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‘In the multitude of the people is the King’s honour; but in the want of people is the destruction of the Prince.’

Proverbs XIV 28

‘The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase in the number of its inhabitants.’

Topics

Fear of population decline
History
Responses to the early fertility transition
Modern examples
Bridging the gap
Tempo policies
Measuring effectiveness
Intended and unintended consequences of public policy
Antiquity of pro-natalist laws and policy

Fear and reality of population decline.

Mercantilist views.

Military power and labour force.

Survival of elites.

- Code of Hammurabi (Babylon, c. 1790 BC)
- Athens 5thC BC
- Augustan laws 18BC-9AD, Nerva (96-98) Trajan (98-117)
- Philip IV of Spain (1605-1665)
- Louis XIV and Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) 1666
- Tokugawa Japan (1605-1868) intensified after Meiji restoration 1868 (1873 code)
The modern world - population decline and population ageing

Previous two centuries of population growth historically abnormal, now ending.
20\textsuperscript{th} C concerns arose from fertility transition.
Population ageing inevitable, permanent consequence of low death and birth rates.
Low /negative natural increase in most developed countries, since 1930s.
Diversity– population growth substantial in (e.g.) UK, France, Sweden, USA (migration).
Japan, Germany, CEE, FSU face decline.

Source: Glass, 1936. **England and Wales:** (a) constant birth and death rates (b) fertility declines to 1985 © fertility returns to 1931 level. **Germany:** (a) births remain constant at 1927 level (b) fertility falls by 25% to 1955, then remains constant.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TFR</th>
<th>NRR</th>
<th>TFR</th>
<th>NRR</th>
<th>TFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1932/4</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.65</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>0.87</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1933</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Glass and Blacker 1938 t.5, Eurostat, National Statistical Yearbooks.

Figure IV. Government views on the level of fertility, Europe, 1976 and 2005

- Satisfactory
- Too high
- Too low
- No data available

Source: Council of Europe

- FSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova)
- CEE unweighted mean
- Balkans

Total fertility trends, Japan and the Far East 'little dragons' to 2006

Source: national statistical offices.
Japan: population projection to 3000
(population in millions: right hand scale. age-structure: left hand scale).
Three examples of developing pronatalist / family policy from the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

France, Germany, Soviet Union.

Prewar polices mostly cash compensation for child costs to ‘male breadwinner’ family, with restrictions on family planning, abortion.

France, Germany – restricting access to fp, cash compensation for child costs, maximising male employment.

USSR – additionally, need to maximise (female) workforce; state childcare in workplace creches etc.

‘Opportunity cost’ to married women not then a major consideration.

Post-war ‘family policies’ aimed at getting / keeping women in workforce, averting child poverty

Structure depends on type of social welfare regime (individualistic /family oriented / ‘liberal’).
## Origins of French demographic concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1978</th>
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<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>British Isles</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<td><strong>41</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany (modern)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (European)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Empire / USSR</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: McEvedy and Jones, Mitchell
French pronatalist policy

1666-83 Colbert’s legislation (promoting marriage, restricting emigration prizes for large families etc)
1813 Napoleonic marriage law doubled Crude Marriage Rate, CBR increased 10%
1896 Alliance National pour L’Accroissement de la Population Francaise.
1914-18 Family Allowances (cost 22% of GDP by 1949)
1920 Laws outlawing abortion and contraception, Médaille de la Famille Française instituted (relaunched 1982).

1939 Code de la Famille. Consistent family support throughout 20th c.
1944 INSEE, INED, Ministère du Travail et de la Population (Vichy)
Numerous benefits for ‘familles nombreuses’, extra benefits for third+ children.
1979 Giscard D’Estaing ‘Four great issues face France: economy, Europe, defence, population
2003 1.1 billion Euro scheme: 800 Euro for first child, more creches, preschool care.
2006 Tax-based incentives benefit higher-earning mothers (Randall 2005).
ALLIANCE NATIONALE - POPULATION ET AVENIR
Association reconnue d'utilité publique, fondée en 1896
35 rue Marbeuf - 75008 PARIS
Tél. (1) 42 25 19 81 - FAX (1) 53 76 02 22

SOS JEUNESSE !
Pour que la France ne se suicide pas par dénatalité

Appel pour sauver l'avenir

Lancé par
♦ Evelyne SULLEROT, sociologue, co-fondateuse du Planning Familial
♦ Jean-Claude CHESNAIS, démographe, économiste, auteur de "Le crépuscule de l'Occident" (Laflont, 1995)
♦ Jacques DUPÂQUIER, démographe, historien, rédacteur en chef de Population et Avenir
♦ Michel GODET, professeur au Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, chaire de prospective industrielle
♦ Philippe ROSSILLON, président de Population et Avenir

Janvier 1996

L'évolution démographique de la France et de la plupart des pays européens est dramatique. Le constat des chiffres est alarmant :

- La France a perdu un million et demi de jeunes depuis 1975, soit presque autant que la saignée de la guerre de 1914 ! Ces enfants ne sont pas nés, ils ne sont donc pas morts et il n'y aura jamais de monuments à l'entrée de nos villes.

- Si, comme probable, la projection basse de fécondité à 1,5 enfant par femme se réalisait, dans vingt ans la France compterait près de trois millions de jeunes en moins !

- L'effondrement sera encore plus fort en Italie du Nord et en Catalogne où la fécondité est tombée à moins d'un enfant par femme.

Qui financerà la protection sociale des anciens, lorsque la pyramide des âges se sera transformée en tourbe ? Personne n'est là pour défendre les générations futures. Elles ne votent pas et l'on peut donc continuer à tirer des traités qu'elles seront censées régler un jour. Cette facture sera d'autant plus insupportable qu'elle pesera sur un nombre sans cesse restreint d'actifs. Déjà aujourd'hui la jeunesse est devenue minoritaire et se trouve sacrifiée au nom de l'égotisme et de l'intérêt des générations nombreuses de l'après-guerre.
1920 Family allowances – for welfare reasons.
1926 Liberalisation of abortion law.
1931 Family allowances increased according to parity.
1933 Nazi anti-Malthusian policy; contraception not outlawed but clinics closed, abortion on eugenic grounds more liberal.
1933 marriage loans to encourage marriage and births, reduce unemployment. 1.1 million by 1938, most cancelled through childbearing.
1938 Tax on unmarried increased to 80% more than married.
1939 3 grades of Mutterkreuz introduced.
1940 severe restrictions on abortion and contraception.

1990s First renewed attempts at family-friendly legislation.
Improved parental leave and child-care.
2007 earnings-related leave payment - 67% for 12 months. Family friendly legislation, administrative change to remove impediments to working motherhood (school hours, shopping hours, part-time work etc)
Explicit encouragements to larger families by Ministers Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Kristina Schroder and MEP Dr Silvana Koch-Mehrin.
## German demographic trends 1876 - 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CBR</th>
<th>Ratio 1932=100</th>
<th>NRR ratio</th>
<th>Abortion ratio</th>
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<tr>
<td>1876-1880</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1906-1910</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1933</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>850-1130</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>125</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>106</td>
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Soviet population policy

1920 Abortion on demand (the first example)
1935-6 Severe restriction on abortion, state support for mothers, creches.
1941 Tax on single and childless.
1944 Medal for ‘Mother Hero’ (ten children raised!)
1955 abortion on demand re-instated
1966 Divorce re-instated, differentiated family policy discussed (European USSR vs. Central Asia).
1980s Gorbachev policy to reduce death rate.
1991 Old policy in disarray, family support continues. Putin regime strongly pro-natalist, new bonuses for mothers.
Medvedev promises land for babies as population suffers from Soviet hangover

Russia

Tony Halpin Moscow

The Kremlin's rulers used to boast that they were creating a New Man fit for a communist paradise on Earth. Now they are facing up to a devastating legacy of poverty, alcohol and suicide that threatens to destroy Russia.

President Medvedev warned yesterday that a demographic slump put the country's future at risk as he started a campaign to persuade millions of families to have more children.

He painted a grim picture of an abandoned generation of young Russians suffering poor health and impoverished lives as a result of years of indifference by parents and the State.

Families should be encouraged to have three or more children with offers of free land to build their own homes. The state should also pay couples 3,000 roubles (£60) a month for a third child and every subsequent baby they produced. Greater efforts should also be made to support young families by creating additional places at kindergartens. Mr Medvedev also demanded action to protect children from the damaging effects of alcohol by introducing tough penalties against people who sold drink to minors.

"The 26 million children and adolescents living in our country should fully develop, grow up healthy and happy and become proper citizens - this is task No 1 for all of us," he said. He...
And some exciting news from Norway

In a bid to counter the tedious stereotyping of Scandinavians, we bring exciting news from Norway. On Wednesday, 40 female employees of the local school — 30 teachers and 10 cleaners — in the north-western town of Saltdal were given the day off by headmaster Kgell Skogstad and asked to engage in an all day “love-in” in the barn in the centre of the town. This event was a dramatic attempt to save Saltdal from depopulation. Or so the official explanation has it.
Can policy affect family formation?

When modern states can spend 50% of GDP, many policies will affect rational choices on union formation and family (education, health, employment, housing) unintentionally.

Demand for children assumed to be axiomatic, or has to be ‘encouraged’. ‘unmet need’ inferred from mismatch of birth-rate and survey responses.

Three channels of influence: reducing costs, increasing income, increasing preferences.

Policies need to address impediments:

- Motivation and desire for children and marriage / union formation.
- Money costs (direct and opportunity).
- Time costs (parental leave, pre-school care).
- Life-course costs (job protection).
- Other burdens on women (gender equity, school and shopping hours).
- Timing of union formation and births (postponement) tertiary education, youth unemployment, housing, labour protection.
(Source: Eurobarometer 2001; Goldstein, Lutz and Rita Testa 2002)

Figure 2 Distribution of Personal Ideal Family Size, Women aged 20 to 34.
Effects of policies (intended or unintended) categories are not rigid or exclusive!

Explicit active pronatalism (usually in totalitarian regimes)
- Restriction of abortion / contraception
- Propaganda and prizes
- Compensations and punishments (creches, allowances, fines).

Democratic pronatalism (Japan, Singapore)
- Welfare based or cash compensation
- Parity-specific measures
- Positive official attitudes and propaganda.

Primarily welfare-oriented (most of Europe).
- Scandinavian ‘state feminism’, emphasis on gender equity, work-based benefits
- Equality, non-discrimination legislation relating to the labour market.
- Comprehensive state child care

Southern Europe
- Mostly financial incentives – protecting pensions, job security.

US ‘non-policy’
- State relief for poor (AFDC etc)
- Private sector child care (low tax, immigrant labour)
- ‘private sector’ feminism
Does it work?
Methodology neglected until recently..
International comparisons:
  Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) – only modest effects 25% increase – 0.07 child.
  Castles 2003 – more powerful effects
  Grant 2004, Adkins 2003 10% income increase – 25% increase in TFR.
  Cash baby bonuses increase tempo, not quantum.
Methodological limitations: single country studies better?
  Kravdal 1996, Hoem (various)
  Neyer and Andersson 2008 – event-history analysis in specific countries better than aggregate measures.
Broad-brush comparison of child-friendly political culture (Hoem 2005, McDonald 2006).
International TFR gap: 0.8 child. Preference / actual gap 0.5 child. Policy prospect 0.2 child (Gauthier 2007).
Divergent neighbours; TFR of two Germanies, 1950 - 2007

TFR trends, Federal German Republic and German Democratic Republic, 1950 - 2007

- East Germany (former GDR)
- West Germany (former FRG)
Swedish family policy ‘speed premium’. Women are paid 80% of their pre-birth salary for a year after leaving work to have a child. If a second child is born within 24 months, the 80% is carried over (not reduced to 64%) to the next period of leave. Allowance extended to 30 months in 1986. A marked reduction in birth intervals, and increase in asfr has followed.

Source: Andersson et al. 2006.

Standardized second-birth rates, by number of years since first birth.

Simulated completed fertility by age 35 Norwegian women birth cohorts 1957–62 by level of child-care availability to 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child-care availability (%)</th>
<th>Children ever-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.74</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 1** Relationship between an index of gender equality and total fertility rates for 13 European Union countries.
Why do many policies fail?

Singapore – persistent failure since 1980s
Japan – Angel Plan, New Angel plan etc
Korea – tax and workforce measures
Southern, Eastern Europe – mostly financial help, exhortations and transient inducements.
Weak gender equity, excessive working hours, precarious employment / job protection more difficult to address.
Culture change more difficult than fiscal adjustments
Conclusion

‘National fertility is possibly best seen as a systemic outcome that depends more on broader attributes, such as the degree of family friendliness of a society, and less on the presence and detailed construction of monetary benefits’.

(Jan Hoem 2008)

‘Look after the interests of women, and population will look after itself.’

(Heather Joshi).
A more detailed look at Central and Eastern Europe
TFR trends, Selected Eastern and Central European countries 1948 - 2006.
Source: national statistical yearbooks, Eurostat, Council of Europe.
Persistent low fertility and persistent strong immigration can be endogenous components of economic growth.

Low fertility accelerates economic growth, increasing the human capital of the children.

Immigrations are indispensable for a long period economic growth in low fertility countries, contrasting the repugnant consequences of low fertility: lack of unskilled workers and aging of population.

Low fertility and immigrations are the “secret demographic engine” of the economic growth in some Western countries.
The social process in the real case...

- Couples adopt low fertility as a strategy for social mobility of children
- Children have higher chances and desire better jobs
- Low level jobs are left empty
- Immigrants fill in low level jobs, but quickly adapt to the host society in terms of low fertility strategies
- Even children of immigrants have higher chances and desire better jobs

... are these hypotheses confirmed?
Feedback between (foreign) immigration and (native) emigration?

- Native out-migration, emigration abroad.
- Belief in ‘xenergic’ economic growth
- Native low fertility
- High foreign immigration
- Immigrant predominance of parts of labour force
- Immigrant predominance in urban areas
- Labour demand
- Ineffective immigration control
- Immigration reinforcement

Native low fertility leads to high foreign immigration, which in turn leads to ineffective immigration control and reinforcement. This cycle perpetuates the high immigration rates, leading to native low fertility and belief in ‘xenergic’ economic growth. The cycle also involves native out-migration, emigration abroad, and immigrant predominance in urban areas, completing the feedback loop.

- Low fertility
  - Higher taxes, less family support.
  - Popn. decline and ageing.
  - Population stabilisation at smaller size.
  - Increased migration
  - Stationary total population, declining native population

- Lower density and housing costs, higher wages.