1 00:00:00,210 --> 00:00:08,400 Today to address a rather speculative problem, rather a problem in a rather speculative way concerning the demographic future, 2 00:00:08,400 --> 00:00:15,580 in particular the fertility future of the developing world, as the developing world becomes more developed as time goes on, 3 00:00:15,580 --> 00:00:21,750 birth rates in most but not all parts of what we call the developing world keep on going down. 4 00:00:21,750 --> 00:00:29,520 There is no lower limit yet in sight. Already, a high proportion of the population of the so-called developing world lives in countries 5 00:00:29,520 --> 00:00:35,160 where the overall total fertility is approaching or even lower than replacement rate. 6 00:00:35,160 --> 00:00:40,890 The prospect is is emerging of large parts of the what we now call the developing world, 7 00:00:40,890 --> 00:00:46,860 acquiring birth rates maybe even lower than those characteristic of north Western Europe and the United States, 8 00:00:46,860 --> 00:00:53,640 while at the same time a minor part of the developing world continues to grow rapidly under high alert. 9 00:00:53,640 --> 00:00:55,950 The study of diminishing fertility, particularly, of course, 10 00:00:55,950 --> 00:01:02,730 in sub-Saharan Africa and a few Asian countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and so on. 11 00:01:02,730 --> 00:01:15,180 And this is just an attempt to see what's going on, what may happen next and what the consequences might be. 12 00:01:15,180 --> 00:01:20,330 I'll try and use this clicker. 13 00:01:20,330 --> 00:01:29,180 Once upon a time, it was widely believed with some justice that I made a lot of sense for people in poor countries to have quite high fertility, 14 00:01:29,180 --> 00:01:35,960 and that, of course, was almost universally true for the demographic transition began in the 18th and 19th century. 15 00:01:35,960 --> 00:01:41,480 The reasons, I think well known and fairly obvious, I listed a few of them here. 16 00:01:41,480 --> 00:01:45,710 The notion much popularised by Jack Caldwell, for example, 17 00:01:45,710 --> 00:01:52,970 that that children were actively beneficial to their parents in many circumstances, that their activities, even when they were young, 18 00:01:52,970 --> 00:01:58,700 brought in either cash or more usually services in the form of looking after animals, 19 00:01:58,700 --> 00:02:04,970 looking after agriculture of various kinds, performing tasks of an artisan nature and so on. 20 00:02:04,970 --> 00:02:11,090 Undoubtedly, children do help to a varying degree, depending on the economy in various traditional kinds of society. 21 00:02:11,090 --> 00:02:16,160 However, I think that the truth of the matter is summarised by Tim Dyson's famous comment 22 00:02:16,160 --> 00:02:21,140 in 1991 that people don't have children in order that children may work, 23 00:02:21,140 --> 00:02:25,770 but rather the children work because people have children. In other words, people have children. 24 00:02:25,770 --> 00:02:30,470 Much more fundamental reasons than possibly, even in my view, biological ones, 25 00:02:30,470 --> 00:02:34,400 rather than the desire to turn them into a private workforce or private army. 26 00:02:34,400 --> 00:02:39,290 The government are going to be there. Then, of course, they're put to use and it's natural and desirable that they should do so. 27 00:02:39,290 --> 00:02:44,240 And that is the normal order of things. 28 00:02:44,240 --> 00:02:52,040 Social prestige also important, although here it's very important to realise that particularly in Africa, where marital ties tend to be rather weak, 29 00:02:52,040 --> 00:02:58,160 the social prestige and the glory, if any, arising from having a large number of children accrues, 30 00:02:58,160 --> 00:03:02,360 the man, the chores and the burden accrue to the woman. 31 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:05,930 It's true that in tropical Africa or in many other parts of the world, 32 00:03:05,930 --> 00:03:12,110 a woman without any children at all is a kind of social outcast and is in a terrible psychological and social condition. 33 00:03:12,110 --> 00:03:19,130 Nonetheless, the benefit of children to the point of view of social standing is very unequal in many societies. 34 00:03:19,130 --> 00:03:27,730 And it's only because the overriding power of men over women that birthrates in many places remain as high as they do. 35 00:03:27,730 --> 00:03:35,600 The other points, I think are well known the risk insurance and the importance of civil society is weak. 36 00:03:35,600 --> 00:03:44,580 The trouble is, a lot of these reasons so well justified when they were put forward in the past now seem to be rather rather rather threadbare. 37 00:03:44,580 --> 00:03:52,130 For example, Cane showed rather persuasively back in Bangladesh in 1980 that the absence of civil society, 38 00:03:52,130 --> 00:03:57,590 the weakness of local government, the fact the only people who could depend upon where your kid, 39 00:03:57,590 --> 00:04:01,430 especially in a country prone to natural disasters like Bangladesh, 40 00:04:01,430 --> 00:04:08,450 that it was really very desirable to keep on preserving the kid network by having lots of children. 41 00:04:08,450 --> 00:04:14,660 Bangladesh, as we all know, has had quite a rapid fertility transition from TFR, about seven in 1970, 42 00:04:14,660 --> 00:04:22,460 down to about three at the present time, rather undermining that apparently perfectly logical argument put forward by me. 43 00:04:22,460 --> 00:04:28,820 Kate, the same sort of argument of Cauldwell put forward in the 1970s about the utility of 44 00:04:28,820 --> 00:04:34,010 children is much undermined by the by the not only by the reduction in the birthrate, 45 00:04:34,010 --> 00:04:38,800 but also by what people actually say in response to questionnaires. 46 00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:45,130 A number of enquiries by Vlasov Castellan and many others actually asking people why they have children and whether 47 00:04:45,130 --> 00:04:51,610 these reasons for high fertility have actually impinged upon their consciousness and influenced their decision making, 48 00:04:51,610 --> 00:04:57,490 appear not to be terribly valid. In many cases, they say these things don't matter that much or do matter that much anymore. 49 00:04:57,490 --> 00:05:06,090 Interestingly enough. There are, of course, also problems of population growth at the state level, I won't dwell on this. 50 00:05:06,090 --> 00:05:12,300 I think Filipinos probably discussed these things probably from our different point of view to mine extensively. 51 00:05:12,300 --> 00:05:20,910 So I won't repeat it. But the sorts of arguments for for for growth and large size are well known. 52 00:05:20,910 --> 00:05:24,180 The problems arising from rapid growth are also well known. 53 00:05:24,180 --> 00:05:31,920 And to cut a long story short, appear to have been taken on board and accepted not only by families at the family level, 54 00:05:31,920 --> 00:05:39,120 most of whom are now limiting their fertility, sometimes to very low levels, but also at the macro level, at the state level by governments. 55 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:46,890 Most of the governments of countries in the developing world have got family policies which attempt to moderate birth rates, 56 00:05:46,890 --> 00:05:58,780 moderate population growth and bring things into stabilisation. Some of them, as you know, are policies of astonishing power and authoritarian nature, 57 00:05:58,780 --> 00:06:07,190 notably in China, trying to undercut a population momentum with its one child policy. 58 00:06:07,190 --> 00:06:14,870 So now we're in a position where we're not only our most individual families limiting their family size with modern methods of family planning, 59 00:06:14,870 --> 00:06:22,730 but also most governments in which those people live are trying to promote various forms of family limitation and bring birth rates down. 60 00:06:22,730 --> 00:06:28,570 So it's by no means a complete consensus, but that is the way that things are going. 61 00:06:28,570 --> 00:06:35,230 A number of things have hold up, this process of decline is by no means universal in the developing world. 62 00:06:35,230 --> 00:06:44,290 As we know, the instability of many governments may make it either impossible to manage family planning programmes, 63 00:06:44,290 --> 00:06:50,230 impossible to obtain family planning services, or even imprudent to start limiting your numbers, 64 00:06:50,230 --> 00:06:56,200 particularly if you live in a diversified population where there are many different tribal groupings, 65 00:06:56,200 --> 00:07:02,720 where it may seem entirely foolish to start limiting your your birth rate and your numbers when others may not be doing the same thing, 66 00:07:02,720 --> 00:07:04,420 particularly, of course, 67 00:07:04,420 --> 00:07:12,910 when some form of democracy starts to become practised in a country and then numbers start to matter much more perhaps than they used to, 68 00:07:12,910 --> 00:07:21,700 particularly when unfortunately, in so many developing countries, political parties develop upon an ethnic or tribal or racial or cultural grounds, 69 00:07:21,700 --> 00:07:28,330 and not on the Class-Based system, which were more used to perhaps in in Western Europe. 70 00:07:28,330 --> 00:07:32,440 So these these are factors which are quite important. 71 00:07:32,440 --> 00:07:41,020 There are also what you might call geological and political factors affecting fertility decline operating in the developed world as well. 72 00:07:41,020 --> 00:07:48,270 One one very strong point of contention is the effect of the international. 73 00:07:48,270 --> 00:07:52,170 Council on Population Development in 1994 in Cairo, 74 00:07:52,170 --> 00:08:02,610 some regard this as a major breakthrough in the empowerment of women and and in the broadening of family planning incentives and an obsession, 75 00:08:02,610 --> 00:08:07,830 if you like, into a much wider health related kind of perspective. 76 00:08:07,830 --> 00:08:11,760 John, Hopcroft, for example, a noted British demographer, is very keen on that idea. 77 00:08:11,760 --> 00:08:22,410 Others, like Wolfgang Lutz, regard the CMPD as the final process whereby demographic science was shoved into the back seat in 78 00:08:22,410 --> 00:08:29,520 international population discussions and decision making and replaced by political activism of various kinds. 79 00:08:29,520 --> 00:08:36,660 One of the consequences, certainly of Cairo has been a very substantial reduction in the amount of money spent on family planning services. 80 00:08:36,660 --> 00:08:40,500 And given that there are many parts of the world where where family planning 81 00:08:40,500 --> 00:08:45,330 services are inadequate to meet the stated needs of the people living there. 82 00:08:45,330 --> 00:08:52,040 This is undoubtedly a retarded fertility decline in many parts of the world. 83 00:08:52,040 --> 00:08:56,060 There's also been doubtless a sort of a similar political ideological reasons, 84 00:08:56,060 --> 00:09:02,430 a remarkable absence of population awareness in a large number of international agreements where 85 00:09:02,430 --> 00:09:07,310 population might have been thought to have been one of several salient important factors. 86 00:09:07,310 --> 00:09:15,720 This was discussed, I think you may recall, in quite strong terms in the Human Sciences Symposium a couple of weeks ago. 87 00:09:15,720 --> 00:09:20,790 In all these agreements on the Millennium Development Goals, on making poverty history, 88 00:09:20,790 --> 00:09:27,390 the Kyoto agreement, demography was not mentioned at all, or in one or two shoved into an afterthought. 89 00:09:27,390 --> 00:09:37,170 This seems to me to be a major weakness of those agreements and a major error of judgement. 90 00:09:37,170 --> 00:09:44,640 Nonetheless, despite all that, it is the case that birthrates in all but about a dozen countries are going down. 91 00:09:44,640 --> 00:09:51,090 As I mentioned, half the world's population now lives in countries where the TFR is at replacement level or lower. 92 00:09:51,090 --> 00:09:55,860 But we have a diverse future facing this because most countries are in that position. 93 00:09:55,860 --> 00:10:03,250 Others have either not started their transition at all, like a Niger and Mali and a few other handful of countries in others. 94 00:10:03,250 --> 00:10:10,380 The fertility transition has stalled for some reason at a level that's still quite substantially above replacement level at three or so, 95 00:10:10,380 --> 00:10:13,260 which is which is in conditions of quite low mortality, 96 00:10:13,260 --> 00:10:20,880 quite enough to drive population growth to a very, very high levels in different parts of the world. 97 00:10:20,880 --> 00:10:26,470 One point which you might really keep in mind. 98 00:10:26,470 --> 00:10:32,900 As we as we go through these points is, of course, of what we call the developing world is getting smaller, 99 00:10:32,900 --> 00:10:35,530 not for demographic reasons, but for economic reasons. 100 00:10:35,530 --> 00:10:43,900 More and more countries, as their economy improves, as they move out of the agricultural sector into industrial and service industries, 101 00:10:43,900 --> 00:10:48,840 will no longer be properly regarded as developing. But they will become developed. 102 00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:53,590 And that is part and parcel, of course, of the whole process of fertility, 103 00:10:53,590 --> 00:11:00,860 declining, mortality declining, and the modernisation of of social life in general. 104 00:11:00,860 --> 00:11:10,250 This is just remind us of the variety and total fertility which we see in countries still classed as part of the developing world at the present time, 105 00:11:10,250 --> 00:11:15,410 you will see that there is over a fourfold difference in TFR between these different countries. 106 00:11:15,410 --> 00:11:22,910 At the top, we've got Mali, Niger over seven or about seven, Uganda, almost seven, Congo and Oman. 107 00:11:22,910 --> 00:11:29,930 In the top block, there's a trio of of countries, Kenya, Pakistan and the Philippines. 108 00:11:29,930 --> 00:11:38,690 It's been between five and three and then below three, India, Egypt, Botswana, Ecuador, Indonesia, South Africa and Sri Lanka. 109 00:11:38,690 --> 00:11:43,610 This is just a selection. There's not the whole lot, of course. And then clearly very replacement. 110 00:11:43,610 --> 00:11:50,090 Already we've got Chile, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Brazil, China, Iran, Thailand and a number of others. 111 00:11:50,090 --> 00:11:55,700 And the difference in the top and the bottom of that is four times, which is really quite astonishing for countries, 112 00:11:55,700 --> 00:11:58,700 all of which are still classified as developing, although, of course, 113 00:11:58,700 --> 00:12:03,170 their GDP are somewhat different because some of the ones at the bottom are still relatively poor, 114 00:12:03,170 --> 00:12:13,410 is by no means a very clear correlation between wealth on the one hand and low birthrates on the other, or high birthrates for that matter. 115 00:12:13,410 --> 00:12:20,580 So pressing the button to enthusiastically get back. Want to go back? 116 00:12:20,580 --> 00:12:26,600 Revert to manual. Oh, oh. And. 117 00:12:26,600 --> 00:12:30,780 Thank you. Always rather young for advice. 118 00:12:30,780 --> 00:12:34,690 Oh, gosh, this is not good. Try it again. 119 00:12:34,690 --> 00:12:46,700 I have to go back. One of the problems with these data is they depend a great deal on surveys. 120 00:12:46,700 --> 00:12:52,600 As you know, there are very few countries in the poorer part of the developing world which have got proper registration systems, 121 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:57,250 which are called births and deaths and other events as they happen in an accurate way. 122 00:12:57,250 --> 00:13:05,300 To a very large extent, the data which I am presenting here depend upon a series of massive, scientifically validated surveys. 123 00:13:05,300 --> 00:13:12,460 There is a demographic and health surveys which are mounted every few years in about 40 plus countries of the world. 124 00:13:12,460 --> 00:13:17,350 And if you happen to be interested in the details of what's going on in these countries, 125 00:13:17,350 --> 00:13:25,180 then looking at demographic and health surveys on the Web will give you access to a marvellous variety of data, not just on demography, 126 00:13:25,180 --> 00:13:29,020 but also on their economy, marriage patterns, contraceptive use, 127 00:13:29,020 --> 00:13:33,640 educational level and all the rest of it with tables which you can make up for 128 00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:39,850 yourselves and graphs to and maps in a very straightforward user-friendly fashion. 129 00:13:39,850 --> 00:13:47,290 Anyway, the they depend upon the demographic and health service a very large extent in the absence of complete voter registration. 130 00:13:47,290 --> 00:13:56,070 And these is the message we get from the higher fertility countries are frankly a bit mixed and not that easy to understand and illustrate 131 00:13:56,070 --> 00:14:03,730 the the complexity of people's attitudes and values in relation to family size and the difficulty which we have sometimes in making sense. 132 00:14:03,730 --> 00:14:12,100 So, for example, if you look at this table, you can see that in in Niger and Mali, the TFR is about seven. 133 00:14:12,100 --> 00:14:22,210 Not that many people don't want any more children. As expected, ideal family size in Niger is reported to be even higher than the current. 134 00:14:22,210 --> 00:14:27,460 Rather remarkable level of fertility rate is pretty robust also in Mali. 135 00:14:27,460 --> 00:14:32,410 But if you look down at the those countries where the birth rate is a bit lower, 136 00:14:32,410 --> 00:14:43,000 you still see the contrast between the fact of the ideal family size is about the same as the actual reported birth rate or even higher than it is. 137 00:14:43,000 --> 00:14:50,920 But at the same time that there is also reported quite a high proportion, 37 percent in Ghana, 57 percent in Cambodia, 138 00:14:50,920 --> 00:15:02,560 20 percent in Congo and Nigeria and Cameroon, who want no more children with corresponding proportions of reported unmet need of a family planning. 139 00:15:02,560 --> 00:15:11,950 So is it paradoxical? People have retained, it seems, an ideal family size which they no longer want actually to realise in practise. 140 00:15:11,950 --> 00:15:21,130 So it would appear. In some of these countries, the the future growth appears to be fairly inexorable. 141 00:15:21,130 --> 00:15:29,440 This is a probabilistic projection from the 2010 United Nations population projections of Niger. 142 00:15:29,440 --> 00:15:34,840 The individual grey lines, which you see are the tracks of each individual stochastic projection, 143 00:15:34,840 --> 00:15:42,040 which I think I've described you before, as being a form of projection, a runner on a Monte Carlo method, 144 00:15:42,040 --> 00:15:54,070 which involves which incorporates random distributions of of of next levels of birth and death rates based upon a fact based probability distribution, 145 00:15:54,070 --> 00:16:00,760 which give one alternate possibilities. The less likely ones are less frequent, the more likely ones are more frequent. 146 00:16:00,760 --> 00:16:05,980 So you've got this fancy with a higher density in the middle and outliers on the edge. 147 00:16:05,980 --> 00:16:14,500 And the median is this red on the median of all a thousand or 10000 of the projections which are run on the stochastic basis. 148 00:16:14,500 --> 00:16:22,240 And they all point to a very rapid growth of population in Niger, partly because of the very high level of current fertility, 149 00:16:22,240 --> 00:16:29,230 the tremendous population momentum built up in the age structure, plus incorporating an assumption about fertility decline. 150 00:16:29,230 --> 00:16:34,310 This is not business as usual. This incorporates fertility decline. It's still shows high growth. 151 00:16:34,310 --> 00:16:40,020 Was that a yes in the seeming contradiction? 152 00:16:40,020 --> 00:16:50,920 We can go back in one direction, said a small number of people having lots of children and many others, but having less than that still. 153 00:16:50,920 --> 00:16:56,370 Uh, the statue was still with the idea of. 154 00:16:56,370 --> 00:17:06,150 Given we're dealing with averages, I'm not quite sure why that would make an effect, certainly as as as birthrates go down, 155 00:17:06,150 --> 00:17:10,450 then those parts of the population which favour large families, 156 00:17:10,450 --> 00:17:14,880 you've got large families that's become more important and probably slow down the rate of decline. 157 00:17:14,880 --> 00:17:22,250 We'll come on to that in a moment. I haven't quite got my head around how your proposal would work after the ruling. 158 00:17:22,250 --> 00:17:32,380 No, no, no. I wouldn't say you were. On the other hand, there are others were fertility decline anyway? 159 00:17:32,380 --> 00:17:36,460 This is fertility, not population, does appear to be uninterrupted if slow. 160 00:17:36,460 --> 00:17:43,300 This is Ferghana and the unevenness in the graph in the hatch lines, which are the actual data, 161 00:17:43,300 --> 00:17:48,460 arrives from the slightly different kind of response you get in successive demographic and health 162 00:17:48,460 --> 00:17:59,260 services and other sorts of information which we get from from 1980 up to the present time. 163 00:17:59,260 --> 00:18:08,800 As a consequence of the uncertainty about future birthrates, the population size of the world, therefore, is really rather uncertain as well. 164 00:18:08,800 --> 00:18:12,010 These are some very wide ranging, very absurdly, 165 00:18:12,010 --> 00:18:20,080 really long term projections for the United Nations based upon different assumptions about total fertility with and also an 166 00:18:20,080 --> 00:18:26,620 assumption about a very favourable further increase in survival up to an expectation of life at birth of one hundred for both sexes. 167 00:18:26,620 --> 00:18:34,330 By no means off limits for countries in the developed world, but probably a bit ambitious, at least for the next 100 years or so. 168 00:18:34,330 --> 00:18:39,850 For much of the developing world, as you see, if the birthrate goes out at one point five, 169 00:18:39,850 --> 00:18:45,480 which for some countries now have, then even by 2100, by the end of the century, 170 00:18:45,480 --> 00:18:50,860 it will be down to seven billion gone up and down to the present level, 171 00:18:50,860 --> 00:18:59,920 a TFR to it'll it'll stabilise at just under 11 billion and with various others in the in between. 172 00:18:59,920 --> 00:19:04,900 And this is the global probabilistic projection done on the same basis as that one for Niger, 173 00:19:04,900 --> 00:19:08,650 which I showed you with the median line in white showing the decline. 174 00:19:08,650 --> 00:19:11,740 This is according to Lutz and his colleagues who are more favourable to the view 175 00:19:11,740 --> 00:19:16,820 that global population will overall in declined by the end of the century. 176 00:19:16,820 --> 00:19:24,980 Most of the action, as we all know, is going to be in the least developed regions of the green part of the graph in tropical Africa, 177 00:19:24,980 --> 00:19:28,610 and that's going to be where the population dynamic is going to be. 178 00:19:28,610 --> 00:19:34,580 And here are some of the more exciting countries in terms of projected population growth by the United Nations, 179 00:19:34,580 --> 00:19:41,060 all of which assume a reduction in the birthrate. These are not constant rate projections. 180 00:19:41,060 --> 00:19:45,790 And as you see that the all those countries on the left hand side put together. 181 00:19:45,790 --> 00:19:50,800 Our project to almost increase by a factor of three by mid century from the present time, 182 00:19:50,800 --> 00:19:57,230 and some of them like newsier, much more, others like Yemen a little bit less. 183 00:19:57,230 --> 00:20:07,280 On the other hand, perhaps the more interesting thing is the perhaps less well known fact of the quite rapid growth of the proportion of people in the 184 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:14,930 world who are going to be living in countries where the birthrate is is one replacement and where population is actually in decline. 185 00:20:14,930 --> 00:20:22,400 These are projections, again, from the UN showing a country is now classified as part of the of the developing world, 186 00:20:22,400 --> 00:20:29,840 except for Japan and Taiwan and of course, in rough rank order when they're supposed to tip into population decline. 187 00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:33,290 Japan is in brackets because it already has dipped into population decline. 188 00:20:33,290 --> 00:20:37,340 Taiwan is certain to follow in the next 15 years or so. 189 00:20:37,340 --> 00:20:45,410 South Korea shortly afterwards, China itself by about two thousand and 140 or thereabouts, 190 00:20:45,410 --> 00:20:51,470 and then perhaps some unexpected ones who thought that Mexico and Brazil would be in that group. 191 00:20:51,470 --> 00:20:57,530 Thailand, less and less surprisingly. So, Iran, also Turkey, Indonesia and Vietnam all together. 192 00:20:57,530 --> 00:21:04,880 This adds up to about two point four billion people, which is really a very important chunk of the world's population, to which, 193 00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:12,590 of course, you've got to add the nearly one billion people in the developed world who are going to be also in a similar position already. 194 00:21:12,590 --> 00:21:21,170 As you know, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, other countries in Eastern Europe have tipped into population decline and Germany is more interesting. 195 00:21:21,170 --> 00:21:23,450 Italy probably going to follow quite shortly. 196 00:21:23,450 --> 00:21:30,140 So it really is a bit of a cascade of population tipping into this position of decline with all of the problems, 197 00:21:30,140 --> 00:21:38,040 the problems and possibilities of population decline, which I tried to outline earlier on this week. 198 00:21:38,040 --> 00:21:43,150 In talking about these countries, it's often easy to forget, 199 00:21:43,150 --> 00:21:47,670 as I think Philip Krieger pointed out to you the other week, that countries, some countries, 200 00:21:47,670 --> 00:21:49,470 especially in the developing world, are very big, 201 00:21:49,470 --> 00:21:56,070 very diverse and warlike empires and countries and different people in them behave in very different ways. 202 00:21:56,070 --> 00:22:03,570 This is the example of India. I'm not sure how well known it is that if you draw a line across the middle of India like here, 203 00:22:03,570 --> 00:22:08,130 then and cut the country roughly in half and the southern half the states in the southern half 204 00:22:08,130 --> 00:22:13,310 all have got birth rates below the level required to replace the population in the long run. 205 00:22:13,310 --> 00:22:19,890 Those are most of the ones in the left hand column of that table that far less than two point one Kerala, 206 00:22:19,890 --> 00:22:28,860 Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra and various others, one or two up here as well in north of India. 207 00:22:28,860 --> 00:22:37,390 Typically higher. As you see some some up to two, about four like Jihad and top the by the north. 208 00:22:37,390 --> 00:22:43,030 Really great contrast arising out of all sorts of contrasts of culture and economy, 209 00:22:43,030 --> 00:22:51,550 which are not very long standing in India, which Tim and his colleagues drew attention to 20 or 30 years ago. 210 00:22:51,550 --> 00:22:59,860 And so when talking about Indian TFR, we have to keep in mind that it's a very it's a very heterogeneous population and 211 00:22:59,860 --> 00:23:05,660 the birth rates and rates of growth in different components are very unequal. 212 00:23:05,660 --> 00:23:10,370 Somewhat similar pattern in many other developing countries, here is Mexico, 213 00:23:10,370 --> 00:23:16,970 the the low fertility regions, here are the blue ones, the higher fertility ones, the pink and red ones. 214 00:23:16,970 --> 00:23:25,310 One of the consequences, of course, of this is that generally speaking, as the the birth rates become divergent, 215 00:23:25,310 --> 00:23:31,190 then those populations in those countries which got the higher birth rates tend to become more numerically dominant. 216 00:23:31,190 --> 00:23:39,710 They increase faster in numbers than those which are limiting their fertility more as a consequence of the rate of change of population growth. 217 00:23:39,710 --> 00:23:43,700 The rate of change of fertility tends to slow down in an adverse fashion. 218 00:23:43,700 --> 00:23:53,000 And you can see that in this graph of the Mexican TFR of the initial high level of reduction is not being followed at the present time. 219 00:23:53,000 --> 00:24:00,620 It's still projected to become below replacement, but progress is slower than it was and one might see the same thing in Turkey. 220 00:24:00,620 --> 00:24:08,660 Here are some remarkable regional variation in Turkey. Here is here in Syria and neighbouring. 221 00:24:08,660 --> 00:24:15,620 This is the Mediterranean Sea. It should become a blue. It's not here as Greece on the left. 222 00:24:15,620 --> 00:24:21,890 Here, the the darker the province, the higher the birth rate, and you can see from the scale over here, 223 00:24:21,890 --> 00:24:28,640 these provinces over here, which are mostly a Kurdistan and which are the least developed part of Turkey in the east, 224 00:24:28,640 --> 00:24:39,140 have got to OSWIN five and seven, which you will recall is about the same at its higher level as we have in Niger and and Chad and Mauritania. 225 00:24:39,140 --> 00:24:45,140 These are African levels of fertility. And over here, we've got some replacement ones more typical of Europe. 226 00:24:45,140 --> 00:24:51,830 In fact, the distinguished Turkish demographer, Professor Abbott and Unknot pointed out that if you go to Ankara, 227 00:24:51,830 --> 00:24:57,230 which is about here somewhere, and drop a line down to the sea, in her words, to the west of that line, it's Europe. 228 00:24:57,230 --> 00:25:04,820 To the east of that line is Africa. She was talking about not just demography, but also social development of cultural progress, 229 00:25:04,820 --> 00:25:08,100 of various kinds, literacy education and modern attitudes and all of that. 230 00:25:08,100 --> 00:25:14,940 It's a very, very diverse country in that respect. 231 00:25:14,940 --> 00:25:23,400 Stalls, fertility declines have become something of a focus of interest in the last 10 years, some of them, I think, not surprisingly, 232 00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:29,790 arising out of this heterogeneity of demographic behaviour in different parts of the same large country, 233 00:25:29,790 --> 00:25:34,170 others apparently rather more general than having somewhat different causes. 234 00:25:34,170 --> 00:25:40,110 Once again, there's a problem of being certain about whether Stoll's are actually happening, 235 00:25:40,110 --> 00:25:43,860 rising out of the rather episodic nature of the data which we're getting. 236 00:25:43,860 --> 00:25:49,570 If we're getting data from that demographic and health survey is held every three or four years, 237 00:25:49,570 --> 00:25:54,090 then of course, it may be that if one of those surveys is a slightly off, 238 00:25:54,090 --> 00:25:58,800 a bit unrepresentative or reflects some some temporary glitch in behaviour, 239 00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:04,500 it may give the impression there's a stall when there isn't really when things are already going down. 240 00:26:04,500 --> 00:26:12,420 And a recent paper in 2010 certainly identified Kenya as being one clear example up to that date anyway, 241 00:26:12,420 --> 00:26:16,020 where fertility declines have stopped and probably been in Rwanda and Zambia, 242 00:26:16,020 --> 00:26:23,280 amongst two others, had also in the same category, maybe not the others that are listed above. 243 00:26:23,280 --> 00:26:26,670 Here's here's an example of of Kenia. 244 00:26:26,670 --> 00:26:32,610 This is the TFR, up to age 39, up to 2005. 245 00:26:32,610 --> 00:26:37,890 I think it is showing a reasonably regular decline from the 1980s down to 1995. 246 00:26:37,890 --> 00:26:48,760 And then and then it's been flatlining both in the rural areas and the dark and also in the urban areas in the in the pale light here. 247 00:26:48,760 --> 00:26:57,370 So not good news. And here is an example of an example of one of the underlying factors behind that contraceptive use is flatlined. 248 00:26:57,370 --> 00:27:04,900 Contraceptive use here is, is is the blue line increasing from more or less zero in the 1970s, 249 00:27:04,900 --> 00:27:13,730 up to about zero, the 1970s, up to about 30 percent by the last decade. 250 00:27:13,730 --> 00:27:18,580 And they're not showing any further progress. What the next survey will show because we don't know. 251 00:27:18,580 --> 00:27:24,940 But so far, no progress. And that's that's clearly associated with flat flatlining of the fertility rate. 252 00:27:24,940 --> 00:27:33,550 No further progress. Evidence that time with considerable implications for the future population of Kenya. 253 00:27:33,550 --> 00:27:39,310 And here are some other examples. I don't want to dwell on them in detail from Benin, Zambia and Tanzania. 254 00:27:39,310 --> 00:27:45,490 You can see that typically speaking, the the urban TFR, the pill line is lower than the rural one, 255 00:27:45,490 --> 00:27:51,670 as you would expect, not as much as perhaps one might expect from from from general principles. 256 00:27:51,670 --> 00:27:54,010 It's one of the features of African demography. 257 00:27:54,010 --> 00:28:00,610 The urban total fertility is by no means as low as you would expect them to be compared to the rural ones. 258 00:28:00,610 --> 00:28:03,550 When you look at the rest of the developing world. 259 00:28:03,550 --> 00:28:10,120 Urbanisation, Africa is often very rather different nature than urbanisation in the developing world in particular, 260 00:28:10,120 --> 00:28:15,370 not so much driven by modernisation of the economy or by any kind of industrialisation, 261 00:28:15,370 --> 00:28:26,200 but to some extent by people finding refuge from an overpopulation or unproductive rural, poverty stricken environment. 262 00:28:26,200 --> 00:28:31,040 The causes of these stalled or slow declines are somewhat controversial. 263 00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:36,310 One of them certainly got to do with with a weak political commitment to family planning programmes. 264 00:28:36,310 --> 00:28:43,050 And there are some governments in Africa like Mr. Museveni is in Uganda, which are committed to higher population growth. 265 00:28:43,050 --> 00:28:47,600 And we don't regard a low fertility as being a priority at all. 266 00:28:47,600 --> 00:28:51,040 Quite the reverse. There's that. 267 00:28:51,040 --> 00:28:57,010 There's the point that as well as rather as in in in Western Europe, 268 00:28:57,010 --> 00:29:01,150 as the birth rates have ceased to decline in Western Europe and started to go up because 269 00:29:01,150 --> 00:29:05,740 of the decades of postponement have been replaced by some recuperation of fertility. 270 00:29:05,740 --> 00:29:09,280 This can also be expected to take place in the developing world as well. 271 00:29:09,280 --> 00:29:19,510 One of the components of lower birth rates in the developing world is the way in which not only of completed family size has gone down, 272 00:29:19,510 --> 00:29:23,650 but also that births have been postponed as more and more women move into education, 273 00:29:23,650 --> 00:29:28,690 as more and more women move into the paid paid work sector, then just as in the developed world. 274 00:29:28,690 --> 00:29:35,080 So also the developing world childbearing is put off once it can be put off through 275 00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:40,150 family planning and also wants norms of later marriage start to take take her late. 276 00:29:40,150 --> 00:29:45,100 Marriage is a very important component of declining fertility in the Third World. 277 00:29:45,100 --> 00:29:54,130 In some countries, probably responsible about a third of the fall in the birthrate, which we observe so far. 278 00:29:54,130 --> 00:30:00,850 I mentioned the failure to meet unmet need arising out of the reduction of the harvest, in fact, 279 00:30:00,850 --> 00:30:08,440 and support of family planning programmes in money terms and also in some parts of the world, there are still very restrictive abortion laws. 280 00:30:08,440 --> 00:30:14,620 Whatever you may think of it, abortion has been a very important component of fertility decline in many parts of the world. 281 00:30:14,620 --> 00:30:19,240 Laws against abortion in many African countries and in some of those two are very strict. 282 00:30:19,240 --> 00:30:27,700 There may not be by any means observed. Nonetheless, they appear to have an effect. 283 00:30:27,700 --> 00:30:30,300 On the other side of things, 284 00:30:30,300 --> 00:30:40,630 the opposite of all those factors generate a rapid declines in the birth rate and we have seen that in a number of countries, including, of course, 285 00:30:40,630 --> 00:30:45,370 the role of family planning programmes where these have taken a grip, where they have been, 286 00:30:45,370 --> 00:30:50,660 where they have enjoyed government support, where they've been well planned and well well financed. 287 00:30:50,660 --> 00:30:55,090 There's a case of saying they have had quite an important effect in bringing down the birthrate. 288 00:30:55,090 --> 00:31:00,230 I will look at that next week. 289 00:31:00,230 --> 00:31:09,260 One of the most important of these is the acceleration of education and also of broadcast media, which to some extent a short cut, 290 00:31:09,260 --> 00:31:18,530 the need for literacy, where everyone has access to a transistor radio, where most villages anyway have access to television coverage. 291 00:31:18,530 --> 00:31:27,410 Youssef Kobar showed in North Africa that that the rate of reduction of the birth of the birth rate in North Africa was much faster than expected, 292 00:31:27,410 --> 00:31:36,400 and future population growth, therefore more modest than expected. If you factor in the variable of education, 293 00:31:36,400 --> 00:31:44,170 if you factor in the fact that the higher and higher proportion of every successive cohort is going on to secondary education and tertiary education, 294 00:31:44,170 --> 00:31:51,580 given the well-known relationship or certainly Hillsborough in North Africa between a higher education and a lower birth rates, 295 00:31:51,580 --> 00:32:00,700 it's only if you regard education as being a static proportion of each of each cohort that you get lower sorry, 296 00:32:00,700 --> 00:32:05,350 higher projections of fertility and higher projections of population in that and other parts of the world. 297 00:32:05,350 --> 00:32:11,740 In fact, Lutz is so keen on the notion that education is the key to the spread of education, 298 00:32:11,740 --> 00:32:15,580 is the key to accelerating reduction in birth rates that he thinks ought to be 299 00:32:15,580 --> 00:32:24,880 incorporated as a kind of formal fourth dimension in demographic analysis. 300 00:32:24,880 --> 00:32:37,470 This is. An example of the projection of the population of working age by level of education in different parts of the world, 301 00:32:37,470 --> 00:32:44,310 showing how one might expect would have had an effect upon upon future levels of facility here. 302 00:32:44,310 --> 00:32:50,220 The Dark Band is tertiary education, the middle grade band in secondary education. 303 00:32:50,220 --> 00:32:56,730 And The Pale Band is is primary. And the white band is none at all. 304 00:32:56,730 --> 00:33:05,700 And looking at looking at as South Asia, we see very rapid changes projected for the future with corresponding rapid changes in the birthrate, 305 00:33:05,700 --> 00:33:11,850 sub-Saharan Africa, some change resulting from a very much lower base on the right hand at the bottom. 306 00:33:11,850 --> 00:33:18,610 And in China, very high level of saturation already evident, not much future. 307 00:33:18,610 --> 00:33:29,830 Affects there, because it's almost saturated already, this grotty series of graphs is a simulation of the likely effects of different levels of 308 00:33:29,830 --> 00:33:34,660 the penetration of education into the population on the future of population size of India. 309 00:33:34,660 --> 00:33:47,340 The left hand graph at the top shows the population pyramid of India at present levels of educational participation rates with. 310 00:33:47,340 --> 00:33:57,030 Primary education being being in pay grade and secondary education in Korea and the black is is tertiary for the future, 311 00:33:57,030 --> 00:34:03,630 if if the pattern of education remains the same and each cohort has the same pattern of education as it moves up, 312 00:34:03,630 --> 00:34:11,880 then we have quite a high level of population because the population pyramid not really becoming Asian at all, 313 00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:18,670 whereas if education participation rates expand so that the proportion of those, 314 00:34:18,670 --> 00:34:25,530 the primary education diminishes with successive cohorts proportional, the second education increases and portion of tertiary increases, 315 00:34:25,530 --> 00:34:31,350 a lot of them get much more rapid, further decline, much more rapid ageing of the population as well, 316 00:34:31,350 --> 00:34:38,940 but also ipso facto, a much faster moderation of the population growth of India. 317 00:34:38,940 --> 00:34:44,520 And in those countries where there's been very successful economic development and population policies, 318 00:34:44,520 --> 00:34:51,810 at the same time they've moved themselves out of the developing world into the developed world very fast indeed. 319 00:34:51,810 --> 00:34:57,660 Back in the 1950s, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan were all developing countries. 320 00:34:57,660 --> 00:35:04,290 They were all poor. The level of GDP per head in those countries back here was about the same as in very many African countries. 321 00:35:04,290 --> 00:35:09,240 It was not different from any other part of the world and important way since then, 322 00:35:09,240 --> 00:35:14,670 of course, enormous levels of economic growth, 10 percent per year in many cases. 323 00:35:14,670 --> 00:35:23,850 I think the record was 13 percent in the 1970s per year in in Singapore have transformed the economy, 324 00:35:23,850 --> 00:35:28,870 transformed the society, transformed the education level and transformed the birth rate. 325 00:35:28,870 --> 00:35:38,880 Now they are all down at a very low level indeed. And that raises some interesting questions as to what the future might be like in this place. 326 00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:49,090 This is to illustrate the importance of of the fight for marriage by women in urban Asia, which which in these countries is almost all of them. 327 00:35:49,090 --> 00:35:56,070 The graph on the left shows in Korea, the high proportion of women who are who are not married, different ages, 328 00:35:56,070 --> 00:36:02,250 59 percent, still unmarried in their late 20s, which is highly unusual for that part of the world. 329 00:36:02,250 --> 00:36:07,410 A really new development even amongst those age 30 to 34, 19 percent said unmarried. 330 00:36:07,410 --> 00:36:10,770 And of course, these are societies in which births outside marriage are complete. 331 00:36:10,770 --> 00:36:18,510 No, no cohabitation may be spreading. Births outside marriage are still two percent of the total and are deeply frowned upon. 332 00:36:18,510 --> 00:36:24,900 So that goes hand in hand with a really severe restriction on the birthrate, which you saw in the previous graph. 333 00:36:24,900 --> 00:36:33,090 And even in some of the less developed parts of Asia, we see high proportions of women unmarried at quite advanced ages. 334 00:36:33,090 --> 00:36:42,870 The dark bars here are percent of women unmarried at age 30 to 34 and the scale of zero to thirty five percent. 335 00:36:42,870 --> 00:36:47,100 The Pilbara are women not married at age 40 to forty four. 336 00:36:47,100 --> 00:36:53,100 And these are countries don't forget where in the past as proportions unmarried at age at age 40 would 337 00:36:53,100 --> 00:36:57,390 be about two or three percent of voters unmarried age 30 would have about two or three percent. 338 00:36:57,390 --> 00:37:06,090 And now we have youth in Jakarta at, what, 15 or 12 percent, unmarried at age 30 and 34. 339 00:37:06,090 --> 00:37:11,190 In Singapore, it's about 22 percent. In Hong Kong, it's about 27 percent. 340 00:37:11,190 --> 00:37:15,510 In Bangkok, it's about 33 percent to 35 percent. 341 00:37:15,510 --> 00:37:22,540 Really quite startling proportions of the remaining unmarried and therefore childless. 342 00:37:22,540 --> 00:37:26,870 One of the consequences, of course, is going to be very rapid population ageing, 343 00:37:26,870 --> 00:37:37,450 and while the level of population ageing in these ultra rapidly developing countries like Singapore and Taiwan and South Korea is unlikely to be well, 344 00:37:37,450 --> 00:37:40,840 cannot really be emulated by any other country in the world. 345 00:37:40,840 --> 00:37:49,060 Nonetheless, in the longer term, something of this kind will happen to all of them if their birthrates to send to the same level. 346 00:37:49,060 --> 00:38:00,430 Is that is that likely? Well, there are some interesting clues from China that in some parts of China and in some 347 00:38:00,430 --> 00:38:05,460 and for some categories of person where the one child family rule no longer applies, 348 00:38:05,460 --> 00:38:11,260 where individuals are free to choose to, in many cases it appears that they do not wish to have to. 349 00:38:11,260 --> 00:38:13,840 They are now not only do not wish to have to, 350 00:38:13,840 --> 00:38:21,430 but also in practise that they are not producing to the in this province in China, where the policy does not apply. 351 00:38:21,430 --> 00:38:30,580 The TFR is about one in Shanghai, a one child family preference appears to have become normalised as these data show, 352 00:38:30,580 --> 00:38:35,900 it is not yet clear if this is a hangover of the one child policy that the power, 353 00:38:35,900 --> 00:38:40,870 the one child policy and and the previous family limitation policy in 1970s 354 00:38:40,870 --> 00:38:46,120 has become so embedded in the culture that people simply do not think about 355 00:38:46,120 --> 00:38:55,330 about larger families anymore that it's possibly an example of evolving Lutzes facility trappin operation and therefore it's rather peculiar to China. 356 00:38:55,330 --> 00:38:59,650 Or is it possible this is something which will become normal, at least for a while, 357 00:38:59,650 --> 00:39:06,220 in urban Asia in general, where the culture does not encourage cohabitation? 358 00:39:06,220 --> 00:39:16,150 And so a marriage where the physical conditions of life in the rapidly developed cities with rather cramped 359 00:39:16,150 --> 00:39:24,160 physical accommodation is highly unhelpful for the point of view of producing a family of more than one child. 360 00:39:24,160 --> 00:39:29,260 And therefore it may not be rather broad a factor function, rather, 361 00:39:29,260 --> 00:39:36,340 of the kind of urban life which is developed in in Asia very rapidly over the last few decades rather than more gradually, 362 00:39:36,340 --> 00:39:46,350 as in other parts of the world. That remains unclear. But the the it is a possibility and it's becoming. 363 00:39:46,350 --> 00:39:54,180 Built into the United Nations population projections, which very interestingly are now suggesting that all sorts of rather unexpected 364 00:39:54,180 --> 00:39:59,610 countries at a national level may fall down to a total level of of TFR, 365 00:39:59,610 --> 00:40:03,480 quite well below the level currently observed in northwest Europe. 366 00:40:03,480 --> 00:40:09,000 So the odd possibility arises of the TFR in most countries of the world, 367 00:40:09,000 --> 00:40:13,320 except perhaps a tropical Africa falling below the level that we see in this country, 368 00:40:13,320 --> 00:40:17,670 even in some of the Arab countries, in Asian countries, in Latin America and so on, 369 00:40:17,670 --> 00:40:24,210 if that apparently inexorable general decline of TFR continues into the future here. 370 00:40:24,210 --> 00:40:35,100 Here is a graph taken from. From the preliminary work for the U.N. population projections, the pink line is about one point eighty five. 371 00:40:35,100 --> 00:40:42,420 The blue line is the US TFR. And here we have projections of the TFR in a number of countries in the developing 372 00:40:42,420 --> 00:40:45,780 world at the present time showing what the UN thinks is going to happen. 373 00:40:45,780 --> 00:40:50,790 You see, by about 2040 to 2050, TFR in Indonesia, Bangladesh, 374 00:40:50,790 --> 00:40:56,460 Uzbekistan and Algeria are all reckoned to be well below replacement, down to about one point five, one point six. 375 00:40:56,460 --> 00:41:01,860 You may think this is daft and fantasy, but that's that's what the UN model modelling suggests. 376 00:41:01,860 --> 00:41:06,420 And that's what some some sort of cultural influences might suggest as well. 377 00:41:06,420 --> 00:41:14,760 If, after all, almost all the countries outside Europe have got a sort of families culture with a gender relations which go hand in hand with that, 378 00:41:14,760 --> 00:41:21,100 insofar as MacDonald is right and high levels of gender inequity tend to go hand in hand with very low birthrates, 379 00:41:21,100 --> 00:41:30,890 at least for a while, until the culture changes, then you might expect this to happen even in the less likely countries of the world. 380 00:41:30,890 --> 00:41:40,150 Here here is here are another example of the perhaps rather surprising projection of the TFI in Oman, one of the least developed to the Gulf states. 381 00:41:40,150 --> 00:41:47,000 Will go down to about one point five by 2050 and and leave, as you see here, Denmark, France, 382 00:41:47,000 --> 00:41:54,620 Australia and other countries with the highest birth rates in the world, again, with the exception of tropical Africa and a few others. 383 00:41:54,620 --> 00:42:01,130 Well, an intriguing possibility. The messages are rather mixed. 384 00:42:01,130 --> 00:42:05,360 Generally speaking, fertility rates, a decline seem inexorable. 385 00:42:05,360 --> 00:42:14,240 There's no lower limit yet apparent in the low birth rates, which some of the developing countries of the contemporary world have achieved. 386 00:42:14,240 --> 00:42:24,410 In others that there is there is population still low fertility, still very few others, hardly any movement apparent at all. 387 00:42:24,410 --> 00:42:30,770 And so the pattern seems to imply considerable diversity, but with a preponderance towards low birth rates, leading, of course, 388 00:42:30,770 --> 00:42:35,990 to the expectation both in the UN projections long term and particularly in these 389 00:42:35,990 --> 00:42:42,050 probabilistic projections of global population decline by before the end of the century. 390 00:42:42,050 --> 00:42:49,370 What's going to happen in certain specific countries like Egypt, Argentina, Bangladesh and Kenya, we still see remains to be seen. 391 00:42:49,370 --> 00:42:55,300 We'll have to wait until what the next fertility surveys show us to be the case. 392 00:42:55,300 --> 00:43:05,820 When I saw the stop, there just would change within time, so thank you very much and I will be back again on Thursday.