Hello, everyone. Welcome to the Oxford Martin School.
My name is Charles Kofi, I'm the director.
It's my great pleasure to welcome the first of a series of talks for having this term on things around food,
the many different aspects of the global food system.
And it's a particular pleasure to introduce an old friend of mine, Michael Steiner, who's going to be giving the talk this afternoon.
And you can see the title there, and it's special for all sorts of reasons.
One is that Micho has had a very distinguished, distinguished career,
most recently as programme director of the Ecosystem Services Management Programme at the in Luxembourg in Australia,
where he's really led on systems approaches to many issues, including food,
has just moved to Oxford as the new head of the Environmental Change Institute.
Nothing since your first formal talk at Oxford outside your department.
Michael, as I said, has had an extraordinary distinguished career,
has published on an enormous range of different topics and is very influential outside academia.
For example, he says on Units International Resource Panel and have been involved in many separate chapters in advance.
And as a steering member of UNHCR, which I probably can't remember exactly what that acronym Global Assessment Report.
So please come and give us your talk. Thank you, choice.
Thank you very much, and it's really a deep on the big pressure to actually be here in Oxford.
This is my new home now and I think up to now I was really very well received.
And it's a super vibrant atmosphere and I'm sure it will be continued.
And maybe I can even spike it a little more and you will.
I will try to do my best. Now, even so, I chose this title.
Sustainability scenarios for the global food and land use system and to many people scenarios,
is this so where you basically you do something and then immediately happens and then you have the outputs?
And it's actually when we invented the bakes,
which is kind of the dominating negative emission technology currently in the in the IPCC scenarios and now we'll actually go into it.
We submitted it to nature and then I got a phone call from someone I didn't know.
And he said, What is this disease? This is the only scenario analysis.
This is not serious work. This is no evidence. And then we basically I gave up and we published it somewhere else.
And and so I thought, I'm not doing really serious work.
And maybe after this one now you have a little bit more patience with me.
And in our work, because, you know, making a science out of the future is not an easy thing.
So what I would like to talk about these scenarios and what role they played for the formulation of a few science based targets.
You know, the planetary boundaries, but this is actually a broader field.
Then I would like to give you some work we did recently with the Food and Land
Use Coalition on multi sector transitions in the food and land use space.
And then something we just recently published is the idea of is in a town.
So now I can get my Wikipedia entry on on a word which we just created didn't do that yet, but we'll definitely do it.
So that's a scenario. Send a ton or haircuts on where we play actually with countries.
And then at the very end,
I would like to talk a little bit about algorithmic policymaking and crowd centred on really kind of down scaling it to individuals
and probably into a little bit of a controversial discussion on this because this is quite the few ethical issues associated with it.
OK. Before I really dive into the details of of scenarios here in India in the episode,
I'm an old IP based guy, so I always pronounce it a little different.
We came up with this scheme where we associate scenarios with the policy cycle,
and what you see here is on the policy side, the agenda setting where you actually use exploratory scenarios.
Then in the design phase, you actually go for Typekit seeking scenarios and you look at pathways on how to get to a particular target.
Let's say a climate targets and then what you do is you do policy screening scenarios.
I'm not super happy with this term, but that's what we agreed upon where you basically model out policy instruments,
a subsidy, a ban of certain behaviour and so on.
And then see how this this particular policy or a bundle of policies actually gets you to a certain target.
And then then in the end, you have monitoring and evaluation.
And we at my previous institute at Yasa International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
we were involved in quite a few scenario exercises which really informed the formulation of science based targets.
So I want to mention here I will actually go into details on the first one.
So when I started my career, 400 PMP in the atmosphere was kind of coined as the safe target that the word should should go for.
So this is well above three degrees temperature.
And then we basically invented our Olympics and we showed what is possible.
And and nowadays we are talking about something many people think and consider infeasible is actually the 1.5°C scenario.
So here really a that the scenario community in.
On the policy process, that more is possible in the policy process really followed up.
What we also did this was together with WWF in the year 2010 2011,
where we really were investigating how can we formulate a target for avoiding deforestation?
And and what we came up with was a zero nets target formulation,
which actually now is even a nest egg invested in what we are currently doing and that will show a few slides on this.
Is this huge discussion currently ongoing?
What's the target for the CBD? What's the biodiversity targets in the works with short form?
And here we do a very similar exercise where we are kind of equivalent to a temperature target.
But see how far how ambitious can we actually go by transforming actually the the food sector?
Mostly. And then this is the new acronym of the UN SDR choice.
So it's UN Deodhar disaster risk reduction.
And here we just start then not even a negotiation,
just a discussion of whether we would be able to formulate this systemic risk targets for global society in the context of of disaster risks.
However, here we we just start with more discussion rather than real quantification, but it's definitely also something that's that's on the horizon.
So let me get into into the nitty gritty details and some of the undesirable aspects of the scenarios the community, the scenario community created.
So this is a paper that just appeared three days ago,
and what it shows is it shows you the the the scenario bundles that consistent with the two degree and 1.5 degrees scenario,
and what you see here is that we really go in free for reduction off of fossil fuel emissions and then even in 2040 or even before 2040.
But most of the density of the scenario is actually around 2050.
We go, we go negative and and then afterwards we actually go negative quite dramatically.
And and I will I will elaborate on this a little more.
However, the bad news is that this is what the pledges see.
This is what the countries that went to Paris and said, yeah, our ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
but they are absolutely not in sync yet with what actually is needed for the 1.5 or two degrees scenario.
So there's a huge it's called ambition gap between the two.
And when we look at the land use sector, the picture is this.
So here you have what the countries the countries expect the emissions will be from the land use sector.
And this is what the that time the intended national contribution was saying.
However, you could equally say that this is technically because it is hot the air.
So these are kind of overstated emissions because there is an incentive to overstate
your baseline emissions because you might get credited for this difference here.
So, so they are. There are incentives for countries to do this kind of red red scenarios,
and this is what countries really should do in order to go to the 1.5 degrees scenario.
So here this is. This is something which is quite alarming,
actually how little we actually progressing on the international negotiations based on the contributions from individual countries.
But let me come back to the to the slide, which I showed before.
So this is kind of the optimal control schedule of negative emissions.
So what you see here is you, you don't talk too much and you do most of the you undo most of the emissions you did
that we are doing now in the last 20 years and and then you hit the two degree target.
However, this very little thinking of what happens afterwards and what the climate models are doing, they basically look.
The year two thousand one hundred and one, and then they say, OK, we just balanced the non CO2 greenhouse gases.
And then we just continue on with time. However, this is to everyone on the street.
This would be a completely nonsensical strategy to do so. So here is a lot of work still to be done.
And when you when you look at the masses of emission scenarios here, you have two different models.
Here you have the different baseline conditions. So to say and here you have different targets and this is the the pathways of the
negative emissions that you actually see basis for an agreement that we should undo.
This is the emissions, the fossil fuel emissions, which we are emitting today just in the in the very last at the very last minute.
And when you look at and we looked at the financial implications of this, so we basically performed the financial stress test of this strategy.
So basically, you go to 2050 then and then afterwards you do negative emissions.
And here what you see is this is the zero line.
And here you have an expected two percent of GDP that is necessary in 2080 in order to just pay for for the negative emissions.
However, you actually see it could even go down to this is 10 percent of GDP,
and it's it's present in the sense of in 2018, we will be six times reach it and today.
So this is a lot of money which we would have to spend at that time.
It's 10 percent of GDP. This is health budget and the education budget together for typically always countries.
So this is quite serious and not very well thought out.
However, we can get lucky and we get negative emissions for much cheaper than then.
This is not so much of a problem. However, in all of these these scenarios, we assume that everyone on Earth pays.
If you establish a rule which is called the Brazilian proposal, where countries pay according to their historical contribution of of emissions,
then a country like the UK would spend its entire governmental budget basically our pensions,
our health care costs and so forth just for negative emissions.
If we get unlucky and there's a small little note in all of these scenarios, there steady economic growth.
So if all any,
the sudden we get the financial meltdown or we might actually start some new Warsaw and destroy a lot of our capital and growth potential,
then we could actually not repair the the atmosphere anymore.
What the climate system. So this is a rather risky strategy to postpone the restoration of the atmosphere.
I call it to the last 20 years. So what what we propose is basically it here.
This is the the current mainstream thinking on how to do this scheduling of negative emissions and the the emission reduction scheduling.
There is one scenario this is quite clearly this scenario would come back to that later.
This is really you try not to incur not to do any of these negative emission technologies and you do very rapid decarbonisation.
But you can also do is you can start very early with the negative emissions and ramp them down later on such that you get to zero net quite early.
And with the benefit that you don't get that a carbon dioxide and temperature overshoot and you might not disturb the the climate system too much,
or you're just smooth it over time, which we call minimise.
So there are different ways to do that to shock you even more.
In most of these scenarios, we did not calculate in climate feedbacks.
And yet one example is permafrost and additional emissions due to permafrost thawing,
which you would have to counteract with negative emissions in in addition.
And what we calculated in this paper in 2018 was the reduction and this is what is shown here, the reduction in the remaining carbon budget.
So this is the additional amount of carbon we can still put into into the atmosphere and still be compliant with at one point five degrees scenario.
However, if we now take into account the permafrost feedbacks, that might be associated also with a 1.5 degree scenario,
which is an ambitious one, the the remaining carbon budget might actually be gone already.
So here you see this 09 and be calculated that since about five percent of the probability that the carbon budget is gone today.
So this would mean we have to stop fossil fuel emissions today and see that we can
actually ramp up negative emission technologies and five percent is not a small number.
Just think about the five percent risk of anything. And now we have got really interested in this.
This is yet unpublished, but I really find this very insightful why?
At least this is the fun of a model, let's put it that way.
So what we did is we we run a mitigation pathway out to two thousand one hundred with the goal to preserve 30 percent of the permafrost.
And here is the emission pathway associated with this target of the permafrost.
And and it's it's really interesting. So you have here free for emission reductions.
You go negative quite early on. And then for about 150 years,
you go into a deep type of negative emissions afterwards because what you have to do so to say you
have to refreeze the Earth in order to freeze the permafrost that it actually actually stays.
And and so if you kind of think about a little blip, which we are doing now in terms of overshooting it,
which we might trigger permafrost thawing, we will regret this for at least for 150 years.
And here the assumption is that this is actually reversible. And this is also a debate whether or not once you trigger a thawing of the permafrost,
whether you can actually refreeze it properly because of microbial activity and other things.
So yeah, this is something really a plea to think longer term and not only formulate targets out for 2100.
OK. So that's exactly what this slide shows really goal for for the long term.
And also think more for intergenerational planning.
And especially when you look at the land use sector, which is one of the hope for negative emission technologies through nature based solutions.
I show you here a a a map, a capacitor map from Austria, f from the year 1823.
And this is basically two hundred years later.
So what it tells you is everything you determine to be determined in this country.
Two hundred years ago. Most of the elements actually stay.
So there's a lot of memory. If so, if we go for nature based solutions, we will see the effect of it in the in the in the very long run.
And so here you have the forests, here you have the houses of the farmers with the livestock and this is where the future.
And unfortunately, in this case, we had urban sprawl. But it's just fascinating how what kind of path dependency you see over time.
When you when you do certain things in in landscapes.
So just to conclude on this bit of the talk is, I think we really need to think long term, we need to do financial stress testing of these scenarios,
which we are creating because we might run into financial feasibility of what what we propose the ice, especially on negative emission technologies.
Take these two technically readiness level. We have quite some uncertainty is whether these technologies will really deliver.
And then on the demand side, so to say, like with the case of the permafrost,
but there are other tipping points in the in the Earth system where you could expect some some feedbacks.
We need to hedge these kind of risks and we need to prepare for them today.
And this was also the original idea of of of BECCS as a technology to actually hedge risks.
However, we in the integrated assessment community decided to make it the regular technology that brings us to one point five,
rather than just being a risk hedging technology, which was a mistake, I would say.
And and then they are, and we will go a little bit into that.
There are environmental and also social trade-offs, which we will have to consider, and they are past dependency.
Just like you think about the Cadastre map, which I showed to you.
And what? We really didn't discuss too much a huge inter-generational equity issues.
So migrant child, she will actually pay for many of these negative emissions and probably go to a lesson down
to university because we will have to to invest quite a lot into restoring the atmosphere,
so to say. So my conclusion on this one is we really need a new set of scenarios and we really
need to go very long term and really think about the long term consequences.
And we also, I think just having a temperature target this we have in today's probably not sufficient.
We really have to go towards a more informed than potential targets like permafrost Typekit,
which really tells you more about the functioning of the Earth system overall, and we are doing first steps in this direction.
OK. Let me now go into the co-production of mighty sector transitions, and this is something we did within the Food and Land Use Coalition,
and we just published now in September, a report which is called Growing Better.
And it's quite important to mention that this is this is a consultation report.
So this is just the outcome of the consultation. Is this not something you know where where you do very authoritative research or so?
I think we ended up also doing that one just very, very shortly.
This is a rather new initiative, mostly from people coming out of the energy sector, who I think think that the energy problem is largely solved.
The land use problem is really the big elephant in the room where we still have to do a lot of work.
And it's it's self-governance. It's rather influential network, both in terms of linkages to businesses, governments, but also to the NGO world.
And it has global coverage with deep dives into into a few countries, and the overall mantra is that we should work as much as possible with evidence.
What we ended up doing was commissioned a few deeper dive papers,
just sketching out some of the most important issues that I associated with the transition of the of the land use sector and in a in a from the.
Came up. How do we actually communicate in a consistent manner?
And then me as the little little model, I raised my my my voice and said, you know, modelling this is really what quantification.
This is a way to have a conversation in order to come up with a consistent story.
And also, it's an elegant way to to battle out certain controversies because in the end, you need to agree on a number.
And so so we used really the modelling quite extensively as a communication tool and to organise the overall consultation process and.
So this pyramid is this is the visualisation of these 10 transitions, and we we partitioned it into kind of nutritious foods.
S. Nature based solutions section. And then why the choice and supply section and opportunities overall here on the nutritious food.
We looked at healthy diets. We shortly go a little bit into more detail.
We also tried to do some modelling on the health consequences of of better diets, not necessarily better diets for humans only.
So it was really more a nurse system focus.
And then on the nature based solutions, we looked a lot into protection, but then also regenerative agriculture, and we also have an ocean component.
Then on the wider choice, we looked into kind of resource efficiency,
but also a circular economy concepts and then food reduction of food loss and waste,
and also which is a big topic diversifying protein supply because they are people
thinking that we are into a phase of complete protein and then supporting issues.
Digital revolution, stronger rural livelihoods where we actually looked at it at the employment consequences,
rural employment consequences of an enhanced transition because most of it will actually trigger a resource of production efficiencies,
which will pay off quite a lot of people.
And here we can easily talk about half a billion of people who would come onto the labour market much earlier than than expected.
Like in many countries like in this country, for example, the transition to the industrialisation went very, very quickly.
However, at that time, we had the demand support from the industry and industrial sites in in our times.
This demand is not that strong anymore. And then we also have an agenda and demography issue down.
OK, now I will go quickly into the detail of the scenarios that get the feel on what were
the discussions behind the pinning down those scenarios and the overall arching.
The overarching question was really is a better future actually possible?
And what is possible? Very shortly. This is a visualisation of the model structure,
which we developed and used where we start with geospatial information on the supply side and then go all the way up to to demand for food,
fibres, energy. And we also added on a an ocean component that the sea food component and we use a
rather simple representation of the markets in order to be sufficiently transparent.
So what kind of assumptions did did we make on the policies related to climate mitigation we have?
First of all, a current trend scenario where you see, for example,
global energy demand decreases by 52 percent and we have biomass coming in quite quite a bit.
But these are the second generation biomass.
And then in the better future, what we assumed was this l e d scenario, which I mentioned before.
This is the very resource efficient scenario with a lot of renewable energy in it.
We have high carbon prices. We don't use any banks at the bioenergy is really a small components in order
to avoid competition for land with the energy sector on the biodiversity side.
We basically in the in the current trends scenario, there is no additional conservation and the EIA in the in the better future one.
We actually assume that certain high biodiverse areas actually spared from from conversion and we impose subsidy payments for restoration.
Now on food security, we basically have a business as usual assumption, and in another assumption, we really try to feed everyone.
We have food loss and waste way and a better future scenario.
We were actually forced. We want it to be way more aggressive.
But the industry more or less taught us to assume only a 25 percent reduction from current levels.
So to say which was a surprise to me because when I'm in Brussels and we talk about the agriculture sector and climate mitigation,
it's actually always the industry that says food loss and waste huge potential.
But then in the end, it didn't. There was quite some resistance here on on the healthy diet.
We basically ended up with published scenarios of The Lancet commission is, on the one hand,
healthy diets for four four people, but also quite turned out to be very healthy for the planet as well.
Then in terms of technological progress,
we overall the world expects up to 2050 yield increases in livestock and crop production of about forty four percent.
In this scenario and a better future scenario,
we have 60 56 percent we actually ended up doing if biophysical study on the feasibility at the the the realism of this scenario,
and it actually looks like this is this is actually not a one to conservative sites, I would say.
And and here we have been on deforestation, deforestation side.
We impose zero net forestation already in 2020, which is given current conditions in quite a few countries.
Also in terms of political constellation, not incredibly realistic.
And on trade, we ended up only not changing a lot.
However, we we changed a 50 percent tariff for sub-Saharan Africa and on ocean proteins.
I just want to point to you that five out of agriculture is actually one of the key technologies that came out.
This kind of a little bit of, for me, a surprise.
It's a huge resource for protein in the future. And the assumption we also made that meat is replaced by some of these these proteins.
So these are are the results which are actually quite quite ambitious, so when you look at deforestation,
we have in the current trends seven six point seven million hectares of deforestation throughout.
On average to 20, 20, 50.
And here we almost eliminate deforestation. What's what's quite striking is the development of agricultural land.
So this is cropland and pastureland we have in the current trends scenario.
It's still an expansion of 400 million hectares,
which is in the order of 50 percent increase of current levels to a reduction in the order of 1.2 billion hectares.
And we end up in this scenario to restore an additional 100 million hectares.
So this is that the Earth from from the satellites would actually look radically different in this scenario.
So if these scenarios were coming through on the biodiversity here, you actually see that would be still a decline of three point twenty two percent.
And here we actually would observe a recovery.
So this is what we call bending the curve on food security we basically eliminated in this one by additional supply.
And one other thing is since we we eat less so to say we also have fewer deaths because of a a more improved body mass index of 5.6 million.
And the ocean economy is also improving quite a lot, so I'm I'm really going very fast through these these results.
They just tell you this is quite the radical scenario and we actually solve most of the problems, which is quite quite encouraging.
One controversial issue, which we always see is what happens to prices.
And what's quite interesting is that so this is the difference from the current
trend scenario we see if we just do current trends and climate change mitigation.
So if we do a single single policy, so to say we actually end up with higher crop prices and livestock prices or meat prices.
However, if we implement all of those things,
which I went through in quite big detail before we actually see a reduction in prices and especially in terms of meat becomes much cheaper.
What's also quite interesting is how you can actually gain from rather than planning for a single policy measure by combining policies.
So what you see here is these are the emissions in terms of gigatons CO2 per year in in the year 2050.
So we predicted the current trend scenario still 12 gigatons of CO2.
However, if we impose climate mitigation policy, we basically have it.
However, if you put in addition,
a biodiversity policy in place and you impose a Lancet Lancet diets and you eliminate some of the food loss and waste.
And here the last one is protein from the ocean. You actually end up with zero net emissions.
So what this tells you that a specific policy targeted to climate mitigation only delivers half off of what you could really gain.
And so we really need to look at the at the bundle,
at the portfolio of measures and try to reap as much synergies as possible rather than looking at policies individually.
When we look at the biodiversity outcomes, it's even even more more, it's even more so that the synergies are playing out.
So here you actually see the current trend scenario and just biodiversity protection and biodiversity protection only helps you to to stabilise.
So to say, however, if you do the bundle of of measures as discussed before, you really can reverse the trend down by in terms of biodiversity.
And we call this bending the curve, bending the curve on biodiversity.
So this is something we tried to inject into the negotiations on biodiversity as a potential target where you could actually say by 2050,
we should improve the status of biodiversity over what we have today.
This could potentially qualify as a new target. However, if there's the the work decides for a massive bio energy to do a negative emissions in 2040,
this is where where the word would go down in terms of biodiversity.
So if, if, if all any sudden, we need to change course on the climate mitigation side,
but say that renewable energies and energy efficiency doesn't deliver it, we need to switch on biomass with carbon capture and sequestration.
Then of course, you have a trade-off here and you lose, you lose a year.
The the ambitious target on biodiversity.
So here what really comes out these days already today,
a very strong rationale to at least coordinate the UNFCCC, the climate negotiation process with with the CBD.
And this is not only in terms of negotiation process, but also in terms of looking at what countries propose to do.
So what's what's currently, for example, done is that in the climate negotiations,
countries put forward measures like afforestation and restoration, and they even produce maps.
And in two metres down the corner and in the Ministry of Environment,
another group delivers something to the biodiversity convention and there is not necessarily an overlap.
It's even in some countries such that these guys never even talk to each other.
Which is amazing in a way, because in the end, we should actually come up with one map, so to say to be delivered on all these things.
And this is why we are proposing these senators and where you actually have
a country led the way I respect you for the coordination of multiple goals.
And this is something we do within the favourite consortium choices the representative for the UK in within the favoured consortium.
And we just published now a report pathways to sustainable engines and food systems, which you can download here.
And so what the objective of this consortium is, is it countries individually come up with transition plans in the in the LNG sector.
However, at the same time, this country let's.
And also individual country exercises need to collectively meet global targets.
The biodiversity target the climate targets because an individual country can plan for itself.
However, if it's uncoordinated, we see that with another country, then there might be a lot of contradiction.
And so what what we did is we collected 18 countries, including the European Union.
And what we are currently engaging on a lot and this is this last point here is that we allow even for cells learning.
So in our case,
the Brazilians are helping the Colombians and the Argentinian is on developing the tourism data gathering to formulate then these new pathways.
This is the representation of the countries that participate.
Of course, with this projection, we achieved a little bit because the North is larger than it really, really is.
And we have a huge gap here. And this gap is already clearing for a long time because the capacity in countries is unfortunately quite low.
And once we built the capacity in these countries, the guys typically disappear because they get much better jobs than being researchers.
So that's that's a big issue. And so what we are technically really doing is we basically currently we just work with an excel sheet.
We also have more richer models and to be populated to begin with with the national data that is internationally available mostly from the field.
And then we we have these these calculator and countries come up with their their plans and then it goes into a link at.
And then we see whether countries jointly actually deliver on global goals.
There's also a verification tour I can probably go in later, so.
So how are we doing these these symbols on? It's it's like this.
So you have a model for country a, you have a model for Country B and there might be bilateral coordination.
So for example, Brazil says, I have so much forest.
I still want to chop down some and export soybeans to you.
And this country says, yes, I have so little forest left and I don't want to chop it down,
I import the soybeans from, you can probably imagine which countries those were now.
And and and so you have you have a coordination in terms of targets.
And in this case, it would be the forest target.
However, there is always trade inconsistency and this this is where currently the link comes in.
But this is this is not the only thing so that the link helps you to do the wipe out the trade, the inconsistency,
but then we also have a dashboard and then see then we see how these individual countries fare globally when they when you combine the actions.
And then, of course, in the first iteration when countries pledged so to say we will not reach the SDGs.
So the SDGs smiley will not smile. And we have to tell the countries, be more ambitious, go on till we actually reach the global targets.
So this is an exercise we went through through kind of virtual coordination,
but also we had one meeting in in Germany where we actually had to head the life discussion.
And we had we had the moderators here and you see here.
For example, Austria Australia pledged an increase in mass production to help other countries to try to produce,
conserve and save far less for more forests.
And he had India pledged to reduce its its milk imports.
This is then kind of a table of the assumptions, and I singled out the UK and the UK was quite interesting because when you look,
you have a population increase assumed of 20 percent.
The meat consumption is reduced by 20 percent.
There's not much happening on the trade and the yield increases are significant, but probably not unrealistic 40 percent up to 2050.
And for crops and for livestock and for crops 1.6.
And you have forest 1.5 million hectares in the in the country.
This is also consistent with some of the the pledges that were really made also on the global effort,
we basically reached many targets or we we fit everyone.
We have zero net global deforestation.
We also got for the land use sector a net negative greenhouse gas budget, and we also did quite well on the biodiversity.
What we didn't achieve was a greenhouse gas reduction goal in the agriculture sector.
Just to give you an idea how this looks for an individual prejudices the forest pledge.
And here you see that deforestation is eliminated over time.
The Reds boss. So this is actually the rest of the work.
So the participating countries really deliver on zero net by 2030.
And you can also see then what are the contributions of the individual countries?
And here these kind of diagrams.
You can also use a little bit for blaming and shaming and get more mobilisation if certain countries don't pledge enough.
What we are planning now, basically, we really want to get into the real pledging,
so to say so we have no agreements with a few countries on participation to actually do something for the CBD cop in in Beijing.
No, it's actually in Kunming, in China, where a similar pledging exercise should be organised as we headed for the Paris Agreement.
And we are also trying to ramp up a food and land use action tracker.
Good. One issue which I if time still allows, I could also stop here.
What we find is but this is not a firm finding yet.
This and this is quite interesting if we do this manual coordination.
So if we just do a bilateral coordination between humans and if countries become sophisticated in the in their negotiations within finite time, you.