1
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Right. Okay. And you come here, I assume, because you're interested in philosophy.

2
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Presumably you don't know a lot about philosophy or you wouldn't have come to a philosophy for beginners.

3
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So I thought I'd start by telling you how I came to philosophy and why I adore it as much as I do.

4
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And I was thrown out of school when I was 15. Truancy and disruption, if you're interested.

5
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Bored to tears. And it was only when I was 26 when I started feeling that I needed some intellectual stimulation, that I started doing it.

6
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Of course, with the Open University, wonderful institution. And part of that was philosophy one.

7
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One unit of it was philosophy. And those were the days where you had to do formal logic.

8
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And I thought this was the most difficult thing I had ever done in my life.

9
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And I actually sat up all night working on it. And I thought actually I really enjoyed that.

10
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And then I did quite well on it, which always helps, doesn't it? And I started reading more.

11
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And the more I read, the more I thought this is what I want to do. And I ended up going full time to London University.

12
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Then came on here to do my graduate work. And I just for three years at Bedford College in London, I was walking on air.

13
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I couldn't believe that actually the government in those days was paying me to study this absolutely fascinating and fantastic subject.

14
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And as I say, three years walking on air. I've come down to earth a little bit since then.

15
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That was quite a few decades ago. But I still adore philosophy.

16
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And my aim in these lectures is to convey to you some of the enthusiasm that I have for the subject.

17
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Some of the love I have for the subject.

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The thing I like most about it is that there are all these things that you might have thought about as your lying in bed.

19
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The things like dust space come to an end. Is somebody the barman in a pub once told me that he often lay in bed wondering if space came to an end,

20
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but actually never getting anywhere because how do you think about something like that?

21
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If you haven't been trained to think about things like that and I explained to him that you could you know,

22
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there was a whole subject devoted to the study of such things as that, and it's philosophy.

23
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So does space come to an end? Well, if it does, it means you get to a point where you can't put your arm out, you know what's in its way.

24
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There's just no space to put your arm into. Is there is space a box or does it carry on to infinity?

25
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That's that's the question that fascinated him. But I'm sure you wouldn't be here if you didn't have a few things like that.

26
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And I hope that sometime over the next five weeks I might address the question that bothers you.

27
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And if not, just ask me about it, because there's plenty going to be plenty of opportunity for you to ask.

28
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What's we going to do today is I build it and I continue to build it as a romp through the history of philosophy.

29
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It really is a romp because look at all the things I'm going to do and we've got one and a half hours.

30
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I could spend six weeks talking about this lot. So it really will be a romp.

31
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But I hope what I'll do is, is show you a bit about how these people thought and why they thought what they thought.

32
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And that'll introduce us to the different areas of philosophy, which is what we'll be studying after today.

33
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Okay. We can start with the chap at the top, chap called Democritus.

34
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He was a priest, Socratic. In other words, he lived before Socrates in the 5th century B.C. Those are his dates.

35
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And he was an activist. I should tell you something about what is it that makes a philosopher?

36
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The first philosophers were actually also the first scientists. They were the first people who looked for explanations of things that were natural.

37
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So instead of looking to God or the supernatural in some form or another, they looked for explanations that were earthbound, if you like.

38
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And so democracies. Democritus was the pupil of somebody called Opus, and he took most of his theory from him or started it.

39
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But Democritus developed it in a big way. He came from the idea that nothing comes from nothing.

40
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The idea that nothing either comes into existence or goes out of existence because everything that exists just exists.

41
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It is or it isn't. And of course, anything that isn't isn't.

42
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So it's not very interesting. I have a view of the universe like that, but nothing comes into existence and nothing goes out of existence.

43
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Then you've got a problem, haven't you? You've got a problem with change. You know, things are changing all the time.

44
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Surely things are coming out of existence, coming into existence all the time, I mean, I don't know how many grandchildren you have, but some.

45
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There's somebody something that's come into existence. Surely it's complete nonsense to think that things don't come into existence.

46
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Well, Democritus and the other activists explains this.

47
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That was the question they set themselves. How do we explain change, given that nothing comes into or goes out of existence?

48
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And their answer was that. And what exists is the void.

49
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And within that void, there are individuals.

50
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There there's a set number of things that have different shapes, different properties, et cetera.

51
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But they exist and they are changeless. In other words, they do not come into existence or go out of existence.

52
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But what they do do is form and reform into different sorts of aggregates.

53
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So you have the individuals, the things that are as they are and don't change the atoms.

54
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And they come together to create things like you and things like this chair here and things like this,

55
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flip charts and things like this microphone and so on. So can you see how an atom becomes an explanatory particle?

56
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It's it's what explains change. And can you also see that that explanation is a completely natural explanation?

57
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It's not postulating God or anything supernatural.

58
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It's just saying that there exist. There's the void and there are atoms within the void.

59
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Why do you think they're indivisible these things? I've given you the answer in what I've said, actually.

60
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So if you can, why are they indivisible atoms?

61
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Cause we know these days that atoms aren't indivisible at all.

62
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But why would they think they were?

63
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Okay, well, if you can't come into existence and go out of existence, if you can't change, how could the atoms change?

64
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How could they divide and come back together?

65
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If these are the things that enter into new combinations all the time and then they can't themselves change, can they?

66
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So they are the individuals that somebody else had.

67
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Another way of describing this. Who was it? Zino said, take a stick.

68
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Chop it in half. Chop it in half again. Chop that half in half.

69
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Chop that half and half and that half and half and so on. Carry on and you can only get two possibilities.

70
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This one is that it's infinitely divisible, isn't it?

71
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You can keep on going into halves. And the other is that you reach a point where as you chop it, you no longer have wood.

72
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What you have is is something that isn't wood. You've cut it beyond the point where it's wood.

73
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And that was another argument for Atomism. OK.

74
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So that's the priest acrostics. And you've had 10 minutes of the priest Socratic.

75
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So that's your lot. I should tell you a little bit more.

76
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This chap wrote over 60 books. He was hugely unpopular.

77
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He was known as the laughing philosopher, which makes it sound as if he ought to be popular.

78
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But he was laughing because he was laughing cynically at everyone else and their stupidity.

79
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So he doesn't strike me as a nice sort of chap. But he wrote all these books and all we have of him now is the fragments.

80
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They are literally fragments of parchment. We have a couple of of pieces by people who also propounded his theories.

81
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But we have a huge amount of stuff by his detractors. The people who didn't like him.

82
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So remember, as you're reading something like that, you've got to bear in mind that they don't like this chap.

83
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Okay, well, that's that's the pre Socratic. So let's move on a bit here.

84
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Let's move on to the post Socratic, if you like, Plato, of whom you will, of course,

85
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have heard and Aristotle I Sutil was Plato's pupil and Plato was the pupil of Socrates.

86
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Socrates himself didn't write anything ever.

87
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Everything we know about Socrates comes down either from Plato or Socrates was

88
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also mentioned by a few of Aristophanes and a few other people who wrote plays.

89
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But Plato himself wrote in dialogue form, and he's very easy to read.

90
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I really do recommend that if you like reading dialogue form, if you're interested in philosophy.

91
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Plato is actually a good place to start and Aristotle's his pupil.

92
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Aristotle is. He has the reputation amongst his peers of being very easy to read.

93
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But the works that we have are his lecture notes. Sadly, we don't have any of his books.

94
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We have his lecture notes. And if you were to read my lecture notes, you wouldn't find a very easy to read.

95
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And Aristotle's work is also not at all easy to read.

96
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It's a shame because Plato is fantastic and we believe that Aristotle was fantastic in the books he wrote.

97
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But let's have a look at a dispute that they had between them.

98
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Can you imagine instantly a school where Plato was the teacher and Aristotle was a pupil?

99
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What must have been completely extraordinary, mustn't it? Okay, let's let's look at this patootie particular thing.

100
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Think about the word read. Okay.

101
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What's the meaning of the word read? How do you understand the word read?

102
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Anyone prepared to have a go which read?

103
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Well, I'm talking about the word read. Remember, there's a big difference between that and that.

104
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Okay. That with the quotes refers to the words, doesn't it?

105
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And that refers to the colour. Okay. So the person you said which read.

106
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OK, what are you talking about, which colour? Oh, I see.

107
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My apologies. I hadn't thought of that. I had that in mind.

108
00:11:33,610 --> 00:11:37,610
OK. No, I mean that red. OK. The colour red. Yeah.

109
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OK. So taking the word red. How do you understand its meaning.

110
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What do you understand by the word red. Anyone prepared to tell me how in.

111
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It's a colour, okay? But that's not going to help me much if I don't know the meaning of the word red.

112
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Do I? I mean, let's assume I know the meaning of the word colour a certain way.

113
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Would that tell me the meaning? Yes. That's interesting, isn't it?

114
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Because the other thing is that here's a little thought experiment for you.

115
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Did you hear the lady said it's a certain wavelength.

116
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Which, of course it is. In one sense. But is that how you understand the word?

117
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That's what people tell you. It's not how you understand it.

118
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There may be people in this room who don't know that, and yet they understand the word read.

119
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So that tells us that can't be the meaning of the word read. As you rightly said.

120
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So you get ready.

121
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Can we ask you? I mean, in one sense, I suppose you do.

122
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And yes, if you refine that a bit, it's the colour of what comes out of you when you cut yourself.

123
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Yeah. Okay, good. So you're talking about it by description.

124
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It's not part of the meaning of it, though. I mean, is it the meaning in China, for example?

125
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No, I mean, we've got two things here, haven't we? There's the word and there's the concept, which is what do you think when you understand the word?

126
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OK. So when I say the word read, you're immediately entertain your concept of red.

127
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Okay, if I say elephant, you're immediately entertaining your concept of elephant.

128
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Okay. Even though there isn't an elephant within miles, that's what the lady there say.

129
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Does it mean danger? I don't think it does mean danger because it might do in our society,

130
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but I'm not sure it would in a society where there wasn't the correlation between red traffic lights, red berries, etc.

131
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I mean, it means love in China, doesn't it? Isn't it the bridal colour?

132
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Was that India? It's India, isn't it? Well, whatever it is, you're taught that it's okay to tell me what it is saying.

133
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There's something else that's red. Okay. Let's let's take that one for a bit. His a way of describing red.

134
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I mean, the lady of their described it. She said it's what. It's the colour of what comes out of you when you cut yourself.

135
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Well, okay, that's that's a good way of understanding, isn't it. As long as somebody knows what comes out.

136
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Here's another way. It's the colour of that gentleman's jumper, roughly.

137
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I mean, maybe it's orange, but let's pretend it's certainly the colour of that gentlemens cardigan.

138
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But he's wearing a jacket. So you can't see it. Okay.

139
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I've given an all sensitive definition, but was it you who said it's the same as something else called red?

140
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Why should you get the colour when I pointed that? I mean, I'm trying to get lots of things apart from the colour on tie green.

141
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Image that we see with our eyes, it's something that we recruit. All we agreed on it.

142
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Do you know that what you see when you look at this gentleman's jumper is what I see when I look at this gentleman's jumper?

143
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Do you. You don't know what to say? Well, no, not necessarily, because that's exactly what I'm asking.

144
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What is the colour of which you have a concept?

145
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Because I point to that. Let's think about a child learning the concept red.

146
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So what do you do when you're explaining what red means to a child?

147
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You point to lots of other lots of different sorts of red. That's red.

148
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That's the lining of your jacket is red. My skirt is sort of red.

149
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Red. They're red there and so on. Do you pick lots of jumpers to point to?

150
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Why not? No, I'm talk about red jumpers.

151
00:16:08,190 --> 00:16:15,350
Yeah. So let's say they are all red. Why would you not point to lots of jumpers.

152
00:16:15,350 --> 00:16:21,600
Exactly. You might think that red means jumper instead of or even red jumper rather than just red.

153
00:16:21,600 --> 00:16:25,950
So you point to lots of different things and you also point to things that are not red.

154
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What you're trying to do is to give the child the conditions under which that is red are true.

155
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And you also want to say things like, is that red pointing to this lady's jumper?

156
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And what do you hope the child says? No. Send that manner.

157
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Yes. You heard the child says no.

158
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So the way you do it is you point to lots of different things and you hope that the child abstracts out what it is you're talking about.

159
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You know that you're not talking about a person. You're not talking about a jumper, that you're talking about that particular quality.

160
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Now, Plato and Aristotle were interested in how you explain our ability to learn language and our ability to apply concepts.

161
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Concepts are hugely important to human beings. Do you remember I said an elephant a minute ago and you all immediately had an elephant in mind?

162
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Even though there isn't an elephant around here at all, that's the difference between a percept and a concept.

163
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A percept is a constituent of a perception. So if I look at this chair, a constituent of the perception I have is the colour blue.

164
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Okay, I can see the blue ness of the chair. And so can you, presumably.

165
00:17:51,180 --> 00:17:55,800
But whenever you think of elephants, I'm not seeing an elephant at all.

166
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My. Instead, I'm having a thought about an elephant.

167
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And the search has a conceptual content. And part of that conceptual content is elephant.

168
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So what makes us different from animals? Arguably, what enables us to think is that we can form concepts.

169
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We can pull apart our thinking about the world from the way the world is.

170
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So we can think about the way the world might be as well as the way the world is.

171
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You can imagine me wearing yellow now, can't you?

172
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Gone. Imagine it doesn't suit me at all, does it? Okay, but.

173
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But what you're doing is you're pulling apart.

174
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You're the percept you see of me wearing black and red and your replacing the black and red with yellow.

175
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So you're pulling apart. That's what enables us to be creative. What enables us to be imaginative.

176
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What enables us to form plans. So we can imagine ourselves going swimming this evening.

177
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Whether we actually make that a reality. It depends on willpower. But we can indeed imagine it.

178
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And that's what it is to form goals, goals that you can then put into action.

179
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Sure. No, I'm not going to get into that.

180
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I am. But I don't expect you to believe me at this point.

181
00:19:18,420 --> 00:19:22,350
No, we will maybe get into that at some point. Okay.

182
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So Plato said this is the problem he was dealing with.

183
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How do we understand words? How do we form concepts?

184
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Words obviously stand for if you like concepts. So the word read the meaning that you entertain when you think about read is your concept of read.

185
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Okay. Not your percept, your concept. You've got to have the percept before you have the concept, perhaps.

186
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And he says, well, how do we do this? And what he says is that when you look or when you as a child looked at different sorts of

187
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red as your mother was telling you or father was telling you the meaning of the word red,

188
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what you did is you were reminded of something you saw before birth.

189
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Okay, this is. Saito's theory of an emesis or memory.

190
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He thinks that before we're born, our soul exists before birth and it exists in the realm of being,

191
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which is where the forms are formed with a capital F and the form is the meaning of the word read.

192
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So there's the form of good, which is what we are reminded of when we see a good act.

193
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When we see somebody do something good, we think, good, that's good.

194
00:20:41,750 --> 00:20:47,760
And what we're doing is we're reminded of the form, which is pure goodness.

195
00:20:47,760 --> 00:20:54,110
Okay. In the form of red is pure redness and the form of blue is pure blueness.

196
00:20:54,110 --> 00:21:00,470
And so it goes on. And this, says Plato, is how you manage to teach your child read.

197
00:21:00,470 --> 00:21:03,410
You point to that. You point to that. You point to that. You point to that.

198
00:21:03,410 --> 00:21:09,260
Why just pointing to all these different things caused the child to form one concept answer.

199
00:21:09,260 --> 00:21:13,020
It reminds him of the form. OK.

200
00:21:13,020 --> 00:21:16,530
That was Plato's theory. What's wrong with that theory?

201
00:21:16,530 --> 00:21:23,290
I mean, I'm telling you this theory now and I can see some of you are thinking, eh, well, why why are you thinking?

202
00:21:23,290 --> 00:21:31,860
What's wrong with this theory? Well, you can't prove it, but a lot of theories you can't prove.

203
00:21:31,860 --> 00:21:37,440
I mean, with theories, we tend to give reasons for believing theories rather than proofs of theories.

204
00:21:37,440 --> 00:21:43,160
We hope to find proofs, but we're not always successful. There's no common failure.

205
00:21:43,160 --> 00:21:48,030
It's completely remembering things.

206
00:21:48,030 --> 00:21:51,900
No, they have to be reminded by the things that they see in this world. Yes.

207
00:21:51,900 --> 00:22:00,580
No, they can't think of it without being reminded. But that's reasonable, as we'll see in a minute and a minute.

208
00:22:00,580 --> 00:22:08,820
Carburettor, for example, subsequent to Plato, carburettor, feminism amongst them.

209
00:22:08,820 --> 00:22:15,190
Okay. Just the same way this lady did explain, read by description a carburettors.

210
00:22:15,190 --> 00:22:19,530
Actually, I've no idea what a carburettor is. Platers theory.

211
00:22:19,530 --> 00:22:29,490
We have encountered only we. Well, okay. Think of unicorn. You certainly haven't come across any unicorns, but you've still got the concept unicorn.

212
00:22:29,490 --> 00:22:40,490
So how do you how would Plato explain your acquisition of the concept unicorn, assuming that there isn't a form of a unicorn?

213
00:22:40,490 --> 00:22:44,970
Come on. I was wrong. You couldn't disagree.

214
00:22:44,970 --> 00:22:48,770
That's right. You come back to my previous question.

215
00:22:48,770 --> 00:22:52,770
Can I come back to you in a second? I have not forgotten this question.

216
00:22:52,770 --> 00:22:59,780
What was it like, unicorn? Don't be a fool. You know what?

217
00:22:59,780 --> 00:23:04,160
That's a good question. Okay. Unicorns don't exist, do they?

218
00:23:04,160 --> 00:23:09,710
But how can you think about a unicorn if they don't exist? Somebody.

219
00:23:09,710 --> 00:23:14,900
And how did they imagine it? Remember what I said about concepts.

220
00:23:14,900 --> 00:23:19,160
Pull them apart. We've seen pictures so perceived.

221
00:23:19,160 --> 00:23:28,950
We've seen pictures. We haven't perceived a unicorn, though. We've perceived the combination of horse white porn, whatever.

222
00:23:28,950 --> 00:23:33,240
Unicorns have wings. They don't, do they? That's Pegasus, right.

223
00:23:33,240 --> 00:23:38,850
Okay. So what we've seen is the. Now think back to Democritus and the atoms.

224
00:23:38,850 --> 00:23:44,390
Okay. We can't think of anything that we haven't come across, you might think.

225
00:23:44,390 --> 00:23:51,770
But what we can do is we can take the bits of what we have come across and re combine them in various ways.

226
00:23:51,770 --> 00:23:57,020
So you've come across birds that fly and you've come across me because you're looking at me right now.

227
00:23:57,020 --> 00:24:03,160
You can now imagine that I could fly. I hope. I can imagine that I can fly.

228
00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:08,900
Sadly, I can't do it, but. So what we're doing is we see the forms, the form.

229
00:24:08,900 --> 00:24:14,300
There are only forms of the simple things and you put those back together again.

230
00:24:14,300 --> 00:24:21,290
But Aristotle had a completely different understanding of this. Aristotle completely rejected the platonic forms.

231
00:24:21,290 --> 00:24:25,940
He argued that we don't need to postulate such.

232
00:24:25,940 --> 00:24:29,900
I mean, going back to the question I asked earlier. What's wrong with this theory?

233
00:24:29,900 --> 00:24:34,790
Well, one thing that's wrong with it is its ontology. Okay?

234
00:24:34,790 --> 00:24:44,750
Ontology is a section of metaphysics. Metaphysics is to do with the nature of things, what there is and what its nature is.

235
00:24:44,750 --> 00:24:49,520
And ontology is your list of things that exist.

236
00:24:49,520 --> 00:24:55,620
So who believes in ghosts here? Oh, you've got no imagination, any of you.

237
00:24:55,620 --> 00:25:05,020
All right. Somebody over here. Okay. If you believe in ghosts, your ontology has things like chairs, people, glasses, necklaces, ghosts on it.

238
00:25:05,020 --> 00:25:09,550
If you believe in God. God's on it. If you believe in fairies, fairies are on it and so on.

239
00:25:09,550 --> 00:25:18,100
That's your list of what there is. And Aristotle says the thing about Plato's theory is it explodes your ontology.

240
00:25:18,100 --> 00:25:24,280
Not only is there redness, which is a colour, there is also the form of red.

241
00:25:24,280 --> 00:25:29,970
So we're doubling everything up. And so have you heard of a chap called Ockham?

242
00:25:29,970 --> 00:25:34,960
What's Ockham famous for? His razor Ozcan, who wasn't born then, of course.

243
00:25:34,960 --> 00:25:40,150
Or even sort of would have said, we've just got to slash through this ontology.

244
00:25:40,150 --> 00:25:47,140
We mustn't postulate entities that we can x that are not needed for explanation.

245
00:25:47,140 --> 00:25:54,490
And Aristotle thought, well, we can understand words and form concepts and so on because we see commonalities.

246
00:25:54,490 --> 00:25:59,320
Sameness is similarities between objects that exist.

247
00:25:59,320 --> 00:26:13,890
So instead of redness being a form up there that you were new before birth, as Plato said, redness is a commonality between different objects.

248
00:26:13,890 --> 00:26:22,150
Much simpler, isn't it? And if that explains our understanding the word red, why should we accept Plato's theory?

249
00:26:22,150 --> 00:26:24,340
Because that one's much simpler,

250
00:26:24,340 --> 00:26:31,360
doesn't require us to postulate anything that is other than the things we can see in front of us, things we can touch.

251
00:26:31,360 --> 00:26:44,010
But let me ask you a question to distinguish between these two theories. If redness didn't exist, could you still have the concept of red?

252
00:26:44,010 --> 00:26:47,810
If you were. If retina's didn't exist at all.

253
00:26:47,810 --> 00:26:57,660
Could we still have the concept of it? And whose theory does that favour Aristotle?

254
00:26:57,660 --> 00:27:06,440
Yeah. Okay, so you only want Plato if you don't think Aristotle's theory can explain everything now.

255
00:27:06,440 --> 00:27:15,860
There are some concepts and we'll get onto them in a minute that are very difficult to explain in terms of commonalities between things.

256
00:27:15,860 --> 00:27:23,840
So any concept we have that can't be explained in that way might take us back towards Plato's theory.

257
00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:32,090
Do you see why? Because if you have two theories, one of which is much simpler than the other, you definitely go for the simpler one.

258
00:27:32,090 --> 00:27:36,830
But only if it can actually explain everything you want to explain.

259
00:27:36,830 --> 00:27:42,800
If in order to explain everything you need to appeal to the richer one, then you have to go for the richer one.

260
00:27:42,800 --> 00:27:47,110
It's no good having a theory that doesn't explain anything, is it?

261
00:27:47,110 --> 00:27:52,050
This is a theory. Who's speaking the other?

262
00:27:52,050 --> 00:27:57,920
That requires you to decide that you can exist before you born.

263
00:27:57,920 --> 00:28:00,320
Well, it doesn't require you to decide.

264
00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:13,070
It does say because any theory you postulate, whether it's scientific or philosophical, will have various ramifications.

265
00:28:13,070 --> 00:28:20,750
I mean, it might postulate theoretical entities like forms or notice that Aristotle does postulate something.

266
00:28:20,750 --> 00:28:29,870
He postulates the existence of what objects, certainly, but also something else.

267
00:28:29,870 --> 00:28:34,790
No other commonalities. Who said that?

268
00:28:34,790 --> 00:28:40,460
Absolutely right. He postulates commonalities, universals, in other words, properties.

269
00:28:40,460 --> 00:28:46,070
Now, that's a huge question in philosophy as to whether universals actually exist.

270
00:28:46,070 --> 00:28:51,700
Are there both properties. Sorry. Objects and things that have properties.

271
00:28:51,700 --> 00:29:04,090
Sorry. And the properties or are there only objects and relations between them is not an object abstract.

272
00:29:04,090 --> 00:29:18,790
Ah, okay. Abstract objects. I mean to suggest that you must be able to see things, you see the commonality at least or perceived as truth or love.

273
00:29:18,790 --> 00:29:23,930
Loyalty is my master. So I wonder if you would.

274
00:29:23,930 --> 00:29:30,310
Well a commonality actually a truth is a commonality between sentences isn't it.

275
00:29:30,310 --> 00:29:36,510
There are some sentences that are true and others that aren't. OK, let's move on from Plato and Aristotle.

276
00:29:36,510 --> 00:29:41,600
Are we going to get lost? But we're not going to leave this subject because we're going to move.

277
00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:45,170
We've come quite a few centuries on now.

278
00:29:45,170 --> 00:29:53,970
We're going to talk about the rationalists and the empiricists noticed that the empiricists were all British locked, Berkeley and Hume.

279
00:29:53,970 --> 00:29:57,650
Is that jingoistic little cheer? No. Okay.

280
00:29:57,650 --> 00:30:00,950
The rationalists. Descartes lied. Nitzan Spinoza.

281
00:30:00,950 --> 00:30:09,050
The difference between these two sets of philosophers is that the rationalists believe that many of our concepts are innate.

282
00:30:09,050 --> 00:30:20,780
In other words, we're born with them. Whereas the empiricists believe that all concepts come from experience, that we're born as blank slates.

283
00:30:20,780 --> 00:30:28,490
You've probably heard that that's saying so. Okay, let's think about this for a minute.

284
00:30:28,490 --> 00:30:33,310
First of all. Can you tie these people up with Plato and Aristotle?

285
00:30:33,310 --> 00:30:37,790
Who do you think the rationalists are more like Plato? Yeah, absolutely.

286
00:30:37,790 --> 00:30:43,190
Plato said that we're born with the memory of the forms.

287
00:30:43,190 --> 00:30:51,980
The rationalist didn't say women. We remember the forms, but they do say that when we are born, our mind is already stocked.

288
00:30:51,980 --> 00:30:59,990
Now there are different sorts of rationalists and instantly there are some modern philosophers, Chuck Kofoed or for example,

289
00:30:59,990 --> 00:31:07,610
who actually thinks that we are born these days with the concept of car berretta and feminism.

290
00:31:07,610 --> 00:31:11,740
What? No, no, you didn't to me. I did.

291
00:31:11,740 --> 00:31:17,450
Yeah, I got that one. Okay. But the idea is we're born with knowledge.

292
00:31:17,450 --> 00:31:21,890
We've already got some knowledge of what some things are and concepts that are

293
00:31:21,890 --> 00:31:28,970
candidates for things like that are concepts like causality or rationality.

294
00:31:28,970 --> 00:31:35,630
So let's take causality. This is something that Hume famously talked about.

295
00:31:35,630 --> 00:31:41,810
If you're a rationalist, you believe that the concept of cause is a concept you're born with.

296
00:31:41,810 --> 00:31:47,000
If you're an empiricist, you think that all your concepts come from experience.

297
00:31:47,000 --> 00:31:55,280
Therefore, you must have some experience of causation that gives you your concept of causation.

298
00:31:55,280 --> 00:31:59,720
Can you think of what your experience of causation might be?

299
00:31:59,720 --> 00:32:05,520
Can anyone tell me what your experience of causation might be?

300
00:32:05,520 --> 00:32:16,760
These very difficult questions and. I don't think there's some.

301
00:32:16,760 --> 00:32:23,090
Actually, that's a complicated one, because you might want to say that that's a reason rather than a cause.

302
00:32:23,090 --> 00:32:29,330
Actually, I don't. I think it is a cause. But can I leave that on one side and think about causation?

303
00:32:29,330 --> 00:32:37,490
Not involving us. How about one billiard ball rolling into another and the other rolls off?

304
00:32:37,490 --> 00:32:44,340
This is the. Okay. Do you experience causation when that happens?

305
00:32:44,340 --> 00:32:56,450
Do you experienced do you see or otherwise experience the causal relation between the billiard balls here or not?

306
00:32:56,450 --> 00:33:01,310
To you who said no? Why not?

307
00:33:01,310 --> 00:33:07,370
Because you don't just say good.

308
00:33:07,370 --> 00:33:15,890
That's right, isn't it? What you actually see is one event, which is a ball rolling and it's touching another.

309
00:33:15,890 --> 00:33:23,480
And the other ball going off. Now, if you didn't know that there was force involved there.

310
00:33:23,480 --> 00:33:37,900
Could you work it out from what you saw? Could you put your hands up if you think you can't?

311
00:33:37,900 --> 00:33:46,530
If you could feel it? Yes. Well, that's why I wanted to use an example that we weren't actually involved in.

312
00:33:46,530 --> 00:33:51,650
OK. Two billiard balls. So think about this. You would have called this a necessary connexion.

313
00:33:51,650 --> 00:33:56,650
He said the idea of causation involves firstly events.

314
00:33:56,650 --> 00:34:04,990
So the relator of the causal relation are events. And one event happens before another event.

315
00:34:04,990 --> 00:34:10,750
OK. And it's the event before that's the cause. So there's temporal priority.

316
00:34:10,750 --> 00:34:18,240
There's spatial contiguity. OK. One billiard ball must actually hit the other before the other rolls off.

317
00:34:18,240 --> 00:34:22,840
But then there's something else, isn't there? And this is something else is says Hume.

318
00:34:22,840 --> 00:34:28,450
Necessary connexion. When you see one billiard ball hitting another.

319
00:34:28,450 --> 00:34:35,830
The reason you think that one event causes the other event, you think the first what happens?

320
00:34:35,830 --> 00:34:40,240
The second would not have happened either. Is that right?

321
00:34:40,240 --> 00:34:50,530
Okay. Let me say that again, because that's a counterfactual. Had the first event not occurred, the second event would not have occurred either.

322
00:34:50,530 --> 00:34:58,030
Now, that's a claim not about this world, because in this world, that event did happen and so did the other.

323
00:34:58,030 --> 00:35:01,810
It's a claim about all possible worlds.

324
00:35:01,810 --> 00:35:11,960
In other words, there is no world in which that second event would have happened without that first event having happened.

325
00:35:11,960 --> 00:35:21,230
Does that make sense? So what you're seeing, if you're claiming to be able to see that, is a necessary connexion,

326
00:35:21,230 --> 00:35:28,070
a connexion between types of events that covers all sorts of different possible worlds.

327
00:35:28,070 --> 00:35:33,950
How can you see that? I don't believe you. I don't think you can see that at all.

328
00:35:33,950 --> 00:35:43,610
I think that this is your theory of causation. In other words, we're suggesting that causation is a theoretical relation.

329
00:35:43,610 --> 00:35:52,550
So if you think those of you know anything about the Higgs bows on the accelerator in CERN, the Higgs Posen on is a theoretical particle.

330
00:35:52,550 --> 00:35:56,060
It's a particle that's postulated within a theory.

331
00:35:56,060 --> 00:36:02,600
The theory says that if you do this, you will see the Higgs pose or at least see traces of the Higgs boson.

332
00:36:02,600 --> 00:36:09,690
And if we do, that will confirm the theory. And we're so sure of the theory, we're spending millions of pounds to test it.

333
00:36:09,690 --> 00:36:16,620
Well, in this case, we're saying the theoretical relation is causation.

334
00:36:16,620 --> 00:36:21,920
We know we don't actually see causation. We postulate it.

335
00:36:21,920 --> 00:36:25,470
OK, one question over here. Sorry.

336
00:36:25,470 --> 00:36:43,590
Can you speak up the and it changes taking place and the consequence of something course the consequence of telling us something before.

337
00:36:43,590 --> 00:36:51,030
Well, no, because you could believe with Liben, it's that there's no such thing as causation.

338
00:36:51,030 --> 00:36:58,650
But what you have instead is lots of events that happen that are quite separate from each other and don't causally interact at all,

339
00:36:58,650 --> 00:37:03,870
but which are arranged in such a way that we can predict them.

340
00:37:03,870 --> 00:37:08,570
OK. That's what life it's thought. Yeah, it's a theory.

341
00:37:08,570 --> 00:37:12,590
It's actually quite a convincing theory if you read like Nitz, but I'm not going to tell you.

342
00:37:12,590 --> 00:37:22,640
Take us too long. The continuity. It was five long way away.

343
00:37:22,640 --> 00:37:37,560
Yes, but does that mean there's nothing in between? Well, something has to be touching, actually.

344
00:37:37,560 --> 00:37:43,620
I mean, this is open to question now the question of whether there is action that Haddix distance is disputed.

345
00:37:43,620 --> 00:37:52,750
But why does the moon cause the tides to change? Can anyone tell us gravity?

346
00:37:52,750 --> 00:38:00,930
Yeah. OK. Well, also so we've got one here.

347
00:38:00,930 --> 00:38:03,390
We have this concept causation.

348
00:38:03,390 --> 00:38:15,670
The concept involves several things that we can see and experience and this strange force or necessary connexion that we don't seem to be able to see.

349
00:38:15,670 --> 00:38:29,860
This is the empiricists or the rationalists who are winning on causation, the concept of causation, doing it with me.

350
00:38:29,860 --> 00:38:35,580
Ah, that's different. Okay, we've got here a concept that we seem to have.

351
00:38:35,580 --> 00:38:41,820
Okay, it's not a problem. So if we have it, it must come from experience according to the empiricists.

352
00:38:41,820 --> 00:38:47,240
But what I'm asking you is, can you experience necessary connexion?

353
00:38:47,240 --> 00:38:53,770
Can you experience it to be the case that had the first ball not hit the second ball?

354
00:38:53,770 --> 00:38:59,300
The second ball would not have run off. Do you experience that or not?

355
00:38:59,300 --> 00:39:10,220
You don't do. Who's winning? The rationalists say, yes, sir.

356
00:39:10,220 --> 00:39:15,680
Yeah, that's not what I'm asking. Let me ask you again. No. Come on, let's be precise here.

357
00:39:15,680 --> 00:39:20,990
Had the first ball not hit it, the second ball would not have rolled off.

358
00:39:20,990 --> 00:39:28,570
That's causation, isn't it? Okay. Do you see? That had the first ball not hit it.

359
00:39:28,570 --> 00:39:33,900
The second ball would not have rolled off. You see that, right?

360
00:39:33,900 --> 00:39:38,200
Yes, we are actually watching. Yes. Right.

361
00:39:38,200 --> 00:39:39,040
I don't think you can.

362
00:39:39,040 --> 00:39:44,980
And I think you should think about that, because what you're seeing and seeing that is things in different possible worlds, not in this world.

363
00:39:44,980 --> 00:39:50,140
You're seeing had the ball not hit it. But of course, the ball did hit it, didn't it?

364
00:39:50,140 --> 00:39:55,870
So in this world, you haven't got a situation in which the ball didn't hit.

365
00:39:55,870 --> 00:40:04,270
And therefore the ball didn't go off. You can instantly if you don't see causation in one instance.

366
00:40:04,270 --> 00:40:10,240
Can we see it in 100? So you might say, well, okay, it's not the first.

367
00:40:10,240 --> 00:40:14,740
I don't see causation the first time it happens. You know, the ball hits full of rolls off.

368
00:40:14,740 --> 00:40:20,020
But when I see this happen all the time, then I see causation.

369
00:40:20,020 --> 00:40:28,030
Can I see in the hundred instance something I can't see in one see goods?

370
00:40:28,030 --> 00:40:34,900
And that's exactly what Hume says. Hume. Now, look, if you're an empiricist here, you've got two ways of going here.

371
00:40:34,900 --> 00:40:41,440
So you've claimed that all concepts come from experience. You found a concept that apparently doesn't come from experience.

372
00:40:41,440 --> 00:40:50,680
What are you going to claim? Sorry, you could claim you do experience it only when some people do claim that.

373
00:40:50,680 --> 00:40:57,370
But you could also claim that there's no such thing as causation. And that's exactly what Hume claims.

374
00:40:57,370 --> 00:41:04,600
What Hume claimed is that causation is an idea in our minds.

375
00:41:04,600 --> 00:41:10,960
It's the expectation we form when we've seen a hundred billiard balls hit each other

376
00:41:10,960 --> 00:41:15,490
and roll off and we still haven't seen causation because if you don't see it in one,

377
00:41:15,490 --> 00:41:25,210
you don't see it in one hundred either. But what we do form is a amental expectation that if a billiard ball hits, the other one will go off.

378
00:41:25,210 --> 00:41:31,930
And to Hume, that was all that causation is. There's no relation in the world of causation.

379
00:41:31,930 --> 00:41:36,880
No force. All there is is an expectation in our minds.

380
00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:42,280
We project onto the world. This expectation. That's what causation is.

381
00:41:42,280 --> 00:41:49,030
Who's winning the rationalists or the empiricists? Right.

382
00:41:49,030 --> 00:41:54,250
No wonder the empiricists were British. I think it's got to be the rationalists at this point.

383
00:41:54,250 --> 00:41:59,050
Unless you're prepared to believe there isn't any such thing as causation.

384
00:41:59,050 --> 00:42:05,800
You're prepared to believe that tied to a actually, I'm not knocking that there are quite a few people who do believe that likeness is one of them,

385
00:42:05,800 --> 00:42:15,850
which is interesting, given that he's a rationalist. Yeah, well, now, that's an interesting question.

386
00:42:15,850 --> 00:42:20,920
Okay, let's pick up what the lady at the back said. Well, we ourselves are involved.

387
00:42:20,920 --> 00:42:28,880
Okay, look, I'm moving this junk here. Now I can feel that force, Kantai.

388
00:42:28,880 --> 00:42:36,490
Okay. I can experience the fact that I'm having an effect on the world, but I had a reason for doing that.

389
00:42:36,490 --> 00:42:43,880
Okay. It was to show you that I can move something, too, and and have an experience.

390
00:42:43,880 --> 00:42:48,520
Was my action caused or was it reasons?

391
00:42:48,520 --> 00:42:53,740
Was it a rational action, one that I performed for a reason?

392
00:42:53,740 --> 00:43:04,690
The other concept that the rationalists say can't be explained except through an innate concept is the concept of reason.

393
00:43:04,690 --> 00:43:10,070
How do I form the idea of of a reasoned.

394
00:43:10,070 --> 00:43:15,350
Where do we get the idea of rationality? I don't see your reasons for acting, do I?

395
00:43:15,350 --> 00:43:20,570
I see what you do, but I can't see your reasons for doing them.

396
00:43:20,570 --> 00:43:28,700
And how could I have a concept of my own reasons for acting unless I have a concept of your reasons for acting?

397
00:43:28,700 --> 00:43:36,590
If we assume that a reason is a theoretical concept that I apply in explanation of your behaviour.

398
00:43:36,590 --> 00:43:42,140
Actually, I lost myself in that sentence, so I probably lost you, too. Shall we start again?

399
00:43:42,140 --> 00:43:45,800
Okay. Right.

400
00:43:45,800 --> 00:43:52,580
If you remember, we're looking at Plato and Aristotle and the question we were posing ourself is where do we get concepts from?

401
00:43:52,580 --> 00:43:56,660
How do we acquire knowledge of the meaning of a word?

402
00:43:56,660 --> 00:44:03,020
If you explain knowledge of a meaning of word in terms of a concept, then it just pushes the question back.

403
00:44:03,020 --> 00:44:07,340
One. What's a concept and where do we get concepts from?

404
00:44:07,340 --> 00:44:16,100
Plato says we recognise the forms or rather we contemplate the forms before birth and then after birth,

405
00:44:16,100 --> 00:44:21,020
we're reminded of these forms in instances we see around ourselves.

406
00:44:21,020 --> 00:44:28,160
Aristotle says there's nothing before birth. We we come into being is a blank slate.

407
00:44:28,160 --> 00:44:33,650
We see instances and that is the forming of a concept, rationalist and empiricists.

408
00:44:33,650 --> 00:44:37,790
Here they are hundreds of years later, still quarrelling about the same thing.

409
00:44:37,790 --> 00:44:39,260
And you better believe it.

410
00:44:39,260 --> 00:44:46,250
We're still quarrelling about it because there is still rationalism and there is still empiricists and it hasn't been decided at all.

411
00:44:46,250 --> 00:44:56,570
The rationalist Descartes, Liveness and Spinoza were really only quarrelling now about key concepts like causation, rationality.

412
00:44:56,570 --> 00:45:02,090
Space is another one. Actually, space is quite a good one.

413
00:45:02,090 --> 00:45:08,600
Do you think that when a baby is born as it first starts to to experience things?

414
00:45:08,600 --> 00:45:15,540
Does it experience things at a distance or does it experience everything in two dimensions?

415
00:45:15,540 --> 00:45:21,560
And it's only as it starts to move that it puts together things at a distance.

416
00:45:21,560 --> 00:45:27,770
So here you are. You're a baby. You're lying in your cot. You see this two dimensional array.

417
00:45:27,770 --> 00:45:31,910
There's the bars we know. The bars, the cot in your mother's face and so on and so forth.

418
00:45:31,910 --> 00:45:38,420
But all the baby sees is this two dimensional array. But it's moving its limbs like this.

419
00:45:38,420 --> 00:45:43,250
And at one point it hits out and something goes out.

420
00:45:43,250 --> 00:45:54,190
Now the baby starts to correlate the owl with that bit of the two dimensional array and its movement like that.

421
00:45:54,190 --> 00:46:00,650
And it soon starts to learn that actually, in order to touch something that looks like that, I've got to move like this.

422
00:46:00,650 --> 00:46:08,060
Do this. And if I touch you hard enough, you'll go out. Or you might say, if I say say something when I touch you.

423
00:46:08,060 --> 00:46:12,290
Well, let's say it works. But you see,

424
00:46:12,290 --> 00:46:25,400
I could either be born seeing things at a distance or I could construct my concept of space from the experience of correlating what I see,

425
00:46:25,400 --> 00:46:32,550
how I move and what I hear, touch, etc.

426
00:46:32,550 --> 00:46:41,180
Maybe more fully. Fully.

427
00:46:41,180 --> 00:46:57,230
Oh, yes, I read about it. Yeah. Well, that's one argument for that would be rationalism, that there's some sort of innate fear of falling.

428
00:46:57,230 --> 00:47:01,130
Okay. Let's move on from sorry. This is a wimp.

429
00:47:01,130 --> 00:47:05,720
If you want to know more about these people, you're gonna have to come and do some lectures. Right.

430
00:47:05,720 --> 00:47:13,150
Let's move on to something completely different. Let's move on to ethics or ethics and politics.

431
00:47:13,150 --> 00:47:16,850
Okay. The Utilitarians and the de ontologies,

432
00:47:16,850 --> 00:47:26,570
it's the Utilitarians believes that the right action is the action that produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

433
00:47:26,570 --> 00:47:30,770
Okay. Let's think about this. What does this mean?

434
00:47:30,770 --> 00:47:35,610
This means that, okay, if we're looking at what is it for something to be right.

435
00:47:35,610 --> 00:47:39,530
Okay. What is it for an action to be the morally right action?

436
00:47:39,530 --> 00:47:44,780
Utilitarians say look for the action that produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

437
00:47:44,780 --> 00:47:54,080
And that will be the right action. Okay. What do people think about that theory?

438
00:47:54,080 --> 00:47:59,630
It's certainly true. We've got to start defining things because what is happiness?

439
00:47:59,630 --> 00:48:06,480
There's a question for you. What is happiness? Anyone want to have a go at that?

440
00:48:06,480 --> 00:48:11,100
I can't I can't resist this. We're having a romp. So I'm going to do it anyway.

441
00:48:11,100 --> 00:48:16,860
Okay. Two theories about happiness. One of them is that it's a subjective experience.

442
00:48:16,860 --> 00:48:27,120
Okay. A certain feeling. And the other is that it's both a certain feeling and the beliefs that cause that feeling.

443
00:48:27,120 --> 00:48:31,320
OK, so the beliefs that caused the feeling must be true. Here's an amazing answer.

444
00:48:31,320 --> 00:48:34,660
You think you believe yourself to be very happily married. Okay.

445
00:48:34,660 --> 00:48:46,200
Your your delirious, everything's going well for you, etc. Then you discover that your partner, your spouse has been playing away.

446
00:48:46,200 --> 00:48:51,570
Okay. Has that taken away the happiness you had before?

447
00:48:51,570 --> 00:49:01,680
In other words, were you happy and then you stopped being happy when you learnt this, or were you not happy all along?

448
00:49:01,680 --> 00:49:05,760
Put up your hands if you think that you were happy before and you're not.

449
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:15,270
Now. OK. Anyone prepared to take the Aristotelian view pop for me?

450
00:49:15,270 --> 00:49:18,960
No. You've got no no courage.

451
00:49:18,960 --> 00:49:25,050
Okay. That actually to a concept.

452
00:49:25,050 --> 00:49:30,810
I mean, there isn't one unitary thing, which is what people understand as being happen.

453
00:49:30,810 --> 00:49:35,880
It's not true. Think about it. I mean, there are lots of things that make us happy.

454
00:49:35,880 --> 00:49:44,730
No, I would say I mean, happiness can be, for instance, a temporary experience, a sense of joy.

455
00:49:44,730 --> 00:49:53,280
Well, that's what I'm talking about is a subjective experience. It can also be a general contentment.

456
00:49:53,280 --> 00:49:57,060
Okay, well, I'm putting those together. Business. Yeah.

457
00:49:57,060 --> 00:50:00,780
Contentment. Long term. OK.

458
00:50:00,780 --> 00:50:04,700
Different from feeling elated. Enjoy it.

459
00:50:04,700 --> 00:50:08,430
OK. But do you see that there's a subjective experience in both of them.

460
00:50:08,430 --> 00:50:11,520
Let me put the Aristotelian question to you another way.

461
00:50:11,520 --> 00:50:21,510
You see, Aristotle comes up everywhere and let's say that some famous scientist comes to the government,

462
00:50:21,510 --> 00:50:31,020
comes the prime minister, and says, I have a machine such that if we attach everybody to it, they will become deliriously happy.

463
00:50:31,020 --> 00:50:35,850
We can either let them off the machine every now and again so that they can do things

464
00:50:35,850 --> 00:50:40,200
that can keep people alive or we can leave a few of them off the machines permanently,

465
00:50:40,200 --> 00:50:43,200
do all the stuff and leave everyone else attached to the machine.

466
00:50:43,200 --> 00:50:50,940
Now, if you were a utilitarian prime minister, ought you to say yes to attaching everyone to this machine?

467
00:50:50,940 --> 00:50:57,540
Okay. Now, let's say that this machine causes you to believe that you're doing things like going to philosophy lectures,

468
00:50:57,540 --> 00:51:01,320
listening to people talk about philosophy.

469
00:51:01,320 --> 00:51:07,530
I don't know what else is seeing your grandchildren or making weddings for your children, all that sort of thing.

470
00:51:07,530 --> 00:51:12,360
Okay, so you believe that you've had the sort of life let's make it exactly your sort of life.

471
00:51:12,360 --> 00:51:18,830
These are the beliefs you have. But actually, all you've ever done is be attached to this machine.

472
00:51:18,830 --> 00:51:23,420
Okay. Because that's making you happier than anything else would.

473
00:51:23,420 --> 00:51:27,610
Are you happy? Who thinks you are.

474
00:51:27,610 --> 00:51:31,980
Happy. Oh, well done.

475
00:51:31,980 --> 00:51:33,900
OK. Only two of you now.

476
00:51:33,900 --> 00:51:44,220
But listen, if happiness is nothing other than a subjective feeling in your own head, you must be happy because you've got that.

477
00:51:44,220 --> 00:51:52,040
New, so those of you who thought that happiness was a subjective feeling inside your own head ought to be putting your hands up here.

478
00:51:52,040 --> 00:51:55,910
If you're going to be consistent. But actually, none of us believe that you are.

479
00:51:55,910 --> 00:52:01,400
I'm sorry to have you believe that you would be happy under that circumstance.

480
00:52:01,400 --> 00:52:03,440
Of course it does. And that's what we're actually doing.

481
00:52:03,440 --> 00:52:11,330
These thought experiments are precisely designed to test what happiness is or what you understand by the word happiness.

482
00:52:11,330 --> 00:52:20,120
I'm with our Sutil on this one. I think that if you were attached the happiness happiness machine, you would falsely believe you were happy,

483
00:52:20,120 --> 00:52:29,230
but you wouldn't be happy because happiness involves the truth of the beliefs on which your happiness is based.

484
00:52:29,230 --> 00:52:37,650
Okay, that's Aristotle, you element the judgement average.

485
00:52:37,650 --> 00:52:42,090
Yes. As I said when we moved, I mean, we all romping through.

486
00:52:42,090 --> 00:52:50,940
Yeah, we've been doing metaphysics and epistemology and philosophy of language and we're now doing ethics and political philosophy.

487
00:52:50,940 --> 00:52:56,210
OK. 18TH century. No,

488
00:52:56,210 --> 00:53:03,350
I'm just at random picking out things that I think you'll find interesting

489
00:53:03,350 --> 00:53:08,300
because my job is to enthuse you with the idea that philosophy is a good thing.

490
00:53:08,300 --> 00:53:13,740
So this is entirely arbitrary, the choice. I'm choosing things because I think you'll enjoy them.

491
00:53:13,740 --> 00:53:20,240
Actually, philosophy is quite hard work, as you might have already discovered. You have to do a lot of thinking.

492
00:53:20,240 --> 00:53:24,920
But yet we've moved to ethics here, ethics and politics. OK.

493
00:53:24,920 --> 00:53:30,860
That's the utilitarian and the right action is the action that produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

494
00:53:30,860 --> 00:53:36,910
And you said, what's happiness? And we then dive, digressed for ten minutes on what happiness is.

495
00:53:36,910 --> 00:53:41,390
So I couldn't resist it. It's a good one, that one, isn't it? Let's go back.

496
00:53:41,390 --> 00:53:47,450
This is the right action. The one that produces the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

497
00:53:47,450 --> 00:53:55,750
Why not? Can anyone think of a counterexample? For example, people if you took a poll.

498
00:53:55,750 --> 00:54:00,640
Right. And that's the greatest number of things.

499
00:54:00,640 --> 00:54:10,070
You could make them happy. Okay. You could say that to bring back happy hanging would make more people happy than not.

500
00:54:10,070 --> 00:54:17,210
Does that make it right? Well, if you're a utilitarian, you would presumably have to say that it would.

501
00:54:17,210 --> 00:54:22,790
But if you don't say that your you might prefer to be a day ontologies, a day ontologies.

502
00:54:22,790 --> 00:54:28,040
Is someone who says that there is something called the moral law.

503
00:54:28,040 --> 00:54:32,300
And the right action is that which accords with the moral law.

504
00:54:32,300 --> 00:54:39,020
So you might say, let's take an example like.

505
00:54:39,020 --> 00:54:45,800
There's a sheriff in a western town, I hate this example, but it happens to have come to mind, so go on with it.

506
00:54:45,800 --> 00:54:52,310
There's been some raping and pillaging around this town and everyone's very upset and there's bound to be riots and so on.

507
00:54:52,310 --> 00:54:57,800
And you have in your cells a tramp who doesn't have any family.

508
00:54:57,800 --> 00:55:02,440
He's very depressed. He wants to die. And you think I.

509
00:55:02,440 --> 00:55:09,170
I know. Sorry. I've got to write in to the person who's been perpetrating these rate rapes has died.

510
00:55:09,170 --> 00:55:15,830
And you can't prove that. But what you do think is if I hang this tramp, I'm giving him what he wants, he's gonna be happy.

511
00:55:15,830 --> 00:55:22,220
I'm giving everyone else what they want. I'm going to say he committed the rapes and I'm going to hang him.

512
00:55:22,220 --> 00:55:28,310
It's going to make everyone happy. Should I do it? Should I hang an innocent man?

513
00:55:28,310 --> 00:55:33,020
No. Okay. So utilitarianism has got to be wrong.

514
00:55:33,020 --> 00:55:43,880
What are we going on? Always saying thou shalt not kill an innocent person.

515
00:55:43,880 --> 00:55:49,260
Don't get me on to that. The moral law is universal. That would be the idea.

516
00:55:49,260 --> 00:55:53,400
It pertains to everyone whether they know it or not.

517
00:55:53,400 --> 00:56:04,670
Okay. Whether they believe it or not. Many would not be true happiness based on the death.

518
00:56:04,670 --> 00:56:08,470
You mean if they knew that he was innocent, they wouldn't be happy? It's certainly true.

519
00:56:08,470 --> 00:56:12,200
You're right. You've got to build in certain epistemological things.

520
00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:19,130
In other words, things to do with knowledge. Yes. If you found out that he'd hung an innocent man, you wouldn't be happy, would you?

521
00:56:19,130 --> 00:56:25,410
So you've got to write into the thought experiment that you wouldn't find out, which I agree is.

522
00:56:25,410 --> 00:56:31,340
Yes. OK. A dance ologists, the right action is that which accords with the moral law.

523
00:56:31,340 --> 00:56:39,050
Thou shalt not kill. And that looks to be the moral law on which the you shouldn't hang an innocent man is based, doesn't it?

524
00:56:39,050 --> 00:56:45,890
Well, is it true? Should you not kill? I mean, is there any circumstance in which killing would be the right thing to do?

525
00:56:45,890 --> 00:56:54,770
Do you think more? Let's let's put more on one side, because we let's look at the laws.

526
00:56:54,770 --> 00:56:58,460
You shouldn't kill an innocent in peace time, shall we? How about that?

527
00:56:58,460 --> 00:57:06,710
Is there any situation which killing an innocent in peacetime would be the right thing to do?

528
00:57:06,710 --> 00:57:20,040
All right. Let's scrub animals, too. Let's talk about human beings.

529
00:57:20,040 --> 00:57:26,310
Okay, well, we might even put that on one. I let let's make things really hard for the day ontology lists.

530
00:57:26,310 --> 00:57:34,550
I'm looking for a time when it would be right to kill a perfectly healthy, ordinary adult human being.

531
00:57:34,550 --> 00:57:39,580
Have I left anything out? Not in war time. Who is innocent?

532
00:57:39,580 --> 00:57:44,910
So it's OK. I think that counts as war.

533
00:57:44,910 --> 00:57:48,830
Actually, let me tell you, a circumstance does I think this might go on too long.

534
00:57:48,830 --> 00:57:55,700
Okay. This was a true story. There's a there was a ship that was on fire just off the coast of Australia.

535
00:57:55,700 --> 00:57:57,470
This was a few years ago.

536
00:57:57,470 --> 00:58:06,050
And the only way of saving the ship on which there were hundreds of sailors was by turning off the oxygen in the engine room,

537
00:58:06,050 --> 00:58:12,110
turning off the oxygen in an engine room and killing the four sailors who were in the engine room.

538
00:58:12,110 --> 00:58:16,700
Should the captain have turned off the oxygen in the engine room?

539
00:58:16,700 --> 00:58:25,490
Put your hands up if you think he should say yes.

540
00:58:25,490 --> 00:58:29,210
Okay. I'm amazed that not all of it usually everyone puts their hands up.

541
00:58:29,210 --> 00:58:33,680
But okay, if you think that he should kill those sailors, they're innocent.

542
00:58:33,680 --> 00:58:39,590
It's wartime. But the fact is, killing those four means saving the hundreds.

543
00:58:39,590 --> 00:58:48,650
And most people at that point swing straight into utilitarianism. Yeah, that's true.

544
00:58:48,650 --> 00:58:53,540
But the fact is, you're still killing. You're breaking the moral law.

545
00:58:53,540 --> 00:59:02,360
If that's what the moral lawyers by saying, by killing those four, in which case we're moving over to utilitarianism.

546
00:59:02,360 --> 00:59:09,830
The utilitarian thinks that the only rights that you have as a human being are not inviolable.

547
00:59:09,830 --> 00:59:14,730
In other words, that you have the rights that you have because it leads to the greatest happiness,

548
00:59:14,730 --> 00:59:19,340
the greatest number for you to be treated as if you have rights.

549
00:59:19,340 --> 00:59:26,360
But if killing you is what's going to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, then you're right.

550
00:59:26,360 --> 00:59:35,180
Disappears, okay? In fact, it becomes my duty to kill you if your life is standing in the way of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

551
00:59:35,180 --> 00:59:41,480
It's my duty to turn off the oxygen in the engine room. If that's the only way I can save the hundreds of other people.

552
00:59:41,480 --> 00:59:47,810
So what we see is, whereas the day ontology lists can recognise a right that's inviolable.

553
00:59:47,810 --> 00:59:53,120
The Utilitarians can't. For the utilitarian, it's always secondary to the great happiness to grace.

554
00:59:53,120 --> 01:00:00,020
No. Here is thinking that they're a utilitarian.

555
01:00:00,020 --> 01:00:03,050
Put your hands up. If you don't know. I've done my job, actually.

556
01:00:03,050 --> 01:00:09,740
So for example, if you hadn't turned it off, they would affect you killing everybody.

557
01:00:09,740 --> 01:00:14,680
So you'll be. Well, I wouldn't because I wouldn't have done anything, would I? Yes, why not?

558
01:00:14,680 --> 01:00:22,310
And he's not happy with the way you take your choice. Well, would you violate your moral right?

559
01:00:22,310 --> 01:00:25,850
It depends whether you think of acts and omissions as the same thing.

560
01:00:25,850 --> 01:00:29,300
Actually, if you're in day ontologies and you go for don't kill.

561
01:00:29,300 --> 01:00:40,820
You probably also have a distinction between acts and omissions where your acts can be morally culpable, but your emissions can't be.

562
01:00:40,820 --> 01:00:50,060
Which is an interesting one. Well, if you think about it, my eucalyptus tree died, it died of lack of water.

563
01:00:50,060 --> 01:00:57,900
Queen Elizabeth didn't water it. So she's to blame for the death of my eucalyptus tree.

564
01:00:57,900 --> 01:01:03,570
I mean, had she watered it, it would've lived, isn't it? Isn't that true?

565
01:01:03,570 --> 01:01:15,150
Isn't that a causal relation? Therefore, Queen Elizabeth is responsible for the death of my eucalyptus.

566
01:01:15,150 --> 01:01:19,710
That's true. But she's still responsible if you're responsible for your emissions.

567
01:01:19,710 --> 01:01:23,160
I mean, it's true. She didn't water it, isn't it? It's true.

568
01:01:23,160 --> 01:01:29,880
It's dead. Okay.

569
01:01:29,880 --> 01:01:34,900
This is not comparing like with like.

570
01:01:34,900 --> 01:01:45,980
I mean, the ontology introduced the concept that somehow you're not utilitarian.

571
01:01:45,980 --> 01:01:52,680
You know what we are discussing.

572
01:01:52,680 --> 01:01:59,280
Do you remember before we were talking about what the question was, is how do we get the meanings for all words?

573
01:01:59,280 --> 01:02:07,010
How do we form concepts? The one we're looking at here is what is it for an action to be right?

574
01:02:07,010 --> 01:02:12,710
OK. We all distinguish between actions that are right and actions that are wrong, don't we?

575
01:02:12,710 --> 01:02:20,380
That's a very human thing. Humans are moral agents. We divide the world up into things that are right and things that are wrong.

576
01:02:20,380 --> 01:02:24,830
And the thing that a philosopher wants to know is how do we do this?

577
01:02:24,830 --> 01:02:29,420
What what is it that makes an action, right? What is it that makes an action wrong?

578
01:02:29,420 --> 01:02:33,650
And these are two different theories about that.

579
01:02:33,650 --> 01:02:40,340
One theory says what makes an action, right is that it's produces the greatest happiness, the greatest number.

580
01:02:40,340 --> 01:02:46,950
And the other theory says no. What makes an action right is in effect, just that it is right.

581
01:02:46,950 --> 01:02:53,000
It's laid down by the moral law. As you say, you do see that.

582
01:02:53,000 --> 01:02:54,890
So they are talking about the same thing,

583
01:02:54,890 --> 01:03:01,710
but they are you're also right that they are different because they're giving different explanations of the same thing.

584
01:03:01,710 --> 01:03:14,470
And they're contradictory explanations, so they can't both be true then, whether the moral or moral law you said was universal once well before time.

585
01:03:14,470 --> 01:03:21,160
The moral law. The idea if you can't for free. I mean, if you're if you believe in the Ten Commandments,

586
01:03:21,160 --> 01:03:25,900
you think that the moral law comes from God and that it's revelation that tells you what it is.

587
01:03:25,900 --> 01:03:34,180
If you're a Kantian, you believe that the moral law is something that's perceived by human beings through intuition.

588
01:03:34,180 --> 01:03:39,790
In other words, we have five senses sensory that enable us to perceive the world.

589
01:03:39,790 --> 01:03:46,270
But we have another. It's not a sense, but it's it's a way of discerning what's right and wrong.

590
01:03:46,270 --> 01:03:53,590
So you actually you see something you see in action and you get a strong feeling of approbation or disapprobation.

591
01:03:53,590 --> 01:03:59,620
That's your moral intuition at work and it's your moral intuition that tells you what is and what isn't.

592
01:03:59,620 --> 01:04:11,290
The moral law, in a sense that seems to have the same difficulty as the issue about Plato in the form it's acting in an unnecessary person.

593
01:04:11,290 --> 01:04:14,480
Well, if it's on Nesson, no, hang on.

594
01:04:14,480 --> 01:04:25,450
In a sense that this so-called moral law, rather than a sixth sense or something, is derived from God, postulate something which is unnecessary.

595
01:04:25,450 --> 01:04:31,260
It could actually just come through experience and empathy.

596
01:04:31,260 --> 01:04:42,070
Yeah. Absolutely. Yeah. I mean, the moral law, you might say, okay, here's another way of looking at the moral law.

597
01:04:42,070 --> 01:04:49,070
If you think of absolutism versus relativism, the relativist says that.

598
01:04:49,070 --> 01:04:57,470
All moral truth is relative to something or other relative to an individual or relative to a community or a culture or something like that.

599
01:04:57,470 --> 01:05:07,610
Whereas the absolutists will say that there are certain things that are true everywhere for everyone at every time, whether they know it or not.

600
01:05:07,610 --> 01:05:12,700
Now, if I ask you whether your relatives saw absolutists, most of you will probably put up your hand.

601
01:05:12,700 --> 01:05:14,930
Say you're relativists.

602
01:05:14,930 --> 01:05:21,170
But what all then point out, you'll see that I'm speeding up because I've got two things to get through and it's not gonna happen.

603
01:05:21,170 --> 01:05:30,990
Okay. Here are two different sorts of moral law.

604
01:05:30,990 --> 01:05:41,400
Don't kill all. Produced the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

605
01:05:41,400 --> 01:05:47,280
Notice that you did utilitarianism is an absolutist moral creed.

606
01:05:47,280 --> 01:05:51,330
It's not a relativist moral creed. And here's the Kantian one.

607
01:05:51,330 --> 01:06:08,160
Never treat yourself or another solely as a means to your own ends run out of room.

608
01:06:08,160 --> 01:06:18,390
What can says is that the categorical imperative. The only thing that is the moral law is the claim that I must treat you as an end in yourself,

609
01:06:18,390 --> 01:06:23,910
which means I must allow you to make up your own mind about how you want to live your life.

610
01:06:23,910 --> 01:06:28,020
If I want you to carry my suitcase for me, I can ask you to do it.

611
01:06:28,020 --> 01:06:32,680
That's treating you as a means, but as if I'm allowing you to say no.

612
01:06:32,680 --> 01:06:41,720
I'm also treating you as an end. Whereas if I trick you into carrying my suitcase, I'm treating you as nothing more than a means to my end.

613
01:06:41,720 --> 01:06:51,950
It's my ends that are important. And what the Day Ontologies says is that if you're in and in yourself, you have intrinsic value.

614
01:06:51,950 --> 01:07:00,690
And in virtue of having intrinsic value, you have rights that are inviolable, that that can't be overruled.

615
01:07:00,690 --> 01:07:10,530
And that's the utilitarian won't say that because there is no such thing as a right that can't be overruled for the utilitarian.

616
01:07:10,530 --> 01:07:19,410
And just to put this in a slightly different way of looking at it, the utilitarian is thinking of actions when they think that something's right.

617
01:07:19,410 --> 01:07:28,530
They're always thinking of actions, whereas the de ontology ist are always thinking of will willing an intention.

618
01:07:28,530 --> 01:07:34,740
If you think of an action as goes back to what we're saying about reasons.

619
01:07:34,740 --> 01:07:45,330
Every action has an intention. The action itself and a consequence.

620
01:07:45,330 --> 01:07:52,620
OK, you don't get an action that is hasn't gotten intention. I mean, where you have causation, there isn't intention.

621
01:07:52,620 --> 01:08:00,630
But that when there's a reason there is intention on the utilitarians are concerned only with consequences.

622
01:08:00,630 --> 01:08:12,240
Whereas the day ontologies are concerned only with intentions. So Kant, for example, says that a good will is the only thing that's good in itself.

623
01:08:12,240 --> 01:08:17,850
OK. Consequences are only good. Secondarily. The intention is there anything that's good in itself.

624
01:08:17,850 --> 01:08:25,200
So what your job is, is to obey the moral law as you understand it sincerely.

625
01:08:25,200 --> 01:08:33,660
In other words, you mustn't be self-serving in doing that. We mustn't. Say, you know, well, lying is going to get me out of a hole here.

626
01:08:33,660 --> 01:08:37,050
Therefore, I'm going to lie. That is not the moral law. OK.

627
01:08:37,050 --> 01:08:41,980
You think, what's the right thing? What should I do here? And you do that thing.

628
01:08:41,980 --> 01:08:47,790
Okay. It's your. It's the duty that takes you into the area of morality.

629
01:08:47,790 --> 01:08:58,170
And that's another big difference between these two. But let's go back to to the core thing linking up with what this gentleman here said.

630
01:08:58,170 --> 01:09:03,750
What you've got is a question. What is it that makes an action, right?

631
01:09:03,750 --> 01:09:12,630
Or what is it that makes an action wrong? And as with any question, you're going to have postulated answers.

632
01:09:12,630 --> 01:09:20,880
People are going to put forward answers. And these are answers are theories that you're putting forward in the hope of answering your question.

633
01:09:20,880 --> 01:09:26,970
Now, once again, this is alive debate. We don't know which is the right theory.

634
01:09:26,970 --> 01:09:28,310
But there are arguments.

635
01:09:28,310 --> 01:09:36,510
I mean, I've just given you a tip of an iceberg of the arguments giving you organs for and against these two different theories.

636
01:09:36,510 --> 01:09:40,350
As a matter of fact, we have no idea which is the right theory.

637
01:09:40,350 --> 01:09:45,570
Sometimes in one situation, one theory looks right. Sometimes in another situation, another theory looks right.

638
01:09:45,570 --> 01:09:53,580
And your job as philosophers is to look at the arguments on both sides and weigh them up against each other.

639
01:09:53,580 --> 01:10:00,120
And you'll probably find, as I have over my philosophical career, I started off as a utilitarian.

640
01:10:00,120 --> 01:10:05,160
I then became a Kantian. I went back to utilitarian. I then went back to Kantian ism.

641
01:10:05,160 --> 01:10:08,760
And at the moment I have absolutely no idea,

642
01:10:08,760 --> 01:10:16,410
because the thing about the more you learn about the theory and the more you learn about how it works, the more strengths you see in it.

643
01:10:16,410 --> 01:10:22,850
So it does become actually quite difficult to decide. But at least, you know, you're not setting up straw men.

644
01:10:22,850 --> 01:10:30,210
You know, sometimes people say it's blindingly obvious that utilitarianism is wrong because of that sheriff example.

645
01:10:30,210 --> 01:10:35,020
OK. That seems pretty conclusive, didn't it? But think about utilitarianism.

646
01:10:35,020 --> 01:10:52,570
Could it justify genocide? I think you could say communism was at the time.

647
01:10:52,570 --> 01:10:58,990
Oh, yeah, absolute. Well, I mean, maybe Hitler was a good utilitarian. It's just that he didn't count Jews.

648
01:10:58,990 --> 01:11:04,470
Do you count animals? I mean, maybe our grandchildren are going to say all of us.

649
01:11:04,470 --> 01:11:08,310
Oh, they come for Sunday lunch.

650
01:11:08,310 --> 01:11:17,390
You know, it depends on who you count as a unit of or, you know, something that can have happiness if you don't count Jews than Hitler.

651
01:11:17,390 --> 01:11:29,560
You know, did he do the right thing? You know, if you don't count women, surely it's all right to abort females just because they're female and so on.

652
01:11:29,560 --> 01:11:44,920
And you said, well, now you're into the area of moral truth, which is a major area case.

653
01:11:44,920 --> 01:11:50,380
You didn't guess that. And I'll just leave you with one thought before I move on to utilitarianism.

654
01:11:50,380 --> 01:11:55,100
What's your name, sir? Michael.

655
01:11:55,100 --> 01:12:03,220
Michael. I don't think you said that first study that you were being kind to me, weren't you?

656
01:12:03,220 --> 01:12:12,150
Okay. Michael believes that Marianne is wearing black.

657
01:12:12,150 --> 01:12:16,120
Okay. There's one sentence there, isn't there?

658
01:12:16,120 --> 01:12:23,830
And then there's another sentence there. So man is wearing black is one sentence that could be true or false.

659
01:12:23,830 --> 01:12:27,800
And Michael believes that Marian is wearing black is another sentence. Right.

660
01:12:27,800 --> 01:12:34,020
Could they both be true? And that's probably the actual situation, isn't it?

661
01:12:34,020 --> 01:12:39,700
Could they both be false? No, no.

662
01:12:39,700 --> 01:12:45,990
Come on. I mean, if Michael wasn't here, he wouldn't have any beliefs about me, would he?

663
01:12:45,990 --> 01:12:52,470
So it would be false that he believes I'm wearing black. So that that what could I be wearing?

664
01:12:52,470 --> 01:12:57,200
Yellow. Right.

665
01:12:57,200 --> 01:13:01,140
Okay. Yes, I could be wearing yellow so they could both be false. Okay.

666
01:13:01,140 --> 01:13:06,300
Could that be true and that false. Yup.

667
01:13:06,300 --> 01:13:09,870
So Michael believes that Marion's wearing black. But Marion isn't wearing black.

668
01:13:09,870 --> 01:13:15,970
He's colour-blind or something. And could that be true and that false?

669
01:13:15,970 --> 01:13:22,890
Yes. OK. So it's true. Marans wearing black. But as Michael didn't turn up today, he doesn't leave on wearing black.

670
01:13:22,890 --> 01:13:33,910
OK, now let's change that to mugging elderly ladies is okay.

671
01:13:33,910 --> 01:13:40,720
OK, so we've got Michael believes that mugging elderly ladies is okay.

672
01:13:40,720 --> 01:13:46,540
What was that? Let's leave that on one side.

673
01:13:46,540 --> 01:13:51,430
We're doing logic at the moment. So we're looking at possible worlds rather than the actual one.

674
01:13:51,430 --> 01:13:55,590
Okay. We've still got one sentence within another, haven't we?

675
01:13:55,590 --> 01:14:02,380
OK. Could they both be true? Could they both be false?

676
01:14:02,380 --> 01:14:07,210
Could they both did it? We've got exactly the same possibilities, haven't we?

677
01:14:07,210 --> 01:14:14,790
The thing is that the truth of that belief, whether it's Marianne is wearing black or mugging elderly ladies is okay,

678
01:14:14,790 --> 01:14:21,100
is determined by something quite different from what determines the truth of that.

679
01:14:21,100 --> 01:14:28,770
That sentence is made true or false by Michael's beliefs, whereas that sentence is made true or false by what I'm wearing.

680
01:14:28,770 --> 01:14:33,190
Well, by whether it's okay to mug elderly ladies.

681
01:14:33,190 --> 01:14:46,430
So you've got to distinguish the epistemology. In other words, what we know or believe from the truth of our beliefs or what actually is the case.

682
01:14:46,430 --> 01:14:54,500
OK, so so you mustn't become a relativist just because you've made that logical blunder, must you?

683
01:14:54,500 --> 01:15:01,190
No, definitely not. OK. That's it. It's that sort of distinction that that philosophers have to use.

684
01:15:01,190 --> 01:15:06,260
Next week, we're going to look at logic and argument and we'll be looking very much at that sort of thing,

685
01:15:06,260 --> 01:15:12,770
because if you're not thinking clearly, you can't think about this sort of abstract thing at all.

686
01:15:12,770 --> 01:15:20,700
It's philosophers do it in the head. You know, they can't go into the into the laboratory and apply the rules of nature.

687
01:15:20,700 --> 01:15:25,160
What they're applying the whole time is the rules of logic, the laws of logic.

688
01:15:25,160 --> 01:15:30,890
And that's a good example of how logic can help you clarify something.

689
01:15:30,890 --> 01:15:36,050
Okay, let's let's move on to Vic Einstein. Okay.

690
01:15:36,050 --> 01:15:41,390
This early, it can start late. Vic Einstein. There's no such thing as Big Einstein.

691
01:15:41,390 --> 01:15:48,980
Well, there was, but, sir, he changed his mind all the time. Which, of course, is a sign of intellectual honesty.

692
01:15:48,980 --> 01:15:53,780
The early book Einstein said and noticed. We're back to the Plato Aristotle in Paris.

693
01:15:53,780 --> 01:16:00,410
This rat rationalist problem early begins. I thought words get their meaning by standing for objects.

694
01:16:00,410 --> 01:16:04,430
So what does chair mean? That.

695
01:16:04,430 --> 01:16:09,980
Okay, what does person mean that? What does purple mean that.

696
01:16:09,980 --> 01:16:25,310
And so on. And he believed that language is the reason we get meaning is we pick up something he called strict and literal truth conditions.

697
01:16:25,310 --> 01:16:29,310
Okay, we. Okay. Why do we think this.

698
01:16:29,310 --> 01:16:34,940
Let's take her. What's your name. Right at the back.

699
01:16:34,940 --> 01:16:38,920
Margaret. Let's say this is the fifth lecture.

700
01:16:38,920 --> 01:16:42,560
Margaret has come in late to every single lecture. Okay.

701
01:16:42,560 --> 01:16:46,130
So we've sorted the fifth lectures. Ten minutes into it. Door flies open.

702
01:16:46,130 --> 01:16:49,460
I say hello Margaret. Early again. Okay.

703
01:16:49,460 --> 01:16:56,540
What's the meaning of what I've said? That she's late, isn't she?

704
01:16:56,540 --> 01:17:02,480
Now, isn't that interesting? What you've got here is you all understood a certain meaning.

705
01:17:02,480 --> 01:17:09,980
But it was put in a certain context. And what you do is you took one meaning and inverted it, didn't you?

706
01:17:09,980 --> 01:17:18,140
How do you explain language, if that's what you can do? Well, here's one way you might explain it.

707
01:17:18,140 --> 01:17:26,150
Language is composed of strict and literal truth, conditions, conditions of truth and falsehood.

708
01:17:26,150 --> 01:17:33,170
So do you remember I said talking about read your teaching a child to learn the conditions under which this is read is true.

709
01:17:33,170 --> 01:17:40,430
And this is read is false. And then you say you've got esoteric sentences like this is read.

710
01:17:40,430 --> 01:17:45,830
Then you've got the work force. So you can say this is read.

711
01:17:45,830 --> 01:17:50,190
Or is this read or make that read or. So you apply a different force.

712
01:17:50,190 --> 01:17:55,300
You do something different with the sentence. Then you can add tone.

713
01:17:55,300 --> 01:18:03,620
So. Early again. Okay, the tone, the sarcasm in that case.

714
01:18:03,620 --> 01:18:10,380
But I mean, there are all sorts of other ones. I'm not angry. You see, we turned it around again.

715
01:18:10,380 --> 01:18:17,150
And in this context, you all laughed because I told you the story about Margaret coming in late every session,

716
01:18:17,150 --> 01:18:30,760
which is why when I said early again, Margaret, you you laughed. Okay, so the early Kingstone sort of thought that meaning was made up only of that.

717
01:18:30,760 --> 01:18:37,780
Okay. And what that did was link a word with an object.

718
01:18:37,780 --> 01:18:48,470
Okay. So if you go back to Atomism, the democracies and the atoms, the idea was that every word gets meaning by standing for an object.

719
01:18:48,470 --> 01:18:53,270
And Vic and I drew huge metaphysical claims from this.

720
01:18:53,270 --> 01:18:58,100
He said words get meaning well. So words have meaning.

721
01:18:58,100 --> 01:19:03,830
It's a necessary condition of words having meaning. That word stands for objects.

722
01:19:03,830 --> 01:19:11,060
Therefore, words must sorry. Objects must exist. So much for scepticism.

723
01:19:11,060 --> 01:19:15,520
That's the end of scepticism, isn't it? Words do have meaning.

724
01:19:15,520 --> 01:19:22,110
And if it's a necessary condition for words having meaning that objects exist, well, then we know that objects existed.

725
01:19:22,110 --> 01:19:27,770
They play bingo. It's good arguments, actually.

726
01:19:27,770 --> 01:19:31,550
As long as you do know that your words have meaning. But of course, if we.

727
01:19:31,550 --> 01:19:36,930
If they didn't. How would you be understanding the word that I'm saying now?

728
01:19:36,930 --> 01:19:42,410
OK. The later Vicky Einstein thought this was rubbish.

729
01:19:42,410 --> 01:19:46,700
What he thought is that words get meaning from the way they used.

730
01:19:46,700 --> 01:19:52,010
In other words. All of this is meaning. OK.

731
01:19:52,010 --> 01:19:58,310
So it isn't just that there's weak meaning and strong meaning, which is the way I put it.

732
01:19:58,310 --> 01:20:07,160
So here's a sentence. Can you read that?

733
01:20:07,160 --> 01:20:12,230
OK. James is tall, is what it says. Okay. Do you understand that sentence?

734
01:20:12,230 --> 01:20:18,680
Yeah. Okay. So it has meaning, does it? Okay. Do you know whether it's true or false.

735
01:20:18,680 --> 01:20:21,860
Why not. You don't know.

736
01:20:21,860 --> 01:20:28,550
I'm talking about do you. In fact, I'm not talking about anyone. I'm not even if there is someone called James here, I'm not talking about them.

737
01:20:28,550 --> 01:20:36,080
The thing is, this is a sentence that could be used, but it's not being used.

738
01:20:36,080 --> 01:20:42,050
Do you see what I mean? I'm talking about a sentence rather than using a sentence.

739
01:20:42,050 --> 01:20:49,460
And because I'm talking about a sentence, it doesn't actually have meaning, does it?

740
01:20:49,460 --> 01:20:58,740
It has potential meaning. Maybe so you could call that meaning the week, meaning the strict and literal meaning.

741
01:20:58,740 --> 01:21:04,110
Or you could say that that actually doesn't have meaning because it doesn't have conditions of truth or falsehood.

742
01:21:04,110 --> 01:21:11,570
You don't know the meaning of that sentence because you don't know how to determine whether it's true or false.

743
01:21:11,570 --> 01:21:18,890
And the fact is, it's not true or false. It's neither true nor false because I'm not actually using the sentence at all.

744
01:21:18,890 --> 01:21:25,880
So the early Vic Einstein thought that that would that had meaning because each of these stood for an object.

745
01:21:25,880 --> 01:21:30,320
OK. It could only have meaning because there was something that was being picked out by James.

746
01:21:30,320 --> 01:21:35,870
And there is something of property, as Aristotle would say, that's being picked out by is tool.

747
01:21:35,870 --> 01:21:40,820
Therefore, this has meaning the later Vic Einstein says, no, that's not true.

748
01:21:40,820 --> 01:21:44,690
It doesn't have meaning until you actually use it.

749
01:21:44,690 --> 01:21:50,360
It doesn't have meaning at all. It's only in use. So what's the meaning of.

750
01:21:50,360 --> 01:22:02,110
Hello, Margaret. Early again. No, no, the use I made of that particular token sentence had the meaning.

751
01:22:02,110 --> 01:22:06,550
You're late again, Margaret, didn't it? I asked you, what's the meaning of Hello, Margaret.

752
01:22:06,550 --> 01:22:12,070
Early again. I mean, actually, it has a different meaning, doesn't it?

753
01:22:12,070 --> 01:22:19,690
Depending on the context in which I use it and depending on the tone I use, so I'm not angry.

754
01:22:19,690 --> 01:22:25,480
What does that mean? Yes, that is all in the tone, isn't it?

755
01:22:25,480 --> 01:22:33,280
Yeah, in that one. So that's why the early vic. So you can see I mean, you went for his theory when I asked you if that had meaning.

756
01:22:33,280 --> 01:22:37,990
But then you went for the other theory when we put it in context.

757
01:22:37,990 --> 01:22:43,000
So once again, you have a question, which is how do words get meaning?

758
01:22:43,000 --> 01:22:46,420
What's what's the nature of the meaning of a word?

759
01:22:46,420 --> 01:22:52,480
And we have two different theories this time postulated by the same chap at different times in his life.

760
01:22:52,480 --> 01:22:59,470
And the question is, which is the right one? And there are good reasons actually on both sides.

761
01:22:59,470 --> 01:23:04,780
And of course, you've got to ask yourself, could it be that these two theories are actually consistent,

762
01:23:04,780 --> 01:23:13,830
that you need both of them for different aspects of meaning? I think in this case that that certainly is a.

763
01:23:13,830 --> 01:23:17,570
A real runner. It hasn't been in some of the other things we've seen.

764
01:23:17,570 --> 01:23:28,020
But on this one it is. I was thinking that they might stop.

765
01:23:28,020 --> 01:23:33,760
Yeah, the context. You're up to.

766
01:23:33,760 --> 01:23:38,410
Right. That humour, humour depends utterly on logic. I mean, this is logic.

767
01:23:38,410 --> 01:23:45,420
This is philosophy of language and logic. And you don't get to humour without the logic being.

768
01:23:45,420 --> 01:23:52,070
Right. The grammar being right. Again, perhaps next week we'll give you some example of that.

769
01:23:52,070 --> 01:23:55,970
Okay. I'm going to move on to the last one. OK.

770
01:23:55,970 --> 01:24:03,730
Let's link this with what I was saying earlier about happiness.

771
01:24:03,730 --> 01:24:08,320
Let me ask you a question. Okay. Do you all have a belief about me?

772
01:24:08,320 --> 01:24:13,510
I mean, I have several beliefs about me, but just one will do any belief about me.

773
01:24:13,510 --> 01:24:24,660
Okay, fine. Do you think you could have that very belief even if I didn't exist?

774
01:24:24,660 --> 01:24:30,300
Okay, so if I didn't exist, you couldn't have that belief, your belief would be different.

775
01:24:30,300 --> 01:24:36,520
It made maybe it wouldn't exist at all. But at least it would be different. Yeah, remarkable consensus that.

776
01:24:36,520 --> 01:24:42,030
Okay. Let me tell you another story. You've heard of Descartes.

777
01:24:42,030 --> 01:24:50,090
I should imagine. Okay. Descartes argued that the world could be completely other than we take it to be.

778
01:24:50,090 --> 01:24:54,090
Okay. So we all think that we're in a lecture room.

779
01:24:54,090 --> 01:25:01,200
We're looking at a lecturer. We're listening to a lecture cetera. Could it be with you exactly as it is now?

780
01:25:01,200 --> 01:25:11,630
And yet that belief be false. OK, so what's your reason for thinking your intellectual?

781
01:25:11,630 --> 01:25:18,740
Because you are well, do you know that your senses tell you?

782
01:25:18,740 --> 01:25:25,880
Okay. You can see me. You can hear me, et cetera. That's another way of the testimony of others.

783
01:25:25,880 --> 01:25:30,220
Yes. Okay. Now, could it be with you that you believe you see me.

784
01:25:30,220 --> 01:25:33,980
But you don't. Okay. Could you give me an example?

785
01:25:33,980 --> 01:25:42,140
I mean, let's make it realistic. Well, maybe you could be.

786
01:25:42,140 --> 01:25:45,800
You could wake up any minute and think, oh, God, I've got to go to that lecture this afternoon.

787
01:25:45,800 --> 01:25:50,360
What a bore. So you could be with you exactly as it is now.

788
01:25:50,360 --> 01:25:55,290
And yet you're not being in the lecture theatre. You're having a lucid dream.

789
01:25:55,290 --> 01:26:06,240
Descartes went one first, not because you believe, don't you, that you're having experiences and that your experiences are being caused by something.

790
01:26:06,240 --> 01:26:14,240
Okay. You're having an experience as of a lecturer. And that experience is being caused by a lecturer.

791
01:26:14,240 --> 01:26:25,040
Don't you? What makes you think that? Can you get outside your experiences to see what's causing them?

792
01:26:25,040 --> 01:26:30,830
No. Well, then how do you know you wouldn't be I wouldn't be here if you didn't want me to be.

793
01:26:30,830 --> 01:26:35,060
Believe me, I wouldn't be here if I didn't want you to be here.

794
01:26:35,060 --> 01:26:39,790
We will leave. No, that's not true either.

795
01:26:39,790 --> 01:26:44,820
You might not need me here at all. Nine, but still be. No, no, no.

796
01:26:44,820 --> 01:26:48,130
We're all. Because there's only two minutes to go.

797
01:26:48,130 --> 01:26:53,810
I'm going to draw this. Okay. Do you remember we talked about causation.

798
01:26:53,810 --> 01:27:02,630
If you're going to know that that causes that, OK, you need to see that they're correlated, that these types events are correlated.

799
01:27:02,630 --> 01:27:06,680
If you think that this is similar to that, you need to be standing here, don't you?

800
01:27:06,680 --> 01:27:16,810
You need to be able to see both. Now, you think that your experiences of P are caused by P?

801
01:27:16,810 --> 01:27:23,330
Okay. Can you stand here with respect to your experiences?

802
01:27:23,330 --> 01:27:29,180
No. Where are you standing with respect to your experiences here? Okay.

803
01:27:29,180 --> 01:27:35,980
You cannot get outside your experiences to determine what's causing those experiences.

804
01:27:35,980 --> 01:27:45,590
So nevertheless, you believe very strongly that not only are your experiences being caused by something external to them,

805
01:27:45,590 --> 01:27:54,200
but also that your experiences are a good guide to the cause of those experiences and what Descartes did, he said.

806
01:27:54,200 --> 01:27:57,830
Why do you believe that not? Why do you believe that?

807
01:27:57,830 --> 01:28:00,710
But what's your justification for believing that?

808
01:28:00,710 --> 01:28:08,180
Could it be that instead of your experiences being caused by a philosopher sounding lecturing to you,

809
01:28:08,180 --> 01:28:17,230
there's an evil demon of some kind who is twiddling your thought processes and causing you to think so.

810
01:28:17,230 --> 01:28:23,660
Your experience is all caused by something, but the cause is completely offers a new take it to be.

811
01:28:23,660 --> 01:28:31,160
Is that a possibility? Can you tell me that that isn't the case?

812
01:28:31,160 --> 01:28:36,870
It could be neurological reasons. I mean, this is why.

813
01:28:36,870 --> 01:28:41,690
Well, let's think about your own body, okay?

814
01:28:41,690 --> 01:28:46,850
You think you've got a body, don't you? Could the demon get in between you and your body?

815
01:28:46,850 --> 01:28:51,320
Could it be that that you although you think you have a hand.

816
01:28:51,320 --> 01:28:56,390
Actually, you don't. You think you have a body and actually you don't.

817
01:28:56,390 --> 01:29:05,910
There's just your thoughts and experiences. And the causes of them, which is the demon, do you see what I mean?

818
01:29:05,910 --> 01:29:14,050
The brain isn't going to help you here. And neither are other people, actually, because your brain is on the other side of the demon.

819
01:29:14,050 --> 01:29:18,610
And so's you. So are your sir. Other people.

820
01:29:18,610 --> 01:29:28,670
So what Descartes did is he he opens up a gap. It may look like a pussycat, but it's a demon.

821
01:29:28,670 --> 01:29:32,960
And this is the world. And this is your mind.

822
01:29:32,960 --> 01:29:41,510
And Descartes showed that this could be or at least he argued, rather this could be exactly as it is lost.

823
01:29:41,510 --> 01:29:49,210
This could be totally other or might not even exist.

824
01:29:49,210 --> 01:29:59,710
So was Descartes an intern list or an external list?

825
01:29:59,710 --> 01:30:06,790
Is he what? He's an intern. Exactly, so he believes that our thoughts could be exactly as they are.

826
01:30:06,790 --> 01:30:14,380
Even if the world were completely different. Now, let's go back to the question with which I started this little bit of the session.

827
01:30:14,380 --> 01:30:23,440
You have a belief about me. Could you have that very belief if I didn't exist?

828
01:30:23,440 --> 01:30:28,420
What would you have to say if you were an intern list? Yes.

829
01:30:28,420 --> 01:30:34,000
OK. Does that make you an extern less than.

830
01:30:34,000 --> 01:30:38,320
Yes. You're sort of nodding, but you're not very sure about this. Okay.

831
01:30:38,320 --> 01:30:45,200
Does that mean you're rejecting the Cartesian thought experiment? You are if you're an externals.

832
01:30:45,200 --> 01:30:51,780
That's right. Do you think the Carthusian thought experiment is incoherent?

833
01:30:51,780 --> 01:30:57,610
You do? Would you like to tell me what's incoherent about it?

834
01:30:57,610 --> 01:31:02,410
Can you be sure that the world is as you experience it?

835
01:31:02,410 --> 01:31:11,280
Sure, that is. We're talking about certainty here. Not just. It's unknowable.

836
01:31:11,280 --> 01:31:16,900
Yes, Molly, if it is unknowable, then your you're with the ense, the intern lists, aren't you?

837
01:31:16,900 --> 01:31:23,250
Because if you're an extern list, your beliefs are the way they are, because the world is the way it is.

838
01:31:23,250 --> 01:31:27,600
In other words, your belief about me is a relation between you and me.

839
01:31:27,600 --> 01:31:32,430
OK? It's not something that's going on in your heads completely independently of me.

840
01:31:32,430 --> 01:31:42,810
It's a relation between you and me. Therefore, if I don't exist, you couldn't have that belief and all your intuitions were that way initially.

841
01:31:42,810 --> 01:31:50,040
But then I told the Descartes story, the Cartesian story, which is pretty convincing, isn't it?

842
01:31:50,040 --> 01:32:00,620
So your homework this week is to go away and worry about the Cartesian story and ask yourself whether you're an internal list or an external list.

843
01:32:00,620 --> 01:32:17,262
OK, we've gone slightly over time. If there are any questions, I'm happy to take them.