1 00:00:05,970 --> 00:00:10,500 Let me welcome everyone to the Friday webinar. 2 00:00:10,500 --> 00:00:21,170 This is the last webinar of term. And it's also the second annual Lachowicz Mahdi Army, a Jalani lecture. 3 00:00:21,170 --> 00:00:31,170 And I'd like to thank particularly the Russian Cultural Heritage Institute for assisting with the establishment of this annual lecture last year. 4 00:00:31,170 --> 00:00:38,100 We were very honoured to have professor found out for Hami honours the first lecture in this series. 5 00:00:38,100 --> 00:00:42,510 And today, we are very pleased to welcome our newest justice nominee, 6 00:00:42,510 --> 00:00:50,150 who's going to talk about Iran and the Arab uprising opportunity Groseclose squandered. 7 00:00:50,150 --> 00:00:58,700 Professor Shamis, I'm sure, well known to everyone that he has had a long and distinct distinguished academic career. 8 00:00:58,700 --> 00:01:05,420 His clothes are too numerous to mention in detail. But just to give you a sense of things, 9 00:01:05,420 --> 00:01:12,870 I noticed Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University is the North, 10 00:01:12,870 --> 00:01:21,890 the home of the Sabar Chair in International Relations and Director of the Sheikh Nossa Muhammad Cinnabar Programme in International Relations, 11 00:01:21,890 --> 00:01:28,670 Regional Politics and Security. He is director of the Institute for Middle East and Islamic Studies at Durham, 12 00:01:28,670 --> 00:01:38,690 and he acts as co-director of the HRC funded Open World Initiative entitled Proff Language Dynamics Reshaping Community. 13 00:01:38,690 --> 00:01:46,020 He was Durham University's first dean of internationalisation, it was the founding head of the School of Government and International Affairs. 14 00:01:46,020 --> 00:01:51,270 He's been a fellow of the World Economic Forum and served as a member of the WEF foremost body, 15 00:01:51,270 --> 00:01:57,450 the Global Agenda Council 2010 2012 focussing on energy. 16 00:01:57,450 --> 00:02:02,220 He was vice president and chair of the Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. 17 00:02:02,220 --> 00:02:09,630 He's editor to make a book series on the Middle East and is a member of the editorial board of Seven International Channels, 18 00:02:09,630 --> 00:02:15,700 is published widely on international relations of the Middle East and on the Islamic Republic of Iran. 19 00:02:15,700 --> 00:02:22,230 He has a very long record of publication, 90 articles and journals and many books. 20 00:02:22,230 --> 00:02:26,680 His most recent book is How China is Changing the Middle East. 21 00:02:26,680 --> 00:02:36,990 And in 2017, Iran Stuck in Transition. I think this is an extremely timely talk that he's going to give to us. 22 00:02:36,990 --> 00:02:45,790 It's a subject which is often the subject of much misunderstanding, both scholarly misunderstanding and also misunderstanding in the wider media. 23 00:02:45,790 --> 00:02:50,280 And I'm extremely pleased to pass the lecture over to him. Professor Shah. 24 00:02:50,280 --> 00:02:53,820 Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Stephanie, for your kind words. 25 00:02:53,820 --> 00:02:57,030 And can I. Thank you, Professor Rogan. 26 00:02:57,030 --> 00:03:03,720 The Middle East centre, of course, in Tampa is college for giving me the honour of delivering this year's annual lecture. 27 00:03:03,720 --> 00:03:07,440 But I have to say, you've set the bar so high. This was our home. 28 00:03:07,440 --> 00:03:17,310 Starting this year is back in 2019. I can only disappoint or at least set the bar lower for the mere mortals who will follow events in future. 29 00:03:17,310 --> 00:03:26,790 This, as you say, is a vexed subject of enquiry and some might say 10 years on, a go getter life of a rising star moved on. 30 00:03:26,790 --> 00:03:31,800 I would like to make the case that actually they haven't and we will ignore them at our peril. 31 00:03:31,800 --> 00:03:40,570 And let me just set my argument out on that from before moving forward to a more detailed discussion and commentary on Iran itself. 32 00:03:40,570 --> 00:03:48,340 So the uprisings, their causes as well as the consequences are still an ongoing concern. 33 00:03:48,340 --> 00:04:00,010 The region's economic conditions have hardly improved. Poverty, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, wealth disparity, lack of opportunity, 34 00:04:00,010 --> 00:04:07,030 environmental vandalism are all continuing to haunt the vast majority of people of the region. 35 00:04:07,030 --> 00:04:13,540 And all of these problems have have magnified as a consequence of the pandemic. 36 00:04:13,540 --> 00:04:19,090 The pandemic has not only crushed national economies, but the countries have been compounded. 37 00:04:19,090 --> 00:04:23,200 The crisis has been compounded by soft oil prices. 38 00:04:23,200 --> 00:04:31,360 And I would argue it will take another decade or more for them to get back to where they were before the uprising started back in 2010. 39 00:04:31,360 --> 00:04:39,610 So we are looking at a very grim prospect for the region and the uprisings, as they were, have not gone away. 40 00:04:39,610 --> 00:04:44,260 We have Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon. 41 00:04:44,260 --> 00:04:49,890 Just in recent memory, igniting in protests as well. 42 00:04:49,890 --> 00:04:57,270 And also, the only lesson that the regional states seems to have learnt from the uprisings is to become more masculine, 43 00:04:57,270 --> 00:05:03,660 to become more assertive and to become more resilient, to become the fierce states that the Lakers, 44 00:05:03,660 --> 00:05:08,310 the AUV, had set out in his seminal work on the Arab state. 45 00:05:08,310 --> 00:05:14,630 If anything, there are more fierce today than they were at the outset of the Arab uprisings. 46 00:05:14,630 --> 00:05:24,070 What all this means, therefore, is that the causes, the uprisings remain unresolved and the calls for change on unanswered. 47 00:05:24,070 --> 00:05:30,490 In practise, that means that there is pent up anger and frustration right across the region. 48 00:05:30,490 --> 00:05:35,440 And if you scratch. That frustration is barely under the skin. 49 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:42,840 It is only skin deep. So the region is still set for major upheaval going forward. 50 00:05:42,840 --> 00:05:46,890 My second general point relates to the conditions of the region. 51 00:05:46,890 --> 00:05:53,760 I see them in our region as an exposed and fragmented subsystem of the international system. 52 00:05:53,760 --> 00:06:03,970 But unlike others, it is penetrated by both outside powers and also irresponsible non-state actors who run riot across the region. 53 00:06:03,970 --> 00:06:12,010 Here, what happens in one country can and indeed does affect the well-being of the other countries. 54 00:06:12,010 --> 00:06:18,730 This reality, of course, is underpinned by some theoretical arguments which relate to notions of a regional 55 00:06:18,730 --> 00:06:24,790 security complex that Barry Buzan and Ali Weaver developed way back in 2003. 56 00:06:24,790 --> 00:06:30,880 But the crucial point to take away from their Simoneau work is that actually that they are all 57 00:06:30,880 --> 00:06:37,480 part of a major international system enmeshed in a global web of security and dependencies. 58 00:06:37,480 --> 00:06:47,760 But crucially as and I'm quoting them here, and as most political and militarily threats travel more easily over short distances. 59 00:06:47,760 --> 00:06:56,590 Insecurities often associated with proximity. It is that proximity that will return to at the end of my lecture. 60 00:06:56,590 --> 00:06:58,810 Let's now turn to the other subject. 61 00:06:58,810 --> 00:07:07,480 And that is what I've put in my abstract, that Iran was arguably the most affected consequentially by the uprisings. 62 00:07:07,480 --> 00:07:13,340 Some may find that unusual, but let me just put my case here briefly. 63 00:07:13,340 --> 00:07:21,590 I would say, as I've stated, that no country stood to gain more from the Arab uprisings in the region, that Iran. 64 00:07:21,590 --> 00:07:25,850 It would help Iran end its regional isolation. 65 00:07:25,850 --> 00:07:34,070 It will give it a stronger foothold in the Arab region, which currently is focussed around Syria and Hezbollah. 66 00:07:34,070 --> 00:07:42,080 It would help Iran flip U.S. allies and build a cross section of Sunni Shia community of states. 67 00:07:42,080 --> 00:07:47,360 But more importantly for them of peoples for the first time since the revolution. 68 00:07:47,360 --> 00:07:55,910 Indeed, I would argue for the first time in centuries, Iran would be looking at creating this coalition of Sunni Arab peoples and states. 69 00:07:55,910 --> 00:07:59,300 It will weaken Iran's enemy, Israel. 70 00:07:59,300 --> 00:08:08,330 It would shift the spotlight away from Iran's own domestic problems, particularly the green movement of which we speak more. 71 00:08:08,330 --> 00:08:20,460 And also in a weakened community of Arab states. It would help Iran consolidate its resistance front, which had been investing in since 1982. 72 00:08:20,460 --> 00:08:26,940 These are the general thesis why Iran was the most affected by the uprisings. 73 00:08:26,940 --> 00:08:32,520 But also there is broader context to what I'm saying, and the context really matters, in my view. 74 00:08:32,520 --> 00:08:41,830 And it is. All also about the way in which crucial events begin to impact behaviour. 75 00:08:41,830 --> 00:08:52,210 And I'm going to highlight this point by looking at particular dates to show the importance of systems, processes, consequences. 76 00:08:52,210 --> 00:08:57,970 That context provides each of these dates is a critical turning point. 77 00:08:57,970 --> 00:09:00,770 And I will start with 9/11. 78 00:09:00,770 --> 00:09:10,490 9/11 was where the region was essentially turned upside down and the US became much more of an intrusive power in this region. 79 00:09:10,490 --> 00:09:13,970 It was followed in 2002. 80 00:09:13,970 --> 00:09:24,110 Barely a year later by the infamous State of the Union address of President Bush, which further affected thinking in Iran and elsewhere. 81 00:09:24,110 --> 00:09:37,580 Then 2003, where Iraq was invaded, which has had deep, deep, deep rooted consequences for the region still affecting relations, 2005. 82 00:09:37,580 --> 00:09:42,950 Which one would argue was the arrival of Iran's own neoconservatives? 83 00:09:42,950 --> 00:09:52,900 And I would say in a very direct response to what was happening in the broader region and the way that was affecting Iran's domestic constituency. 84 00:09:52,900 --> 00:10:04,240 For Iran in particular, the 2006 summer of 2006 in which Hezbollah declared war on Israel and arguably won it for the first time. 85 00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:15,010 And finally, 2009, where the Zone Republic's legitimacy was questioned by millions of people on the streets for the first time since 1979. 86 00:10:15,010 --> 00:10:23,940 These are not random dates. These are all part and parcel of a process of securitisation of the region. 87 00:10:23,940 --> 00:10:34,210 So by 2010, I would argue we were witness to a deepening of secularisation in the region in which all manner of life, whether policies, 88 00:10:34,210 --> 00:10:41,140 whether attributes were cultural practises and habits with the traditional behaviours of Iran 89 00:10:41,140 --> 00:10:46,690 and other Muslim majority countries were being scrutinised through the lens of security, 90 00:10:46,690 --> 00:10:53,740 from textbooks to the foreign policy was being subjected to a critical analysis of all these guys. 91 00:10:53,740 --> 00:11:01,450 Breeding terrorists to come and blow up American buildings and innocent Europeans on holiday in Indonesia and elsewhere. 92 00:11:01,450 --> 00:11:07,160 This was a highly charged region by 2010. 93 00:11:07,160 --> 00:11:17,420 What this resulted in, of course, was here underlining the importance of securitisation is both in narrative and in policy. 94 00:11:17,420 --> 00:11:29,100 So in this period before 2010, we became familiar with so much praises and all those who are not with us or against this or that. 95 00:11:29,100 --> 00:11:37,290 Some countries, including Iran, constitute an axis of evil or that this is a war on terror, 96 00:11:37,290 --> 00:11:45,900 or that if Iraq doesn't behave itself or its leader, Saddam Hussein doesn't comply, it will be subject to America's shock and awe. 97 00:11:45,900 --> 00:11:55,500 These are all highly emotive securitise statements that leave the impression on the minds of leaders and peoples of the region. 98 00:11:55,500 --> 00:12:06,540 But also they had very direct policy consequences. Afghanistan was invaded in the autumn of 2001, followed by Iraq in March of 2003. 99 00:12:06,540 --> 00:12:14,490 Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Cuba, all these so-called adversaries were subjected to this direct sense of threat 100 00:12:14,490 --> 00:12:20,370 arising from what was essentially America's new national security doctrine. 101 00:12:20,370 --> 00:12:31,140 This background is important for me, standing where the 2010 2011 uprisings actually fit in the broader context of the region. 102 00:12:31,140 --> 00:12:35,940 Now, let me get to Iran and the uprisings themselves. 103 00:12:35,940 --> 00:12:42,480 The uprising started when Iran was grappling with three fundamental developments, some of which I've already alluded to. 104 00:12:42,480 --> 00:12:51,480 But let me develop this a bit further from a definite. The first is what I've called the Islamic Republic's 1969 movement movement. 105 00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:56,790 This was arguably when the power of the monarchy began to realise the growing wealth 106 00:12:56,790 --> 00:13:03,680 coming from its oil exports and understood the importance of developing a grand strategy. 107 00:13:03,680 --> 00:13:08,970 And that was based on the notion of building a domestic power and constituency in order 108 00:13:08,970 --> 00:13:15,340 to be able to extent and project power in a more permissive regional environment. 109 00:13:15,340 --> 00:13:25,880 The Islamic Republic did not have this night, is it tonight moment until a short window between 2004 and 2006. 110 00:13:25,880 --> 00:13:34,800 Is the need for is when Iran is confident of what we may call this Shia and ization of Iraq. 111 00:13:34,800 --> 00:13:40,700 That for over a century, finally, Iran's brethren's, if you like, 112 00:13:40,700 --> 00:13:45,970 were in control of Iraq for all the mission nations of the British and the Arab forces. 113 00:13:45,970 --> 00:13:51,940 Iran was now able to talk Iraqi leaders directly with them and many of whose 114 00:13:51,940 --> 00:13:56,920 current elite actually came from Iran having been exiled by Saddam Hussein. 115 00:13:56,920 --> 00:14:07,540 That 2004 was Iran's window strategic window onto Iraq as not just an adversary, but a close brother and friendly country. 116 00:14:07,540 --> 00:14:16,570 And the other 2006, which was where Iran could claim that it's nurtured Hezbollah organisation, having been armed, 117 00:14:16,570 --> 00:14:25,240 trained and not rated by jihad, had for the first time taken on the Israeli armed forces on the battlefield. 118 00:14:25,240 --> 00:14:33,670 And for the first time, in their view, had beaten the Zionist enemy in battle, that this was Iran's glorious moment. 119 00:14:33,670 --> 00:14:43,240 Very important to keep that in mind. Iran's leaders began to dream of a greater Iran whose soft and hard power could now 120 00:14:43,240 --> 00:14:49,450 be stretched from the subcontinent to the east and to the Mediterranean in the west. 121 00:14:49,450 --> 00:14:55,930 What some call it, the Shia crescent was actually much bigger geopolitically and geostrategic. 122 00:14:55,930 --> 00:15:04,180 Secondly, we're almost at the same time facing the serious challenges of self identity, of legitimacy. 123 00:15:04,180 --> 00:15:13,090 What also in practise, stability and acquiescence. Posed by the 2009 Green Movement. 124 00:15:13,090 --> 00:15:21,460 The slogan, whereas my vote was a multifaceted, multidimensional attack on the legitimacy of the republic. 125 00:15:21,460 --> 00:15:27,700 And that is really important. Where from within the system by some of its own elite members. 126 00:15:27,700 --> 00:15:36,440 Question was raised about the authenticity of elections and the legitimacy of power in the republic. 127 00:15:36,440 --> 00:15:41,180 Iran was grappling with this a year before the uprisings actually broke out. 128 00:15:41,180 --> 00:15:52,370 And the third and equally important problem for Iran was the growing impact of the Obama administration's sanctions on Iran, 129 00:15:52,370 --> 00:15:56,930 in which not just a GDP, but the middle class was being squeezed. 130 00:15:56,930 --> 00:16:03,920 And Iran's ability to continue to provide for the downtrodden was becoming increasingly difficult. 131 00:16:03,920 --> 00:16:12,140 Iran's inability to trade globally to attract support globally was being essentially questioned 132 00:16:12,140 --> 00:16:18,980 by this increasing what Obama called the world's most intrusive sanctions on any one country. 133 00:16:18,980 --> 00:16:24,060 These three forces were in the background when the uprisings happened. 134 00:16:24,060 --> 00:16:30,820 And it was in this context that the Rising's seemed to Tehran to be offering a godsend, 135 00:16:30,820 --> 00:16:40,840 a golden geopolitical opportunity which would knock out America's Arab allies, make the region, make the same countries more vulnerable, 136 00:16:40,840 --> 00:16:43,930 create space for Iran to spread its wings, 137 00:16:43,930 --> 00:16:55,600 to return to its 969 movement and to actually begin to exercise what he always saw as its legitimate revolutionary right amongst the Muslim lands. 138 00:16:55,600 --> 00:17:03,430 Indeed, it was Ayatollah Khamenei himself who said that events taking place in Tunisia and Egypt were, to quote him, 139 00:17:03,430 --> 00:17:15,000 a natural continuation of the Iranian revolution of 1979, an Islamic awakening, a phrase that stuck in the throat a little bit later. 140 00:17:15,000 --> 00:17:22,800 But I would also argue that Iran had no choice but to present the uprisings as Islamic awakening. 141 00:17:22,800 --> 00:17:24,360 Had it not done so, 142 00:17:24,360 --> 00:17:31,860 it would affect to submit to the fact that there are other revolutionary forces in place beyond Islam and beyond an Islam which is beyond its control. 143 00:17:31,860 --> 00:17:39,300 So in a sense, Iran was imprisoned by its own logic of revolution and narrative. 144 00:17:39,300 --> 00:17:44,770 In Iran's assessment, the uprisings decisively change the regional balance of power. 145 00:17:44,770 --> 00:17:53,780 It is on Republic's favour. Assuring it of a greater influence of greater protection for itself and a much wider network 146 00:17:53,780 --> 00:18:00,660 of regional friends and like minded Arab ruling regimes and elites that it had never had. 147 00:18:00,660 --> 00:18:05,460 But things did not turn out as Iran had expected or indeed assumed. 148 00:18:05,460 --> 00:18:09,750 And I'm going to illustrate this point by way of a number of examples. The first one. 149 00:18:09,750 --> 00:18:15,510 Exhibit number one. Egypt. Egypt was the prise for everybody. 150 00:18:15,510 --> 00:18:23,010 Egypt, after all, is the beating heart of the Arab world. A close U.S. ally, the first country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. 151 00:18:23,010 --> 00:18:27,520 The guardian of the Camp David Accords. Mubarak. 152 00:18:27,520 --> 00:18:36,300 A staunch anti Islamist president who had mobilised Egyptian and other forces against political Islam across the region. 153 00:18:36,300 --> 00:18:44,180 An Islamic revolution in Egypt would be a cultural, political, ideological earthquake. 154 00:18:44,180 --> 00:18:49,310 But Egyptians found Tehran's utterances totally patronising. 155 00:18:49,310 --> 00:18:55,970 As I heard my Egyptian friends and colleagues saying, we're not trying to get rid of Mubarak to end up with a harmony in his place. 156 00:18:55,970 --> 00:19:01,130 We are not fighting Iran's ghosts and battles. We've got our own future to make. 157 00:19:01,130 --> 00:19:10,340 And that was something that was hard for Iranians to accept, partly because they have not had close proximity to the region. 158 00:19:10,340 --> 00:19:15,570 Isolation has actually hurt them and also hurt their neighbours. 159 00:19:15,570 --> 00:19:20,840 Sure. Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed Morsi was a good thing. 160 00:19:20,840 --> 00:19:26,890 But when he was in power, he did not change course come, David stayed intact. 161 00:19:26,890 --> 00:19:31,600 Relations with Israel remained. America remained its ally. 162 00:19:31,600 --> 00:19:40,560 And it drew closer to Saudi Arabia than it would we would have expected from any so-called Islamist leader. 163 00:19:40,560 --> 00:19:48,770 Morsi in power went further and opposed Iran's resistance front, its own axis of resistance. 164 00:19:48,770 --> 00:19:52,890 And there are three short examples to illustrate this. 165 00:19:52,890 --> 00:20:02,370 First is August 2012. Soon after he was elected president into Iran's Non-Aligned Movement meeting. 166 00:20:02,370 --> 00:20:06,660 Significant first on objection, president had been to Iran. 167 00:20:06,660 --> 00:20:13,360 He's given the red carpet treatment welcomed as a friendly head of state and indeed he was. 168 00:20:13,360 --> 00:20:17,250 And when he gets on platform, what does he talk about? 169 00:20:17,250 --> 00:20:26,730 Essential that Assad is removed from power, that Egypt, its people and the Arab world demand that Assad is removed from power. 170 00:20:26,730 --> 00:20:36,670 It doesn't matter what he said. It matters where he said it in Tehran's corridors of power, where Iran was already the patron of the Assad regime. 171 00:20:36,670 --> 00:20:45,040 The second example, February 2013, when for the first time since the revolution in Iran and president visits to Egypt, 172 00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:51,070 this was President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who arrived in Egypt in February 2013. 173 00:20:51,070 --> 00:20:55,390 He was greeted with red carpet and a guard of honour, as he should. 174 00:20:55,390 --> 00:21:00,890 And he was thrilled to be in Egypt, the country about which he knew very little. 175 00:21:00,890 --> 00:21:10,520 When he met, however, with the Mufti's, the Islamist leaders of Egypt and other political figures, they talked about sectarianism. 176 00:21:10,520 --> 00:21:19,640 They talked about Iran fanning the flames of sectarianism, of being anti Sanni, of doing things in Syria that no Muslim would do. 177 00:21:19,640 --> 00:21:25,720 And these were hard pills for the president of the Islamic Republic to accept. 178 00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:33,300 And the third example, of course, was the resistance front in which Iran had invested so heavily since the 1980s, 179 00:21:33,300 --> 00:21:36,830 had one Sunni participant and that was Hamas. 180 00:21:36,830 --> 00:21:44,510 Hamas, from 1988 onwards, as it lost its voice and support from the rest of the Arab world, began to lean on Iran. 181 00:21:44,510 --> 00:21:51,440 And Iran found in Hamas a useful revolutionary and designers Palestinian organisation. 182 00:21:51,440 --> 00:21:58,130 And unquestionably, Hamas's inclusion in the Resistance Front was an important coup for Iran. 183 00:21:58,130 --> 00:22:07,190 But come a change of regime in Egypt. The first thing that happens is Hamas reconnects with Egypt. 184 00:22:07,190 --> 00:22:17,120 The second thing that happens is much out. Its leader, who was based in Damascus in protest to Iran's role in suppressing the uprisings, 185 00:22:17,120 --> 00:22:22,790 moves out of Syria and is given home in Qatar and open arms. 186 00:22:22,790 --> 00:22:34,940 In Egypt. This was a blow for Iran, this revolution, Islamic awakening in Egypt was not of the sort that Iran could make many friendly deals with. 187 00:22:34,940 --> 00:22:40,320 The second example I move on quickly was the Arab monarchies. 188 00:22:40,320 --> 00:22:47,460 This was also an opportunity for Iran to push against the monarchies, particularly in the Gulf Arab monarchies. 189 00:22:47,460 --> 00:22:57,030 Here, though, money and force restored order and compliance and the only place where there was a whiff of a revolution, and that was in Bahrain, 190 00:22:57,030 --> 00:23:03,590 Iran had no choice but to sit on its hands while a Saudi led GCSE force moved in, 191 00:23:03,590 --> 00:23:09,090 demolished the symbols of revolution in Bahrain and ensure that Al Khalifa regime stays in power. 192 00:23:09,090 --> 00:23:15,260 Iran's revolutionary ideas could travel, but not its influence beyond its borders. 193 00:23:15,260 --> 00:23:20,070 In the debate in Libya and Yemen, Iran had a slightly different take. 194 00:23:20,070 --> 00:23:29,670 Libya was too far for it to do much about. But Gadhafi was a residual supporter are grown in the past, gone Yemen. 195 00:23:29,670 --> 00:23:35,370 Hiver was where Iran could claim geostrategic gains. 196 00:23:35,370 --> 00:23:40,740 It, of course, could support the thieves who's still there, who still poking your finger in the eye of Saudi Arabia. 197 00:23:40,740 --> 00:23:45,300 And that Jurisich, she's speaking, is a good thing as far as Iran is concerned. 198 00:23:45,300 --> 00:23:47,430 But that has come, I would argue, 199 00:23:47,430 --> 00:23:58,830 against much loss of diplomatic and political clout in the wider region and also greater animosity from Russia as well. 200 00:23:58,830 --> 00:24:04,950 But it is exhibit number for Syria where everything begins to unravel. 201 00:24:04,950 --> 00:24:12,610 Here is where the Islamic Republic's Islamic awakening turns into an absolute nightmare. 202 00:24:12,610 --> 00:24:21,940 Iran changes this narrative very quickly. No longer talking of Islamic awakening, but now referring to serious Sunni uprising. 203 00:24:21,940 --> 00:24:29,710 That's what it was initially as terrorists threatening the stability of a legitimate government. 204 00:24:29,710 --> 00:24:34,840 And a critical member of the resistance front, the Feris, were on the march. 205 00:24:34,840 --> 00:24:42,280 Supported by the Great Satan. And they were hobbies to undermine the resistance in Syria and that Iran needed 206 00:24:42,280 --> 00:24:48,030 to act to protect what was a revolutionary agenda for the wider region. 207 00:24:48,030 --> 00:24:52,830 It's rush to provide military, logistical and financial support. 208 00:24:52,830 --> 00:25:03,240 Invited further derision and exposure in the wider region who are now sensitive to revolutionary change wrought across the Arab world. 209 00:25:03,240 --> 00:25:15,370 And this exposed Iran even further to the Salafi jihadi goal of attacking this Shia menace that is undermining Sunni struggles. 210 00:25:15,370 --> 00:25:18,930 Having to buttress a weakening ally. 211 00:25:18,930 --> 00:25:27,120 Was one thing, but having to play second fiddle to Russia, who really saved Assad's seat of power, was something else. 212 00:25:27,120 --> 00:25:34,070 Iran had shown the limitations of its ability to project power in this moment of crisis. 213 00:25:34,070 --> 00:25:45,600 So having to mobilise Shia militias, Hezbollah militias from Iraq, from Afghanistan, from Pakistan and so on was also a problem. 214 00:25:45,600 --> 00:25:53,430 And that merely added to this tenor of Iran, is waging a sectarian war in Syria, 215 00:25:53,430 --> 00:26:01,370 making it even stronger and legitimising countries like Saudi Arabia and others to mobilise against Iran. 216 00:26:01,370 --> 00:26:10,370 Iran's. Whether you call it miscalculation, misreading certainly is intervention proved costly in man and treasure. 217 00:26:10,370 --> 00:26:13,010 We don't know the exact figures, 218 00:26:13,010 --> 00:26:21,950 but Iran may have devoted as much as 10 billion dollars money that he didn't really have to spend in keeping Assad afloat. 219 00:26:21,950 --> 00:26:30,530 It has lost hundreds of its own people and thousands of the militia demobilised from elsewhere to keep Assad in power. 220 00:26:30,530 --> 00:26:40,810 But it also had cost it in reputation. The call of the new SATs coming Borth was one that did not sit comfortably with Iran's 221 00:26:40,810 --> 00:26:46,360 revolutionaries being called sectarian was not something that they had fathomed. 222 00:26:46,360 --> 00:26:53,450 But most importantly of all, being called occupier of Arab lands. 223 00:26:53,450 --> 00:27:05,130 A title reserved only for his writing was something that really, really affected Iran's personality and self belief in its mission. 224 00:27:05,130 --> 00:27:11,520 All of this meant that Iran was the inevitable target of Salafi jihadi. 225 00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:23,670 What does all this mean? First, that there has been domestic blowback from Iran's hubris during the Arab Rising's we've seen in 2017 and 2018. 226 00:27:23,670 --> 00:27:30,810 Mass mobilisation against corruption, poverty, lack of opportunity, lack of democracy and so on. 227 00:27:30,810 --> 00:27:42,250 And the slogans link. Iran's behaviour in the region directly to the regime's legitimacy when they say not Syria, not Lebanon, 228 00:27:42,250 --> 00:27:51,580 not Gaza, but will die for Iran, is a very clear statement of discontent from vast population mobilised, 229 00:27:51,580 --> 00:28:00,010 but also Iran's intervention in the region, as in many ways hardened the factional arteries in Iran and has arguably strengthened 230 00:28:00,010 --> 00:28:05,650 the rise of a conservative alliance which is now in control of the parliament. 231 00:28:05,650 --> 00:28:10,120 And it will be in control of the presidency come June 2024 elections. 232 00:28:10,120 --> 00:28:14,240 That has. Cleared the middle ground. 233 00:28:14,240 --> 00:28:22,700 This space for dialogue within Iran itself. Iran's regional alliances remain weak and fragile. 234 00:28:22,700 --> 00:28:33,330 But most importantly, they're all high maintenance. To keep its foot in Iraq, to keep control in Syria, to keep Hezbollah afloat, 235 00:28:33,330 --> 00:28:39,390 to keep the Ruthie's as its thorn in the side of the Saudis come with a heavy price tag. 236 00:28:39,390 --> 00:28:44,700 And Iran is having to pay out of its own pocket. And no one else's. 237 00:28:44,700 --> 00:28:51,920 And also, the uprisings are growing sharp and confrontation between Iran and Israel and a further securitise, 238 00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:55,820 Iran's relations with virtually all of its Arab neighbours. 239 00:28:55,820 --> 00:29:08,710 But bar Iraq and Syria. Fear and perceived threat of rivalry and Iran's growing regional role. 240 00:29:08,710 --> 00:29:13,270 In my view, was the precursor to the Abrahamic codes, 241 00:29:13,270 --> 00:29:18,340 which have now changed the geopolitical dynamic so much that Iran is not increasingly 242 00:29:18,340 --> 00:29:26,130 isolated country standing against Israel in ways that was not the case before the 2010. 243 00:29:26,130 --> 00:29:30,600 So finally. Where opportunities squandered. 244 00:29:30,600 --> 00:29:34,540 Yes. Could things have been different? 245 00:29:34,540 --> 00:29:39,640 My argument is probably not given the context and the arguments that I've made. 246 00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:43,450 But does the future look better or more promising? 247 00:29:43,450 --> 00:29:53,810 I would say, alas, not so long as Iran and also other regional countries continue to assume that they are playing into a Zero-Sum game. 248 00:29:53,810 --> 00:30:00,860 Rather than a shared geopolitical game in which cooperation can yield better outcomes than competition. 249 00:30:00,860 --> 00:30:06,410 We're gonna go round the same circle again when the Arab masses decide to rise again for their rights. 250 00:30:06,410 --> 00:30:10,740 I'll stop that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. 251 00:30:10,740 --> 00:30:17,880 This is extremely textured analysis of the history of the past 10 or 15 years. 252 00:30:17,880 --> 00:30:24,040 I just like to ask you a couple of questions before we move to the wider audience. 253 00:30:24,040 --> 00:30:30,870 The first question really picks up where your final was ended. 254 00:30:30,870 --> 00:30:40,110 And you mentioned that the beginning of your talk, the gains that were available to Enron as a result of the Arab uprising. 255 00:30:40,110 --> 00:30:45,620 And these were considerable. And I wonder then, of course, 256 00:30:45,620 --> 00:30:54,080 the Americans and the Israelis would have been equally aware of these games that they are about uprisings were opening up for Iran. 257 00:30:54,080 --> 00:30:59,840 So I wonder to what extent you think that the very magnitude of the opportunity 258 00:30:59,840 --> 00:31:07,070 offered to Iran dominated the politics of the region in subsequent years. 259 00:31:07,070 --> 00:31:17,630 In other words, the stakes was so high that the intervention sometimes cover up, sometimes over of the Americans and the Israelis was aimed. 260 00:31:17,630 --> 00:31:29,840 Primarily at limiting Iran's expansion. And as a consequence, encouraged the darkest forces in the region to greater stability. 261 00:31:29,840 --> 00:31:41,310 So we have again, you mentioned some of these really very, very difficult situations in the countries where the Arab Spring was the most smocked. 262 00:31:41,310 --> 00:31:48,320 And you said at the end, could things have been different? Probably not. And I'm just wondering if you could expand on that a little bit and say, 263 00:31:48,320 --> 00:31:53,600 what do you think your on might have done to mitigate the difficulties that it faced, 264 00:31:53,600 --> 00:32:04,970 not just in its regional relations, but in the respect of aggravating its its tensions with the U.S. and Israel? 265 00:32:04,970 --> 00:32:14,500 The question really is a of thing. But you explained how, for example, the Iranians radically misread the situation in Egypt. 266 00:32:14,500 --> 00:32:22,920 I'm just wondering, I mean, you said it's because of their isolation, but it seems to me more than that in the sense that it was a very obvious. 267 00:32:22,920 --> 00:32:30,090 I think to observers that Morsi was not mainly the Muslim Brothers are not revolutionaries. 268 00:32:30,090 --> 00:32:35,630 They are conservative. They were likely to form alliances with other conservative forces. 269 00:32:35,630 --> 00:32:42,660 It isn't difficult to understand that. And I'm just wondering if you think the fact that the Iranians got that so spectacularly wrong is a 270 00:32:42,660 --> 00:32:50,710 kind of code for a much wider misunderstanding about what's going on in these individual country. 271 00:32:50,710 --> 00:32:54,400 Very insightful questions for you. Thank you. I think you're absolutely spot on. 272 00:32:54,400 --> 00:33:01,660 Let me take the second one first. It's true that actually Iran has as much clue about what's going on in Egypt as 273 00:33:01,660 --> 00:33:08,170 Obama did in the White House for all of talk of Islamic solidarity and so on. 274 00:33:08,170 --> 00:33:13,570 Iran's Islamic revolution has been a highly isolating experience. 275 00:33:13,570 --> 00:33:19,030 And the less contact Iran has had with its wider regions, 276 00:33:19,030 --> 00:33:27,850 the more isolate it has been and the less it actually understands what makes these other countries tick and the absence of diplomatic relations. 277 00:33:27,850 --> 00:33:31,030 But also any cultural contact. 278 00:33:31,030 --> 00:33:41,880 Inevitably, Iran would fall in the same mis understanding of when masses in Tahrir Square mobilise and some shout Allo Akbar! 279 00:33:41,880 --> 00:33:45,880 Does it seem a lot but that they're here in the Gitomer prayers in Tehran? 280 00:33:45,880 --> 00:33:55,600 It was not. It was not. And the fact that they then reduced and I'm not using this term, you know, this is restfully, 281 00:33:55,600 --> 00:34:03,890 but the fact that reduce what was going on in the wider region to an Islamic awakening was completely misreading. 282 00:34:03,890 --> 00:34:14,050 What the Arab youth in particular, the same constituency that is resisting Tehran's normative position, 283 00:34:14,050 --> 00:34:20,410 we're asking for all they had to do was tune in to Al Jazeera. 284 00:34:20,410 --> 00:34:28,150 Interpret the slogans in Tahrir Square to understand this was no Islamic revolution, and they did misread it. 285 00:34:28,150 --> 00:34:40,980 And so when Morsi goes to Tehran. They are completely taken aback by his position that we, the Arabs, stand in support of the Syrian revolution. 286 00:34:40,980 --> 00:34:48,480 Inevitably, he would say that of course he would. And that when Ahmadinejad goes to Cairo and he goes to Al-Azhar, 287 00:34:48,480 --> 00:34:56,550 what they will tell him for the first time meeting that Iranian president is keep your nose out of Arab affairs. 288 00:34:56,550 --> 00:35:01,680 Of course, they would say that inevitably. But it goes further than that. 289 00:35:01,680 --> 00:35:02,730 Stephanie, 290 00:35:02,730 --> 00:35:17,280 when are we in Doha meeting at a high level meeting of Arab dignitaries that is looking to bolster the position of the Syrian national forces, 291 00:35:17,280 --> 00:35:22,960 refers in his speech to Hezbollah? Sheikh Don, we're talking about Hezbollah. 292 00:35:22,960 --> 00:35:31,220 Yeah, it's a very clear message that Iran's narrative is welcome. 293 00:35:31,220 --> 00:35:35,450 Apart from all of its behaviour. So, yeah, absolutely. 294 00:35:35,450 --> 00:35:46,420 They misread it. And in some ways, the only shed crocodile tears when Morsi was deposed. 295 00:35:46,420 --> 00:35:50,010 Equally interesting whether things could have been different. 296 00:35:50,010 --> 00:35:56,600 I would argue that that was less of Iran's own making, but rather a victim of this, 297 00:35:56,600 --> 00:36:03,720 the broader environment in which the uprisings took place, where the region was already highly charged. 298 00:36:03,720 --> 00:36:13,080 And the fact that the US had intervened in Iraq without consent and support of Arab regimes, 299 00:36:13,080 --> 00:36:19,020 Arab states was a significant blow going to regional capitals. 300 00:36:19,020 --> 00:36:25,520 One was struck by the animosity that you felt by elites against United States. 301 00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:31,090 It's not that they love Saddam Hussein. They complained for three reasons. 302 00:36:31,090 --> 00:36:38,830 One was, you can't just march into Arab states and remove people you don't like. 303 00:36:38,830 --> 00:36:45,040 You've exposed us. To our proximity to you by our people. 304 00:36:45,040 --> 00:36:49,510 And thirdly, you have opened the gates, as the Saudis said, 305 00:36:49,510 --> 00:36:57,040 of Iraq to Iran is marching in and taking over one of the most important Arab countries on the planet. 306 00:36:57,040 --> 00:37:01,840 Thank you very much. And it's true. These were important developments. 307 00:37:01,840 --> 00:37:09,750 And so having occurred in a highly securitise. Polarised environment. 308 00:37:09,750 --> 00:37:16,680 In which not only Iran at home had problems with the regional rollout problems, including outside intervention. 309 00:37:16,680 --> 00:37:22,110 There was, I don't think, much room beyond a zero sum game calculation. 310 00:37:22,110 --> 00:37:28,570 And I would say, sadly, that in a sense, look at Myanmar today. 311 00:37:28,570 --> 00:37:32,770 What you see the regional countries do to address that problem. 312 00:37:32,770 --> 00:37:40,090 They are also caught in their own bubble of insecurity rather than converging together. 313 00:37:40,090 --> 00:37:45,370 They all find shelter in their own comfortable habitats. 314 00:37:45,370 --> 00:37:51,610 And that was what was happening in the region in 2010. I hope that captures your questions. 315 00:37:51,610 --> 00:38:00,580 Thank you. Thank you very much. Some pants may I'll hand over to Professor Rogan, who I think has been keeping an eye on the question. 316 00:38:00,580 --> 00:38:05,350 Thank you, Stephanie. Yes. The questions are already starting to come in fast and furiously. 317 00:38:05,350 --> 00:38:08,950 Let me remind all viewers that if you would like to put a question, 318 00:38:08,950 --> 00:38:15,280 please just go to the Q and A bar at the bottom of your screen and take your answer and we'll take all the questions we can fit. 319 00:38:15,280 --> 00:38:19,300 If you would like your name to be associated with your question, type your name. 320 00:38:19,300 --> 00:38:22,780 But if you'd rather be anonymous, we take anonymous questions as well. 321 00:38:22,780 --> 00:38:29,710 Now, I'm going to begin with a question from Yasmin's mother who takes you back to Syria, Anoush, 322 00:38:29,710 --> 00:38:39,230 and asks whether we couldn't also envisage a situation where Saudi intervention was deliberately planned to draw Iran into the civil war. 323 00:38:39,230 --> 00:38:47,660 And what's your response to Iran's claims that had it not fought for Damascus, it would have faced a war in Tehran? 324 00:38:47,660 --> 00:38:55,950 Iran have made it very clear when fires were burnt in rubber that it would it would have to defend Assad. 325 00:38:55,950 --> 00:38:58,410 I don't know how many have made it very clear before that. 326 00:38:58,410 --> 00:39:04,450 In fact, he said in a celebrated speech that if we don't fight them in Syria, we'll have to fight them. 327 00:39:04,450 --> 00:39:11,410 We can match up. In many ways, ironically, this is Israel's security doctrine. 328 00:39:11,410 --> 00:39:17,930 Fight your battles away from your borders. One lesson at least Iranians have learnt from. 329 00:39:17,930 --> 00:39:29,110 The Saudis, of course, capitalise on this because it was the first time that they could strike at the heart of the axis of resistance and flipping 330 00:39:29,110 --> 00:39:38,830 Syria in the way that Iran had perceived Egypt flipping was strategically important for Saudi Arabia because before 2010, 331 00:39:38,830 --> 00:39:43,720 Saudis have invested heavily in making a friend of asset. 332 00:39:43,720 --> 00:39:51,160 And they would rather now move on to a Sunni majority regime in Syria, which was also unheard of. 333 00:39:51,160 --> 00:39:55,030 Going back to the 1950s, if not before. 334 00:39:55,030 --> 00:40:01,300 And that would have been historic opportunity for them to do to Iran what they saw Iran did to them in Iraq. 335 00:40:01,300 --> 00:40:05,110 So there is all this massive nation going on. 336 00:40:05,110 --> 00:40:11,750 And in a sense, inevitably Iran intervenes. Saudi would have intervened as well. 337 00:40:11,750 --> 00:40:23,680 The second question comes from Mehdi Asghari, who wants to draw that parallel between the Arab uprisings in 2011 and Iran's green movement of 2009. 338 00:40:23,680 --> 00:40:30,160 To what extent do you think Iran influenced the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprising? 339 00:40:30,160 --> 00:40:40,630 I I wouldn't I wouldn't set out a store arguing that the green movement was a catalyst for the uprisings because, you know, looking at Egypt. 340 00:40:40,630 --> 00:40:48,100 Egypt had had and we will have in future a cycle of protest and violence against 341 00:40:48,100 --> 00:40:55,720 the protesters for from bread to voting to housing to land distribution, 342 00:40:55,720 --> 00:41:00,730 to public transport, to price of taxi fares, you name it. 343 00:41:00,730 --> 00:41:09,530 Lebanon in 2005 had been up in arms for the Hariri assassination. 344 00:41:09,530 --> 00:41:14,720 Iraq had had its own mass movements at that time as well. 345 00:41:14,720 --> 00:41:21,980 So the green movement was not something that triggered in faraway Tunisia. 346 00:41:21,980 --> 00:41:27,500 Well, what it was, was a sense of solidarity that they felt with the Iranian people. 347 00:41:27,500 --> 00:41:36,170 Beyond that, it was much more of a concern for the regime that, oh, goodness, now we are really vulnerable because the Arab masses, 348 00:41:36,170 --> 00:41:41,180 the Arab youth, are marching in the way that our people did in many millions. 349 00:41:41,180 --> 00:41:49,060 2009. Well, let's stay with the theme of Iranian society here and your fun begins asking how 350 00:41:49,060 --> 00:41:53,020 you've spoken a lot about the Iranian state's response to the Arab uprisings. 351 00:41:53,020 --> 00:41:59,680 But could you comment on Iranian society's responses to the Arab uprisings or the view of Iranian society? 352 00:41:59,680 --> 00:42:04,900 Has there been much divergence between state and society on the subject? 353 00:42:04,900 --> 00:42:08,400 What an excellent question, Eugene. Absolutely. Absolutely. 354 00:42:08,400 --> 00:42:18,310 That there has been in the early days when Iran intervened in Syria, there was a degree of tolerance because it was an arms length. 355 00:42:18,310 --> 00:42:23,470 Iran did not have troops on the ground. Body bags were not coming back to Iran. 356 00:42:23,470 --> 00:42:28,030 Iran was not celebrating the role of its generals in Syria. 357 00:42:28,030 --> 00:42:32,800 Iranians were not watching militias walking across into Syria. 358 00:42:32,800 --> 00:42:37,780 Fatima Yune were not being celebrated as brigades in Syria. 359 00:42:37,780 --> 00:42:45,810 And also the Treasury was not being squandered in Syria. It's when those realities began to strike. 360 00:42:45,810 --> 00:42:52,060 And for all of Iran's isolation, its capitulation remains highly networked. 361 00:42:52,060 --> 00:43:02,530 The regime has failed miserably to distance the Iranian population society from international networks, and the news gets to them. 362 00:43:02,530 --> 00:43:07,690 They may not be allowed to have satellite television legally, but they have it illegally. 363 00:43:07,690 --> 00:43:14,080 In fact, the buy from supplies of the regime themselves to make sure that it's not been taken off. 364 00:43:14,080 --> 00:43:25,360 So they became aware of the cost of the Syrian war and also the security dimensions of the Syrian war. 365 00:43:25,360 --> 00:43:33,190 And as such, did begin to articulate a much, much harsher position on the regime's support for Syria. 366 00:43:33,190 --> 00:43:42,750 But you only see flashes of this in street protests and slogans that we hear from time to time in Iranian towns and cities. 367 00:43:42,750 --> 00:43:53,110 Formerly, Iran is there to protect Syria as the linchpin of axis of resistance, which is the ultimate liberator of all Muslims, 368 00:43:53,110 --> 00:44:06,130 informally is very conscious of the cost of having to carry what the Americans call lemon states and the cost of that for its own grip at home, 369 00:44:06,130 --> 00:44:16,510 particularly on the sanctions. So, you know, the phrase chickens come to roost really did so post Syrian civil war. 370 00:44:16,510 --> 00:44:22,830 Thank you. Our next question comes from Paul, who's joining us from the University of Amsterdam. 371 00:44:22,830 --> 00:44:30,450 He says that your talk reminds him of Kissinger's famous saying that is Iran a cause or a nation? 372 00:44:30,450 --> 00:44:39,030 That is to say, there is no mention at all of Iran's own security considerations, usually addressed by the notion of forward defence. 373 00:44:39,030 --> 00:44:48,620 Is this notion completely nonsensical? And is Iran to the 21st century still the same as the revolutionary Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini? 374 00:44:48,620 --> 00:44:53,480 So can you elaborate on that one? Yeah. Did you say pull out? 375 00:44:53,480 --> 00:44:57,500 I did. Yeah. He is a troublemaker. Eugene, I told you not to let him in. 376 00:44:57,500 --> 00:45:00,900 You know, he got right past me and he's on his way down to St. 377 00:45:00,900 --> 00:45:07,690 It is wonderful to have a question from Paul. And it is a very insightful comment, if I may say so. 378 00:45:07,690 --> 00:45:13,780 Let's get constructivists for a moment. And I think Iran is a state and an idea, a brother. 379 00:45:13,780 --> 00:45:18,750 Let me correct that. The Islamic Republic is a state and an idea. 380 00:45:18,750 --> 00:45:24,960 And its elite chooses, which is more convenient in its arsenal at times. 381 00:45:24,960 --> 00:45:37,020 It's an idea, the Islamic awakening, the notion and the other more times I would add it is a state that what Iran does, 382 00:45:37,020 --> 00:45:41,730 it does in the interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran itself. 383 00:45:41,730 --> 00:45:49,740 It is very clear on that. In that sense, it behaves like any other state and it uses all sorts of justifications, 384 00:45:49,740 --> 00:45:55,590 all manner of justifications for its misconduct as well as its conduct. 385 00:45:55,590 --> 00:46:05,720 It does have legitimate interests. Having invested in the partnership with Syria since 1979, it will not let it go without a fight. 386 00:46:05,720 --> 00:46:14,510 Having kept Hezbollah. In place since 1982 and haven't seen it in action as it's very effective, 387 00:46:14,510 --> 00:46:24,140 very effective revolutionary militant armed force in Lebanon, in Syria, but also against Israel. 388 00:46:24,140 --> 00:46:30,500 It is part of its forward defence. Absolutely. No question about it. It will keep it there as long as it can. 389 00:46:30,500 --> 00:46:41,300 And Syria helps keeping it there. Iraq, being a Shia state, helps Iran keeping Iraq and Syria as part of its broader strategic arena. 390 00:46:41,300 --> 00:46:49,310 It does give it forward defence and it can justify just about this within this notion of axis of resistance. 391 00:46:49,310 --> 00:46:58,580 But towards the end, I alluded to the reality that actually the ground is shifting under the feet of the Islamic Republic. 392 00:46:58,580 --> 00:47:03,350 The fact that Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, Sudan, Sudan, 393 00:47:03,350 --> 00:47:10,880 that Iran has so invested in the 80s and 90s has now got relations with Israel, no matter under what conditions is not. 394 00:47:10,880 --> 00:47:22,640 The question here shows that Iran's ability, not just not Kushan of control, but to even set agendas are slipping away from it. 395 00:47:22,640 --> 00:47:29,370 And that would be a cause of concern. If I was sitting where I was Al-Hammadi sitting in Tehran. 396 00:47:29,370 --> 00:47:33,650 Well, you're beginning to attract many old friends and usual suspects. 397 00:47:33,650 --> 00:47:39,110 But I have the next question from Professor Matteo Renzi, who's joining us from Venice, 398 00:47:39,110 --> 00:47:45,170 who wants to know with the likely renewal of the JCP highway and the situation in Yemen being what it is. 399 00:47:45,170 --> 00:47:53,990 Aren't things starting to look bleak for the Saudi grand strategy? Do you think the current Iranian government will be able to rise to the occasion 400 00:47:53,990 --> 00:47:59,080 and exploit the space between the Biden administration and the Saudi government? 401 00:47:59,080 --> 00:48:03,670 Tolomato, it's lovely to see you. Or rather, I'd love to have your question. 402 00:48:03,670 --> 00:48:14,590 Another good one, Eugene. The problem with you crowd. Yeah, I, I think both Iran and Saudi Arabia want the Yemen question settled. 403 00:48:14,590 --> 00:48:18,460 I think the Houthis are now more trouble than they're worth. For Iran. 404 00:48:18,460 --> 00:48:23,440 And there's been trouble for Saudis from the beginning. But we need an honest broker here. 405 00:48:23,440 --> 00:48:27,900 I would like to see Omani bulls, for example, to try and de-escalate. 406 00:48:27,900 --> 00:48:35,020 They've done so before. Very much welcome the role. I would like the Kuwaiti government to intervene in this. 407 00:48:35,020 --> 00:48:42,910 What we don't want is America to intervene in this. Given what was underlined in your question, Matou, is the tension. 408 00:48:42,910 --> 00:48:48,280 What we perceive as tension in the Biden Saudi relations? 409 00:48:48,280 --> 00:48:55,690 I think that we probably blow over in any case, given that they've got bigger fish to fry or that they'll come to some modus operandi. 410 00:48:55,690 --> 00:48:59,470 But we need a region honest broker to help us through this. 411 00:48:59,470 --> 00:49:03,400 Qatar is being very active on these fronts as well. 412 00:49:03,400 --> 00:49:12,670 But. The fact that they have meets with others to find a negotiated settlement of Syria will not sit very, very kindly with the Iranians. 413 00:49:12,670 --> 00:49:18,370 So there is a question mark over that one. But I think what this requires to cut a long, 414 00:49:18,370 --> 00:49:27,100 long answer short is for the parties to recognise that it's time for them to come to the table and find a solution not to draw interest, 415 00:49:27,100 --> 00:49:41,530 but the interest of Yemeni people. It is a stain on the whole Muslim world to have so many innocent Yemenis dying of hunger in the 21st century. 416 00:49:41,530 --> 00:49:48,640 This is a stain on all of us. But for Muslims in particular, we talk about brotherly love for each other. 417 00:49:48,640 --> 00:49:54,490 Not to rush to the aid of the Yemeni people, not to force Iran and Saudi Arabia to end. 418 00:49:54,490 --> 00:50:01,400 This nonsense is of importance here, not what the United States does. 419 00:50:01,400 --> 00:50:05,930 I knew she wouldn't be 20, 21 if I didn't have a couple of questions for you on the pandemic. 420 00:50:05,930 --> 00:50:10,970 So let me put these two questions to you in quick succession and you could take the both of them together. 421 00:50:10,970 --> 00:50:14,450 The first comes to you from our student, David Roddie, who asks, 422 00:50:14,450 --> 00:50:20,810 Do you think that the state society connexion has been weakened by government failures during the pandemic? 423 00:50:20,810 --> 00:50:27,650 And does that put Iran at an increased risk of uprising today than was the case in 2011? 424 00:50:27,650 --> 00:50:36,860 So now hold onto that one. OK, then a second question, which is going to look specifically at China's role or influence as a result. 425 00:50:36,860 --> 00:50:45,350 This comes from Andreas Burckhardt, who asks. You mentioned the effects of the pandemic on the region and growing interdependencies with this in mind. 426 00:50:45,350 --> 00:50:54,100 How do you see China's influence in Iran developing post Cauvin and the impact of this influence on reform movements in the country? 427 00:50:54,100 --> 00:51:02,560 Thank you, Jeanne. I would like to issue myself an invitation to come back to talk at length on Andreas's question about China. 428 00:51:02,560 --> 00:51:09,460 But not to disappoint. We'll talk about that. Let me take the first one first, which was on state society relations postcode. 429 00:51:09,460 --> 00:51:18,220 There has been a complete breakdown of trust between state and society over Kovik, not just because of their own incompetence, 430 00:51:18,220 --> 00:51:28,270 incompetence in managing the pandemic in Iran, but also because of what is seen as Iran's indulgence of the pandemic at its very beginning, 431 00:51:28,270 --> 00:51:37,420 where they failed to alert the population when they were going to vote in the parliamentary elections and they 432 00:51:37,420 --> 00:51:45,410 failed to alert the population when they were organising the celebrations for anniversary of the revolution, 433 00:51:45,410 --> 00:51:49,580 with people in the hundreds of thousands are encouraged to come out. 434 00:51:49,580 --> 00:52:01,310 Weeks later, we see this spike in infections and why the rest of the world is beginning to distance itself in terms of geographical access to China. 435 00:52:01,310 --> 00:52:10,120 We have long flights. Continuing between Iran and China and Iranian officials. 436 00:52:10,120 --> 00:52:14,180 Come back on a daily basis from China, on a daily basis from China. 437 00:52:14,180 --> 00:52:22,250 When this is declared a pandemic. And what's more so because it's the elite travelling that take the virus in 438 00:52:22,250 --> 00:52:27,440 the back pockets and go to places like own and spread it amongst the clergy. 439 00:52:27,440 --> 00:52:36,800 And one of the reasons why the death rate spike in Iran was because many of these elderly people had absolutely no defence against it. 440 00:52:36,800 --> 00:52:47,840 And it spread like wildfire. So Iranian population society is anxious about the state's ability to address the rise of the cry of the pandemic. 441 00:52:47,840 --> 00:52:57,590 What also is the ability to this day of having a strategy for vaccination, for example, whose vaccine the Iranians take was vaccine. 442 00:52:57,590 --> 00:53:03,230 Do they trust what happened to the 200000 vaccines that came in from the West? 443 00:53:03,230 --> 00:53:11,180 When you're that it was not going to take any vaccine from the West. These are all kind of now existential questions for society. 444 00:53:11,180 --> 00:53:13,220 So you're right. 445 00:53:13,220 --> 00:53:23,540 Strains in state society relations have in many ways deepened rather than being shortened as a consequence of of the regime's response. 446 00:53:23,540 --> 00:53:31,280 And because you address this question on China, part of that I've already mentioned, unquestionably, 447 00:53:31,280 --> 00:53:39,230 so long as sanctions on they are in place, Iran's relations with China will not just endure but will develop. 448 00:53:39,230 --> 00:53:49,260 They are this 25 year old strategic partnership of many billions of dollars of investment in Iran is important to Iran. 449 00:53:49,260 --> 00:53:57,780 Iran is important to China for strategic reasons, for energy reasons, for geopolitical reasons, for belt and road initiative reasons, 450 00:53:57,780 --> 00:54:04,350 and also for the fact that Iran of all of its neighbours stands aside from the United 451 00:54:04,350 --> 00:54:12,090 States in a global game where tensions between Beijing and Washington seem to be rising. 452 00:54:12,090 --> 00:54:15,870 Thank you so much for coming to the end of our time for questions, 453 00:54:15,870 --> 00:54:22,500 and I already owe our audience a huge apology because I can see another 12 questions piling in. 454 00:54:22,500 --> 00:54:32,220 So inspiring. Has your talked in? And I've also been economical with the questions because each and every one begins by praising you. 455 00:54:32,220 --> 00:54:38,130 And say how much they've enjoyed the talk and send you greetings. But the interesting questions, short and sharp. 456 00:54:38,130 --> 00:54:42,850 Let me end with one more that's going to tax your great knowledge of international relations. 457 00:54:42,850 --> 00:54:50,160 This comes from Alexander Brendle, who asks, What can we expect from the high level Hezbollah delegation to Russia later this month? 458 00:54:50,160 --> 00:54:55,620 Can Russia maintain relations with the GCSE with Iran and Israel simultaneously? 459 00:54:55,620 --> 00:55:02,850 So after bringing China into the formula a little Russia, Iran here to bring the session to a close and then over to Stephanie. 460 00:55:02,850 --> 00:55:05,010 Short of that, Eugene is yes. 461 00:55:05,010 --> 00:55:15,990 This is the same Russia which fights the Turks in Syria and then sits with the Turks and negotiates a final settlement for Syria. 462 00:55:15,990 --> 00:55:23,430 This is the same Russia which provides military support for Syria and sells for hundreds. 463 00:55:23,430 --> 00:55:32,460 To Turkey. This is the same Russia that arms Iran, but also sells weapons to UAE. 464 00:55:32,460 --> 00:55:38,480 So there is no contradiction as far as Russian policy is concerned. It's very much. 465 00:55:38,480 --> 00:55:45,830 I have no enemies. Who remembers that one where anyone was talking about way back in the old days approach? 466 00:55:45,830 --> 00:55:53,990 And, you know, a meeting with Hezbollah leadership is in many ways a good thing as far as I'm concerned, because it's actually dialogue. 467 00:55:53,990 --> 00:56:04,370 If the Russians are serious about winding up the civil war in Syria, none of that, of course, addresses Syria's deep, deep crisis. 468 00:56:04,370 --> 00:56:10,290 And re-election of Assad as president is merely prolonging the pain. 469 00:56:10,290 --> 00:56:21,060 We've talked about what I've talked about Yemen. Let me finish, Eugene, on another cross that excuse the pun that we're all carrying. 470 00:56:21,060 --> 00:56:28,770 Who would have thought that six million Syrians would be refugees outside of their homeland? 471 00:56:28,770 --> 00:56:34,950 Who would have thought that nine million Syrians would be refugees in their own country? 472 00:56:34,950 --> 00:56:46,590 Syria, of all places. Place of learnt civilisation, of culture, of multiple religious. 473 00:56:46,590 --> 00:56:56,450 Convergence of literature of science would be reduced to rubble as it is now. 474 00:56:56,450 --> 00:57:01,590 Yeah, this area needs the support of all of us, 475 00:57:01,590 --> 00:57:10,410 but it should break all of our hearts to see a Syrian carrying a bucket full of water across the Jordanian desert. 476 00:57:10,410 --> 00:57:18,930 It should break all of our hearts. This is not the Syria that we have known. 477 00:57:18,930 --> 00:57:21,280 Thank you. 478 00:57:21,280 --> 00:57:31,050 Just finally, to thank our news for what was an extremely informative, if rather depressing survey of the situation over the last few years. 479 00:57:31,050 --> 00:57:36,880 Well, I think the questions have indicated how many issues have been raised and discussed. 480 00:57:36,880 --> 00:57:41,030 And I think we have all found it extremely useful and enlightening. 481 00:57:41,030 --> 00:57:46,120 So, once again, many thanks for taking the time and trouble to give this lecture. 482 00:57:46,120 --> 00:57:50,530 We are extremely grateful and I think it's been dreaming as well. Thank you so much. 483 00:57:50,530 --> 00:57:55,190 And thank you, Stephanie. The pleasure has been all mine. 484 00:57:55,190 --> 00:58:01,610 I'm sorry I wasn't there in Oxford to enjoy your hospitality tonight, but I will take a couple of rain cheques for that. 485 00:58:01,610 --> 00:58:08,300 It's been an absolute honour to be able to give this year's annual lecture on the very best, you and your audience. 486 00:58:08,300 --> 00:58:21,836 Thank you very much. Thank you.