1 00:00:00,720 --> 00:00:09,810 The title of the conference, the subject of the conference, is the Serious Study of Peace and what is strikingly obvious. 2 00:00:09,810 --> 00:00:19,990 In particular in the area of peace building that this area still heavily under theorised and under conceptualised. 3 00:00:19,990 --> 00:00:25,050 Why? Because it's still a relatively young subject. Why? 4 00:00:25,050 --> 00:00:31,920 Because the study of peace has somewhat shifted, speaking with Galtung from a focus on negative peace. 5 00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:41,010 So basically, absence of war two positive peace, which is far more holistic, addressing the root causes of conflict. 6 00:00:41,010 --> 00:00:49,350 So addressing this, the question of how to achieve positive peace is a far greater challenge in a 7 00:00:49,350 --> 00:00:58,230 far more complex undertaking which creates challenges in terms of governance. 8 00:00:58,230 --> 00:01:07,650 Let me tell you how actually we arrived at this topic, because in a way, 9 00:01:07,650 --> 00:01:17,550 the paper I'm talking about is an ongoing conversation I have with this gentleman sitting the far left. 10 00:01:17,550 --> 00:01:26,250 We had to kind of consultancy a few years ago where we brought the kind of background paper, 11 00:01:26,250 --> 00:01:31,650 which was part and parcel of what's called the consultation of peace in Africa was 12 00:01:31,650 --> 00:01:40,440 a kind of undertaking to support the implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan. 13 00:01:40,440 --> 00:01:44,880 So in the Africa G8 Africa implementation plan, 14 00:01:44,880 --> 00:01:51,390 there was one line or a kind of call on the international community how we can actually 15 00:01:51,390 --> 00:01:58,620 improve our collective ability to support the consolidation of peace in Africa, 16 00:01:58,620 --> 00:02:08,400 especially in countries emerging from conflict. So basically, we looked at various documents and various efforts within organisations, 17 00:02:08,400 --> 00:02:15,720 institutions and coordination and learning appeared as a kind of policy mantra, 18 00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:24,510 kind of policy prescription that seemed to be a cure, to achieve better results, to achieve better peace building operations. 19 00:02:24,510 --> 00:02:27,870 So that's basically how we are. 20 00:02:27,870 --> 00:02:37,200 We arrived at coordination and learning and and began to struggle with those two policies, prescriptions. 21 00:02:37,200 --> 00:02:43,410 But as you see, I call those two policy prescriptions misplaced analogies. 22 00:02:43,410 --> 00:02:50,490 And I hope to make clear at the end of my talk why I think that in a way they are misplaced 23 00:02:50,490 --> 00:02:56,220 analogies and we perhaps would rather focus on on on far more important elements. 24 00:02:56,220 --> 00:03:05,340 So basically, the underlying questions of our paper are why has improvement in coordination been so elusive? 25 00:03:05,340 --> 00:03:08,760 Because despite all these calls for coordination, 26 00:03:08,760 --> 00:03:15,570 we don't see necessarily very astonishing results where we can see improvements in terms of coordination. 27 00:03:15,570 --> 00:03:22,320 And then if the underlying problems are actually known, why our lessons are actually not learnt. 28 00:03:22,320 --> 00:03:25,620 So why our mistakes are repeated. 29 00:03:25,620 --> 00:03:37,170 So what we actually suggest that there are deeper underlying causes that we should look at are and I think that's important. 30 00:03:37,170 --> 00:03:46,770 We need to highlight in particular, one, we want to get a better understanding of peacebuilding and want to develop better concepts, 31 00:03:46,770 --> 00:03:54,120 how peacebuilding actually works or how we can actually achieve better results. 32 00:03:54,120 --> 00:04:12,660 So we introduce the coordination and learning challenge as a kind of multi level governance problem and conceptualise it as a nested game, 33 00:04:12,660 --> 00:04:18,390 a nested game, basically, that takes place at multiple levels. 34 00:04:18,390 --> 00:04:22,800 Let me perhaps perhaps you may see it. 35 00:04:22,800 --> 00:04:31,140 We don't have PowerPoint here, but illustrate the problems as such. 36 00:04:31,140 --> 00:04:35,970 We have basically a multiplicity of actors and a large diversity of actors. 37 00:04:35,970 --> 00:04:40,170 We have NGOs and and firms involved in the building of peace. 38 00:04:40,170 --> 00:04:48,060 We have states and state it state agencies. We have international institutions, the agencies, funds and programmes. 39 00:04:48,060 --> 00:04:53,580 And all these actors come together in the building of peace. 40 00:04:53,580 --> 00:04:58,470 So basically, we have intra agency coordination games going on. 41 00:04:58,470 --> 00:05:02,820 We have inter. Agency coordination games going on. 42 00:05:02,820 --> 00:05:06,930 And then we have multiple actor coordination games. 43 00:05:06,930 --> 00:05:13,770 And that's basically it's part and parcel of a large peace building coordination game. 44 00:05:13,770 --> 00:05:23,620 So this is basically the challenge we are talking about when we when we look at peace building as a coordination problem. 45 00:05:23,620 --> 00:05:26,280 And as you may imagine, first of all, 46 00:05:26,280 --> 00:05:36,450 the large and character of this enterprise and also the diversity of the actors involved creates huge challenges that cannot be easily overcome, 47 00:05:36,450 --> 00:05:41,820 because it's not only this problem I have talked about, they are so different. 48 00:05:41,820 --> 00:05:49,380 Another problem adds a problem that this coordination game takes place at multiple levels. 49 00:05:49,380 --> 00:05:58,620 We have a global level of coordination efforts going on at U.N. headquarters level with an IMF World Bank and so on and so forth. 50 00:05:58,620 --> 00:06:08,220 Then we have regional and subregional levels. We are a regional organisation address a particular problem and they coordinate amongst each other. 51 00:06:08,220 --> 00:06:12,540 And then last but certainly not least and most importantly, 52 00:06:12,540 --> 00:06:18,750 we have the field level where the conflict is basically should be addressed with the peacebuilding operations going on. 53 00:06:18,750 --> 00:06:24,840 And that's actually the most important level of engagement. 54 00:06:24,840 --> 00:06:37,860 And once we understand peacebuilding or the challenge of coordination and learning in this peacebuilding exercise as a nested game, 55 00:06:37,860 --> 00:06:42,900 we learn to appreciate the limits of coordination and this larger game. 56 00:06:42,900 --> 00:06:50,280 And we come up with very unsurprising findings that that coordination and learning are very 57 00:06:50,280 --> 00:07:01,710 difficult in large and situations like the one I've just described that another problem refers to. 58 00:07:01,710 --> 00:07:03,090 Not every peace building games. 59 00:07:03,090 --> 00:07:12,990 The same changes in the active engagement from one crisis to another basically weakens what we call in the in the game theoretical literature, 60 00:07:12,990 --> 00:07:28,260 the shadow of the future. So because the different actors do not, they will not basically see a future prospect of cooperation. 61 00:07:28,260 --> 00:07:36,240 And for that reason, they will rather they will appreciate or see peacebuilding as a one off game. 62 00:07:36,240 --> 00:07:40,530 So basically, for that reason, issues of turf issues. 63 00:07:40,530 --> 00:07:46,770 Off, off, off, off, off of parochial interests play a very important role in this peace building game. 64 00:07:46,770 --> 00:07:57,000 So had the rigidity of relevant actors also reduces the probability that the utility functions of these various actors actually lying, 65 00:07:57,000 --> 00:08:07,990 then the possibility of defection from international coordination is very high due to the nested quality of the gains I've just referred to. 66 00:08:07,990 --> 00:08:16,950 And what we can see is, although coordination is likely to prove than hierarchical situations, are it, or in hierarchical institutions. 67 00:08:16,950 --> 00:08:21,810 This is not how peacebuilding actually evolves. It's a highly decentralised process. 68 00:08:21,810 --> 00:08:28,530 And when you look at the structure or the quality of the United Nations system, it's a highly decentralised system. 69 00:08:28,530 --> 00:08:37,000 And coordination is basically done by persuasion rather than imposed on on on on different actors. 70 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:47,080 And but we should also keep in mind is that many agencies and programmes, NGOs do not want to be coordinated. 71 00:08:47,080 --> 00:08:50,730 Independence as part of the mission statement. 72 00:08:50,730 --> 00:09:03,750 So it's not so easy just to advocate coordination or streamlined engagement of the UN system as a whole. 73 00:09:03,750 --> 00:09:16,110 Pretending as if the U.N. could deliver as one, delivering as one as the latest of the latest policy statement mission document, 74 00:09:16,110 --> 00:09:25,350 which was basically produced as a kind of follow up of the World Summit 2005 as a result of another High-Level 75 00:09:25,350 --> 00:09:36,090 Panel who looked into how coordination between various human turn agent agencies could could be improved. 76 00:09:36,090 --> 00:09:42,120 So we do have a problem here that need to be addressed. 77 00:09:42,120 --> 00:09:46,770 We do have its policy relevant. 78 00:09:46,770 --> 00:09:53,550 So for that reason, it's really important to actively engage with the question. 79 00:09:53,550 --> 00:09:59,650 While coordination is in essence a good thing, the. 80 00:09:59,650 --> 00:10:08,040 Limits and achieving coordination and the academic literature on coordination. 81 00:10:08,040 --> 00:10:12,220 Well, appreciate it. Limit. 82 00:10:12,220 --> 00:10:20,710 Somehow we could see authors like booze Jones wrote about strategic coordination. 83 00:10:20,710 --> 00:10:24,130 But in our view, this is not the actual problem, 84 00:10:24,130 --> 00:10:32,440 because what we can actually see in practise that operations can be successful even without coordination. 85 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:42,670 So the real problem here is to deconstruct or to highlight the actual the actual factors that contribute to operation success and failure. 86 00:10:42,670 --> 00:10:48,590 And our our our point here is it's most of the time it's not coordination. 87 00:10:48,590 --> 00:10:56,470 Once in the paper, we basically try to deconstruct the strategic coordination label. 88 00:10:56,470 --> 00:11:03,340 Bruce Jones, see. He introduces of so-called facilitators of strategic coordination, 89 00:11:03,340 --> 00:11:10,740 basically highlighting the role of special representatives on the ground, resident coordinators, 90 00:11:10,740 --> 00:11:20,440 the continuous involvement of key actors and informal institutions like groups of friends, core groups, contact groups and so on and so forth. 91 00:11:20,440 --> 00:11:25,750 But this is not so much talking about strategic coordination in our view. 92 00:11:25,750 --> 00:11:36,010 It's far more about leadership. It's a long term commitment to to a conflict. 93 00:11:36,010 --> 00:11:47,190 It's about personalities staying involved or assuming it's very often the engine and ingenuity. 94 00:11:47,190 --> 00:11:53,560 I mean, once you once you look at various cases, Mozambique, for example, drove under our yellow on the ground, 95 00:11:53,560 --> 00:12:05,950 how he basically creatively interpreted relatively vague mandate of the Security Council, creating a slush fund and things, things like that. 96 00:12:05,950 --> 00:12:13,480 So basically then engaged basically the ambassadors of Security Council countries on the ground. 97 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:18,400 So basically to have this link between the field level and the and the headquarters 98 00:12:18,400 --> 00:12:23,130 level to mobilise basically support for ongoing support for the poor, 99 00:12:23,130 --> 00:12:30,920 the peace operation, then another continuous commitment of key actors, Italy's role very important. 100 00:12:30,920 --> 00:12:39,040 And in that regard. So it's it's it's less this strategic coordination mantra that matters, 101 00:12:39,040 --> 00:12:52,560 but more underlying factors like the continued availability of resources basically spent by Bob, but by key actors. 102 00:12:52,560 --> 00:12:56,860 It's about that so-called veto. 103 00:12:56,860 --> 00:13:07,000 Players basically support the peace process and then the role of informal institution. 104 00:13:07,000 --> 00:13:12,330 I haven't touched on that. That's far less about strategic coordination. 105 00:13:12,330 --> 00:13:24,970 It's far more giving actress a platform where they can basically either influence Security Council decision 106 00:13:24,970 --> 00:13:34,720 making at headquarters level or basically engage actors on the ground or engage with actors at all, 107 00:13:34,720 --> 00:13:40,810 with key people at international financial institutions, for example. 108 00:13:40,810 --> 00:13:51,520 So basically, you're having this institutional mechanism to connect the various levels of engagement. 109 00:13:51,520 --> 00:13:57,280 For example, the global level with the field level and so on and so forth. 110 00:13:57,280 --> 00:14:04,660 How does our understanding of peacebuilding as a nested game affect our understanding of learning? 111 00:14:04,660 --> 00:14:13,420 What we can actually see is that our idea of learning as a holistic exercise doesn't really play out so well. 112 00:14:13,420 --> 00:14:21,610 When you look at various conflicts, I mean the question why we are why we have the problems in Sierra Leone that we had the 113 00:14:21,610 --> 00:14:27,910 hostage hostage taking off of the peacekeeping force because although it was so obvious, 114 00:14:27,910 --> 00:14:37,180 clear that you need a strong mandate, you need a Chapter seven mandate, you need a rather robust peacekeeping minded on the ground to be successful. 115 00:14:37,180 --> 00:14:45,130 Why do these mistakes happen again? It's basically it's very difficult to know. 116 00:14:45,130 --> 00:14:50,710 Well, it's perhaps easy to review individual operations. 117 00:14:50,710 --> 00:14:56,650 Yes. But it's very difficult to apply lessons from one mission to the other. 118 00:14:56,650 --> 00:15:08,450 And what we can actually see in. In recent literature is not what you can, in fact, see that within a mission. 119 00:15:08,450 --> 00:15:22,840 If you have if you have the kind of learning infrastructure, it's it's it's relatively likely that you can achieve learning within a single mission. 120 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:27,400 Sierra Leone is, for example, one is is one good example in that regard, 121 00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:34,360 because there was a review mission led by General Isolda that basically pinpointed problems 122 00:15:34,360 --> 00:15:42,760 and and and and basically concluded with some forward looking policy prescriptions. 123 00:15:42,760 --> 00:15:53,680 So information learning is possible. So it's important to have a kind of learning information, learning infrastructure in place. 124 00:15:53,680 --> 00:15:57,550 And that's basically it. Slowly appreciate it at U.N. headquarters level. 125 00:15:57,550 --> 00:16:02,960 So one one, in fact, is that, for example, some policy, 126 00:16:02,960 --> 00:16:16,630 some some officers working on the ground take on additional functions, basically to review the mission on an ongoing basis. 127 00:16:16,630 --> 00:16:32,500 And if problems arise, they basically try to to adapt the mandate or the terms of reference of the mission while the mission is actually going on. 128 00:16:32,500 --> 00:16:45,160 So basically, this is a far more promising approach than trying to apply lessons across missions. 129 00:16:45,160 --> 00:16:57,040 And the difficulty is, I mean, we can talk about the difficulty, even strikingly similar missions like Kosovo and East Timor, for example. 130 00:16:57,040 --> 00:17:07,930 What we can learn from from from the current perspective is that it's not very easy to just to apply a kind of cookie 131 00:17:07,930 --> 00:17:16,450 cutter approach that from what we have in Kosovo and the mission we have in Kosovo can be easily applied in East Timor, 132 00:17:16,450 --> 00:17:21,880 because what we could see there are a lot of ownership problems and so on and so forth. 133 00:17:21,880 --> 00:17:28,290 So in conclusion, the coordination debate resembles, in a way, 134 00:17:28,290 --> 00:17:41,200 analogical discourse that has actually emerged in response to the complexities of peacebuilding and humanitarianism in the post-Cold War world. 135 00:17:41,200 --> 00:17:52,170 In a way, it's a natural reflex, a means to reduce the complexity of the peace building exercise because the discourse is basically undertaken. 136 00:17:52,170 --> 00:18:02,050 Policymakers, diplomats who don't have the time or even the capacity to deeply penetrate peace building as a whole. 137 00:18:02,050 --> 00:18:16,750 So labels like Coordination, Learning Our World Come are basically a welcome policy prescription to basically highlight problems. 138 00:18:16,750 --> 00:18:23,670 But the problem I tried to I tried to. 139 00:18:23,670 --> 00:18:30,070 What I tried to highlight is that there is a danger that the coordination label basically 140 00:18:30,070 --> 00:18:37,720 obscures the real factors that contribute to mission success and mission failure. 141 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:46,630 And very interesting. Where does it leave us and how do we basically steer peacebuilding as a process? 142 00:18:46,630 --> 00:18:49,510 It's very interesting that John Manley, you know, 143 00:18:49,510 --> 00:18:58,750 before he actually assumed the position of Undersecretary General for Peace peacekeeping operation at U.N. headquarters. 144 00:18:58,750 --> 00:19:04,080 He wrote The Peace and Survival in 99. 145 00:19:04,080 --> 00:19:07,960 Why are you basically comparing the interdependent post-Cold War world? 146 00:19:07,960 --> 00:19:13,860 The weather system that needed to be as described by chaos theory? 147 00:19:13,860 --> 00:19:22,030 And I think he has a really good point, that it's very difficult to steer the process of peace building as a whole. 148 00:19:22,030 --> 00:19:31,810 In particular, when we talk about positive peace. So applying Germany, great a suggestion. 149 00:19:31,810 --> 00:19:40,990 I think we could basically compare the role of global institutions, perhaps the actors working at headquarters level, 150 00:19:40,990 --> 00:19:55,300 perhaps as people who create the right weather conditions, conditions conducive to to facilitate the actual peacekeeping process on the ground. 151 00:19:55,300 --> 00:19:59,470 And I think this is a far more promising prospect as. 152 00:19:59,470 --> 00:20:05,185 Hand-wringing over coordination, failure or how to achieve better coordination.