1 00:00:06,030 --> 00:00:12,330 Good evening and welcome to this week's Zoome Webinar. From the Middle East centre, this week's topic is Libya. 2 00:00:12,330 --> 00:00:14,160 Past, present and future. 3 00:00:14,160 --> 00:00:22,210 And I'm delighted to invite you to hear two fantastic speakers who are beaming in from abroad, not exactly from Libya at the moment. 4 00:00:22,210 --> 00:00:25,380 They are Mary Fitzgerald and Assume Komati. 5 00:00:25,380 --> 00:00:33,360 Libya's 2011 uprisings offered an early example of the dangers of the regional upheavals when met with the military might of a recalcitrant dictator. 6 00:00:33,360 --> 00:00:38,070 The civil war that ensued and ultimately led to the killing of Gadhafi in October 2011 marked 7 00:00:38,070 --> 00:00:42,450 the beginning of a challenging transition that has been held up by repeated setbacks, 8 00:00:42,450 --> 00:00:49,230 complex civil wars, wars by proxy and shaky cease fires. The future remains uncertain, but deserves our attention. 9 00:00:49,230 --> 00:00:54,180 Our two speakers for this evening are Larry Fitzgerald and Anas Komati. 10 00:00:54,180 --> 00:01:00,030 Mary is a researcher specialising in the euro Mediterranean region with a particular focus on Libya. 11 00:01:00,030 --> 00:01:06,150 She's reported on and researched Libya since February 2011 and lived there in 2014. 12 00:01:06,150 --> 00:01:13,830 An associate fellow of CSR King's College, London, she has conducted research on Libya, the International Crisis Group, 13 00:01:13,830 --> 00:01:20,850 the European Council on Foreign Relations CFR, the United States Institute for Peace USCAP, amongst many others. 14 00:01:20,850 --> 00:01:26,190 Previously a journalist. Her reporting on Libya has appeared in publication, including in The Economist. 15 00:01:26,190 --> 00:01:28,980 Foreign Policy. The New York Financial Times. 16 00:01:28,980 --> 00:01:35,820 And she's also the contributing editor to an edited volume on the Libyan revolution and its aftermath with Oxford University Press. 17 00:01:35,820 --> 00:01:41,280 And Assume Komati is the founder and director of the Tripoli based Saddiq Institute, 18 00:01:41,280 --> 00:01:46,320 the first public policy think tank in Libya's history, established in August 2011. 19 00:01:46,320 --> 00:01:53,100 He has held several positions in the region and Europe as a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut, 20 00:01:53,100 --> 00:01:56,370 a visiting lecturer at the NATO Defence College in Rome. 21 00:01:56,370 --> 00:02:03,900 And he is a frequent contributor on Libya and many affairs on Al-Jazeera, BBC, France 24 and Sky News. 22 00:02:03,900 --> 00:02:08,650 Many of us have watched him on a regular basis as a commentator on these channels. 23 00:02:08,650 --> 00:02:14,500 He's the author of Libya's Islamists and Salafi Jihadists The Battle for a Theological Revolution. 24 00:02:14,500 --> 00:02:18,910 In the edited volume The Arab Spring Handbook published in 2011 by Routledge. 25 00:02:18,910 --> 00:02:23,980 And so it gives us great pleasure here in the Middle East centre to invite the two of you to speak. 26 00:02:23,980 --> 00:02:29,830 I have committed to mention myself and somehow as any other department lecturer in contemporary Islamic studies, 27 00:02:29,830 --> 00:02:32,410 and it gives me great pleasure to kill Mary first. 28 00:02:32,410 --> 00:02:38,940 If you can give us your take on how we should look at Libya today in light of a decade of revolution. 29 00:02:38,940 --> 00:02:45,480 Thank you very much, Osama. And thank you very much to the Middle East centre for organising this event. 30 00:02:45,480 --> 00:02:50,730 The week before, Libyans will mark the anniversary of February 17th, 31 00:02:50,730 --> 00:03:00,090 the day many Libyans consider was the beginning of the uprising that ultimately brought about the end of the Gadhafi regime in 2011. 32 00:03:00,090 --> 00:03:03,960 The protest that started on February 17th, February 15th, 33 00:03:03,960 --> 00:03:14,780 actually a couple of days before with the arrest of a terrible lawyer who represented families of the victims of the Abu Salim massacre, 34 00:03:14,780 --> 00:03:17,700 a massacre in the Abu Salim prison, 35 00:03:17,700 --> 00:03:28,740 the most notorious prison in Gadhafi's Libya, which had taken place in 1996 in which around 1200 prisoners were killed by regime forces, 36 00:03:28,740 --> 00:03:34,200 according to Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other human rights organisations. 37 00:03:34,200 --> 00:03:44,430 Those anti regime protests that started and snowballed in Benghazi, Libya's second city, soon tipped in to an armed uprising. 38 00:03:44,430 --> 00:03:54,630 And I think it's interesting to compare what happened in Libya in early 2011 with what had already happened in Egypt, neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia. 39 00:03:54,630 --> 00:04:01,620 In that in Libya, those anti regime protests very quickly became an armed uprising against the regime, 40 00:04:01,620 --> 00:04:09,240 partly to do with the regime's own response to those gathering protests that had happened in February. 41 00:04:09,240 --> 00:04:19,920 And also, as we know, that armed uprising then later brought about, it led to a NATO led intervention mandated by the U.N. resolution. 42 00:04:19,920 --> 00:04:29,640 So all of that made Libya quite distinctive in terms of what happened early on in 2011 and obviously made it very different to Tunisia and Egypt. 43 00:04:29,640 --> 00:04:35,730 I arrived in Benghazi about 10 days after those very first anti regime protests started. 44 00:04:35,730 --> 00:04:44,400 And what was striking at that time, this was just before the opposition announced the formation of the National Transitional Council, 45 00:04:44,400 --> 00:04:51,750 the body that was to be the international community's interlocutor on the part of the opposition throughout that year. 46 00:04:51,750 --> 00:05:01,140 And what was really striking for me in Benghazi in those early days and weeks before the U.N. resolution mandating the NATO intervention, 47 00:05:01,140 --> 00:05:09,660 was this sense of fear, a sense of fear in terms of how the regime had already responded to those 48 00:05:09,660 --> 00:05:16,660 protests and how the regime may respond as those protests started to quicken? 49 00:05:16,660 --> 00:05:26,750 And of course, that was what was behind the whole push for intervention, the whole push for that U.N. resolution mandating that intervention. 50 00:05:26,750 --> 00:05:30,170 As we know, the uprising continued. 51 00:05:30,170 --> 00:05:39,920 The rebels took control of Tripoli, the capital, in August, and Gadhafi was caught by rebels and killed at the hands of rebels in October that year. 52 00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:51,500 One thing I was really struck by in late 2011 and early 2012 was how optimistic many of the Libyans who supported the uprising were about the future. 53 00:05:51,500 --> 00:05:57,350 And many internationals who are looking at Libya at that time also were quite optimistic. 54 00:05:57,350 --> 00:06:00,350 There was a sense that on paper, at least, 55 00:06:00,350 --> 00:06:10,910 Libya had all the signs of possibly being one of the success stories of what at that time many people were collectively terming the Arab Spring. 56 00:06:10,910 --> 00:06:22,850 On paper, Libya could appear deceptively straightforward country of just six million people, urbanised population predominantly in comparison with, 57 00:06:22,850 --> 00:06:31,580 say, Syria and Iraq, homogenous, relatively homogenous society with not so much the pronounced ethnic cleavages of Syria and Iraq. 58 00:06:31,580 --> 00:06:36,650 None of the sectarian cleavages of Syria and Iraq and an educated population. 59 00:06:36,650 --> 00:06:46,040 None of the literacy challenges of neighbouring Egypt, for example. And then, of course, on top of all of that, Africa's largest oil reserves. 60 00:06:46,040 --> 00:06:55,710 So on paper, Libya appeared to have many of the ingredients that could lead to a success story. 61 00:06:55,710 --> 00:07:04,200 But I think what wasn't discussed enough at that time was the fact that you were lifting the lid on 62 00:07:04,200 --> 00:07:15,060 42 years of rule by Moammar Gadhafi and Gadhafi's Libya wasn't your common garden variety autocracy, 63 00:07:15,060 --> 00:07:22,920 if you like. This was a very unique and very idiosyncratic experiment in autocracy. 64 00:07:22,920 --> 00:07:30,840 So when Gadhafi's regime collapsed, it soon became more apparent what the nature of that regime was, 65 00:07:30,840 --> 00:07:37,770 how Gadhafi ruled, how his 42 years in power had shaped Libyan society, 66 00:07:37,770 --> 00:07:44,850 had shaped the way Libyans dealt with each other, interacted with each other, had shaped the institutions of the state. 67 00:07:44,850 --> 00:07:51,870 And I think that at those early stages, there wasn't enough understanding of that internationals. 68 00:07:51,870 --> 00:08:00,660 I would say as well that between 2011 and 2014, a couple of fateful decisions were taken. 69 00:08:00,660 --> 00:08:07,770 That really helped set the course for the turbulence of post Gadhafi Libya. 70 00:08:07,770 --> 00:08:17,790 The first fateful decision was to basically give a state salary to those who claim to have been fighters and during the uprising, 71 00:08:17,790 --> 00:08:20,370 anti Gadhafi fighters during the uprising. 72 00:08:20,370 --> 00:08:30,570 That led to a situation that from 2012 on, you had over two hundred thousand men who were armed on state salaries. 73 00:08:30,570 --> 00:08:41,280 And that continues today. And that led to the situation from 2014 when Libya tipped into a civil conflict where you had belligerents on both sides, 74 00:08:41,280 --> 00:08:46,440 fighters on both sides drawing state salaries. 75 00:08:46,440 --> 00:08:51,960 And, of course, at that dynamic also helped encourage the growth of more armed groups. 76 00:08:51,960 --> 00:08:56,850 So we saw the armed groups that had emerged during the uprising against Gadhafi. 77 00:08:56,850 --> 00:09:04,320 They grew in size. And then we saw the emergence of new groups in the post 2011 period. 78 00:09:04,320 --> 00:09:14,130 So that militia dynamic was something that emerged from that fateful decision to award state salaries and is fed by it still today. 79 00:09:14,130 --> 00:09:17,880 The other fateful decision was in 2013, 80 00:09:17,880 --> 00:09:29,690 when a mix of zero sum and politicking in the first elected parliament of the of the post Gadhafi period that was elected in summer 2012, 81 00:09:29,690 --> 00:09:41,070 a mix of zero sum politicking inside that parliament and threats of force by the various armed groups pushing for this. 82 00:09:41,070 --> 00:09:48,510 At the time brought about a sweeping lustration law, the so-called political isolation law, 83 00:09:48,510 --> 00:09:55,920 which barred whole swathes of officials who had connexions with the previous regime, 84 00:09:55,920 --> 00:10:03,420 thereby hollowing out at a lot of expertise in the machinery of the state institutional expertise. 85 00:10:03,420 --> 00:10:14,740 In one fell swoop. But it also made the whole question of reconciliation in the post Gadhafi period all the more difficult. 86 00:10:14,740 --> 00:10:21,970 It fed those tensions and what has been striking to me in recent years is in conversations 87 00:10:21,970 --> 00:10:28,300 with people who are some of the strongest proponents at the time of that lustration law, 88 00:10:28,300 --> 00:10:33,580 many of them now regret that it was a sweeping, as it turned out to be. 89 00:10:33,580 --> 00:10:43,960 They believe it was actually a mistake at that time. So it is interesting to talk to Libyans who played key roles either during the 2011 uprising 90 00:10:43,960 --> 00:10:51,010 and in the critical period between 2011 and 2014 to see how they look back on it now, 91 00:10:51,010 --> 00:10:56,830 the mistakes that were made, what they would have done differently, how they would have done it differently. 92 00:10:56,830 --> 00:11:03,190 But I would also add that what is interesting in the last couple of years and indeed concerning, 93 00:11:03,190 --> 00:11:10,720 is the amount of revisionism we're seeing creep in to the conversation on Libya, 94 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:20,350 whether it's the Libyan conversation about what happened in 2011 and since or indeed the international conversation on Libya. 95 00:11:20,350 --> 00:11:30,850 So to give one example, I've noticed over the last year or two, I see several references in different places, media references, et cetera, 96 00:11:30,850 --> 00:11:37,150 researchers references to Libya's 10 year long civil war, 97 00:11:37,150 --> 00:11:45,190 which to me is an extraordinary assertion to make because many would describe what happened in 2011 as civil war. 98 00:11:45,190 --> 00:11:50,470 But Libya between 2011 and 2014 was not in a state of civil war. 99 00:11:50,470 --> 00:11:56,170 There were skirmishes throughout the country. There were certainly tensions. 100 00:11:56,170 --> 00:12:01,780 But at that time, Libyans didn't talk about their country being in a state of civil war. 101 00:12:01,780 --> 00:12:12,130 So I think we have to be really careful in terms of how we look back at what happened in 2011, what happened particularly between 2011 and 2014. 102 00:12:12,130 --> 00:12:17,260 I see 2014 as the critical year in the post Gadhafi period. 103 00:12:17,260 --> 00:12:21,490 And we'll we'll talk about that later in terms of what happened that year. 104 00:12:21,490 --> 00:12:32,980 But, you know, I think between 2010 and 2014, we have to see that examine that separately and then look at 2014 as this pivotal year. 105 00:12:32,980 --> 00:12:36,120 A couple of things about 2014. 106 00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:46,110 One thing I think is very important to bear in mind about that year is the impact on Libya of what had happened in Egypt in 2013. 107 00:12:46,110 --> 00:12:51,480 And by that, I mean the military coup to oust the government of Mohamed Morsi. 108 00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:53,880 And then, of course, what followed there. 109 00:12:53,880 --> 00:13:03,510 And it's interesting to see that Libya, in its post 2014 trajectory, tipped more towards echoing what had happened in Egypt than, 110 00:13:03,510 --> 00:13:09,750 say, what had happened in Tunisia, where in undoubtedly fragile transition. 111 00:13:09,750 --> 00:13:14,850 But Tunisians managed to forge a sense of consensus in their political conversation. 112 00:13:14,850 --> 00:13:21,690 They managed to have conversations about the past, transitional justice, conversations, et cetera. 113 00:13:21,690 --> 00:13:34,590 That didn't happen in Libya. And I think the impact of what happened in 2013 in Egypt on Libya in terms of certainly and I lived in Libya in 2014, 114 00:13:34,590 --> 00:13:42,480 the Libyans who wanted a repeat of what had happened in Egypt to happen in Libya and the Libyans who were 115 00:13:42,480 --> 00:13:50,520 fearful that a repeat of what had happened in Egypt in 2013 would happen in 2014 happened in Libya that year. 116 00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:56,880 So that created a very febrile atmosphere in Libya in early 2014, 117 00:13:56,880 --> 00:14:04,050 an atmosphere that was really ripe for someone or something to come along and tip the situation, 118 00:14:04,050 --> 00:14:11,390 tip the transition as it stood at that point, and that someone did come along. 119 00:14:11,390 --> 00:14:18,500 Khalifa Haftar, who I think when we look at the last decade in Libya. 120 00:14:18,500 --> 00:14:27,230 Stands alone as a singular figure, a singular figure in terms of his ambitions, 121 00:14:27,230 --> 00:14:33,920 in terms of his actions and critically and I think this is really important in terms of the conversation 122 00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:42,800 about where Libya's is at today and in the future in terms of his backing from an array of external actors, 123 00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:49,220 which unfortunately has become a key aspect of the Libyan conflict since 2014. 124 00:14:49,220 --> 00:14:57,020 So I would end there with those opening remarks because I think they lead to a wider conversation about what's happened since. 125 00:14:57,020 --> 00:15:03,560 Thank you so much. This has really been a really comprehensive sweep, given how short of a time you are given or allotted for this. 126 00:15:03,560 --> 00:15:12,380 And it really gives us a sense, right from the beginning of 2011 down to the present, the sorts of challenges that we face in a place like Libya. 127 00:15:12,380 --> 00:15:17,270 The hope that existed, the polarisation that was brought about, in a sense, 128 00:15:17,270 --> 00:15:23,960 in the post 2013 context and the emergence of the precipitating, in a sense, Libya's second civil war. 129 00:15:23,960 --> 00:15:29,810 And I think also you highlight something which is very important, which is that people don't pay attention to Libya. 130 00:15:29,810 --> 00:15:38,000 And so they will make these sort of offhand remarks, even reasonably informed observers, that Libya has been in civil war for 10 years. 131 00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:44,060 And, of course, you made very clear that that wasn't the case and that the second civil war emerged out 132 00:15:44,060 --> 00:15:50,250 of this effort to imitate what happened in Egypt on the part of some of like Heffter. 133 00:15:50,250 --> 00:15:54,480 I think now is an opportune moment for us to hand it over to a. 134 00:15:54,480 --> 00:16:04,900 To give perhaps a perspective on what the future holds. And of course, and it speaks with considerable experience living within Libya for many years. 135 00:16:04,900 --> 00:16:10,920 Although he joins us, interestingly enough, from Turkey. Sir, the floor is yours. 136 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:16,950 Thank you so much. Thank you very much for kindly hosting us today. And thank you again to the Middle East effort for hosting us today. 137 00:16:16,950 --> 00:16:22,890 I don't want to draw in too much from what Mary has said. I think I concur with Mary's kind of timeline. 138 00:16:22,890 --> 00:16:27,540 I think the interesting points that Mary has made take into where I want to pick up from this. 139 00:16:27,540 --> 00:16:31,800 But I will say something about the past, because we are approaching that decade anniversary. 140 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:38,400 And I think it's important because there are so many that watch Libya. There are so many that right on Libya, so many that analyse Libya. 141 00:16:38,400 --> 00:16:44,070 That essentially in this conundrum, how do you describe the conflict in Libya? 142 00:16:44,070 --> 00:16:47,640 How do you describe the binary, if you want to go for for that now? 143 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:54,960 There has been several attempts there unless that tried to describe Libya as a battle between Islamists and secularists. 144 00:16:54,960 --> 00:16:57,480 There were those that tried to define it between its regions, 145 00:16:57,480 --> 00:17:05,180 the historic rivalry between the west and the east of Libya when there were there are new attempts to try to define it by the greed of the actors, 146 00:17:05,180 --> 00:17:09,810 a ideology, the history, the regionalism plays no role in this. 147 00:17:09,810 --> 00:17:12,090 And that is really just about dollar bills, essentially. 148 00:17:12,090 --> 00:17:17,670 So I think with all of that in mind, I found myself in this conundrum pondering it for the last year, really, 149 00:17:17,670 --> 00:17:23,310 whilst I've been writing various papers for the institute, whilst I've been analysing the situation from afar. 150 00:17:23,310 --> 00:17:27,150 And it's given me a perspective that we can't wrench Libya from its context. 151 00:17:27,150 --> 00:17:32,590 But we certainly got mentioned from its context and doesn't leaven and we can't wrench it from its context in the broader region. 152 00:17:32,590 --> 00:17:40,980 And what I mean by this is that if we tried to understand what happened in 2011 and a series of almost like cardiac arrests 153 00:17:40,980 --> 00:17:47,580 of these kind of moments that have shaken the system in Libya but have also drawn thousands of people to the fight. 154 00:17:47,580 --> 00:17:51,360 And I agree with what Mary was saying earlier on. There were skirmishes. 155 00:17:51,360 --> 00:17:58,200 Many of these moments can be characterised by certain flickers between certain camps in Libya, certain regions in Libya, 156 00:17:58,200 --> 00:18:03,900 certain elements of greed pertains to some of the actors that are making their way into political life. 157 00:18:03,900 --> 00:18:09,840 But in my view, I would say that there are two irreconcilable visions of the state today in Libya. 158 00:18:09,840 --> 00:18:16,200 And broadly speaking, that is a war that is ravaging the entire region, is a war that has been going on for many years. 159 00:18:16,200 --> 00:18:21,060 That also encompasses what Mary was trying to illustrate about the events and doesn't infighting 160 00:18:21,060 --> 00:18:26,640 and the knock on events that took place in May of 2014 with the emergence of Khalifa Haftar. 161 00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:31,280 Now we can get rooted down in the personalities we can say to us of, well, Libya's complicated. 162 00:18:31,280 --> 00:18:31,800 And, you know, 163 00:18:31,800 --> 00:18:38,070 there are so many differences amongst us people amongst its different categories of fighters and armed groups from all over the country. 164 00:18:38,070 --> 00:18:42,660 But if we think of the of the times that matter, there are three essential moments. 165 00:18:42,660 --> 00:18:49,640 2011, the moment that galvanised hundreds of thousands of Libyans across the country to either demonstrate or go to the front 166 00:18:49,640 --> 00:18:56,420 lines and fight the very same moment that took place again in 2014 with the emergence of the first civil war after Halifa. 167 00:18:56,420 --> 00:19:01,020 Those emerges in 2014 and the latest chapter in that civil war. 168 00:19:01,020 --> 00:19:03,000 April four thousand nineteen. 169 00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:09,750 With the emergence of Khalifa Haftar in western Libya trying to overthrow the last U.N. backed government, the government of National Accord. 170 00:19:09,750 --> 00:19:16,530 Why do these moments matter? Because they galvanise. They were, in my view, this kind of political lightning rod moments. 171 00:19:16,530 --> 00:19:21,060 They weren't straight line skirmishes. They weren't neighbourhood localised fights. 172 00:19:21,060 --> 00:19:25,860 Tens of thousands of civilians, many of whom dropped their weapons in 2011, 173 00:19:25,860 --> 00:19:31,260 picked their weapons up again, either in 2014 or in the latest chapter in 2014. 174 00:19:31,260 --> 00:19:36,620 They left their small local communities from across the country and made their way to the capital. 175 00:19:36,620 --> 00:19:45,660 Why? And I think part of this reason is also trying to describe this event to Libyans is also trying to describe the experience of Libyans. 176 00:19:45,660 --> 00:19:51,030 Libyans have experienced military rule in the past. They experienced the Jamahiriya. 177 00:19:51,030 --> 00:19:55,980 Now we can again go into the analytical rigour of which groups, from which cities and so forth. 178 00:19:55,980 --> 00:20:02,910 But the perception on the ground matters because that perception provoked so many thousands of people to turn to the front lines. 179 00:20:02,910 --> 00:20:06,090 And what I mean about this all in the grand scheme of things, 180 00:20:06,090 --> 00:20:13,320 is that these two irreconcilable visions are at the roots of the diplomatic efforts today to unify the country. 181 00:20:13,320 --> 00:20:20,410 And we've been down this road before. We've seen that film before, 1014 and fifteen in Libya's first civil war. 182 00:20:20,410 --> 00:20:27,810 And I think the essence of that for me and the relevance of this is that there was an inability to acknowledge the differences between the two camps. 183 00:20:27,810 --> 00:20:33,450 And I think you can find yourself looking at the emergence of Khalifa Haftar and saying, well, could we find an alternative? 184 00:20:33,450 --> 00:20:38,400 Could we find someone that's different? Could we find someone without such a chequered history? 185 00:20:38,400 --> 00:20:43,200 But if we monitor or look from where Mary left off in 2014, fifteen. 186 00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:50,310 And look at the subsequent years of negotiations since at least 2016 to 2019. 187 00:20:50,310 --> 00:20:55,050 We see that there has been one consistent demand from Khalifa Haftar side. 188 00:20:55,050 --> 00:21:00,360 And that demand has been to reconfigure the presidential council of this U.N. backed government. 189 00:21:00,360 --> 00:21:05,990 Now, the presidential council is more than just a symbolic figure or symbolic position. 190 00:21:05,990 --> 00:21:11,570 It's the supreme commander of the armed forces. That position is a defining characteristic. 191 00:21:11,570 --> 00:21:16,220 It's a defining hallmark of democratic states. It defines the character of your states. 192 00:21:16,220 --> 00:21:24,140 If you have a civilian presidency that can assure that neutrality and subservience of your military, then it's one clear marker, not the only marker. 193 00:21:24,140 --> 00:21:29,870 But it's the clearest marker of living in a free and fair society or democratic state. 194 00:21:29,870 --> 00:21:37,130 If you have the inverse where it's the military that are in control of your presidency, as you find is the model in these old dates. 195 00:21:37,130 --> 00:21:39,320 I'm living in Turkey at the moment. I'm staying in Turkey. 196 00:21:39,320 --> 00:21:49,250 This Turkish word, Askhat, the Arabic word Ascoli, the Turkish Turkish word for soldier ascaris states where essentially you can think of 1952, 197 00:21:49,250 --> 00:21:53,900 Egypt as one of those models and models across the region where the state is so 198 00:21:53,900 --> 00:21:58,130 finally intertwined with the military that you can't pull one to the other. 199 00:21:58,130 --> 00:21:59,630 Those are military states. 200 00:21:59,630 --> 00:22:07,160 And the real hallmark of the states is the presidency, a position that should be held by a civilian, is controlled by the military. 201 00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:13,490 And if we don't have that separation of power, if we don't have a subservient military, then essentially you live in a military state. 202 00:22:13,490 --> 00:22:20,570 And that is what is essentially being offered by Phillip after it's at the heart of the negotiations that we've seen over the last four or five years. 203 00:22:20,570 --> 00:22:27,500 And it's a central line that divides not only Libya and not only the permanent ceasefire line that today stands in the centre of Libya, 204 00:22:27,500 --> 00:22:35,720 in the city where Gadhafi died in October 2011. What is so important about that aspect is it almost divides the region east of Sirte. 205 00:22:35,720 --> 00:22:43,100 You find that a lot more gulf, at least in the Gulf, in the mush, Rick, you find military states west of Sirte towards the Maghreb. 206 00:22:43,100 --> 00:22:50,600 You find that states have accommodated for this, have bridged this, have gone through that their maturer and they accommodate for other challenges. 207 00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:55,310 Some of them are constitutional monarchies. Some of them are civilians, states, democratic states like Tunisia. 208 00:22:55,310 --> 00:23:02,980 And then you have states like Algeria that are undergoing a major, major transformation but are still negotiating that since the 1990s. 209 00:23:02,980 --> 00:23:06,140 So I think for me, that is like Libya's Iron Curtain. 210 00:23:06,140 --> 00:23:11,860 And I think that's what for me is the only way to describe Libya and not it from its initial context. 211 00:23:11,860 --> 00:23:17,410 So I'm not gonna go on too much because I think Mary has already given us so much substance from the earlier period. 212 00:23:17,410 --> 00:23:19,270 But I think that's the only way to describe it. 213 00:23:19,270 --> 00:23:26,410 And I would say, and I have called this, it is almost like a political culture war that is ravaging the Middle East and North Africa right now. 214 00:23:26,410 --> 00:23:30,070 And it's funny that we're there now in 10 years. But I shudder to think what the future holds, 215 00:23:30,070 --> 00:23:37,120 because I think given that Libya has resisted or Libyans have resisted for the last two civil wars, this model, 216 00:23:37,120 --> 00:23:41,830 I find it interesting that we're in a new conundrum where that model still hasn't been 217 00:23:41,830 --> 00:23:46,810 spoken about in negotiations or at least within the UN framework for negotiations. 218 00:23:46,810 --> 00:23:52,420 But I'll leave it to you or somewhat provoke more questions and elicit better answers from Marion for myself. 219 00:23:52,420 --> 00:23:57,310 Thank you so much. And send. I think you touched on a number of very important points. 220 00:23:57,310 --> 00:24:06,190 Your closing remark highlighted the UN's involvement. You have also yourself then both of you been in touch with the UN actors in the region. 221 00:24:06,190 --> 00:24:10,690 And also, in a sense, there's so much background to give to the Libyan context. 222 00:24:10,690 --> 00:24:13,410 Mary, you did a wonderful historical overview. 223 00:24:13,410 --> 00:24:19,660 And unless you sort of pointed out some very important aspects of the current Libyan situation, but in a sense, 224 00:24:19,660 --> 00:24:25,330 you presupposed a bit of knowledge and the sense that people aren't always aware of the East-West divide in Libya, 225 00:24:25,330 --> 00:24:31,360 the fact that the Western government is backed by the UN and in essence, 226 00:24:31,360 --> 00:24:35,710 Khalifa Haftar, who we've spoken about, has loomed large, very large in the last decade of Syria, 227 00:24:35,710 --> 00:24:40,600 although his stance seems to be waning considerably in the present and potentially being 228 00:24:40,600 --> 00:24:45,850 replaced by other comparable actors to himself who have the support of his backers, 229 00:24:45,850 --> 00:24:52,620 as it were. The challenge with someone like him who is getting so much international support, in fact, 230 00:24:52,620 --> 00:24:59,250 including from Western states, but who represents hostility towards a U.N. backed government. 231 00:24:59,250 --> 00:25:08,290 And so we have this, in a sense, a contradiction in the way in which supporters outside the country are interacting with the Libyan situation. 232 00:25:08,290 --> 00:25:13,530 And, you know, I would like to ask both of you in a sense that to a certain extent, 233 00:25:13,530 --> 00:25:20,150 is it the way in which policymakers and international observers and powerful actors in the international community. 234 00:25:20,150 --> 00:25:26,280 Approach Libya in this very contradictory fashion, which has allowed it to perpetuate its civil war, 235 00:25:26,280 --> 00:25:30,980 would put it in the plural, its civil wars without proper resolution. 236 00:25:30,980 --> 00:25:34,520 And what could they do differently and why aren't they doing it? 237 00:25:34,520 --> 00:25:39,200 This is kind of the big question about Libya right now. And I'm putting it to you at the beginning. 238 00:25:39,200 --> 00:25:47,530 I want to let everyone know you can ask questions. Wolter Armbrust won't be kindly sort of curating them and sharing them in just a moment, 239 00:25:47,530 --> 00:25:51,610 but I just want to start off this conversation by asking both of you this question. 240 00:25:51,610 --> 00:25:57,570 How do we address the Libyan conundrum in light of the international contradiction in many respects in the policy world? 241 00:25:57,570 --> 00:26:02,140 And Mary, if you'd like to go first and then a. Thank you. Thank you, Asama. 242 00:26:02,140 --> 00:26:10,450 Well, again, I think it's instructive to go back to that very early period after the end of the uprising. 243 00:26:10,450 --> 00:26:19,060 And again, look at what was done, what could have been done differently, how the trajectory might have turned out differently. 244 00:26:19,060 --> 00:26:22,120 And in terms of the international engagement, 245 00:26:22,120 --> 00:26:32,290 Libyans from a very early stage at the end of the uprising told the U.N., told other internationals, we can do this. 246 00:26:32,290 --> 00:26:40,210 We want a light footprint, a U.N. mission. You know, we will be able to oversee our transition. 247 00:26:40,210 --> 00:26:45,850 And they were very forceful in that argument, very forceful in their insistence on that. 248 00:26:45,850 --> 00:26:51,790 It is interesting now to have conversations with two Libyans who insisted that at the time, 249 00:26:51,790 --> 00:26:57,580 who now regret that and believes that that was actually a mistake in hindsight. 250 00:26:57,580 --> 00:27:04,250 One of the many regrets in that one of the key challenges in the three years, 251 00:27:04,250 --> 00:27:12,370 the post 2011 period at those critical years was did your how you deal with these revolutionary 252 00:27:12,370 --> 00:27:16,600 brigades and the other armed groups that were starting to spring up in the environment. 253 00:27:16,600 --> 00:27:25,570 I outlined earlier how you deal with them. You know, one of the challenges of Gadhafi's legacy was that after his fall, 254 00:27:25,570 --> 00:27:31,990 the Libyan army, as it was at that point, had been utterly hollowed out by Gadhafi. 255 00:27:31,990 --> 00:27:40,510 Gadhafi came to power in a military coup in 1969, and he was terrified that somebody would plot a coup against him. 256 00:27:40,510 --> 00:27:44,140 And there were attempts over the 42 years of his regime. 257 00:27:44,140 --> 00:27:51,220 So what he did was he emasculated the army to ensure that it was not capable of a coup against him. 258 00:27:51,220 --> 00:27:56,710 Instead, what he did was he empowered brigades led by his own son. 259 00:27:56,710 --> 00:28:04,840 So there was that familial loyalty there. But it meant that after the fall of his regime, security was a major challenge. 260 00:28:04,840 --> 00:28:12,940 You had all of these revolutionary groups, many of them regionally based, based in cities and towns, 261 00:28:12,940 --> 00:28:19,750 loyalties to their communities, loyalties to their tribes, loyalties to political currents, et cetera. 262 00:28:19,750 --> 00:28:23,110 And no one was able to kind of pull that together. 263 00:28:23,110 --> 00:28:33,340 So, again, going back to how right Libya was in early 2014 for someone or something to come along, that was a key part of it. 264 00:28:33,340 --> 00:28:39,430 And, you know, when Khalifa Haftar came along and in February 2014 and, you know, 265 00:28:39,430 --> 00:28:45,280 issued a video, basically he was accused of of attempting a coup at that time. 266 00:28:45,280 --> 00:28:55,210 People laughed at that early stage. But when he emerged again in May in Benghazi, he managed to gather substantial support base. 267 00:28:55,210 --> 00:29:03,190 Why? Because Benghazi was a city that was plagued by insecurity, plagued by assassinations, plagued by bombings, et cetera. 268 00:29:03,190 --> 00:29:07,540 So there was an opportunity there. And Haftar came along and took it. 269 00:29:07,540 --> 00:29:12,460 Looking back at 2014 again and talking about the kind of international approach 270 00:29:12,460 --> 00:29:17,140 to Libya and particularly on the role of external meddlers in the country, 271 00:29:17,140 --> 00:29:19,990 which is, you know, a key part of the conflict. 272 00:29:19,990 --> 00:29:31,840 Since 2014, there was an effort to impose narratives on Libya that fit other regional realities outside Libya. 273 00:29:31,840 --> 00:29:34,990 But we're totally at odds with Libyan realities. 274 00:29:34,990 --> 00:29:43,540 And as mentioned earlier, the you know, this false idea of a secular versus Islamist conflict in Libya. 275 00:29:43,540 --> 00:29:49,360 That's not the case. You know that this is not that kind of ideological battle. 276 00:29:49,360 --> 00:30:00,550 In fact, since 2014, if there is one driving force in the Libyan conflict, it is a struggle to control Libya's resources, its oil wealth. 277 00:30:00,550 --> 00:30:09,310 That's essentially what much of this boils down. Other aspects of the conflict since 2014 are merely ancillary to that. 278 00:30:09,310 --> 00:30:19,960 So I think we've we've seen regional powers since 2014 who were involved in their own regional power struggles that have then played out in Libya. 279 00:30:19,960 --> 00:30:25,990 And then more widely, you see countries that are allied with those regional powers, 280 00:30:25,990 --> 00:30:32,980 be they France, for example, in Europe, close to the UAE, which is one of the meddlers in Libya. 281 00:30:32,980 --> 00:30:37,660 So all of that has kind of had a knock on effect on Libyan dynamics. 282 00:30:37,660 --> 00:30:41,910 So we can talk about the role of the U.N., what the U.N. could have. 283 00:30:41,910 --> 00:30:50,460 Should have done better since 2011, but also I think the role of the external actors, specifically the external meddlers, 284 00:30:50,460 --> 00:31:01,410 those countries that have been violating the U.N. arms embargo on Libya blatantly since 2014, and no one has managed to to rein them in properly. 285 00:31:01,410 --> 00:31:02,280 Thank you very much, Mary. 286 00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:10,410 And I'd just like to remind everyone that you can put in your questions and we hope to get to them straight after and its response to 287 00:31:10,410 --> 00:31:17,910 the question about international engagement that NSA and perhaps you can also tie in with the point that you made about in a sense, 288 00:31:17,910 --> 00:31:27,060 this is a challenge of how we confront military dictatorship as a model that is being appealed to by certain international actors. 289 00:31:27,060 --> 00:31:33,640 And Mary kind of highlighted the fact that the chaos that in a sense is precipitated in the context of war. 290 00:31:33,640 --> 00:31:38,210 Nic, some people actually yearn for that sort of authoritarian stability. 291 00:31:38,210 --> 00:31:47,040 He said in some respects, very problematic phrase that reminds us of things like Oriental despotism and perhaps he could comment in nature. 292 00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:50,490 Those two sort of aspects of the question. But certainly. Well, I think. 293 00:31:50,490 --> 00:31:54,520 I mean, I want to also touch on this one, because I think it's it's an interesting model. 294 00:31:54,520 --> 00:32:01,290 You know, Mary has spoken about how Gadhafi gutted the army after he came to power in 1969 following a military coup. 295 00:32:01,290 --> 00:32:10,320 He had done that for the first several decades. But in the early 1990s, he began to realise that there were challenges from Libyans of all stripes. 296 00:32:10,320 --> 00:32:15,990 And I think one of the things that he did in 1993 following an attempted coup in the town of Bani Walid in central Libya, 297 00:32:15,990 --> 00:32:22,470 was to try to bleed into the lower tier army, which is essentially what it was called under the Gadhafi regime. 298 00:32:22,470 --> 00:32:27,270 It's causational Bucca named after Boubacar Yunis, the former defence minister of Libya. 299 00:32:27,270 --> 00:32:34,710 He bled into it, tribal loyalty. One of the reasons for that is that Libya's Libya's revolution is also a giveaway as to why this was the case. 300 00:32:34,710 --> 00:32:39,870 It wasn't just a national civil war. It wasn't people rushing from east to fight in the western west to fight in the east. 301 00:32:39,870 --> 00:32:46,830 They were intercommunal battles. Libya was truly a fragmentation of the local community level, and it was neighbours fighting against neighbours. 302 00:32:46,830 --> 00:32:50,640 One of the reasons for this is that Gadhafi had selected particular tribes that 303 00:32:50,640 --> 00:32:54,990 lived on the peripheries of certain cities to blend them into the lower army, 304 00:32:54,990 --> 00:32:56,940 not an army that was designed to fight. 305 00:32:56,940 --> 00:33:03,240 There was an army that was designed to acquire a certain amount of social and political privilege and a certain amount of power. 306 00:33:03,240 --> 00:33:08,730 But in a sense, coup proof the regime by extending their regime into the bloodlines of local tribes. 307 00:33:08,730 --> 00:33:15,210 This was one of the ways in which he felt that he could avoid uprisings, because if there was to be an uprising or a coup or a, 308 00:33:15,210 --> 00:33:19,710 you know, a protest against his rule, it would be neighbouring communities that would put it down. 309 00:33:19,710 --> 00:33:26,520 He wouldn't have to do it from the central level. He reserved his own power, his own Praetorian Guard, essentially, that was led by his own sons. 310 00:33:26,520 --> 00:33:31,020 He was out of that for external opponents, but then had to start fighting on the local level. 311 00:33:31,020 --> 00:33:33,210 In 2011, it was a very chaotic time. 312 00:33:33,210 --> 00:33:40,770 And that model essentially is what Khalifa Haftar has mimicked since 2014 with the support of countries like Egypt, 313 00:33:40,770 --> 00:33:46,230 countries like the United Arab Emirates, France and Russia. And the architecture of that is exactly the same. 314 00:33:46,230 --> 00:33:52,980 There is a tribal army, for example, in the east of the country. It's often quoted that the East supports Haftar. 315 00:33:52,980 --> 00:33:57,660 Which segment of the East often find that people say we'll have to represent something in the east. 316 00:33:57,660 --> 00:34:00,150 If we look at the tribes that are represented in the east, 317 00:34:00,150 --> 00:34:06,030 it's 12 percent of the tribes or the inhabitants of the east are represented in the senior command of helicopters army. 318 00:34:06,030 --> 00:34:09,870 It's 88 percent of the population are not represented. So there is something that is going on. 319 00:34:09,870 --> 00:34:17,400 It's ironic that only a small portion of the society represented in an army that often calls itself the Libyan National Army. 320 00:34:17,400 --> 00:34:24,030 Now, that framework, that architecture is so important because it's concealed behind the narratives that Mary was talking about. 321 00:34:24,030 --> 00:34:28,080 It's concealed as a Libyan national army that is fighting against, you know, 322 00:34:28,080 --> 00:34:34,650 a national threat of other Islamists and terrorists, a narrative that was imposed essentially from the outside. 323 00:34:34,650 --> 00:34:41,220 And it's quite funny because when you look at the journalists that came to eastern Libya and 2014 and asked what is happening here? 324 00:34:41,220 --> 00:34:46,230 Who are you? Well, where are the army and where fighting ISIS or al-Qaida in Arabic. 325 00:34:46,230 --> 00:34:49,320 That wasn't the case. If you look at Arabic media, they would often say, well, 326 00:34:49,320 --> 00:34:53,910 where the Bedouin and we're fighting the Jews and the Turks over there often find that peculiar 327 00:34:53,910 --> 00:34:58,440 because it would often that that kind of rhetoric that conceals it's easy to conceal it in English. 328 00:34:58,440 --> 00:35:00,300 It's not so easy to conceal it in a local language. 329 00:35:00,300 --> 00:35:05,880 And any anthropologist, what I picked up on this in 2014 and any anthropologist would pick up on the structures, 330 00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:11,720 the embedded tribalism within these structures that is being carved out now for the last six, seven years. 331 00:35:11,720 --> 00:35:18,970 Now, I think it's funny that the need for narrative to impose itself on that was important because they're playing from the same the same playbook. 332 00:35:18,970 --> 00:35:27,150 Haftar also has a Pretoria and God, led by his own sons and a son in law with a very kind of sweet loyalty to the father or fatwah. 333 00:35:27,150 --> 00:35:34,470 So you have his sons and his son in law or you have radical Salafi medicalise from Saudi Arabia who follow a fatwa from the primal. 334 00:35:34,470 --> 00:35:40,320 But clearly in Saudi Arabia, who has designated Khalifa Haftar as the as the ruler of Libya since, doesn't know. 335 00:35:40,320 --> 00:35:45,900 It's a very peculiar branch, a very peculiar architecture of an army, but it is one that Libya hasn't experienced. 336 00:35:45,900 --> 00:35:50,280 With that, for me, was the hallmark of the Jamahiriya under Gadhafi. 337 00:35:50,280 --> 00:35:53,490 So I think that's where I think the subject of the of the military. 338 00:35:53,490 --> 00:35:58,230 But it also gives you an idea about if that's what's been going on for the last seven years. 339 00:35:58,230 --> 00:36:03,720 Khalifa Haftar has not been able to. Has not been. Legitimately the head of an army since 2015. 340 00:36:03,720 --> 00:36:10,350 December seventeen thousand fifteen. How has he been able to go from a small foothold in the east of the country to 341 00:36:10,350 --> 00:36:15,170 trying to overthrow the UN backed government in Tripoli within four years? 342 00:36:15,170 --> 00:36:20,640 And I think what's been so peculiar about this and why it's so relevant to a decade on is that in 2011, 343 00:36:20,640 --> 00:36:26,490 when the U.N. passed Resolution 1973, there were skirmishes at the UN Security Council. 344 00:36:26,490 --> 00:36:32,700 Russia abstained. China wasn't happy, but they passed that legislation and it gave a green light to NATO to intervene. 345 00:36:32,700 --> 00:36:37,550 In April 2011. If we go 10 years later. 346 00:36:37,550 --> 00:36:42,590 States that were that were worried, particularly regional states like the United Arab Emirates, 347 00:36:42,590 --> 00:36:47,030 like Saudi Arabia, who were fearful of the Arab Spring at that time, 348 00:36:47,030 --> 00:36:49,520 they wised up, and especially the UAE, 349 00:36:49,520 --> 00:36:56,930 who have transformed from a small but a medium power to one of the most aggressive and activist powers the region has ever seen. 350 00:36:56,930 --> 00:37:03,580 And the way they've been able to accomplish that is through something that no one, I think, really predicted and doesn't love in. 351 00:37:03,580 --> 00:37:12,520 Essentially a very simple to procuring diplomatic veto at the UN Security Council level and at the European Union level by bridging and 352 00:37:12,520 --> 00:37:21,370 forging alliances with France has a very crucial role in being both the EU member states and as a member of the UN Security Council, 353 00:37:21,370 --> 00:37:27,370 but also Russia, who also play that role with them at the U.N. Security Council and by being able to do that. 354 00:37:27,370 --> 00:37:31,950 They've not only been able to, you know, break international norms, 355 00:37:31,950 --> 00:37:35,710 and I'm saying because they've got social such little time to go through with this. 356 00:37:35,710 --> 00:37:40,560 But an example of that is that when you think of the ways in which not only wars are fought, 357 00:37:40,560 --> 00:37:47,140 but how wars are funded, the most peculiar aspect of the past decade for me is something that's quite banal. 358 00:37:47,140 --> 00:37:54,400 Russia funded Khalifa Haftar by counterfeiting or printing counterfeit Libyan currency in their 359 00:37:54,400 --> 00:38:00,610 own national mint cognac and sending around 10 billion dollars worth to the east of Libya. 360 00:38:00,610 --> 00:38:03,940 No country on the planet would be able to do this apart from Russia, 361 00:38:03,940 --> 00:38:08,530 by being able to break those kind of norms, international financial norms and the way that it has. 362 00:38:08,530 --> 00:38:11,560 So just to summarise this kind of point, 363 00:38:11,560 --> 00:38:20,860 by being able to erode those norms and being able to conceal the actions of a power like the UAE or Egypt or Khalifa Haftar, 364 00:38:20,860 --> 00:38:27,340 that procurement of a diplomatic veto was so crucial because Khalifa Haftar wasn't only able to just launch that war. 365 00:38:27,340 --> 00:38:33,490 He was able to launch on April 4th, 2019, in the presence of the chief of the UN, Antonio Guterres, 366 00:38:33,490 --> 00:38:38,170 who had just arrived in Tripoli to announce a national reconciliation conference. 367 00:38:38,170 --> 00:38:43,960 It's baffling, but it's only now, given it's been a decade that we can cannot absorb such a major, 368 00:38:43,960 --> 00:38:52,700 major transformations and not only in Libya, but in the international order that we rely upon to give us stability and to give the security. 369 00:38:52,700 --> 00:38:54,650 Can I interject a couple of questions? 370 00:38:54,650 --> 00:39:00,570 Now, we've got a large number of questions coming in and we're not going to have time to get through anywhere near all of them. 371 00:39:00,570 --> 00:39:08,330 But let me ask a couple. One is from Patrick Jeffrey, who is the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies. 372 00:39:08,330 --> 00:39:14,630 And his question has to do with something you just mentioned, which is that Russian forces remain in the city of Giuffre access following the 373 00:39:14,630 --> 00:39:19,490 January deadline for their departure and trying to the nationwide cease fire. 374 00:39:19,490 --> 00:39:24,840 And his question quite generally is what does Russia hope to gain from its involvement in Libya? 375 00:39:24,840 --> 00:39:31,430 What is their end game? And let me throw out another question to you as well, because we're going to run out of time. 376 00:39:31,430 --> 00:39:38,720 And this one is from Peter MILIT, who was the British ambassador to Libya from 2015 to 2018. 377 00:39:38,720 --> 00:39:43,910 And his question is that the UK is often seen by Libyans as an important player. 378 00:39:43,910 --> 00:39:50,720 But in recent years, the British government has been preoccupied by its own problems with Brexit and with coded questions. 379 00:39:50,720 --> 00:40:00,140 What role can the UK government play now to bolster the UN agreement and to support a possible unity government and help build stability in Libya? 380 00:40:00,140 --> 00:40:05,910 So two questions. One to do with Russia, the other to do with the UK, to both of you think. 381 00:40:05,910 --> 00:40:11,320 The first one has to do with Russia. Why is Russia involved in this? What do they hope to gain from it? 382 00:40:11,320 --> 00:40:16,530 And I said, you would like to take that. Yeah, sure, I'll take that quickly and I'll let you to the second question, Mary. 383 00:40:16,530 --> 00:40:20,790 But in a nutshell, Russia's playing a very intriguing game. 384 00:40:20,790 --> 00:40:24,270 And I would say that the only way to understand that is by looking at the other players. 385 00:40:24,270 --> 00:40:29,160 The other players are playing Chequers. They have a very binary set of choices in front of them, 386 00:40:29,160 --> 00:40:35,160 either that is trying to support the UN backed governments and establishing a essentially a civilian democratic state. 387 00:40:35,160 --> 00:40:42,300 I would say or they're trying to, you know, return Libya to a military leader or a military or to return legitimate rule. 388 00:40:42,300 --> 00:40:47,530 And there are very strict binary choices and binary objectives and what they're doing in Libya. 389 00:40:47,530 --> 00:40:54,740 Turkey, perhaps, is the peculiar actor in that it has geostrategic ambitions, given that there is the eastern Mediterranean gas based in the. 390 00:40:54,740 --> 00:40:59,890 But Russia. Russia is not playing Chequers, Russia. Russia's playing chess. 391 00:40:59,890 --> 00:41:05,930 Russia has been able to carve out a space in search of flight. That is more important than just Libya. 392 00:41:05,930 --> 00:41:10,700 Libya and the southern Mediterranean, is that the southern flank of NATO? 393 00:41:10,700 --> 00:41:14,120 And by. By being able to just forge and carve out that role. 394 00:41:14,120 --> 00:41:21,140 We can't only just see in the context of the repositioning of that in the last six months or in July of 2020. 395 00:41:21,140 --> 00:41:28,790 But go back to Watford and December 8th, 2020. Go back to the comments of Emmanuel Macron at the last NATO conference. 396 00:41:28,790 --> 00:41:34,760 He called NATO braindead. I essentially called into question why NATO's alliance exists. 397 00:41:34,760 --> 00:41:41,210 Why should we be anti Russian? Russia is going to be a crucial partner for a country like France in subsaharan Africa, 398 00:41:41,210 --> 00:41:49,220 where France has a very keen interest in making sure that has a foothold in southern Libya into the Sahara and SA health space. 399 00:41:49,220 --> 00:41:55,820 But when you look at the way that NATO has brought interaction, you know, it's a long and it's a very old machine and the logic is that, you know, 400 00:41:55,820 --> 00:42:04,970 there are different logics that underpin each state within NATO, its eastern flank, its Baltic states feel Russia's presence every single day. 401 00:42:04,970 --> 00:42:12,290 They see a Build-Up of a ammunition. They see an aggressive Russia moving, whether it's in its actions in Georgia and in Ukraine and Crimea. 402 00:42:12,290 --> 00:42:19,340 But then you have states that are in the Mediterranean or in the western and southern flank of NATO that don't see Russia and don't feel that problem. 403 00:42:19,340 --> 00:42:26,360 And Russia has been able to carve out a space right in the southern Mediterranean and really call into question two key actors. 404 00:42:26,360 --> 00:42:34,100 Turkey, who supports the Jenay? And France, who support Haftar and the Libyan national army, the LNA and the Fusion, 405 00:42:34,100 --> 00:42:42,770 or the massive fissure that has erupted between those two key member states of NATO is essentially, I think, really what Russia's end goal is. 406 00:42:42,770 --> 00:42:48,230 This isn't about Libya and it isn't about having a decisive win. They had a decisive win in Syria. 407 00:42:48,230 --> 00:42:54,320 They could have called, I think, and had a decisive win in Libya. But a protracted conflict really plays into Russia's hands. 408 00:42:54,320 --> 00:43:02,050 And I would say just watch. In that sense, everyone else is playing a Chequers. But but Russia continues to play chess to our detriment. 409 00:43:02,050 --> 00:43:07,300 OK. What about the role the UK is, the role of the UK would be in affairs? 410 00:43:07,300 --> 00:43:15,490 Well, I think what I'd like to do is bring the conversation back to what's happening in Libya today and what's happening on the ground in Libya. 411 00:43:15,490 --> 00:43:22,600 Because I think very often the conversation on Libya has become a very geopolitical conversation that is quite 412 00:43:22,600 --> 00:43:29,380 disconnected from what's going on on the ground in terms of some of the dynamics shaping Libyan society at the moment. 413 00:43:29,380 --> 00:43:29,980 And right now, 414 00:43:29,980 --> 00:43:43,560 we have just had a U.N. led dialogue forum that elected a new executive authority to put together a cabinet and oversee the country for the next time, 415 00:43:43,560 --> 00:43:47,710 months until planned elections in December. 416 00:43:47,710 --> 00:43:55,690 Parliamentary and presidential elections are what are planned, and these elections will be the first elections that Libya is experience since 2014. 417 00:43:55,690 --> 00:44:00,850 Libya has actually only had three sets of national elections since the fall of Gadhafi. 418 00:44:00,850 --> 00:44:04,330 One parliamentary election in 2012. 419 00:44:04,330 --> 00:44:12,610 Then there were elections to form a constitutional committee, a committee tasked with writing Libya's first constitution in decades. 420 00:44:12,610 --> 00:44:17,310 And then in 2014, the second set of parliamentary elections. 421 00:44:17,310 --> 00:44:20,800 And one thing I think many are wondering about, you know, 422 00:44:20,800 --> 00:44:26,950 if we reach a stage where in December elections can take place and there are all kinds of caveats about that, 423 00:44:26,950 --> 00:44:30,970 because a lot of things can happen in the 10 months in between. 424 00:44:30,970 --> 00:44:39,430 But say we do reach that point. There are many people wondering, first of all, what kind of turnout we might see in those elections. 425 00:44:39,430 --> 00:44:50,140 It was very striking to watch what happened to the kind of euphoria, if you like, about democracy, a democratic transition amongst Libyans in 2012. 426 00:44:50,140 --> 00:44:56,290 There was an enormous turnout for those first elections. I was in Libya for that election day. 427 00:44:56,290 --> 00:45:04,270 I was in Benghazi. There was a euphoria. There was a sense that Libya had gone another important step in its transition. 428 00:45:04,270 --> 00:45:08,650 Fast forward to 2014 and the turnout plummeted. 429 00:45:08,650 --> 00:45:14,710 It was a tiny turnout and something that undermined the legitimacy of the resulting parliament. 430 00:45:14,710 --> 00:45:19,990 There are real concerns that we may face into another low turnout in December or some of 431 00:45:19,990 --> 00:45:26,020 the elections more recently in Libya for municipal councils have shown a low turnout. 432 00:45:26,020 --> 00:45:37,480 So there is a question as to whether Libyans as a society are basically not so and armoured with the idea of democracy and not, 433 00:45:37,480 --> 00:45:44,880 of course, raises real concerns in terms of what kind of trajectory Libya might be on in terms of its transition. 434 00:45:44,880 --> 00:45:55,990 You know, Haftar spoke to a significant percentage of the Libyan population that felt that their most important priority was security. 435 00:45:55,990 --> 00:46:04,450 They felt they wanted what Haftar presented, which was a close eye military rule, if you like, or at least that model. 436 00:46:04,450 --> 00:46:09,340 He is far to the Egyptian model in many respects. And that spoke to a lot of Libyans. 437 00:46:09,340 --> 00:46:13,690 I think the question now goes back to what Ana said earlier is, you know, 438 00:46:13,690 --> 00:46:19,120 the competing visions for what Libyans would like to see as the Libyan state. 439 00:46:19,120 --> 00:46:25,060 What does the Libyan state look like in the future? Will it be a democratic civil state? 440 00:46:25,060 --> 00:46:29,260 Will it be some kind of attempt at a cois ie military role? 441 00:46:29,260 --> 00:46:35,470 Have to remember is in his mid 70s. So I think that's worth bearing in mind as well. 442 00:46:35,470 --> 00:46:44,620 The question of what may be left once Haftar is no longer on the scene in terms of what he has constructed in eastern Libya, 443 00:46:44,620 --> 00:46:49,840 the forces he has built up, the forces he and his supporters will an army. 444 00:46:49,840 --> 00:46:59,050 What will the legacy of that be and the polarisation we've seen within Libyan society over the last six years, 445 00:46:59,050 --> 00:47:06,420 that the deep wedge that has formed between East and west Libya driven by media narratives. 446 00:47:06,420 --> 00:47:12,070 You know, there has been an intense war of narratives in Libya over the last six years. 447 00:47:12,070 --> 00:47:18,340 So I think looking forward, this question of what does a future Libyan state look like? 448 00:47:18,340 --> 00:47:25,210 What kind of state do Libyans want at this point after the last decade where they have experienced democracy, 449 00:47:25,210 --> 00:47:30,800 at least in the form of minimally of elections? What do they want now? 450 00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:41,320 On what do they aspire to? I often remember in 2011, after the uprising, Libyans were many Libyans told foreign journalists, you know, just wait. 451 00:47:41,320 --> 00:47:46,300 Within five or 10 years, Libya will be like a Dubai on on the Mediterranean. 452 00:47:46,300 --> 00:47:52,180 That's what we aspire to. Other Libyans said they wanted to be Switzerland on the Mediterranean. 453 00:47:52,180 --> 00:47:57,280 Ten years on, I think the question of what a future Libyan state will look like, 454 00:47:57,280 --> 00:48:01,520 what Libya will look like 10 years hence, I think that's the interesting. 455 00:48:01,520 --> 00:48:06,890 And in terms of what kind of state will actually emerge from what we see now. 456 00:48:06,890 --> 00:48:12,450 I also had a question from Michael Willis in relation to one of the neighbouring states, 457 00:48:12,450 --> 00:48:20,820 which I don't think has been mentioned once in the whole evening, but which arguably has a significant stake in Libyan affairs, which is Algeria. 458 00:48:20,820 --> 00:48:26,720 Can either of you say anything about the role of Algeria and the current Libyan situation? 459 00:48:26,720 --> 00:48:33,680 I think Algeria. I'll make this very brief. In fact, where we're publishing, hopefully in the next week a publication called The Great Game. 460 00:48:33,680 --> 00:48:37,820 And looking at the 12 pirates that have shaped Libya over the past decade, Algeria being one of them. 461 00:48:37,820 --> 00:48:42,500 And I think I think actually the author actually is in the room with those yahoos about. 462 00:48:42,500 --> 00:48:47,240 So I think I'd probably defer to him to speak about this, but having looked at Algeria over the past decade, 463 00:48:47,240 --> 00:48:52,250 Algeria is undergoing its own transformation with the headache over the past 18 months. 464 00:48:52,250 --> 00:48:55,880 And I think despite those changes, I think Algeria is true. 465 00:48:55,880 --> 00:49:01,250 Role has been too often called that head giant. I think that's that's a very easy kind of statement to make. 466 00:49:01,250 --> 00:49:06,830 But I think Algeria had played a diplomatic role in Libya's last civil war. 467 00:49:06,830 --> 00:49:12,740 But I think going forward, Algeria is concerned with two things power, politics and the regional interference, 468 00:49:12,740 --> 00:49:19,850 particularly by Egypt and their own struggle to reshape the hegemony over the African Union over North Africa following the fall of Gadhafi. 469 00:49:19,850 --> 00:49:26,640 But there's a lot that hinges on Algeria's own domestic changes, but it's still to really early. 470 00:49:26,640 --> 00:49:32,900 I think Algeria could have played its hand many, many years ago and has decided, given its long history of non-interference, 471 00:49:32,900 --> 00:49:39,350 it's decided that it prefers diplomacy over interfering in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring states. 472 00:49:39,350 --> 00:49:44,890 Barry, do you have anything to add to that? So it was kind of just pick up very quickly on Mary's last points. 473 00:49:44,890 --> 00:49:51,020 Yes, and that's very important as we are moving towards elections over the next 10 months. 474 00:49:51,020 --> 00:49:58,550 I think what's so important and what's so interesting about Libya experience with the last decade is the degradation of daily life. 475 00:49:58,550 --> 00:50:03,440 And I think what's so fascinating about about that is it's a very, very lived experience. 476 00:50:03,440 --> 00:50:05,090 It's such a brutal experience. 477 00:50:05,090 --> 00:50:12,760 The Danish Refugee Council in the summer during Koban at its peak, said that living conditions in Libya were apocalyptic. 478 00:50:12,760 --> 00:50:15,950 You know, if you just think about that for a moment and think what that means, 479 00:50:15,950 --> 00:50:21,410 daily water cuts or water cuts to three million people at one point during the last civil war, 480 00:50:21,410 --> 00:50:23,720 there are electricity cuts that are already intermittent now. 481 00:50:23,720 --> 00:50:30,560 But our entire blackouts in some places of the country for days, the inability to get cash, physical cash. 482 00:50:30,560 --> 00:50:37,490 And Libya as a cash economy. The inability to get cash frequently, conveniently or predictably for nearly a decade. 483 00:50:37,490 --> 00:50:43,670 Just think what that does to the political psyche of your average person, to any person, in fact, in the country. 484 00:50:43,670 --> 00:50:47,900 And think about what that does to your decision making when you move towards elections. 485 00:50:47,900 --> 00:50:51,780 We often think about ourselves in Europe or in the U.K. 486 00:50:51,780 --> 00:50:57,430 You know, thinking about the decision making that was taking place during Brexit, you know, irrespective of which way one stands on, 487 00:50:57,430 --> 00:51:02,680 that was on the discussion, it was the way in which people really believed that their lives were at risk. 488 00:51:02,680 --> 00:51:08,830 And it was the way in which they believed their lives needed to change. But their daily living conditions hadn't changed at that point. 489 00:51:08,830 --> 00:51:13,660 If we look at what's happened in Libya over the past decade, there has been a major transformation in that. 490 00:51:13,660 --> 00:51:18,640 And what concerns me is that when you are living in such quote unquote apocalyptic conditions, 491 00:51:18,640 --> 00:51:24,220 how do you decide soberly how do you make such a good decision and do you not get more drawn? 492 00:51:24,220 --> 00:51:28,270 And do you not become more ripened to making quite extreme decisions? 493 00:51:28,270 --> 00:51:31,510 Do you not become more ripened to listening to quite simple ideas, 494 00:51:31,510 --> 00:51:39,100 very simple lethal ideas about explaining a very complex phenomena, fiscal service delivery, geopolitics? 495 00:51:39,100 --> 00:51:43,660 And you start saying, well, why did we just give it to someone? So why don't we give it to the side of that side? 496 00:51:43,660 --> 00:51:50,140 And I think to go back to what Mary was saying, that experience is something that I think essentially didn't need to happen, 497 00:51:50,140 --> 00:51:55,960 irrespective of the disputes and the conflicts in Libya over the last six years. Why has electricity not been managed? 498 00:51:55,960 --> 00:52:02,180 You don't need a prime minister from the east or for the West to have your electricity infrastructure repaired. 499 00:52:02,180 --> 00:52:05,980 Not something that really concerns Libyans. I'll leave this on an anecdote. 500 00:52:05,980 --> 00:52:09,490 I was in Spain last year and the Spanish Foreign Ministry, to their credit, 501 00:52:09,490 --> 00:52:14,290 who don't have much bandwidth in Libya, asked what could we do to help Libyans? 502 00:52:14,290 --> 00:52:19,420 Could we support the UN mission? Can we talk on diplomacy? Can we talk on national reconciliation? 503 00:52:19,420 --> 00:52:25,630 And I thought, you don't have the bandwidth, but I did joke an injustice. I said, if you want every single Libyan east western side to love, 504 00:52:25,630 --> 00:52:29,890 you have a conference about delivering electricity in Libya or delivering water in Libya. 505 00:52:29,890 --> 00:52:32,170 They will love you for that. 506 00:52:32,170 --> 00:52:39,070 Just break the mould of the continuous conversations and essentially respond to very desperate needs that Libyans are living under. 507 00:52:39,070 --> 00:52:46,570 That, I would say indirectly have shaped the minds of many Libyans that today, as Mary was saying or asking themselves, who should we support? 508 00:52:46,570 --> 00:52:50,920 And making quick binary decisions on things that are quite complex. Thank you. 509 00:52:50,920 --> 00:52:53,930 That's very helpful. And actually, we have had a number of questions. 510 00:52:53,930 --> 00:53:02,000 I'll just summarise them, asking for more information about the local dynamics of what's going on in Libya, both in terms of what's going on now, 511 00:53:02,000 --> 00:53:08,690 in terms of the balance between any attempt that somebody might make for state building as opposed to security, 512 00:53:08,690 --> 00:53:15,290 but also in the longer term, the social conditions leading up to the fall of Gadhafi. 513 00:53:15,290 --> 00:53:21,320 I don't know if we have time for any more discussion, but if I could just make a few final points. 514 00:53:21,320 --> 00:53:28,280 I think following on from what I said about the discontent in Libya over living conditions and, you know, 515 00:53:28,280 --> 00:53:36,200 last August, we saw the biggest demonstrations, the biggest nationwide demonstrations in Libya since 2011. 516 00:53:36,200 --> 00:53:45,080 They were basically driven by grievances over widespread corruption, poor living conditions, and just the frustrations that come from all of that. 517 00:53:45,080 --> 00:53:48,590 One final point. If you look at the demographics of Libya. 518 00:53:48,590 --> 00:53:55,400 Libya is a predominately youthful population. Some two thirds of the population are under the age of 30. 519 00:53:55,400 --> 00:54:02,510 We're now looking at a younger generation that has no real lived memory of the Gadhafi era. 520 00:54:02,510 --> 00:54:11,870 So talking about the Gadhafi era, you know, framing what's happening now through that particular lens doesn't resonate with that generation. 521 00:54:11,870 --> 00:54:18,920 It's a generation that has been shaped by the experience of 2011 and by the experience of the last decade. 522 00:54:18,920 --> 00:54:26,780 And I think we really need to think a little bit more about that generation that is emerging, how it sees the Libyan state, 523 00:54:26,780 --> 00:54:34,640 how it sees its future, its demands, its grievances, the very real frustrations it feels right now. 524 00:54:34,640 --> 00:54:40,940 And one final word in terms of those including the U.K. and other countries that are wondering 525 00:54:40,940 --> 00:54:47,870 what they can do in terms of supporting this new transitional period should it succeed. 526 00:54:47,870 --> 00:54:54,510 After this new executive has been established, I think thinking about Libya in those terms, 527 00:54:54,510 --> 00:55:01,700 those future terms and looking at that younger generation, looking at what it's demanding, how it has been shaped. 528 00:55:01,700 --> 00:55:07,880 I think that's key because it's often something that is missing in the conversation on Libya, 529 00:55:07,880 --> 00:55:13,640 just that useful segment and how they may view things very differently from the 530 00:55:13,640 --> 00:55:18,880 older political figures that international interlocutors are dealing with. 531 00:55:18,880 --> 00:55:20,620 Thank you very much, Mary. 532 00:55:20,620 --> 00:55:27,640 This has really been an amazing conversation, a very wide ranging conversation, and it's nice to sort of end on a note of youth, 533 00:55:27,640 --> 00:55:33,760 youthful hope, he could say, because in a sense, the youth represent the future of this country going for decades. 534 00:55:33,760 --> 00:55:37,480 And I think it's entirely to the point to highlight, 535 00:55:37,480 --> 00:55:45,740 including the policymakers in the audience and the people involved in thinking about how Britain or other countries should engage in the region. 536 00:55:45,740 --> 00:55:51,850 That that aspect of the region be highlighted. I'd like to thank you both, Mary, and. 537 00:55:51,850 --> 00:55:58,030 I'd like to thank Walter for handling the questions. I'd like to apologise to those whose questions we didn't get to. 538 00:55:58,030 --> 00:56:01,870 But this has really been a wonderfully informative evening about a very 539 00:56:01,870 --> 00:56:06,970 challenging subject and one which I hope we will try to give more attention to. 540 00:56:06,970 --> 00:56:11,950 It's one of the topics that Libya doesn't get as much attention as many of us would like, 541 00:56:11,950 --> 00:56:16,630 and it persists in facing a number of challenges as a consequence, I think. 542 00:56:16,630 --> 00:56:22,960 So with that, I'd like to wish you all a wonderful evening and a wonderful weekend in advance. 543 00:56:22,960 --> 00:56:27,410 And see you in a week's time in a week. We will have. 544 00:56:27,410 --> 00:56:31,690 Actually, I wasn't entirely certain who will be presenting next week. 545 00:56:31,690 --> 00:56:37,910 So if one of my colleagues could very kindly perhaps jumped in and inform us that we will be welcoming. 546 00:56:37,910 --> 00:56:46,450 Vitaly Donkin, Aleksey Vasiliev, we'll be speaking about Russia in the decades since the Arab uprisings of 2011. 547 00:56:46,450 --> 00:56:50,200 How apposite. After it after a discussion on Libya. 548 00:56:50,200 --> 00:57:07,837 So we would love to have you there in a week's time. Until then, good evening from Oxford.