International migration: guest workers, dependents, asylum and others

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Outline

Migration in the broader context of demography.
The importance, or otherwise, of migration in demographic change.
Migration theory and its difficulties
The processes and diversity of migration in the modern world.
Volume and trend of migration.
Demographic, economic and other consequences.
A problematic variable

A fuzzy category: repeatable, reversible.
Poor statistics – defined by 57 varieties of laws.
Often big errors in both directions – but getting better.

A multiplicity of processes and streams
Theory and prediction even more difficult than in fertility and mortality.

Politicised and unappealing?
Poor statistics- some examples

Flow - most ‘migration’ data isn’t.  
Stock - invisible ‘foreigners’.  
Different sources, different numbers.
Migration paramount – Palaeolithic and later globalization

Migration an essential survival strategy for animal and early human populations.

Constant movement of most hunter-gatherers, transhumance of pastoralists.

Colonisation of the Earth – ‘Out of Africa’; wave of advance

*Volkerwanderung* period up to 15th century.

Eventually, globalisation of people, diseases and aspects of culture.
A summary of genetic variation in Europe: first principal component

Barbujani G., Bertorelle G. PNAS 2001;98:22-25
Genetic relics of ancient migration to Europe. A map created solely on principal components of genetic data.

Source: Novembre et al, 2008 Nature 456, 7218
Cultural and political effects of migration 1: integration. The first Euro zone, around 120AD.
Ancestry flow can be slow: distribution of one surname (from a single place-name), Census of England and Wales 1881, and 1998.

Source: National Trust, and Longley et al.
Migration marginalised?

Used to be relatively ignored by demographers (*pace* Kingsley Davis).

A Eurocentric view? – migration minor between settled wealthy states in peacetime Europe from 15\textsuperscript{th} c; even within EU in late 20\textsuperscript{th}.

But migration very large from Europe to (e.g.) Americas. Emigration may have retarded fertility transition. Migration effects dominant at local level.

In 19\textsuperscript{th}, early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, migration effects in Europe mostly overwhelmed by birth / death differentials of first demographic transition.
Migration theory - fragmented theory for a diverse process?

Push and pull factors: demographic and economic inequalities.
Economic ‘equilibrium’ models – supply and demand for labour and capital.
Economic refinements – cost/benefit decisions; household investments;
Segmented or ‘dual’ labour markets.
Active labour recruitment, skilled migration, intercompany transfers
Networks and chains, marriage, ‘Cumulative causation’.
‘transnational’ populations, non-labour related movement.
Force, political instability and persecution, environmental change. Refugees and asylum seeking.
Importance of politics and policy in sending and receiving countries.
Some facilitating factors

Uneven progress of economic development and demographic transition.
Geographical proximity.
Political / historical connections.
Post-war ‘revolutions’ in transport, information and rights.
State policy in sending and receiving countries.
International conventions.
The ‘migration industry’ and trafficking.
Some components of gross immigration inflows to Western Europe (blue is family; OECD 2003)
Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%).

France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow) according to reason for admission (percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Worker</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Percent by area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Europe</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INED

Note: 'Other' includes inactive, retired, refugee. Percent by purpose excludes minors (about 8% of total). Switzerland and Turkey omitted. 12% of total; mostly Turkey, 39% for family reasons.
Projections of world population by level of development, 1950 - 2050.

Source: UN World Population Prospects 2004
Economic disparities across the Mediterranean (GDP per head in US$)
Southern Europe and its neighbours

Source UN World Population Prospects - the 2002 revision

- Southern Europe
- North Africa
Turkey and Western Europe

Percent of population that are immigrants, world and selected regions, 1960-2005. Source: UN.

Note: increase in Europe around 1990 is connected with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Oceania omitted; peaks at 10%.

Percent of world and regional population that are international migrants, 1960 - 2005. Source: UN
Long-term trends of migration to the United States

Note: peak in 1991 is an artefact following an amnesty arising from IRCA 1986.

UK Net Immigration 1962-2010 (thousands). Source: ONS.

Net balance corrected
Post-2001 Census

UK net migration by citizenship 1967 - 2010 (thousands).

Migration flows to European Union and USA

Net immigration to EU-15, EU27 and gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2008
(thousands)

- Net immigration to EU-15
- Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)
- Net immigration to EU27
Migration can go down as well as up. Germany 1954 – 2007.

Migration to Germany 1954 - 2007, by citizenship.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.
Net migration to selected European countries 1997 - 2008

Net migration, selected European countries 1997 - 2008, thousands.
Source: Eurostat
Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – 2008.
Note: increase primarily due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal residence through amnesties.

Net migration, Spain and Italy, 1997 - 2008 (thousands).
Source: Eurostat.
Consequences of migration

Demographic change. Growth and decline, age-structure effects, depopulation.
Demographic salvation through migration?
Economic benefits and costs
Replacement migration.
Ethnic change
Figure 2 - Bilan démographique 2001 pour les principaux pays d'Europe occidentale, classés selon la part de croissance due aux migrations

N. B. : l'épaisseur des bandes (axe vertical) indique la population des pays ; les surfaces sont donc proportionnelles aux excédents et aux déficits

Lecture : Avec un taux d'accroissement naturel de 4 pour 1 000 et un taux d'accroissement migratoire de 1 pour 1 000, la France est le pays d'Europe dont la croissance démographique annuelle dépend le moins de l'immigration : seulement 20 %, alors que l'Allemagne, à l'autre extrémité, compte plus de décès que de naissances (accroissement naturel négatif inférieur à -1 pour mille) et un accroissement migratoire supérieur à 3 pour mille qui dépasse de 50 % la croissance globale.

Source : Ined (www.ined.fr)
Net immigration compared with births in some Western European countries.

Selected Western European countries 2007
Comparisons of live births, net immigration and natural increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population 1st Jan08</th>
<th>Live births</th>
<th>Natural increase</th>
<th>Net immigration</th>
<th>Immigration as percent of births percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>44475</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>7509</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>59131</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4681</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10585</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8299</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11172</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5447</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60817</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France mét</td>
<td>61538</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>82315</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>-141</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All in table: 355968 3792 483 1752 46

Source: Eurostat
UK population 2008-2081 (millions).
Source: ONS 2009 Principal Projection.

Population projection, United Kingdom 2008 - 2081 (millions).
Principal Projection and migration variants. Source: ONS 2009.

Potential effect upon age-structure (percent distribution).

Figure 1: Age structure of the population on 1 January 2009 and of immigrants in 2008, EU-27
Imigration and the Potential Support Ratio
Population Trends 103

Figure 8  Support ratio under alternative assumptions, United Kingdom, 1980-2100
(a) alternative migration assumptions

Long-term TFR: 1.8
Long-term annual net inward migration: as shown

Projected

Ratio

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5

Year

1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100

1,000,000 500,000 250,000 95,000 (principal) Zero

Long-term annual net inward migration: 95,000
UK population size required to maintain given PSRs by immigration, 2000 - 2100 (millions)
The economic arguments for mass migration – labour market and macroeconomic

Increases GDP
Fiscal benefit
Essential for labour needs
Does the natives no harm
Fiscal effects - many studies, unclear message

Variety of approaches - static and dynamic, national and provincial.

Variety of effects - educated, skilled immigrants, mostly from rich countries, make large contribution. Unskilled immigrants, mostly from poor countries, do not.

Mixed, small overall effect (e.g. Sweden -$718) e.g: Net present value in US: high skill +$96k, low skill -$36k (Storesletten 2000). Annual fiscal effect Denmark: rich countries +$1650 poor countries -$8546 (Wadensjo ‘99).

Emigration usually ignored.

Fiscal analysis relates to limited, direct effects only.
**Net fiscal contribution of immigrants - a mixed message.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Surplus ($bn)</th>
<th>% GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Borjas 1994</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huddle 1993</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Passel 1994</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lee and Miller 1998*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lee and Miller 1998**</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lee and Miller 1998***</td>
<td>-76</td>
<td>-1.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (debt interest and public goods costs not allocated to immigrants)
** (increased taxes to balance budget, no more spend on immigrants)
*** (taxes constant, debt interest and public goods allocated pro rata)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual fiscal contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland 1990</td>
<td>Weber and Straubhaar 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 1999/2000</td>
<td>Gott and Johnson 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Wadensjo 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from developed countries</td>
<td>$1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor countries</td>
<td>-$8546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Labour migration

Fiscal, labour market, productivity benefits of high skill migration.

Most migration is not (formal) labour migration.

Labour emigration tends to be ignored.

Some foreign / minority unemployment rates are high in first and second generation; workforce participation rates low.

Evidence that as a whole immigration benefits consumers and employers, damages interests of low-paid native workers, locally and remotely (Dustmann, Hatton and Tani, House of Lords 2008. MAC 2012).
Strategic aspects of labour migration

Demand for immigrant labour reflects superior work ethic, skills, restrictive domestic labour market, population ageing.

But can perpetuate poor conditions and lack of training for domestic youth.

Part of demand arises directly from growth of immigrant population itself.

Immigrant labour alters economy; can create dependence, maintains low cost enterprises with poor conditions (e.g. NHS).

Permanent population acquired for transient jobs (1960s German car plants, uncompetitive industries in Bradford, Oldham, etc.)
Ethnic change

Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other. If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated. Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.
Long-term projected ethnic change in UK population under different migration scenarios 2006 – 2100.

FIGURE 6 Long-term projection of White British population (percent) 2006–2101 under various scenarios
Comparison of results of European foreign-origin projections

Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as percent of total population.
Conclusions

Patterns, sources, causes and consequences highly heterogeneous; theory and prediction difficult.

Migration now the primary driver of population change in many low TFR countries. But not (yet) in East Asia, some CEE and FSU.

Mixed and controversial economic consequences. Can moderate, but not ‘solve’ population ageing. Possibly leads to a ‘third demographic transition’.
Obstacles to achieving aim of reducing net immigration to the UK

**Internal government problems**

- Many Liberal Democrat coalition partners dislike basic policy of reduction of immigration.
- Liberal Democrat partners will resist reform of Human Rights legislation, EU arrangements.
- Incompatibility with other strands of government policy: cutting expenditure on police and border controls, enthusiasm for EU membership of Balkan countries, Turkey, increase in foreign aid.

**EU immigration (Eastern Europe) cannot be stopped.**

**Economic dependency and distortion from 13 years of high immigration.**

- Opposition from business interests – ‘risking the recovery’.
- Opposition from universities made dependent upon non-EU students.

**Strength of immigrant, human rights pressure groups.**

**Electoral pressure from immigrants, including non-UK citizens.**

**External pressures from asylum claims, forced climate migration.**

**Instability of ‘net’ migration (little control over emigration element).**
A scheme of the main demographic processes documented in the archaeological record of Europe

Barbujani G., Bertorelle G. PNAS 2001;98:22-25
Net immigration to UK 1993 – 2010 according to citizenship. Source: ONS.

Net migration to UK 1993 - 2010. by citizenship. Source; ONS

Source: Eurostat.