1 00:00:00,300 --> 00:00:08,550 I want to move on today something rather different, namely not so much the pattern of fertility and the level of fertility and the trend of fertility, 2 00:00:08,550 --> 00:00:12,480 but rather the setting of fertility and more broadly, 3 00:00:12,480 --> 00:00:20,160 the circumstances under which men and women have lived together in in Europe over the last half a century or so. 4 00:00:20,160 --> 00:00:25,530 Other remarkable transitions which have taken place over that time. 5 00:00:25,530 --> 00:00:32,920 You'll recall that right at the beginning we started talking about the the so-called West European marriage pattern and the contrast which 6 00:00:32,920 --> 00:00:40,050 that was claimed to have with the marriage patterns of Eastern Europe to the east of so-called Hindoos line and generally speaking, 7 00:00:40,050 --> 00:00:45,120 with the rest of the world. Not to say that the rest of the world or east of Europe was homogeneous in any way. 8 00:00:45,120 --> 00:00:48,120 Not to say that west of Muslim was homogeneous. 9 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:55,050 Nonetheless, there were there were distinct patterns in terms of later marriage, in terms of the nuclear family based household, 10 00:00:55,050 --> 00:01:03,720 which seemed to be rather consistently different and arguably important for the social economic future of those different areas of the world. 11 00:01:03,720 --> 00:01:11,160 Well, things, of course, are now changing. And we have seen in the last 50 years, certainly in my lifetime, 12 00:01:11,160 --> 00:01:16,710 an extraordinary transformation, certainly in setting a facility in the popularity of marriage, 13 00:01:16,710 --> 00:01:23,130 in the popularity of of alternatives to marriage, in conjunction with changes in the birth, 14 00:01:23,130 --> 00:01:29,880 in conjunction with radical changes in social and behavioural attitudes and behaviour which follows from them. 15 00:01:29,880 --> 00:01:37,500 And this this package of behaviour and this package of changing attitudes goes under the heading of the second demographic 16 00:01:37,500 --> 00:01:45,840 transition and the transformation of the West European marriage pattern and the the the rise of the second demographic transition. 17 00:01:45,840 --> 00:01:57,480 It's possible a journey into universality, according to its proponents, is one to talk about today. 18 00:01:57,480 --> 00:02:03,550 This is one indicator of what's been happening to marriage in Western Europe, using England and Wales as the example, 19 00:02:03,550 --> 00:02:09,030 what you see here is the change in the mean age of marriage from the nineteen 20 00:02:09,030 --> 00:02:19,140 from 1889 and the far left over to this table of 1889 here of up to 2001. 21 00:02:19,140 --> 00:02:24,990 Over here, the blue line, the median age of unmarried men at marriage. 22 00:02:24,990 --> 00:02:35,250 And the red line is women ages, unmarried women who then called spinsters at marriage, as you can see right into the 1930s, 23 00:02:35,250 --> 00:02:43,560 hovering around a median age of about 25 for girls and about 27, 28 for four young men. 24 00:02:43,560 --> 00:02:46,350 In fact, if anything, increasing in means age. 25 00:02:46,350 --> 00:02:53,580 So no decay of that aspect to the West European marriage pattern evident at all right up to the eve of the Second World War. 26 00:02:53,580 --> 00:02:58,290 And you can see the unevenness here arising out of the the turmoil of the Second World War, 27 00:02:58,290 --> 00:03:05,910 followed by the this remarkable decline in median age of marriage, going hand in hand with a huge popularity, new popularity of marriage. 28 00:03:05,910 --> 00:03:10,740 95 percent of the people born around the time that I was born eventually got married. 29 00:03:10,740 --> 00:03:19,620 Most unusual in Western European traditions. And then almost as soon as it appeared, by the time we get to the to the early 70s, it goes into reverse. 30 00:03:19,620 --> 00:03:25,890 And we see this increase in the age of marriage, a hitherto unprecedented levels to about 30 or so. 31 00:03:25,890 --> 00:03:30,000 Now over thirty four young men and approaching thirty for women. 32 00:03:30,000 --> 00:03:34,470 Now, ten years after this graph is drawn, is gone even higher. 33 00:03:34,470 --> 00:03:37,590 And that, of course, has gone up not just with a delay in marriage, 34 00:03:37,590 --> 00:03:47,700 but also a reduction in the popularity of marriage and a transformation of the whole setting for family life and for reproduction. 35 00:03:47,700 --> 00:03:55,230 This is generally mimicked over the rest of Western Europe and also in other parts of Europe as well. 36 00:03:55,230 --> 00:04:04,890 Even more interestingly, what we see here is groups of countries, the unweighted mean of the average age of first marriage groups of countries. 37 00:04:04,890 --> 00:04:14,220 These are for women. The blue line here is, is Scandinavia, as always, in the vanguard of social change in these respects, 38 00:04:14,220 --> 00:04:22,650 mean age of marriage rising up to nearly 30 women higher than in in in Western Europe in green here. 39 00:04:22,650 --> 00:04:35,030 This is north Western Europe. That's Britain, Belgium, France and other countries in that general area following very close behind. 40 00:04:35,030 --> 00:04:37,720 Even in southern Europe, something similar has happened, 41 00:04:37,720 --> 00:04:44,510 a later change over the changeover in Scandinavia started to happen in the 1960s, as you can see in southern Europe. 42 00:04:44,510 --> 00:04:49,970 It didn't happen until until the 1970s, but still falling very much the same pattern. 43 00:04:49,970 --> 00:04:56,840 And more interesting, perhaps, is what's been going on in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. 44 00:04:56,840 --> 00:05:01,040 You'll recall there was just this very surprising, 45 00:05:01,040 --> 00:05:10,940 perhaps paradoxical fact that communism supposedly and regarded by many as being progressive, modernising, updating kind of procedure, 46 00:05:10,940 --> 00:05:15,530 breaking old traditions and opening up possibilities for all kinds of new behaviour, 47 00:05:15,530 --> 00:05:19,160 reinforced the traditional differences between Eastern and Western Europe. 48 00:05:19,160 --> 00:05:23,480 As far as marriage was concerned, marriage remained near. 49 00:05:23,480 --> 00:05:32,390 A universal marriage were made early on the communism. It was not, as you might have expected, sort of modernised in remade later and more optional. 50 00:05:32,390 --> 00:05:38,060 And you can see here in the blue line, which is for Central and Eastern Europe and the Purple Line, 51 00:05:38,060 --> 00:05:40,340 which is the former Soviet Union, that Russia, Ukraine, 52 00:05:40,340 --> 00:05:50,810 Belarus and all that lot military marriage was actually becoming even even younger women over the course of the of the 50s and 60s and 70s, 53 00:05:50,810 --> 00:05:52,430 right up to the end of communism. 54 00:05:52,430 --> 00:06:03,940 So by the time we get to 1989, mediation marriage was just about 22 for both groups of countries, compared with 26, 28 in the rest of Europe. 55 00:06:03,940 --> 00:06:07,810 Once communism evaporated, all that changed very radically, 56 00:06:07,810 --> 00:06:15,910 something which will come back to later on because it's rather remarkably rapid change and it's also a kind of Springle, 57 00:06:15,910 --> 00:06:22,150 these countries bounce back to the sort of level of media matters which they would have had decades earlier 58 00:06:22,150 --> 00:06:28,880 if they had shared with the kind of patterns which Western Europe had been developing over that time. 59 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:35,810 More on that later, but certainly a major and very sudden transformation. 60 00:06:35,810 --> 00:06:41,940 Hand in hand with a delay in marriage is a decline in the popularity of marriages are merely numbers. 61 00:06:41,940 --> 00:06:48,830 Thousands of marriages in England and in the U.K., sorry, from 1951 to 2009, as you can see, 62 00:06:48,830 --> 00:06:56,360 all marriages, the light blue almost halved, maybe down to to about 60 percent of the previous level. 63 00:06:56,360 --> 00:07:01,970 First marriages down to about half of the previous level. And this time figure is in the population, which is increasing. 64 00:07:01,970 --> 00:07:10,560 So the actual rate is declining even faster than these numbers would lead one to suppose. 65 00:07:10,560 --> 00:07:20,220 A lot of these changes, the concomitant reduction in middle age in popularity of marriage, the increase in the mean age delay, 66 00:07:20,220 --> 00:07:27,420 its avoidance of the accompanying patterns of cohabitation of of reproduction outside of marriage, 67 00:07:27,420 --> 00:07:36,270 go under a bundle of patterns, both of behaviour and of underlying attitudes under the heading of the second demographic transition. 68 00:07:36,270 --> 00:07:44,490 This is one of the most influential models and and ideas in contemporary demography, in particular to pioneers in the low countries. 69 00:07:44,490 --> 00:07:49,680 Dirk Van de Car and Ron Lithographer. We'll hear a lot more. 70 00:07:49,680 --> 00:07:59,550 They they observe these these empirical changes going on of an unprecedented kind in Western Europe, really starting in the 1960s, 71 00:07:59,550 --> 00:08:08,670 and and developed a theory to explain not only what was happening, but also why it was happening, which is outlined in this graph here. 72 00:08:08,670 --> 00:08:17,190 There's this undoubted empirical evidence of these very substantial changes in marriage, cohabitation, births, outside marriage, divorce, 73 00:08:17,190 --> 00:08:21,660 new patterns of upbringing for children going from one kind of family to another rather than 74 00:08:21,660 --> 00:08:26,100 being remaining with their biological parents for as long as their biological parents live, 75 00:08:26,100 --> 00:08:33,030 for the most part, replaced by all this cohabitation and delay of marriage and all the rest of it. 76 00:08:33,030 --> 00:08:41,940 And as far as they were concerned, also also going with the low fertility which followed the baby boom when marriage became less popular, 77 00:08:41,940 --> 00:08:49,140 when the retreat for marriage began in the 1960s. That was also the beginning of the decline of the birthrate from the baby boom 78 00:08:49,140 --> 00:08:56,170 peak of a reproduction rate above replacement level down to much lower levels. 79 00:08:56,170 --> 00:09:02,010 Indeed, by the time we get to the 1980s, the so-called lowest low fertility, which we talked about before, 80 00:09:02,010 --> 00:09:06,540 that is to say birth rates equivalent to less than one point three children per woman, 81 00:09:06,540 --> 00:09:16,080 which of course, bring with them a very strong indications of a population decline and population ageing if they're to be continued. 82 00:09:16,080 --> 00:09:23,190 They put this package of undoubted package of behaviour together with a theory 83 00:09:23,190 --> 00:09:29,310 that this was driven by the spread of new attitudes and values in society, 84 00:09:29,310 --> 00:09:34,320 which they felt were were fundamentally due to the rise in prosperity, to the rise of welfare, 85 00:09:34,320 --> 00:09:40,080 to the accompanying increase in secular thinking and high levels of education, 86 00:09:40,080 --> 00:09:47,760 which satisfied how satisfied earlier material needs and enable people to, as it were, 87 00:09:47,760 --> 00:09:53,460 be emancipated and do their own thing to think about new ways of behaving, 88 00:09:53,460 --> 00:10:01,200 not to be so bound by notions of duty to God and to parents and to peers and to society, but rather to, 89 00:10:01,200 --> 00:10:06,240 as it were emphasised, the duty they had to themselves to to develop their own interests, 90 00:10:06,240 --> 00:10:13,670 their own inclinations, without quite so much constraint from traditional pressures, 91 00:10:13,670 --> 00:10:22,410 a set of attitude which they described as following Robert Englehardt, rather, using the rather unsatisfactory term of post materialism, 92 00:10:22,410 --> 00:10:30,300 post materialist values, or the kind which went hand in hand with post terrorist behaviour in the form of new ways of family life, 93 00:10:30,300 --> 00:10:41,610 new low levels of reproduction, according to the theories of Mazo and Engelhart, which say which they translated, as it were, into demographic terms. 94 00:10:41,610 --> 00:10:51,150 These changes inevitably follow once a society became educated, a liberal, materially prosperous enough to devise welfare systems, 95 00:10:51,150 --> 00:10:55,680 to insulate people, as it were, from the consequences of their own behaviour. And as such. 96 00:10:55,680 --> 00:11:05,010 Insofar as development, economic development would be would become universal insofar as the development of secular, 97 00:11:05,010 --> 00:11:10,470 more educated attitudes to life would go hand in hand with that with that prosperity. 98 00:11:10,470 --> 00:11:16,320 All these patterns would eventually became become universal. What was, first of all, back in the 60s, 99 00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:25,860 thought to be an innovation of progressive Scandinavians would in fact be something shared in the very, very long run over the whole world. 100 00:11:25,860 --> 00:11:35,110 And there is certainly some evidence to suggest that this is exactly what's happening. 101 00:11:35,110 --> 00:11:43,960 This is the model of the first and second demographic transition, the first demographic transition starting in the in the well in the 18th century, 102 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:48,610 as far as the death rate is concerned, in the 19th century, as far as the birth rate is concerned, 103 00:11:48,610 --> 00:11:52,930 this marked reduction in the birth rate from a family size of five or six or seven 104 00:11:52,930 --> 00:11:58,390 down to one of two or three reduction preceding reduction in the death rate, 105 00:11:58,390 --> 00:12:08,620 an intervening period of population growth in green brought to an end as the birth rate fell to become similar to the birth rate. 106 00:12:08,620 --> 00:12:19,000 And then after the beginning of the second demographic transition, these things continuing in ways not expected in the first demographic transition. 107 00:12:19,000 --> 00:12:28,150 The first demographic transition was not unreasonably expected to restore a balanced position of more or less zero population growth, 108 00:12:28,150 --> 00:12:34,810 which it started with back in the in the early 17th century or the 18th century. 109 00:12:34,810 --> 00:12:44,290 That is not what happened. The natural rate of increase fell to below zero and as far as they were concerned, stayed there and would stay there, 110 00:12:44,290 --> 00:12:51,760 that some replacement fertility was a natural concomitant of the the emphasis upon personal satisfaction, 111 00:12:51,760 --> 00:13:00,760 personal realisation of individual needs, rather than the sort of duties which I've been talking about earlier on. 112 00:13:00,760 --> 00:13:04,960 That was one aspect of the second demographic transition, which I thought was important. 113 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:10,930 They also felt that an increase in migration having been negative emigration predominating in 114 00:13:10,930 --> 00:13:15,160 the first demographic transition to become a positive in the second demographic transition. 115 00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:27,600 Well, we will see. This is a rather idealised version of the the underlying theoretical underpinnings of this second demographic idea. 116 00:13:27,600 --> 00:13:33,780 Abraham Maslow wrote a very influential book in 1954 called Motivation and Personality, 117 00:13:33,780 --> 00:13:42,330 and he felt that one of the one of the major aspects of human development over over centuries was the way in which human society, 118 00:13:42,330 --> 00:13:50,940 human innovation had progressively mastered the various problems and needs which affected human beings, 119 00:13:50,940 --> 00:13:56,460 taking them away from the kind of preoccupations which were more to do with mere survival, 120 00:13:56,460 --> 00:14:00,240 which were shared with animals, the ones at the bottom, because you can't read it. 121 00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:07,590 These are biological and physiological needs. Basic life needs food, drink, shelter, warmth, sex, sleep, etc. 122 00:14:07,590 --> 00:14:11,520 The daily life of the undergraduate, I suppose, but a lot in some respects, 123 00:14:11,520 --> 00:14:19,020 all that different from the kinds of expectations and needs and desires of any animals and birds outside, 124 00:14:19,020 --> 00:14:26,700 followed by safety, needs of protection, security, but more important, order, law, limits on behaviour, 125 00:14:26,700 --> 00:14:34,650 stability of society, contracts and its enforceability and all the rest of it covid-19, 126 00:14:34,650 --> 00:14:40,190 I suppose, in health and safety legislation leading to once those are satisfied, 127 00:14:40,190 --> 00:14:49,590 then then more more humane as well rather than human emotional needs could come to the fore leads for for for family affection, 128 00:14:49,590 --> 00:14:52,950 relationships, companionship, 129 00:14:52,950 --> 00:15:02,250 easy friendship with people at work and neighbourhood and so on and leading up to to to as the most important need of all. 130 00:15:02,250 --> 00:15:06,690 Once all these are satisfied, one's personal security is guaranteed. 131 00:15:06,690 --> 00:15:12,000 You have to you can stop worrying about being being fed tomorrow, being employed tomorrow. 132 00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:18,930 The rest of it self actualisation became important. You could start concentrating much more on your own personal development, 133 00:15:18,930 --> 00:15:24,810 on your unique capacities, your unique ambitions to social self actualisation. 134 00:15:24,810 --> 00:15:29,160 This is a very idealistic way of looking at Maslow's hierarchy. 135 00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:33,330 As you can see, there's no reason why this should happen at once to some extent. 136 00:15:33,330 --> 00:15:44,130 But I think you get the point that it's a kind of emancipation of human society from from basic worries moving on, 137 00:15:44,130 --> 00:15:53,250 as are always worries, I suppose, into more personal concerns about about self actualisation. 138 00:15:53,250 --> 00:16:00,660 This has been put into more empirical forms, more testable forms by Robert Englehardt in particular, 139 00:16:00,660 --> 00:16:07,470 in a very influential book called The Silent Revolution Changing Values and Political Styles of Western Politics, 140 00:16:07,470 --> 00:16:11,710 published in 1977, which have been succeeded by several other. 141 00:16:11,710 --> 00:16:21,220 Volumes exemplifying this idea of providing lots more data for it, perhaps you've come across this already. 142 00:16:21,220 --> 00:16:27,580 He was concerned with with measuring empirically, not just the spread of the behaviour which I've been talking about, 143 00:16:27,580 --> 00:16:32,440 which is quite easily done through demographic and other sorts of information, 144 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:39,520 but also testing the opinions and values which went with it and which allegedly underpinned it, 145 00:16:39,520 --> 00:16:45,250 measured in tools, all sorts of questionnaires which are now universally applied, 146 00:16:45,250 --> 00:16:50,770 starting off with the European Values Survey, asking a whole battery of questions about attitudes and values, 147 00:16:50,770 --> 00:16:53,440 which is now being developed into the World Values Survey, 148 00:16:53,440 --> 00:17:00,730 which is a tremendous resource easily available from the net, showing that the spread of new values, 149 00:17:00,730 --> 00:17:09,190 attitudes or the persistence of old ones in various countries of the world embracing more and more populations as time goes on. 150 00:17:09,190 --> 00:17:15,080 He devised a rather simple questionnaire to test the extent to which people were 151 00:17:15,080 --> 00:17:21,550 what traditional so-called materialist in their value orientation on the one hand, 152 00:17:21,550 --> 00:17:27,300 and or post materialist, a progressive, more open minded in the others. 153 00:17:27,300 --> 00:17:32,500 And this this questionnaire consisted of of contrasting pairs of questions. 154 00:17:32,500 --> 00:17:40,270 And depending on which of the pair you answered, you will be ticked off as well as more materialist or more positively. 155 00:17:40,270 --> 00:17:48,970 And here here are the first two simple ones. You were invited to ask whether you preferred the idea of maintaining order in the 156 00:17:48,970 --> 00:17:53,590 nation or alternatively giving people more say in the decisions of the government, 157 00:17:53,590 --> 00:17:57,860 fighting rising prices or protecting freedom of speech, 158 00:17:57,860 --> 00:18:02,410 maintaining a higher rate of economic growth, and making sure the country has strong defence forces, 159 00:18:02,410 --> 00:18:08,950 or giving people more say in how things are decided at work and trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 160 00:18:08,950 --> 00:18:17,470 You get the picture. Asia has indeed been rather criticised as being essentially Telegraaf versus Gardian. 161 00:18:17,470 --> 00:18:27,170 I imagine if you look at your own consciences and see which ones of these you prefer, then it may be apparent how that how that balances out. 162 00:18:27,170 --> 00:18:32,200 Nonetheless, it has been very widely used, rather more questions than this. 163 00:18:32,200 --> 00:18:44,290 Normally to try and put a population's individuals and countries on a somewhere on a materialist versus personal scale. 164 00:18:44,290 --> 00:18:53,170 So the more the more of the blue questions that are answered, the more materialist the person or the population is judged to be, 165 00:18:53,170 --> 00:19:02,890 the more green, the more materialist, and the more prone to to indulge in behaviour of the kind we've been talking about. 166 00:19:02,890 --> 00:19:10,840 What Vandar Current Lazika did was to take these notions that the basic notions of Mazzello empirical and 167 00:19:10,840 --> 00:19:17,260 testable refinements by Englehardt and his colleagues and turn them into a demographic interpretation 168 00:19:17,260 --> 00:19:24,970 such that they felt that those who were more likely to to adopt a more peaceful terrorist approach 169 00:19:24,970 --> 00:19:32,200 would be those more likely to approve of and indeed participate in cohabitation before marriage. 170 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:34,780 Delaying or avoiding marriage would be relaxed, 171 00:19:34,780 --> 00:19:41,110 but having having babies outside marriage would not be concerned about the moral anyway aspects of divorce, 172 00:19:41,110 --> 00:19:45,670 whatever their views might be on the practicalities, and would also take a, quote, 173 00:19:45,670 --> 00:19:52,060 progressive, unquote, view about the acceptability of abortion, homosexuality, 174 00:19:52,060 --> 00:19:59,800 the presence of foreigners in different countries and different people from different countries in their communities and all the rest of it, 175 00:19:59,800 --> 00:20:06,460 and vice versa. And this is to a considerable extent what happens. 176 00:20:06,460 --> 00:20:15,670 Here are some examples which which let's start with his colleagues collected a while ago from behaviour and attitudes in Belgium, 177 00:20:15,670 --> 00:20:23,590 France, West Germany and the Netherlands. Quite a large sample of people aged 20 to 29 in your age group. 178 00:20:23,590 --> 00:20:32,680 What they did was to compare the the values expressed by single men living with their parents who are scored as one in 179 00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:40,180 each case compared with those of the same age who are cohabiting in this column and those who are married in that column. 180 00:20:40,180 --> 00:20:47,830 Here are men and women. And you can see that if you look at traditional values like a belief in God, 181 00:20:47,830 --> 00:20:53,830 you find that the married population is three times more likely than cohabiting population in the same countries, 182 00:20:53,830 --> 00:20:59,950 in the same age group to believe in God, that those those are perhaps not surprisingly, 183 00:20:59,950 --> 00:21:05,950 who are cohabiting are only one third as likely to believe in sin as those who are married. 184 00:21:05,950 --> 00:21:13,420 Likewise, differences praying outside church and a curious reversal of belief in reincarnation. 185 00:21:13,420 --> 00:21:18,190 Now, this is not reincarnation as at Easter time. 186 00:21:18,190 --> 00:21:23,490 This is reincarnation, of course, in the. New Age form the sort of rope, 187 00:21:23,490 --> 00:21:30,750 sandals and lentils and certainly Buddhist notion of reincarnation held only by a minority of people that are much more likely 188 00:21:30,750 --> 00:21:40,080 to be held and held by by by the New Age enthusiasts who are cohabiting rather than more traditional folk who are married. 189 00:21:40,080 --> 00:21:48,390 Interesting. Also contrast what justified comparing comparing this to a marriage with those of cohabiting. 190 00:21:48,390 --> 00:21:52,260 So there's those who think that taking drugs is never justified. 191 00:21:52,260 --> 00:21:54,630 That's often to be found amongst those cohabiting. 192 00:21:54,630 --> 00:22:06,240 Predictably, perhaps those who feel that cheating the taxman is OK are twice as likely to be found in cohabiting couples than amongst the married. 193 00:22:06,240 --> 00:22:14,410 Likewise, avoiding fines and even fighting with police appears to be thought to be more OK if your committing well is wrong. 194 00:22:14,410 --> 00:22:18,330 The young of Belgium, France, West Germany and the Netherlands, perhaps here too. 195 00:22:18,330 --> 00:22:23,580 I don't know. I don't know what you get up to on weekends, but it's not all that. 196 00:22:23,580 --> 00:22:30,810 Curiously enough, certain other aspects of a broadly moral thought are not very different between the two groups. 197 00:22:30,810 --> 00:22:35,370 There's general disapproval of littering, of lying, drink driving. 198 00:22:35,370 --> 00:22:41,970 So it's a very particular aspect of behaviour which is which is contrasted by no means all aspects. 199 00:22:41,970 --> 00:22:48,390 And it would be quite wrong to suppose that the one category is generally as well as moral. 200 00:22:48,390 --> 00:22:57,330 Not at all. The empirical evidence for the trends in the total divorce of trend for the second 201 00:22:57,330 --> 00:23:03,050 demographic transition are pretty unequivocal and all really begins in the 1960s. 202 00:23:03,050 --> 00:23:07,250 You may know Batwoman's, they're not parents, Larkin's poet, 203 00:23:07,250 --> 00:23:12,480 where he tells us that traffic congestion and sexual intercourse were invented in 1963 when 204 00:23:12,480 --> 00:23:19,320 it's pretty much true this is the total divorce rate in various different areas of Europe. 205 00:23:19,320 --> 00:23:24,180 The divorce rate is a Humalog of the total fertility rate. 206 00:23:24,180 --> 00:23:32,790 You recall the total fertility rate is the number of babies you acquire over your fertile lifespan as you go. 207 00:23:32,790 --> 00:23:39,930 If you if you experienced the age specific fertility rates of women at different ages at the same point in time, 208 00:23:39,930 --> 00:23:44,370 how many babies would you acquire if things continue as they were? 209 00:23:44,370 --> 00:23:50,250 This is the number of divorces you require if things continue as they were in the earlier question. 210 00:23:50,250 --> 00:24:04,320 And if you are living in the early 1960s, then in most European regions you only have about a 12 percent chance of getting divorced on current rates. 211 00:24:04,320 --> 00:24:13,950 By the time we get up to 2000, it's up to 40 or even 50 percent in Scandinavia and in Western Europe, 212 00:24:13,950 --> 00:24:18,150 rather rather less, while slower change elsewhere are all moving upwards. 213 00:24:18,150 --> 00:24:24,360 You notice that there isn't there in this group anyway any any major downturn. 214 00:24:24,360 --> 00:24:30,780 It's all going the way that Lazaar romantical expected it would go, spreading from one region to another, 215 00:24:30,780 --> 00:24:35,400 not necessarily by diffusion, but by the adoption of similar kinds of patterns of behaviour, 216 00:24:35,400 --> 00:24:40,200 leaving behind the old stability of marriage and moving into a new area of substantial 217 00:24:40,200 --> 00:24:48,270 instability and a considerable likelihood that marriages will will end in divorce. 218 00:24:48,270 --> 00:24:55,650 Marriage in decline, this contrasts to birth cohorts of women, those who are born in 1935, 219 00:24:55,650 --> 00:25:05,530 who who are marrying age in the mid 1960s and slightly later and the 1960 birth cohort. 220 00:25:05,530 --> 00:25:11,710 Who are now who are now aged now, he's 52, who, of course, grew up in a different era sort of era, 221 00:25:11,710 --> 00:25:17,920 you can see on the left hand side here in Sweden, it's down to almost half of proportion ever married. 222 00:25:17,920 --> 00:25:26,080 And about 65 percent of those are women born in 1960 have married and probably even fewer of those whose cohorts are not yet complete, 223 00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:32,420 much less change in Switzerland, substantial change in Finland, Austria, Denmark, France, 224 00:25:32,420 --> 00:25:40,870 less so in Italy and and some of the other southern European countries which aren't on that diagram. 225 00:25:40,870 --> 00:25:43,600 Likewise, the trends in the total first marriage rate, 226 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:51,220 the total first marriage rate is another one of these period synthetic cohort Humalog of the total fertility rate. 227 00:25:51,220 --> 00:25:55,930 That is to say, this is the number of first marriages that you that you would pick up in the course of 228 00:25:55,930 --> 00:26:01,870 your lifetime up to age 50 if you experienced the age specific first marriage rates, 229 00:26:01,870 --> 00:26:06,290 which are prevalent in the country, are in question. 230 00:26:06,290 --> 00:26:13,990 You may notice something peculiar about this, which is which may throw doubt upon the validity of the measure over here. 231 00:26:13,990 --> 00:26:20,680 Back in the mid 1960s, we have total first marriage rates exceeding one point nought. 232 00:26:20,680 --> 00:26:27,760 Now it will be immediately obvious even to the demographically uninformed, you can't have more than one first marriage each. 233 00:26:27,760 --> 00:26:36,640 But that data, if it's just you are this is a very interesting and good example of the way in which tempo shifts in synthetic cohort period 234 00:26:36,640 --> 00:26:47,510 measures can give you inflated results to your analysis this this impossible figure of more than one first marriage per person. 235 00:26:47,510 --> 00:26:58,120 So this is these are women, I think arises because marriage is becoming more popular and was becoming earlier in the middle of the baby boom. 236 00:26:58,120 --> 00:27:06,520 Forget that was where marriage was increasing. And of course, if you're squeezing more marriages into fewer years and previously was the case, 237 00:27:06,520 --> 00:27:10,510 you're going to get if you sum them across different women, 238 00:27:10,510 --> 00:27:17,920 you're going to get an inflation figure in exactly the same way as a total fertility rate was inflated by tempo 239 00:27:17,920 --> 00:27:25,960 processes here just to say be deflated by tempo processes when things start being delayed and stretched out over time. 240 00:27:25,960 --> 00:27:33,820 Anyway, you can see here that from marriage, the extremely popular in all the regions of Europe which are represented here, 241 00:27:33,820 --> 00:27:40,150 Scandinavia, Southern European, blue, north, west, European, Purple, Central and Eastern Europe, green, 242 00:27:40,150 --> 00:27:52,450 red for the former Soviet Union and orange for the former Yugoslavia, all very popular until until the mid 1970s. 243 00:27:52,450 --> 00:28:00,910 And this precipitous fall begins later, much later in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union once more down to quite low levels. 244 00:28:00,910 --> 00:28:06,610 Now, on the face of it, this would appear to suggest that on these marriage rates, 245 00:28:06,610 --> 00:28:11,260 not much more than 50 percent of women are going to marry in the course of their lifetime, 246 00:28:11,260 --> 00:28:20,230 at least up to age 50 and really want marriage by age 50, then the chances are not all that great will marry at all. 247 00:28:20,230 --> 00:28:21,850 It's certainly got a lot lower, 248 00:28:21,850 --> 00:28:29,200 but it's important to remember that just as as the acceleration of marriage inflated this rate over here back in the 1960s. 249 00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:32,830 So the deceleration of marriage, the delay of marriage is spreading out. 250 00:28:32,830 --> 00:28:41,170 A marriage over time is deflating the indicator. And the cohort rates, which are of course, not yet complete, 251 00:28:41,170 --> 00:28:46,960 do indicate that this is a somewhat pessimistic, if that's the right word, view about the likely future. 252 00:28:46,960 --> 00:28:51,190 It's probably going to end up a sort of 60 to 70 percent marriage in most 253 00:28:51,190 --> 00:28:56,110 groups of countries rather than the 50 to 60 percent which these data indicate. 254 00:28:56,110 --> 00:29:04,930 Another interesting point, just a file away, is that there does seem to be a limit to this gathering decline into a non marital state 255 00:29:04,930 --> 00:29:09,910 in the sense that the levels of have flattened out since since since the early 1990s. 256 00:29:09,910 --> 00:29:14,410 And there's no significant further decline visible in proportions marrying. 257 00:29:14,410 --> 00:29:18,880 So it's much reduced, much delayed, which hasn't gone away. 258 00:29:18,880 --> 00:29:23,530 And more recent data sustain that point of view as well. 259 00:29:23,530 --> 00:29:33,190 Here is births outside marriage and other component of the second demographic transition and empirical package of new demographic behaviour. 260 00:29:33,190 --> 00:29:46,300 Starting off back in 1955, you can see that between 60 and 80 births per thousand births outside marriage and I was births outside marriage, 261 00:29:46,300 --> 00:29:49,450 sort of five to eight percent of the total, 262 00:29:49,450 --> 00:29:55,660 which is very much an historically similar total to that which you saw in the 18th century, the 19th century. 263 00:29:55,660 --> 00:30:02,890 In fact, in the 1950s, proportion of births outside marriage had fallen to the lowest levels seen for a very long time. 264 00:30:02,890 --> 00:30:10,840 Partly, of course, because the advent of contraception made it much easier for those engaged in marital liaisons to suppress the 265 00:30:10,840 --> 00:30:19,450 consequences of the partnership in a way probably much more important for them than for those who are married. 266 00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:28,090 So very low levels of births outside marriage back in the 1950s, going hand in hand with very low rates of divorce, high rates of marriage, 267 00:30:28,090 --> 00:30:38,080 a kind of golden age for traditional behaviour in this respect radically changed, as I mentioned, from the early 60s onwards, particularly fast. 268 00:30:38,080 --> 00:30:43,540 Of course, predictably, in Scandinavia, Western Europe trailing along behind. 269 00:30:43,540 --> 00:30:52,660 So this is English-Speaking. Well, this is this is the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in this respect, as in others, 270 00:30:52,660 --> 00:30:57,940 behaving quite similarly to North Western Europe and Scandinavia, in particular, Western Europe, 271 00:30:57,940 --> 00:31:03,160 following along Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union also increasing, 272 00:31:03,160 --> 00:31:09,670 particularly after 1989 and the southern European trend lagging behind, still pointing in the same direction. 273 00:31:09,670 --> 00:31:14,560 So all happening together along with increase in cohabitation. 274 00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:23,230 The purple here are the proportions unmarried and ever cohabited amongst young men 275 00:31:23,230 --> 00:31:28,870 and women aged 25 to 34 in various European Union countries around the year 2000. 276 00:31:28,870 --> 00:31:38,050 On the left in Sweden and Denmark and France and Finland, as you might imagine, right over on the right is Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, 277 00:31:38,050 --> 00:31:44,620 the usual suspects in southern Europe, much more resistant to second demographic transition type behaviour, 278 00:31:44,620 --> 00:31:49,360 although by no means ignoring it, as you can see. 279 00:31:49,360 --> 00:31:57,670 And there is an association or sometimes quite a week, one between all these behaviours on the one hand, and personal religious values, 280 00:31:57,670 --> 00:32:06,280 the post materialist score is on the vertical axis and proportion of the population of cohabiting is is on the right. 281 00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:10,450 Not a strong correlation, but there are better examples than that. 282 00:32:10,450 --> 00:32:20,350 Well, that seems to be pretty. Yeah, I just wondering if the values are an inevitable consequence of some kind of material level 283 00:32:20,350 --> 00:32:28,540 and how do they explain the fact that like so what do they say about that kind of variation? 284 00:32:28,540 --> 00:32:36,580 Well, I don't think this argument are not ignorant of the fact that there are important cultural differences 285 00:32:36,580 --> 00:32:41,830 which which which encourage this kind of thinking in some societies and discourages in others. 286 00:32:41,830 --> 00:32:48,240 One of the interesting you might say that Scandinavia, the north west Europe in particular, 287 00:32:48,240 --> 00:32:54,610 were in biological terms, pre adapted to adopt these kinds of attitudes because, 288 00:32:54,610 --> 00:33:03,010 of course, in family structure, they'd be more individually oriented in the past compared with Southern Europe and Eastern Europe anyway, 289 00:33:03,010 --> 00:33:10,330 in the sense that much higher proportions of of families in Scandinavia and north Western Europe, 290 00:33:10,330 --> 00:33:15,220 including Britain, back in the early modern period in the 18th century, 291 00:33:15,220 --> 00:33:16,840 the 17th and 16th century, 292 00:33:16,840 --> 00:33:28,010 were a nuclear family based where elderly parents were not usually living with a young young adult children and being looked after. 293 00:33:28,010 --> 00:33:32,260 It certainly happened to a quite reasonable degree, but it was not the norm. 294 00:33:32,260 --> 00:33:36,340 It was the norm in southern Europe. And you might expect that under those circumstances, 295 00:33:36,340 --> 00:33:42,820 a more family oriented or family culture typical of southern Europe typically or most of the rest of the world, 296 00:33:42,820 --> 00:33:48,010 would tend to be rather more resistant for all sorts of reasons to to accuse 297 00:33:48,010 --> 00:33:52,060 of doing our own thing and ignoring your kin regarding their their opinions. 298 00:33:52,060 --> 00:34:01,380 That examples are not very important. It doesn't work so well in southern Europe or in the Far East, as we will see on. 299 00:34:01,380 --> 00:34:08,730 Some rather glib objections here that you might say you might wonder if it was really a second demographic transition, 300 00:34:08,730 --> 00:34:13,350 but merely following on from the first in some way. Is it really demographic? 301 00:34:13,350 --> 00:34:20,590 Is it really a transition? Does it does the whole package actually make sense, particularly the question of low birthrate? 302 00:34:20,590 --> 00:34:22,590 So come on in a moment. 303 00:34:22,590 --> 00:34:32,820 And also, is it the only way of explaining the radical changes in marital behaviour and so on, which you seen in different parts of Europe? 304 00:34:32,820 --> 00:34:37,590 It seems to work better in some than in others. I hope I can show. 305 00:34:37,590 --> 00:34:45,600 Nonetheless, as many have said, it remains probably the single most frequently cited and used model of demographic 306 00:34:45,600 --> 00:34:56,540 change in Western Europe and the rest of the world at the present time. So it won't do to to try and rubbish it too much. 307 00:34:56,540 --> 00:35:02,780 Some aspects of this may be regarded as merely the continuation of unfinished 308 00:35:02,780 --> 00:35:07,490 business from the first democratic transition and in part a consequence of it. 309 00:35:07,490 --> 00:35:12,710 So some, for starting with K 1991, have insisted. 310 00:35:12,710 --> 00:35:18,920 A more interesting objection, perhaps, is that it doesn't deal with the central issues of demography. 311 00:35:18,920 --> 00:35:23,810 It doesn't have anything directly at all to say about mortality and health. 312 00:35:23,810 --> 00:35:31,580 It doesn't have anything directly to say about migration, which is the major driver of demographic change in most developed countries. 313 00:35:31,580 --> 00:35:36,380 You may say, of course, that insofar as it correctly predicts very low birthrates, 314 00:35:36,380 --> 00:35:42,110 then it may be indirectly predicting high levels of migration as a kind of compensating mechanism. 315 00:35:42,110 --> 00:35:46,850 But that would be, I think, taking things a little bit far. 316 00:35:46,850 --> 00:35:54,710 And therefore, it doesn't have a lot to say about population ageing or population decline as such. 317 00:35:54,710 --> 00:35:59,150 Is it being too nit picking to ask whether it's really a transition? 318 00:35:59,150 --> 00:36:02,330 Perhaps it may be too early to say. 319 00:36:02,330 --> 00:36:11,420 Nonetheless, what we have seen is that it's created a huge element of diversity in those countries where it has become more popular, but it isn't. 320 00:36:11,420 --> 00:36:15,050 These behaviours are not completely displaced. Traditional behaviour. 321 00:36:15,050 --> 00:36:22,760 For example, even in Scandinavia, the proportion of births outside marriage has much exceeded 50 percent. 322 00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:27,950 It's not inexorably going up, but you may have seen it in the previous graph. 323 00:36:27,950 --> 00:36:35,810 The level was somewhat flattening out. So what's been happening is that in in the same countries, in the same populations, in the same communities, 324 00:36:35,810 --> 00:36:40,520 in the same towns, even in the same streets, there'll be some people who will be married. 325 00:36:40,520 --> 00:36:46,280 Some people will be cohabiting, some people with some certain kinds of values, certain people with other kinds of values. 326 00:36:46,280 --> 00:36:52,760 And the more progressive ones, if you like, are not completely eliminating the traditional ones. 327 00:36:52,760 --> 00:36:57,170 And this is a bit of a contrast. If that remains true with the first demographic transition, 328 00:36:57,170 --> 00:37:00,860 the first demographic transition has become more or less universal in the sense that 329 00:37:00,860 --> 00:37:09,080 almost no one has a family size of six or seven and the average is generally very low, 330 00:37:09,080 --> 00:37:16,460 whereas that kind of convergence is not at community level as well as national level is not apparent yet. 331 00:37:16,460 --> 00:37:21,410 In second demographic transition behaviour. 332 00:37:21,410 --> 00:37:31,280 And this is an example of the variety of preferences for living arrangements, as in the 1990s, things have moved on a bit a bit further than this. 333 00:37:31,280 --> 00:37:41,030 But just looking at the at the top line preferred living arrangements for in Austria, 18 percent felt that marriage is preferable. 334 00:37:41,030 --> 00:37:45,530 Czechoslovakia, as it was then 64 percent. Italy, 76 percent. 335 00:37:45,530 --> 00:37:54,930 Netherlands, 48 percent. That may simply reflect as less tolerant, Vanderkam would insist, a different level of acquisition, 336 00:37:54,930 --> 00:38:01,250 a different rate of diffusion, and that eventually, in some decades time, those will be the same and not different. 337 00:38:01,250 --> 00:38:10,160 Here's an example of tremendous variety in the United States, as you may, as you may possibly recognise at the bottom. 338 00:38:10,160 --> 00:38:21,250 But no one. What you got here is a scoring by the his colleagues of second demographic behaviour transmission behaviour at the county level in the US, 339 00:38:21,250 --> 00:38:24,730 a very ambitious exercise in statistics. Second, 340 00:38:24,730 --> 00:38:31,060 demographic transmission behaviour being estimated by an index made up of the proportions who are reported 341 00:38:31,060 --> 00:38:37,400 to be cohabiting and the proportion of births outside of marriage and some other variables I forget anyway, 342 00:38:37,400 --> 00:38:41,290 the ones which are manifesting those things to a higher level. 343 00:38:41,290 --> 00:38:48,310 I call it blue. The blue or you are the more likely you are to live in a country where these things are statistically common. 344 00:38:48,310 --> 00:38:52,570 The redder you are, the more likely you are to be in a population where where most people are married, 345 00:38:52,570 --> 00:38:59,560 where births outside marriage are very infrequent. And all of this, as you might imagine, is the great state of Utah. 346 00:38:59,560 --> 00:39:12,670 Very rare indeed. This is the the central heartland of of conservatism, of the religious right, if I can impose a political notion upon it. 347 00:39:12,670 --> 00:39:18,850 And here is the liberal progressive East Coast and a laid back California, 348 00:39:18,850 --> 00:39:23,260 indulging in behaviour very much more similar to that of north Western Europe and Scandinavia, 349 00:39:23,260 --> 00:39:26,620 and also much more similar to Canada up in the north, 350 00:39:26,620 --> 00:39:32,580 where behaviour is somewhat different from that in the United States and certainly very different from from this. 351 00:39:32,580 --> 00:39:40,690 This is a more conservative area here. So much so that some satirists have imagined that the future might look like that, 352 00:39:40,690 --> 00:39:50,650 that Canada and California and the East Coast might might combine that leaving leaving the rest to a different way of looking at the world, 353 00:39:50,650 --> 00:39:56,860 interestingly enough, and without wishing to divert too much this and flip back second, 354 00:39:56,860 --> 00:40:04,960 this contrast here is alleged by some to have considerable potential political consequences, because while as we will see, 355 00:40:04,960 --> 00:40:11,530 it is not the case that a favour for a second demographic transition behaviour 356 00:40:11,530 --> 00:40:15,460 in terms of cohabitation and so on goes hand in hand with low birthrates, it doesn't. 357 00:40:15,460 --> 00:40:21,850 It's the reverse. Nonetheless, within countries, the less our expectation is roughly expected. 358 00:40:21,850 --> 00:40:26,320 And those, as might seem reasonable, those countries where you're doing our own thing, 359 00:40:26,320 --> 00:40:36,040 where you're putting yourself first to caricature almost those values, are also the ones where birth rates are low and indeed birth rates are low. 360 00:40:36,040 --> 00:40:43,030 In East Coast states, birth rates are low in the non Hispanic populations in California and elsewhere and tend 361 00:40:43,030 --> 00:40:50,500 to be high here in so far insofar as there is a strong religious association there. 362 00:40:50,500 --> 00:40:55,990 According to Eric Kaufmann, that's good news for religion insofar as religion is transmitted from parents of children with a 363 00:40:55,990 --> 00:41:01,930 lot of leakage that will that will benefit the survival and spread of a strong religious values. 364 00:41:01,930 --> 00:41:09,550 It will also have political consequences because these states tend to vote for Mr. Bush and not for Mr. 365 00:41:09,550 --> 00:41:18,580 Obama insofar as as political prejudices and political tastes are inherited from from parents of children, 366 00:41:18,580 --> 00:41:22,180 which they are, but with a very considerable leakage, 367 00:41:22,180 --> 00:41:31,630 then it should be the Republicans have got a built in demographic advantage over Democrats, and in due course, the future may be red. 368 00:41:31,630 --> 00:41:34,480 Now, there are so many other factors affecting politics. 369 00:41:34,480 --> 00:41:42,710 This this is perhaps rather a far fetched notion that it is seriously advanced in some American political science circles. 370 00:41:42,710 --> 00:41:54,760 There's a demographic problem with the Democrats have got to overcome by by by trying harder as well on the political front. 371 00:41:54,760 --> 00:42:03,010 Is this transition just the political aspects of it, if the Republican came to office, 372 00:42:03,010 --> 00:42:21,400 maybe in the top down investment increase, that you might want to be a role model like abortion or gay? 373 00:42:21,400 --> 00:42:34,120 There may be increased political changes that change the demographics, but it's it's it's by no means impossible. 374 00:42:34,120 --> 00:42:42,820 And in authoritarian states, of course, that has is exactly what has happened in Romania being the most dramatic example back in 1966, 375 00:42:42,820 --> 00:42:50,320 I think in the United States politics, that it is inconceivable that something wrong were over, that that could happen. 376 00:42:50,320 --> 00:42:59,440 Not the least, of course, because although Republicans tend to be more and more pro-life than Democrats, generally speaking, 377 00:42:59,440 --> 00:43:05,120 nonetheless, is a very strong American tradition of of the state not interfering in various private matters. 378 00:43:05,120 --> 00:43:10,660 And I thought that would that by itself would be the overwhelming factor which would prevent that happening, 379 00:43:10,660 --> 00:43:16,010 quite apart from the obvious huge political problems, which would cause I to pretend to be a political scientist. 380 00:43:16,010 --> 00:43:22,150 But that's just my view. I would not do any better than yours in that matter. 381 00:43:22,150 --> 00:43:26,560 Is that a question or a stretch? OK, yes. 382 00:43:26,560 --> 00:43:35,740 The transition is not meant to be irreversible. And again, there are small indications that there is a bit of a rebound going on here in terms of now 383 00:43:35,740 --> 00:43:39,700 this is the total first marriage rate is actually creeping up a bit in these countries, 384 00:43:39,700 --> 00:43:44,320 which I have carefully selected to make my point for me. But the increase is not great. 385 00:43:44,320 --> 00:43:52,180 Nonetheless, it is there and we'll have to wait and see if it sustains birth rates can go up as well as down, 386 00:43:52,180 --> 00:43:54,490 as you will recall, from from previous elections. 387 00:43:54,490 --> 00:44:03,130 And again, those are a few carefully selected patterns showing a long term, although slow drift upwards. 388 00:44:03,130 --> 00:44:11,650 There's also the question as to whether all aspects of this transition can be sustainable, particularly in an era of constrained economies. 389 00:44:11,650 --> 00:44:17,560 And even more important, perhaps they are where all populations in the developed world are ageing, 390 00:44:17,560 --> 00:44:27,070 some of them ageing very fast, and this is imposing absolutely unavoidable extra burdens upon the economy. 391 00:44:27,070 --> 00:44:35,770 One of the ways in which the demographic transition behaviours can be sustained is because they can rely upon welfare. 392 00:44:35,770 --> 00:44:43,030 If you've got a welfare cushion which protects you from what in previous decades or previous centuries would have been very dire, 393 00:44:43,030 --> 00:44:48,250 economical consequences of having a baby outside marriage, getting divorced and so on, 394 00:44:48,250 --> 00:44:55,180 then of course, it opens the field for for a wider participation in those behaviours. 395 00:44:55,180 --> 00:45:03,190 If economies become constrained and the considerable welfare costs of that welfare support become more difficult to support, 396 00:45:03,190 --> 00:45:05,470 partly because of adverse economic circumstances, 397 00:45:05,470 --> 00:45:16,180 partly because of competing demands from the older generation, then that it may be that the welfare blanket will will become more moderated. 398 00:45:16,180 --> 00:45:21,940 And it's certainly been revolts in the polling booth against the very, 399 00:45:21,940 --> 00:45:27,820 very high taxation required to sustain the welfare state in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries. 400 00:45:27,820 --> 00:45:33,730 And probably know to socialist parties, which have had held sway for 40 years or so in Sweden and Norway, 401 00:45:33,730 --> 00:45:44,200 have been from time to time thrown out of office in the last decade or more, partly as a result of concerns about the tax costs of the welfare system. 402 00:45:44,200 --> 00:45:49,360 It's certainly a coherent concept in the sense that the divorce rate variable, 403 00:45:49,360 --> 00:45:55,300 the cohabitation variable, the birth outside marriage variable all go together quite demonstrably. 404 00:45:55,300 --> 00:46:01,360 Where they were it doesn't fit is in the very important dimension of the birthrate. 405 00:46:01,360 --> 00:46:10,180 International comparisons nowadays show that those countries which have got the most marked manifestation of second demographic transition behaviour, 406 00:46:10,180 --> 00:46:16,240 that is to say, hi births outside marriage, high levels of divorce, cohabitation and so on, 407 00:46:16,240 --> 00:46:21,760 are the ones which have got the highest levels of fertility in the developed world, not the lowest, 408 00:46:21,760 --> 00:46:26,050 which is exactly what you would expect with the contrary, 409 00:46:26,050 --> 00:46:34,630 given that the the the importance of self realisation and what some people would call selfish behaviour or self oriented behaviour anyway, 410 00:46:34,630 --> 00:46:38,770 which is supposed to be characteristic of the underlying values, if you are thinking about me, 411 00:46:38,770 --> 00:46:43,630 you don't want to lumbered with babies for reasons we've got into in previous lectures. 412 00:46:43,630 --> 00:46:54,700 But as you see here, the TFR around 2000 is high, close to two or even above it in those countries where where births outside marriage are. 413 00:46:54,700 --> 00:46:59,720 Competition is common divorce, common, Iceland, Norway, France, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, 414 00:46:59,720 --> 00:47:06,100 the U.K. and so on, very low down here, Italy, Greece, Spain, Switzerland, Germany and so on. 415 00:47:06,100 --> 00:47:11,630 As I mentioned earlier on, statistically speaking, you can't get a TFR of one point, 416 00:47:11,630 --> 00:47:15,790 one point seven or above unless at least 30 percent of births are outside marriage. 417 00:47:15,790 --> 00:47:21,670 That's not a policy. Prescription is simply an empirical observation of contemporary demographic behaviour. 418 00:47:21,670 --> 00:47:26,350 And that's gone hand in hand with the reversal of the international correlation between 419 00:47:26,350 --> 00:47:33,180 women's workforce participation on the one hand and the birth rate over 20 years. 420 00:47:33,180 --> 00:47:41,640 The underlying theory is, in some respects, perhaps a little a little shaky, I mentioned the criticisms made, 421 00:47:41,640 --> 00:47:49,590 but it's not in any in any important way different from the conservative progressive axis of of social behaviour, 422 00:47:49,590 --> 00:47:56,850 which social psychologists have been playing with for quite a long time, as indeed less tolerant than to call themselves state. 423 00:47:56,850 --> 00:48:04,950 It is in some respects an underlying fashion and economic model of the the the capacity, the freedom of action, as it were, 424 00:48:04,950 --> 00:48:12,450 to behave in ways which are described in these various indices, does rely upon a certain level of economic prosperity. 425 00:48:12,450 --> 00:48:20,970 Without that prosperity, you go back down the magic, the scale as you start becoming more concerned with with day to day survival, 426 00:48:20,970 --> 00:48:27,630 more concerned about your standard of living, more concerned with with other material things. 427 00:48:27,630 --> 00:48:32,370 And indeed, they they themselves expected that if if there were major economic downturns, 428 00:48:32,370 --> 00:48:38,400 then opinion would shift back towards a more materialist approach, at least temporarily. 429 00:48:38,400 --> 00:48:44,440 And so in some respects, this is not a purely ideational model like most of these models. 430 00:48:44,440 --> 00:48:48,780 It is related to other aspects of the way the world works and is in some respects 431 00:48:48,780 --> 00:48:56,460 basically based fundamentally an economic model and not just an ideological one. 432 00:48:56,460 --> 00:49:02,820 Finally, there's the question of whether one can find other explanations for behaviour, 433 00:49:02,820 --> 00:49:08,250 which looks like that is the second demographic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 434 00:49:08,250 --> 00:49:12,630 for example, there was a temporary huge reduction in standards of living. 435 00:49:12,630 --> 00:49:19,200 Once communism collapsed, the guaranteed wage disappeared, even though it might have been bogus, 436 00:49:19,200 --> 00:49:25,320 as the old Soviet gybe was that we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us. 437 00:49:25,320 --> 00:49:30,150 Nonetheless, there was guaranteed employment, there wasn't any inflation, 438 00:49:30,150 --> 00:49:39,370 and a basic standard was sure that went temporary anyway out of the window once communism collapsed and wasn't replaced by a coherent alternative, 439 00:49:39,370 --> 00:49:45,090 a way of dealing with the economy. And you can see these fat lines. 440 00:49:45,090 --> 00:49:51,720 That's a graph of the real GDP or real net material product, as it was then called in Soviet times, 441 00:49:51,720 --> 00:49:57,630 showing a tremendous dip in after 1989 to much lower levels than previously was the case. 442 00:49:57,630 --> 00:50:02,370 And these are the births outside of marriage in central Eastern European countries, 443 00:50:02,370 --> 00:50:06,930 Bulgaria, Estonia, Belarus, East Germany, Czech Republic at the same time. 444 00:50:06,930 --> 00:50:14,290 So you see this huge reduction in central living happening at the same time as the second demographic transition indicator goes shooting up. 445 00:50:14,290 --> 00:50:17,400 That's not what's meant to happen. It's meant to be a result. 446 00:50:17,400 --> 00:50:26,670 If it is following the Mazlo Englehardt Lisagor model, it's meant to be a response of prosperity and security, not insecurity and problems. 447 00:50:26,670 --> 00:50:33,540 And that's led many to suggest that one of the reasons why marriage has declined so fast versus a major 448 00:50:33,540 --> 00:50:39,900 increase so much in Eastern Europe is is not entirely because there's no second demographic transition, 449 00:50:39,900 --> 00:50:45,270 genuine behaviour. People nowadays are many more prosperous. But but also because in many parts of society, 450 00:50:45,270 --> 00:50:53,670 there is very considerable aname that the Soviet period damaged or destroyed the previous religious 451 00:50:53,670 --> 00:50:59,400 based approach to morality and replaced it with some what some called socialist morality. 452 00:50:59,400 --> 00:51:08,790 When that disappeared, then it's left something of a moral vacuum and that is led to very radical changes 453 00:51:08,790 --> 00:51:13,290 which can't possibly be explained in terms of prosperity in Eastern Europe. 454 00:51:13,290 --> 00:51:21,090 Here's the number of births outside marriage in various European countries, Eastern European countries shooting up after that transition. 455 00:51:21,090 --> 00:51:26,220 Likewise, we have curious patterns happening in East Asia. 456 00:51:26,220 --> 00:51:30,990 It is certainly true that mediumship marriage is going up there from quite low levels. 457 00:51:30,990 --> 00:51:37,350 These populations, Far East, if you like, a final line typically at very early ages of marriage, 20, 21, 22. 458 00:51:37,350 --> 00:51:46,080 For women, those have increased substantially. But that seems to me to be better explained simply in terms of modernisation of a hugely educated, 459 00:51:46,080 --> 00:51:57,480 hugely successful society which has overtaken the West in many indicators of survival and of individual prosperity. 460 00:51:57,480 --> 00:52:07,770 I guess that's out of place. So I'll leave. That is certainly the case that a yes or an unheard of proportions of women never married. 461 00:52:07,770 --> 00:52:12,780 That, too, is growing. Previously, the proportion of women never marrying was very, very low. 462 00:52:12,780 --> 00:52:16,200 You see, amongst the Malaysian Chinese in 1960, 463 00:52:16,200 --> 00:52:26,490 eighty three point eight percent had never married by by by by age thirty thirty four, only two point six percent by age 40 to 44. 464 00:52:26,490 --> 00:52:33,510 And similarly in Taiwan, one point three percent. Japan, three point two percent or below 10 percent now. 465 00:52:33,510 --> 00:52:38,910 By the year 2000, either approaching 10 percent or even in Bangkok, 20 percent. 466 00:52:38,910 --> 00:52:43,680 Is this simply modernisation that they're delaying marriage and avoiding marriage and then 467 00:52:43,680 --> 00:52:49,980 and or is it part of because of the much better possibilities of education and career, 468 00:52:49,980 --> 00:52:55,380 or is it something to do with the spread of new values as well? 469 00:52:55,380 --> 00:52:57,120 The. 470 00:52:57,120 --> 00:53:04,320 The answer to that so far seems to be not much, because these are proportional births, outside marriages, which you'd have thought would have gone up. 471 00:53:04,320 --> 00:53:10,340 Likewise, if that had been there's been symptoms of the second demographic transition behaviour and they're not the Cerillo. 472 00:53:10,340 --> 00:53:19,110 This is a burst of marriage per thousand two thousand three thousand twenty four thousand forty four thousand two percent to four percent. 473 00:53:19,110 --> 00:53:24,300 I haven't got much data, but this is for Japan. This is for Taiwan. 474 00:53:24,300 --> 00:53:31,410 And that's for for Hong Kong. So very mixed messages from from the from East Asia. 475 00:53:31,410 --> 00:53:40,830 So to conclude, while many aspects of the old West European system have gone, some have remained somewhat like a late marriage, 476 00:53:40,830 --> 00:53:47,490 like delayed marriage, like proportions never marrying, are becoming common in areas where previously they were not common. 477 00:53:47,490 --> 00:53:50,760 So in some respects, it's not dead becoming universal. 478 00:53:50,760 --> 00:54:00,870 In other respects it has gone because the constraint of not having births outside marriage is is vanishing and such behaviour is very, 479 00:54:00,870 --> 00:54:06,720 very common and universal. The transition is not complete. 480 00:54:06,720 --> 00:54:08,940 It may not become complete and as I mentioned, 481 00:54:08,940 --> 00:54:17,850 may end up with a situation of greater diversity rather than a complete switchover from one sort of pattern of behaviour and demography to another. 482 00:54:17,850 --> 00:54:25,710 And in some areas, like in Central and Eastern Europe, like in the Far East, second, demographic transition models are only one possible example. 483 00:54:25,710 --> 00:54:31,470 One possible explanation for what is certainly a very interesting transformation in behaviour and that I'm to stop. 484 00:54:31,470 --> 00:54:35,244 Thank you very much.