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So as the chair of the second section,

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I'm very glad to welcome all of those of you who have joined us since the operation

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began at our second session is rather unhelpfully perhaps called risks and technologies.

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But that's a very brief bit of shorthand for the the various different topics that we're trying to cover in this session.

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The first is not to go through a few of the highest nuclear risks, which humankind faces at the moment.

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And in that respect, we are focussing on, first of all, a European focus with particular reference to Iran,

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Israel and Western nations, and then on emerging technologies and their impact on crises.

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And then finally, all the other threats which which don't easily fall under those headings.

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So let me start with the first surcharging, that's to say the particular high risk areas.

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And let me start with our first speaker, who's Ambassador Peter Jenkins,

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who is kindly agreed to to make his contribution focus on Iran, Israel and the West Asia.

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And he is particularly well qualified to this is a long term British diplomat.

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He was made the UK ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

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And there he was particularly concerned with the international nuclear aspects of international peace and security, and that more recently,

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he's become more specifically involved in the negotiations with Iran and particularly in the apparent breakdown,

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the possible resuscitation of the jackpot.

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So without further delay, I will invite him to make his contribution.

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He is the keynote speaker of the session. So we are allowing him that.

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I think he said we said 25 minutes. So, Peter, please go ahead.

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Ah, Christopher, I thought we agreed that I would try not to speak for much more than ten minutes in practise,

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I think it may be closer to 15, but I'm afraid people will be disappointed if they expect me to talk for four.

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Twenty five. Well, anyway, since since we have five minutes to catch up from the first session, let's let's go with with your proposed timings.

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Thank you. Thank you. Let me start by saying a few words about the talks underway in Vienna to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.

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At this point, I think prospects for reviving the agreement must be characterised as uncertain.

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This for several reasons. It's not clear that the US is ready to lift enough of the sanctions imposed under Trump to satisfy Iran.

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Many sanctions imposed under Trump are related nominally to non-nuclear matters.

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Iran expects many of these, if not all of them, to be lifted.

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The US has shown an inclination to hold back supposedly non-nuclear sanctions to serve as

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leverage in subsequent negotiations on other aspects of Iranian behaviour that the US dislikes.

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It's not clear that Iran will cease demanding verification of sanctions lifting

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before doing what it must do to return to full compliance with the 2015 agreement.

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As the US ideal would be for Iran to move first, the very least the US is likely to accept our parallel moves to full compliance.

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A formula that allows both sides to save face and caters for an absence of trust on both sides must be found, but that won't be easy.

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Iran is currently operating six are two centrifuge cascades, one are full cascade and one is six Cascade,

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all of these centrifuges are more efficient than the one centrifuges specified as permissible under the 2015 agreement.

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Iran is asking that under a revived agreement, these later models be permitted in place of the IAEA ones,

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since many of the latter were destroyed last month by Israeli saboteurs.

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It's not clear that the US will agree to this,

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even if Iran can demonstrate that the combined output of the new machines would not exceed the combined output of the old ones.

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The US is like the US likes to see the 2015 agreement as a way of retarding Iranian mastery of nuclear technology.

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On a more positive note,

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it does seem possible that if an agreement cannot be reached by the end of this month ahead of a presidential election in Iran on 18 June,

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negotiations will resume post-election, whatever the result.

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Iran's supreme leader seems to recognise that the 2015 agreement has value the unfreezing of

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dollar reserves in various places around the world and the lifting of sanctions on oil exports,

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still only a third of potential volumes and a vital source of government revenue are worth having.

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Should we in the West also see value in the 2015 agreement?

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Yes, it provides for intrusive international monitoring of all nuclear activity in Iran and it restricts fissile material production capabilities.

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It offers the prospect of confidence in the absence of undeclared material or facilities in Iran.

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It offers probability that diversion of material or equipment to a covert facility would be detected in good time.

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Americans like to claim that it closes all pathways to a nuclear weapon that is not strictly true.

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The covert pathway is not entirely closed, but from an Iranian perspective, it would entail a high risk of detection.

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In fact, the risk of Iran seeking nuclear weapons is currently low, whether or not the 2015 agreement can be revived.

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Western intelligence agencies have charged with a high degree of confidence that in 2003,

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the supreme leader ordered an end to nuclear weapons research research aimed at the making of five nuclear weapons.

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If Mr. Netanyahu can be believed. And that the Revolutionary Guards have been have largely complied with the supreme leader's instruction.

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The supreme leader has issued a fatwa against the possession and use of nuclear weapons.

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Iran's diplomats have put Iran's reputation within the Non-Aligned Movement on the line by

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affirming on numerous occasions that Iran is fully committed to nuclear non-proliferation pledges.

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The Iranian determination to retain an enrichment capability they do not truly need for civil purposes is troubling,

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but it can be explained as part of a nuclear hedging strategy and the thirst for national prestige.

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The Iranian leadership has shown itself to be shrewd and adept at cost benefit judgements.

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Settling for a capability and stopping short of crossing the nuclear threshold looks to be a shrewder option than going for a bomb.

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That said, there will be other options for mitigating concern about Iranian capabilities and intentions if the 2015 agreement expires.

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The friendship of Russia and China in particular is of increasing importance to Iran.

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Neither Russia nor China would be content for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

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They can be expected to press for Iran to continue to allow intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring and to comply with the NPT.

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In addition, agreement to a nuclear weapon free zone in the Gulf might conceivably be a possibility if Saudi

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Arabia's current interest in creating a basis for durable coexistence with Iran proves lasting.

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A Gulf nuclear weapon free zone would have the added virtue of consolidating Saudi Arabia's NPT commitments,

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Saudi Arabia having declared an intention to match Iran's enrichment capability.

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Would a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone also be an option?

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No, because the Israel is determined to retain its undeclared nuclear arsenal of 80 to 100 warheads.

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Iran has been a supporter of a Middle East zone since the time of the Shah,

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as are all the Arab states, all the Arab states of the region led by Egypt.

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Sadly, what's foreseeable is that Egypt will continue to press for a Middle East zone at NPT conferences and in the United

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Nations and the US on behalf of Israel will continue to produce reasons why Egypt's proposals are premature.

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What about the use of force to destroy Iranian facilities, would that be a good idea?

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Israel is thought to have been eager to attack Iranian facilities from the air on several past occasions alone or in the US company.

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But to have been restrained by the US. Such military aggression would be a gross violation of international law.

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International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors could be amongst the resulting casualties.

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And the benefit would be doubtful. Iran's small centrifuge facility at Fordo.

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Not industrial in scale, but ideal for weapons grade material production would probably survive because it's buried deep within a mountain.

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And Iran would have been given a good excuse to withdraw from the NPT and embark on nuclear weapon acquisition.

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Stoppable only through invasion and occupation.

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Thank you. That's it, Christopher.