OK. Welcome to the series of mini podcasts, welcome to everyone here.
Thank you for coming and welcome to everyone who's watching or listening on podcasts.
OK, this is the third in the series of common arguments.
This time we're going to look at it's all a matter of opinion.
So sometimes people suggest that morality is a matter of personal opinion, that it's somehow subjective.
So, for example, judging that abortion is wrong is comparable, or so they say to deciding that sardines are tasty.
And so whereas I like sardines, maybe you don't like sardines,
you might say that I find I don't think abortion is morally right and you think abortion is morally wrong.
And that's just like my liking sardines and you're not liking sardines.
And that's the claim that we're going to consider in this podcast.
OK, the idea that morality is just a matter of opinion and statements of personal
preference such as sardines are tasty or red is the most beautiful colour or whatever,
or I like bleu. And I usually thought to have these three characteristics.
Firstly, they're made true or false by some fact about the individual who makes them.
So if I say sardines are tasty, what makes sardines tasty?
True is some fact about me. The fact I like sardines actually is as straightforward as that.
It's also made true or false by some fact about which I'm an authority.
So if I like sardines, I know I like sardines. There's no I don't have to consult you about this.
I don't have to look it up. If if I like sardines, I know I like sardines and I know immediately that I like sardines.
And also I it's usually thought that I can't get that wrong. I can't be wrong about whether I like sardines or not.
If if I believe I like sardines, the chances are that I do like sardines.
This isn't something I can get wrong.
And if we compare moral statements to that sort of list of things, so if we get the statement, it's morally acceptable to rob elderly ladies.
So some believes that it's morally acceptable to rob elderly ladies.
Well, that would have to be made true or false by some fact about some.
So it's morally acceptable to rob elderly ladies.
Well, that's not made true or false by some fact about some.
Is it obviously wrong, some facts perhaps about which some is an authority?
OK, well, why is some an authority about it's being morally acceptable to rob elderly ladies?
Again, no sense that he's an authority. So, again, we put across here and finally the idea, some can't be wrong about its being wrong or sorry,
its being morally acceptable to rob elderly ladies. Well, I think he's obviously wrong, far from being infallible.
So again, we get across there, it really seems to be nonsense.
Moral statements are nothing like statements of personal preference.
So this triggers the question, why do people think this?
Why do people liken moral statements to statements of personal preference?
And what I'm going to offer is, is my understanding of this mistake.
And the explanation lies in the fact that people confuse first-order beliefs,
beliefs about the world with second-order beliefs, beliefs about beliefs.
And I'll explain this in a second. But if you think my belief about that chair's being blue is a first order belief, a belief about the world,
whereas my belief about your belief that that chair is blue is a second-order belief.
It's a belief about a belief.
OK, well, why do I think that people think that moral statements are like statements of personal preference because they make this confusion, OK?
Well, this statement is is ambiguous. Robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable for some.
There are two different ways we might interpret that. Here are the two interpretations.
We might think that Sam believes that robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable.
So robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable for some might believe that nothing more than that.
Sam believes that mugging elderly ladies is morally acceptable or we might
understand it to be morally mugging elderly ladies is morally acceptable for some.
And let's look at these in turn. So if we we have reason to believe that Sam believes that robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable,
whenever someone gives us reason to believe that he believes robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable.
So let's say Sam says, well, of course, mugging elderly ladies is OK.
You know, where you get the idea it isn't. I've always thought this is OK.
Or maybe he just goes out and drops elderly lady. So it's by his actions that we get the impression that he believes it's OK.
And it's just an unfortunate fact about the way some human beings are brought
up that they do form that sort of belief that it's OK to rob elderly ladies.
And but we've got reason to believe that robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable for some.
Only when we have reason to believe that it is morally acceptable for some, even if not for anyone else.
Not for you, not for you, not for me, but OK for some to rob elderly ladies.
And where is it was very easy to imagine a situation in which some might believe that it's OK to rob elderly ladies.
It's very difficult indeed to imagine a situation in which we would have reason
to believe that it is morally acceptable for some to rob elderly ladies.
And if we believe that some actually was sorry, it was morally acceptable for some to rob elderly ladies,
we'd have no reason to interfere with his robbing an elderly lady would have no reason to stop him.
It's almost inconceivable that we think it's OK for some to rob elderly ladies.
So let's go back to that. OK, robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable for some is ambiguous.
And there are the two interpretations. So the first one is what Sam believes, that robbing elderly ladies, we've said that, yes,
he may may believe that, but if he does, something has gone wrong with his upbringing.
But that one robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable.
Sam is out of the question.
But if you confuse those two, if you understand that sentence as being that rather than that, you might think that that is as unexceptionable as that.
And that's the confusion that I think you're causing.
So let's have a look at this. Mike believes that Marianne's wearing green.
Marianne is wearing green, as a matter of fact. OK. Notice there's one sentence here embedded within another sentence.
OK, so there's the embedding sentence, which is the whole thing and the embedded sentence, which is just Marijan is wearing green.
OK. Now each of these because their sentences admits of both truth and falsehood.
Tell me, could that sentence be true? And yet that sentence false.
So could it be true that Mike believes that Marianne's wearing green and yet false that Marion's wearing green?
Could be Mike is colour-blind. OK, could it be true that Marianne is wearing green and yet full that Mike believes that Marianne's wearing green?
That is different from the one I had before, I hope. Could it be?
Yes, could be again. OK, and what about could it be?
Now hang on, I've got. That's true. That's false.
Could that be true and that true? The embedding sentence true.
And the embedded sentence true. Yeah. And could they both be false?
OK, the moral of this story is that the truth value of the embedded sentence and the embedding sentence vary completely independently,
and this isn't surprising. The reason it isn't surprising is the sort of thing that makes that sentence true is a fact about me, isn't it?
Me and what I'm wearing. What sort of facts makes that sentence true?
A fact about Mike and what he believes, isn't it?
So the fact that makes the embedding sentence true is a quite different fact from the fact that makes the embedded sentence true.
And that's exactly the same when it comes to moral statements, so consider some believes that robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable.
Here we've got so the embedding sentences in green and the embedded sentence is in red.
Now, put the embedded sentence be true with the embedding sentence false.
Yep, could they both be true, could they both be false, could whichever is the other way around?
OK, once again, the truth values of these two sentences, the embedding sentence in the embedded sentence, values vary completely independently.
And again, what this shows us is that the fact that it makes that sentence true,
which is a fact about Sam and his beliefs, is completely independent from the facts.
That makes the embedded sentence true, which is a fact about robbing elderly ladies and whether it's morally acceptable.
So we might ask ourselves, what sort of fact does make it true or false that robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable?
Well. Uh oh, okay, sorry, just the new the embedding sentence, some believes that robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable,
is made true by a fact about Sam and the embedded sentence.
Robbing elderly ladies is morally acceptable, is made true by a fact about robbing elderly ladies, and some may be an authority about his own beliefs.
OK, so he may if he believes that mugging elderly ladies is OK, we're prepared to say that OK, this is a fact about which he may be an authority,
but there's no reason to think that he's an authority on the embedded sentence, is there, just because he's an authority on the embedding sentence.
And to the extent that we think he's an authority on whether or not he has a certain belief,
we might actually think that his beliefs about his own beliefs are infallible.
But that doesn't mean his beliefs are infallible.
In other words, his beliefs about the moral acceptability of robbing elderly ladies, that's not only not infallible, it's false.
So it's simply not the case that a belief to the effect that robbing elderly
ladies is morally acceptable is made true by facts about a given individual,
far less about the individual effect on which he has authority.
And if you listen to the podcasts about ethical theories,
you'll know that there are actually many ideas about what makes a moral belief true or false.
So if we say, OK, mugging elderly ladies is morally acceptable, is it or is it not?
Well, if we're utilitarians, what sort of fact would make it true that mocking elderly ladies is not morally acceptable?
What do we say about this? We would say something about it's not leading to the greatest happiness,
the greatest number wouldn't be so a utilitarian would think that muskeg elderly ladies
is morally acceptable if it produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
And it's not the case that mugging elderly ladies is morally acceptable if it doesn't produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
So the sort of fact that makes a moral statement true will be a fact about the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
So again, we move away completely from the idea that that moral truths are personal preferences,
that they're facts about individuals and that they're facts about individuals, about which individuals are infallible.
So I think we should reject the claim quite categorically, reject the claim that morality is a matter of personal opinion.
And it isn't surprising. Morality matters to us much more than personal preference.
I mean, whether you like sardines or not is is something I mean,
it really it's not terribly relevant to me unless you're coming to tea with me and I'm thinking of serving you sardines on toast or something.
But whether you like kindness or honesty actually matters to me a great deal.
And there's a very good reason for morality's mattering much more.
And I can only lie successfully to you if you believe me.
The truth and lying is parasitic upon truth telling.
And so I want you to tell the truth. The only way we can communicate, in fact, is if I if we most of us tell the truth most of the time.
If I ask you about what's on at the local cinema, for example, and you're able to tell me, then I've saved myself time and energy.
But if I then think, well, hang on a second, why should I believe him? I've actually wasted my time and energy, haven't I?
So it matters to me a great deal that most of the time most people tell the truth.
And actually it matters to liars that most people most of the time tell the
truth because you can't lie to somebody unless they're going to believe you.
So we do and should argue about morality.
Morality is not a matter of personal preference.