1 00:00:01,730 --> 00:00:12,590 Yes. OK. Good afternoon and welcome everybody. Speaker today is none other than Dr. Arnold Allen was a senior lecturer and the 2 00:00:12,590 --> 00:00:19,340 head of Department of International Politics at City University of London. 3 00:00:19,340 --> 00:00:25,640 I've known his work deals with international relations of the Middle East and foreign policy analysis, 4 00:00:25,640 --> 00:00:32,210 and his publications include three monographs Israel's Foreign Policy towards the PLO. 5 00:00:32,210 --> 00:00:35,840 The impact of Globalisation came out in 2009. 6 00:00:35,840 --> 00:00:44,870 Foreign policy analysis New approaches came with Rutledge in 2016, written with Chris al-Din and most recently, 7 00:00:44,870 --> 00:00:53,330 Israel's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War came with came out with Cambridge University Press last year. 8 00:00:53,330 --> 00:01:00,980 And he's also is also the topic of the talk today, of course. And he's also published in journal such as International Studies, 9 00:01:00,980 --> 00:01:07,370 Reviews in International Politics and the Journal of Strategic Studies Strategic Studies. 10 00:01:07,370 --> 00:01:12,380 I'm not. Thank you so much for coming. Think of it. Well, thank you very much, Yaakov, for inviting me. 11 00:01:12,380 --> 00:01:16,610 Thank you all very much for coming. I'd like to extend a special thanks to Professor Bridgeline, 12 00:01:16,610 --> 00:01:25,640 who helped me throughout the stages of writing the book and also provided a stalwart support throughout my career. 13 00:01:25,640 --> 00:01:29,030 So thank you all very much for coming here. 14 00:01:29,030 --> 00:01:36,590 And I thought I'd start maybe with providing just a very brief context about the starting point of the book, 15 00:01:36,590 --> 00:01:45,920 which is, of course, the end of the Cold War. And the end of this conflict really ushered in a new period in Israeli foreign 16 00:01:45,920 --> 00:01:52,550 policy situating Israel in what I think was undoubtedly an unprecedented, 17 00:01:52,550 --> 00:02:00,800 strong strategic position. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which had supported Israel's Arab foes, 18 00:02:00,800 --> 00:02:10,880 ended effectively the bipolar world order and established the United States, Israel's closest ally, as the world's sole superpower. 19 00:02:10,880 --> 00:02:21,380 And shortly thereafter, in the 1991 Gulf War, a U.S. coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, 20 00:02:21,380 --> 00:02:25,580 exposed very deep divisions within the Arab world and of course, 21 00:02:25,580 --> 00:02:36,200 weakened the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, or the PLO, which had supported the Iraqi president at the time, Saddam Hussein during the conflict. 22 00:02:36,200 --> 00:02:45,890 Now, I think it's quite important to note that these quite dramatic international shifts were also coupled with changes inside Israel. 23 00:02:45,890 --> 00:02:55,790 There was a very successful restructuring of the Israeli economy via what was termed the 1985 Economic Emergency Stability Plan. 24 00:02:55,790 --> 00:03:05,600 And of course, with the end of the Cold War, we witnessed the arrival of close two million immigrants from the former Soviet Union. 25 00:03:05,600 --> 00:03:11,360 And those, of course, greatly increased Israel's state capacities to seise the opportunities, 26 00:03:11,360 --> 00:03:18,980 but also deal with some of the challenges that were generated by the confluence of domestic and international changes. 27 00:03:18,980 --> 00:03:21,950 Now, as the Cold War really came to an end, 28 00:03:21,950 --> 00:03:33,980 Israeli foreign policy makers were very deeply divided about what foreign policy path Israel should pursue in the wake of these dramatic changes. 29 00:03:33,980 --> 00:03:43,130 And what I really tried to do in the book is look at these paths that Israel pursued in relation to four key arenas the Middle East, 30 00:03:43,130 --> 00:03:48,980 which occupies arguably the majority of the book, but also which occupies, I would say, 31 00:03:48,980 --> 00:03:56,120 the majority of Israeli foreign policy attention, but also three other bilateral. 32 00:03:56,120 --> 00:04:02,960 Relations, if you like, with the United States, irrespective of its role as a mediator or as a player in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 33 00:04:02,960 --> 00:04:16,160 the European Union and two great powers in Asia, which are India and China, and I'll be happy to sort of discuss why I chose them to focus on them. 34 00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:24,230 So set against this background I'd like in the next 40 minutes or so to really do a couple of things. 35 00:04:24,230 --> 00:04:29,870 I'd like to identify the foreign policy postures that Israel adopted since the end of the Cold War, 36 00:04:29,870 --> 00:04:36,440 and also explain why some seem to have succeeded, while others have had a slightly more short lived endurance. 37 00:04:36,440 --> 00:04:41,180 And to do that? I'll try to focus really on three key questions. 38 00:04:41,180 --> 00:04:45,260 First of all, what are the determinants of Israeli foreign policy? 39 00:04:45,260 --> 00:04:47,030 We all know Kissinger's quip. 40 00:04:47,030 --> 00:04:54,170 Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics, and I think hopefully I would like to slightly challenge that quote. 41 00:04:54,170 --> 00:04:59,060 Not entirely to refute Kissinger's observation, 42 00:04:59,060 --> 00:05:06,770 because my book does very much hinge on the idea that domestic players and domestic structures 43 00:05:06,770 --> 00:05:15,140 determine Israel's foreign policy in the wake of international events and processes. 44 00:05:15,140 --> 00:05:17,150 So much so that somebody who read my book asked me, 45 00:05:17,150 --> 00:05:24,050 Why didn't you call it inside Israeli foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, which I think might have been a good suggestion. 46 00:05:24,050 --> 00:05:32,810 But if we think about this question more broadly, big events like the end of the Cold War, like the defeat of Iraq in the 1991 war like 9-11, 47 00:05:32,810 --> 00:05:39,050 these are international events which are then interpreted through the prism of domestic players of domestic structures. 48 00:05:39,050 --> 00:05:51,890 And it's that interpretation that in turn often guides and even determines how the country in this case, Israel responds to an international event. 49 00:05:51,890 --> 00:05:56,180 And I think these really different interpretations and actions that are quite interesting to look at. 50 00:05:56,180 --> 00:06:01,490 So first of all, what are the determinants of Israeli foreign policy? That will be one thing I'd like to answer. 51 00:06:01,490 --> 00:06:06,470 The second really is what are the postures that Israel adopted since the end of the Cold War? 52 00:06:06,470 --> 00:06:12,170 And sometimes when one looks at Israel's foreign policy or foreign policy of other countries for that matter, 53 00:06:12,170 --> 00:06:16,970 we might have the impression that these are disorganised on strategic, very ad hoc. 54 00:06:16,970 --> 00:06:19,670 But actually, when I as I sort of delved into the material, 55 00:06:19,670 --> 00:06:25,470 I saw that there was more coherence perhaps than incoherence in Israel's foreign policy position. 56 00:06:25,470 --> 00:06:30,530 So I'll try and outline what are the key postures that I identified. 57 00:06:30,530 --> 00:06:35,300 And then in the final part, I'll try and offer some explanations, 58 00:06:35,300 --> 00:06:41,090 which I hope we can maybe debate about why some foreign policy postures prevailed over 59 00:06:41,090 --> 00:06:48,440 others and maybe some thoughts about some reflections for the future with a noted caveat. 60 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:55,400 Since the demise of the Second Temple about what happens to those who offer prophecies, so I will bear that in mind. 61 00:06:55,400 --> 00:06:59,600 So what have been the key determinants of Israeli foreign policy? 62 00:06:59,600 --> 00:07:06,110 I think if we look very broadly at the literature, there are a few competing approaches which I will really look at very, very briefly. 63 00:07:06,110 --> 00:07:10,820 One is that Israeli foreign policy is determined by the country's security network. 64 00:07:10,820 --> 00:07:15,410 This is some of the stuff that people like Government, Sheffield and Old Block wrote. 65 00:07:15,410 --> 00:07:19,340 There was a famous special issue which talked about an army with a state, right? 66 00:07:19,340 --> 00:07:29,780 So through this prism, this security network is really the main institution that effectively determines Israel's foreign policy. 67 00:07:29,780 --> 00:07:36,440 Another is that Israeli foreign policy conforms to what international relations scholars often like to call a realism. 68 00:07:36,440 --> 00:07:40,400 In other words, there is an abstract national interest which is clear to all. 69 00:07:40,400 --> 00:07:48,170 Prime ministers tend to remind us of this national interest on a daily basis and supposedly a country photos that national interest very coldly. 70 00:07:48,170 --> 00:07:52,220 People like Clive Jones have argued that in relation to Israel. 71 00:07:52,220 --> 00:07:57,800 And then the third approach is that Israeli foreign policy is almost an exercise in muddling through, right? 72 00:07:57,800 --> 00:08:05,660 Very strategic, very ad hoc, a victim of the vagaries of Israeli coalition government. 73 00:08:05,660 --> 00:08:14,960 And that's been the main argument of people like Chuck Freilich, and you'd have been made to mention just a few names. 74 00:08:14,960 --> 00:08:20,660 I think by and large, I do not agree with any of these approaches, as you might not be too surprised to hear. 75 00:08:20,660 --> 00:08:26,960 And instead, what I try to develop in the book is a sort of loose model, if you like, 76 00:08:26,960 --> 00:08:33,170 of understanding Israeli foreign policy through the prism of three concentric circles. 77 00:08:33,170 --> 00:08:39,140 And the first and most influential circle really comprises of the Israeli prime 78 00:08:39,140 --> 00:08:47,180 minister and the circle of confidence and trusted aides around him or her up, 79 00:08:47,180 --> 00:08:55,740 which often certainly in the period that I've looked at, have replaced the official structure of the state both in. 80 00:08:55,740 --> 00:09:03,510 Rate in foreign policy, but also sometimes in implementing it, and I'll get back to this a bit later on. 81 00:09:03,510 --> 00:09:08,340 What is quite interesting about most of the key decisions taken in Israel since the end of the Cold War, 82 00:09:08,340 --> 00:09:12,660 whether or not to respond to the Iraqi attacks in the 1991 war, 83 00:09:12,660 --> 00:09:19,320 whether or not to embark upon the Oslo process, whether or not to withdraw from the Gaza Strip under Ariel Sharon. 84 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:25,170 Usually, these key decisions were first deliberated within a very small circle of trust and very informal one. 85 00:09:25,170 --> 00:09:31,680 Then they were often coordinated with the United States, Israel's closest ally, and only then they were brought, 86 00:09:31,680 --> 00:09:41,520 often as a fait accompli to the government, the cabinet, and finally not always to parliament for approval. 87 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:45,700 So I think what's interesting to ask about this very strong concentric circles 88 00:09:45,700 --> 00:09:50,700 is how did it come about and how does it endure and survive for so long? 89 00:09:50,700 --> 00:09:56,820 And I think here the fact that Israeli that Israel's government is formed on the basis 90 00:09:56,820 --> 00:10:02,040 of a coalition government is quite significant because prime ministers often do not 91 00:10:02,040 --> 00:10:08,070 trust their fellow ministers and therefore their fellow ministers are really not a forum 92 00:10:08,070 --> 00:10:15,210 for deliberation of what historian Ian Kershaw has described as fateful decisions. 93 00:10:15,210 --> 00:10:22,260 And I'd like to just share with you one quote from the chief of staff of Ariel Sharon, the vice glass who I interviewed for the book. 94 00:10:22,260 --> 00:10:31,590 And this quote, the sentiment, the flavour of it has been really repeated time and time again in interviews that I conducted for this 95 00:10:31,590 --> 00:10:38,040 research and in relation to whether or not the prime minister can debate or reflect with his colleagues. 96 00:10:38,040 --> 00:10:40,530 This is what he told me. 97 00:10:40,530 --> 00:10:49,560 Quote The Prime Minister will never come to the cabinet with an idea that has not first been tested within his intimate circle. 98 00:10:49,560 --> 00:10:58,950 And then, he continues, Members of the cabinet are not people you can brainstorm with for better or worse in our political system. 99 00:10:58,950 --> 00:11:08,040 They are enemies of the prime minister. But those who sit with him, the prime minister is around the table want to substitute him. 100 00:11:08,040 --> 00:11:15,570 Nine out of 10 want to replace him. Nine out of 10 are legitimately waiting for the prime minister's downfall. 101 00:11:15,570 --> 00:11:22,770 They feel they are not an appropriate forum for brainstorming, and this quote really came time and time again. 102 00:11:22,770 --> 00:11:26,130 I remember. Ethan Habib, who was the chief of staff of Rabin. 103 00:11:26,130 --> 00:11:32,160 When I asked him whether Rabin deliberated with his colleagues, he looked at me quite amazing, said young man. 104 00:11:32,160 --> 00:11:36,840 Mr. Rabin did not trust his own shoes, let alone his colleagues. 105 00:11:36,840 --> 00:11:43,260 So this is the kind of flavour, and I think this profound mistrust has really meant that Israeli prime ministers often 106 00:11:43,260 --> 00:11:50,340 do not deliberate with their colleagues and rather deliberate with this informal forum. 107 00:11:50,340 --> 00:11:58,470 Of course, in the case of an election, it was called the Raj Forum famously, but each of these Israeli prime ministers had his own his own forum. 108 00:11:58,470 --> 00:12:01,590 Now there's another point, of course, which is a vote against the prime minister, 109 00:12:01,590 --> 00:12:06,810 which can of course take place and does often will be also a vote against the US president. 110 00:12:06,810 --> 00:12:12,480 And that is something that Israeli politicians in serving government usually have been reluctant to do. 111 00:12:12,480 --> 00:12:17,760 Not all of them and not all the time, but as a modus operandi, this is usually been the case. 112 00:12:17,760 --> 00:12:21,780 The third factor that really preserves this system is that the prime minister is 113 00:12:21,780 --> 00:12:26,080 the only policy maker that really has the access to the whole picture to all 114 00:12:26,080 --> 00:12:31,290 the information coming both within the state institutions and also from important 115 00:12:31,290 --> 00:12:34,710 international players and several Israeli prime ministers probably owed. 116 00:12:34,710 --> 00:12:41,520 Barak is the most notorious of them, likes to prevent that information and doesn't share it with his colleagues again, 117 00:12:41,520 --> 00:12:47,070 so they really do not have access to the whole picture. 118 00:12:47,070 --> 00:12:51,780 A third sort of element that sustains this very important circle is the fact that Israeli 119 00:12:51,780 --> 00:12:56,160 prime ministers have not only refrained from deliberating with their colleagues, 120 00:12:56,160 --> 00:13:03,480 but have also put in post their own confidants for carrying out sensitive foreign policy missions. 121 00:13:03,480 --> 00:13:10,890 So, for example, the peace agreement with Jordan, the main individual that was responsible for crafting it, was not Israel's foreign minister. 122 00:13:10,890 --> 00:13:16,680 In fact, you almost bungled it. The person who was really responsible for it was then Deputy Olmert. 123 00:13:16,680 --> 00:13:21,300 Sudden this day, a levy Binyamin Netanyahu has had his own lawyer misstates. 124 00:13:21,300 --> 00:13:28,110 Talk more Ariel Sharon appointed no less than his son to go and negotiate with Mr. 125 00:13:28,110 --> 00:13:34,260 Yasser Arafat at the time. So we have you this very interesting system that is almost parallel to state institutions, 126 00:13:34,260 --> 00:13:42,730 which is primarily weakened and harmed the Israeli Foreign Ministry, a weak institution pretty much from the inception of the State of Israel. 127 00:13:42,730 --> 00:13:47,910 Now, of course, the fact that this central circle is so important creates quite significant problems. 128 00:13:47,910 --> 00:13:51,600 First of all, it begs the question who is ultimately accountable for foreign policy? 129 00:13:51,600 --> 00:13:55,590 And second, of course, there is the legal question because the Israeli government by law is. 130 00:13:55,590 --> 00:14:05,250 Responsible for foreign policy and security decisions, so this is the first circle the prime minister and his or her aides and confidence. 131 00:14:05,250 --> 00:14:12,870 The second concentric circle is really the security network and especially the Israeli Defence Force, which has significant power. 132 00:14:12,870 --> 00:14:17,220 But I would caution against seeing the security service and the security network 133 00:14:17,220 --> 00:14:21,540 and the Israeli Defence Force in particular as more stronger than it actually is. 134 00:14:21,540 --> 00:14:28,230 First of all, by law, the Israeli security apparatus is subordinate to the prime. 135 00:14:28,230 --> 00:14:34,560 Second, the security establishment is often divided about what to do in relation to several issues. 136 00:14:34,560 --> 00:14:42,750 A good example of that would be whether or not Yasser Arafat was actually responsible for quote unquote orchestrating the Second Intifada or not. 137 00:14:42,750 --> 00:14:52,630 There was a very, very deep argument and debate within the security apparatus, and Israeli prime ministers have very skilfully been able to. 138 00:14:52,630 --> 00:14:57,890 Benefit from these divisions, but most importantly, I think the Israeli Defence Force, 139 00:14:57,890 --> 00:15:02,440 especially the army, is ultimately embedded in Israeli society and in the economy. 140 00:15:02,440 --> 00:15:07,930 It is not an isolated corporate entity like in a sort of classic military state, 141 00:15:07,930 --> 00:15:16,750 and therefore it is to some degree porous to the influences from civil society and broader society as a whole. 142 00:15:16,750 --> 00:15:21,700 And it's quite interesting to look. When I reflected back again on these key decisions, 143 00:15:21,700 --> 00:15:25,870 how many decisions since the end of the Cold War were actually taken by an Israeli 144 00:15:25,870 --> 00:15:31,030 prime minister against the advice and against the will of the Israeli Defence Force? 145 00:15:31,030 --> 00:15:38,660 The withdrawal from Gaza? As one example, the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, the army was dead against that. 146 00:15:38,660 --> 00:15:41,930 The beginning of the Oslo process, which the army was not consulted on, 147 00:15:41,930 --> 00:15:47,210 was described by the then chief of staff as a Swiss cheese because of the multiple 148 00:15:47,210 --> 00:15:52,370 holes that the then chief of Staff Mark thought he found in the Oslo Accord. 149 00:15:52,370 --> 00:15:55,700 So I think we should, of course, take into consideration the security network, 150 00:15:55,700 --> 00:16:01,640 but not overstate its power in influencing Israel's foreign policy directions. 151 00:16:01,640 --> 00:16:11,030 And then the third concentric circles, I think, comprises of this very fluid notion that we have as scholars of national identity. 152 00:16:11,030 --> 00:16:20,240 And here in thinking about the links really between national identity and foreign policy, I sort of try to, if you like, 153 00:16:20,240 --> 00:16:28,670 identify five national discourses that I thought at least played out time and time again in Israel's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, 154 00:16:28,670 --> 00:16:34,730 the first which Yaakov knows much more than I do about. But nevertheless, I will mention is the notion of Israel as a Jewish state. 155 00:16:34,730 --> 00:16:39,350 Right. And I think it has very different manifestations, which I'm having to talk about. 156 00:16:39,350 --> 00:16:41,930 But but Israel's Palestinian Arab minority, 157 00:16:41,930 --> 00:16:49,910 I would say that a broad notion of Israel existing as a Jewish state is shared by the vast majority of Israeli society. 158 00:16:49,910 --> 00:16:55,520 The second notion is Israel as a Zionist state, which is not exactly the same as Israel as a Jewish state. 159 00:16:55,520 --> 00:17:03,350 Also, it has different expressions. And again, for two important groups Jewish, ultra-Orthodox parts of the Middle East. 160 00:17:03,350 --> 00:17:06,890 Not all. And Israeli Palestinians. 161 00:17:06,890 --> 00:17:16,190 Again, the notion of Israel as a Zionist state has been shared, interestingly by the Zionist left so-called liberals and the Zionist right. 162 00:17:16,190 --> 00:17:18,920 The third aspect, which really is a new, I would say, 163 00:17:18,920 --> 00:17:25,760 discourse that we begin to see only with the end of the Cold War is this idea of Israel as the Start-Up Nation, right? 164 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:35,690 This highly technological superpower that really develops in tandem with the changes in the Israeli economy, 165 00:17:35,690 --> 00:17:43,400 which has been used by Israeli foreign policy makers in forging ties with countries like India like China, 166 00:17:43,400 --> 00:17:48,770 but also have played an quite an instrumental role in clinching the recent Abraham Accords, 167 00:17:48,770 --> 00:17:57,430 especially in relation to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, perhaps less so with the case of Sudan and Morocco. 168 00:17:57,430 --> 00:18:00,640 Now, the fourth national discourse concerns the Holocaust, 169 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:09,910 which is deeply embedded in Israeli identity via national commemoration days, legislation, museums, the education system and so on. 170 00:18:09,910 --> 00:18:17,050 And what is interesting it is our title as written on this very instructively, is that especially in moments of crisis and conflict, 171 00:18:17,050 --> 00:18:22,960 Israeli foreign policy makers tend to brand Israel's foes once it was the PLO. 172 00:18:22,960 --> 00:18:27,310 Today it is Iran as incarnations of the Nazis. 173 00:18:27,310 --> 00:18:29,620 And what is interesting also is that in Israel, 174 00:18:29,620 --> 00:18:40,480 this discourse around the Holocaust has amplified what is already a fairly high threat perception that Israeli foreign policymakers operate with. 175 00:18:40,480 --> 00:18:48,130 So the past in this sense, the Holocaust. This idea, this notion that is manufactured time and time again of never again is really a long 176 00:18:48,130 --> 00:18:53,620 and threatening shadow that looms quite large over Israel and its foreign policy. 177 00:18:53,620 --> 00:19:02,050 And finally, in terms of these narratives is the notion of Israel as a democracy within the 1967 borders. 178 00:19:02,050 --> 00:19:06,970 You could say that Israel has a free press, free and fair elections, competitive party system, 179 00:19:06,970 --> 00:19:11,350 universal suffrage, respect for freedom of speech and so on and so forth. 180 00:19:11,350 --> 00:19:15,610 But of course, at the same time, Israeli democracy has been very seriously impaired. 181 00:19:15,610 --> 00:19:22,450 Some would say even broken by the prolonged and deepening occupation of the Gaza Strip until 2005. 182 00:19:22,450 --> 00:19:32,020 And, of course, the enduring and deepening occupation of the West Bank, where Palestinians are not granted citizenship, they cannot vote. 183 00:19:32,020 --> 00:19:37,720 They are subject to very severe limitations on their personal movement, their movement of goods. 184 00:19:37,720 --> 00:19:43,810 They operate, in some cases on different transportation systems and legal systems as well. 185 00:19:43,810 --> 00:19:46,150 Now how should we think about these national narratives? 186 00:19:46,150 --> 00:19:53,290 So what I would say is that effectively we should look at them as imposing certain contours around Israeli foreign policy, 187 00:19:53,290 --> 00:20:00,640 and they instruct and are used by political parties to determine what is possible and what is impossible, 188 00:20:00,640 --> 00:20:07,510 what might be a legitimate foreign policy path or what might be an illegitimate foreign policy path. 189 00:20:07,510 --> 00:20:10,480 And really, we see throughout the Cold War, 190 00:20:10,480 --> 00:20:18,910 Israeli foreign policy makers use such categories to justify and legitimise certain foreign policy positions and to suppress others. 191 00:20:18,910 --> 00:20:29,440 And I think a very clear example of this was during the anti-peace campaign led by Likud, the then leader of the opposition, Mr. Binyamin Netanyahu. 192 00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:35,620 And the main arguments that he levelled against the Rabin government was that the Oslo Accords 193 00:20:35,620 --> 00:20:42,550 were under Jewish and Zionist and challenged the very moral foundations of the State of Israel. 194 00:20:42,550 --> 00:20:50,830 So you can see how at least two of these discourses come up very strongly in this example of PLO. 195 00:20:50,830 --> 00:20:58,870 So having said sort of this context for trying to explain Israeli foreign policy as being really if you like, 196 00:20:58,870 --> 00:21:02,560 determined or produced by these three concentric circles, 197 00:21:02,560 --> 00:21:07,180 the prime minister and its confident security service and national narratives, 198 00:21:07,180 --> 00:21:16,030 I think I can now proceed to talk a little bit more about the various postures and positions that Israel adopted since the end of the Cold War. 199 00:21:16,030 --> 00:21:17,620 And I'm sure, as you've seen now, 200 00:21:17,620 --> 00:21:28,360 the book really hinges on the idea that these domestic structures really inform and determine the different responses to very similar events, 201 00:21:28,360 --> 00:21:38,830 for example, the end of the Cold War. So in the book, I really divide Israel's foreign policy positions into three, and they are engagement, 202 00:21:38,830 --> 00:21:43,150 which is one entrenchment, which is another, and unilateralism is the third. 203 00:21:43,150 --> 00:21:47,260 And those are the main foreign policy positions Israel employed towards the Middle East. 204 00:21:47,260 --> 00:21:51,640 And I'll proceed by talking a little bit about them now. 205 00:21:51,640 --> 00:21:59,980 If we look at Israeli prime ministers, which I really think have much more power than perhaps the literature has ascribed to them so far. 206 00:21:59,980 --> 00:22:06,520 So he took Shamir, who was the leader of Likud, Israel's largest Center-Right party, 207 00:22:06,520 --> 00:22:11,800 and of course, Israel's most longest serving Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. 208 00:22:11,800 --> 00:22:15,580 Both of them were really the main advocates, and indeed, 209 00:22:15,580 --> 00:22:26,050 embodiments of Israel's foreign policy of entrenchment and entrenchment effectively rests on three very clear principles. 210 00:22:26,050 --> 00:22:37,360 The first principle is that Israel will make peace with Arab states and with the Arab world more generally in exchange for peace, 211 00:22:37,360 --> 00:22:47,800 rather than the principle of exchanging territory that Israel occupied in the 1967 war in exchange for peace. 212 00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:56,610 So this idea is that peace will be struck in exchange for peace, not a territory. 213 00:22:56,610 --> 00:23:08,140 Now, the second principle is that Israel's foreign policy has to remain even under conditions of peace primarily. 214 00:23:08,140 --> 00:23:18,880 Following the notion of building an iron wall of military might, which obvious written so extensively about rather than on diplomacy. 215 00:23:18,880 --> 00:23:25,930 So the notion here is that building a military strength becomes almost an end in itself rather than a means to achieve peace. 216 00:23:25,930 --> 00:23:31,450 But even on the conditions of peace, preserving Israel's iron wall of military might, 217 00:23:31,450 --> 00:23:35,500 let alone in other engagements, which are not in the context of peace. 218 00:23:35,500 --> 00:23:40,930 That is a fundamental of this notion of entrenchment. 219 00:23:40,930 --> 00:23:45,880 Principle number two and principle number three is that the Palestinians residing in the West 220 00:23:45,880 --> 00:23:52,810 Bank and in the Gaza Strip again until 2005 could be granted some dimensions of autonomy, 221 00:23:52,810 --> 00:23:58,570 predominantly economic autonomy, but would remain effectively under Israeli occupation. 222 00:23:58,570 --> 00:24:09,400 So this position sees no tension between Israel pursuing a particular foreign policy and Israel's empowerment of its own democracy. 223 00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:15,880 So it's interesting to think where does this foreign policy derive from? 224 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:22,210 The first thing is that, of course, it's Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu, but more as embodiments, 225 00:24:22,210 --> 00:24:26,080 not only as two individuals really represent the notion of the Israeli right, 226 00:24:26,080 --> 00:24:30,850 both religious and secular, that Israel, by virtue of the history of the Jewish people, 227 00:24:30,850 --> 00:24:39,670 has a right to the whole of the land, almost an undisputed right from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. 228 00:24:39,670 --> 00:24:43,240 So that's one ideological staple of this approach. 229 00:24:43,240 --> 00:24:51,760 The second is that the Arab states, including the Palestinians, cannot be trusted to keep their side of the bargain. 230 00:24:51,760 --> 00:25:01,000 Shamir and Netanyahu have been always very, very suspicious about the real motives of the Arabs in making peace, 231 00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:10,300 and therefore this suspicion brought them to believe that Israel has to hold the territory even in a peace agreement. 232 00:25:10,300 --> 00:25:18,910 And then a third important guiding rule was that time effectively was on Israel's side. 233 00:25:18,910 --> 00:25:23,620 And this approach really subscribes to the view that the more time passes 234 00:25:23,620 --> 00:25:27,670 Israel would be able to consolidate itself further would become much stronger, 235 00:25:27,670 --> 00:25:30,040 much more established, much more recognised. 236 00:25:30,040 --> 00:25:42,250 And eventually the Arab side would come around and recognise that the existence of Israel as a Jewish state is irreversible and therefore make peace. 237 00:25:42,250 --> 00:25:53,140 And of course, the recent Abraham Accords that Binyamin Netanyahu struck shortly before the end of his term were perhaps the strongest indication of 238 00:25:53,140 --> 00:26:01,210 this approach of the ability to strike a peace agreement with important Arab countries without making any territorial concessions, 239 00:26:01,210 --> 00:26:10,030 and with the Palestinian question really figuring very, very low on the order of priorities of all signatures. 240 00:26:10,030 --> 00:26:17,080 So this is entrenchment, something that we will go back to a bit later and the other side of the spectrum we find you will not be surprised. 241 00:26:17,080 --> 00:26:22,240 The notion of engagement in some of you might ask, why didn't I call it striving for peace? 242 00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:28,210 The reason is that in some cases, we know that Israel did strike a peace like in the case of Jordan, that is clear. 243 00:26:28,210 --> 00:26:32,680 But in other cases, it is less clear. Most notably, of course, the Palestinians, 244 00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:38,020 those of you who are familiar with these Rabin's last speech before he was assassinated will note that 245 00:26:38,020 --> 00:26:45,160 he said very clearly that what he's willing to offer to the Palestinians is something less than a state, 246 00:26:45,160 --> 00:26:47,440 something quite similar, in fact, to what Benjamin Netanyahu, 247 00:26:47,440 --> 00:26:54,430 perhaps and Donald Trump had in mind when they devised what was called the so-called Deal of the Century. 248 00:26:54,430 --> 00:26:59,320 And again, going back to the interviews when I interviewed again Rabin's chief of staff, 249 00:26:59,320 --> 00:27:05,380 Ethan Hubbell, I asked him, How did Mr Rabin, how you know, what did Mr. Rabin hadn't have in mind? 250 00:27:05,380 --> 00:27:09,490 So both he and former head of Mossad, Mr. Danny Yatom, 251 00:27:09,490 --> 00:27:15,580 said that what Rabin had in mind really was giving to the Palestinians maximum 60 percent of the territory. 252 00:27:15,580 --> 00:27:23,170 Yet almost all right, this is in his memoirs of the West Bank. Moreover, Habib was a very humorous individual. 253 00:27:23,170 --> 00:27:27,550 He said if he had been would have witnessed what Barak offered the Palestinians, 254 00:27:27,550 --> 00:27:31,630 he would have jumped from the sixth floor of the hotel that we were conducting the interview. 255 00:27:31,630 --> 00:27:34,930 And so you can see how sceptical Habib was. 256 00:27:34,930 --> 00:27:42,820 And again, when asked how would have been, how did I think to actually implement this Habib pose for a minute and said, Well, 257 00:27:42,820 --> 00:27:48,820 Rabin was under the view that the balance of power tilted so firmly towards Israel that when push comes to shove, 258 00:27:48,820 --> 00:27:56,110 Israel would able to enforce this kind of agreement. In other words, 60 percent of the West Bank, no more, no division of Jerusalem, 259 00:27:56,110 --> 00:28:00,190 the Gaza Strip in its entirety to the Palestinians upon the Palestinians. 260 00:28:00,190 --> 00:28:10,830 So that's why I did not really call this. Foreign policy approach, peace, but there was an undisputed degree of engagement under Rabin. 261 00:28:10,830 --> 00:28:16,050 It was the same degree of engagement under Shimon Peres, and even Ehud Barak was an engagement. 262 00:28:16,050 --> 00:28:25,530 Even not perhaps he was not a peacemaker. So you have to engage it because it's not zero percent that he was willing to offer. 263 00:28:25,530 --> 00:28:29,610 Well, it's engagement because we cannot really, we cannot really tell it. 264 00:28:29,610 --> 00:28:39,270 Certainly in the context of the Palestinians that the final aim was the kind of of peace that would be required. 265 00:28:39,270 --> 00:28:42,750 Under the parameters that Israel and the Palestinians had at the time, 266 00:28:42,750 --> 00:28:47,610 and we do not know for sure that certainly Rabin or Paris wanted to follow through 267 00:28:47,610 --> 00:28:51,150 this notion of engagement to the kind of peace that was required at the time. 268 00:28:51,150 --> 00:28:59,130 So following from what been and how said if the Palestinians would not accept the 60 percent offer, so be it. 269 00:28:59,130 --> 00:29:07,260 This was not a peace that was driven out of this notion of reconciliation, but rather a peace by force, a kind of take it or leave it option. 270 00:29:07,260 --> 00:29:15,090 But nevertheless, it's interesting to think why people like Rabin and like Peres and certainly Barak, 271 00:29:15,090 --> 00:29:22,290 who engage significantly with the Palestinians, certainly engage significantly with Syria, try to reach a peace agreement with Syria. 272 00:29:22,290 --> 00:29:31,350 And I would say that the record is more favourable to Israel than in the case of the Palestinians. 273 00:29:31,350 --> 00:29:38,400 Why did they reach such a starkly different conclusion than people, for example, like Binyamin Netanyahu and S.U.? 274 00:29:38,400 --> 00:29:44,880 The first thing, of course, was that they were much more optimistic about Arab intentions. 275 00:29:44,880 --> 00:29:49,110 They were not as suspicious as Shamir and as Netanyahu. 276 00:29:49,110 --> 00:29:58,170 The second, of course, was that they saw the opportunities that the Cold War offered Israel to be much greater than Netanyahu and Shamir envisaged. 277 00:29:58,170 --> 00:30:07,500 But most importantly, perhaps both Rabin and Peres and Barak were very pessimistic about the prospect of 278 00:30:07,500 --> 00:30:12,210 a prolonged occupation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 279 00:30:12,210 --> 00:30:18,810 and therefore they pursued what I call this foreign policy of engagement, which was based again on three very clear principles. 280 00:30:18,810 --> 00:30:24,660 First, you make peace with the Arab world in exchange of returning territories, not these territories, 281 00:30:24,660 --> 00:30:31,080 but territories part of them that Israel had occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 282 00:30:31,080 --> 00:30:35,550 The second is that you put premium on diplomacy rather than on military force. 283 00:30:35,550 --> 00:30:36,810 When engaging with the Middle East. 284 00:30:36,810 --> 00:30:44,490 It doesn't mean that military force is completely thrown out of the window, but the premium is on diplomacy rather than on military force. 285 00:30:44,490 --> 00:30:49,020 And thirdly, all of them were convinced that the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, 286 00:30:49,020 --> 00:30:52,590 which at the end of the Cold War, including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip is Jerusalem. 287 00:30:52,590 --> 00:30:56,970 The Golan Heights, but also parts of south Lebanon should be downscaled. 288 00:30:56,970 --> 00:31:03,960 They were all under the view that this is against Israel's national interest. 289 00:31:03,960 --> 00:31:10,050 And this was the background for historical decisions such as the initiation of the Oslo Accords or Labour. 290 00:31:10,050 --> 00:31:14,910 Governments carried out serious negotiations with Syria. 291 00:31:14,910 --> 00:31:17,940 Even Olmert did that under the mediation of Turkey. 292 00:31:17,940 --> 00:31:30,510 Interestingly, not the United States, and the whole idea was again exchanging land for full peace with an Arab side. 293 00:31:30,510 --> 00:31:33,240 Now here there were some clear successes, of course, as well. 294 00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:40,830 The peace with Jordan was to a large degree facilitated by the breakthrough that was done with the PLO. 295 00:31:40,830 --> 00:31:45,540 Again, merely engaging with the PLO without making full peace with the Palestinians 296 00:31:45,540 --> 00:31:51,240 was enough to get the Israeli Jordanian peace process going and finalising it. 297 00:31:51,240 --> 00:31:58,980 And of course, Israel had significant of what I call dividends of engagement from merely negotiating with the PLO and being 298 00:31:58,980 --> 00:32:05,310 able to forge very close relations with countries like India and like China and developing full diplomatic, 299 00:32:05,310 --> 00:32:13,260 economic, political relations. Whereas prior to the end of the Cold War, Israel had no relations with China or with India. 300 00:32:13,260 --> 00:32:19,650 So actually, once the Cold War ends and once these relations are forged, China here is particularly important. 301 00:32:19,650 --> 00:32:29,220 Israel finally has relations with all members of the Security Council, something that it did not have before the end of the Cold War. 302 00:32:29,220 --> 00:32:36,930 At the same time, of course, the limits to both entrenchment and engagement became quite clear. 303 00:32:36,930 --> 00:32:41,010 A decade more or less after the end of the Cold War. 304 00:32:41,010 --> 00:32:46,140 And this really, I would say, gave birth to a third foreign policy position, 305 00:32:46,140 --> 00:32:55,410 which is unilateralism and unilateralism was most closely associated with Ariel Sharon with his unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, 306 00:32:55,410 --> 00:33:07,380 but also, of course, who decided to unilaterally withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2000 after 18 years of presence occupation in that country. 307 00:33:07,380 --> 00:33:11,550 Now Israel's, but it was fresh. 308 00:33:11,550 --> 00:33:24,570 Yeah. So Israel's unilateralist foreign policy was also based on this idea that the occupation of our own land had to be downscaled, 309 00:33:24,570 --> 00:33:31,530 but the mechanism would be very different. People like at the end zone like Mark reached the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, 310 00:33:31,530 --> 00:33:38,710 that there was not that they could not make strike an agreement with an Arab partner. 311 00:33:38,710 --> 00:33:46,240 And instead, therefore Israel would negotiate territorial withdrawals, not with the Arab partners, but with the international community. 312 00:33:46,240 --> 00:33:56,680 And this is precisely why Israelis were so pedantic with the United Nations over drawing the border with Lebanon right to the MM. 313 00:33:56,680 --> 00:34:03,070 This is why Ariel Sharon, the father of the settlements, was so adamant on withdrawing a small settlement like the gate, 314 00:34:03,070 --> 00:34:06,340 which really encroached about 100 metres into the Gaza Strip. 315 00:34:06,340 --> 00:34:14,320 The notion was that the international community would give the legitimacy stamp on an Israeli withdrawal. 316 00:34:14,320 --> 00:34:18,250 And of course, it is in this context that Israel withdrew from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. 317 00:34:18,250 --> 00:34:23,020 The only snag was and that was quite a significant snag, was because there was not an agreement. 318 00:34:23,020 --> 00:34:31,390 Israel would had to manage the new territorial configuration with other foreign policy tools, military, economic, diplomatic. 319 00:34:31,390 --> 00:34:37,870 And of course, if we look at the outcome of these approaches of these withdrawals, I think I'll return to a bit later. 320 00:34:37,870 --> 00:34:45,280 We see that none of them produce the kind of stability that Israeli foreign policymakers promised when they were going through Lebanon. 321 00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:47,740 Perhaps a bit of a better case than Gaza. 322 00:34:47,740 --> 00:34:54,130 But contrary to Israeli proclamations that this is only because of the withdrawal and the subsequent Israeli Hezbollah war, 323 00:34:54,130 --> 00:35:03,490 one must always remember that the attention of Hezbollah in the last 10 or so years even more was squarely towards the civil war in Syria, 324 00:35:03,490 --> 00:35:06,430 and much less so to Israel in the South. 325 00:35:06,430 --> 00:35:13,840 And I think that provides also as important the important factor of explaining why the Israeli-Lebanese war has been relatively sorry. 326 00:35:13,840 --> 00:35:22,660 Border has been, relatively speaking, uneventful since the 2006 Israel Hezbollah. 327 00:35:22,660 --> 00:35:24,790 So unilateralism, really like engagement, 328 00:35:24,790 --> 00:35:33,310 embodied an understanding which was shared at least by five of the seven Israeli prime ministers since the end of the Cold War. 329 00:35:33,310 --> 00:35:41,860 That the occupation of Arab lands, at least in its entirety, was against Israel's interests. 330 00:35:41,860 --> 00:35:46,960 And I think it's worthwhile to think about why really these prime ministers reach 331 00:35:46,960 --> 00:35:52,440 the conclusion that they did some of them like a mutual but also Shimon Peres. 332 00:35:52,440 --> 00:35:58,140 Having been once supportive of the settlement project, and it's something that sometimes is forgotten, 333 00:35:58,140 --> 00:36:02,820 certainly about Shimon Peres to moving to the to the position, 334 00:36:02,820 --> 00:36:05,490 certainly unexpected in the case of alienation, 335 00:36:05,490 --> 00:36:14,160 of actually uprooting evacuating Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip and re defining Israel's borders. 336 00:36:14,160 --> 00:36:17,220 So what was the thinking behind that? The first one was, of course, 337 00:36:17,220 --> 00:36:26,430 that the prolonged occupation did pose a threat to Israel remaining a democratic state by virtue of the fact that 338 00:36:26,430 --> 00:36:35,550 it did continue to hold millions of citizens without rights that are normally enshrined in democratic regimes. 339 00:36:35,550 --> 00:36:40,290 The second, of course, and this is something that is quite conspicuous and was conspicuous much more 340 00:36:40,290 --> 00:36:44,640 than now in the Israeli political argument was this notion of Palestinians, 341 00:36:44,640 --> 00:36:52,680 quote unquote overtaking numerically, the number of Israeli Jews that reside between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. 342 00:36:52,680 --> 00:36:59,910 And then the question is, can Israel still proclaim to be a Jewish state under these circumstances? 343 00:36:59,910 --> 00:37:05,850 Now, the challenged Israeli democracy and the challenge to the Jewish identity of the state was not only an internal matter, 344 00:37:05,850 --> 00:37:11,730 of course, for people like Sean, for people like, I mean, even for people like Shimon Peres and the. 345 00:37:11,730 --> 00:37:21,930 But both of all of them also understood through their interactions with successive U.S. presidents and of course, 346 00:37:21,930 --> 00:37:30,690 with their counterparts in Western Europe, that the notion that Israel has shared valued shared values with liberal democracies 347 00:37:30,690 --> 00:37:37,500 in the West is being eroded as a result of this enduring and prolonged occupation. 348 00:37:37,500 --> 00:37:43,500 And even Ariel Sharon confided to his very loyal aide device class and told him, You know, 349 00:37:43,500 --> 00:37:51,150 what changed my mindset was my continuous encounters with U.S. officials and my recognition, 350 00:37:51,150 --> 00:37:54,210 which, of course, Binyamin Netanyahu would say that even Sharon was wrong. 351 00:37:54,210 --> 00:38:02,170 But this is how Sheldon felt that even the United States could not be brought around to support Israel's prolonged. 352 00:38:02,170 --> 00:38:15,290 Occupation and deprivation of Democratic basic democratic rights of the Palestinians in the long during. 353 00:38:15,290 --> 00:38:29,130 Now, I think. Thirty years after the Cold War, it does look or does seem that Israel's foreign policy of entrenchment has prevailed, 354 00:38:29,130 --> 00:38:33,600 perhaps over engagement and over unilateralism. 355 00:38:33,600 --> 00:38:35,640 If you look at the foreign policy record, 356 00:38:35,640 --> 00:38:43,320 the only peace agreement that remained from the engagement stance is Egypt before the end of the Cold War and, of course, Jordan. 357 00:38:43,320 --> 00:38:47,820 The other attempts by Palestinians and Syria were unsuccessful. 358 00:38:47,820 --> 00:38:54,900 And by contrast, the Abraham Accords, probably the vindication of entrenchment have been the most recent success, 359 00:38:54,900 --> 00:39:02,110 together with Sudan and with Morocco. So I think it's an interesting question to ask Is that the case? 360 00:39:02,110 --> 00:39:08,730 If so, why is it the case and perhaps offer some thoughts, at least of what might be the implications for the future? 361 00:39:08,730 --> 00:39:14,880 So why is it really that entrenchment seems to have prevailed? 362 00:39:14,880 --> 00:39:25,890 I think the first thought that I have on this matter is that really relates to Israel's definition as a Jewish and democratic state. 363 00:39:25,890 --> 00:39:32,070 And if we look at the peace agreements that have succeeded and those that have not, especially with the Palestinians, 364 00:39:32,070 --> 00:39:40,110 a peace agreement with the Palestinians would have entailed if one would forge one dividing Jerusalem, 365 00:39:40,110 --> 00:39:47,190 which is the holiest city, the Jews and of course, the third holiest city for Muslims. 366 00:39:47,190 --> 00:39:50,910 It would mean relinquishing the vast majority of the West Bank, 367 00:39:50,910 --> 00:40:03,910 at least if you look at the negotiations that began in the 2000 Camp David summit and onwards, which of course, is replete with religious and Jewish. 368 00:40:03,910 --> 00:40:12,280 Historical and religious symbols, and in a way, if you look at the critique that was levelled against the ENGAGES, 369 00:40:12,280 --> 00:40:18,820 this type of foreign policy outcome was constantly seen as an attempt to rebalance Israel's 370 00:40:18,820 --> 00:40:29,740 definition of being much less Jewish and much more democratic and open to the world. 371 00:40:29,740 --> 00:40:38,680 And in hindsight, I think that whereas the majority of the Israeli prime ministers, the vast majority of whom, by the way, were completely secular, 372 00:40:38,680 --> 00:40:48,100 reached the conclusion that they would be content with this rebalance, the vast majority of the Israeli Jewish society was certainly not. 373 00:40:48,100 --> 00:40:52,450 And this was the background for the very vile campaign against talk being. 374 00:40:52,450 --> 00:40:56,440 The settler movement played a very significant role in it. 375 00:40:56,440 --> 00:41:09,190 And of course, the emoting, the emotive elements that identity so often invokes were a constant and very powerful obstacle to realising 376 00:41:09,190 --> 00:41:18,610 Israel's foreign policy of engagement and subsequently perhaps a peace with the Arab sides of the Palestinians. 377 00:41:18,610 --> 00:41:22,690 This, of course, is not the only matter. The second factor, 378 00:41:22,690 --> 00:41:32,620 I think equally important was that the peace negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians were constantly accompanied by 379 00:41:32,620 --> 00:41:41,740 military confrontations with Hezbollah in the north around Lebanon and simultaneously with the negotiations with Syria. 380 00:41:41,740 --> 00:41:49,210 And Hezbollah, of course, was seen to be an ally of the Assad regime, as indeed it proved to be. 381 00:41:49,210 --> 00:41:55,280 And of course, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, both Israelis and Palestinians. 382 00:41:55,280 --> 00:42:03,580 But if we're focussing now on Israel, the continuous waves of attacks by militants, some would call them terrorists, 383 00:42:03,580 --> 00:42:11,950 especially during the 2000s and certainly following the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in the 384 00:42:11,950 --> 00:42:23,110 form of the second Palestinian Intifada and the 2006 Israel Hezbollah war created within the Israeli public. 385 00:42:23,110 --> 00:42:31,720 A very clear perception which was exploited by politicians, namely that every time Israel withdraws from territory, 386 00:42:31,720 --> 00:42:40,870 the security risks become greater and therefore any further relinquishment of land would in fact not result in a peace process, 387 00:42:40,870 --> 00:42:48,010 but in fact would result in an exacerbation of Israel's already complicated security challenges. 388 00:42:48,010 --> 00:42:57,130 And this narrative became etched in the Israeli political discourse, certainly during the Second Intifada following the Second Lebanon War 2006. 389 00:42:57,130 --> 00:43:08,470 And Binyamin Netanyahu has really done a very effective job in literally instilling this narrative as the only narrative that really should matter. 390 00:43:08,470 --> 00:43:14,410 And in his opposition to peace, which, by the way, has been very strategic, very consistent. 391 00:43:14,410 --> 00:43:20,050 He has not changed his views since he published his blueprint, a place amongst the nation. 392 00:43:20,050 --> 00:43:21,910 He's not changed his views. 393 00:43:21,910 --> 00:43:34,650 He has been very clear that from his point of view, any withdrawal from territory would result in the security risks becoming far greater. 394 00:43:34,650 --> 00:43:41,940 Now, a third factor that helps explain the sort of relative success of entrenchment is that going back to this notion of engagement, 395 00:43:41,940 --> 00:43:47,790 you really didn't have to make full peace to enjoy quite a lot of benefits already. 396 00:43:47,790 --> 00:43:52,890 Engagement, as I've said before, already was critical in facilitating the peace agreement with Jordan. 397 00:43:52,890 --> 00:43:59,130 Once the PLO agreed to recognise Israel countries further afield, certainly like India and China, 398 00:43:59,130 --> 00:44:07,650 who once upon a time were part of the Non-Aligned Movement Anti-imperialism said If the PLO recognises Israel, why shouldn't we? 399 00:44:07,650 --> 00:44:15,240 And this was really pivotal in also breaking the Arab opposition and Arab reaction to countries like China and India, 400 00:44:15,240 --> 00:44:24,090 making peace and subsequently developing very deep relations with Israel since the end of the Cold War. 401 00:44:24,090 --> 00:44:30,360 So if you like the dividends of engagement without having to make peace played a significant 402 00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:37,890 role in creating for Israel great opportunities far beyond the Middle East and of course, 403 00:44:37,890 --> 00:44:47,070 also helped consolidate and preserve Israel's relations with the United States, and to some extent, I would say. 404 00:44:47,070 --> 00:44:55,170 I would not say I would say smoothen some of the acrimonious that existed with the European Union in a very 405 00:44:55,170 --> 00:45:00,660 interesting formula whereby Israel continues to deepen and expand economic and social relations with Europe. 406 00:45:00,660 --> 00:45:07,770 Israel, by the way, is the greatest non EU scientific partner with the European Union, probably more than Brexit Britain. 407 00:45:07,770 --> 00:45:16,380 That's probably for another conversation, even though politically there could be quite a lot of acrimony, but socially and economically. 408 00:45:16,380 --> 00:45:25,200 Israel and the US have grown much closer since the end of the Cold War, even though peace has not been achieved. 409 00:45:25,200 --> 00:45:28,590 I think a fourth factor that helps understand the sort of relative success of 410 00:45:28,590 --> 00:45:35,040 entrenchment and ill success of engagement has to be the role of the US as a mediator. 411 00:45:35,040 --> 00:45:38,610 This is something I followed quite closely in the book, 412 00:45:38,610 --> 00:45:51,950 but it's quite interesting to see this significant gap between the political power and economic power and security. 413 00:45:51,950 --> 00:45:56,870 Insurance that the US provides Israel and Saudi and Egypt. 414 00:45:56,870 --> 00:46:00,380 So there's a gap between that very powerful material, 415 00:46:00,380 --> 00:46:08,540 United States and its ability to leverage that material advantage to push the sides to actually make peace. 416 00:46:08,540 --> 00:46:16,460 And if you look at the United States, and I would give huge credit to Dennis Ross for writing his memoirs, which are very illuminating in the sense. 417 00:46:16,460 --> 00:46:20,420 But he even he has been very candid that the United States, 418 00:46:20,420 --> 00:46:32,420 under his leadership as the chief peace negotiator and under the presidencies of Clinton and even Bush subsequently was too reactive, 419 00:46:32,420 --> 00:46:46,070 was too much taken by events, did not pressurise Israel sufficiently, and the memoirs of Aaron David Miller are even more forceful in that regard. 420 00:46:46,070 --> 00:46:53,870 And I think even if one is a is a is a is a strong critique of Donald Trump, as I certainly am myself. 421 00:46:53,870 --> 00:47:02,510 One cannot notice the difference can not notice the difference between the Trump administration effectively. 422 00:47:02,510 --> 00:47:09,410 Departing from the role of the U.S. as an honest broker, he said upfront, we're no longer an honest broker. 423 00:47:09,410 --> 00:47:11,420 That's it. We're done with that. 424 00:47:11,420 --> 00:47:17,100 What we are going to do is offer very clear material dividends to any Arab country who wants to sign peace with Israel. 425 00:47:17,100 --> 00:47:22,340 So the United Arab Emirates got a lot of weapons and a bit more shield from the presidency. 426 00:47:22,340 --> 00:47:32,390 Sudan got kicked off the terrorist list and the US at least extended its recognition to Western Sahara, 427 00:47:32,390 --> 00:47:39,140 supporting Morocco in the context of this conflict. Morocco has with Algeria over that piece of land, 428 00:47:39,140 --> 00:47:45,440 so I think certainly there were a lot of factors that help understand why entrenchment in 429 00:47:45,440 --> 00:47:52,820 effect became the prevailing foreign policy position over engagement and unilateralism. 430 00:47:52,820 --> 00:47:54,200 So let me end, 431 00:47:54,200 --> 00:48:05,390 perhaps in two minutes by posing the question about whether this means that entrenchment is indeed the preferred foreign policy option for Israel. 432 00:48:05,390 --> 00:48:07,400 As Benjamin Netanyahu tends to remind us, 433 00:48:07,400 --> 00:48:18,260 or tended to remind us time and time again belittling the merits of peace with the Arab world, especially with the Palestinians. 434 00:48:18,260 --> 00:48:26,540 And I would say that probably that is not necessarily the case, and I would offer three reflections on that. 435 00:48:26,540 --> 00:48:35,780 First of all, entrenchment does not deal with the challenges that occupying the Palestinians pose to Israeli democracy, 436 00:48:35,780 --> 00:48:40,460 to the Jewish identity of Israel. 437 00:48:40,460 --> 00:48:47,750 And it certainly undermines, in the long run the notion that Israel has any shared values with liberal democracies in the West. 438 00:48:47,750 --> 00:48:51,500 This is certainly something that is impossible to sustain. 439 00:48:51,500 --> 00:48:59,480 And I think the discourse around the question of whether the two-State solution can be resolved is is a bit anachronistic at the moment. 440 00:48:59,480 --> 00:49:06,290 The question that really should be raised is Israel is currently one state of Israelis and Palestinians. 441 00:49:06,290 --> 00:49:09,830 The question is how this how is Israel going to organise that state? 442 00:49:09,830 --> 00:49:16,010 Is it going to be a highly stratified, unequal segment of states where some groups, 443 00:49:16,010 --> 00:49:22,430 Jews have greater rights than other groups, which in some cases have no rights? 444 00:49:22,430 --> 00:49:25,320 Or is this entity going to be reorganised in a different way? 445 00:49:25,320 --> 00:49:31,360 But the notion that, you know, let's think about two states is probably anachronistic at this point and entrenchment. 446 00:49:31,360 --> 00:49:39,880 Does nothing to resolve that. If anything, it only deepens these challenges to Israel's core identity and Israel's so-called democratic credentials. 447 00:49:39,880 --> 00:49:46,240 And of course, to this notion that Israel has shared values with liberal democracies in the West. 448 00:49:46,240 --> 00:49:55,420 Now, of course, these weakened ties with traditional Western allies, assuming of course they are weakened, 449 00:49:55,420 --> 00:49:58,930 would be a significant departure in the diplomatic history of Zionism, 450 00:49:58,930 --> 00:50:05,410 which historically has always made sure that Israel would be backed at least by one superpower. 451 00:50:05,410 --> 00:50:12,340 That was the idea of Zionism and gradually sliding into a position that actually you are not backed by a 452 00:50:12,340 --> 00:50:21,730 superpower because your values have been so significantly eroded would put Israel in a very precarious position. 453 00:50:21,730 --> 00:50:22,960 Specifically, of course, 454 00:50:22,960 --> 00:50:34,270 if the current trends of U.S. disengagement from the region and the commensurate re entrance of Russia as an important power in the region, 455 00:50:34,270 --> 00:50:40,900 Iran becoming further entrenched in places like Syria will continue. 456 00:50:40,900 --> 00:50:50,380 And therefore, if you like in the long run, Israel's so-called victories in the form of the Abraham Accords might be likened to the army of 457 00:50:50,380 --> 00:50:56,590 Napoleon back in its Russian winter of an army charging towards one victory after the other, 458 00:50:56,590 --> 00:51:06,040 which ultimately might leave Israel. In this case, in a very dark and cold winter characterised by instability nuclearized Middle East, 459 00:51:06,040 --> 00:51:15,460 with its former great power gradually disengaging and new powers with which Israel has no natural proximity being ever closer. 460 00:51:15,460 --> 00:51:21,143 They got into that thanks.