1 00:00:11,420 --> 00:00:17,830 OK. Right. Let's get started. Lecture three. 2 00:00:17,830 --> 00:00:22,840 Wow. Oh, now hang on. I'm not pointing to the right area. 3 00:00:22,840 --> 00:00:30,460 Here we are. Okay, so just to go through what we did last week so that we remind ourselves where we were. 4 00:00:30,460 --> 00:00:35,740 We answered, as we're always asking these lectures, what is causation? 5 00:00:35,740 --> 00:00:40,630 And we looked at one possible answer is, could it be counterfactual dependence? 6 00:00:40,630 --> 00:00:49,690 And if you remember, counterfactual dependence e counterfactual need depends on C, if had C not occurred, E would not have occurred. 7 00:00:49,690 --> 00:00:54,520 So that's counterfactual dependence. And we saw no. 8 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:59,660 If we looked at we looked at early pre-emption. Do you remember Lucy throwing the rock. 9 00:00:59,660 --> 00:01:09,880 And we saw that there can be causation without counterfactual dependence because Lucy's rock throwing cause the window to shatter. 10 00:01:09,880 --> 00:01:17,380 But if Lucy hadn't thrown her rock, the window would still have shattered because Brian would have shattered it. 11 00:01:17,380 --> 00:01:23,200 So then we looked at could causation consist in chains of counterfactual dependence, 12 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:28,390 thereby picking up a question that somebody asked me after the session in the first week. 13 00:01:28,390 --> 00:01:36,130 Lady there. So could it be chains of counterfactual dependence and trouble there was with trumping? 14 00:01:36,130 --> 00:01:40,120 Do you remember the sergeant major? So no. Did I get that right? 15 00:01:40,120 --> 00:01:45,490 No. The major and the sergeant both yelled or ordered advance. 16 00:01:45,490 --> 00:01:51,760 And the troops advanced. But of course, it was the major's order that called into advance, not the sergeant's order, 17 00:01:51,760 --> 00:02:03,640 because the major trumps the sergeant and leaked pre-emption where Brian throws his rocks so soon after Lucy that there's nowhere 18 00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:10,780 that there's a chain of counterfactual dependents leading back to Lucy's rock throwing that isn't there in Brian's rock throwing. 19 00:02:10,780 --> 00:02:15,700 So it can't be just chains of counterfactual dependence. 20 00:02:15,700 --> 00:02:21,550 And then we looked, if you remember, we looked at the idea of an alternate event. 21 00:02:21,550 --> 00:02:28,660 So an event that's different in time or place or slightly in manner from another event. 22 00:02:28,660 --> 00:02:37,480 And we see that had Lucy's rock throwing being slightly different, the window shattering would have been slightly different. 23 00:02:37,480 --> 00:02:44,050 So but had Brian's rock throwing being different, the window shattering would have been exactly the same. 24 00:02:44,050 --> 00:02:49,240 So it looks as if we can say that it was Lucy's rock that shattered the window 25 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:56,470 because there a chain of stepwise influence there that's missing with Brian's rock. 26 00:02:56,470 --> 00:02:59,260 And we looked at some objections to this, 27 00:02:59,260 --> 00:03:07,690 but all the objections to that seemed to be dealt with by making a distinction between causation and explanation. 28 00:03:07,690 --> 00:03:10,530 So if you remember, we looked at. OK. 29 00:03:10,530 --> 00:03:20,140 There's a chain of stepwise influences from the compass starting his campfire to the forest fire, burning the forest down. 30 00:03:20,140 --> 00:03:28,660 But there's also a chain of stepwise influence from the campers birth to the burning down of the forest. 31 00:03:28,660 --> 00:03:32,540 So why should we say that one is the cause when the other isn't? 32 00:03:32,540 --> 00:03:38,650 And Lewis says if you remember that he holds no truck with these principles of invidious selection. 33 00:03:38,650 --> 00:03:43,060 He's not interested in an explanation. He's only interested in causation. 34 00:03:43,060 --> 00:03:51,250 And yes, it's true that the campers birth was amongst the causes of the forest fire, the forest burning down. 35 00:03:51,250 --> 00:03:57,340 But the one we choose to explain, the forest fire burning down is not the campers birth, 36 00:03:57,340 --> 00:04:01,630 obviously, because it doesn't help to make the forest far intelligible. 37 00:04:01,630 --> 00:04:07,510 But the for the campers, lighting the forest fire does help to make the forest fire into. 38 00:04:07,510 --> 00:04:16,120 Sorry. The campfire does help to make the forest fire intelligible. And therefore we can cite it in an explanation. 39 00:04:16,120 --> 00:04:21,400 So there's a difference between two events that are equally causes of the forest fire. 40 00:04:21,400 --> 00:04:24,400 That one's an explanation and the other isn't. 41 00:04:24,400 --> 00:04:32,980 But we mustn't mistake that for thinking that one is the cause and the other isn't, because they're both causes. 42 00:04:32,980 --> 00:04:41,860 But then we looked at whether the counterfactual theory of causation, which is what all of this is, of course, is just a type of regularity theory. 43 00:04:41,860 --> 00:04:42,460 And if you remember, 44 00:04:42,460 --> 00:04:51,520 we looked at Helen Beebees claim that actually because the counterfactual theory of causation rests on the idea of laws of nature. 45 00:04:51,520 --> 00:04:56,350 Exactly. In the way that the regularity theory rests on laws of nature. 46 00:04:56,350 --> 00:05:01,780 And in each case, the laws of nature are understood along the mill. 47 00:05:01,780 --> 00:05:10,510 Ramsey Lewis model, according to which some things a law of nature, a regularity or a description of a regularity counts. 48 00:05:10,510 --> 00:05:20,110 The law of nature and if and only if it can be taken out of our best theories of explanation. 49 00:05:20,110 --> 00:05:28,480 So interestingly, the laws of nature themselves depend upon intelligibility to us. 50 00:05:28,480 --> 00:05:36,940 So it looks as if the counterfactual theory of causation is just a version of the regularity theory of causation, 51 00:05:36,940 --> 00:05:43,120 which would, of course, Lewis's hair to fall out, which would have been interesting, given that he's got so much of it. 52 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:54,470 But he he thought that his counterfactual theory of causation was a rival to the regularity theory, but it looks as if it might not be. 53 00:05:54,470 --> 00:05:59,710 OK. That's what we did last week. OK. Right. 54 00:05:59,710 --> 00:06:04,300 I'm not going to ask for questions of clarification, but I hope there'll be enough time left at the end. 55 00:06:04,300 --> 00:06:08,230 If there are any questions, by all means, ask them. And you could always e-mail me. 56 00:06:08,230 --> 00:06:11,740 People have been e-mailing me questions. So. So do e-mail me. 57 00:06:11,740 --> 00:06:15,310 Except that if you e-mail me a question, I will answer it. 58 00:06:15,310 --> 00:06:26,760 So beware of my time because I am sorry I'm pointing out Mike here because he sends me reams of questions and then says you don't need to answer them. 59 00:06:26,760 --> 00:06:32,440 Okay, so let's look at this week. This week, we're going to look at a new interpretation of Hume. 60 00:06:32,440 --> 00:06:38,260 So somebody who believes that all these regularity and counterfactual theories that 61 00:06:38,260 --> 00:06:44,500 have been derived from Hume's work are actually based on a misinterpretation of Hume. 62 00:06:44,500 --> 00:06:51,220 And we're going to look at singular ist theories of causation. And I'll explain what they are, of course. 63 00:06:51,220 --> 00:06:56,680 We're going to look at the argument for the new interpretation. So we're going to look first at what it is. 64 00:06:56,680 --> 00:07:04,180 And later, the argument for it. And we're going to look at an ambiguity in the new interpretation. 65 00:07:04,180 --> 00:07:06,820 And finally, we're going to clarify it. 66 00:07:06,820 --> 00:07:18,280 And so we'll leave today with a new interpretation of Hume, but we won't have looked at a version of the new type of theory that will come from it. 67 00:07:18,280 --> 00:07:23,570 We'll just just be looking at the different interpretation of human. 68 00:07:23,570 --> 00:07:31,000 OK. So the traditional interpretation of Hume that we've already looked at Hume on the 69 00:07:31,000 --> 00:07:37,390 traditional interpretation believes that causation is both real and mind independent. 70 00:07:37,390 --> 00:07:41,200 He's a realist. The traditional Hume is a realist about causation. 71 00:07:41,200 --> 00:07:47,740 He thinks that even if there were no human beings, there would still be events that cause each other. 72 00:07:47,740 --> 00:07:57,730 They'd still be causal relations in the world. But he thinks that there's no more to causation than regularity. 73 00:07:57,730 --> 00:08:04,480 So what he's saying is that regularities exist independently of us and our minds. 74 00:08:04,480 --> 00:08:10,330 So even if we didn't exist, there would be regular events in the universe. 75 00:08:10,330 --> 00:08:17,560 There'd be correlations between events of certain types, and therefore there'd be causation whether we're here or not. 76 00:08:17,560 --> 00:08:25,240 So whether there's any explanation of any of these events is completely irrelevant as long as there's causation. 77 00:08:25,240 --> 00:08:34,600 There's potential explanation. But if there are no human beings, there's nobody either to explain or to have something explained to them. 78 00:08:34,600 --> 00:08:40,330 Let's leave other animals out of this for the moment. Okay. 79 00:08:40,330 --> 00:08:44,560 So the traditional Hume is a reductive realist. 80 00:08:44,560 --> 00:08:49,750 He's a realist. He thinks that causation is real and mind independent. 81 00:08:49,750 --> 00:08:57,610 But he reduces causation to regularity. He thinks that there isn't causation in the individual case. 82 00:08:57,610 --> 00:09:05,770 When you see one billiard ball hitting another and there isn't a causal relation there, there's only a causal relation. 83 00:09:05,770 --> 00:09:13,120 In virtue of the fact that actually when any one billiard ball hits another billiard ball, the second billiard ball will roll off. 84 00:09:13,120 --> 00:09:22,510 It's that regularity that's causation. Okay, so what is this new interpretation of Hume? 85 00:09:22,510 --> 00:09:31,570 Well, it's, again, a realist theory exactly the same way it believes that causation is real and mind independent. 86 00:09:31,570 --> 00:09:39,190 So explanation is a totally different thing. Causation exists whether we exist or not. 87 00:09:39,190 --> 00:09:44,380 But it thinks that there might be more to causation than regularity. 88 00:09:44,380 --> 00:09:53,230 For example, it might be a power or force or a necessary connexion of some kind. 89 00:09:53,230 --> 00:09:59,320 So whereas Hume thinks it's nothing more than regularity, nothing more than correlation. 90 00:09:59,320 --> 00:10:07,750 This new interpretation says that Hume allows that there may be necessary connexion or a power. 91 00:10:07,750 --> 00:10:12,960 So the first billiard balls hitting the second. Has power. 92 00:10:12,960 --> 00:10:21,550 That makes the second run Rohloff. So the New Hume is called a sceptical realist. 93 00:10:21,550 --> 00:10:28,620 He's a realist. Because of this again, and sceptical because he's saying there might be more to causation. 94 00:10:28,620 --> 00:10:32,830 Not that there is more to causation, but that there might be. 95 00:10:32,830 --> 00:10:39,990 And you'll see a bit more later about why we think why why we call this sceptical realism. 96 00:10:39,990 --> 00:10:51,130 OK. So that's the new interpretation of Hume. And so the new interpretation of Hume introduces the possibility of a singular IST theory of causation. 97 00:10:51,130 --> 00:10:55,870 And that's quite different from the two theories of causation. 98 00:10:55,870 --> 00:11:04,000 Or two versions of the one theory of causation, depending on whether you agree with Helen Beebee or not that we've already looked at. 99 00:11:04,000 --> 00:11:12,880 So let's according to a singular ISTE theory of causation, which I'm going to call STC because I'm lazy. 100 00:11:12,880 --> 00:11:18,340 Firstly, causation is not austere. It's not reductive. 101 00:11:18,340 --> 00:11:25,000 So what? Hume thinks there is no causation in the individual case. 102 00:11:25,000 --> 00:11:31,060 It's only because we see the correlation that we say that there's causation. 103 00:11:31,060 --> 00:11:44,410 But and therefore, where we're denying that there is a power or a force or an intrinsic property in a cause that makes the effect happen. 104 00:11:44,410 --> 00:11:56,330 So we're not reducing causation to regularity. Instead, what we're saying causation is a real force of some kind or is or could be a real force. 105 00:11:56,330 --> 00:11:59,800 And so it's a real relation between two individual events. 106 00:11:59,800 --> 00:12:06,250 When the first billiard ball hits the second billiard ball, there is a force, a power, a necessary connexion. 107 00:12:06,250 --> 00:12:09,940 They're quite independently of anything else that happens. 108 00:12:09,940 --> 00:12:15,760 Any other case of one billiard ball hitting another billiard ball. 109 00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:19,210 So it's present in the individual actually arms. Explain this all the time. 110 00:12:19,210 --> 00:12:28,180 It's it's really the same points just in different ways. And so we're saying that causation is an intrinsic relation. 111 00:12:28,180 --> 00:12:33,910 It's intrinsic to the individual case, not extrinsic to it. 112 00:12:33,910 --> 00:12:39,430 So intrinsic means that it would have the property, whatever else were the case. 113 00:12:39,430 --> 00:12:45,160 So, for example, being female is an intrinsic property of mine. 114 00:12:45,160 --> 00:12:51,460 Even if the rest of you were to disappear off the face of the earth or have never been born or anything like that, I would still be females. 115 00:12:51,460 --> 00:12:55,600 I was left. I'd still be female. It's an intrinsic property of mine. 116 00:12:55,600 --> 00:13:02,350 But that time, taller than average for for a woman is not an intrinsic property of mine. 117 00:13:02,350 --> 00:13:06,880 It's relative to everyone else, all the other women in the world. 118 00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:14,230 Okay, so there are certain properties we have that are intrinsic properties that we'd have, whether anything else existed or not. 119 00:13:14,230 --> 00:13:22,630 And there are other properties like being five foot six, bigger wife, being a husband that we have only because there are other things. 120 00:13:22,630 --> 00:13:35,650 So according to the singulars theory of causation, causation is a property that's an intrinsic or being a cause is an intrinsic property of the event 121 00:13:35,650 --> 00:13:41,950 that causes and other effects and being an event effect is an intrinsic property of an effect. 122 00:13:41,950 --> 00:13:53,050 You don't need to look at correlations, constant conjunctions, regularities before you can say that there is a cause there. 123 00:13:53,050 --> 00:13:59,050 So singulars theory of causation postulates a real connexion between cause and effect, 124 00:13:59,050 --> 00:14:08,380 not just a real regularity between repeated instances of the type of event instantiated by cause and effect. 125 00:14:08,380 --> 00:14:14,200 And if you think about that, there's a. 126 00:14:14,200 --> 00:14:19,990 So one billiard ball hit another billiard ball and calls it to cause it to rub off. 127 00:14:19,990 --> 00:14:31,600 According to the traditional Hume, you've got to see lots of instances of this before you have a case of causation. 128 00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:40,810 It comes in when you've seen these types of event correlated with these types of event 129 00:14:40,810 --> 00:14:46,690 according to the singulars theory of causation or the new interpretation of Hume. 130 00:14:46,690 --> 00:14:52,120 It happens in the individual case. That can be a case of a causal relation. 131 00:14:52,120 --> 00:15:08,290 You don't need to have seen more of them. Okay, so a real connexion between Tolkan events rather than a regularity between types of events. 132 00:15:08,290 --> 00:15:16,880 Okay, so the new interpretation of Hume is the brainchild of Galen Straus, and there he is looking rather younger, I think. 133 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:24,460 And perhaps I might have chosen a more up to date one, but that there is his book and that's you might have an earlier copy of this. 134 00:15:24,460 --> 00:15:32,200 I have an earlier copy of this. But that's the book in which he gives the new interpretation. 135 00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:36,580 Strauss' argument for the new interpretation is this. 136 00:15:36,580 --> 00:15:49,990 He believes that the traditional interpretation slides from the claim that we have no idea of necessary connexion, which is an epistemological claim. 137 00:15:49,990 --> 00:15:57,760 Can anyone tell me why that's an epistemological claim, not a metaphysical claim? 138 00:15:57,760 --> 00:16:04,360 Because it's talking about our knowledge of necessary connexion. We have no idea of necessary connexion. 139 00:16:04,360 --> 00:16:09,400 That's a fact about us. Okay. Not a fact about the world independently of us. 140 00:16:09,400 --> 00:16:18,280 It's a fact about us. So the traditional interpretation slides from this epistemological claim to this metaphysical claim. 141 00:16:18,280 --> 00:16:24,340 There is no necessary connexion. Now, that isn't a claim about us. 142 00:16:24,340 --> 00:16:30,580 That's a claim about the world independently of us. Its claim about necessary connexion itself. 143 00:16:30,580 --> 00:16:36,760 Can everyone see that? That's an epistemological claim. And that's a metaphysical claim. 144 00:16:36,760 --> 00:16:44,770 And that you cannot go from one to the other because it could be true that we have no idea of necessary connexion. 145 00:16:44,770 --> 00:16:48,800 And yet there be a necessary connexion, couldn't it? 146 00:16:48,800 --> 00:16:57,670 And this is obvious. So it could be true that we have no idea that the earth is round, but it's still round. 147 00:16:57,670 --> 00:17:07,150 So what we think we know about the world, but our beliefs about the world and how the world is are two separate things. 148 00:17:07,150 --> 00:17:12,100 We hope they come together. But but they don't necessarily. 149 00:17:12,100 --> 00:17:19,300 Okay. So according to Straughan, Hume does make the epistemological claim. 150 00:17:19,300 --> 00:17:24,010 He does believe that we have no idea of necessary connexion. 151 00:17:24,010 --> 00:17:29,410 But he doesn't make. And he wouldn't have made the metaphysical claim. 152 00:17:29,410 --> 00:17:37,510 So according to Straughan, Hume didn't and wouldn't have said there is no necessary connexion. 153 00:17:37,510 --> 00:17:40,750 So the metaphor, because the physical claim, according to Straughan, 154 00:17:40,750 --> 00:17:52,390 goes completely against Coomes confirmed and sceptical belief that we're ignorant of the way the world is independently of our ideas of it. 155 00:17:52,390 --> 00:17:57,070 Now Strauss' onto something here. I mean, Hume is a sceptic. 156 00:17:57,070 --> 00:18:06,660 He does believe that if if there is something that we couldn't know, then that thing may as well not exist. 157 00:18:06,660 --> 00:18:13,450 That we can only know what we can know. She said rather obviously. 158 00:18:13,450 --> 00:18:22,930 But he does claim that as far as the world is independently of ideas, we can have no idea of it. 159 00:18:22,930 --> 00:18:29,530 We can only only know the world through are ideas. And if you think about that, that's a very old philosophical idea. 160 00:18:29,530 --> 00:18:33,580 You think of Descartes for a second who wasn't an empiricist by any means. 161 00:18:33,580 --> 00:18:40,390 But Descartes pointed out that we can only know the world through our perceptions of the world. 162 00:18:40,390 --> 00:18:44,560 We believe that our perceptions of the world are caused by the world, 163 00:18:44,560 --> 00:18:51,400 cause notice by the world, and that our perceptions are a good guide to how the world is. 164 00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:56,410 But actually, how can we know that, given that we can't stand outside our perceptions, 165 00:18:56,410 --> 00:19:02,920 the world, to see the world as it is in itself, independently of our ideas of it? 166 00:19:02,920 --> 00:19:13,160 How could we do that? So Slawson thinks because Hume wouldn't claim anything about what we know about. 167 00:19:13,160 --> 00:19:24,550 The world independently of ideas. Our ideas of it. He would never have made the metaphysical claim even if he did make the epistemological claim. 168 00:19:24,550 --> 00:19:31,360 So the new interpretation of Hume has Hume affirming the possibility, not the actuality. 169 00:19:31,360 --> 00:19:37,200 And that's important because Hume is not saying that necessary connexion does exist. 170 00:19:37,200 --> 00:19:43,440 If he's sceptical about the world into art or knowledge of the world independently of our ideas, the world, 171 00:19:43,440 --> 00:19:50,820 then the fact we have no idea of necessary connexion tells us nothing about necessary connexion, does it? 172 00:19:50,820 --> 00:19:56,850 It doesn't say that there is necessarily a connexion, but it also doesn't say that there isn't necessarily a connexion. 173 00:19:56,850 --> 00:20:02,220 Hence the problem with the traditional theory, according to Rawson. 174 00:20:02,220 --> 00:20:09,060 So the traditional turf irritation of Hume denies even the possibility of necessary connexion. 175 00:20:09,060 --> 00:20:16,050 It says, well, I mean, it looks as if the the argument is exactly the argument that Straus Ancestors', 176 00:20:16,050 --> 00:20:20,340 the Hume goes from the idea we don't have an idea of necessary connexion. 177 00:20:20,340 --> 00:20:24,150 If you remember, as far as we're concerned, 178 00:20:24,150 --> 00:20:31,650 the the one billiard ball might hit another and the other could turn purple and spin off in the other direction, 179 00:20:31,650 --> 00:20:42,450 like the illustration I had in the first case. There is no necessary connexion between a cause and its effect. 180 00:20:42,450 --> 00:20:54,750 It's not entailed. Okay. So according to Straus and there are two reasons Hume would have admitted the possibility of necessary connexion. 181 00:20:54,750 --> 00:21:03,840 That's against the traditional interpretation. Firstly, he thinks the necessary connexion is part of our ordinary idea of causation. 182 00:21:03,840 --> 00:21:09,900 And he was very into the acceptance of our ordinary ideas. 183 00:21:09,900 --> 00:21:14,190 He used to, you know, hit their heads. He'd call us the vulgar. 184 00:21:14,190 --> 00:21:17,910 Those of us who are not philosophers, he calls the vulgar. 185 00:21:17,910 --> 00:21:25,010 But if he thinks that if the vulgar have a certain idea and it's an idea that's irremovable, 186 00:21:25,010 --> 00:21:32,070 that they're going to keep on whatever you say to them, then we've got to pay proper attention to that idea. 187 00:21:32,070 --> 00:21:40,920 So induction, for example, the idea that the future is like the past is an idea that can't be shifted from the way we think. 188 00:21:40,920 --> 00:21:54,630 Whatever we do and says so Hume says, well, we've got to accept that induction exists while at the same time denying that it's logically justifiable. 189 00:21:54,630 --> 00:21:59,700 So if necessary, connexion is part of our ordinary idea of causation, 190 00:21:59,700 --> 00:22:08,760 then we shouldn't just dismiss the idea of the existence of necessary connexion and secondly, set. 191 00:22:08,760 --> 00:22:18,540 Secondly, secondly, I don't know why that happened. Slawson believes that it's implausible to deny the existence of necessary connexion. 192 00:22:18,540 --> 00:22:25,380 He thinks it's blindingly obvious that there can't be just regularities. 193 00:22:25,380 --> 00:22:32,850 There's got to be an explanation for these regularities. Notice word explanation comes in here again. 194 00:22:32,850 --> 00:22:37,620 So. So how can there just be one billiard ball hitting another and the other Roli of one billiard 195 00:22:37,620 --> 00:22:41,520 ball hitting another and the other rolling off one billiard ball hitting another and the other. 196 00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:49,110 Surely there's got to be an explanation for why this regularity not only exists, 197 00:22:49,110 --> 00:22:58,560 but is indeed a regularity and one that we can use to predict and explain and manipulate the world. 198 00:22:58,560 --> 00:23:02,700 Okay, so let's have a look at these reasons. 199 00:23:02,700 --> 00:23:10,410 Let me stop there for a second. Just ask if there are any questions of clarification at this point. 200 00:23:10,410 --> 00:23:18,340 Just refer back any particular passages and any handouts, I've given you all the references. 201 00:23:18,340 --> 00:23:27,640 Sorry, I haven't put them on here because I think it's easier to have slides that have a little writing on those possible. 202 00:23:27,640 --> 00:23:31,930 But in the handout, you'll find all the references to everything. Least I think. 203 00:23:31,930 --> 00:23:41,190 And if there is something that you don't find, just e-mail me and I'll send it to you and the other questions of clarification at this point. 204 00:23:41,190 --> 00:23:45,400 No. Okay, let's carry on looking at recent once. Okay. 205 00:23:45,400 --> 00:23:53,410 So the idea of reason one, if you remember, was that necessary connexion is part of our ordinary idea of causation. 206 00:23:53,410 --> 00:23:59,890 Well, traditionalists won't deny that. If you remember, they they see it as humans. 207 00:23:59,890 --> 00:24:06,760 Negative argument. Do you remember them first week? So we think that there is necessary connexion. 208 00:24:06,760 --> 00:24:17,110 But but how do we get an idea of necessary connexion? Therefore, we've got to explain the idea of necessary connexion. 209 00:24:17,110 --> 00:24:22,300 But we can explain it away, says the traditional human. 210 00:24:22,300 --> 00:24:28,300 So traditionalists accept that necessary connexion is part of the ordinary idea of Corney causation. 211 00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:34,480 But they believe that Hume explained it as a habit of mind projected onto the world. 212 00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:37,630 I'm going to explain that. Okay. 213 00:24:37,630 --> 00:24:48,010 So if you remember, Hume said, well, okay, how can we get an idea from lots of instances that we don't get in the first one? 214 00:24:48,010 --> 00:24:52,290 Okay. I mean, surely what if it's missing from the first one? 215 00:24:52,290 --> 00:24:55,770 It's missing from all of them, isn't it? 216 00:24:55,770 --> 00:25:03,700 And what Hume says, or at least the traditional Hume says, is that when we see this happen and that's how this happened and that happened. 217 00:25:03,700 --> 00:25:10,870 This happened and that happened. It causes us, if we see that again, to expect the second event. 218 00:25:10,870 --> 00:25:16,840 And it's that expectation that we project onto the world. 219 00:25:16,840 --> 00:25:22,270 So necessary connexion doesn't exist in the world independently of us. 220 00:25:22,270 --> 00:25:31,210 It's we who project a necessary connexion onto the world as a result of the habit that forms when we see a constant conjunction. 221 00:25:31,210 --> 00:25:37,990 So if we see A and B constantly conjoined, then when we see DNA, we're going to expect a B. 222 00:25:37,990 --> 00:25:43,720 And it's that expectation that we think is necessary connexion. 223 00:25:43,720 --> 00:25:49,960 So it's we projecting a habit of ours onto the world. 224 00:25:49,960 --> 00:26:00,340 But Straughan argues that Hume's appeal to habits needn't be interpreted as explaining away the idea of necessary connexion. 225 00:26:00,340 --> 00:26:09,340 Instead, it can be interpreted as signalling that the idea of necessary connexion is a relative, not a representative idea. 226 00:26:09,340 --> 00:26:14,830 So this is a very important move on Galen's Strauss' part. 227 00:26:14,830 --> 00:26:23,110 If you remember, Hume is an empiricist. He believes that we can't have ideas without having impressions first. 228 00:26:23,110 --> 00:26:31,000 So if you remember, I liken that to we can't have concepts without having percepts first. 229 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:37,270 So we couldn't have a concept of red, for example, unless we had experienced red. 230 00:26:37,270 --> 00:26:42,850 So blind people who can't experience red, they can have a concept of red, 231 00:26:42,850 --> 00:26:48,640 but they can't have the same concept that we as normally sighted people have. 232 00:26:48,640 --> 00:26:57,230 So their concept of red is going to be parasitic upon our concept of red, because red is a concept of size. 233 00:26:57,230 --> 00:27:04,780 It comes from an impression that comes through site. So. 234 00:27:04,780 --> 00:27:16,990 That's Humes empiricism. There's got to be an impression before there's an idea, but what Straus is saying is that there are two types of idea. 235 00:27:16,990 --> 00:27:30,370 There's one type of idea that comes from an impression that's a representative idea, but there's another type of idea that's a relative idea. 236 00:27:30,370 --> 00:27:37,720 So we've got to understand Hume's epistemological claim very carefully. 237 00:27:37,720 --> 00:27:43,720 Our idea of necessary connexion has no content. It is not a representative idea. 238 00:27:43,720 --> 00:27:49,270 There is no impression of necessary connexion. We do not look at this and this. 239 00:27:49,270 --> 00:27:58,900 And this and this. And this and this and see a necessary connexion and therefore form an idea of what necessary connexion is like. 240 00:27:58,900 --> 00:28:05,570 Instead, our idea of necessary connexion is a relative idea, if you like. 241 00:28:05,570 --> 00:28:14,680 And the way we'd put it these days and the way Hume couldn't have put it, because the idea of a theoretical postulate wasn't around in Hume's time. 242 00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:23,030 But it a theoretical idea. It's an idea of fact which lies behind. 243 00:28:23,030 --> 00:28:30,650 So theoretical ideas are formed in explanation of our observations and experiences, 244 00:28:30,650 --> 00:28:37,070 so we see the tracks in the Wilson Clouds chamber and we postulate the existence of atoms. 245 00:28:37,070 --> 00:28:44,510 Okay. We see certain observations and we postulate something or other to explain. 246 00:28:44,510 --> 00:28:52,010 So, for example, the Higgs Boesen until recently was an ideal theoretical postulate. 247 00:28:52,010 --> 00:28:54,920 Our theories postulated it. 248 00:28:54,920 --> 00:29:06,950 What we saw about the world, our observations, the world enabled us to form a theory which postulated the existence of something that had this. 249 00:29:06,950 --> 00:29:14,630 These properties or this activity, et cetera. So it's formed an explanation of our observations and experiences. 250 00:29:14,630 --> 00:29:19,450 And the idea of that which lies behind our experience. 251 00:29:19,450 --> 00:29:26,570 The cause, if you like, of of what we're experiencing. So can you see that there are these two different ideas? 252 00:29:26,570 --> 00:29:32,390 There's this idea of red, which is pre-eminently. A representative idea. 253 00:29:32,390 --> 00:29:36,470 My concept of red must have come from an impression. 254 00:29:36,470 --> 00:29:43,910 I couldn't have had a concept of red. Not the concept I have any other way than by experiencing redness. 255 00:29:43,910 --> 00:29:47,690 That my concept of Higgs bows on. Or my concept of God, if you like. 256 00:29:47,690 --> 00:29:57,770 God is another theoretical idea is postulated in explanation of the observations that I see. 257 00:29:57,770 --> 00:30:04,820 And a theoretical postulate is something that is postulated in order to explain. 258 00:30:04,820 --> 00:30:22,100 So Strauss' idea is that if you like, causation is a theoretical idea, not an idea of not a representative idea, not a content awful idea. 259 00:30:22,100 --> 00:30:30,770 So according to the new interpretation of Hume, Hume thinks we've got an idea of causation as that which lies behind regularity. 260 00:30:30,770 --> 00:30:35,740 So why do we experience these things in rigid, regular succession? 261 00:30:35,740 --> 00:30:48,440 Answer There's some causal relation between each of them, which explains why they're always in constant conjunction. 262 00:30:48,440 --> 00:30:55,090 So that which lies behind regularity. And you might think of it as the something we know, not what. 263 00:30:55,090 --> 00:31:02,540 Okay. We don't know what causation is. We only know the the effects, if you like, of causation. 264 00:31:02,540 --> 00:31:14,120 So we don't know what atoms are. Exactly. We only know the effects of the essence when we see the tracks in the Wilson Cloud Chamber. 265 00:31:14,120 --> 00:31:26,940 Okay. Any questions at that point? Do you see the distinction between representative ideas and relative ideas or theoretical ideas? 266 00:31:26,940 --> 00:31:36,600 David O. Does this argument strauss' argument? 267 00:31:36,600 --> 00:31:42,860 Yes. Does it some sort of equivalent between the Higgs boson particle? 268 00:31:42,860 --> 00:31:46,950 And is there a connexion in terms of their explanatory power? 269 00:31:46,950 --> 00:31:51,730 Because one feels about eyesight. Or better be able to say are experts on. 270 00:31:51,730 --> 00:31:59,400 Oh. Whereas with a necessary connexion. Going to the doctors is going to do it. 271 00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:10,290 Okay. Yes. No. That's an interesting question. Okay. And it's true that once you've postulated an entity or a relation that explains something, 272 00:32:10,290 --> 00:32:14,740 the next thing you're going to want to do is try and find that entity itself, aren't you? 273 00:32:14,740 --> 00:32:16,620 And it's quite true that I mean, 274 00:32:16,620 --> 00:32:28,020 the Large Hadron Collider is a pretty good example of our faith in our theories of physics that we will find the Higgs bows on. 275 00:32:28,020 --> 00:32:31,020 We will be able to see it. 276 00:32:31,020 --> 00:32:40,680 The question of whether we'll see whatever it is that causes whatever it is that lies behind regularity is a very different question. 277 00:32:40,680 --> 00:32:46,110 We might know what sort of experiment that we can do because we might think that this as 278 00:32:46,110 --> 00:32:52,320 the traditional Hume was that there's nothing all the way down but yet another regularity. 279 00:32:52,320 --> 00:33:02,070 So if we find what explains that regularity, we'll just find another aguy like Varity, which itself needs explanation. 280 00:33:02,070 --> 00:33:05,300 And so on, all the way down. So you're quite right. 281 00:33:05,300 --> 00:33:14,460 It's very difficult to think of what experiments you might construct that would enable you to find a necessary connexion. 282 00:33:14,460 --> 00:33:22,430 Just big. Well, we're we're going to say I'll say something about that later. 283 00:33:22,430 --> 00:33:33,900 So, OK, Bob, I'm surprised about the traditional interpretation because Hume says more than once in the enquiry that there could be a sequel. 284 00:33:33,900 --> 00:33:38,850 There are implies that a secret power, which we can't ever find out. 285 00:33:38,850 --> 00:33:46,860 We're going to look at the regularity. And also, when he talks about getting simpler and simpler, more and more basic laws of nature, 286 00:33:46,860 --> 00:33:54,420 regularities, even if we did got the ultimate, we wouldn't actually know what caused it. 287 00:33:54,420 --> 00:34:01,230 Well, I mean, the first is an expression of the of the new interpretation fume. 288 00:34:01,230 --> 00:34:04,950 And the second is an expression of the old interpretation of him. 289 00:34:04,950 --> 00:34:14,160 And Straus makes a lot of the places in Hume where he talks about special powers and so on and says that this is grist to his mill. 290 00:34:14,160 --> 00:34:20,040 But actually, if you are talking about all the way down, then you're talking about the judicial interpretation of him. 291 00:34:20,040 --> 00:34:25,290 If you go all the way down, you still haven't really. You still wouldn't have found else. 292 00:34:25,290 --> 00:34:27,450 Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 293 00:34:27,450 --> 00:34:36,000 Well, I wonder if you if people were traditionalists, but if you won't find anything else then then as an empiricist he's got to say, 294 00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:40,260 you know, well what good is this something else to us. 295 00:34:40,260 --> 00:34:47,580 And again, I'll say something about that later on. Mike, just describe to me exactly on Bob's question. 296 00:34:47,580 --> 00:34:56,580 There is one point where you said something like, yes, of course, we can allow for causation to be obvious in a single instance, 297 00:34:56,580 --> 00:35:03,060 provided that particular observation can be subsumed under previously observed regularity. 298 00:35:03,060 --> 00:35:07,230 Isn't that kind of in-between ground between the old and new? 299 00:35:07,230 --> 00:35:09,570 Well, I mean, I think I think there's quite a lot. 300 00:35:09,570 --> 00:35:17,580 I mean, when you when you read, it stauss and you'll see that he gives lots of places in Hume, which he says a grist to his mill. 301 00:35:17,580 --> 00:35:23,320 And I find myself quite sympathetic with a lot of what he says. 302 00:35:23,320 --> 00:35:31,170 And as I said earlier, how can you I mean, Hume himself says at one point, how can you see in the multitude of cases what you can't see? 303 00:35:31,170 --> 00:35:38,370 In one case, you know, that seems to be causation has got to be there in the individual case, 304 00:35:38,370 --> 00:35:43,470 in which case no causation as opposed to our knowledge of causation, which is the distinction. 305 00:35:43,470 --> 00:35:44,540 Oh, I see. Okay. 306 00:35:44,540 --> 00:35:54,820 What I'm trying to ask really is this particular comment of Humes strikes me as kind of in between the two interpretation, agreeing with neither. 307 00:35:54,820 --> 00:35:59,760 Well, I mean, a lot of what he says wouldn't agree with either, because, of course, 308 00:35:59,760 --> 00:36:04,620 actually the sintered two interpretation is something we're imposing on on him. 309 00:36:04,620 --> 00:36:10,050 And he wouldn't have had any theory of theoretical ideas. 310 00:36:10,050 --> 00:36:13,710 I mean, we know a lot about theoretical postulates now. 311 00:36:13,710 --> 00:36:22,020 I mean, Lewis himself worked very important paper on how can anyone tell me what it's called? 312 00:36:22,020 --> 00:36:28,510 I can't remember why he talks about theoretical ideas. 313 00:36:28,510 --> 00:36:34,180 It is an important paper and I can't remember what it's called, I'll try and remember to bring it next week. 314 00:36:34,180 --> 00:36:40,180 Two more questions and then I'll move on. Sure. If they're fairly quick, it's this idea. 315 00:36:40,180 --> 00:36:46,690 The traditional the new one. Yes. If you could devise an event that only ever occurs once. 316 00:36:46,690 --> 00:36:57,440 Well, the Big Bang, for instance, I'm going to say that. But yes, that supports this idea because that preference. 317 00:36:57,440 --> 00:37:01,300 In fact, no big bang. No idea. 318 00:37:01,300 --> 00:37:09,930 I'm sure you couldn't find an event that occurs only once and that causes another event that has an effect effect associate. 319 00:37:09,930 --> 00:37:19,770 Yes, of course. You could still say had had this occurred again, it would have had the same effect, but it didn't. 320 00:37:19,770 --> 00:37:23,980 Okay, but but Huma's regularity theory would allow that. 321 00:37:23,980 --> 00:37:30,940 What would what he wouldn't allow is that we would know it's a case of causation. 322 00:37:30,940 --> 00:37:38,740 Because without the regularity there, we can't know that it's causation. 323 00:37:38,740 --> 00:37:45,150 Sort of wondering if you consider physical. 324 00:37:45,150 --> 00:37:48,900 Well, that that's what we're asking. Not when. 325 00:37:48,900 --> 00:37:54,600 This is all very strange, mystical kind of this is something that lives to me. 326 00:37:54,600 --> 00:38:03,600 There is a mystery here. But but the mystery is not mystical. I mean, when we're talking about something that lies behind, we're just and for example, 327 00:38:03,600 --> 00:38:08,430 I postulate beliefs and desires in explanation of your behaviour. 328 00:38:08,430 --> 00:38:11,280 Nobody's ever seen a belief or a desire. 329 00:38:11,280 --> 00:38:18,800 But but their theoretical postulates, we postulate them an explanation of certain behaviours and nothing that chair does. 330 00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:29,090 I mean, it would they would see those things. Two classes in a human activity, cause and effect and then natural, unthinking. 331 00:38:29,090 --> 00:38:38,910 But but if you think about a theory, a theory is is constructed in order to explain certain observations. 332 00:38:38,910 --> 00:38:43,920 If you have a theory that says, okay, we x we see these things. 333 00:38:43,920 --> 00:38:54,060 And if we postulate something with these properties as the cause of these X observations, this is a theory. 334 00:38:54,060 --> 00:39:02,790 And if the theory is a good one, we can now try and search out a little bit more about these things that we're postulating. 335 00:39:02,790 --> 00:39:08,280 Those explanations. So causation is behind all of this. 336 00:39:08,280 --> 00:39:12,420 I mean, you don't have a theory that's postulated an explanation. 337 00:39:12,420 --> 00:39:21,840 I mean, if you remember I mean, either, you know, any of these, we would consider whether there's different kinds of causation. 338 00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:27,600 Oh, yes. This manmade formation. Human human causation. 339 00:39:27,600 --> 00:39:35,680 Well, I'm going to be talking about mental causation as a very particular type of causation thing. 340 00:39:35,680 --> 00:39:40,810 Yeah, well, we're going to talk about mental causation. The whole of week six. 341 00:39:40,810 --> 00:39:48,660 So, OK, so we what's important in understanding Hume is this. 342 00:39:48,660 --> 00:39:55,920 We've got to distinguish the logically unknowable locks for those of you who are familiar with John Locke, 343 00:39:55,920 --> 00:40:05,490 the idea of the something we know, not what. So Locke postulated the sort of coathanger theory of substance. 344 00:40:05,490 --> 00:40:12,240 So we only X and we never experience extension or substance space filling this. 345 00:40:12,240 --> 00:40:16,170 All we ever experience is properties that go together. 346 00:40:16,170 --> 00:40:21,840 And we might think of of objects as bundles of properties. 347 00:40:21,840 --> 00:40:25,740 And the substance. Why? Why do we think substance exists? 348 00:40:25,740 --> 00:40:29,910 Well, it's that in which the properties in here. 349 00:40:29,910 --> 00:40:36,240 So the substance that a human being is that which carries all the properties of it. 350 00:40:36,240 --> 00:40:46,230 But what's the substance itself and how do we know about this? Is it logically unknowable, i.e. it Sutton doesn't itself have any properties. 351 00:40:46,230 --> 00:40:51,020 It's just that the thing on which properties in here. 352 00:40:51,020 --> 00:40:56,610 Well. Why should we postulate something that has no properties, 353 00:40:56,610 --> 00:41:05,700 something that in principle we couldn't experience, something that in principle is unknowable? 354 00:41:05,700 --> 00:41:12,840 That's that's really very uncomfortable. And it's certainly uncomfortable for an empiricist. 355 00:41:12,840 --> 00:41:21,600 All we could talk about, something empirically unknown, something that science could in principle discover. 356 00:41:21,600 --> 00:41:25,410 OK. Do you see the difference there? A difference between something that's logically. 357 00:41:25,410 --> 00:41:36,450 I mean, imagine writing a research proposal that you can go off and find something that logic can tell you is unknowable. 358 00:41:36,450 --> 00:41:40,980 That it has no properties. There's no way you could recognise it. 359 00:41:40,980 --> 00:41:45,390 There's nothing to be discovered. I mean, nobody is gonna give you any money. 360 00:41:45,390 --> 00:41:49,320 I mean, they probably won't give you any money anyway, but they're certainly not going to give you money for that. 361 00:41:49,320 --> 00:41:58,110 And quite right, too. Whereas if something's empirically unknown, then that's a different matter entirely, isn't it? 362 00:41:58,110 --> 00:42:03,960 That's that's something. If you can give me a good enough reason to think that this thing exists, 363 00:42:03,960 --> 00:42:12,510 even though nobody has yet seen it, then I might give you some money to to go and see if you can find it. 364 00:42:12,510 --> 00:42:19,920 So Hume, the empiricist would never have countenanced something logically unknowable. 365 00:42:19,920 --> 00:42:24,990 Why should you postulate the existence of something logically unknowable? 366 00:42:24,990 --> 00:42:32,370 But the postulation is something empirically unknown is a completely different kettle of fish at all. 367 00:42:32,370 --> 00:42:39,960 We've got to understand if if Strauss' is right in his interpretation of Hume, we've got to understand it that way. 368 00:42:39,960 --> 00:42:46,500 To understand it in that way would be too big a stretch of Hume's empiricism. 369 00:42:46,500 --> 00:42:51,370 Anymore questions at that point? No. 370 00:42:51,370 --> 00:43:00,090 Okay, so let's have a look at this idea of causation being something that's empirically unknown. 371 00:43:00,090 --> 00:43:04,230 So we have this theoretical idea of causation. 372 00:43:04,230 --> 00:43:13,260 And what we're saying is that causation itself is a relation between events or, you know, whatever it is between. 373 00:43:13,260 --> 00:43:21,390 We don't know what it is at the moment. All we know is that it gives rise to regularities between types of events. 374 00:43:21,390 --> 00:43:27,600 But what we want to know is what this event is in itself. So in the same way that Higgs bows on. 375 00:43:27,600 --> 00:43:34,110 We don't know what it is in itself, but it gives rise to all these things that we observe. 376 00:43:34,110 --> 00:43:44,580 And we think we can find it. If we look harder or crash some particles into each other hard enough. 377 00:43:44,580 --> 00:43:53,220 Okay, let's have a look at this. There are two ways. There's real essence and there's as a realised of a functional role. 378 00:43:53,220 --> 00:43:59,100 These are two ways we might understand a theoretical idea. 379 00:43:59,100 --> 00:44:02,490 So let's have a look at real essence. Okay. 380 00:44:02,490 --> 00:44:08,330 The idea of a distinction between real a nominal essence is actually already there. 381 00:44:08,330 --> 00:44:13,220 In Aristotle. So five hundred years B.C. 382 00:44:13,220 --> 00:44:21,360 A long time ago. But science, for example, discovered that water is H2O. 383 00:44:21,360 --> 00:44:25,830 It's also discovered that gold has atomic number seventy nine. 384 00:44:25,830 --> 00:44:30,360 Well, long before we discovered that water was H2O, we talked about water. 385 00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:35,700 We used water. We exchanged confidences about water. 386 00:44:35,700 --> 00:44:41,700 We knew what water is. There are people around today who don't know that water is H2O. 387 00:44:41,700 --> 00:44:48,420 But water was always H2O. Pure water was always H2. 388 00:44:48,420 --> 00:44:54,900 And similarly, there are lots of people around today who don't know that gold has atomic number seventy nine. 389 00:44:54,900 --> 00:45:00,380 But science has discovered that gold does have atomic number 79. 390 00:45:00,380 --> 00:45:05,590 That atomic having atomic number 79 is the real essence of gold. 391 00:45:05,590 --> 00:45:18,780 So the discoveries that science made here were the discoveries of the real essence of something, the nature of water, the nature of gold, if you like. 392 00:45:18,780 --> 00:45:24,630 So in a world in which the colourless possible liquid is not H2O. 393 00:45:24,630 --> 00:45:34,620 In other words, it has the same nominal essence. It has all the properties by which we recognise something as water in everyday life. 394 00:45:34,620 --> 00:45:40,670 If we actually look at it and it's not H2O, then it's not water. 395 00:45:40,670 --> 00:45:44,880 And it's exactly the same way we might find a yellow, malleable metal, 396 00:45:44,880 --> 00:45:52,620 something with the nominal essence of gold, something that has all the properties by which we recognise gold. 397 00:45:52,620 --> 00:45:58,620 But if it's not got atomic number seventy nine, it isn't gold. 398 00:45:58,620 --> 00:46:03,830 I don't know how to tell the difference between something that looks like gold and something that is gold. 399 00:46:03,830 --> 00:46:07,830 If it's very important to me to find out whether something is gold or not. 400 00:46:07,830 --> 00:46:12,750 I take it to an expert who seems able to apply the appropriate tests. 401 00:46:12,750 --> 00:46:19,620 And he'll tell me whether it is gold, i.e. whether it has atomic number seventy nine. 402 00:46:19,620 --> 00:46:31,380 If it doesn't, it's not gold. End of story. So given that water is H2O and gold has atomic number 79, this is the interesting bit. 403 00:46:31,380 --> 00:46:38,730 Water is necessarily H2O. If it being H2O is of the essence of water. 404 00:46:38,730 --> 00:46:44,660 If this is the very nature of water and science is discovered that it is. 405 00:46:44,660 --> 00:46:51,300 And then anything that isn't H2O also isn't water. 406 00:46:51,300 --> 00:47:02,290 And ditto with gold. Anything that hasn't got atomic number seventy nine isn't gold, however much it looks like gold. 407 00:47:02,290 --> 00:47:09,090 OK, so that that's real essence. So that's a type of theoretical property, if you like. 408 00:47:09,090 --> 00:47:14,850 So natural kinds terms, we look at tigers and we see similarities. 409 00:47:14,850 --> 00:47:18,660 OK. All these animals have this similarity. They all have stripes. 410 00:47:18,660 --> 00:47:23,640 They all growl. They all. What else to have tigers have. 411 00:47:23,640 --> 00:47:31,530 It will look like large cats, etc. But we think that there's a nature that these animals have. 412 00:47:31,530 --> 00:47:35,370 That explains the similarities. OK. 413 00:47:35,370 --> 00:47:39,540 And this nature will almost certainly be DNA of some kinds. 414 00:47:39,540 --> 00:47:46,980 There's tiger DNA that makes something a tiger. And anything that hasn't got that DNA is not a tiger. 415 00:47:46,980 --> 00:47:50,850 Even if it looks like one. Okay. 416 00:47:50,850 --> 00:47:57,910 Any questions about real essence? Because I think I'm going onto functional definitions next. 417 00:47:57,910 --> 00:48:04,210 Are you all completely bemused? You don't look as if you're totally bemused, you look as if you're really interested. 418 00:48:04,210 --> 00:48:11,470 I do hope that is the case. Right. 419 00:48:11,470 --> 00:48:21,180 So let's look at functional definitions. Now, remember, this is a different way of understanding the idea of a theoretical definition. 420 00:48:21,180 --> 00:48:28,080 And science has also discovered that blue objects reflect light at 425 nanometres. 421 00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:34,930 Okay. That's something we didn't know before. And it's something that we now know. 422 00:48:34,930 --> 00:48:39,370 But this wasn't the discovery of the real essence of blue. 423 00:48:39,370 --> 00:48:49,510 I get students who swear blind to me that blue is really for the ability to reflect light, not 425 nanometres. 424 00:48:49,510 --> 00:48:56,140 No, it's not. In a world in which objects appear blue to us, reflect light. 425 00:48:56,140 --> 00:49:00,370 850 nanometres now. Obviously, that's a different possible world. 426 00:49:00,370 --> 00:49:06,790 This is a thought experiment that we're doing. We would still call these objects blue. 427 00:49:06,790 --> 00:49:13,300 And that's because the word blue goes along with our experiences, doesn't it? 428 00:49:13,300 --> 00:49:20,900 If there was a cosmic change tonight that turns all these chairs in here, the colour of. 429 00:49:20,900 --> 00:49:28,330 I'm sorry, I don't know your name. I know your father's name got dots, orange jumper. 430 00:49:28,330 --> 00:49:36,400 So all these chairs suddenly looks like that, but they still reflected light at 425 nanometres. 431 00:49:36,400 --> 00:49:46,430 What do we say? They changed colour all that they hadn't. So they look like that, but they reflect if they look like that. 432 00:49:46,430 --> 00:49:50,850 Have they changed colour? No. Who said that? 433 00:49:50,850 --> 00:49:59,370 God, why not? Because. What what we call blue is what blue seems to us. 434 00:49:59,370 --> 00:50:03,690 Oh, I'm sorry. I thought, okay. I thought you were disagreeing with me. I. 435 00:50:03,690 --> 00:50:07,410 Yes. They haven't. They have changed colour. 436 00:50:07,410 --> 00:50:18,240 They look like that. You should be saying yes. Not no. Essentially, whatever lines, whatever waving you read is irrelevant. 437 00:50:18,240 --> 00:50:23,130 We have. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. That's what I'm claiming to. 438 00:50:23,130 --> 00:50:28,620 So if if the chairs continue to reflect the light at the wavelengths they're currently doing. 439 00:50:28,620 --> 00:50:33,860 But they looked like that. We would think they'd change colour. 440 00:50:33,860 --> 00:50:44,970 And that's because colour words go along with our experiences. They don't go along with the wavelength of light behind it. 441 00:50:44,970 --> 00:50:50,180 So, again, that's irrelevant. OK. 442 00:50:50,180 --> 00:51:01,040 So in a world in which objects appeared blue to us but reflected light at a different wavelength, we'd still call these objects blue. 443 00:51:01,040 --> 00:51:12,200 As you rightly say, so nothing is blue unless normal human beings under normal conditions experience it as blue. 444 00:51:12,200 --> 00:51:17,060 So we're not looking at people here who who are blind or who have or are colour-blind. 445 00:51:17,060 --> 00:51:23,840 And we're not looking at conditions in which you have a light with a bit of blue paper over it or anything like that. 446 00:51:23,840 --> 00:51:39,190 Normal. Something is blue. If a normal human being under normal conditions experiences it as blue is contextual experience kind of blue as blue. 447 00:51:39,190 --> 00:51:49,970 Green. Okay. We're not talking about what they call it where I'm using the word blue as it behind people. 448 00:51:49,970 --> 00:51:56,360 We can't get to the experience behind it. Full stop. I have no idea what you experience when you look at this curtain. 449 00:51:56,360 --> 00:52:01,070 But you call it blue. At least you do when you're trying and not trying to be clever. 450 00:52:01,070 --> 00:52:06,170 That I understand because it because a normal human being. 451 00:52:06,170 --> 00:52:12,850 Yeah. But I'm using this in the normal meaning of English of blue. 452 00:52:12,850 --> 00:52:20,030 Blow the country blue is a great example. But anyway, I've got another example, so let's have a look at that one. 453 00:52:20,030 --> 00:52:28,910 Science knows that pain in human beings is realised by sea fibres and alpha delta fibrous. 454 00:52:28,910 --> 00:52:34,940 These the firing of these fibres are not the real essence of pain. 455 00:52:34,940 --> 00:52:43,550 Okay, so this is a scientific discovery that you might say is the discovery of what pain really is. 456 00:52:43,550 --> 00:52:52,280 But actually, it's not, because in a world where green lumps at the pier appear at the site of human tissue damage and hurt, 457 00:52:52,280 --> 00:52:58,310 green lumps would realise pain. It's the hurting that's important. 458 00:52:58,310 --> 00:53:07,370 Nothing is pain unless normal human beings experience it as painful as hurting. 459 00:53:07,370 --> 00:53:17,930 It's that experience of hurting, of pain that makes something pain, not the fact that it's C5 or firing or a Delta firing. 460 00:53:17,930 --> 00:53:28,610 So, for example, if there are Martians who don't have these physical or to take it into real life, 461 00:53:28,610 --> 00:53:33,530 if dogs don't have these fibres, they can still be in pain. 462 00:53:33,530 --> 00:53:39,740 If they still experience hurts, that something is hurting. 463 00:53:39,740 --> 00:53:47,900 So, okay, we've got two different ways of understanding theoretical ideas. 464 00:53:47,900 --> 00:54:00,800 There's the real essence model, according to which what science discovers is the nature of these things, like as in water and gold. 465 00:54:00,800 --> 00:54:08,480 And then there's the functional definition model in which what science discovers is not the nature of these things, 466 00:54:08,480 --> 00:54:13,490 but the physical realisation of these things. 467 00:54:13,490 --> 00:54:22,100 So the physical realisation of the appearance of blue to normal human beings under normal conditions is 468 00:54:22,100 --> 00:54:31,280 it reflects light at 425 nanometres and the physical realisation of pain as it affects human beings is. 469 00:54:31,280 --> 00:54:36,290 It's the firing of Adolph Delta, fibres of sea fibres, et cetera. 470 00:54:36,290 --> 00:54:42,230 But physical realisation is not the essence or the nature. 471 00:54:42,230 --> 00:54:48,230 Okay. Do you see the difference between the two types of theoretical idea, Bob? 472 00:54:48,230 --> 00:54:57,030 And then what would I be writing saying that the only time a functional definition differs from real essence is object. 473 00:54:57,030 --> 00:55:04,910 Things like. Or any other examples? 474 00:55:04,910 --> 00:55:09,170 Well, let me think about the answer to that. Oh, OK, go on. I mean, this say so. 475 00:55:09,170 --> 00:55:21,110 Right. Because the real essence used examples that are purely scientific or material objects. 476 00:55:21,110 --> 00:55:26,500 Yes. No, I mean the function definition of you using human experiences. 477 00:55:26,500 --> 00:55:30,550 Yeah. Is there an example of the opposite? This doesn't mean it's a human experience. 478 00:55:30,550 --> 00:55:37,830 That's a really interesting question. And one thing I hate doing when I'm actually giving lectures is actually thinking. 479 00:55:37,830 --> 00:55:46,270 I wish I'd done this thinking because that's a very good question. Because it would have been. 480 00:55:46,270 --> 00:55:55,260 Can anyone think of a functional definition of something that doesn't involve human experience? 481 00:55:55,260 --> 00:56:00,360 No, cannot. Can I perhaps answer that question next week when I've given it some thought? 482 00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:14,060 Because I'd have to think on my feet now and it's hard to do that and finish a lecture at the same time. 483 00:56:14,060 --> 00:56:23,400 Sorry, now I can't stop thinking. No, I'm a stop thinking, okay, so two definitions of a theoretical idea. 484 00:56:23,400 --> 00:56:32,330 One is something that lies behind. But isn't the nature and the others something that lies behind and is the nature? 485 00:56:32,330 --> 00:56:37,740 OK. So we're asking now, is causation more like water and gold? 486 00:56:37,740 --> 00:56:48,900 In other words, if science discovers something that lies behind is what it discovers the real essence of causation or 487 00:56:48,900 --> 00:56:56,790 is causation more like blue and pain in that what it discovers is not the real essence of causation, 488 00:56:56,790 --> 00:57:04,740 but the physical realisation of the nominal essence, if you like, of our experiences of causation. 489 00:57:04,740 --> 00:57:08,910 That's why it's interesting, but I'm not thinking about it. 490 00:57:08,910 --> 00:57:16,540 Okay, so is causation more like water and gold or more like blue and pain? 491 00:57:16,540 --> 00:57:25,890 OK. If it's more like water and gold, then regularity is nothing more than the nominal essence of causation. 492 00:57:25,890 --> 00:57:29,930 Okay, regularities the way we recognise causation. 493 00:57:29,930 --> 00:57:34,550 It's not itself causation. Okay. 494 00:57:34,550 --> 00:57:39,350 To discover the real essence of causation will be to discover. 495 00:57:39,350 --> 00:57:51,800 So if science discovers the real essence of causation in this world, what it will have discovered is the nature of causation in every world. 496 00:57:51,800 --> 00:58:01,280 If we believe that causation has a real essence, then we think that it's going to have the same real essence in every possible world. 497 00:58:01,280 --> 00:58:11,510 So if we think that we're discovering the real essence of causation, what we're discovering is something with modal import, 498 00:58:11,510 --> 00:58:18,290 something that has ramifications for our beliefs about necessary worlds and possible worlds, 499 00:58:18,290 --> 00:58:26,090 we're to discover the real essence of causation in this world will be to discover that in every possible world. 500 00:58:26,090 --> 00:58:31,970 That's what causation is. Because that's the nature of causation. 501 00:58:31,970 --> 00:58:40,160 And that's a very, very strong claim. If causation is what's okay. 502 00:58:40,160 --> 00:58:48,980 So do you see that that's a very strong pain that claim pain claim, because you're making a claim not just about this world, 503 00:58:48,980 --> 00:58:56,630 not just about what causation is in this world, but a claim about what causation is in every possible world. 504 00:58:56,630 --> 00:59:02,690 And, in fact, that she is Straus and denies that, that if we found the real essence in this world, 505 00:59:02,690 --> 00:59:08,230 we would therefore have found the real essence in every possible world. 506 00:59:08,230 --> 00:59:14,780 If causation is more like blue and pain, then it's not that. 507 00:59:14,780 --> 00:59:19,130 It's what the causation is, what lies, beliefs, regularity. 508 00:59:19,130 --> 00:59:32,480 It's the regularity that's essential to causation and what lies belief may be what realises causation, realises regularities in this world. 509 00:59:32,480 --> 00:59:36,890 Even if we discover there is a relation underpinning the regularity, 510 00:59:36,890 --> 00:59:45,020 this relation will not be causation in the same way that C fibre firing is not pain, it's not. 511 00:59:45,020 --> 00:59:50,510 The nature of pain is just what realises pain in human beings. 512 00:59:50,510 --> 00:59:56,000 And Martin, pain may be realised by something completely different. 513 00:59:56,000 --> 01:00:08,060 So this relation won't be causation. Causation could be realised by a different physical relation in every possible world. 514 01:00:08,060 --> 01:00:13,430 So what we'd be discovering would merely realise causation in this world. 515 01:00:13,430 --> 01:00:20,240 It doesn't have the same modal implications as the real essence SPU does. 516 01:00:20,240 --> 01:00:25,070 So in other words, causation might be realised by different relation. 517 01:00:25,070 --> 01:00:28,790 So if you go for the functional definition thing you're going from, 518 01:00:28,790 --> 01:00:35,600 you're saying that causation could be multiples realised that regularity might be realised by this relation. 519 01:00:35,600 --> 01:00:43,130 This physical relation, this world, but this physical relation in this world. 520 01:00:43,130 --> 01:00:53,450 So do you think there's a power or force that underpins regularities in this and every other world? 521 01:00:53,450 --> 01:01:01,610 If so, then you think that causation is like water and pain, not pain. 522 01:01:01,610 --> 01:01:05,240 Gold. Gold. Okay. 523 01:01:05,240 --> 01:01:09,840 Gold in this it has a scientifically discoverable. 524 01:01:09,840 --> 01:01:14,750 Yeah. No, it's a real essence. 525 01:01:14,750 --> 01:01:23,520 And in that case, you're likely to reduce it to reject reductive realism and accept a single arrest theory of causation. 526 01:01:23,520 --> 01:01:32,690 Okay. Most philosophers reject this, even if they believe that science will one day discover a force, 527 01:01:32,690 --> 01:01:37,730 power or necessary connexion underpinning the regularities in this world. 528 01:01:37,730 --> 01:01:48,860 And they believe that in other worlds, regularities might be underpinned by different forces, powers or connexions. 529 01:01:48,860 --> 01:01:52,970 The same is what they might be. 530 01:01:52,970 --> 01:01:57,650 I mean, whatever the regularities are in that world. Yes. 531 01:01:57,650 --> 01:02:06,950 I mean, they might be the same as this one. But actually, again, we might think they might be different. 532 01:02:06,950 --> 01:02:11,870 OK. Or do you think that there might be one relation or more? 533 01:02:11,870 --> 01:02:15,960 Because there might be different types of causation in this world underpinning. 534 01:02:15,960 --> 01:02:20,130 Regularities in this world and different relations in other worlds. If so, 535 01:02:20,130 --> 01:02:30,990 that you think that regularity is essential to causation and that any relation underpinning it is merely a realisation of causation in this world, 536 01:02:30,990 --> 01:02:45,660 not the very nature of causation. In which case, you're likely to be happy with reductive realism and reject single arist theories of causation. 537 01:02:45,660 --> 01:02:52,950 Okay, that's finished the discussion of reason one, I'm going to look very quickly at reason, too, and I'll remind you what that is first. 538 01:02:52,950 --> 01:02:57,660 But any questions about reason one dot come back before? 539 01:02:57,660 --> 01:03:03,490 I just wonder if there's a possibility there isn't a category mistake. 540 01:03:03,490 --> 01:03:15,990 Your or your examples about involve experience, not Essenes, functional definition of evil, 541 01:03:15,990 --> 01:03:25,530 materialistic things in the world and all the ones in the functional definition that all seem to talk about experience. 542 01:03:25,530 --> 01:03:33,000 So it then comes down to whether or not you think causation is a thing in the real world or whether it's something that we experience. 543 01:03:33,000 --> 01:03:43,560 Well, that is, if the functional definition is going to leave causation as being the regularity that we observe. 544 01:03:43,560 --> 01:03:53,430 So yes, indeed, it will bring in much more of the human experience than it would do if it was something that had a real essence, 545 01:03:53,430 --> 01:03:59,970 because the real essence of gold is nothing at all to do with us. Whereas the real essence of blue is, as you say, 546 01:03:59,970 --> 01:04:10,650 very importantly to do with an experience that normal human beings have under normal experiences, conditions on the thing as well. 547 01:04:10,650 --> 01:04:14,890 No, let's not begs the question. But yes, that's possible. 548 01:04:14,890 --> 01:04:22,110 Yeah. Okay. So let's have a look at recent two, if you remember reason to. 549 01:04:22,110 --> 01:04:30,420 So Straus and gave two reasons for thinking that Human Hume would not have denied the existence and necessary connexion. 550 01:04:30,420 --> 01:04:35,160 The first was that it's part of our ordinary idea of causation. 551 01:04:35,160 --> 01:04:41,610 The second was because he thinks it's implausible to deny the existence of necessary connexion. 552 01:04:41,610 --> 01:04:47,280 So he restores and thinks that it's just absurd to think that there's no reason 553 01:04:47,280 --> 01:04:55,860 for the regularities that we observe that there could be these regularities. And yet nothing that lies behind them. 554 01:04:55,860 --> 01:05:04,320 Just absurd. So he says, and humans not stupid. Hume wouldn't have thought something so patently, obviously stupid. 555 01:05:04,320 --> 01:05:07,650 And actually, again, we can sympathise with this view, I think. 556 01:05:07,650 --> 01:05:19,250 I remember as an undergraduate suddenly realising what was meant by the regularity view, i.e. that causation didn't really exist. 557 01:05:19,250 --> 01:05:25,350 Which isn't how you should put it. But that's what I put it as myself, that there is no necessary connexion. 558 01:05:25,350 --> 01:05:31,740 There is no force or power behind the regularities. And I thought it was absurd. 559 01:05:31,740 --> 01:05:40,320 And you might have had the same idea. I mean, from a few of your questions in the first week, I think you were having the same trouble there. 560 01:05:40,320 --> 01:05:48,480 So Straughan would agree with you if you had that intuition. Absurd to think that there can be these regularities. 561 01:05:48,480 --> 01:05:56,790 And yet no explanation of them. But philosophers on the whole haven't gone along with this. 562 01:05:56,790 --> 01:06:04,140 So Helen Beebee says appealing to necessary connexion is a bit like appealing to destiny or conspiracy. 563 01:06:04,140 --> 01:06:10,500 It doesn't no work. It's a loose cog. So when we. 564 01:06:10,500 --> 01:06:21,060 So something happens. Michael and I have this happen and we think, you know, it turns out that his his wife is my sister's. 565 01:06:21,060 --> 01:06:26,900 Something like, you know, that sort of coincidence. And we say, oh, it must be destiny now. 566 01:06:26,900 --> 01:06:32,610 Destiny is just we don't really believe that there's a force called destiny, do we? 567 01:06:32,610 --> 01:06:37,060 We just think, you know, here's a very strange coincidence. 568 01:06:37,060 --> 01:06:42,100 We appeal to it, but we actually aren't doing any explanatory work, are we, in appealing to it. 569 01:06:42,100 --> 01:06:52,200 And the conspiracy theorists are also. Have you ever had a conversation with somebody who is absolutely sure that Diana was taken out by. 570 01:06:52,200 --> 01:07:02,490 It doesn't matter what evidence you gave or what you know, you say, well, can you imagine the machinery that must be behind hiding this or something? 571 01:07:02,490 --> 01:07:13,140 There's an explanation for it always. Because somebody who believes in a conspiracy theory always has an answer to anything you're going to say. 572 01:07:13,140 --> 01:07:23,940 That's what's a conspiracy theory is. And if you think that Diana was taken out by Prince Philip, please don't engage me in conversation afterwards. 573 01:07:23,940 --> 01:07:27,050 But can you say it's a loose cog? It does no work and hasn't. 574 01:07:27,050 --> 01:07:34,440 Beebe is saying that a necessary connexion is exactly the same if science looks and finds a necessary connexion. 575 01:07:34,440 --> 01:07:40,680 It's not going to tell us anything a bit like David, you were saying. Did you think here? 576 01:07:40,680 --> 01:07:49,110 You know, this is not something for which you're going to need glasses. This is like thinking further, you go down to the next level. 577 01:07:49,110 --> 01:07:55,740 You go down to the next level. You go down to the next level. It's regularity all the way down. 578 01:07:55,740 --> 01:08:02,130 And the philosopher Simon Blackburn says there isn't any straight jacket on nature. 579 01:08:02,130 --> 01:08:08,640 It's always possible that the future is not going to be like the past. 580 01:08:08,640 --> 01:08:14,070 There's nothing that guarantees that the future will be like the past. 581 01:08:14,070 --> 01:08:25,470 There's nothing that guarantees that the next time one billiard ball hits another, the other won't turn purple and spiral off into into the heavens. 582 01:08:25,470 --> 01:08:32,640 And therefore, there isn't any necessary connexion of this kind. 583 01:08:32,640 --> 01:08:35,880 Well, I. It's interesting, isn't it? 584 01:08:35,880 --> 01:08:42,960 I sort of wonder a bit about that. I prefer Helen Beebees answer. 585 01:08:42,960 --> 01:08:51,060 But I think this is really interesting. And if you look at the handouts, you can make your own minds up by reading these. 586 01:08:51,060 --> 01:09:04,190 But I have some sympathy with your claim that it might be just a bald assertion that. 587 01:09:04,190 --> 01:09:09,750 Three, recourse to the rules laws. 588 01:09:09,750 --> 01:09:19,450 Yes, but if the laws of nature are read on the Ramsey M. sorry, M. Ramsey Lewis model, that doesn't give you a necessary connexion either. 589 01:09:19,450 --> 01:09:25,670 Okay, so both these philosophers think that we should stick with RTC or actually more likely CTC, 590 01:09:25,670 --> 01:09:36,680 because that gives us much more of a feel that there is less of a gap between the ordinary understanding of causation and causation itself. 591 01:09:36,680 --> 01:09:41,000 Because if we can say had C not occurred, E would not have occurred. 592 01:09:41,000 --> 01:09:44,750 That gives us a type of feeling of force. 593 01:09:44,750 --> 01:09:52,160 But both believe that the only possible evidence we can have for causation is going to consistent regularity and that there is little point, 594 01:09:52,160 --> 01:09:58,010 therefore, in insisting that causation is really something else. 595 01:09:58,010 --> 01:10:08,240 Some force or power or necessary connexion. Well, can I just finish and then and then we can go to questions. 596 01:10:08,240 --> 01:10:16,920 So go back to the last pages. OK. 597 01:10:16,920 --> 01:10:24,790 OK. So they're all philosophers, though, who believe that we can find an empirical account of causation. 598 01:10:24,790 --> 01:10:31,250 This is going to be an account of causation in this world. It won't be an account of the nature of causation. 599 01:10:31,250 --> 01:10:34,510 And next week, we're going to look at the views of these philosophers, 600 01:10:34,510 --> 01:10:43,870 the views of people who believe that we can find a physical force or power in this world that we can say 601 01:10:43,870 --> 01:10:51,400 is causation a bit in the way that people would say that reflecting light at 425 nanometres is blue. 602 01:10:51,400 --> 01:10:52,070 Because, of course, 603 01:10:52,070 --> 01:11:00,670 there's there happens to be a correlation between something's appearing blue to normal human beings under normal circumstances in this world, 604 01:11:00,670 --> 01:11:08,470 and it's reflecting light at 425. So actually, there's no empirical difference in saying that they're the same thing. 605 01:11:08,470 --> 01:11:16,270 It's only philosophers who get very uptight about that sort of thing. Okay, so next we we're going to look at except that it's not next week. 606 01:11:16,270 --> 01:11:21,910 It's the week after. As you know, I thought that side. Okay, so let's do a quick summary of this week. 607 01:11:21,910 --> 01:11:29,740 So we looked at a new interpretation of Hume as a sceptical realist as opposed to a reductive realist. 608 01:11:29,740 --> 01:11:37,690 We looked at singulars theories of causation which insist that causation is a force or power or necessary connexion. 609 01:11:37,690 --> 01:11:47,950 We looked as strauss' argument for the new interpretation, which involves distinguishing between representative ideas and relative ideas, 610 01:11:47,950 --> 01:11:54,850 giving us the idea of a theoretical concept or a theoretical idea. 611 01:11:54,850 --> 01:11:59,530 We looked at an ambiguity in the new interpretation when we're talking about theoretical ideas. 612 01:11:59,530 --> 01:12:08,740 Are we talking about ideas of a real essence or are we talking about ideas of a physical, functional definition? 613 01:12:08,740 --> 01:12:16,840 And we had a look at why the real essence thing, because it has modal implications, is problematic. 614 01:12:16,840 --> 01:12:28,030 Whereas the functional definition doesn't have modal implications and is maybe less problematic for that fact, 615 01:12:28,030 --> 01:12:36,850 but also means that we can't really say that causation is this force or power or necessary connexion, 616 01:12:36,850 --> 01:12:46,720 just that it is realised in this world by this scientifically discoverable force or power or necessary connexion. 617 01:12:46,720 --> 01:12:50,540 And that's the thought that the slide that I thought was coming up last time. 618 01:12:50,540 --> 01:12:52,990 Okay, so. So there's no lecture next week. 619 01:12:52,990 --> 01:12:58,450 I'm now told that this is no longer necessary because there was going to be something in this room that's no longer a book. 620 01:12:58,450 --> 01:13:02,140 So it could have been next week. But sadly, I'm going to London. 621 01:13:02,140 --> 01:13:07,420 So I'll see you again on the 18th of November. 622 01:13:07,420 --> 01:13:19,270 And we've got course now four questions. If you've got any questions raised again. 623 01:13:19,270 --> 01:13:26,410 No, not yet. No, Sean. There was a point one of your friends was made about. 624 01:13:26,410 --> 01:13:31,420 There's no reason to think that the future will be always the same as the past. Simon Blattman. 625 01:13:31,420 --> 01:13:36,880 That's fair enough. So if we want billiard balls bouncing off each other. 626 01:13:36,880 --> 01:13:44,770 In terms of regularity, that the next one will say the same probability. 627 01:13:44,770 --> 01:13:56,740 Whether we drop a book or we go before guaranteed. 628 01:13:56,740 --> 01:14:04,210 Whatever that may be. So there's no conflict? 629 01:14:04,210 --> 01:14:11,280 Well, I do not have to say no. Don't forget, Simon Blackburn is giving a reason for that foot. 630 01:14:11,280 --> 01:14:20,640 It's being more like you've just described. So a necessary connexion. 631 01:14:20,640 --> 01:14:32,520 Between A and B means that if A occurs must occur. 632 01:14:32,520 --> 01:14:39,480 I pray that there's a necessary. And you're just pointing out exactly what Simon Blackburn is pointing out is nonsense. 633 01:14:39,480 --> 01:14:46,550 There's no must about it. It's much more of a case of probability or whatever. 634 01:14:46,550 --> 01:14:53,950 And because there's no must about it. Why should we want to postulate a necessary connexion? 635 01:14:53,950 --> 01:14:59,070 So. So you're saying exactly what Simon Blackburn is saying. 636 01:14:59,070 --> 01:15:12,830 So when you have the sequence, what if I believed X, then I have to believe Y two or three slices in the following argument would be necessary. 637 01:15:12,830 --> 01:15:18,000 You're quite right. I know I'm doing something right. 638 01:15:18,000 --> 01:15:30,870 When I get a student who says, oh, I don't want to use the word necessarily. That one was on before that, if you. 639 01:15:30,870 --> 01:15:38,270 Yes. But. This one. Yes. If I say something, then I will say something. 640 01:15:38,270 --> 01:15:44,340 Yes, I could see you just pulled back. See that's out there on your hand. 641 01:15:44,340 --> 01:15:49,080 Yeah. Either they or they're a reference to them. 642 01:15:49,080 --> 01:15:55,530 We'll be on. So the idea is that if you think that there's a necessary connexion, 643 01:15:55,530 --> 01:16:07,730 then you're saying that the causation has a real essence and that if A causes B, there's a force that ensures that if A cause B must occur. 644 01:16:07,730 --> 01:16:14,580 At that point, I apply Ockham's Razor. I don't need. Yeah, well, that's exactly what I had a baby and Simon Blackburn are doing. 645 01:16:14,580 --> 01:16:23,220 They're saying, you know, why are we postulating this necessary connexion? We don't we don't need it. 646 01:16:23,220 --> 01:16:28,380 David and then Mike, why don't we go? 647 01:16:28,380 --> 01:16:33,870 Why don't we go the whole hog and just dispense with causation itself? 648 01:16:33,870 --> 01:16:43,290 I'm just regarded as one of the segments of the universe is just the sort of lubricant for the sake of ease of talking about the universe. 649 01:16:43,290 --> 01:16:51,930 Instead, just talk about the nature of things. I think you'd find well, Russell would agree with you there. 650 01:16:51,930 --> 01:16:55,290 He has a lovely quote that I'm not gonna be able to remember something. 651 01:16:55,290 --> 01:17:02,100 Causation is a bit like the monarchy and plays no role at all in anything that we do. 652 01:17:02,100 --> 01:17:07,290 Well, Eyskens. Let's get rid of it. He's going to seek membership for these children. 653 01:17:07,290 --> 01:17:11,550 Hundreds. Which is a fiction, but it's convenient. Yes. 654 01:17:11,550 --> 01:17:14,890 But notice we have the word the children, hundreds for it. 655 01:17:14,890 --> 01:17:24,360 And even if causation I mean, trying to imagine doing without the concept of causation just gives me the screaming heebie jeebies. 656 01:17:24,360 --> 01:17:36,240 How do we get rid of the idea of the causation of billiard balls or the sort of things that will play into each other causes? 657 01:17:36,240 --> 01:17:42,060 Oh, I wish I knew he would do that. 658 01:17:42,060 --> 01:17:46,500 The other reason is because they're solid. Because. 659 01:17:46,500 --> 01:17:50,640 Because because I mean, you can't get rid of observation. 660 01:17:50,640 --> 01:17:56,580 Just confirms that to be the case. No, but because it is an appeal to causation. 661 01:17:56,580 --> 01:18:01,320 A because B. E. 662 01:18:01,320 --> 01:18:06,480 Honestly, you can try it if you like. But I think you'd have a real problem with getting rid of the attitude. 663 01:18:06,480 --> 01:18:17,480 And four, because. Oh. Oh. Now OK, we're going to do a bit of logic here. 664 01:18:17,480 --> 01:18:33,890 So anyone who remembers that truth tables through A and B, whoops, A and B. 665 01:18:33,890 --> 01:18:40,650 OK, so in the world where A is true and B is true, is A and B true? 666 01:18:40,650 --> 01:18:47,180 Yeah. Yeah. In the world where A is true and B is false is A and B true or false. 667 01:18:47,180 --> 01:18:53,580 False in the world where A is false and B is true, is A and B true or false. 668 01:18:53,580 --> 01:19:00,080 False. And in the world where A is false and B is false, is A and B, true or false. 669 01:19:00,080 --> 01:19:05,630 False. Okay, good. So we see that. And is truth functional? 670 01:19:05,630 --> 01:19:12,860 Okay. The truth of A and B is always going to be a function of the truth of A. 671 01:19:12,860 --> 01:19:17,720 And the truth would be nice. Try a b. 672 01:19:17,720 --> 01:19:25,310 A because B. So true. 673 01:19:25,310 --> 01:19:29,660 True. True. False. True. False. True. 674 01:19:29,660 --> 01:19:40,860 True. False, false. Okay. In the world where A is true and B is true is A because B true. 675 01:19:40,860 --> 01:19:52,470 In the world where A is true and B is true, is the world A sorry, the sentence A because B, true, or do we not know? 676 01:19:52,470 --> 01:20:04,290 We don't know. OK. In the world where A is true and B is false is A because B, true or false, it must be false. 677 01:20:04,290 --> 01:20:12,330 Okay. In the world where A is false and B is true is A because B true. 678 01:20:12,330 --> 01:20:21,810 Where A is false and B is true is A because B true. 679 01:20:21,810 --> 01:20:28,680 I think if you don't know it's yours, it's either false or we don't know. 680 01:20:28,680 --> 01:20:35,270 And what about when they're both false? I have seen it, so I'm confused. 681 01:20:35,270 --> 01:20:41,030 We probably will. If A because B. implies A is true, then that's going to be false, too. 682 01:20:41,030 --> 01:20:44,270 But the fact is, we've got a question mark in there. 683 01:20:44,270 --> 01:20:55,600 The truth of A because B depends on more than the truth of A and B, and so it's completely different from and has a different meaning. 684 01:20:55,600 --> 01:21:03,350 With that first question mark. Oh, I say we knew more about O. 685 01:21:03,350 --> 01:21:07,140 But we didn't need to know anything more here did we. 686 01:21:07,140 --> 01:21:15,590 I mean here we need to know more than the truth values of A and B in order to give you A because B you need to know that they are related. 687 01:21:15,590 --> 01:21:24,950 I mean A could be. The truth of Marion's wearing black trousers A B could be the truth of David's wearing a red sweatshirt. 688 01:21:24,950 --> 01:21:31,850 In which case A, because B is false. Presumably you don't wear a red sweatshirt every time I wear black trousers. 689 01:21:31,850 --> 01:21:42,050 Do you mean. Right. But but if we give a different definition of A and B, we will get it. 690 01:21:42,050 --> 01:21:48,830 Yes, there is a causal relation. So because an end means something completely different. 691 01:21:48,830 --> 01:22:00,050 Sorry, that was a I couldn't resist. Just still so often I can given a completely tabular example of why somebody is wrong. 692 01:22:00,050 --> 01:22:06,920 Sorry, David. You just happened to be it. No good. I to go back to what David was saying. 693 01:22:06,920 --> 01:22:19,010 Speak up. You could one could I presume, change the language in such a way that whenever at the moment we talk about what 694 01:22:19,010 --> 01:22:27,570 happens such and such whenever a boundary cause and just talk in terms of regularity. 695 01:22:27,570 --> 01:22:36,600 Now would we lose anything if we did that? Well, of course, we do know that. 696 01:22:36,600 --> 01:22:44,280 I mean, one of the problems for the regularity theory of causation was the fact that there appear to be irregularities that are not causal. 697 01:22:44,280 --> 01:22:51,810 In that case, they're not really that regular. I mean, the reason we know because when you actually examine it, you find that it's. 698 01:22:51,810 --> 01:22:57,660 Well, imagine the situation where every single male in this room happens to be a second son. 699 01:22:57,660 --> 01:23:01,740 I mean. And so it's an entirely universal regularity. 700 01:23:01,740 --> 01:23:06,250 Every male attending Marianne's lectures is the second son. 701 01:23:06,250 --> 01:23:10,540 So it's as regular as you. But it's still a coincidence. Not true. 702 01:23:10,540 --> 01:23:17,610 Why? How do we know it? Well, if it were true electors, then probably wouldn't be. 703 01:23:17,610 --> 01:23:23,840 It is just possible that it is true of all my lectures that every male attending them is his second son. 704 01:23:23,840 --> 01:23:34,800 I see. I still think that it would be a coincidence. I mean, I wouldn't want that regularity to become part of my theory of reality because, 705 01:23:34,800 --> 01:23:40,990 you know, from experience, this is very unlikely to be a regularity this year. 706 01:23:40,990 --> 01:23:50,510 Yes. But but the point still stands, which is that you can have regularities that are not causal, that we do not believe a causal. 707 01:23:50,510 --> 01:23:57,030 And so we can't just appeal to there's more to our concept of causation than regularity itself. 708 01:23:57,030 --> 01:24:01,230 That's why we introduced talk of laws of nature. 709 01:24:01,230 --> 01:24:10,060 Do you remember in the in the first instance the distinction because all law of nature is a real heavy research into what's required and what is. 710 01:24:10,060 --> 01:24:15,000 Yeah, but it doesn't get it doesn't get further than regularity. 711 01:24:15,000 --> 01:24:22,950 But but there are the laws of nature can be derived from our best explanations of the world. 712 01:24:22,950 --> 01:24:29,180 So there is a distinction there. But you're right, there is no more to them than regularities. 713 01:24:29,180 --> 01:24:36,950 Just just before you. Is there anyone else who hasn't yet asked a question? 714 01:24:36,950 --> 01:24:42,000 It's not my question about this is about the relationship between the two. 715 01:24:42,000 --> 01:24:50,430 Two of the philosophies you've spoken about in the last week, Straus and now and Lewis last week in particular, David, just wondering whether, 716 01:24:50,430 --> 01:25:01,290 in fact, these two people who presumably represent different schools of thought within philosophy are popularly supported all their margin wildly. 717 01:25:01,290 --> 01:25:13,130 Well, that's it's quite an interesting question because there's a book called The New Debate about Hume Coal on the new debate or something like that. 718 01:25:13,130 --> 01:25:16,730 It's on the reading list in. 719 01:25:16,730 --> 01:25:26,010 And it is interesting because the old debate of whether causation is nothing more than regularity has been around since Hume himself. 720 01:25:26,010 --> 01:25:37,620 The new debate was really introduced by Straus in 1989. And so the old debate or the new debate is gaining some. 721 01:25:37,620 --> 01:25:41,570 That was after Lewis. That was after Lewis. 722 01:25:41,570 --> 01:25:48,150 I mean, Lewis started working on causation and all and started working on counterfactual theories of causation in seventy three. 723 01:25:48,150 --> 01:25:56,750 Or at least that was his big paper. I mean, there are people there are followers of stauss. 724 01:25:56,750 --> 01:26:00,990 And there are followers of Lewis on it. I wouldn't like to say who is more popular. 725 01:26:00,990 --> 01:26:11,240 And anyway, of course, it's not a popularity contest. But it just shows you the regularity and philosophy. 726 01:26:11,240 --> 01:26:17,130 So I just want to point out some of them to say I'm kind of confused by the notion of regularity, 727 01:26:17,130 --> 01:26:23,320 because on the one hand, we're talking about these natural law. And that's my kind of ego. 728 01:26:23,320 --> 01:26:24,320 That's the explanation. 729 01:26:24,320 --> 01:26:31,930 But you think, well, all of this talk about this concept referred as the variable to inanimate objects that have no mind of their own. 730 01:26:31,930 --> 01:26:40,970 Now, is that you going to talk about this? But it seems that a lot of this is predisposed to assume that there's irregularity in everything or that, 731 01:26:40,970 --> 01:26:46,770 you know, that even if you see one off event, if you see if you see one off events or let's say, for example, 732 01:26:46,770 --> 01:26:52,020 something like, um, telepathy, mind reading, you know, now there's plenty of examples where people, 733 01:26:52,020 --> 01:26:59,430 individuals who we have to say use an example where it's doubtful about authority and causation of these things. 734 01:26:59,430 --> 01:27:02,190 But you could say certainly that there are independent you know, 735 01:27:02,190 --> 01:27:07,920 there are examples of people guessing correctly or getting above average scores, whatever. 736 01:27:07,920 --> 01:27:14,670 Now, you can't do that community directly deny that there's. 737 01:27:14,670 --> 01:27:21,480 You lost the mantle. Well, you can say it doesn't seem there's always regularity and there's a lot of things that don't seem to be regular. 738 01:27:21,480 --> 01:27:25,650 Does that mean that we have to discount being any causal relation? Because it seems to be no regularity? 739 01:27:25,650 --> 01:27:29,130 Well, that was that was Bob's point, I think. Yes. 740 01:27:29,130 --> 01:27:37,050 I mean, there is some evidence that under certain conditions, some people can can mind read. 741 01:27:37,050 --> 01:27:40,500 I mean, that they think there's a very no regularity. That's why it's been so. 742 01:27:40,500 --> 01:27:43,110 Well, this is what science is looking at, 743 01:27:43,110 --> 01:27:51,760 is whether those who say that whether there is a regularity between Johnny's thinking or somebody is thinking, 744 01:27:51,760 --> 01:27:58,500 eh, or imagining that and somebody else is being able to tell that that's what they're thinking. 745 01:27:58,500 --> 01:28:07,080 And they're looking for regularities because regularities all whatever else is true or evidence for causation. 746 01:28:07,080 --> 01:28:15,570 But that's again, that's I mean, without regularities, without scientific evidence of regularity, we tend to say there isn't any causation. 747 01:28:15,570 --> 01:28:22,410 Again, that's kind of this is the question beginning all surgeries and say, well, we must know because everything is based on regularity. 748 01:28:22,410 --> 01:28:27,300 How do we know what is based on the regularity? Because Hume says that these basically. 749 01:28:27,300 --> 01:28:28,860 No, it's certainly not because Hume I mean, 750 01:28:28,860 --> 01:28:34,680 Hume says it's based on regularity because it tends to be based on regularity rather than the other way round. 751 01:28:34,680 --> 01:28:39,990 Anyway, we're going to have to finish there. So no lecture next week. 752 01:28:39,990 --> 01:28:47,770 The lecture the week after. And we'll look at a singular test theory of causation and empirical theory of causation. 753 01:28:47,770 --> 01:28:54,575 Actually, we'll look at several.