Well, let me welcome everyone to the Friday webinar.
This is the last webinar of of term.
And it's also the second annual Lachowicz Mahdi Army, a Jalani lecture.
And I'd like to thank particularly the Russian Cultural Heritage Institute for assisting with the establishment of this annual lecture.
Last year, we were very honoured to have professor found Dapper Hami on the first lecture in this series.
And today, we are very pleased to welcome Professor Unassessed Ciampi,
who's going to talk about Iran and the Arab uprisings opportunity drost squandered.
Professor Shamis, I'm sure well known to everyone that he has had a long and distinct distinguished academic career.
Is his plaudits are too numerous to mention in detail.
But just to give you a sense of things,
I noticed Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University is the The Hammer,
the Silver Chair in International Relations and director of the Sheikh Nasser
Muhammad Cinnabar Programme in Internationalist in International Relations,
Regional Politics and Security. He is director of the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at Durham.
And he acts as co-director of the HRC funded Open World Initiative entitled Proff Language Dynamics Reshaping Community.
It was time to term University 13 of internationalisation. It was the founding head of the School of Government and International Affairs.
He's been a fellow of the World Economic Forum and served as a member of the WEF performance body,
the Global Agenda Council 2010 2012 Focussing on energy.
He was vice president and chair of the Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies.
Is ready to make a book series on the Middle East and is a member of the editorial board of Seven International
Channels is published widely on international relations of the Middle East and on the Islamic Republic of Iran.
He has a very long record of publication, 90 articles in journals and many books.
His most recent book is How China is Changing the Middle East.
And in 2017, Iran Stuck in Transition. I think this is an extremely time that is going to give to us.
It's a subject which is often the subject of much misunderstanding, both a scholarly misunderstanding and also misunderstanding in the wider media.
And I'm extremely pleased to pass the lecture over to him.
Professor Shah. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Stephanie, for your kind words.
And can I thank you, Professor Rogan.
The Middle East centre, of course, in Tampa is college for giving me the honour of delivering this year's annual lecture.
But I have to say, you've set the bar so high. This was our home.
Starting this year is back in 2019. I can only disappoint or at least set the bar lower for the mere mortals who will follow events in future.
And this, as you say, is a vexed subject of enquiry and some might say 10 years on a go getter life.
The ever rising sun moved on. I would like to make the case that actually they haven't.
And we will. We will ignore them at our peril.
And let me just set my argument out on that from before moving forward to a more detailed discussion and commentary on Iran itself.
So the uprisings, their causes as well as the consequences are still an ongoing concern.
The region's economic conditions have hardly improved.
Poverty, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, wealth disparity, lack of opportunity,
environmental vandalism are all continuing to haunt the vast majority of people of the region.
And all of these problems have magnified as a consequence of the pandemic.
The pandemic has not only crushed national economies, but the countries have been compounded.
The crisis have been compounded by soft oil prices,
and I would argue it will take another decade or more for them to get back to where they were before the uprising started back in 2010.
So we are looking at a very grim prospect for the region.
And the uprisings, as they were, have not gone the way we have Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, just in recent memory, igniting in protest as well.
And also, the only lesson that the regional states seems to have learnt from the uprisings is to become more masculine,
to become more assertive and to become more resilient, to become the fierce states that the Lakers,
the AUV, had set out in his seminal work on the Arab state.
If anything, they are more fierce today than they were at the outset of the uprisings.
What all this means, therefore, is that the causes, the uprisings remain unresolved and the call for change on unanswered.
In practise, that means that there is pent up anger and frustration right across the region.
And if you scratch. That frustration is barely under the skin.
It is only skin deep. So the region is still set for major upheaval going forward.
My second general point relates to the conditions of the region.
I see them in our region as an exposed and fragmented subsystem of the international system.
But unlike others, it is penetrated by both outside powers and also irresponsible non-state actors who run riot across the region here.
What happens in one country can and indeed does affect the well-being of the other countries.
This reality, of course, is underpinned by some theoretical arguments which relates to notions of a regional
security complex that Barry Mouzon and Ali Weaver developed way back in 2003.
But the crucial point to take away from their are similar work is that actually that they are
all part of a major international system enmeshed in a global web of security and dependencies.
But crucially, as I'm putting them here and as most political and militarily threats travel more easily over short distances,
insecurities often associated with proximity. It is that proximity that I'll return to at the end of my lecture.
Let's now turn to the other subject.
And that is what I've put in my abstract, that is that Iran was arguably the most affected consequentially by the uprisings.
Some may find that unusual. But let me just put my case here briefly.
I would say, as I've just argued, devastated, rather, that no country stood to gain more from the Arab uprisings in the region,
that Iran it would help Iran end its regional isolation.
It will give it a stronger foothold in the Arab region, which currently is is focussed around Syria and Hezbollah.
It would help Iran flip U.S. allies and build a cross section of Sunni Shia community of states.
But more importantly for them. Of peoples for the first time since the revolution.
Indeed, I would argue for the first time in centuries, Iran would be looking at creating this coalition of Sunni Arab peoples and states.
It will weaken Iran's enemy, Israel.
It would shift the spotlight away from Iran's own domestic problems, particularly the green movement of which we speak more.
And also in a weakened community of Arab states. It would help Iran consolidate its resistance front, which had been investing in since 1982.
These are the general thesis why Iran was the most affected by the uprisings.
But also there is broader context to what I'm saying, and the context really matters, in my view.
And it is. All also about the way in which crucial events begin to impact behaviour and end up going
to highlight this point by looking at particular dates to show the importance of systems,
processes, consequences that that context provides.
Each of these dates is a critical turning point.
And I always start with 9/11.
9/11 was where the region was essentially turned upside down and the US became much more of an intrusive power in this region.
It was followed in 2002.
Barely, barely a year later by the infamous State of the Union address of President Bush, which further affected thinking in Iran and elsewhere.
Then 2003, where Iraq was invaded, which which has had deep, deep, deep rooted consequences for the region still affecting relations, 2005.
Which one would argue was there the arrival of Iran's own neo conservatives?
And I would say in a very direct response to what was happening in the broader region and the way that was affecting Iran's domestic constituency.
For Iran in particular, the two then unseat 2006. Summer of 2006, in which Hezbollah declared war on Israel and arguably won it for the first time.
And finally, 2009, where the Zone Republic's legitimacy was questioned by millions of people on the streets for the first time since 1979.
These are not random dates. These are all part and parcel of a process of securitisation of the region.
So by night, by 2010, I would argue we were witness to a deepening of the security secularisation in the region in which all manner of of of life,
whether policies, whether attributes, whether cultural practises and habits with the traditional behaviours of Iran and
other Muslim majority countries were being scrutinised through the lens of security,
from textbooks to the foreign policy was being subjected to a critical analysis of all these guys.
Breeding terrorists to come and blow up American buildings and innocent Europeans on holiday in Indonesia and elsewhere.
This was a highly charged region. By 2010.
What this resulted in, of course, was here underlining the importance of securitisation is both in narrative and in policy.
So in this period before 2010, we became familiar with such great phrases and all those who are not with us or against us or that.
Some countries, including Iran, constitute an axis of evil or that this is a war on terror,
or that if Iran doesn't behave itself or its leader, Saddam Hussein doesn't comply, it will be subject to America's shock and awe.
These are all highly emotive securitise statements that leave the impression on the minds of leaders and peoples of the region.
But also they had very direct policy consequences. Afghanistan was invaded in the autumn of 2001, followed by Iraq in March of 2003.
Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Cuba, all these so-called adversaries were subjected to this direct sense of threat
arising from what was essentially America's new national security doctrine.
This background is important for me, standing where the 2010 2011 uprisings actually fit in the broader context of the region.
Now, let me get to Iran and the uprisings themselves.
The uprising started when Iran was grappling with three fundamental developments, some of which I've already alluded to.
But let me develop this a bit further from me, Stephanie. The first is what I've called the Islamic Republic's 1969 movement movement.
This was arguably when the power of the monarchy began to realise the growing wealth
coming from its oil exports and understood the importance of developing a grand strategy.
And that was based on the notion of building a domestic power and constituency in order
to be able to extent and project power in a more permissive regional environment.
The Islamic Republic did not have this night, is it tonight, movement moment until a short window between 2004 and 2006.
Is the name for is when Iran is confident of what we may call this year as Shia and ization of Iraq.
That for over a century, finally, Iran's brethren's, if you like, were in control of Iraq for all the messy nations of the British on the Arab forces.
Iran was now able to talk Iraq and lead leaders directly with them.
A menu of whose current elite actually came from Iran having been exiled by Saddam Hussein.
That 2004 was Iran's window strategic window onto Iraq as not just an adversary, but a close brother and friendly country.
And the other 2006, which was where Iran could claim that it's nurtured Hezbollah organisation, having been armed,
trained, and they did not related by jihad, had for the first time taken on the Israeli armed forces on the battlefield.
And for the first time, in their view, had beaten the Zionist enemy in battle.
That this was Iran's glorious moment. Very important to keep that in mind.
Iran's leaders began to dream of a greater Iran whose soft and hard power could now
be stretched from the subcontinent to the east and to the Mediterranean in the west,
what some call it, the Shia crescent, was actually much bigger geopolitically and geostrategic.
Secondly, Iran was at the same time facing the serious challenges of self identity,
of legitimacy, but also in practise stability and questions posed by the 2009 Green Movement.
That slogan. Whereas my vote was a multifaceted, multidimensional attack on the legitimacy of the legitimacy of the republic.
And that is really important where from within the system by some of its own element,
this question was raised about the authenticity of elections and the legitimacy of power in the republic.
Iran was grappling with this a year before the uprisings actually broke out.
And the third and equally important problem for Iran was the growing impact of the Obama administration's sanctions on Iran,
in which not just a GDP, but the middle class was being squeezed.
And Iran's ability to continue to provide for the downtrodden was becoming increasingly difficult.
Iran's inability to trade globally, to attract support globally was being.
Essentially questioned by this increasing what is Obama called the world's most intrusive sanctions on any one country, these three forces.
But in the background when the uprisings happened.
And it was in this context that the Rising's seemed to Tehran to be offering a godsend,
a golden geopolitical opportunity which would knock out America's Arab allies, make the region, make the same countries more vulnerable,
create space for Iran to spread its wings, to return to its non and movement,
and to actually begin to exercise what he always saw as its legitimate revolutionary right amongst the Muslim Muslim lands.
Indeed, it was Ayatollah Khomeini himself who said that events taking place in Tunisia and Egypt were, to quote him,
a natural continuation of the Iranian revolution of 1979, an Islamic awakening, a phrase that stuck in the throat a little bit later.
But I would also argue that Iran had no choice but to present the uprisings as Islamic awakening.
Had it not done so, it would have had to submit to the fact that there are other revolutionary
forces in play beyond Islam and beyond an Islam which is beyond its control.
So in a sense, Iran was imprisoned by its own logic of revolution and a narrative.
In Iran's assessment, the uprisings would decisively change the regional balance of power.
It is on Republic's favour. Assuring it of a greater influence of greater protection for itself and a much wider network
of regional friends and like minded Arab ruling regimes and elites that it had never had.
But things did not turn out as Iran had expected or indeed assumed.
And I'm going to illustrate this point by way of a number of examples. The first one.
Exhibit number one, Egypt. Egypt was the prise for everybody.
Egypt, after all, is the beating heart of the Arab world. A close U.S. ally, the first country to sign a peace treaty with Israel.
The guardian of the Camp David Accords. Mubarak.
A staunch anti Islamist president who had mobilised Egyptian and other forces against political Islam across the region.
An Islamic revolution in Egypt would be a cultural, political, ideological earthquake.
But Egyptians from Tehran's oppressive utterances totally patronising.
As I heard my Egyptian friends and colleagues saying, we're not trying to get rid of Mubarak to end up with a harmony in his place.
We are not fighting Iran's ghosts and battles. We've got our own future to make.
And that was something that was hard for Iran to accept, partly because they have not had close proximity to the region.
Isolation has actually hurt them and also hurt their neighbours.
Sure. Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi was a good thing.
But when he was in power, he did not change course come, David stayed intact.
Relations with Israel remained. America remained its its ally.
And it drew closer to Saudi Arabia than it would we would have expected from any so-called Islamist leader.
Morsi in power went further and opposed Iran's resistance front, its own axis of resistance.
And there are three short examples to illustrate this.
First is August 2012.
Soon after he was elected president in Tehran's Non-Aligned Movement meeting, significant first on objection, president had been to Iran.
He's given the red carpet treatment, welcomed as a friendly head of state, and indeed he was.
And when he gets on platform, what does he talk about?
It's essential that Saddam that Assad is removed from power, that Egypt, its people and the Arab world demand that Assad is removed from power.
It doesn't matter what he said. It matters where he said it in Tehran's corridors of power, where Iran was already the patron of the Assad regime.
The second example, February 2013, when for the first time since the revolution, an Iranian president visits Egypt.
This was President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who arrived in Egypt in February 2013.
He was greeted with red carpet and a guard of honour, as he should.
And he was thrilled to be in Egypt, the country about which he knew very little.
When he met, however, with the Mufti's, the Islamist leaders of Egypt and other political figures, they talked about sectarianism.
They talked about Iran fanning the flames of sectarianism, of being anti Sanni, of doing things in Syria that no Muslim would do.
And these were hard pills for the president of the Islamic Republic to accept.
And the third example, of course, was the resistance front in which Iran had invested so heavily since the 1980s,
had one Sunni participant and that was Hamas. Hamas from 1988 onwards.
As it lost. It's voice and support from the rest of the Arab world began to lean on Iran and
Iran found in Hamas a useful revolutionary and designers Palestinian organisation.
And unquestionably, Hamas's inclusion in the resistance front was an important coup for Iran.
But come a change of regime in Egypt. The first thing that happens is Hamas reconnects with Egypt.
They're starting. The second thing that happens is much out.
Its leader, who was based in Damascus in protest to Iran's role in suppressing the uprisings,
moves out of Syria and is given home in Qatar and open arms in Egypt.
This was a blow for Iran. This revolution, Islamic awakening in Egypt was not of the sort that Iran could make many friend friendly deals with.
The second example I move on quickly was the Arab monarchies.
This was also an opportunity for Iran to push against the monarchies, particularly in the Gulf.
Gulf Gulf Arab monarchies here, though, money and force restored order and compliance.
And the only place where there was a whiff of a revolution, and that was in Bahrain.
Iran had no choice but to sit on its hands while Saudi led GCSE force moved in,
demolished the symbols of revolution in Bahrain and ensure that Al Khalifa regime stays in power.
Iran's revolutionary ideas could travel, but not its influence beyond its borders inhibit in Libya and Yemen.
Iran had a slightly different take. Libya was too far for it to do much about.
But Gadhafi was a residual supporter.
I've grown in the past, gone Yemen. Hiver was where Iran could claim geostrategic gains.
It, of course, could support the who these who still there,
who still poking a finger in the eye of Saudi Arabia and that juicy Shulie speaking is a good thing as far as Iran is concerned.
But that has come, I would argue,
against much loss of diplomatic and political clout in the wider region and also created animosity from Russia as well.
But it is exhibit number for Syria where everything begins to unravel.
Here is where the Islamic Islamic Republic's Islamic awakening turns into an absolute nightmare.
Iran changes this narrative very quickly. No longer talking of Islamic awakening, but now referring to serious Sunni uprising.
That's what it was initially as terrorists threatening the stability of a legitimate government.
And a critical member of the resistance front, the Feris well on the march.
Supported by the Great Satan. And there were hobbies to undermine the resistance in Syria and that Iran
needed to act to protect what was a revolutionary agenda for the wider region.
It rushed to provide military, logistical and financial support.
Invited further derision and exposure in the wider region who are now sensitive to revolutionary change wrought across the Arab world.
In this exposed Iran even further to the Salafi jihadi goal of attacking this Shia menace that is undermining Sunni struggles.
Having to buttress a weakening ally.
It was one thing, but having to play second fiddle to Russia who really saved assets, chair a seat of power was something else.
Iran had shown the limitations of its ability to project power in this moment of crisis or so having to mobilise Shia militias,
Hezbollah militias from Iraq, from Afghanistan, from Pakistan and so on was also a problem.
And that merely added to this tenor of Iran, is waging a sectarian war in Syria,
making it even stronger and legitimising countries like Saudi Arabia and others to mobilise against against Iran.
Iran's whether you call it miscalculation, misreading. Certainly his intervention proved costly in man and treasure.
We don't know the exact figures.
But Iran may have may have devoted as much as 10 billion dollars money that he didn't really have to spend in keeping Assad afloat.
It has lost hundreds of its own people and thousands of the militia demobilised from elsewhere to keep Assad in power.
But it also had cost in reputation. The call of the new set of these coming forth was one that did not sit comfortably with
Iran's revolutionaries being called sectarian was not something that they had fathomed.
But most importantly of all, being called occupier of Arab lands.
A title reserved only for his right was something that really, really affected Iran's personality and self belief in his mission.
All of this meant that Iran was the inevitable target of Salafi jihadis.
What does all this mean? First, that there has been domestic blowback from Iran's hubris during the Arab Rising's we've seen in 2017 and 2018.
Mass mobilisation against corruption, poverty, lack of opportunity, lack of democracy and so on.
And the slogans link. Iran's behaviour in the region directly to the regime's legitimacy.
When they say not Syria, not Lebanon, not Gaza,
but will die for Iran is a very clear statement of discontent from vast population mobilised, but also Iran's intervention in the region,
as in many ways hardened the factional arteries in Iran and has arguably strengthened
the rise of a conservative alliance which is now in control of the parliament.
And it will be in control of the presidency come June 2008 and then 21 elections that that has.
Cleared the middle ground. The space for dialogue within Iran itself.
Iran's regional alliances remain weak and fragile.
But most importantly, they're all high maintenance. To keep its foot in Iraq, to keep control in Syria, to keep Hezbollah afloat,
to keep the fees as its thorn in the side of the Saudis come with a heavy price tag.
And Iran is having to pay out of its own pocket. And no one else's.
And also, the uprisings are going to and confrontation between Iran and Israel and a further securitise,
Iran's relations with virtually all of its Arab neighbours.
But bar Iraq and Syria.
Fear and perceived threat of rivalry and Iran's growing regional role.
In my view, was the precursor to the Abrahamic courts,
which have now changed the geopolitical dynamic so much that Iran is not increasingly
isolated country standing against Israel in ways that was not the case before the 2010s.
So finally. Where opportunity squandered.
Yes. Could things have been different?
My argument is probably not given the context and the and the arguments that I've made.
But does the future look better or more promising?
I would say, alas, not so long as Iran and also other regional countries continue to assume that they are playing into a Zero-Sum game.
Rather than a shared geopolitical game in which cooperation can you better outcomes than competition?
We're gonna go around the same circle again when the Arab masses decide to rise again for their rights.
I'll stop that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. This is extremely textured analysis of the history of the past ten or fifteen years.
I just like to ask you a couple of questions before we move to the wider audience.
And the first question really picks up, what were your your final words ended and you mentioned at the beginning of your talk.
The gains that were available to Iran as a result of the Arab uprising.
And these were considerable. And I wonder then, of course,
the Americans and the Israelis would have been equally aware of these gains that they are about pricings were opening up for Iran.
So I wonder to what extent you think that the very magnitude of the opportunity
offered to Iran dominated the politics of the region in subsequent years.
In other words, the stakes were so high that the intervention sometimes cover up, sometimes over what the Americans and the Israelis was aimed.
Primarily at limiting Iran's expansion.
And as a consequence, encouraged the darkest forces in the region to greater stability.
So we have, again, as you mentioned, some of these really very, very difficult situations in the countries where the Arab Spring was the most mocked.
So and as you said at the end, could things have been different? Probably not.
And I'm just wondering if you could expand on that a little bit and say,
what do you think you're on might have done to mitigate the difficulties that it faced,
not just in its regional relations, but in the respect of aggravating its its tensions with the U.S. and Israel?
The question really is a simple thing. But you explained how, for example, the Iranians radically misread the situation in Egypt.
And I'm just wondering, I mean, you said it because of their isolation, but it seems to me more than that in the sense that it was very obvious.
I think two to two observers that Morsi was an all ommaney.
The Muslim Brothers are not revolutionaries. They are conservative.
They were likely to form alliances with other conservative forces. But it is not difficult to understand that.
And I'm just wondering if you think the fact that the Iranians got that so spectacularly wrong is a
kind of code for a much wider misunderstanding about what's going on in these individual country.
Very insightful questions for you. Thank you. I think you're absolutely spot on.
Let me take the second one first. It's true that that actually Iran has as much clue about what's going on Egypt as Obama did in the White House.
For all for all of of talk of Islamic solidarity and so on.
Iran's Islamic revolution has been a highly isolating experience.
And the less contact Iran has had with its wider regions,
the more isolate it has been and the less it actually understands what makes these other countries tick and the absence of diplomatic relations.
But also any cultural contact.
Inevitably, Iran will fall in the same mis understanding of when masses in Tahrir Square mobilise and some shout Allo Akbar.
Does it seem a lot better that the here in the Duma prayers in Tehran?
It was not. It was not. And the fact that they reduced and I'm not using this this term, you know, this is fretfully,
but the fact that reduce what was going on in the wider region to an Islamic awakening was completely misreading.
What the Arab youth in particular, the same constituency that is resisting Tehran's normative position,
we're asking for all they had to do was tune in to Al Jazeera.
Interpret the slogans in Tahrir Square to understand this was no Islamic revolution.
And and they did misread it. And so when Morsi goes to Tehran.
They are completely taken aback. By his position that we, the Arabs, stand in support of the Syrian revolution.
Inevitably he would say that of course he would. And and that when Ahmadinejad goes to Cairo and he goes to Al-Azhar,
what they will tell him for the first time meeting the Iranian president is keep your nose out of Arab affairs.
Of course, they would say that inevitably. But it goes further than that.
Stephanie,
when are we in Doha meeting at a high level meeting of Arab Arab dignitaries that is looking to bolster the position of the Syrian national forces,
refers in a speech to Hezbollah shaitan when talking about Hezbollah?
Yeah, it's a very clear message that Iran's narrative is unwelcome.
Apart from all of its behaviour. So, yeah, absolutely.
They misread it and and and and in some ways, the only [INAUDIBLE] cockatiel tears when Morsi was deposed and.
First question. It could be interesting whether things could have been different.
I would argue that that was less of Iran's own making, but rather a victim of this,
the broader environment in which the uprisings took place, where the region was already highly charged.
And and the fact that the US had intervened in Iraq without consent and support of.
Arab Arab regimes. Arab states. Was a significant blow going to regional capitals.
One was struck by the animosity that you felt by elites against United States.
It's not that the love Saddam Hussein. They complained for three reasons.
One was, you can't just march into Arab states and remove people you don't like.
You've exposed us. To our proximity to you by our people.
And thirdly, you have opened the gates, as the Saudi said,
of Iraq to two Iranians marching in and taking over one of the most important Arab countries on the planet.
Thank you very much. Yeah. And it's true.
These were important developments. And so having having occurred in a highly securitise.
Polarised environment. In which not only Iran at home had problems, but the regional Grolier problems, including outside intervention.
There was, I don't think, much room beyond a zero sum game calculation.
And I would say, sadly, that in a sense, look at Marmar today.
What you see the regional countries do to address that problem.
They are also caught in their own bubble of insecurity rather than converging together.
They all find shelter in their own comfortable habitats.
And that was what was happening in the region in 2010. I hope that captures your questions.
Thank you. Thank you very much so much.
I'm proud to have gone to Professor Rogan, who I think has been keeping an eye on the question from the audience.
Thank you, Stephanie. Yes, the questions are already starting to come in fast and furiously.
Let me remind all viewers that if you would like to put a question,
please just go to the Q&A bar at the bottom of your screen and type your answer and we'll take all the questions we can fit.
If you would like your name to be associated with your question, type your name.
But if you'd rather be anonymous, we take anonymous questions as well.
Now, I'm going to begin with a question from Yasmin's mother who takes you back to Syria, Anoush,
and asks whether we couldn't also envisage a situation where Saudi intervention was deliberately planned to draw Iran into the civil war.
And what's your response to Iran's claims that had it not fought for Damascus, it would have faced a war in Tehran?
Iran had made it very clear at when when fires were burnt in rubber that that it would it would have to defend Assad.
I don't know how many have made it very clear before that.
In fact, I had a said in a celebrated speech that if we don't fight them in Syria, we'll have to fight them.
Kermanshah. In many ways, ironically, this is Israel's security doctrine.
Fight your battles away from your borders. One lesson at least Iranians have learnt from Israel.
And the Saudis, of course, capitalise on this because it was the first time that they could strike at the heart of the axis of resistance and flipping
Syria in the ways that Iran had perceived Egypt flipping was strategically important for Saudi Arabia because before 2010,
Saudis have invested heavily in making a friend of asset.
And they would rather now move on to a Sunni majority regime in Syria, which was also head up going back to the 1950s, if not before.
And that would have been a historic opportunity for them to do to Iran what they saw Iran do to them in Iraq.
So there is all this massive nation going on.
And in a sense, inevitably Iran intervenes. Saudi would have intervened as well.
Second question, Eugene, was. Coming up now, the second question comes from Maggie Asghari,
who wants to draw that parallel between the Arab uprisings in 2011 and Iran's Green Movement of 2009,
to what extent do you think Iran influenced the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprising?
I I wouldn't I wouldn't set out a store arguing that the green movement was a catalyst for the uprisings because, you know, looking at Egypt.
Egypt had had and we will have in future a cycle of protest and violence against
the protesters fall from bread to voting to housing to land distribution,
to public transport, to price of taxi fares, you name it.
Lebanon in 2005 had been up in arms for the Hariri assassination and Iraq had had its own mass movements at that time as well.
So the green movement was not something that triggered in faraway Tunisia.
Well, what it was, was a sense of solidarity that they felt with the Iranian people.
And beyond that, it was much more of a concern for the regime that, oh, goodness, now we are really vulnerable because the Arab masses,
the Arab youth, are marching in the way that our people did in many millions in 2009.
Well, let's stay with the theme of Iranian society here and your fun begins asking how
you've spoken a lot about the Iranian state's response to the Arab uprisings.
But could you comment on Iranian society's responses to the Arab uprisings or the view of Iranian society?
Has there been much divergence between state and society on the subject?
What an excellent question, Eugene. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. That there has been an in the in the early days when Iran intervened in Syria.
There was a degree of tolerance because it was an arms length. Iran did not have troops on the ground.
Body bags were not coming back to Iran. Iran was not celebrating the role of its generals in Syria.
Iranians were not watching militias walking across into Syria.
Fatima EWN were not being celebrated as brigades in Syria.
And also the Treasury was not being squandered. In Syria. It's when those realities began to strike.
And for all of Iran's isolation, its capitulation remains highly networked.
The regime has failed miserably to distance the Iranian population society from international networks, and the news gets to them.
There may not be allowed to have satellite television legally, but they have it illegally.
In fact, the bite from supplies of the regime themselves to make sure that it's not been taken off.
So they became aware of the cost of the Syrian war and also the security dimensions of the Syrian war.
And as such, did begin to articulate a much, much harsher position on the regime's support for Syria.
But you only see flashes of this in street protests and slogans that we hear from time to time in Iranian towns and cities.
Formerly, Iran is there to protect Syria as the linchpin of axis of resistance, which is the ultimate liberator of all Muslims,
informally is very conscious of the cost of having to carry what the Americans call lemon states and the cost of that for its own grip at home,
particularly on the sanctions. So, you know the phrase chickens come to roost, really.
They did so post Syrian civil war. Thank you.
Our next question comes from Paul, who's joining us from the University of Amsterdam.
He says that your talk reminds him of Kissinger's famous saying that is Iran a cause or a nation?
That is to say, there is no mention at all of Iran's own security considerations, usually addressed by the notion of forward defence.
Is this notion completely nonsensical? And is Iran to the 21st century still the same as the revolutionary Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini?
So kindly elaborate on that one. Yeah. Did you say pull out?
I did. Yeah. He is a troublemaker. Eugene, I told you not to let him in.
You know, he got right past me and he's on his way down to street. It is wonderful to have a question from Paul.
And it's and it's a it's a it's a very insightful comment, if I may say so.
And I think. I think. Let's get constructivists for a moment.
And I think Iran is a state and an idea, a brother.
Let me correct that. The Islamic Republic is a state and an idea and its elite chooses, which is more convenient in its arsenal at times.
It is an idea, the Islamic awakening, the notion that other more times I would add it is a state that what Iran does,
it does in the interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.
It is very clear on that. In that sense, it behaves like any other state and it uses all sorts of justifications,
all manner of justifications for its misconduct as well as its conduct.
It does have legitimate interests. Having invested in the partnership with Syria since 1979, it will not let it go without a fight.
Having kept Hezbollah. In place since 1982 and have haven't seen it in action as a very effective,
very effective revolutionary militant armed force in Lebanon, in Syria, but also against Israel.
It is part of its former defence. Absolutely. No question about it. It will keep it there as long as it can.
And Syria helps keeping it there. Iraq, being a Shia state, helps Iran keeping Iraq and Syria as part of its broader strategic arena.
It does give it forward defence and it can justify just about this within this notion of axis of resistance.
But towards the end, I alluded to the reality that actually the ground is shifting under the feet of the Islamic Republic.
The fact that Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, Sudan, Sudan, that Iran had so invested in.
In the 80s and 90s has now got relations with Israel, no matter under what conditions is not.
The question here shows that Iran's ability, not just not Kushan of control, but to even set agendas are slipping away from it.
And that would be a cause of concern. If I were sitting where Mohamed is sitting in Tehran.
Well, you're beginning to attract many old friends, the usual suspects, but I have the next question from Professor Matteo Renzi,
who's joining us from Venice, who wants to know with the likely renewal of the JCP away at the situation in Yemen being what it is.
Aren't things starting to look bleak for the Saudi grand strategy? Do you think the current Iranian government will be able to rise to the occasion
and exploit the space between the Biden administration and the Saudi government?
Tolomato. It's lovely to see you. Or rather, I'd love to have your.
Your question. Another good one, Eugene. This is the problem with you, with your crowd.
Yeah, I. I think both Iran and Saudi Arabia want the Yemen question settled.
And I think I think they are who these are now more trouble than they're worth.
For Iran and there being trouble for Saudis from the beginning. But we need we need an honest broker here.
I would like to see Omani bulls, for example, to try and de-escalate.
And they've done so before. I would very much welcome their role. I would like the Kuwaiti government to intervene in this.
What we don't want is America to intervene in this.
Given what was in on the line on the line in your question, Matel, is the tension what we perceive as tension in that Biden Saudi relations?
I think that would probably blow over in any case, given that they've got bigger fish to fry or that they'll come to some modus operandi.
But we need a region honest broker to help us through this.
Qatar is being very active on these fronts as well.
But. The fact that Potter meets with with others to find a negotiated settlement of Syria will not sit very, very kindly with the Iranians.
So there is a question mark over that one. But I think what this requires to cut a long, long,
long answer short is for the parties to recognise that it's time for them to come to the table and find a solution not in your interests,
but the interests of Yemeni people. It is a stain on the whole Muslim world to have so many innocent Yemenis dying of hunger in the 21st century.
This is a stain on all of us. But for Muslims in particular, we talk about brotherly love for each other.
Not to rush to the aid of the Yemeni people,
not to force European Sidorova to end this nonsense is of importance here, not what the United States does.
I knew she wouldn't be 20, 21 if I didn't have a couple of questions for you on the pandemic.
So let me put these two questions to you in quick succession and you could take the both of them together.
The first comes to you from our student, David Roddie, who asks,
Do you think that the state society connexion has been weakened by government failures during the pandemic?
And does that put Iran at an increased risk of uprising today than was the case in 2011?
So now hold onto that one. OK, then a second question, which is going to look specifically at China's role or influence as a result.
This comes from Andreas Burckhardt, who asks. You mentioned the effects of the pandemic on the region and growing interdependencies with this in mind.
How do you see China's influence in Iran developing postcode covered and the impact of this influence on reform movements in the country?
Thank you, Jeanne. I would like to issue myself an invitation to come back to talk at length on Andreas's question about China.
But not to disappoint. I will I will talk about that.
Let me take the first note first, which was on state society relations, both Corbitt,
that there has been a complete breakdown of trust between state and society over Kovik, not just because of the environment,
government's incompetence in managing the pandemic in Iran,
but also because of what is seen as Iran's indulgence of the pandemic at its very beginning,
where they failed to alert the population when they were going to vote in the parliamentary elections.
And they failed to let the population when they were organising the celebrations for anniversary of the revolution,
where people in their hundreds of thousands are encouraged to come out.
Weeks later, we see this spike in infections and why the rest of the world is beginning to distance itself in terms of geographical access to China.
We have long flights. Continuing between Iran and China.
And Iranian officials. Come back on a daily basis from China, on a daily basis from China.
When this is declared a pandemic. And what's more so because it's the elite travelling that take the virus in
the back pockets and go to places like home and spread it amongst the clergy.
And one of the reasons why the death rate spiked in Iran was because many of these elderly people had absolutely no defence against it.
And it spread like far like wildfire. So Iranian population society is anxious about the state's ability to.
To address the rise of the cry of the pandemic, what also is the ability to this day of having a strategy for vaccination?
For example, whose vaccine do Iranians take most vaccine?
Do they trust what happened to the two hundred thousand vaccines that came in from the West when you're.
It was not going to take any vaccine from the West. These are all kind of now existential questions for society.
So you're right. Strains in state society relations have in many ways deepened rather than than than that being shorten.
As a consequence of of the regime's response. And and because you address this question on China, part of that I've already mentioned questionably,
so long as sanctions on that are in place, Iran's relations with China will not just endure what will develop there.
This twenty five year old strategic partnership of many billions of dollars of investment in Iran is important to Iran.
Iran is important to China for strategic reasons, for energy reasons, for job, geopolitical reasons, for belt and road initiative reasons,
and also for the fact that Iran of all of its neighbours stands aside from the United
States in a global game where tensions between Beijing and Washington seem to be rising.
Thank you so much for coming to the end of our time for questions,
and I already owe our audience a huge apology because I can see another 12 questions piling in.
So inspiring has your talk been. And I've also been economical with the questions because each and every one begins by praising you.
And say how much they've enjoyed the talk and send you greetings. But the interesting questions, short and sharp.
Let me end with one more that's going to tax your great knowledge of international relations.
This comes from Alexander Brendle, who asks, What can we expect from the high level Hezbollah delegation to Russia later this month?
Can Russia maintain relations with the GCSE with Iran and Israel simultaneously?
So after bringing China into the formula a little Russia, Iran here to bring this session to a close and then over to Stephanie.
And short of that, Eugene is yes, rather,
this is the same Russia which fights the Turks in in Syria and then sits with the Turks and and negotiates a final settlement for Syria.
This is the same Russia which provides military support for Syria and sells for hundreds.
To Turkey. This is the same Russia that arms Iran, but also sells weapons to UAE.
So there is no contradiction as far as Russian foreign policy is concerned.
It's very much. I have no enemies. Who remembers that one where anyone was talking about way back in the old days approach.
And I'm an. You know, a meeting with Hezbollah leadership is in many ways a good thing as far as I'm concerned, because it's actually dialogue.
If the Russians are serious about winding up the civil war in Syria, none of that, of course, addresses Syria's deep, deep crisis.
And re-election of Assad as president is merely prolonging the pain.
We've talked about what I've talked about Yemen. Let me finish, Eugène, on another cross that secures in the pond that we're all carrying.
Who would have thought that six million Syrians would be refugees outside of their homeland?
Who would have thought that nine million Syrians would be refugees in their own country?
Syria, of all places. Place of learnt civilisation, of culture, of multiple religious.
Convergence of of. Literature of science would be reduced to rubble as it is now.
Yeah, this area needs the support of all of us,
but it should break all of our hearts to see a Syrian carrying a bucket of water across the Jordanian desert.
It should break all of our hearts. This is not the Syria. That we have known.
Thank you very much.
And just finally, to thank our nose for what was an extremely informative, if rather depressing survey of the situation over the last few years.
I think the questions have indicated how many issues have been raised and discussed.
And I think we have all found it extremely useful and enlightening.
So, once again, many thanks for taking the time and trouble to give this lecture.
We are extremely grateful and I think it's been it's been extremely useful.
Thank you so much. And thank you, Stephanie. The pleasure has been all mine.
I'm sorry I wasn't there in Oxford to enjoy your hospitality tonight, but I will take a couple of regexp for that.
It's been an absolute honour to be able to give this year's annual lecture all the very best to you and your audience.
Thank you very much. Thank you.