But just as urgent. 531 00:57:59,820 --> 00:58:10,210 Whether it's a converted to Christianity or some Buddhism or a form of spirituality without labels, which in fact is the largest growing in the world. 532 00:58:10,210 --> 00:58:16,990 The spirituality without religion, basically this very individualistic, inward looking. 533 00:58:16,990 --> 00:58:28,630 So I don't think he's going to go anywhere, but I really would be incredibly shocked if Salafism becomes ever again the majority 534 00:58:28,630 --> 00:58:33,910 of the population giving the competition over ideas and the access to social media, 535 00:58:33,910 --> 00:58:37,660 access to modern ideas that, you know, if you're young, 536 00:58:37,660 --> 00:58:44,980 you don't look to Iran or Saudi as an Islamic state or any as the place where you'd want one to live and have freedoms. 537 00:58:44,980 --> 00:58:50,860 And so then they don't offer attractive virgins. So I doubt that the future. 538 00:58:50,860 --> 00:58:55,890 But I don't think they'd disappear. You know, just very quickly on that. 539 00:58:55,890 --> 00:59:03,990 I mean, Nadia captured some of the less political Salafis. It's also interesting to ask about Salafi parties. 540 00:59:03,990 --> 00:59:07,440 They aren't as active as they used to be during the Arab Spring. But, you know, 541 00:59:07,440 --> 00:59:14,640 I remember after the parliamentary elections when I was in Egypt in early 2012 542 00:59:14,640 --> 00:59:20,620 and the results are finalised and the Noor Party or the Noor Parties Coalition. 543 00:59:20,620 --> 00:59:26,610 So the Salafi coalition won a remarkable portion of the vote, close to 27 percent. 544 00:59:26,610 --> 00:59:31,350 And I remember that, like all my like secular elite family members were like, OK, 545 00:59:31,350 --> 00:59:35,610 we kind of knew about the Brotherhood, but we really didn't know our country. 546 00:59:35,610 --> 00:59:41,430 If there's twenty seven percent of our country men and women who are going for these crazy Salafi types. 547 00:59:41,430 --> 00:59:51,930 I think the Noor party has lost a lot of it's lost a lot of support because it supported the coup and Sisi and it hasn't got a lot in return. 548 00:59:51,930 --> 00:59:53,430 You know, it's an interesting question. 549 00:59:53,430 --> 01:00:00,420 If there is a political opening, whether they can whether Salafis can try to position themselves as an alternative to the Brotherhood and say, 550 01:00:00,420 --> 01:00:05,520 look, we tried the Brotherhood already, that didn't work out so well. 551 01:00:05,520 --> 01:00:09,450 Salafi, you know, that that might be part of how they approach it. 552 01:00:09,450 --> 01:00:16,560 It's really hard to anticipate these things. Part of the problem with having so many authoritarian regimes in authoritarian societies. 553 01:00:16,560 --> 01:00:21,120 We know we don't have a clear sense of what people's natural inclinations are. 554 01:00:21,120 --> 01:00:30,150 We do have polling. But obviously a lot of this polling is happening with very high levels of fear and perhaps self-censorship. 555 01:00:30,150 --> 01:00:37,800 And so, for example, if you're polling people on the Brotherhood in Egypt, I mean, you're probably not going to get most honest answer. 556 01:00:37,800 --> 01:00:43,150 And Salafis probably to some extent as well, which is why oftentimes I go back. 557 01:00:43,150 --> 01:00:51,240 You know, we go back to the question of political opening and democracy that changes so many of the variables and so many 558 01:00:51,240 --> 01:00:57,420 new new factors will be introduced if there is a political opening in Egypt that we're going to have to reassess. 559 01:00:57,420 --> 01:01:06,910 I think a lot of our our starting premises, because it's going to be a very fluid situation once again, just as it was in 2011. 560 01:01:06,910 --> 01:01:09,700 Chaddy, thank you very much and thank you so much, Nadia, for. 561 01:01:09,700 --> 01:01:13,060 I mean, this has really been a great session because you've really bounced off each other. 562 01:01:13,060 --> 01:01:16,670 There's been a lot of dynamic discussion, and I think our viewers have thoroughly enjoyed it. 563 01:01:16,670 --> 01:01:22,030 We apologise to you that we haven't gotten to you. We still have 20 questions actually pending. 564 01:01:22,030 --> 01:01:28,120 So we really apologise. But I hope that this has been very fascinating discussion. 565 01:01:28,120 --> 01:01:32,650 And indeed, you know, there were one of those wonderful debate element to this as well. 566 01:01:32,650 --> 01:01:37,400 And I'll leave you at this point to that. And I look forward to catching you guys. 567 01:01:37,400 --> 01:01:41,320 You know, I look forward to staying in touch with you and for everyone else. 568 01:01:41,320 --> 01:01:46,600 Please do join us next week. We're going to have a couple of wonderful scholars. 569 01:01:46,600 --> 01:01:54,340 And again, a think tank and a subcommittee and Larry Fitzgerald talking about Libya about and we're roughly a year on from the start. 570 01:01:54,340 --> 01:01:58,690 You know what? We're roughly, exactly ten years on from the start of the Libyan uprising. 571 01:01:58,690 --> 01:02:03,640 So we really look forward to having you there. And until then, stay safe. 572 01:02:03,640 --> 01:02:22,458 Take care. And thank you for your Zemmour. Thank you.