Okay. Nice to see you all again. Have you had a good week today?
We're going to leave logic an argument that or ugly?
Not actually, because you can't you can't get away with logic and arguments in philosophy.
I'm going to talk about ethics and politics. So you might not it won't sound quite as foreign to you today, perhaps.
OK. I mean, it took us three ethical theories. I mean, obviously, I've chosen to leave because I could have talked about a number of things,
but these three are probably the three most popular theories.
Firstly, Aristotle and his work has become virtue ethics.
Now, then I get to talk about Kant and then I'm going to talk about utilitarianism and all.
Compare and contrast them to each other.
But I think by the end of today, you'll at least have a feel for some of the key issues of each of these theories.
Okay. So we're going to start with Aristotle. Now, tell me actually, because it all ties to what what is it that we're trying to answer?
Well, in ethics, when we're trying to do ethics, what do you think the question is that we're concerned with?
That's not a question. I mean, yes, we're concerned, right or wrong, but what is the question to which.
Well, it's it's morally right. Right.
Okay. What question might be is it right to do whatever, to lie, to kill or whatever that might be with us?
Good. That's right. There are two sorts of ethical question.
How can you call me in my office? Sorry, I got the question of their answer.
Got it. Okay. The first answer was the question we're looking to answer is, is doing this right or wrong?
And the second also was the principles behind what are the principles behind decisions about what to what the council said.
OK. And between the two of you, you've come up with absolutely the distinction that I want to come up with.
Thank you very much. The distinction between first order ethics and second-order ethics.
Now first order ethics looks at the world. It looks at certain action types, lying, killing, clothing, whatever.
And it says it's an action of this type, morally acceptable. OK.
That's a first sort of question because it pertains to the world, if you like,
that there are second thoughts and moral questions which ask what is it that makes an action, right or wrong?
Do you think that we've got one back, if you like?
So just in the same way, if I talk about first order beliefs, I'm talking about beliefs about the world.
So my belief that she has blue is a first order belief.
But if I don't think it's my belief that that chair's blew through.
That's a second order brief because it's a belief about belief.
Got it. So you can have second order desires as well.
Does someone want to give me a first order? What's a first order?
Desire. All I have I want her.
I want a cream cake or I'll eat something to eat or whatever and some other second order.
Desire is a bit more difficult times with desires.
I realise now start to finish. Can anyone think of the second order dessert.
I'm very near.
Yeah. Absolutely. You might think, OK, I want to cream cake but I want to be slim.
Both of those first order desires. But then you might think I want to be the sort of person who wants a salad rather than a cream cake or I
want to be the sort of person who wants my health more than I want a cigarette or something like that.
So you should be noticing instantly that the philosophy works in the second order.
So is that belief true? Is it is a very philosophical question.
What does. What is truth? What constitutes truth? What constitutes rightness?
So, OK, we can say whether clothing's right or killings right or keeping promises is right.
But as a philosopher, what we're interested in is what is it? There's something to be right.
What is it for an action to be right? What is it for an action to be wrong?
Okay, we step back with it. So what we're interested in today is not so much first order ethics, but second-order ethics or metter ethics.
It's sometimes called we're interested, not so much in judgements about particular types of action.
We're interested in judgements about that sort of judgement, what it is that makes something right now.
Very importantly, you can only test your second order ethical theories against your first order.
Ethical. So if an ethical theory says, well, what it is for an action to be right is this,
it would be perfectly reasonable to say, well, there's one problem with that and it comes out.
And the problem is that it comes out of saying that it's fine to kill people.
Now, that's because it clashes with the first-order ethics.
You think there's probably something wrong with your second daughter? Ethics. Do you see what I mean?
You test the two against each other. I've seen everything theory and practise interact with each other.
So to link this to last week when we were when I was doing logic, I said to quite a few times, you are all rational animals.
You all make logical decisions, logical judgements the whole time,
because whenever you decide where development is good or bad, you're making a logical decision.
The difference between us is that I know what I'm doing when I do.
That's where you. Do it just from instinct, from intuition.
But what's a logician does is identify what you do when you reason and then formulate a theory on that.
But of course, if that theory came out telling you to do something that you think is blindingly obviously wrong, all of you do.
Then there's something wrong with the ethical theory. So theory and practise interact to trust you.
Test your true intuitions about ethical theory against your ordinary, everyday ethical judgements.
We're going to be doing a bit of that today. So I'll draw your attention to the fact that we're doing it when we do it.
So you'll see what I mean when I when what I'm saying now.
OK, so let's talk first about Aristotle.
And I ask him, like, if you his states that says that the right action is the action that would be chosen by a virtuous person.
You feel like saying not very useful are not a good decision making theory, this one,
because I now got to know who is a virtuous person and ask them and make sure I understand.
And so. But anyway, that's what Aristotle says. The right action is an action that would be chosen by the virtuous person.
And what is a virtuous person? Well, here we are. A virtuous person knows three things, or at least has three characteristics.
The first is he or she knows which is the right action in a situation.
Now, this is quite important feature of Aristotelian ism.
Aristotle believes that morality has nothing to do with rules, rules like keep promises, don't tell lies, etc.
And let me give you an example of that. OK, I want you to imagine the situation.
OK. Your mom comes back from the hairdresser or your wife or your husband or your daughter or whoever you like,
comes back from the hairdresser and says, What do you think? And you think, yuck.
OK. You've got a problem you want. What's your problem? Truth is, it's a problem, it's a word.
Tell me what the problem is. I think you might hurt the person.
Okay. That's one element. But that's only one side because that's not a problem.
You might have to lie. You're not going to have to lie. You've got a choice.
You might be wrong. You know what?
If you think you're up, you can't be wrong about what you think. At least your mom has asked you, what do you think?
So. OK. You got a problem here. There are two rules out there.
Be kind. Be honest. And it looks as if in this situation you've got a conflict.
You can't be both kind and honest. Right.
So what do you do? OK, well, Aristotle says this is a classic example of a moral dilemma.
You cannot use rules here because the rules run out.
The thing about rules is that their general claims don't lie, don't kill that have to be applied in particular situations.
And give me that in various particular situations. Second, to come into conflict, don't they?
And so in this tug, you're thinking, my goodness, if I tell her the truth, she's going to think I'm really cruel.
If I tell her a lie, I'm going to think I'm really awful. What do you do?
So you've got to make a choice between these two. Does it change your mind if I say your mother's been depressed for six months?
This is the first time you've seen a smile. Does that push you in one direction?
Okay. I hope you thought that before.
Oh, I see what you're doing. I'm going to be. Okay.
Well, okay.
I'm going to embarrass some of you now because what do you do if you're not a proper moral agent in this situation is make yourself a set of rules.
You're going to say, oh, goodness, I can't bear this sort of moral dilemma.
You know, I really I don't want to be cruel and I don't want to be dishonest either.
What am I going to do? I'll just have to say, look, in this, I value truth more than I value being kind.
So whenever this situation arises, whenever I put the dilemma of this kind.
Fine. I'm going to be honest. Now, we all know people like that, don't we?
Some of you may be people like that.
And there are other people who hit that situation and they say, oh, the sorts of dilemma I'm going to make myself a little rule.
And the rule is whenever I hit a situation of this kind. I'm going to be kind.
I think kindness trumps honesty. And I'm going to become perhaps you you hear me okay.
But you see that if you make that sort of we all know that sort of person, too, don't we?
Aristotle says that you shouldn't be a person of either of those kinds because what you should do
is maintain the value of both truth and honesty and make a decision in this particular situation.
That doesn't necessarily have any ramifications whatsoever or any other situation.
So you don't make a rule that says I value truth more than honesty. I mean, I must be more than truth.
You say in this situation, given the particularities of the whole situation, I'm going to go for kindness,
given that my mom has been depressed for so long, etc. But in another situation, pretty much the same, you'd say, I'm going to go to her honesty.
And the point, according to our Sibley's, you don't make yourself rules.
You just do whatever seems to you. In that situation to be the right thing to do.
Surely there should be another.
Yes. Well, I'm glad you wouldn't so many other people, you say that.
What does my bum look big in there, you know? What do you think of this dress or did you like the stew I made tonight?
Or I mean, we're constantly seeking the opinions of others on things and therefore putting them potentially into that situation of moral dilemmas.
And anyway, the fact is, you can generalise the example I'm using.
The example I'm using is fairly trivial. But any moral dilemma is exactly the situation.
You talk two values to general rules, which in a particular situation come into conflict and you can't obey both.
Of course, you get a recall launches. I'm going to be cruel to be kind.
You're going to say or something like that. Of course, it's not really a lie. It's only a white lie.
OK. Where did you both try to do try that before you gave your answer?
I'm sure you did, because one of the things about being a virtuous person is that you've got to be a wise person, says Aristotle.
He thinks that all the virtues come together. Others say that that's a wise and virtuous person, is that they do know what to do in a situation.
Unfortunately, not in a way that they can give you a rule.
OK. All they can do is, is what they can't do anything that they'd like to be modest with.
Well, of course. But if you think they're virtuous, you should watch them see what they do.
Try, try and intuitively act as they would act.
Ask yourself how would they act in this situation, that sort of thing.
So he knows what the right action is.
Even though knowing what the right action is is so very difficult and there aren't any rules that you can give to anyone but to go to help them.
The second thing about the virtuous person is that he performs the right faction.
Well, we all know about this, don't we? You know you know what the right thing is to do.
But do you do it? Oh, you know, they. Again, you gave in to temptation.
Okay. You need to be malicious or something like that.
Could be just a moment's weakness or whatever. And clearly, knowing what the right action is is not a sufficient reason for being not sufficient.
In addition to being virtuous, you've actually got to do the right action as well.
And Aristotle says that's the thinking about the virtuous person. Is that.
And this is actually very important here. You can be born benevolent.
Okay. You're you're sort of naturally benevolent person. But that doesn't mean that you're going to acquire the virtue of benevolence comparison here
as you could be born strong with the potential to be a real athlete or something like that.
But if you sit around eating crisps and watching television all day, this disposition is going to disappear, isn't it?
So you were born with the potential to be strong, but you're not strong or with the potential to be athletic.
You're not athletic. Similarly, you might be born with the potential to be virtuous, to be benevolent, say, but not be benevolent.
And the difference is that you actually have to exercise the netherlands'.
You have to do it. So if you're born strong, you actually have to exercise.
You have to practise. You have to train. If you do all those things, you will become strong, properly strong.
Similarly, it doesn't matter whether you've been born benevolent.
So you occasionally do kind things just because it's your nature to Aristotle.
You've actually got to do it because it is the right thing to do.
And you've got to practise. You've got to get the habit of telling the truth.
We all know it. The first lie is quite difficult. But the second one's a bit easier.
And the third one. The fourth one. And the fifth one. You know, you can get the habit of being dishonest.
You can't get the habit of not fulfilling your attentions of going swimming this afternoon.
That reminds me, you've got to try and get the good habits to habits.
The other way round. So you've not only got to know what the right action is, you've actually got to act on that knowledge.
And what's more, make it a habit of acting on that knowledge.
OK. And finally, you've got to pull the right action for the right reason.
OK. Now, each of us is the guardian of our own morality, if you like, of our own values.
Imagine the situation again with your mum. OK.
Here's the situation. She said, what do you think? A new baby. You think?
Yup. And you make a lightning decision. I'm going to be kindlier now.
You can justify that, can't you? It's you know, it's very easy to say I've just being kind.
You can also just files for Spain on this. But we all know that sometimes when we were honest, actually what we did was give into a moment's fight.
Have we ever done that? Don't need to tell.
I won't ask you to put your hands up so you couldn't.
You can claim to be being honest. But actually, you're giving into a moment struck at this fight.
And similarly, you can claim to be being kind. But actually, you've just failed in moral courage.
Is that also a common situation? So it's no good just knowing what the right action is and performing the right action.
You've got to perform the right action for the right reason.
Okay, so one's intention is is very important to Aristotle.
And if throughout her lifetime you do these things, I mean,
obviously you get better as you get older and then saw an eight thousand lifetime, we do these things, you will become a virtuous person.
And at that point, you could be looked to as someone whose actions to emulate someone's decisions, to emulate, somebody whose advice to ask and so on.
So, for example, when the government gets together, a group of the greats in the boots to form an advisory committee or something like that,
what the government is doing is actually acting in a very Aristotelian sense.
They're saying, look, all you've got your your wise and virtuous. So let's put you together and ask your advice on these issues.
Let's see what you would do or what you would tell us to do.
And that's what we're doing, is consulting people who have a reputation, who have proven themselves in some sphere of life to two productive virtues.
OK, that's Aristotle then. Yes, I was just going to say, Allburn, excuse me.
You seem to agree that an unnecessary complexity with this business about having fun it to a person why is an unnecessary layer of complexity has.
Those conditions and some people that have to be from situations made in some situations are not others.
It's not just black or white thing. Our stuff that seeps in doesn't this is not the case with those.
And so this disease actually presupposes that every invention there is.
And, you know, it does matter. No, it doesn't presuppose either.
I'll deal with that one first because it's very easy. Doesn't sit presuppose that there is a right action.
As a matter of fact, in the situation I gave you with your mom, either of those options could be right and it would be perfectly reasonable for you to
make either of those decisions if you were sincerely making them on your best judgement.
So the fact is there can be many different types of cases, but that doesn't mean there isn't a wrong one.
Do you see what I mean? I mean, there are lots of different right answers in this situation.
Doesn't mean there isn't a wrong one. Only the first one.
I didn't think it's a layer of complexity.
Because if I have a moral dilemma, if I have a problem that I think is a moral one, I'll go and ask lots of different people.
But I'm not going to ask anyone I think is either stupid or would it be more likely to give me biased advice or something like that.
The people choose will be people I think can give me something safe.
And of course, I'm not going to choose just one. I'm going to choose several.
And I don't see why that shouldn't be described as looking for a virtuous person to help me out of this situation.
Of course, the decision is eventually mine. But I think I'd be stupid not to go seeking advice.
I would have just thought it's hard enough making that decision in some situations where it's complex.
It's hard not knowing what's going on in action and doing it for the right reasons without having to then make decisions.
I need to move together to make decisions about which this is virtuous in this respect and which person isn't.
But I think you'll see it the wrong way round, because it seems to me that when I have a moral dilemma,
what I usually mean by that is I do know what the right faction is in this situation, or I can give arguments for several different factions.
And it might be that only one of them would be right. And that's why I would seek the opinion of somebody else whom I respected.
Guess my stand is to think about that and why at a press conference that there's look at the reasons that you would you wouldn't consult anyone else.
It depends. Right.
Well, I know that that's a personal anecdote. What I would say is that what you should do is you might not consult them.
You might say, what would so-and-so do situation? What would so-and-so do in that situation anyway?
You didn't have to agree with our stuff. But this is his theory. I mean, I do agree there's something here.
But I would certainly I wouldn't make a serious moral decision where I wasn't sure of the pros and cons myself without asking some other people.
Then, of course, I'd weigh the pros and cons for myself because eventually that decision must be yours, mustn't it?
You know, you can't get away from weighing the pros and cons,
but you can either do it without supplies or you can take advice from people whom you respect and admire.
OK. Any other questions that are simple change?
What is essentially a slight. But looking.
And what's the trivia question? What do you think, my head.
I think it is trivial. What do you get?
Could you ask somebody. Said construction.
And you say to them, are you going to do that? Eventually you put it that long.
And she said on 72 days, Daniel. Then you you said you were your.
Well, I mean, I would suggest that you walk in with her first and maybe support her or not support her, depending on how the argument went.
But I would also say that you should ask someone else. The key question is, why are you going to vote for X if you are someone else?
Why are you going to vote? Why? I mean, I use the trivial question as an example, but as I said, it applies in every case of moral dilemmas.
I mean, should we allow cyberattacks, for example?
These are the use of a cow egg to incubated human nucleus, producing something that's 99 percent human, one percent bovine.
I mean, should we do that? Is that morally acceptable?
Well, you know, I could just weigh the pros and cons by myself or I could ask just one friends or.
But I think what I would do is ask lots of people. I would set up a commission to look into it.
Get lots of people on this commission who who are reputation being wise.
And I'd ask them to discuss it and then weigh the pros and cons on the basis of this.
So the question. It doesn't matter how trivial or important the question is.
It brings up the same process, which is that you consult as many virtuous people as possible and then weigh up the situation yourself.
Your thoughts are out there all the time.
No, no, I wouldn't think that was the case.
What you do become virtuous until you've been performing the right action for the right reason.
On many occasions in the past. I mean, we can all get it wrong occasionally, but we all know that there are some people who get it wrong a lot.
You know, they either never know what they did. Do you think he's a car crash waiting to happen?
Listen to this one. Or they know what the right action is, but never perform it.
You know, they're weak or malevolence or something or they do perform the right action.
So, I mean, for example, if I'm an honest if I'm a dishonest person, my best bet is to tell the truth, isn't it?
Most of the time, wasn't this on this person does is merely hold themselves ready to be dishonest when it's going to benefit them.
I mean, actually, it's it's important if I want to be dishonest to get you to trust me.
But what I'm doing is telling the truth. I know the whole truth is the right thing to do.
I'm often telling the truth that the reason I'm doing it is to get you to trust me so I can then
sell you that nice timeshare that I suddenly just sprung a leak the other day or whatever that is.
And I'm doing it for the wrong reason. So it's not in a situation that you that someone is virtuous if they're virtuous as I am.
So they have been purchased over a long period. The nice thing is you can't really be virtuous.
Nearly all white owned. I mean, we're whales qualify qualified.
We buy made it by now we're not. So, you know, we can all make mistakes.
No, no, nobody's denying that. But you can make mistakes.
But the thing is and you know, this is not a foolproof procedure because, you know, you can get the great.
I mean, Mary Bono came out recently and said she made the wrong decision on special schools.
I mean, she's a prime example of the sort of person the government consults when it comes to wanting a virtuous person.
Well, she's come out and said she believes she's wrong on something. You know, that's that's entirely consistent with being virtuous person.
But if someone did it too often, then you'd stop consulting them, wouldn't you?
We're spending too long on ourselves. So just one quick question. Say, well, it makes some more votes.
If he has said it suggests that something could be wrong.
Yes. OK. So that's Aristotle. So you've got one ethical theory now, one account of what it is, what the right action is.
The right action is once it's performed by a virtuous person or chosen by a virtuous person.
Not very action guiding, but a good theory, I think. OK, here's another one.
Kant believes this in action is right.
Only if the person performing it does so out of reverence, separate the law or as he would also put it, out of a sense of duty.
But didn't you teach here? You've got to be quite careful.
We have a tendency to think of duty as something dry and horrible, whereas Kant doesn't think of it like that.
Let me leave that. He said no, just Kant talks about the groundwork and the metaphysical morals, which is on your reading list.
He talks about the only way you can tell whether someone's virtuous or not.
He's eigth in a situation of moral dilemmas. They're prepared to act out a duty rather than inclination.
So we always have many motives. Could doing all that almost everything we do.
There are several different motives or reasons for doing it, reasons for not doing it, and some reasons are better than others.
And if we act on the right reasons. So Camus is very similar to our subtle in this.
He thinks it's intention that's important. It's acting out of reverence for the law after duty.
So let's say we I'm having four wanted to raise those.
Then you're coming from the other. What's your name? Alison's coming from the other.
The bigger me sits with her young child in winter, wrapped up at least is asking for money.
And Alison gives her pounds and I give her a pound. So we. What exactly the right actually.
Alison gave her a pound because she thought it was the right thing to do.
I gave her a pound because I wanted Alison to think I'm the kind of person.
OK, have we both acted morally or have I acted morally and Alison's acted in self interest?
What did I get? Not the wrong way around. You know what I mean? Just a little test for you.
Make sure you're listening. Who thinks that I have acted just as morally as Alison?
OK. Why is against your best interest? Oh, well, why are you here?
Sorry. What's your name? Georgia. Georgia. Same as Alison did it as well because she wanted to make herself feel good.
Is that right? Yeah. Yes. Think I did. Then you.
You think everything is done mostly ok. It is not the reason it's subconscious.
Okay. Doing what they can. You're in good company here, Hugh.
David Hume, the Scottish philosopher, would say the same thing.
That everything is performed out of self-interest, that you do absolutely nothing out of altruism.
Pants thinks that is absolutely wrong. He thinks that if you do something out of inclination, then it's not.
But by inclination, he means for self-interest at any level, that it's not a moral act.
And he actually thinks that most of the actions we do and people think they're moral are
in fact not moral because they all are done from this idea of wanting to appear good or,
you know, you give something to charity and it gives you a nice warm glow. And you knows it's that's a nice thing.
Well, if you do it for that reason, that it's not a moral action, says Kant,
it's only a moral action if you perform it because you think it's the right.
Thing to do, and the real test is, is there's an action that you really, really, really want not to perform.
And yet your duty tells you you should perform it. So you believe it's the right thing to do.
It's the right thing rather than what you want to do.
You are acting morally in that particular instance, whereas if you give in to your inclination, you're not acting morally.
So hence would disagree with you on the belief that every action is self-interested.
He thinks most sanctions are self-interested, but not all of them.
There are the occasional acts that is performed out of reverence for the law.
Well, Catherine Callaway wouldn't care about that.
Well, you've lost the suit, cared about that, not because I'm not religious, but sorry, killing them because you want to have a.
Douglas Adams is just less than.
I see what you because you're saying to the extent that they couldn't give you an inclination towards performing the right thing.
OK. This is what cats would say. This will remind you of something I said last week.
In fact, it's exactly the same. Something else and mostly. OK.
Doing a is right. I should do a. OK.
A German bride said the count would say that that is entailed by that.
You don't need didn't hear anything like I want to do the right thing.
Now, in effect, Georgia, this is this is what you will say, that there must always be a desire of that kind.
In between this premising and this conclusion, I'm Scouts' would say, well, no,
because actually, if you think you need to add in that you want to do the right thing,
you were implying that there might be an occasional which you didn't want to do the right thing.
And if that's true, you don't have the concept of rights at all.
You don't understand what rights is. If on an occasion, you might not want to do it.
You see how it would work. So you do the very important thing here is that this without the want.
Here is what cancer is call a categorical imperative.
The imperative I should do A is not contingent upon your having this desire without doing the right thing, because this desire doesn't make any sense.
Because if you know what it is to do right. You couldn't not want to do right.
Doesn't mean that you will always do right. Because we do quite often do things that we tend to do.
But the fact that we believe we were wrong will be manifested in shame and guilt.
So if you really knew what's doing right, doing wrong is you cannot want to do wrong.
That's what counts as so. OK, so there's a very long tradition stemming from him that says you can't do any action without a self-interest behind it.
Now, if that's so and if so, please write to the ancients believe that actually it has to be reason, not desire.
That's storing propelling most moral actions.
It would mean that actually none of our actions is moral. Wouldn't it?
Because not one of them is altruistic. So can you sorry.
Humans come up with another account of morality that's consistent with no actions being altruistic anyway.
So that's kind. And I thought about doing it tough with reverence for the law.
So what is this moral law? Okay, well, this actually counts.
Skip six different accounts of the categorical imperative of which this is one.
And I'll give you this one because I like this one best. But there are six others.
But there's supposed to be equivalent. So it shouldn't really matter if I'm giving you one rather than six act in such a way that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or the person of another, always at the same time as an ends and never solely as a means.
So what's your name? Dorothy. Lend me your pen for a second.
Thank you. Now I use Dorothy as a means to my end.
Then in time I wanted to tell you something.
To show you something. I also to give my pension. Give me her pen.
She gave it to me. So she was a means to my end of giving you an example, is that right?
But I also at the same time you can have it. I used use then who didn't herself because she could have said no.
She could have said I'm sorry, I'm using it or it's the only pen I've got or my I left my pen or you know, she had the choice.
That's not true. Is it really interesting. But you can see what I mean.
I did two things. We're always using each other means when we say pass the salt, would you carry my suitcase?
Will you do this for me, etc. But it's what's important is that we always treat others as ends in themselves as well.
In other words, we allow them to make their own choices.
If I trick you into carrying my suitcase, then I'm not treating you as an engine yourself because I'm not giving you the choice I.
So what can says is that you've always got to treat humanity as an end in themselves
because the thing about humans and he allows that there may be other rational animals.
But but that's just for humans. Thing about humans is they're rational.
They make choices and they make them freely. Not all my choices are free, but some of them are.
And the fact we can make free choices is what makes us moral animals.
Okay. That's. That makes us moral a notice. It's not just the other people.
We've got to treat as ends in themselves. It's also ourselves.
Your every bit as wicked. If you treat yourself as nothing more than the means to somebody else's end,
because that's conflicting with your integrity as an autonomous being, as somebody with free will.
So that's the moral law. Notice since that day, that count is also pretty lousy as a decision maker.
Okay. What's the right action? Oh, well, it's the one that the law says we should perform.
What's the law? The one that says we should always treat others as enemies. Lousy school rules, isn't it?
Please try. Tell us a sentence. That's every time I tried it through time.
Does it? Fine. Fine. I'll just say, as you treat them as a means, you're also treating them as an end of it.
So it doesn't mean it's OK. There's no duration to it.
It's just that simultaneously you can't make up for having treated someone as a means by then treating it as an end.
You were wrong to treat them as a means in the first place. OK.
So that's Kant. Robert came through the philosophers here.
OK. The next one we going to look at is utilitarianism.
Now, utilitarianism is quite different from either Aristotle or cans because utilitarianism tells us that the right.
They actually produces the greatest happiness and greatest number. Now, this is a consequentialist, not a doctrine based on intention or will.
So whereas Camus believes that the only thing that's good in itself is the will, the choices, the intentions on which you act.
The utilitarian thinks it's the consequences of your actions that matter.
So I think let's think about the nature of an action for a minute.
Here's an act. OK. Whatever that act is, it might be me scratching my nose because I told you I.
OK. I told David that if Mike isn't back today filming me, I'll let him know by structuring my news.
OK. And so I'm scratching my nose. In effect, the structure of the movies is a lie.
You said this, Mike, is that. So this act could be a stretching of the noose, but of course, it's also a lie.
Well, that wouldn't be a lie, but it would be a stretching of the day. I know that that's quite important because some people say this is all media.
Oh, I have to go a little bit. No, I'll never find this [INAUDIBLE] again.
If you think think of OK, forgive me, I'm an object.
I'm an object with many properties. There are many, many descriptions that pick out me uniquely, aren't there?
So she's the only person in this room who's on the stage. She's the person who is director of studies and philosophy.
So you do see she's the person who's wearing a turquoise jumper.
Several other people here. But I'm the one on the stage wearing the turquoise comforts.
You see, these are all uniquely identifying descriptions of me.
So there are lots of different ways of getting to me in.
The same thing is true of an action. Okay, here's the class of notice scratching.
This one is a lie. OK?
This is the one where I'm looking at they and say to tell him that Mike's not in the room.
This one isn't. This is just a no stretching. OK.
And this one is a I'm very bored with this sort of move and so on.
You see, so it can be a token thing that is also a lie.
But when any connexion. So hesitation action is an action.
Escutcheon knows the fact that its action means that it must have an intention, mustn't it?
OK. So if I come in Tripp overmatch and you will laugh, I might think to myself, oh, that's interesting.
I might make him laugh. I'll do it again next week. So when I come in next week, I trip over much again.
Now the first one was unintentional, wasn't it? The second one is intentional.
So in order for it to be an action something, it's got to be something you've chosen to do.
It's any action. You haven't chosen to do it. Not too much for which you're morally responsible.
There can be manslaughter rather than murder. You might be culpably guilty of manslaughter, but you really shouldn't have been cleaning your gun.
As it pointed at, David was loaded and so on.
So that's more or less guilt attached to manslaughter. But in order for it to murder, there has to be an intention there.
So you've got the intention. You've got an action. And you've got the consequences of an action.
You're always going to be consequences of the action. So now David knows that Mike isn't there.
He's got go an and ask where my kids or something like that.
So there's a consequence. So every act has an intention.
And as a consequence, I'm concerned.
Aristotle thinks that the moral evaluation of an action carried goes on here, whereas utilitarianism thinks this an can only be evaluated fear.
Okay, so it's not the intentions with which we act that make the act wrong.
It's the consequences of the attack.
So if I want to take my dear old arms out for tea and as I take her out, we cross the road and she's squashed by a bus.
The action I have performed has been wrong, even though my intention was a good one.
I'm going to feel guilty. You know, other people are going to worry about me.
What counts is making an action wrong is its consequences. And you can see one huge advantage of this is that if we're looking at courts of law,
it's pretty well only consequences that we can look at, isn't it?
I have no way of getting to your intentions. Also isn't through your actions, including your linguistic actions.
I mean, you might tell me that your intention was this that's or the other.
So in a court of law, it's nearly always the consequences that matter more than the intention.
Of course, I may want to get the attention, but do you think that somebody could always intent?
Well, but as a matter of fact, everything they do is wrong.
So they intend to do the right thing, but they never actually succeed.
I mean, wouldn't you be getting a bit suspicious? So know this is the third top taken out and squashed under a bus.
Funny enough, they each left me money, you know?
I mean, what's going on here? So we look at we look at the consequences in order to determine the intentions.
You know, let's look at something again. Oh, my goodness me.
I just I meant to make her happy, etc. You're not going to believe me.
I said in a court of law is it tends to be the consequences, not the.
There's another nice thing about utilitarianism, and that is it gets us a bit of a decision procedure, doesn't it?
So I mean, Aristotle has a school searching around for virtuous people and Kant has us searching
our own intuitions for what the moral law tells us to do on this occasion.
But utilitarian is an inductive, inductive moral theory.
It tells us that whatever action will produce the greatest happiness is the greatest number is the right action.
So it looks as if it's much easier to work out what you should or shouldn't do.
But do you think that's maybe misleading? Oh, you all do then.
So I think. Okay, let me just give you one example. Dropping the ball on.
Hiroshima was not the right thing to do or not. Well, if you're a utilitarian, you think it was the right thing.
If dropping the bomb produced the great stuff is the greatest number and it wasn't the right thing.
If dropping the bomb didn't produce the greatest happiness, the greatest number.
Now, what's the truth of the matter? Did dropping the bomb produce success, happiness, the greatest number or not?
I mean, actually, we could give arguments, can't we, on both sides? There is a fact of the matter.
But the chances of our ever knowing that fact are virtually nil, aren't they?
So utilitarianism might seem to give us a very easy decision procedure, but actually it doesn't.
And there are all sorts of other problems as well. I mean, to me, let's say that, David, this is such a happy, cheery person.
You know, if he smiles all the time. It's very easy to make David happy, whereas Alison is a miserable.
And I can say how I can produce much more happiness in this class by concentrating on David because he's very easy to make happy.
And I can just ignore Alison because she's you know, nothing I can do is make her happy.
I'm not talking about average happiness or total happiness. What is happiness anyway?
So actually, utilitarianism is not as easy as it looks to to execute.
Or you can worry out that we cannot know what will happen if we do all the facts.
We can't know. Doesn't mean there isn't a fact of the matter. So, for example, all that three consecutive sets sevens and the decimal expansion of PI.
Excuse me a second. I'm just looking for something here. Something I can't find.
Done. So happy to see. Yes, the intentional doesn't happen.
Well, no, no, I mean. I mean, ending a war doesn't make people happy, actually.
And of course, the alleviation of unhappiness produces happiness as well.
But sorry, going back to your question. You can't say that because we'll never know what the are.
Therefore, that wasn't a fact. I mean, the decimal expansion of PI is an infinite extension.
If there are no three consecutive settlements in the decimal expansion of PI, then we will never know this ever.
And we can those that in principle, it doesn't mean the fact of the matter.
Was there a tree here? Twenty thousand years ago?
Right here. I mean, there is a factor that matter, isn't that?
Will we ever know it? Well, it wasn't that.
What is it? Nothing. I mean, this being a is being thrown all the world.
The fact of what would happen. You could never know.
Yes, but but that's a different problem, because the fact is, it was a long time ago.
And with the problem, there is the fact of the matter now as to whether that would produce more happiness or not.
But the fact that the future we can't know about happiness is actually very interesting, isn't it?
Because it does mean that when you actually act, you don't know what the consequences of your action will be.
You can make a good, good guess, perhaps, but you can never be certain what the consequences of your actions will be.
So utilitarianism makes a very important distinction between the morality of an agent and the morality of an action.
And where is the morality of the action? Always depends on the consequences.
The moral morality of an agency depends upon the fact that they act with the intention of producing the best consequences.
OK, so immoral cannot morally. Yes.
So if I go to the principal minnow in a supermarket or something like that, and it's actually quite a small bomb.
And as it goes off in it. So I'm trying you could probably see where I'm going somewhere, but I can't.
It stops a major disaster from happening. It's something else.
So my small bomb actually results in a lot more people being left alive than would otherwise have been left alive.
The consequences of what I've done have been good, but what I did was bad.
And so part of me might and I was bad for doing what I did.
Even though the consequences of being good.
So utilitarianism, you've got to make a distinction to be moral worth of the agent and the moral worth of the action that they perform.
Problems for utilitarianism. One of the difficulties of utilitarianism is that it says that the action that
produces the great something is the greatest number is the right action. But there seems to be some very clear counterexamples to this.
For example, genocide. It looks as if utilitarianism could justify genocide.
If you have a situation where the two of you downhill, the three of you down here are a different race for us or something, rather, from us.
And we don't like them, do we? But they're not here.
And many of them. All of it. So let's just get rid of them. OK, now that's produced the greatest happiness of greatest number.
Because, you know, there are not many of you to be happy. Your happiness doesn't really count.
And we all wanted them dead. So that's produced the greatest happiness of gross numbers, hasn't it?
That looks a bit worrying. To say the least. Now, it might be that some of us feel pretty outraged that these people have been shot.
So. So four of you over here think that was really awful. So we can actually put your unhappiness with their unhappiness.
But can we ever be sure that the unhappiness of those who are against gendercide will outweigh the happiness of those who are for it?
Can we be sure? No. It looks if we can't, in which case, if you go for utilitarianism,
it rather looks as if you're opening yourself to the possibility of justifying genocide.
And that's because the utilitarian human rights, the right to life, for example,
is only a right on the understanding that your right to life isn't conflicting with the greatest happiness and grace.
No. You have a right to life because on the whole,
it produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number to treat people as if they have a right to life.
But if somebody, your right to life comes into conflict, to the greatest happiness in the greatest number, then your right to life lapses.
Okay. I have a duty to kill you. If killing you will produce the great sadness of the greatest number.
So there seemed to be counterexamples to utilitarianism.
On the other hand, it's so incredibly useful. I mean, we're we're actually using it to the National Health Service movement.
And it's only One-Third of Collie's. So quality adjusted life years for something policy.
Somebody out there, some quality adjusted life years when when a surgeon or a doctor is considering some
sort of intervention and she can only afford to do one of these perhaps wrong.
The other, you decide by looking at the quality of the.
So the number of life years that would be produced by this intervention. So for you, it would be ten, and for you it would be five.
And then you look at the quality of those years that you're producing.
So you would have five actually pretty mediocre years where I would say I can give you five really good ones.
Of course, I could not make it difficult for myself.
But you see that you can look at Pawleys to give you some way, a measure of which intervention you should do.
And that's based very, very firmly on utilitarianism, which will lead to more.
Well, do you remember the sailor to the captain not to shut off their oxygen in the engine room on purpose?
Well, utilitarianism did seem to justify shutting off fields to the.
And it might justify war. But, of course, cannons could also perhaps justify war unsurpassable.
If if the war seems to be their only thing that's treating others as ends in themselves or all the thing that the virtuous people would suggest.
So it's not just utilitarianism that can justify war, that everyone can do that.
But what utilitarianism could do couldn't justify genocide. And it's not obvious the other theories can do that.
So if you want to justify genocide, utilitarianism is probably your theory.
It makes it sounds as if I've got a to the sirens.
This is absolutely not the case. I think that there are many ways of interpreting this in particular.
I think that you might want to say that utilitarianism is a discredited theory, not a prescriptive one.
In other words, it's not telling us that this is true, but that this is.
It's something that we noticed in some of his comments that it was estimated because.
Stop. OK. What was I say?
Right. The descriptive theory is just say that what you do do the right action.
It will work out that that was the action that produced the great something to squish.
No, not that's what you should do. Because actually, there's something wrong with saying it's prescriptive.
I mean, I intend to go home tonight after I've been swimming, of course, and have a glass of wine.
Now, I could actually go and work in the Oxfam to go house for a bit or something like that,
which would presumably make more people happy than me having my glass of wine.
Should I be doing that?
I mean, surely I actually if what I'm supposed to do is producing a very suddenly suppressed number all the time, I'm going to get very tired.
So you might think it's not a prescriptive theory to put a descriptive one.
So I didn't do that. The bad news headlines about utilitarianism.
But I promise you that there are ways of understanding this that make it much less simple than deny giving the impression of saying, you know.
Three, but I wonder to pay is that make me feel good?
That's it. Child development you have to develop.
We're using the food that makes the crucial switch from whether it's externally imposed by consequences imposed by.
Mommy, punish me. And when it rains, it comes into.
This is one of the major factors is that childhood development development?
Yeah. And for any moral philosophy, it doesn't actually take into account that one of the major concerns of Oromo reasoning is.
But surveys can all take and was pass because.
Yes. Capitalism is it seems to sort of be right?
Well, I'm concerned for your happiness, I think. And I've got to exercise an empathy is only a method of determining what others are feeling.
I did if I put myself in your position that I'm using empathy, but I'm using empathy to determine what's going to make you happy or I'm imagining,
you know, who's going to be affected by my action, how will they be affected by it?
Or I'm thinking, what is it in this situation to treat to in yourself?
What would you choose if you if I was able to ask you again?
I've got to use empathy. It's supposed to be the human body is simply actually experiencing the experience, not the other person.
It's not it's not the reasoning or the rational person. Maybe not.
But the fact is, it's all there acting on. I mean, think back to what Aristotle said about you can be naturally benevolent and I mean children.
If one child in the nursery starts screaming, the others are going to come out in sympathy very quick.
And if you cry in front of the child, the child gets very distressed.
I mean, children are naturally empathetic, but that boy, they're not naturally moral.
I mean, aid in order to become moral. They've got to learn what the right action is.
They've got to learn that they've got to do the right action and they've got to do it for the right reasons.
So that is the beginning of knowing that other people have feelings and experiences like you have a family.
Yes. And then from that, you begin to see a finding such and such.
And so it will hurt. I don't like it. Yes, but you give it a psychological theory of morality.
I'm interested in the philosophical theory of morality. So in the same way I can say it, we can be interested in language.
What is language? What is meaning? How do we manage to communicate with each other?
That's a philosophical interest. All we can say, how does language develop in a child?
That's a psychological theory. And I'm teaching you philosophy.
I don't know. Know, it's just sort of more sophisticated development of that law and things like that.
Otherwise, where this will come from. Yeah.
OK. Margaret, did you have a specific question, though?
I was asking you to describe this theory was prescriptive theory tells you what you ought to do.
Such a prescription of your actually not just the description.
You obviously, obviously had to write actions because.
Or, you know, you don't have to do it.
It's just that utilitarianism is a prescriptive theory, says you should produce great suppleness, the greatest number.
It's a descriptive theory.
When you have done the right action, it will be the case that it does produce great stuff, this number, whatever your intention was in doing it.
Yes. OK. Including if you intended to do wrong.
OK. I'm going to move on to politics now because otherwise we're not going to get politics done.
OK, so that's ethical theory and it's to go back to the developmental thing.
Of course, empathy is important. I think empathy is actually I called it charity, the principle of charity.
I think there's very good reason to think that when we're trying to understand this world,
we're constrained in all our thinking by something called the gospel of the uniformity of nature.
In other words, if we want to understand whether A causes B, we've got to see that, see if we can get name without a B, because if we can.
That shows A doesn't cause B, so we're assuming Natuzzi reform.
But in the case of understanding each other, we've got to use the principle of charity,
which is a form of empathy, where if you say something that strikes me as mad.
So you say P and I say, look, you know, it's obviously not.
Now, I could just dismiss you as stupid. But actually, if you're right, I'll be losing my opportunity to learn something.
So the principle of charity tells you to to always assume that the other person's error is less likely and your bad interpretation.
OK, so if you seem to be saying something mad, it's probably because I haven't understood you and I need to ask you, why are you saying that?
What if I dismiss you as mad then and there's something wrong with me because you're a worthy collaborator in pursuit of truth.
You're a rational animal. I'm doing wrong by dismissing you is stupid.
OK, moving on to politics, I'm going to talk about just one political issue, because it's quite nice and central issue, distributive justice.
How do we distribute the goods of society in such a way as it's done to us to do justice Kelly?
So in this country, we not only have a tax regime, we also have a benefits regime.
And we redistribute wealth in various ways.
And we presumably do this because we think that this is the just most just way of distributing things like education, the vote,
freedom of speech, etc. We try and equalise it, but we don't go for equality and we go for redistribution of the sort that we do.
And I'm going to be talking about two philosophers, John Rawls and Robert Nosek.
First, I want to talk about rules, too. I can talk to a party that gets in the.
Right. I I've no idea how that got there.
No idea. I don't. I think he's still a lot. I.
I'll have to look it up anyway. It's definitely not box or release.
If it is, I don't know. Okay. Rose wrote a very influential, hugely influential book called Fair Justice.
It's very big. It's very boring. I don't recommend it, but it is it has some very interesting stuff in it.
And what rules sets out to do is to choose the principles of justice for society, he says.
What is it? That was all the principles on which goods should be distributed in such ways to make it as just as possible.
And the real hallmark of rules is originality was something called the original position, which is his way of choosing the principles of justice.
This is how he did it. The original position is a position where people of a certain kind are put in a certain position.
I'm asked to decide on the rules by which justice should be by which good should be distributed.
The people are like this. They're rational. They're self-interested.
OK, so. So they're not stupid. They they care about themselves.
But they also, you know, they're quite happy to be kind to other people.
They're also risk averse. They don't really want to put themselves into into a difficult position.
They don't want to take risks. And the original position was that the sort of the position that Putin is behind the veil of ignorance.
Now, the veil of ignorance means that you don't know anything about yourself.
So you don't know whether you're male or female. You don't know whether you're old or young.
You don't know whether you're rich or poor, black or white, intelligent or stupid, ill or fit.
OK. You know nothing about yourself. You could be any of these things.
OK. The only knowledge you have is the thin theory of good rules, cause that's what this in theory good is.
It tells you things like human beings need warmth.
They need comfort. They need a certain amount of property over which they have autonomy.
Humans gestate for nine months. So you you have the basic physiological, psychological, political or economic facts about human beings.
But you don't know anything about you.
Now you've got to decide what the principles of justice should be and what those things is that because you're behind the veil of ignorance.
You're forced to be fair. OK.
You don't know whether your well sick.
So you're not going to make the set up such that people are set to be discriminated against because that might be you.
You don't know whether you're rich or poor. So you're not going to give the rich everything or leave the poor with nothing.
Like a poor. You're not going to be. You don't.
Whether you're black or white. So you're not going to set up a system so that black people are discriminated against
or white people are discriminated against because you don't know who you are.
Ditto with female. If they were. I mean. Because you don't know who you are.
Your self interest is not going to work for any particular type of person.
Your self-interest is going to work on behalf of anyone or rather everyone who might cover.
Isn't it good? I do. I'm just rules thinks that the two principles of justice that he believes will come out of this process are these two.
Everyone's entitled to maximum liberty, compatible with equal liberty for all.
OK. So actually, he's a libertarian. He is a consequentialist.
But whereas is to the terrible happiness as the sun burns the thing we all want.
He puts liberty there. It's liberty. That's the most important thing.
And you could say we want equality. Things should be distributed equally.
But if you do that, you're you're not taking account of the fact that we're not given an equal distribution to start with.
All we know. If I male, I possibly need more goods than you need because you'll fit.
So he says the inequalities are permitted, but only when they make the worse off, better off.
OK, so those are two principles of justice.
So to evaluate rules, you've got to think, OK, what do we think of the original position in the first place?
And what do we think of the principles of justice that come out of it?
I mean, we might think we might dismiss the original position is not a good idea or we might dismiss the principles of justice.
Come out and I'll say just a little something on the original position.
One important thing you've got to work out is just how which information goes where behind the veil of ignorance or in this hidden theory of good.
Let's say that you believe that women are very emotional, okay.
And that therefore they shouldn't be allowed to fly planes. Now, do you think women are very emotional into the things here of good?
Because this is a fact, about half the human race. I'm just as you put it, it's women who have babies because it would be very important.
That was it in the thin period. Wouldn't it? Do you think women are emotional in that or do you put that in the behind the veil of ignorance?
So your decision about where you put various bits of information is actually going to serve garbage in, garbage out in effect, isn't it?
So somebody in South Africa might have put all sorts of things about black people into the
thin theory of goods that we would think probably belong in the behind the veil of ignorance.
People 200 years ago would have put a lot of facts about women into the same theory of good that we think ought to be behind the veil of ignorance.
So. So surely it's the whole thing. Just question, Becky, that we're going to put in the veil of ignorance.
All the things, all our prejudices are going to be exercised simply in the division of where we put things.
That's one thing. There's no same problem. We might think that's OK.
Inequalities are permitted when they make the worse off, better off.
Well, OK. Let's say that I've got something I can do in this room.
You're the worse off. Sorry, you didn't really badly to them. No, the worse off.
We're the best off. And I can do something is going to make us a lot better off.
Who can really do something? Unfortunately, it's not going to shift them by so much as a halfpenny.
OK. Now, this is ruled out. We can't do that because this is an inequality that isn't making the worse off, better off.
On the other hand, I could do it if I make and just half a penny better off.
We can Upshaw's by just a tiny little something like that.
So there seems to be something of a politics of envy that could work in here, quite worryingly,
because it might prevent changes that would make an awful lot of people better off,
but would be prevented just because it doesn't make the worse off, better off.
So that's all I can say by the rules. But that that's a very quick romp through distributive justice according to the theory of justice.
And the original position is the key thing in that point.
And of that, it's the original position and the thing, theory of good fortune.
Enough fine, man. It's going to no thick no. Nosik holds a Lockean.
John Locke, English philosopher of property theory.
And what that says in effect is, is that you own the labour of your own body and everything with which you mix that labour.
Now, that's actually this theory of property is is underpins the American constitution.
It also underpins much of our law.
I mean, for example, there was a time when you were allowed to include all the lands that you and your family could power between sunrise and sunset.
And one thing that was wrong, fair about this is that you if you were very strong and you had a family of lusty sons,
you get up there and power lots of land, then you could impose a lot of that land between sunrise and sunset.
But you could also work, you know, with all these sons.
And what's what? You eat it, too. What is it if you and your little mother were telling that, you know, you couldn't get much done?
But on the other hand, you wouldn't need that much either, would you? So that was the idea between you.
You can own what you mix your labour with big problems, though.
And somebody pointed out that if I add to your wine glass into the sea. Have I lost my wine or games of the sea?
Even if I'm telling the lands to, I also get to own the mineral rights under the land or just the topsoil.
So there are big there is another big theory, not specified and surface news,
but you've got to leave as good as much behind for people who come off to you.
And the trouble with this is it can zip back. If there are 10 apples, then you take one, you take you on, you take one, you take one.
But when it gets to the 10th, I can't take it. I'm not leaving as good and as much behind.
But if I can't take it, neither can the ninth. Personal, big, a perfect world, personal and personal.
And it looks as if mother property can't be owned at all.
If you think of the settlement principle. So there are problems with the Lockean property theory which underpins No.6 theory.
But one of the big things that he claims is that taxation is forced labour.
And his argument for this. He talks about Wilt Chamberlain, who was a basketball player.
Now, Wilt is a wonderful basketball player. He's actually fantastic.
And you all have a certain number of holdings.
Okay, you've got this money. Let's say we've all got equal amounts of money.
And since Wilt, we thought that everyone, including Wilt, has the same amount of money.
But Wilt has this talent. Okay. But he says on any good exercise, this talent, if you pay me and we all say, that's all I will pay.
We'll give you 25 cents for the same basketball. What Wilt does play basketball.
He ends up richer than the rest of us. Now, No.6 says that's fair.
You all chose to give him the extra type of 25 cents. He chose to exercise his talents.
He didn't have to work like that. And he's unequal.
Wealth is owned by him. If you now take 25 percent of that away in taxation, you're in effect.
You're forcing him to work for 25 percent of the time. I mean, for the hour and a half, I've been measuring two percent of that.
I think. It's good to be taken away from you. Yeah, that's wicked.
Well, shouldn't I be left with that 25 percent?
We could then. I mean, we could have private medicine, private education, toll roads and so on.
Why should the states take that money away and spend it on things that I don't have any children?
Why should I spend money on education? I don't drive. Why should I spend money on rock on the roads?
So the conflict between liberty and equality, the only way says no.
Sick of avoiding that link is you either have to interfere with Wilt's ability to choose whether or not to exercise his talents.
You've got to make an exercise first for no extra money. Or you've got to stop you from choosing to spend your money freely.
OK. You can't spend it all on wealth. Either way, there's a conflict between liberty and equality.
And that, says Nosek, is the key problem for all liberals.
Theories of distributive justice. What do you think of that as a theory?
Rubbish. That's why I think.
I don't want some fur here. But it does look stupid.
Justice, choosing to super talented, go to the right or this, that and the other escapes perpetuate inequality.
Where is taxation as we are conservatives? Should I go to the polls?
But surely Hillary. Sounds good, but no, it could say that there's nothing uneven about this taxation.
If we're starting from sorry about private use.
Look, I've tried to legal that. If we've all started with equality.
OK? I don't have children and I don't have a car, but I do like swimming occasionally.
I would like to spend my money on decent leisure facilities in National Trust, things like that.
You had a car. You would what you would be prepared to pay to have toll roads.
Top so private. Any of you who might get sick.
Probably all of us would want to pay for private insurance to make sure that we had hospitals available when we did it.
So it's not that there wouldn't be hospitals that we cancelled.
Well, that's but that's exactly his point.
It's it's his point is that as we do not sometimes equal and you want to encourage everyone to use their talents,
if you're sick enough to make it to stop them from using their talents by taxing them, then you're going to lose.
They're not going to use those terms. I mean, in some ways you can see that this happens.
Taxation is set too high. These are people with challenge are going to leave the country and not pay them.
So it's quite it's crucial, isn't it? And set the taxation level so that you don't lose the people who because there is this conflict.
So it's not to say there shouldn't be any taxation,
but he's saying that if you get taxation is forced labour and therefore you don't want too much of it.
Well, I mean, one thing you might say is, is that if you tax people sorry,
if you don't tax people thought there are some people who get to pull out of the net.
You might say there has to be a safety net and someone knows it wouldn't even accept that.
He thinks that very importantly, charity must be supported in a big way.
So it must be voluntary.
Giving becomes very important in a society where there is very little taxation and taxation.
And I'm sure that must encourage that. Well, in schools and in I mean, there are there are ways of encouraging giving.
They do it in America very much. They do it here. There were.
We will find out when two people part of.
Yeah. Kimberly, yes, he has, because Wilt Chamberlain wanted to get to be a milkman.
Let's say he did not want to play basketball. He's playing basketball.
And you're prepared to pay. He doesn't like playing basketball.
Okay, well, that's that's got five minutes for questions. Let's so let's have some questions out on ethics and politics.
Surely everybody equal. On Monday.
The next day. That's his that's his response.
Yeah. His point is that in order to get some quality, you've got to interfere with liberty.
And in order to get liberty, you cannot assume equality will follow because it plays a key conflict between liberty and equality.
But the light truth and.
Georgia, I'm sorry, the way that those points made, and I think it is very small, but a very funny I that isn't just about money.
I think you will be paid for taxation.
But no, distributive justice is about the goods in society.
So it includes things like the boat, education, the roads, hospitals, health, everything.
That's fine. But of course, given the way our societies are, as a matter of fact, set up because it's money that pays for these things.
So it does tend to come down to money. Please sit down.
Yes. Try this. This is. How about this?
Well, the question remains, what shall I also want one just quickly, because I'll forget it otherwise.
One contradiction in the body of its work is he does think that you have to have property to be autonomous.
So it is for him. Autonomy is the key value that businesses make choices.
The key value. But if you need property in order to make choices and if on his theory,
you could be left without any property at all because there's nobody redistributive mechanisms in society, then surely that can't be right.
There's got to be something wrong with that.
Social ills, with some basic redistributive mechanism to at least ensure that everybody has some property.
However much is needed to be autonomous if being autonomous is the most.
And I was just you know what I mean, is he possibly. But he's a libertarian and he's not just a possible.
Oh, yes. I mean I mean in philosophy as a people, I mean,
one would hope that their physical positions are broken rather more thought out than those of non philosophers.
But I'm afraid this isn't necessarily so. But yeah.
Philosopher with a political position, Roger Scruton, for example,
is another famous loss where the wrong things, political positions and are lost was lost.
As to who a political sceptics as well.
So you can go either way. Our forces, virtuous people.
I'm a little bit suspicious also. It's very hard to find somebody who can be equally reliable.
All right. They are.
Butterflies. Oh, I say, baby.
When don't know that they have decided to do something special.
They need to keep it in. Why?
Well, I mean, I think it's all right in practise as well, because it's what we did in the practise.
I mean, Aristotle would think that somebody could somebody who's virtuous would be virtuous about everything,
although he would admit that they can get it wrong. Oh, no influence by the framers.
Yes. I mean, one thing you would want to do if you were a wise and virtuous person is to look at the problem as effectively as possible.
I mean, you would try not to let these.
And also, you might say, I'm sorry, this is this this is something which I don't want to advise you because I know that I'm going to be biased.
And I know that it's going to be biased. Therefore, this is also an issue which I want to be consulted.
I think that's perfectly reasonable and consistent with being virtues.
But perhaps people would say. Two very good ones.
One here. One man is coming back next year. Do not impose.
Absolutely. That's right. That's right.
So actually, all the theories we've looked at here, absolutist theories.
Yes.