1 00:00:00,300 --> 00:00:13,530 All right. I'm here to talk about building peace in Georgia, international organisations and conflict resolution in Southwest there. 2 00:00:13,530 --> 00:00:23,820 And has the I realised in looking at the programme that probably building peace in Georgia should have been in inverted commas. 3 00:00:23,820 --> 00:00:37,380 But we are given recent events, the, if you will, the institutional background to this kind of analysis is pretty simple. 4 00:00:37,380 --> 00:00:46,320 If you look at where international organisations are involved in security came from and you take a long perspective, 5 00:00:46,320 --> 00:00:51,570 basically there have been various moments, particularly in 20th century, 6 00:00:51,570 --> 00:01:01,260 where people states took the view that international organisations were one means of solving the, 7 00:01:01,260 --> 00:01:08,970 if you will, the collective action problem of war and therefore producing peace. 8 00:01:08,970 --> 00:01:20,310 Now, in thinking about the role of these organisations, regional and universal, in building peace through at least two ways of approaching the topic. 9 00:01:20,310 --> 00:01:25,260 One is to look at it institutionally and productively. 10 00:01:25,260 --> 00:01:33,630 You take a look at the roles, the organisation, the practises, the politics of international institutions. 11 00:01:33,630 --> 00:01:38,640 You generate hypotheses which we love to do in political science. 12 00:01:38,640 --> 00:01:44,670 And then you apply them to cases in the sort of top to bottom approach. 13 00:01:44,670 --> 00:01:53,790 Or you can take a case and see what that case might tell us about the performance and the promise of multilateral institutions. 14 00:01:53,790 --> 00:01:58,620 In other words, bottom up, I have to say I prefer the second. 15 00:01:58,620 --> 00:02:06,870 My case is Georgia. I've been working on Georgia with great pleasure and a fair amount of pain over the years. 16 00:02:06,870 --> 00:02:11,910 For about 20 years, I want to do four things. 17 00:02:11,910 --> 00:02:18,450 One is first, I guess I should ask, how many in this audience have ever been to Georgia? 18 00:02:18,450 --> 00:02:29,310 Oh, thank you. One. All right. With apologies to my friend, I will give a brief introduction on the characteristics of Georgia. 19 00:02:29,310 --> 00:02:38,590 Secondly, a background to account of conflicts. Third, an account of the roles of international organisations in the effort to build peace. 20 00:02:38,590 --> 00:02:44,070 And fourth, what lessons we might draw. Now, my account. 21 00:02:44,070 --> 00:02:50,030 I'm sorry to say, may sound rather harsh. 22 00:02:50,030 --> 00:03:00,810 I think it's reasonably accurate, but I don't mean to give offence to the huge number of people whom I have known over the 23 00:03:00,810 --> 00:03:07,170 years involved in the activities of these organisations who were making a genuinely, 24 00:03:07,170 --> 00:03:17,700 genuinely genuine effort to address the real problems of this country and its people. 25 00:03:17,700 --> 00:03:23,590 So context first. Georgia is, as you know, a successor republic to the Soviet Union. 26 00:03:23,590 --> 00:03:31,010 So a weak state, its elites and structures had no experience of sovereignty or independent decision making. 27 00:03:31,010 --> 00:03:46,290 The society has for the last 6000 years or so been fragmented along multiple communal lines, which we now call ethnic lines. 28 00:03:46,290 --> 00:03:54,060 In 1989, the last Soviet census, 70 percent of the population was ethnically Georgian. 29 00:03:54,060 --> 00:04:01,080 What that means is not entirely clear because there is substantial, fragmented identities amongst the Georgians themselves. 30 00:04:01,080 --> 00:04:08,970 In addition, eight percent Armenian, six percent Armenian, six percent, Russian three percent or set and one percent abhors. 31 00:04:08,970 --> 00:04:20,010 So I guess that's a demonstration of the proposition that small groups can create big issues. 32 00:04:20,010 --> 00:04:25,800 These multiple communal identities were strengthened in the Soviet era quite 33 00:04:25,800 --> 00:04:33,810 deliberately by the Soviet authorities who who encouraged the development of, 34 00:04:33,810 --> 00:04:34,260 if you will, 35 00:04:34,260 --> 00:04:45,750 diverse identity and institutionalised it through structured constitutional structures of autonomy in the Georgian case in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 36 00:04:45,750 --> 00:04:51,240 And Jarda, retrospectively, 37 00:04:51,240 --> 00:05:00,060 I think one can conclude that this was sort of semi-conscious effort to set minority and majority elites against each other union. 38 00:05:00,060 --> 00:05:11,810 Republics, in order to be able to rule more effectively by dividing these institutional and cultural artefacts, 39 00:05:11,810 --> 00:05:20,270 were built into a long history of deep grievance between Abkhaz or Setton Georgian populations. 40 00:05:20,270 --> 00:05:27,860 The second characteristic is the proximity to a large state, Russia, that had its own deep historical role in the region. 41 00:05:27,860 --> 00:05:36,620 And I guess, as we saw in August 2008, is not really interested in giving up that role. 42 00:05:36,620 --> 00:05:45,050 A state which evinces an aspiration to primacy throughout what used to be the former Soviet Union minus the Baltics. 43 00:05:45,050 --> 00:05:49,640 We hope the economy reasonably poor. 44 00:05:49,640 --> 00:05:52,970 It had been highly integrated into the larger Soviet economy. 45 00:05:52,970 --> 00:06:02,330 When the Soviet Union collapsed, those markets collapsed, leading to a massive economic crisis that lasted for about nine years. 46 00:06:02,330 --> 00:06:09,620 So conflict in Georgia one. Well, there there are basically three dimensions to this issue. 47 00:06:09,620 --> 00:06:15,610 One is South Ossetia. This mini conflict erupted in 1990. 48 00:06:15,610 --> 00:06:29,780 The first time in Georgia at the time was headed for independence under a an extremist majoritarianism nationalist elected government, 49 00:06:29,780 --> 00:06:40,580 a government which questioned the legitimacy of the presence of these minorities in Georgia, notably the offsets. 50 00:06:40,580 --> 00:06:51,020 This was a government that was unhappy with the inherited structure of local autonomy, is in this many regions inherited from Soviet times. 51 00:06:51,020 --> 00:07:00,950 So not surprisingly, minority elites in these regions were somewhat insecure about their future in a united Georgia South Ossetia in 1990. 52 00:07:00,950 --> 00:07:09,830 Its prints Soviet then voted to leave Georgia and join NATO, which is across the border in the Russian Federation. 53 00:07:09,830 --> 00:07:15,470 The Georgian government responded by annulling self-assessed. Is that is that autonomy? 54 00:07:15,470 --> 00:07:23,780 And that basically rolled forward into a two year conflict until June of 1992 with several hundred deaths. 55 00:07:23,780 --> 00:07:31,670 The displacement of 60 to 100000 people in June of nineteen ninety two, 56 00:07:31,670 --> 00:07:37,760 there was a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities mediated by the president of Russia. 57 00:07:37,760 --> 00:07:50,420 And that cease fire was policed. Between 1990 to and 2008 by a mixed ad hoc peacekeeping force comprising Russians, Georgians and assets. 58 00:07:50,420 --> 00:07:57,260 The second element of conflict in Georgia was an intra Georgian conflict. 59 00:07:57,260 --> 00:08:03,800 As South Ossetia deteriorated, as the economy declined, state gradually collapsed. 60 00:08:03,800 --> 00:08:08,300 The opposition to the sitting government grew a little bit impatient. 61 00:08:08,300 --> 00:08:15,980 The Georgian National Guard revolted against it, marched off from South Ossetia to Tbilisi, the capital city, 62 00:08:15,980 --> 00:08:28,880 proceeded to shell the centre of Tbilisi to the ground and managed to achieve the departure of the elected president in January 1992. 63 00:08:28,880 --> 00:08:37,250 He went off first to Chechnya and then to Armenia, and his supporters fomented a rebellion in western Georgia. 64 00:08:37,250 --> 00:08:53,540 Earlier in the spring of 1992, Georgian forces shifted their attention to western Georgia in a number of punitive expeditions. 65 00:08:53,540 --> 00:09:02,360 The rebels took sanctuary in a positive. This gave Georgian forces a reason to go after Abkhazia. 66 00:09:02,360 --> 00:09:10,080 The ALP has also gave the Georgians a reason they declared sovereignty in August of 1992. 67 00:09:10,080 --> 00:09:15,500 Sounds there are two good reasons to go after the other. Has the Georgians attacked in August? 68 00:09:15,500 --> 00:09:28,220 Took So Sukhumi, the uproars government fled north, coming back with the support of substantial numbers of Russian volunteers in the spring of 1993. 69 00:09:28,220 --> 00:09:37,460 Georgian military collapsed. It was a chaotic retreat back into Georgian held territory, 70 00:09:37,460 --> 00:09:46,550 and the rebellion in western Georgia then began again, and the Georgian state consequently neared collapse. 71 00:09:46,550 --> 00:09:59,870 Georgia requested Russian intervention. Russia intervened and stopped the Upper House conflict and suppressed the single Western Georgian rebellion. 72 00:09:59,870 --> 00:10:00,430 Sequences. 73 00:10:00,430 --> 00:10:09,770 Two hundred and fifty thousand refugees into western and central Georgia and also into the Russian Federation, several thousand more deaths. 74 00:10:09,770 --> 00:10:20,600 Russia mediated that ceasefire to in April 1994, creating a security zone between the two territories and installing a peacekeeping 75 00:10:20,600 --> 00:10:25,760 force nominally under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 76 00:10:25,760 --> 00:10:30,380 Actually, Russia, so, so much for the conflicts. 77 00:10:30,380 --> 00:10:35,450 From 1994 to 2008, they were basically frozen. 78 00:10:35,450 --> 00:10:42,980 There was the sustained effort to resolve them and to reconcile the populations that these regions were stymied. 79 00:10:42,980 --> 00:10:47,960 For reasons I'm happy to get into a discussion, but not now. 80 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:54,560 Low level security incidents persisted along the lines of contact in South Ossetia. 81 00:10:54,560 --> 00:11:03,380 There was a small partisan war of Georgians against the Abkhaz cause there in the late 1990s. 82 00:11:03,380 --> 00:11:12,350 Both said that Abkhaz authorities harassed Georgian civilians in areas under the control of secessionist authorities. 83 00:11:12,350 --> 00:11:19,370 It was sort of a low level mess, which lasted a very long time and was really rather resistant to, 84 00:11:19,370 --> 00:11:28,340 if you will, international organisational treatment. They returned to war in some of those that year in August 2008, 85 00:11:28,340 --> 00:11:39,530 producing a decisive defeat of the Georgian military and effectively its destruction, this time by the Russians and the Georgian military. 86 00:11:39,530 --> 00:11:50,240 And the Georgian ethnic population was expelled from South Ossetia by Russian forces, who then consolidated a buffer around South Ossetia. 87 00:11:50,240 --> 00:11:59,330 The Abkhaz took advantage of this to clear the last areas of up Huslia under Georgian control. 88 00:11:59,330 --> 00:12:02,840 That overall effect was another hundred and one hundred. 89 00:12:02,840 --> 00:12:06,080 Two hundred and twenty thousand displaced. 90 00:12:06,080 --> 00:12:14,480 A cease fire, an eventual withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian territory back into these two enclaves. 91 00:12:14,480 --> 00:12:19,760 The insertion of an EU monitoring force to monitor the cease fire. 92 00:12:19,760 --> 00:12:24,920 Abkhazia and South Ossetia reiterated their claim to statehood. 93 00:12:24,920 --> 00:12:38,030 That claim was then recognised by the Russian Federation and also by Nicaragua, for reasons that are not immediately clear to me. 94 00:12:38,030 --> 00:12:45,800 Anyway, there we are. The EU installed a monitoring force, having mediated the cease fire, and here we are. 95 00:12:45,800 --> 00:12:57,800 In summary, Georgia presents a, if you will, a garden variety of post-Cold War conflict interest state in its origins and in its nature. 96 00:12:57,800 --> 00:13:04,070 It involves multiple ethnic groups and their elites competing for position and conditions 97 00:13:04,070 --> 00:13:10,580 of weak and ineffectual state structures and in deteriorating economic situation. 98 00:13:10,580 --> 00:13:16,070 In addition, it evinces a disproportionate interest on the part of a neighbouring major state, 99 00:13:16,070 --> 00:13:21,650 creating a sustained pattern of intervention in a larger sense still. 100 00:13:21,650 --> 00:13:27,260 The Georgian conflicts have been met by widespread indifference on the part of the rest of us, 101 00:13:27,260 --> 00:13:32,540 so there's no real capacity to balance the effect of the neighbouring power. 102 00:13:32,540 --> 00:13:34,530 One last point in summary and then I'll get on. 103 00:13:34,530 --> 00:13:41,840 You'll be pleased to know where two international organisations may give them the benefit of ten more minutes. 104 00:13:41,840 --> 00:13:46,610 I think six things are good. 105 00:13:46,610 --> 00:13:53,510 I think one thing that is interesting in a sort of general sense from this experience is it indicates the perils of implementation, 106 00:13:53,510 --> 00:14:01,790 principle of national self-determination. National self-determination is, of course, a good thing, I suppose. 107 00:14:01,790 --> 00:14:11,930 But every time it is implemented through statehood, you risk generating several follow on claims for the same right. 108 00:14:11,930 --> 00:14:17,000 And that is clearly what happened in Georgia. The roles of international organisations. 109 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:28,290 I will be brief. I want to get on to lessons. International organisations have been involved in the effort to regulate these issues since 1992. 110 00:14:28,290 --> 00:14:40,880 The CSC, then OSCE, took the lead in South Ossetia from December 1992 and they established a mission of long term duration in Georgia. 111 00:14:40,880 --> 00:14:48,020 One purpose of which was to observe the operations of the peacekeeping force in South Ossetia to keep a 112 00:14:48,020 --> 00:14:56,650 watching brief on the security situation in the region and to facilitate negotiations leading to a settlement. 113 00:14:56,650 --> 00:15:08,650 The UN also entered in nineteen. 92 in the establishment of, you know, Meg, the U.N. observer mission in Georgia. 114 00:15:08,650 --> 00:15:14,670 A little peacekeeping force in nineteen ninety four. 115 00:15:14,670 --> 00:15:23,380 Its mandate was changed and expanded to basically monitor the activities of the parties to the conflict, 116 00:15:23,380 --> 00:15:31,150 to observe the Russian peacekeeping force, to facilitate talks focussed on resolution. 117 00:15:31,150 --> 00:15:36,760 The E.U., the E.U. at the time these conflicts broke out. 118 00:15:36,760 --> 00:15:41,260 The EU had no foreign policy or security personality. It has developed one. 119 00:15:41,260 --> 00:15:50,590 And as it has developed one, it has become increasingly engaged, not least in Georgia, 120 00:15:50,590 --> 00:15:59,770 leading to its monitoring and mediation role in 2008 assessment. 121 00:15:59,770 --> 00:16:05,440 International organisations have been involved in these conflicts for 17 years now. 122 00:16:05,440 --> 00:16:14,020 They were incidental to the earlier cease fires, which were essentially mediated by the dominant power in the region, Russia. 123 00:16:14,020 --> 00:16:20,110 There was no real progress towards peace during the frozen period of these conflicts. 124 00:16:20,110 --> 00:16:25,960 International organisations were marginalised during the resumption of conflict during 2008. 125 00:16:25,960 --> 00:16:32,050 It's pretty bleak. It would be wrong, by the way, to say that they were completely irrelevant. 126 00:16:32,050 --> 00:16:38,500 The presence of international organisations on the ground in the field had several positive effects. 127 00:16:38,500 --> 00:16:44,050 First of all, they did facilitate negotiations when the parties were interested in negotiations. 128 00:16:44,050 --> 00:16:55,840 I'll get back to that. Second, they're monitoring presence in the zones of conflict did reduce the risk of inadvertent resumption of hostilities. 129 00:16:55,840 --> 00:17:03,040 They also contributed modestly to the protection of the human rights of civilians caught in the middle of all of this. 130 00:17:03,040 --> 00:17:11,290 And to be fair to the EU, it played a fundamentally important role in bringing the latest phase of hostilities to an end. 131 00:17:11,290 --> 00:17:16,540 What lessons do we draw from this experience? 132 00:17:16,540 --> 00:17:24,340 First of all, the autonomous role of international organisations in the pursuit of peace is distinctly limited in key respects. 133 00:17:24,340 --> 00:17:32,530 To state the obvious, they are made up of states. These states have different levels of interest in any given context. 134 00:17:32,530 --> 00:17:36,460 The interests of these states may conflict in any given context, 135 00:17:36,460 --> 00:17:45,340 and that constrains the capacity of multilateral organisations to pursue peace effectively. 136 00:17:45,340 --> 00:17:51,190 In Georgia, the impact of these organisations on peace processes was limited by one the 137 00:17:51,190 --> 00:17:57,820 low policy priority for most major members of the organisations in question, 138 00:17:57,820 --> 00:18:07,450 and that translated into an unwillingness to commit significant diplomatic and other resources to the pursuit of peace. 139 00:18:07,450 --> 00:18:13,420 There were a small number of members, notably Russia, that were really interested in what was going on. 140 00:18:13,420 --> 00:18:16,450 Who did consider Georgia a priority issue. 141 00:18:16,450 --> 00:18:26,110 But they were more interested in defending their particular state interests than in pursuing a collective strategy towards peace operations. 142 00:18:26,110 --> 00:18:32,650 The second point concerns how these institutions work. What are their decision rules? 143 00:18:32,650 --> 00:18:40,600 It is interesting that in August 2008, the Security Council did not produce a resolution on the renewal of conflict in Georgia. 144 00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:49,180 The reason for that is very simple. One veto bearing member of the Security Council didn't want it. 145 00:18:49,180 --> 00:18:53,560 So the UN is constrained in its response by the veto. 146 00:18:53,560 --> 00:18:59,110 The OSCE is constrained by a consensus rule and decision making. 147 00:18:59,110 --> 00:19:13,870 If you've got someone who is resistant to effective multilateralism as part of the supposed consensus, you don't get a consensus in the EU context. 148 00:19:13,870 --> 00:19:22,630 Foreign and security policy is a matter of national competence, not the competence of the organisation. 149 00:19:22,630 --> 00:19:31,510 So essentially, again, any effective action on the part of the EU depends significantly on consensus amongst the members. 150 00:19:31,510 --> 00:19:41,410 All three organisations therefore lead to a lowest common denominator outcome in which which which appears to me. 151 00:19:41,410 --> 00:19:55,060 This sounds awful. Awful. It's sort of appearing to be engaged and interested without really being engaged and interested. 152 00:19:55,060 --> 00:19:59,730 Thirdly, there's the matter of standard operating procedures here. 153 00:19:59,730 --> 00:20:06,870 National organisations, international organisations, and particularly the U.N., Yohann can project it later, 154 00:20:06,870 --> 00:20:13,530 tend to offer a tend to attempt to implement standard templates to rather specific situations 155 00:20:13,530 --> 00:20:19,230 to deliver standardised responses on the basis of the accumulated past experience conflicts. 156 00:20:19,230 --> 00:20:24,210 On the other hand, in this part of the world, as elsewhere, are the product of historical, 157 00:20:24,210 --> 00:20:30,150 cultural and political processes that are deep and specific to the case in question. 158 00:20:30,150 --> 00:20:38,200 And they place a premium on case knowledge, flexibility, adaptability, innovation. 159 00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:45,570 You and I don't think is known for significant achievement in any of those areas. 160 00:20:45,570 --> 00:20:51,630 Complex bureaucracies in the larger sense tend toward standard operating procedures. 161 00:20:51,630 --> 00:20:55,320 Are poorly adapted to the task of pursuing peace. 162 00:20:55,320 --> 00:21:06,150 In contrast, in my view to, for example, nongovernmental organisations which are much more flexible at the end of the day. 163 00:21:06,150 --> 00:21:13,140 And fourthly, I think another lesson you draw is that the contributions of international organisations 164 00:21:13,140 --> 00:21:19,830 to the pursuit of peace are positive when the parties to conflict want them to be. 165 00:21:19,830 --> 00:21:24,570 If there is no societal and political willingness on the part of those in conflict 166 00:21:24,570 --> 00:21:31,080 to engage seriously with the tough decisions necessary for conflict resolution, 167 00:21:31,080 --> 00:21:41,070 then the efforts of international organisations to pursue peace that are likely to be frustrated and futile. 168 00:21:41,070 --> 00:21:46,380 In our in my case, there's little evidence of success on the part of international organisations in 169 00:21:46,380 --> 00:21:54,120 shifting key players towards compromises necessary for durable peace and also little 170 00:21:54,120 --> 00:21:58,680 evidence that international organisations have been successful in shifting popular 171 00:21:58,680 --> 00:22:05,740 attitudes significantly towards recognition that compromise is necessary for peace.