1 00:00:07,930 --> 00:00:13,450 Well, let me welcome everyone to the Friday webinar. 2 00:00:13,450 --> 00:00:17,590 This is the last webinar of of term. 3 00:00:17,590 --> 00:00:25,660 And it's also the second annual Lachowicz Mahdi Army, a Jalani lecture. 4 00:00:25,660 --> 00:00:35,470 And I'd like to thank particularly the Russian Cultural Heritage Institute for assisting with the establishment of this annual lecture. 5 00:00:35,470 --> 00:00:42,970 Last year, we were very honoured to have professor found Dapper Hami on the first lecture in this series. 6 00:00:42,970 --> 00:00:47,500 And today, we are very pleased to welcome Professor Unassessed Ciampi, 7 00:00:47,500 --> 00:00:55,570 who's going to talk about Iran and the Arab uprisings opportunity drost squandered. 8 00:00:55,570 --> 00:01:04,450 Professor Shamis, I'm sure well known to everyone that he has had a long and distinct distinguished academic career. 9 00:01:04,450 --> 00:01:08,800 Is his plaudits are too numerous to mention in detail. 10 00:01:08,800 --> 00:01:11,970 But just to give you a sense of things, 11 00:01:11,970 --> 00:01:19,810 I noticed Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University is the The Hammer, 12 00:01:19,810 --> 00:01:25,250 the Silver Chair in International Relations and director of the Sheikh Nasser 13 00:01:25,250 --> 00:01:29,660 Muhammad Cinnabar Programme in Internationalist in International Relations, 14 00:01:29,660 --> 00:01:36,430 Regional Politics and Security. He is director of the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham. 15 00:01:36,430 --> 00:01:46,470 And he acts as co-director of the HRC funded Open World Initiative entitled Proff Language Dynamics Reshaping Community. 16 00:01:46,470 --> 00:01:54,960 It was time to term University 13 of internationalisation. It was the founding head of the School of Government and International Affairs. 17 00:01:54,960 --> 00:02:00,180 He's been a fellow of the World Economic Forum and served as a member of the WEF performance body, 18 00:02:00,180 --> 00:02:06,390 the Global Agenda Council 2010 2012 Focussing on energy. 19 00:02:06,390 --> 00:02:11,160 He was vice president and chair of the Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. 20 00:02:11,160 --> 00:02:16,970 Is ready to make a book series on the Middle East and is a member of the editorial board of Seven International 21 00:02:16,970 --> 00:02:24,540 Channels is published widely on international relations of the Middle East and on the Islamic Republic of Iran. 22 00:02:24,540 --> 00:02:31,140 He has a very long record of publication, 90 articles in journals and many books. 23 00:02:31,140 --> 00:02:35,750 His most recent book is How China is Changing the Middle East. 24 00:02:35,750 --> 00:02:46,570 And in 2017, Iran Stuck in Transition. I think this is an extremely time that is going to give to us. 25 00:02:46,570 --> 00:02:56,180 It's a subject which is often the subject of much misunderstanding, both a scholarly misunderstanding and also misunderstanding in the wider media. 26 00:02:56,180 --> 00:02:59,910 And I'm extremely pleased to pass the lecture over to him. 27 00:02:59,910 --> 00:03:04,560 Professor Shah. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Stephanie, for your kind words. 28 00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:08,340 And can I thank you, Professor Rogan. 29 00:03:08,340 --> 00:03:16,320 The Middle East centre, of course, in Tampa is college for giving me the honour of delivering this year's annual lecture. 30 00:03:16,320 --> 00:03:20,550 But I have to say, you've set the bar so high. This was our home. 31 00:03:20,550 --> 00:03:31,020 Starting this year is back in 2019. I can only disappoint or at least set the bar lower for the mere mortals who will follow events in future. 32 00:03:31,020 --> 00:03:39,440 And this, as you say, is a vexed subject of enquiry and some might say 10 years on a go getter life. 33 00:03:39,440 --> 00:03:44,490 The ever rising sun moved on. I would like to make the case that actually they haven't. 34 00:03:44,490 --> 00:03:47,040 And we will. We will ignore them at our peril. 35 00:03:47,040 --> 00:03:55,890 And let me just set my argument out on that from before moving forward to a more detailed discussion and commentary on Iran itself. 36 00:03:55,890 --> 00:04:05,760 So the uprisings, their causes as well as the consequences are still an ongoing concern. 37 00:04:05,760 --> 00:04:10,020 The region's economic conditions have hardly improved. 38 00:04:10,020 --> 00:04:18,000 Poverty, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, wealth disparity, lack of opportunity, 39 00:04:18,000 --> 00:04:25,030 environmental vandalism are all continuing to haunt the vast majority of people of the region. 40 00:04:25,030 --> 00:04:31,530 And all of these problems have magnified as a consequence of the pandemic. 41 00:04:31,530 --> 00:04:37,050 The pandemic has not only crushed national economies, but the countries have been compounded. 42 00:04:37,050 --> 00:04:41,190 The crisis have been compounded by soft oil prices, 43 00:04:41,190 --> 00:04:49,350 and I would argue it will take another decade or more for them to get back to where they were before the uprising started back in 2010. 44 00:04:49,350 --> 00:04:53,800 So we are looking at a very grim prospect for the region. 45 00:04:53,800 --> 00:05:08,920 And the uprisings, as they were, have not gone the way we have Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, just in recent memory, igniting in protest as well. 46 00:05:08,920 --> 00:05:16,300 And also, the only lesson that the regional states seems to have learnt from the uprisings is to become more masculine, 47 00:05:16,300 --> 00:05:23,190 to become more assertive and to become more resilient, to become the fierce states that the Lakers, 48 00:05:23,190 --> 00:05:28,300 the AUV, had set out in his seminal work on the Arab state. 49 00:05:28,300 --> 00:05:34,870 If anything, they are more fierce today than they were at the outset of the uprisings. 50 00:05:34,870 --> 00:05:44,310 What all this means, therefore, is that the causes, the uprisings remain unresolved and the call for change on unanswered. 51 00:05:44,310 --> 00:05:51,210 In practise, that means that there is pent up anger and frustration right across the region. 52 00:05:51,210 --> 00:05:56,790 And if you scratch. That frustration is barely under the skin. 53 00:05:56,790 --> 00:06:04,290 It is only skin deep. So the region is still set for major upheaval going forward. 54 00:06:04,290 --> 00:06:08,970 My second general point relates to the conditions of the region. 55 00:06:08,970 --> 00:06:15,810 I see them in our region as an exposed and fragmented subsystem of the international system. 56 00:06:15,810 --> 00:06:26,730 But unlike others, it is penetrated by both outside powers and also irresponsible non-state actors who run riot across the region here. 57 00:06:26,730 --> 00:06:34,230 What happens in one country can and indeed does affect the well-being of the other countries. 58 00:06:34,230 --> 00:06:41,100 This reality, of course, is underpinned by some theoretical arguments which relates to notions of a regional 59 00:06:41,100 --> 00:06:46,890 security complex that Barry Mouzon and Ali Weaver developed way back in 2003. 60 00:06:46,890 --> 00:06:53,700 But the crucial point to take away from their are similar work is that actually that they are 61 00:06:53,700 --> 00:06:59,880 all part of a major international system enmeshed in a global web of security and dependencies. 62 00:06:59,880 --> 00:07:11,310 But crucially, as I'm putting them here and as most political and militarily threats travel more easily over short distances, 63 00:07:11,310 --> 00:07:19,770 insecurities often associated with proximity. It is that proximity that I'll return to at the end of my lecture. 64 00:07:19,770 --> 00:07:21,990 Let's now turn to the other subject. 65 00:07:21,990 --> 00:07:31,770 And that is what I've put in my abstract, that is that Iran was arguably the most affected consequentially by the uprisings. 66 00:07:31,770 --> 00:07:38,820 Some may find that unusual. But let me just put my case here briefly. 67 00:07:38,820 --> 00:07:46,890 I would say, as I've just argued, devastated, rather, that no country stood to gain more from the Arab uprisings in the region, 68 00:07:46,890 --> 00:07:53,220 that Iran it would help Iran end its regional isolation. 69 00:07:53,220 --> 00:08:03,300 It will give it a stronger foothold in the Arab region, which currently is is focussed around Syria and Hezbollah. 70 00:08:03,300 --> 00:08:11,310 It would help Iran flip U.S. allies and build a cross section of Sunni Shia community of states. 71 00:08:11,310 --> 00:08:16,590 But more importantly for them. Of peoples for the first time since the revolution. 72 00:08:16,590 --> 00:08:25,170 Indeed, I would argue for the first time in centuries, Iran would be looking at creating this coalition of Sunni Arab peoples and states. 73 00:08:25,170 --> 00:08:28,530 It will weaken Iran's enemy, Israel. 74 00:08:28,530 --> 00:08:37,560 It would shift the spotlight away from Iran's own domestic problems, particularly the green movement of which we speak more. 75 00:08:37,560 --> 00:08:51,200 And also in a weakened community of Arab states. It would help Iran consolidate its resistance front, which had been investing in since 1982. 76 00:08:51,200 --> 00:08:59,510 These are the general thesis why Iran was the most affected by the uprisings. 77 00:08:59,510 --> 00:09:06,320 But also there is broader context to what I'm saying, and the context really matters, in my view. 78 00:09:06,320 --> 00:09:17,100 And it is. All also about the way in which crucial events begin to impact behaviour and end up going 79 00:09:17,100 --> 00:09:25,620 to highlight this point by looking at particular dates to show the importance of systems, 80 00:09:25,620 --> 00:09:30,360 processes, consequences that that context provides. 81 00:09:30,360 --> 00:09:34,290 Each of these dates is a critical turning point. 82 00:09:34,290 --> 00:09:36,540 And I always start with 9/11. 83 00:09:36,540 --> 00:09:46,260 9/11 was where the region was essentially turned upside down and the US became much more of an intrusive power in this region. 84 00:09:46,260 --> 00:09:49,660 It was followed in 2002. 85 00:09:49,660 --> 00:10:01,570 Barely, barely a year later by the infamous State of the Union address of President Bush, which further affected thinking in Iran and elsewhere. 86 00:10:01,570 --> 00:10:16,750 Then 2003, where Iraq was invaded, which which has had deep, deep, deep rooted consequences for the region still affecting relations, 2005. 87 00:10:16,750 --> 00:10:22,990 Which one would argue was there the arrival of Iran's own neo conservatives? 88 00:10:22,990 --> 00:10:32,840 And I would say in a very direct response to what was happening in the broader region and the way that was affecting Iran's domestic constituency. 89 00:10:32,840 --> 00:10:46,820 For Iran in particular, the two then unseat 2006. Summer of 2006, in which Hezbollah declared war on Israel and arguably won it for the first time. 90 00:10:46,820 --> 00:10:57,320 And finally, 2009, where the Zone Republic's legitimacy was questioned by millions of people on the streets for the first time since 1979. 91 00:10:57,320 --> 00:11:06,430 These are not random dates. These are all part and parcel of a process of securitisation of the region. 92 00:11:06,430 --> 00:11:18,740 So by night, by 2010, I would argue we were witness to a deepening of the security secularisation in the region in which all manner of of of life, 93 00:11:18,740 --> 00:11:27,800 whether policies, whether attributes, whether cultural practises and habits with the traditional behaviours of Iran and 94 00:11:27,800 --> 00:11:33,230 other Muslim majority countries were being scrutinised through the lens of security, 95 00:11:33,230 --> 00:11:40,280 from textbooks to the foreign policy was being subjected to a critical analysis of all these guys. 96 00:11:40,280 --> 00:11:50,120 Breeding terrorists to come and blow up American buildings and innocent Europeans on holiday in Indonesia and elsewhere. 97 00:11:50,120 --> 00:11:55,820 This was a highly charged region. By 2010. 98 00:11:55,820 --> 00:12:06,080 What this resulted in, of course, was here underlining the importance of securitisation is both in narrative and in policy. 99 00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:18,220 So in this period before 2010, we became familiar with such great phrases and all those who are not with us or against us or that. 100 00:12:18,220 --> 00:12:26,380 Some countries, including Iran, constitute an axis of evil or that this is a war on terror, 101 00:12:26,380 --> 00:12:35,020 or that if Iran doesn't behave itself or its leader, Saddam Hussein doesn't comply, it will be subject to America's shock and awe. 102 00:12:35,020 --> 00:12:45,730 These are all highly emotive securitise statements that leave the impression on the minds of leaders and peoples of the region. 103 00:12:45,730 --> 00:12:58,000 But also they had very direct policy consequences. Afghanistan was invaded in the autumn of 2001, followed by Iraq in March of 2003. 104 00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:05,950 Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Cuba, all these so-called adversaries were subjected to this direct sense of threat 105 00:13:05,950 --> 00:13:12,290 arising from what was essentially America's new national security doctrine. 106 00:13:12,290 --> 00:13:23,720 This background is important for me, standing where the 2010 2011 uprisings actually fit in the broader context of the region. 107 00:13:23,720 --> 00:13:28,530 Now, let me get to Iran and the uprisings themselves. 108 00:13:28,530 --> 00:13:35,100 The uprising started when Iran was grappling with three fundamental developments, some of which I've already alluded to. 109 00:13:35,100 --> 00:13:44,340 But let me develop this a bit further from me, Stephanie. The first is what I've called the Islamic Republic's 1969 movement movement. 110 00:13:44,340 --> 00:13:49,650 This was arguably when the power of the monarchy began to realise the growing wealth 111 00:13:49,650 --> 00:13:56,540 coming from its oil exports and understood the importance of developing a grand strategy. 112 00:13:56,540 --> 00:14:01,830 And that was based on the notion of building a domestic power and constituency in order 113 00:14:01,830 --> 00:14:08,170 to be able to extent and project power in a more permissive regional environment. 114 00:14:08,170 --> 00:14:19,490 The Islamic Republic did not have this night, is it tonight, movement moment until a short window between 2004 and 2006. 115 00:14:19,490 --> 00:14:29,170 Is the name for is when Iran is confident of what we may call this year as Shia and ization of Iraq. 116 00:14:29,170 --> 00:14:40,750 That for over a century, finally, Iran's brethren's, if you like, were in control of Iraq for all the messy nations of the British on the Arab forces. 117 00:14:40,750 --> 00:14:46,660 Iran was now able to talk Iraq and lead leaders directly with them. 118 00:14:46,660 --> 00:14:53,320 A menu of whose current elite actually came from Iran having been exiled by Saddam Hussein. 119 00:14:53,320 --> 00:15:04,360 That 2004 was Iran's window strategic window onto Iraq as not just an adversary, but a close brother and friendly country. 120 00:15:04,360 --> 00:15:13,870 And the other 2006, which was where Iran could claim that it's nurtured Hezbollah organisation, having been armed, 121 00:15:13,870 --> 00:15:22,990 trained, and they did not related by jihad, had for the first time taken on the Israeli armed forces on the battlefield. 122 00:15:22,990 --> 00:15:28,300 And for the first time, in their view, had beaten the Zionist enemy in battle. 123 00:15:28,300 --> 00:15:34,520 That this was Iran's glorious moment. Very important to keep that in mind. 124 00:15:34,520 --> 00:15:41,010 Iran's leaders began to dream of a greater Iran whose soft and hard power could now 125 00:15:41,010 --> 00:15:47,210 be stretched from the subcontinent to the east and to the Mediterranean in the west, 126 00:15:47,210 --> 00:15:53,660 what some call it, the Shia crescent, was actually much bigger geopolitically and geostrategic. 127 00:15:53,660 --> 00:16:00,650 Secondly, Iran was at the same time facing the serious challenges of self identity, 128 00:16:00,650 --> 00:16:10,880 of legitimacy, but also in practise stability and questions posed by the 2009 Green Movement. 129 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:20,100 That slogan. Whereas my vote was a multifaceted, multidimensional attack on the legitimacy of the legitimacy of the republic. 130 00:16:20,100 --> 00:16:25,110 And that is really important where from within the system by some of its own element, 131 00:16:25,110 --> 00:16:33,900 this question was raised about the authenticity of elections and the legitimacy of power in the republic. 132 00:16:33,900 --> 00:16:40,320 Iran was grappling with this a year before the uprisings actually broke out. 133 00:16:40,320 --> 00:16:52,080 And the third and equally important problem for Iran was the growing impact of the Obama administration's sanctions on Iran, 134 00:16:52,080 --> 00:16:56,640 in which not just a GDP, but the middle class was being squeezed. 135 00:16:56,640 --> 00:17:03,960 And Iran's ability to continue to provide for the downtrodden was becoming increasingly difficult. 136 00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:11,140 Iran's inability to trade globally, to attract support globally was being. 137 00:17:11,140 --> 00:17:22,500 Essentially questioned by this increasing what is Obama called the world's most intrusive sanctions on any one country, these three forces. 138 00:17:22,500 --> 00:17:27,110 But in the background when the uprisings happened. 139 00:17:27,110 --> 00:17:35,030 And it was in this context that the Rising's seemed to Tehran to be offering a godsend, 140 00:17:35,030 --> 00:17:46,400 a golden geopolitical opportunity which would knock out America's Arab allies, make the region, make the same countries more vulnerable, 141 00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:53,060 create space for Iran to spread its wings, to return to its non and movement, 142 00:17:53,060 --> 00:18:02,870 and to actually begin to exercise what he always saw as its legitimate revolutionary right amongst the Muslim Muslim lands. 143 00:18:02,870 --> 00:18:11,090 Indeed, it was Ayatollah Khomeini himself who said that events taking place in Tunisia and Egypt were, to quote him, 144 00:18:11,090 --> 00:18:22,620 a natural continuation of the Iranian revolution of 1979, an Islamic awakening, a phrase that stuck in the throat a little bit later. 145 00:18:22,620 --> 00:18:30,450 But I would also argue that Iran had no choice but to present the uprisings as Islamic awakening. 146 00:18:30,450 --> 00:18:34,800 Had it not done so, it would have had to submit to the fact that there are other revolutionary 147 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:39,480 forces in play beyond Islam and beyond an Islam which is beyond its control. 148 00:18:39,480 --> 00:18:47,600 So in a sense, Iran was imprisoned by its own logic of revolution and a narrative. 149 00:18:47,600 --> 00:18:53,430 In Iran's assessment, the uprisings would decisively change the regional balance of power. 150 00:18:53,430 --> 00:19:02,700 It is on Republic's favour. Assuring it of a greater influence of greater protection for itself and a much wider network 151 00:19:02,700 --> 00:19:09,800 of regional friends and like minded Arab ruling regimes and elites that it had never had. 152 00:19:09,800 --> 00:19:14,780 But things did not turn out as Iran had expected or indeed assumed. 153 00:19:14,780 --> 00:19:19,070 And I'm going to illustrate this point by way of a number of examples. The first one. 154 00:19:19,070 --> 00:19:24,560 Exhibit number one, Egypt. Egypt was the prise for everybody. 155 00:19:24,560 --> 00:19:32,340 Egypt, after all, is the beating heart of the Arab world. A close U.S. ally, the first country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. 156 00:19:32,340 --> 00:19:38,400 The guardian of the Camp David Accords. Mubarak. 157 00:19:38,400 --> 00:19:48,650 A staunch anti Islamist president who had mobilised Egyptian and other forces against political Islam across the region. 158 00:19:48,650 --> 00:19:57,150 An Islamic revolution in Egypt would be a cultural, political, ideological earthquake. 159 00:19:57,150 --> 00:20:04,170 But Egyptians from Tehran's oppressive utterances totally patronising. 160 00:20:04,170 --> 00:20:12,030 As I heard my Egyptian friends and colleagues saying, we're not trying to get rid of Mubarak to end up with a harmony in his place. 161 00:20:12,030 --> 00:20:17,220 We are not fighting Iran's ghosts and battles. We've got our own future to make. 162 00:20:17,220 --> 00:20:26,400 And that was something that was hard for Iran to accept, partly because they have not had close proximity to the region. 163 00:20:26,400 --> 00:20:32,220 Isolation has actually hurt them and also hurt their neighbours. 164 00:20:32,220 --> 00:20:37,490 Sure. Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi was a good thing. 165 00:20:37,490 --> 00:20:43,540 But when he was in power, he did not change course come, David stayed intact. 166 00:20:43,540 --> 00:20:48,880 Relations with Israel remained. America remained its its ally. 167 00:20:48,880 --> 00:20:57,850 And it drew closer to Saudi Arabia than it would we would have expected from any so-called Islamist leader. 168 00:20:57,850 --> 00:21:06,660 Morsi in power went further and opposed Iran's resistance front, its own axis of resistance. 169 00:21:06,660 --> 00:21:10,820 And there are three short examples to illustrate this. 170 00:21:10,820 --> 00:21:13,630 First is August 2012. 171 00:21:13,630 --> 00:21:24,880 Soon after he was elected president in Tehran's Non-Aligned Movement meeting, significant first on objection, president had been to Iran. 172 00:21:24,880 --> 00:21:31,630 He's given the red carpet treatment, welcomed as a friendly head of state, and indeed he was. 173 00:21:31,630 --> 00:21:35,470 And when he gets on platform, what does he talk about? 174 00:21:35,470 --> 00:21:45,880 It's essential that Saddam that Assad is removed from power, that Egypt, its people and the Arab world demand that Assad is removed from power. 175 00:21:45,880 --> 00:21:55,630 It doesn't matter what he said. It matters where he said it in Tehran's corridors of power, where Iran was already the patron of the Assad regime. 176 00:21:55,630 --> 00:22:04,630 The second example, February 2013, when for the first time since the revolution, an Iranian president visits Egypt. 177 00:22:04,630 --> 00:22:11,230 This was President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who arrived in Egypt in February 2013. 178 00:22:11,230 --> 00:22:15,550 He was greeted with red carpet and a guard of honour, as he should. 179 00:22:15,550 --> 00:22:21,620 And he was thrilled to be in Egypt, the country about which he knew very little. 180 00:22:21,620 --> 00:22:32,660 When he met, however, with the Mufti's, the Islamist leaders of Egypt and other political figures, they talked about sectarianism. 181 00:22:32,660 --> 00:22:41,900 They talked about Iran fanning the flames of sectarianism, of being anti Sanni, of doing things in Syria that no Muslim would do. 182 00:22:41,900 --> 00:22:49,310 And these were hard pills for the president of the Islamic Republic to accept. 183 00:22:49,310 --> 00:22:56,750 And the third example, of course, was the resistance front in which Iran had invested so heavily since the 1980s, 184 00:22:56,750 --> 00:23:04,400 had one Sunni participant and that was Hamas. Hamas from 1988 onwards. 185 00:23:04,400 --> 00:23:10,870 As it lost. It's voice and support from the rest of the Arab world began to lean on Iran and 186 00:23:10,870 --> 00:23:18,310 Iran found in Hamas a useful revolutionary and designers Palestinian organisation. 187 00:23:18,310 --> 00:23:25,000 And unquestionably, Hamas's inclusion in the resistance front was an important coup for Iran. 188 00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:35,430 But come a change of regime in Egypt. The first thing that happens is Hamas reconnects with Egypt. 189 00:23:35,430 --> 00:23:39,430 They're starting. The second thing that happens is much out. 190 00:23:39,430 --> 00:23:46,090 Its leader, who was based in Damascus in protest to Iran's role in suppressing the uprisings, 191 00:23:46,090 --> 00:23:55,810 moves out of Syria and is given home in Qatar and open arms in Egypt. 192 00:23:55,810 --> 00:24:06,650 This was a blow for Iran. This revolution, Islamic awakening in Egypt was not of the sort that Iran could make many friend friendly deals with. 193 00:24:06,650 --> 00:24:12,040 The second example I move on quickly was the Arab monarchies. 194 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:18,520 This was also an opportunity for Iran to push against the monarchies, particularly in the Gulf. 195 00:24:18,520 --> 00:24:25,570 Gulf Gulf Arab monarchies here, though, money and force restored order and compliance. 196 00:24:25,570 --> 00:24:30,100 And the only place where there was a whiff of a revolution, and that was in Bahrain. 197 00:24:30,100 --> 00:24:36,660 Iran had no choice but to sit on its hands while Saudi led GCSE force moved in, 198 00:24:36,660 --> 00:24:42,160 demolished the symbols of revolution in Bahrain and ensure that Al Khalifa regime stays in power. 199 00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:50,410 Iran's revolutionary ideas could travel, but not its influence beyond its borders inhibit in Libya and Yemen. 200 00:24:50,410 --> 00:24:56,450 Iran had a slightly different take. Libya was too far for it to do much about. 201 00:24:56,450 --> 00:25:00,510 But Gadhafi was a residual supporter. 202 00:25:00,510 --> 00:25:08,860 I've grown in the past, gone Yemen. Hiver was where Iran could claim geostrategic gains. 203 00:25:08,860 --> 00:25:11,470 It, of course, could support the who these who still there, 204 00:25:11,470 --> 00:25:18,790 who still poking a finger in the eye of Saudi Arabia and that juicy Shulie speaking is a good thing as far as Iran is concerned. 205 00:25:18,790 --> 00:25:20,890 But that has come, I would argue, 206 00:25:20,890 --> 00:25:32,300 against much loss of diplomatic and political clout in the wider region and also created animosity from Russia as well. 207 00:25:32,300 --> 00:25:38,990 But it is exhibit number for Syria where everything begins to unravel. 208 00:25:38,990 --> 00:25:47,320 Here is where the Islamic Islamic Republic's Islamic awakening turns into an absolute nightmare. 209 00:25:47,320 --> 00:25:56,950 Iran changes this narrative very quickly. No longer talking of Islamic awakening, but now referring to serious Sunni uprising. 210 00:25:56,950 --> 00:26:04,690 That's what it was initially as terrorists threatening the stability of a legitimate government. 211 00:26:04,690 --> 00:26:09,820 And a critical member of the resistance front, the Feris well on the march. 212 00:26:09,820 --> 00:26:17,920 Supported by the Great Satan. And there were hobbies to undermine the resistance in Syria and that Iran 213 00:26:17,920 --> 00:26:24,010 needed to act to protect what was a revolutionary agenda for the wider region. 214 00:26:24,010 --> 00:26:28,810 It rushed to provide military, logistical and financial support. 215 00:26:28,810 --> 00:26:39,880 Invited further derision and exposure in the wider region who are now sensitive to revolutionary change wrought across the Arab world. 216 00:26:39,880 --> 00:26:53,000 In this exposed Iran even further to the Salafi jihadi goal of attacking this Shia menace that is undermining Sunni struggles. 217 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:57,190 Having to buttress a weakening ally. 218 00:26:57,190 --> 00:27:07,300 It was one thing, but having to play second fiddle to Russia who really saved assets, chair a seat of power was something else. 219 00:27:07,300 --> 00:27:18,460 Iran had shown the limitations of its ability to project power in this moment of crisis or so having to mobilise Shia militias, 220 00:27:18,460 --> 00:27:27,610 Hezbollah militias from Iraq, from Afghanistan, from Pakistan and so on was also a problem. 221 00:27:27,610 --> 00:27:35,410 And that merely added to this tenor of Iran, is waging a sectarian war in Syria, 222 00:27:35,410 --> 00:27:43,580 making it even stronger and legitimising countries like Saudi Arabia and others to mobilise against against Iran. 223 00:27:43,580 --> 00:27:54,460 Iran's whether you call it miscalculation, misreading. Certainly his intervention proved costly in man and treasure. 224 00:27:54,460 --> 00:27:57,100 We don't know the exact figures. 225 00:27:57,100 --> 00:28:07,120 But Iran may have may have devoted as much as 10 billion dollars money that he didn't really have to spend in keeping Assad afloat. 226 00:28:07,120 --> 00:28:15,280 It has lost hundreds of its own people and thousands of the militia demobilised from elsewhere to keep Assad in power. 227 00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:25,630 But it also had cost in reputation. The call of the new set of these coming forth was one that did not sit comfortably with 228 00:28:25,630 --> 00:28:31,960 Iran's revolutionaries being called sectarian was not something that they had fathomed. 229 00:28:31,960 --> 00:28:39,300 But most importantly of all, being called occupier of Arab lands. 230 00:28:39,300 --> 00:28:52,090 A title reserved only for his right was something that really, really affected Iran's personality and self belief in his mission. 231 00:28:52,090 --> 00:28:58,490 All of this meant that Iran was the inevitable target of Salafi jihadis. 232 00:28:58,490 --> 00:29:10,640 What does all this mean? First, that there has been domestic blowback from Iran's hubris during the Arab Rising's we've seen in 2017 and 2018. 233 00:29:10,640 --> 00:29:17,810 Mass mobilisation against corruption, poverty, lack of opportunity, lack of democracy and so on. 234 00:29:17,810 --> 00:29:25,860 And the slogans link. Iran's behaviour in the region directly to the regime's legitimacy. 235 00:29:25,860 --> 00:29:30,230 When they say not Syria, not Lebanon, not Gaza, 236 00:29:30,230 --> 00:29:41,040 but will die for Iran is a very clear statement of discontent from vast population mobilised, but also Iran's intervention in the region, 237 00:29:41,040 --> 00:29:47,640 as in many ways hardened the factional arteries in Iran and has arguably strengthened 238 00:29:47,640 --> 00:29:53,310 the rise of a conservative alliance which is now in control of the parliament. 239 00:29:53,310 --> 00:30:01,920 And it will be in control of the presidency come June 2008 and then 21 elections that that has. 240 00:30:01,920 --> 00:30:08,250 Cleared the middle ground. The space for dialogue within Iran itself. 241 00:30:08,250 --> 00:30:12,510 Iran's regional alliances remain weak and fragile. 242 00:30:12,510 --> 00:30:23,490 But most importantly, they're all high maintenance. To keep its foot in Iraq, to keep control in Syria, to keep Hezbollah afloat, 243 00:30:23,490 --> 00:30:29,550 to keep the fees as its thorn in the side of the Saudis come with a heavy price tag. 244 00:30:29,550 --> 00:30:35,060 And Iran is having to pay out of its own pocket. And no one else's. 245 00:30:35,060 --> 00:30:42,290 And also, the uprisings are going to and confrontation between Iran and Israel and a further securitise, 246 00:30:42,290 --> 00:30:46,160 Iran's relations with virtually all of its Arab neighbours. 247 00:30:46,160 --> 00:30:52,240 But bar Iraq and Syria. 248 00:30:52,240 --> 00:30:59,890 Fear and perceived threat of rivalry and Iran's growing regional role. 249 00:30:59,890 --> 00:31:04,420 In my view, was the precursor to the Abrahamic courts, 250 00:31:04,420 --> 00:31:09,790 which have now changed the geopolitical dynamic so much that Iran is not increasingly 251 00:31:09,790 --> 00:31:18,430 isolated country standing against Israel in ways that was not the case before the 2010s. 252 00:31:18,430 --> 00:31:23,350 So finally. Where opportunity squandered. 253 00:31:23,350 --> 00:31:27,460 Yes. Could things have been different? 254 00:31:27,460 --> 00:31:33,550 My argument is probably not given the context and the and the arguments that I've made. 255 00:31:33,550 --> 00:31:37,360 But does the future look better or more promising? 256 00:31:37,360 --> 00:31:48,090 I would say, alas, not so long as Iran and also other regional countries continue to assume that they are playing into a Zero-Sum game. 257 00:31:48,090 --> 00:31:55,170 Rather than a shared geopolitical game in which cooperation can you better outcomes than competition? 258 00:31:55,170 --> 00:32:00,720 We're gonna go around the same circle again when the Arab masses decide to rise again for their rights. 259 00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:11,820 I'll stop that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. This is extremely textured analysis of the history of the past ten or fifteen years. 260 00:32:11,820 --> 00:32:17,880 I just like to ask you a couple of questions before we move to the wider audience. 261 00:32:17,880 --> 00:32:28,800 And the first question really picks up, what were your your final words ended and you mentioned at the beginning of your talk. 262 00:32:28,800 --> 00:32:35,080 The gains that were available to Iran as a result of the Arab uprising. 263 00:32:35,080 --> 00:32:40,590 And these were considerable. And I wonder then, of course, 264 00:32:40,590 --> 00:32:49,050 the Americans and the Israelis would have been equally aware of these gains that they are about pricings were opening up for Iran. 265 00:32:49,050 --> 00:32:54,840 So I wonder to what extent you think that the very magnitude of the opportunity 266 00:32:54,840 --> 00:33:02,040 offered to Iran dominated the politics of the region in subsequent years. 267 00:33:02,040 --> 00:33:12,620 In other words, the stakes were so high that the intervention sometimes cover up, sometimes over what the Americans and the Israelis was aimed. 268 00:33:12,620 --> 00:33:17,780 Primarily at limiting Iran's expansion. 269 00:33:17,780 --> 00:33:26,390 And as a consequence, encouraged the darkest forces in the region to greater stability. 270 00:33:26,390 --> 00:33:39,710 So we have, again, as you mentioned, some of these really very, very difficult situations in the countries where the Arab Spring was the most mocked. 271 00:33:39,710 --> 00:33:44,030 So and as you said at the end, could things have been different? Probably not. 272 00:33:44,030 --> 00:33:47,480 And I'm just wondering if you could expand on that a little bit and say, 273 00:33:47,480 --> 00:33:53,330 what do you think you're on might have done to mitigate the difficulties that it faced, 274 00:33:53,330 --> 00:34:06,630 not just in its regional relations, but in the respect of aggravating its its tensions with the U.S. and Israel? 275 00:34:06,630 --> 00:34:16,800 The question really is a simple thing. But you explained how, for example, the Iranians radically misread the situation in Egypt. 276 00:34:16,800 --> 00:34:25,230 And I'm just wondering, I mean, you said it because of their isolation, but it seems to me more than that in the sense that it was very obvious. 277 00:34:25,230 --> 00:34:30,480 I think two to two observers that Morsi was an all ommaney. 278 00:34:30,480 --> 00:34:34,560 The Muslim Brothers are not revolutionaries. They are conservative. 279 00:34:34,560 --> 00:34:40,500 They were likely to form alliances with other conservative forces. But it is not difficult to understand that. 280 00:34:40,500 --> 00:34:45,810 And I'm just wondering if you think the fact that the Iranians got that so spectacularly wrong is a 281 00:34:45,810 --> 00:34:54,060 kind of code for a much wider misunderstanding about what's going on in these individual country. 282 00:34:54,060 --> 00:34:57,750 Very insightful questions for you. Thank you. I think you're absolutely spot on. 283 00:34:57,750 --> 00:35:08,070 Let me take the second one first. It's true that that actually Iran has as much clue about what's going on Egypt as Obama did in the White House. 284 00:35:08,070 --> 00:35:14,760 For all for all of of talk of Islamic solidarity and so on. 285 00:35:14,760 --> 00:35:20,190 Iran's Islamic revolution has been a highly isolating experience. 286 00:35:20,190 --> 00:35:25,650 And the less contact Iran has had with its wider regions, 287 00:35:25,650 --> 00:35:34,470 the more isolate it has been and the less it actually understands what makes these other countries tick and the absence of diplomatic relations. 288 00:35:34,470 --> 00:35:37,620 But also any cultural contact. 289 00:35:37,620 --> 00:35:48,510 Inevitably, Iran will fall in the same mis understanding of when masses in Tahrir Square mobilise and some shout Allo Akbar. 290 00:35:48,510 --> 00:35:53,160 Does it seem a lot better that the here in the Duma prayers in Tehran? 291 00:35:53,160 --> 00:36:04,710 It was not. It was not. And the fact that they reduced and I'm not using this this term, you know, this is fretfully, 292 00:36:04,710 --> 00:36:13,700 but the fact that reduce what was going on in the wider region to an Islamic awakening was completely misreading. 293 00:36:13,700 --> 00:36:24,940 What the Arab youth in particular, the same constituency that is resisting Tehran's normative position, 294 00:36:24,940 --> 00:36:31,290 we're asking for all they had to do was tune in to Al Jazeera. 295 00:36:31,290 --> 00:36:38,110 Interpret the slogans in Tahrir Square to understand this was no Islamic revolution. 296 00:36:38,110 --> 00:36:43,470 And and they did misread it. And so when Morsi goes to Tehran. 297 00:36:43,470 --> 00:36:52,890 They are completely taken aback. By his position that we, the Arabs, stand in support of the Syrian revolution. 298 00:36:52,890 --> 00:37:01,860 Inevitably he would say that of course he would. And and that when Ahmadinejad goes to Cairo and he goes to Al-Azhar, 299 00:37:01,860 --> 00:37:09,960 what they will tell him for the first time meeting the Iranian president is keep your nose out of Arab affairs. 300 00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:15,090 Of course, they would say that inevitably. But it goes further than that. 301 00:37:15,090 --> 00:37:16,140 Stephanie, 302 00:37:16,140 --> 00:37:31,920 when are we in Doha meeting at a high level meeting of Arab Arab dignitaries that is looking to bolster the position of the Syrian national forces, 303 00:37:31,920 --> 00:37:37,640 refers in a speech to Hezbollah shaitan when talking about Hezbollah? 304 00:37:37,640 --> 00:37:45,860 Yeah, it's a very clear message that Iran's narrative is unwelcome. 305 00:37:45,860 --> 00:37:50,060 Apart from all of its behaviour. So, yeah, absolutely. 306 00:37:50,060 --> 00:38:00,720 They misread it and and and and in some ways, the only [INAUDIBLE] cockatiel tears when Morsi was deposed and. 307 00:38:00,720 --> 00:38:06,900 First question. It could be interesting whether things could have been different. 308 00:38:06,900 --> 00:38:13,500 I would argue that that was less of Iran's own making, but rather a victim of this, 309 00:38:13,500 --> 00:38:21,610 the broader environment in which the uprisings took place, where the region was already highly charged. 310 00:38:21,610 --> 00:38:31,100 And and the fact that the US had intervened in Iraq without consent and support of. 311 00:38:31,100 --> 00:38:39,710 Arab Arab regimes. Arab states. Was a significant blow going to regional capitals. 312 00:38:39,710 --> 00:38:46,270 One was struck by the animosity that you felt by elites against United States. 313 00:38:46,270 --> 00:38:51,780 It's not that the love Saddam Hussein. They complained for three reasons. 314 00:38:51,780 --> 00:38:59,510 One was, you can't just march into Arab states and remove people you don't like. 315 00:38:59,510 --> 00:39:05,740 You've exposed us. To our proximity to you by our people. 316 00:39:05,740 --> 00:39:10,210 And thirdly, you have opened the gates, as the Saudi said, 317 00:39:10,210 --> 00:39:18,430 of Iraq to two Iranians marching in and taking over one of the most important Arab countries on the planet. 318 00:39:18,430 --> 00:39:23,710 Thank you very much. Yeah. And it's true. 319 00:39:23,710 --> 00:39:32,310 These were important developments. And so having having occurred in a highly securitise. 320 00:39:32,310 --> 00:39:42,150 Polarised environment. In which not only Iran at home had problems, but the regional Grolier problems, including outside intervention. 321 00:39:42,150 --> 00:39:48,440 There was, I don't think, much room beyond a zero sum game calculation. 322 00:39:48,440 --> 00:39:54,890 And I would say, sadly, that in a sense, look at Marmar today. 323 00:39:54,890 --> 00:39:59,090 What you see the regional countries do to address that problem. 324 00:39:59,090 --> 00:40:06,680 They are also caught in their own bubble of insecurity rather than converging together. 325 00:40:06,680 --> 00:40:11,960 They all find shelter in their own comfortable habitats. 326 00:40:11,960 --> 00:40:19,040 And that was what was happening in the region in 2010. I hope that captures your questions. 327 00:40:19,040 --> 00:40:21,170 Thank you. Thank you very much so much. 328 00:40:21,170 --> 00:40:28,820 I'm proud to have gone to Professor Rogan, who I think has been keeping an eye on the question from the audience. 329 00:40:28,820 --> 00:40:33,590 Thank you, Stephanie. Yes, the questions are already starting to come in fast and furiously. 330 00:40:33,590 --> 00:40:37,220 Let me remind all viewers that if you would like to put a question, 331 00:40:37,220 --> 00:40:43,520 please just go to the Q&A bar at the bottom of your screen and type your answer and we'll take all the questions we can fit. 332 00:40:43,520 --> 00:40:47,630 If you would like your name to be associated with your question, type your name. 333 00:40:47,630 --> 00:40:51,020 But if you'd rather be anonymous, we take anonymous questions as well. 334 00:40:51,020 --> 00:40:57,950 Now, I'm going to begin with a question from Yasmin's mother who takes you back to Syria, Anoush, 335 00:40:57,950 --> 00:41:07,470 and asks whether we couldn't also envisage a situation where Saudi intervention was deliberately planned to draw Iran into the civil war. 336 00:41:07,470 --> 00:41:15,290 And what's your response to Iran's claims that had it not fought for Damascus, it would have faced a war in Tehran? 337 00:41:15,290 --> 00:41:26,740 Iran had made it very clear at when when fires were burnt in rubber that that it would it would have to defend Assad. 338 00:41:26,740 --> 00:41:29,210 I don't know how many have made it very clear before that. 339 00:41:29,210 --> 00:41:37,440 In fact, I had a said in a celebrated speech that if we don't fight them in Syria, we'll have to fight them. 340 00:41:37,440 --> 00:41:46,460 Kermanshah. In many ways, ironically, this is Israel's security doctrine. 341 00:41:46,460 --> 00:41:52,010 Fight your battles away from your borders. One lesson at least Iranians have learnt from Israel. 342 00:41:52,010 --> 00:42:04,130 And the Saudis, of course, capitalise on this because it was the first time that they could strike at the heart of the axis of resistance and flipping 343 00:42:04,130 --> 00:42:13,850 Syria in the ways that Iran had perceived Egypt flipping was strategically important for Saudi Arabia because before 2010, 344 00:42:13,850 --> 00:42:18,800 Saudis have invested heavily in making a friend of asset. 345 00:42:18,800 --> 00:42:30,590 And they would rather now move on to a Sunni majority regime in Syria, which was also head up going back to the 1950s, if not before. 346 00:42:30,590 --> 00:42:36,830 And that would have been a historic opportunity for them to do to Iran what they saw Iran do to them in Iraq. 347 00:42:36,830 --> 00:42:41,000 So there is all this massive nation going on. 348 00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:47,900 And in a sense, inevitably Iran intervenes. Saudi would have intervened as well. 349 00:42:47,900 --> 00:42:54,890 Second question, Eugene, was. Coming up now, the second question comes from Maggie Asghari, 350 00:42:54,890 --> 00:43:03,920 who wants to draw that parallel between the Arab uprisings in 2011 and Iran's Green Movement of 2009, 351 00:43:03,920 --> 00:43:10,850 to what extent do you think Iran influenced the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprising? 352 00:43:10,850 --> 00:43:21,730 I I wouldn't I wouldn't set out a store arguing that the green movement was a catalyst for the uprisings because, you know, looking at Egypt. 353 00:43:21,730 --> 00:43:30,280 Egypt had had and we will have in future a cycle of protest and violence against 354 00:43:30,280 --> 00:43:37,930 the protesters fall from bread to voting to housing to land distribution, 355 00:43:37,930 --> 00:43:42,940 to public transport, to price of taxi fares, you name it. 356 00:43:42,940 --> 00:43:58,750 Lebanon in 2005 had been up in arms for the Hariri assassination and Iraq had had its own mass movements at that time as well. 357 00:43:58,750 --> 00:44:06,020 So the green movement was not something that triggered in faraway Tunisia. 358 00:44:06,020 --> 00:44:11,460 Well, what it was, was a sense of solidarity that they felt with the Iranian people. 359 00:44:11,460 --> 00:44:20,880 And beyond that, it was much more of a concern for the regime that, oh, goodness, now we are really vulnerable because the Arab masses, 360 00:44:20,880 --> 00:44:29,250 the Arab youth, are marching in the way that our people did in many millions in 2009. 361 00:44:29,250 --> 00:44:36,190 Well, let's stay with the theme of Iranian society here and your fun begins asking how 362 00:44:36,190 --> 00:44:40,240 you've spoken a lot about the Iranian state's response to the Arab uprisings. 363 00:44:40,240 --> 00:44:46,870 But could you comment on Iranian society's responses to the Arab uprisings or the view of Iranian society? 364 00:44:46,870 --> 00:44:52,100 Has there been much divergence between state and society on the subject? 365 00:44:52,100 --> 00:45:02,990 What an excellent question, Eugene. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. That there has been an in the in the early days when Iran intervened in Syria. 366 00:45:02,990 --> 00:45:09,160 There was a degree of tolerance because it was an arms length. Iran did not have troops on the ground. 367 00:45:09,160 --> 00:45:16,520 Body bags were not coming back to Iran. Iran was not celebrating the role of its generals in Syria. 368 00:45:16,520 --> 00:45:23,480 Iranians were not watching militias walking across into Syria. 369 00:45:23,480 --> 00:45:29,420 Fatima EWN were not being celebrated as brigades in Syria. 370 00:45:29,420 --> 00:45:37,450 And also the Treasury was not being squandered. In Syria. It's when those realities began to strike. 371 00:45:37,450 --> 00:45:43,700 And for all of Iran's isolation, its capitulation remains highly networked. 372 00:45:43,700 --> 00:45:54,740 The regime has failed miserably to distance the Iranian population society from international networks, and the news gets to them. 373 00:45:54,740 --> 00:45:59,900 There may not be allowed to have satellite television legally, but they have it illegally. 374 00:45:59,900 --> 00:46:07,310 In fact, the bite from supplies of the regime themselves to make sure that it's not been taken off. 375 00:46:07,310 --> 00:46:18,620 So they became aware of the cost of the Syrian war and also the security dimensions of the Syrian war. 376 00:46:18,620 --> 00:46:26,660 And as such, did begin to articulate a much, much harsher position on the regime's support for Syria. 377 00:46:26,660 --> 00:46:36,760 But you only see flashes of this in street protests and slogans that we hear from time to time in Iranian towns and cities. 378 00:46:36,760 --> 00:46:47,100 Formerly, Iran is there to protect Syria as the linchpin of axis of resistance, which is the ultimate liberator of all Muslims, 379 00:46:47,100 --> 00:47:00,400 informally is very conscious of the cost of having to carry what the Americans call lemon states and the cost of that for its own grip at home, 380 00:47:00,400 --> 00:47:06,550 particularly on the sanctions. So, you know the phrase chickens come to roost, really. 381 00:47:06,550 --> 00:47:12,230 They did so post Syrian civil war. Thank you. 382 00:47:12,230 --> 00:47:17,890 Our next question comes from Paul, who's joining us from the University of Amsterdam. 383 00:47:17,890 --> 00:47:25,510 He says that your talk reminds him of Kissinger's famous saying that is Iran a cause or a nation? 384 00:47:25,510 --> 00:47:34,090 That is to say, there is no mention at all of Iran's own security considerations, usually addressed by the notion of forward defence. 385 00:47:34,090 --> 00:47:43,680 Is this notion completely nonsensical? And is Iran to the 21st century still the same as the revolutionary Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini? 386 00:47:43,680 --> 00:47:49,550 So kindly elaborate on that one. Yeah. Did you say pull out? 387 00:47:49,550 --> 00:47:53,580 I did. Yeah. He is a troublemaker. Eugene, I told you not to let him in. 388 00:47:53,580 --> 00:47:59,540 You know, he got right past me and he's on his way down to street. It is wonderful to have a question from Paul. 389 00:47:59,540 --> 00:48:03,910 And it's and it's a it's a it's a very insightful comment, if I may say so. 390 00:48:03,910 --> 00:48:10,040 And I think. I think. Let's get constructivists for a moment. 391 00:48:10,040 --> 00:48:14,450 And I think Iran is a state and an idea, a brother. 392 00:48:14,450 --> 00:48:25,710 Let me correct that. The Islamic Republic is a state and an idea and its elite chooses, which is more convenient in its arsenal at times. 393 00:48:25,710 --> 00:48:38,230 It is an idea, the Islamic awakening, the notion that other more times I would add it is a state that what Iran does, 394 00:48:38,230 --> 00:48:42,910 it does in the interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. 395 00:48:42,910 --> 00:48:51,010 It is very clear on that. In that sense, it behaves like any other state and it uses all sorts of justifications, 396 00:48:51,010 --> 00:48:56,860 all manner of justifications for its misconduct as well as its conduct. 397 00:48:56,860 --> 00:49:07,010 It does have legitimate interests. Having invested in the partnership with Syria since 1979, it will not let it go without a fight. 398 00:49:07,010 --> 00:49:15,790 Having kept Hezbollah. In place since 1982 and have haven't seen it in action as a very effective, 399 00:49:15,790 --> 00:49:27,550 very effective revolutionary militant armed force in Lebanon, in Syria, but also against Israel. 400 00:49:27,550 --> 00:49:33,910 It is part of its former defence. Absolutely. No question about it. It will keep it there as long as it can. 401 00:49:33,910 --> 00:49:47,140 And Syria helps keeping it there. Iraq, being a Shia state, helps Iran keeping Iraq and Syria as part of its broader strategic arena. 402 00:49:47,140 --> 00:49:55,150 It does give it forward defence and it can justify just about this within this notion of axis of resistance. 403 00:49:55,150 --> 00:50:04,400 But towards the end, I alluded to the reality that actually the ground is shifting under the feet of the Islamic Republic. 404 00:50:04,400 --> 00:50:12,460 The fact that Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, Sudan, Sudan, that Iran had so invested in. 405 00:50:12,460 --> 00:50:17,980 In the 80s and 90s has now got relations with Israel, no matter under what conditions is not. 406 00:50:17,980 --> 00:50:29,730 The question here shows that Iran's ability, not just not Kushan of control, but to even set agendas are slipping away from it. 407 00:50:29,730 --> 00:50:36,900 And that would be a cause of concern. If I were sitting where Mohamed is sitting in Tehran. 408 00:50:36,900 --> 00:50:44,660 Well, you're beginning to attract many old friends, the usual suspects, but I have the next question from Professor Matteo Renzi, 409 00:50:44,660 --> 00:50:52,850 who's joining us from Venice, who wants to know with the likely renewal of the JCP away at the situation in Yemen being what it is. 410 00:50:52,850 --> 00:51:01,640 Aren't things starting to look bleak for the Saudi grand strategy? Do you think the current Iranian government will be able to rise to the occasion 411 00:51:01,640 --> 00:51:06,740 and exploit the space between the Biden administration and the Saudi government? 412 00:51:06,740 --> 00:51:10,370 Tolomato. It's lovely to see you. Or rather, I'd love to have your. 413 00:51:10,370 --> 00:51:19,250 Your question. Another good one, Eugene. This is the problem with you, with your crowd. 414 00:51:19,250 --> 00:51:24,720 Yeah, I. I think both Iran and Saudi Arabia want the Yemen question settled. 415 00:51:24,720 --> 00:51:30,200 And I think I think they are who these are now more trouble than they're worth. 416 00:51:30,200 --> 00:51:36,830 For Iran and there being trouble for Saudis from the beginning. But we need we need an honest broker here. 417 00:51:36,830 --> 00:51:41,610 I would like to see Omani bulls, for example, to try and de-escalate. 418 00:51:41,610 --> 00:51:50,540 And they've done so before. I would very much welcome their role. I would like the Kuwaiti government to intervene in this. 419 00:51:50,540 --> 00:51:53,830 What we don't want is America to intervene in this. 420 00:51:53,830 --> 00:52:07,520 Given what was in on the line on the line in your question, Matel, is the tension what we perceive as tension in that Biden Saudi relations? 421 00:52:07,520 --> 00:52:15,860 I think that would probably blow over in any case, given that they've got bigger fish to fry or that they'll come to some modus operandi. 422 00:52:15,860 --> 00:52:19,640 But we need a region honest broker to help us through this. 423 00:52:19,640 --> 00:52:23,600 Qatar is being very active on these fronts as well. 424 00:52:23,600 --> 00:52:35,680 But. The fact that Potter meets with with others to find a negotiated settlement of Syria will not sit very, very kindly with the Iranians. 425 00:52:35,680 --> 00:52:43,420 So there is a question mark over that one. But I think what this requires to cut a long, long, 426 00:52:43,420 --> 00:52:52,180 long answer short is for the parties to recognise that it's time for them to come to the table and find a solution not in your interests, 427 00:52:52,180 --> 00:53:06,580 but the interests of Yemeni people. It is a stain on the whole Muslim world to have so many innocent Yemenis dying of hunger in the 21st century. 428 00:53:06,580 --> 00:53:13,690 This is a stain on all of us. But for Muslims in particular, we talk about brotherly love for each other. 429 00:53:13,690 --> 00:53:17,650 Not to rush to the aid of the Yemeni people, 430 00:53:17,650 --> 00:53:26,950 not to force European Sidorova to end this nonsense is of importance here, not what the United States does. 431 00:53:26,950 --> 00:53:31,480 I knew she wouldn't be 20, 21 if I didn't have a couple of questions for you on the pandemic. 432 00:53:31,480 --> 00:53:36,550 So let me put these two questions to you in quick succession and you could take the both of them together. 433 00:53:36,550 --> 00:53:40,000 The first comes to you from our student, David Roddie, who asks, 434 00:53:40,000 --> 00:53:46,360 Do you think that the state society connexion has been weakened by government failures during the pandemic? 435 00:53:46,360 --> 00:53:53,210 And does that put Iran at an increased risk of uprising today than was the case in 2011? 436 00:53:53,210 --> 00:54:02,410 So now hold onto that one. OK, then a second question, which is going to look specifically at China's role or influence as a result. 437 00:54:02,410 --> 00:54:10,900 This comes from Andreas Burckhardt, who asks. You mentioned the effects of the pandemic on the region and growing interdependencies with this in mind. 438 00:54:10,900 --> 00:54:19,930 How do you see China's influence in Iran developing postcode covered and the impact of this influence on reform movements in the country? 439 00:54:19,930 --> 00:54:28,930 Thank you, Jeanne. I would like to issue myself an invitation to come back to talk at length on Andreas's question about China. 440 00:54:28,930 --> 00:54:32,200 But not to disappoint. I will I will talk about that. 441 00:54:32,200 --> 00:54:36,710 Let me take the first note first, which was on state society relations, both Corbitt, 442 00:54:36,710 --> 00:54:45,830 that there has been a complete breakdown of trust between state and society over Kovik, not just because of the environment, 443 00:54:45,830 --> 00:54:49,270 government's incompetence in managing the pandemic in Iran, 444 00:54:49,270 --> 00:54:56,410 but also because of what is seen as Iran's indulgence of the pandemic at its very beginning, 445 00:54:56,410 --> 00:55:05,320 where they failed to alert the population when they were going to vote in the parliamentary elections. 446 00:55:05,320 --> 00:55:13,450 And they failed to let the population when they were organising the celebrations for anniversary of the revolution, 447 00:55:13,450 --> 00:55:17,730 where people in their hundreds of thousands are encouraged to come out. 448 00:55:17,730 --> 00:55:30,030 Weeks later, we see this spike in infections and why the rest of the world is beginning to distance itself in terms of geographical access to China. 449 00:55:30,030 --> 00:55:36,480 We have long flights. Continuing between Iran and China. 450 00:55:36,480 --> 00:55:43,890 And Iranian officials. Come back on a daily basis from China, on a daily basis from China. 451 00:55:43,890 --> 00:55:52,560 When this is declared a pandemic. And what's more so because it's the elite travelling that take the virus in 452 00:55:52,560 --> 00:55:58,080 the back pockets and go to places like home and spread it amongst the clergy. 453 00:55:58,080 --> 00:56:09,120 And one of the reasons why the death rate spiked in Iran was because many of these elderly people had absolutely no defence against it. 454 00:56:09,120 --> 00:56:18,450 And it spread like far like wildfire. So Iranian population society is anxious about the state's ability to. 455 00:56:18,450 --> 00:56:28,410 To address the rise of the cry of the pandemic, what also is the ability to this day of having a strategy for vaccination? 456 00:56:28,410 --> 00:56:32,360 For example, whose vaccine do Iranians take most vaccine? 457 00:56:32,360 --> 00:56:39,240 Do they trust what happened to the two hundred thousand vaccines that came in from the West when you're. 458 00:56:39,240 --> 00:56:46,470 It was not going to take any vaccine from the West. These are all kind of now existential questions for society. 459 00:56:46,470 --> 00:56:56,670 So you're right. Strains in state society relations have in many ways deepened rather than than than that being shorten. 460 00:56:56,670 --> 00:57:08,850 As a consequence of of the regime's response. And and because you address this question on China, part of that I've already mentioned questionably, 461 00:57:08,850 --> 00:57:17,670 so long as sanctions on that are in place, Iran's relations with China will not just endure what will develop there. 462 00:57:17,670 --> 00:57:26,840 This twenty five year old strategic partnership of many billions of dollars of investment in Iran is important to Iran. 463 00:57:26,840 --> 00:57:35,720 Iran is important to China for strategic reasons, for energy reasons, for job, geopolitical reasons, for belt and road initiative reasons, 464 00:57:35,720 --> 00:57:42,290 and also for the fact that Iran of all of its neighbours stands aside from the United 465 00:57:42,290 --> 00:57:50,020 States in a global game where tensions between Beijing and Washington seem to be rising. 466 00:57:50,020 --> 00:57:53,800 Thank you so much for coming to the end of our time for questions, 467 00:57:53,800 --> 00:58:00,460 and I already owe our audience a huge apology because I can see another 12 questions piling in. 468 00:58:00,460 --> 00:58:10,150 So inspiring has your talk been. And I've also been economical with the questions because each and every one begins by praising you. 469 00:58:10,150 --> 00:58:16,060 And say how much they've enjoyed the talk and send you greetings. But the interesting questions, short and sharp. 470 00:58:16,060 --> 00:58:20,770 Let me end with one more that's going to tax your great knowledge of international relations. 471 00:58:20,770 --> 00:58:28,090 This comes from Alexander Brendle, who asks, What can we expect from the high level Hezbollah delegation to Russia later this month? 472 00:58:28,090 --> 00:58:33,580 Can Russia maintain relations with the GCSE with Iran and Israel simultaneously? 473 00:58:33,580 --> 00:58:40,530 So after bringing China into the formula a little Russia, Iran here to bring this session to a close and then over to Stephanie. 474 00:58:40,530 --> 00:58:43,640 And short of that, Eugene is yes, rather, 475 00:58:43,640 --> 00:58:56,330 this is the same Russia which fights the Turks in in Syria and then sits with the Turks and and negotiates a final settlement for Syria. 476 00:58:56,330 --> 00:59:05,450 This is the same Russia which provides military support for Syria and sells for hundreds. 477 00:59:05,450 --> 00:59:14,660 To Turkey. This is the same Russia that arms Iran, but also sells weapons to UAE. 478 00:59:14,660 --> 00:59:19,910 So there is no contradiction as far as Russian foreign policy is concerned. 479 00:59:19,910 --> 00:59:30,780 It's very much. I have no enemies. Who remembers that one where anyone was talking about way back in the old days approach. 480 00:59:30,780 --> 00:59:41,050 And I'm an. You know, a meeting with Hezbollah leadership is in many ways a good thing as far as I'm concerned, because it's actually dialogue. 481 00:59:41,050 --> 00:59:52,150 If the Russians are serious about winding up the civil war in Syria, none of that, of course, addresses Syria's deep, deep crisis. 482 00:59:52,150 --> 00:59:58,850 And re-election of Assad as president is merely prolonging the pain. 483 00:59:58,850 --> 01:00:09,620 We've talked about what I've talked about Yemen. Let me finish, Eugène, on another cross that secures in the pond that we're all carrying. 484 01:00:09,620 --> 01:00:17,330 Who would have thought that six million Syrians would be refugees outside of their homeland? 485 01:00:17,330 --> 01:00:23,510 Who would have thought that nine million Syrians would be refugees in their own country? 486 01:00:23,510 --> 01:00:35,160 Syria, of all places. Place of learnt civilisation, of culture, of multiple religious. 487 01:00:35,160 --> 01:00:46,140 Convergence of of. Literature of science would be reduced to rubble as it is now. 488 01:00:46,140 --> 01:00:51,290 Yeah, this area needs the support of all of us, 489 01:00:51,290 --> 01:01:00,110 but it should break all of our hearts to see a Syrian carrying a bucket of water across the Jordanian desert. 490 01:01:00,110 --> 01:01:10,640 It should break all of our hearts. This is not the Syria. That we have known. 491 01:01:10,640 --> 01:01:11,650 Thank you very much. 492 01:01:11,650 --> 01:01:23,570 And just finally, to thank our nose for what was an extremely informative, if rather depressing survey of the situation over the last few years. 493 01:01:23,570 --> 01:01:31,070 I think the questions have indicated how many issues have been raised and discussed. 494 01:01:31,070 --> 01:01:35,460 And I think we have all found it extremely useful and enlightening. 495 01:01:35,460 --> 01:01:40,850 So, once again, many thanks for taking the time and trouble to give this lecture. 496 01:01:40,850 --> 01:01:44,930 We are extremely grateful and I think it's been it's been extremely useful. 497 01:01:44,930 --> 01:01:50,510 Thank you so much. And thank you, Stephanie. The pleasure has been all mine. 498 01:01:50,510 --> 01:01:57,330 I'm sorry I wasn't there in Oxford to enjoy your hospitality tonight, but I will take a couple of regexp for that. 499 01:01:57,330 --> 01:02:04,610 It's been an absolute honour to be able to give this year's annual lecture all the very best to you and your audience. 500 01:02:04,610 --> 01:02:17,600 Thank you very much. Thank you.