1 00:00:07,870 --> 00:00:13,860 Particularly a pandemic, as we saw, has impact on the economic development of the world. 2 00:00:14,220 --> 00:00:17,310 Doesn't mean that you react the same way. But 911 is. 3 00:00:17,310 --> 00:00:22,830 We all have seen it. You know, so it's synchronised that moment, though they might differ. 4 00:00:22,890 --> 00:00:29,370 The shocks that were considered real shocks internally for the organisation, then what might be the global shocks? 5 00:00:30,690 --> 00:00:35,640 Welcome to Global Shots, the podcast of the Oxford Mountain Program on Changing Global Voice. 6 00:00:36,060 --> 00:00:39,690 My name is John Aitken and I'm a research fellow in international relations. 7 00:00:40,230 --> 00:00:44,790 And in this podcast, we're going to explore how international organisations deal with global shocks. 8 00:00:45,570 --> 00:00:51,240 Global shocks are all around us, from humanitarian emergencies to war, financial crises to pandemics. 9 00:00:51,720 --> 00:00:57,150 So how can international organisations respond to them, adapt to them and survive such turbulent times? 10 00:00:57,690 --> 00:01:02,160 To find out, we are entering the conversation with leading figures from these organisations, 11 00:01:02,580 --> 00:01:09,480 to find out how they're affected by crisis and turbulence, what lessons they draw from the past, and what future prospects they have. 12 00:01:22,030 --> 00:01:25,420 Today, we're going to talk about peacekeeping at the United Nations. 13 00:01:25,540 --> 00:01:32,650 The UN's Department of Peace Operations distinguishes between peacebuilding, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. 14 00:01:32,950 --> 00:01:40,900 The latter was designed in 1948 as an instrument to help countries torn by conflict to create the conditions for lasting peace. 15 00:01:41,170 --> 00:01:47,440 As the UN itself puts it, we've all seen images of U.N. peacekeepers wearing characteristic blue helmets. 16 00:01:47,860 --> 00:01:53,170 Their deployment depends on a decision by the Security Council, which has the power to send out peacekeeping troops. 17 00:01:53,350 --> 00:01:58,180 Following Chapter seven of the U.N. charter, peacekeeping is not uncontroversial. 18 00:01:58,720 --> 00:02:03,580 Peacekeepers have been involved in cases of sexual assault and rape and peacekeeping failures 19 00:02:03,580 --> 00:02:08,650 to prevent genocide in Rwanda and in Bosnia have led some to dismiss peacekeeping altogether. 20 00:02:09,550 --> 00:02:17,110 Yet, in a conflict ridden world, thinking about how peacekeeping can learn from its past successes and failures is arguably essential. 21 00:02:17,770 --> 00:02:23,230 To discuss this question. I'm joined by the former chief of U.N. peacekeeping policy at one. 22 00:02:33,130 --> 00:02:36,250 So today I have the privilege of speaking to Dr. Ron Assad, 23 00:02:36,250 --> 00:02:44,680 one who is a peace and conflict expert with now two decades of experience working for U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world. 24 00:02:45,370 --> 00:02:50,500 Most recently, Renata has been the chief of U.N. peacekeeping policy and best practices, 25 00:02:50,980 --> 00:02:58,450 and she also was the director of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research from 2018 to 2020. 26 00:02:58,480 --> 00:03:02,290 She is, in other words, a leading peacekeeping and development expert. 27 00:03:02,320 --> 00:03:05,350 So hello and welcome to Global Sharks. Renata, it's an honour to have you. 28 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:08,710 It's great to be with you, YOUNG And hello to you. 29 00:03:09,280 --> 00:03:16,660 Maybe just very briefly in your own words, why do you think thinking about these kinds of global shifts and changes global shocks, 30 00:03:16,960 --> 00:03:21,520 why that matters for the organisations that you're familiar with and that you've been working for? 31 00:03:22,210 --> 00:03:32,650 I mean, first I would say that what I felt working in peace keeping that was both a reflection of a consensus by 32 00:03:32,650 --> 00:03:40,540 a significant number of states and organisations around a problem and possibly how to respond to that. 33 00:03:40,660 --> 00:03:52,510 So therefore if that instrument of international order, if that instrument of states is going to be effective, both in maintaining legitimacy, 34 00:03:52,930 --> 00:04:03,220 in reflecting where consensus around ideas are and in being able to adapt to crises as understood by those that essentially drives the tool, 35 00:04:03,700 --> 00:04:08,230 then it needs to be assessing and constantly able to navigate change. 36 00:04:08,290 --> 00:04:14,830 So there's a legitimacy dimension, there's a representation dimension, and then there's an effective delivery dimension. 37 00:04:14,870 --> 00:04:23,290 And so I think that's why peacekeeping and I would argue all crisis management instruments need to have that adaptability now, 38 00:04:23,290 --> 00:04:31,060 of course, and will come onto it whether you adopt in a long and slow and gradual way what you adapt to shocks and sudden changes. 39 00:04:31,330 --> 00:04:33,550 They're obviously different drivers. 40 00:04:34,330 --> 00:04:40,210 So there are currently 12 peacekeeping missions around the world, the biggest of which being MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, 41 00:04:40,560 --> 00:04:46,480 U.N. Mission, South Sudan, Monaco and the Democratic Republic of Congo and MINUSMA in Mali. 42 00:04:46,750 --> 00:04:51,610 You have yourself work as chief of development coherence for the U.N. Assistance Mission in 43 00:04:51,610 --> 00:04:57,310 Afghanistan and as a team leader for the UN's integrated operational teams for Asia and for Mali. 44 00:04:57,820 --> 00:05:04,059 And during your time working in these posts. What would you say was the most challenging shock and or more protracted 45 00:05:04,060 --> 00:05:07,990 conflict that you had to deal with that you and your co-workers had to manage? 46 00:05:08,200 --> 00:05:12,280 And what were its practical consequences for the mission and for the organisation? 47 00:05:12,730 --> 00:05:20,080 I mean, I think what's interesting for me and when I think back on my time in peacekeeping, if I think about what were the big shocks, 48 00:05:20,140 --> 00:05:26,110 they might defer the shocks that were considered real shocks internally for the organisation. 49 00:05:26,320 --> 00:05:29,890 And by that I mean Secretariat and Staff and Peacekeeping. 50 00:05:30,370 --> 00:05:34,360 Then what might be the global shock? So let me give you an example. 51 00:05:34,750 --> 00:05:39,690 Let's talk about global shocks. The financial crisis of 2008, for example. 52 00:05:39,700 --> 00:05:45,310 That was a shock for the world, its suddenness, its contagion, its relative speed. 53 00:05:46,180 --> 00:05:50,710 It saw effects on U.N. peacekeeping were not immediate, however. 54 00:05:51,190 --> 00:05:57,160 Why? Because those budgets were planned in advance of the peacekeeping support account works on a two year cycle. 55 00:05:57,610 --> 00:06:01,600 And those systems were in place. Those mandates were authorised. 56 00:06:01,630 --> 00:06:12,730 So that lack of pressure on financing, pressure on funds actually started to only be felt, I think, from 2010. 57 00:06:13,300 --> 00:06:21,100 And in fact, even you could argue that financial crisis can lead to heightened demand for U.N. peacekeeping through contributing countries, 58 00:06:21,100 --> 00:06:31,160 make money from sending the troops. 30% of peacekeeping budget goes on salaries to to contributing countries for their forces and their equipment. 59 00:06:31,180 --> 00:06:34,350 So you had both a sort of potentially incentive. 60 00:06:34,360 --> 00:06:40,060 I'm not saying that incentive alone, but it's a it's a financial income for for certain countries. 61 00:06:40,300 --> 00:06:48,070 Similarly, countries concerned about crises in the implications of instability and turbulence may have 62 00:06:48,070 --> 00:06:52,990 perhaps had attitudes or been willing to consider the deployment of peacekeeping forces. 63 00:06:52,990 --> 00:06:58,150 And I'm thinking of particular about that period and the significant activism in places like Cote d'Ivoire, 64 00:06:58,450 --> 00:07:02,380 Liberia, Sierra Leone and so West Africa peacekeeping at that time. 65 00:07:02,740 --> 00:07:06,069 So you didn't see an immediate crisis to begin. 66 00:07:06,070 --> 00:07:14,260 Arguably, the financial crisis for peacekeeping happened after about 2012 as Departments of Foreign Affairs in the world 67 00:07:14,920 --> 00:07:23,770 sort of received from their finance ministries less budget as the pressures on budgetary spending grew and the, 68 00:07:23,770 --> 00:07:31,620 let's say, financial crisis that the U.N. faced and U.N. peacekeeping was most marked with the arrival of the Trump administration into. 69 00:07:31,650 --> 00:07:39,540 2017 and the refusal of the Trump administration to pay its quota or supported Jew of peacekeeping. 70 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:43,170 The Arab Spring, I would argue, was more of a shock. 71 00:07:43,200 --> 00:07:47,790 Again, less to perhaps the UN peacekeeping instrument in the immediate term. 72 00:07:48,180 --> 00:07:51,510 Perhaps more to the UN development instruments. 73 00:07:51,630 --> 00:07:55,530 Issues around how close were they to whole state authorities? 74 00:07:55,680 --> 00:08:05,730 What was the appropriate role of the UN in the face of public protests for change in regimes that were partially or non democracies? 75 00:08:06,330 --> 00:08:10,200 How to respond to that? Those demands from the street. 76 00:08:10,620 --> 00:08:18,650 And I think that was more a political and a development and a human rights crisis for the organisation than a specific peacekeeping. 77 00:08:18,660 --> 00:08:28,470 However, the long term lag effect of the Arab Spring became very much felt with the peace operation in Libya, a special political mission, 78 00:08:28,500 --> 00:08:37,770 and then particularly the destabilising impact that it had on the Sahel with the opening of free flow of weapons being significant, 79 00:08:37,770 --> 00:08:49,080 increase of weapons of munitions, of smuggling of of all sorts through and across the Sahel, and the implications that had for for Mali in particular. 80 00:08:49,260 --> 00:08:55,739 But if I just in conclusion say that some of the more bigger threats that I felt sort 81 00:08:55,740 --> 00:09:01,740 of shook the system to its core were not those what you might call macro shocks, 82 00:09:02,340 --> 00:09:05,620 but shocks of perhaps more micro nature. 83 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:15,510 So I would say the US led invasion of Iraq was a political crisis for the and that really drove significant wedges in the U.N., 84 00:09:15,870 --> 00:09:19,530 created tension between the UN leadership and the US, 85 00:09:19,950 --> 00:09:25,970 and then of course led to the deployment of of a UN political mission and the 2003 canal bombing. 86 00:09:25,980 --> 00:09:30,570 That was quite a shock for the UN in terms of understanding itself to be a target, 87 00:09:30,660 --> 00:09:38,490 forcing it to rethink issues around its impartiality, its perception of its impartiality, its role, mission protection, etc. 88 00:09:38,760 --> 00:09:46,620 A seminal crisis was the 2010 Haiti earthquake that not only led to a huge humanitarian crisis, 89 00:09:46,860 --> 00:09:52,140 but also led to the collapse of the UN headquarters and the death of peacekeepers. 90 00:09:52,320 --> 00:09:57,390 Including this the mission leadership of that crisis and how to respond to the calls to 91 00:09:57,660 --> 00:10:02,910 lead a humanitarian response while you yourself are a victim of that that incident. 92 00:10:03,360 --> 00:10:07,920 And then third, I would say the Rwanda and the provinces genocides. 93 00:10:08,400 --> 00:10:14,850 The impact of that had UN doctrine and thinking, particularly around peace operations, 94 00:10:15,360 --> 00:10:23,999 reform that led to the Brahimi Report 2010 and comprehensive rethinking of the role and purpose of of U.N. peacekeeping. 95 00:10:24,000 --> 00:10:25,260 And then particularly, of course, 96 00:10:25,260 --> 00:10:33,080 ultimately the are to the responsibility to protect doctrine and placing protection of civilians at the heart of operations. 97 00:10:33,090 --> 00:10:39,419 So I'd be interested in making sure that we distinguish between what I would call shocks that 98 00:10:39,420 --> 00:10:45,090 are perceived as shocks within the system and then perhaps more macro global shocks that impact, 99 00:10:45,090 --> 00:11:09,050 but over a much longer lead time. All right. 100 00:11:09,060 --> 00:11:17,780 So essentially, we're making a drawing, a distinction between shocks to the operational structures of the of the U.N. itself and its deployments, 101 00:11:17,780 --> 00:11:24,139 its missions, and how that changes its own thinking, reflections on how to improve those operations. 102 00:11:24,140 --> 00:11:24,920 And then, on the other hand, 103 00:11:24,920 --> 00:11:33,020 shocks that are sort of generally globally happening and then with a time lag affecting the UN's capabilities and capacities to to actually engage. 104 00:11:33,770 --> 00:11:37,759 Can you maybe think of an example of a sort of concrete moment in your experience, 105 00:11:37,760 --> 00:11:43,940 how that actually changed constraints or sort of leeway in operational considerations? 106 00:11:44,570 --> 00:11:52,160 Yeah. So let's take the financial crisis first of 2008. 107 00:11:52,640 --> 00:12:03,230 To some extent, it appeared initially to respond and to confirm the approach that U.N. peacekeeping that try 108 00:12:03,230 --> 00:12:08,180 not approach U.N. peacekeeping had been taking about the importance of tackling root causes, 109 00:12:08,510 --> 00:12:11,890 about issues around preventing conflicts before they happen, 110 00:12:11,910 --> 00:12:19,430 about economic deprivation being a long term cause of instability that could lead to a major armed conflict. 111 00:12:19,850 --> 00:12:28,250 So to some extent, I think the UN peacekeeping and it was right around that time in 2008 that the first attempt to 112 00:12:28,490 --> 00:12:33,680 publicly communicate the UN peacekeeping doctrine of the so-called capstone project came out. 113 00:12:34,100 --> 00:12:40,549 So there was there was almost a sense of, see, we've been telling you these things that issues around operational issues, 114 00:12:40,550 --> 00:12:49,820 around significant human need have destabilising effects, including the threat of conflict, and the UN must respond to that. 115 00:12:49,820 --> 00:12:52,430 And also the Security Council Member states must respond. 116 00:12:52,430 --> 00:13:04,340 So to some extent it was a it was seen as a we were right moment as the fallout of the budgets started to impact UN peacekeeping, 117 00:13:04,460 --> 00:13:13,040 you started to get much greater scrutiny from about 2012 13 on the part of Member States in the past of General Assembly, 118 00:13:13,040 --> 00:13:21,230 financial and budgetary bodies as to how large peacekeeping operations should be, what should be a component of them. 119 00:13:21,770 --> 00:13:28,400 And that had interesting implications around debates, around civil affairs activities, 120 00:13:29,060 --> 00:13:38,330 issues around how large should the human rights component be, functions that might be considered protection of civilians type functions. 121 00:13:38,750 --> 00:13:44,990 Those functions in mandates and in mission plans became much harder to defend. 122 00:13:45,650 --> 00:13:49,250 And while you tended I can recall, for example, 123 00:13:49,250 --> 00:13:57,980 defending a budget for the mission in Mali at one point and having a huge expenditure item around infrastructure projects for 124 00:13:58,070 --> 00:14:06,680 accommodation for large troops and significant outsourcing of huge contracts for the construction of camps that sailed through. 125 00:14:06,680 --> 00:14:11,300 I think it was something in the region of over 9 million without even a look, a second look, 126 00:14:11,750 --> 00:14:18,950 but calling for the idea of a driver and one protection of civilians Affairs officer with particular 127 00:14:18,950 --> 00:14:25,010 focus on child protection became a source of huge contention and almost held up the budget for refusing. 128 00:14:25,340 --> 00:14:29,510 So it wasn't even in the scope, but it was the idea of what can we trim down? 129 00:14:29,810 --> 00:14:35,530 And then of course, that entered into the whole debate that you saw that increasing tension between 130 00:14:35,540 --> 00:14:41,059 states about concepts of sovereignty versus human rights versus to how invasive, 131 00:14:41,060 --> 00:14:44,990 let's say, or intrusive should U.N. peacekeeping be? So I think that was an example. 132 00:14:44,990 --> 00:14:46,940 Another example, I would say, 133 00:14:46,940 --> 00:14:57,110 and that became particularly notable after the arrival of the Trump administration and its decision to not pay its 28% stake. 134 00:14:57,440 --> 00:15:07,070 That led to a shortfall, obviously, but it also led the Security Council to start to demand a significant review of every peacekeeping operation. 135 00:15:07,080 --> 00:15:14,510 So rather than than just renew mandates as a sort of matter, of course, as an annual to the council, start to demand significant reviews. 136 00:15:14,510 --> 00:15:23,180 And I can remember going to Lebanon in 2017 to review the UN peacekeeping operation there as part of a multidimensional team. 137 00:15:23,420 --> 00:15:30,020 And I was trying to understand what were the sources that we were looking at because there was no particular election hadn't happened. 138 00:15:30,020 --> 00:15:33,229 There hadn't been a we were not sort of at a point of inflection. 139 00:15:33,230 --> 00:15:36,590 When you review a mission plan and its priorities, 140 00:15:37,100 --> 00:15:44,480 the particular source of irritation on the part of the member State concerned in this case us had been 141 00:15:44,690 --> 00:15:50,809 the idea somehow that they'd come to see from seeing literature of the UN mission being distributed, 142 00:15:50,810 --> 00:15:56,150 magazines that peacekeepers were just spending money on these so-called quick impact projects. 143 00:15:56,390 --> 00:16:02,090 Quick impact projects were small portions of money that were given to troops contingents so 144 00:16:02,090 --> 00:16:06,590 that they could spend some money in terms of building relationships with the community. 145 00:16:06,650 --> 00:16:17,240 And then this particular. Instance, it was pictures of Italian forces making pizzas prior to the engagement with the local community. 146 00:16:17,240 --> 00:16:22,910 And this was considered indicative of the the wastage and the crisis that UN peacekeeping have. 147 00:16:23,330 --> 00:16:32,030 So I felt that one of the implications of that practically were that we all became entirely shrinking down our perspective 148 00:16:32,030 --> 00:16:39,589 on micro details and micro budgets and micro activities at a time when a much broader challenge was beginning to happen, 149 00:16:39,590 --> 00:16:45,980 which is to what extent are UN peacekeeping operations having effective change? 150 00:16:46,280 --> 00:16:49,010 To what extent are they delivering on their mandates? 151 00:16:49,340 --> 00:16:54,319 What of the some broader trends that are happening around them in their regions in a region like Lebanon, 152 00:16:54,320 --> 00:17:00,889 with Syria, with the inflow of refugees, or in the case of Mali, with a much broader regional crisis? 153 00:17:00,890 --> 00:17:03,050 It became much harder to address those questions. 154 00:17:03,470 --> 00:17:13,040 And I recall that in 2016 to about 2018, the debate almost centred entirely on sexual exploitation and abuse issues. 155 00:17:13,040 --> 00:17:18,500 So issues around the conduct of peacekeepers and issues around the costs of the wastage of U.N. peacekeeping. 156 00:17:18,920 --> 00:17:22,200 And while I don't dispute that those issues aren't important. 157 00:17:22,220 --> 00:17:30,590 I felt that we missed an important opportunity to assess, to measure, and to begin a conversation of what was working and what was not. 158 00:17:30,590 --> 00:17:36,860 And I think we saw that crisis play out in the last few years in the Sahel and particularly, but also in the Congo. 159 00:17:37,580 --> 00:17:37,940 Right. 160 00:17:37,940 --> 00:17:46,969 So you've given us a lot of insight on how different kinds of shocks with some kind of time lag affected the capabilities of UN peacekeeping forces, 161 00:17:46,970 --> 00:17:50,200 but also just simply very practical kinds of constraints. 162 00:17:50,210 --> 00:17:54,410 Do you think that there were moments where some of these shocks also presented 163 00:17:54,410 --> 00:17:59,180 opportunities for for the UN peacekeeping forces precisely to innovate its operations? 164 00:18:00,260 --> 00:18:06,410 Yeah, undoubtedly. Let's take the situation of the Arab Spring. 165 00:18:06,860 --> 00:18:19,370 And so I deployed to Syria in 2012 as part of a very short lived, temporary military cease fire observation mission from about May to August 2012. 166 00:18:19,580 --> 00:18:25,280 I think what I find very interesting about that was it revealed to me a couple of things. 167 00:18:25,700 --> 00:18:31,759 First, there was analysis on the ground by U.N. actors and particularly by U.N. development 168 00:18:31,760 --> 00:18:37,820 actors and humanitarian actors about the potential for crisis in that country. 169 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:45,110 And that was coming from about 2010, and that we saw, for example, a U.N. Peace Human development report, 170 00:18:45,440 --> 00:18:51,290 WFP, warning of the that the harvest had not been good for a series of years. 171 00:18:51,590 --> 00:18:58,980 Warnings of food crisis, warnings of the lack of economic opportunities for young people throughout the Maghreb. 172 00:18:59,090 --> 00:19:04,669 But I'm talking specifically about Syria and also a trend to watch the significant 173 00:19:04,670 --> 00:19:09,200 speed of urbanisation in that country and the tensions that was producing between urban 174 00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:15,410 rural together with the Assad government economic policies that move sort of move away 175 00:19:15,530 --> 00:19:19,759 from the subsidies that his father had provided to rural communities in terms of bread, 176 00:19:19,760 --> 00:19:23,270 sugar and certain basic materials and basic goods. 177 00:19:24,020 --> 00:19:32,620 So I found that very interesting because that was a real opportunity we felt, to try to shape the narrative from the debate in the Security Council. 178 00:19:32,630 --> 00:19:37,820 So I recall that a lot of our cables and reporting we had our mandate to report every two weeks to the 179 00:19:37,820 --> 00:19:44,090 Security Council was very contentious operation where we were trying to draw attention to societal pressures, 180 00:19:44,570 --> 00:19:52,160 to longer term issues, to tensions in and around specifically and in particular governance, social and economic challenges. 181 00:19:52,670 --> 00:20:01,670 At the time, however, there was a strong narrative that we were not going to, you know, that this was about internationalised civil tensions. 182 00:20:01,670 --> 00:20:04,540 You had Russia and U.S. opposing views. 183 00:20:04,550 --> 00:20:11,270 You had the Western tensions around you with the Assad regime ever since the assassination of Hariri in Lebanon. 184 00:20:11,660 --> 00:20:16,370 And so as a consequence of sort of not much interest in assessing these, 185 00:20:16,850 --> 00:20:21,709 but one factor that I do think the development that the Arab Spring drove for 186 00:20:21,710 --> 00:20:28,130 the UN was really a consideration of do we have across the system analysis, 187 00:20:28,130 --> 00:20:37,670 but we're not bringing it to play collectively together. And it drove quite a bit of thinking about how to get better integration of analysis, 188 00:20:37,670 --> 00:20:43,250 and that was led under the centralised in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General 189 00:20:43,370 --> 00:20:47,240 to start to have much more shared analysis and more thinking so that 190 00:20:47,570 --> 00:20:52,700 political responses are informed by these longer term trends that other parts of 191 00:20:52,700 --> 00:20:56,450 the House and in particular development and humanitarian actors were spotting. 192 00:20:57,020 --> 00:21:01,370 So it did lead to beginning to think about much more system wide analysis. 193 00:21:14,830 --> 00:21:20,709 In the UN system within these conversations, are historical analogies drawn as well, or is that a background saying, 194 00:21:20,710 --> 00:21:25,630 Well, yes, we're drawing obviously on our experience from the past, but not necessarily explicitly? 195 00:21:25,780 --> 00:21:34,329 How would you answer that? On the whole, I've tended to think that some of the historical analogies are not helpful. 196 00:21:34,330 --> 00:21:39,880 And so let's take, for example, Libya in 2011 12. 197 00:21:40,510 --> 00:21:50,440 There was, I think, by the proponents of protection of civilians some false conclusions or analogies made with the Kosovo scenario. 198 00:21:50,890 --> 00:21:59,740 So we were going to avoid a potential significant threat to protection of civilians by supporting a NATO led intervention. 199 00:22:00,280 --> 00:22:05,979 And that was itself begged questions to the extent the scale of the threat, 200 00:22:05,980 --> 00:22:13,810 certainly at a rhetorical level and in some cases actions Gadhafi did on these forces Act Libyan protesters. 201 00:22:14,260 --> 00:22:17,680 But it did build this sort of idea that you could get it fast. 202 00:22:17,680 --> 00:22:20,830 You could have a NATO led, primarily an aerial mission, and it would be quick. 203 00:22:20,860 --> 00:22:25,480 So that's, I think, an example of of a historical analogy that might be a bit skewed. 204 00:22:25,840 --> 00:22:29,920 And then this idea that the lessons of Rwanda and. 205 00:22:29,980 --> 00:22:36,430 KREPON, it's meant that you had to drive a response quickly when civilians were under imminent threat of danger. 206 00:22:36,670 --> 00:22:41,709 I think the problem with that is that it drove this idea of never ending peace operations, 207 00:22:41,710 --> 00:22:50,320 because there was always or there's quite often a set of civilians under threat and under imminent threat of violence. 208 00:22:50,620 --> 00:22:58,870 And distressing as that is, there's a sort of an infinite perpetuity of UN crisis interventions that there simply isn't the political will, 209 00:22:58,870 --> 00:23:03,310 nor even the operational material capacity to to to respond to at all times. 210 00:23:03,940 --> 00:23:08,410 And in the case then of Libya, I was also struck with the historical analogy. 211 00:23:08,890 --> 00:23:18,340 One of the analogies, the historical lessons that were drawn was that Libyans remember the UN positively 212 00:23:18,700 --> 00:23:25,060 from its experiences of decolonisation in the immediate period after World War Two. 213 00:23:25,600 --> 00:23:35,200 Therefore, they will be favourably disposed to the United Nations because there's a sort of a historical mindset of appreciation to the UN. 214 00:23:35,530 --> 00:23:39,450 And while I don't know enough about Libya to to say if that's indeed true or not, 215 00:23:39,460 --> 00:23:45,760 I think one always needs to be very careful as an outside actor about how the 216 00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:49,989 extent to which any domestic population feels good about any set of actors, 217 00:23:49,990 --> 00:23:54,219 regardless of their statements, wills or dispositions. 218 00:23:54,220 --> 00:23:58,360 And and I think that's when historical analogies are drawn or badly drawn. 219 00:23:58,540 --> 00:24:02,529 So historical analogies on the whole, to not be drawn too much, 220 00:24:02,530 --> 00:24:07,689 they tend to be quite short term and I'm not sure they're always effective because they're very 221 00:24:07,690 --> 00:24:12,009 externally focussed and based on how we understood the issue as opposed to a deep reading, 222 00:24:12,010 --> 00:24:15,340 an analysis of the country or the conflict in question. 223 00:24:16,180 --> 00:24:18,130 Let's go back to Mali for just a second. 224 00:24:18,430 --> 00:24:24,540 Since we're talking about lessons being drawn, what's the bottom line of a particular operation, of a particular mission? 225 00:24:24,550 --> 00:24:28,810 How do we learn from that in order to deploy missions more effectively in the future? 226 00:24:29,020 --> 00:24:33,970 Of course, in the case of Mali, what's on the horizon is withdrawal, despite ongoing tensions. 227 00:24:34,210 --> 00:24:38,290 We know that in 20 1314, the U.N. launched its MINUSMA mission. 228 00:24:38,440 --> 00:24:41,800 Since then, however, more Malians have joined insurgent groups. 229 00:24:42,130 --> 00:24:43,660 Fatalities have increased. 230 00:24:43,660 --> 00:24:52,510 Over 300 MINUSMA personnel have been killed, and I think only UNIFIL in Lebanon has been more faithful to peacekeepers and the mandate has run out. 231 00:24:52,540 --> 00:24:58,420 The UK and Sweden have already pulled out early. France suspended its its own counter-terrorism operations. 232 00:24:58,570 --> 00:25:02,709 So it looks it looks like another case of withdrawal despite ongoing tensions. 233 00:25:02,710 --> 00:25:06,910 And perhaps there are signs of change or signs of the UN learning from this. 234 00:25:06,910 --> 00:25:11,140 But I'm wondering what your perspective on that is. Are lessons already being drawn? 235 00:25:11,350 --> 00:25:16,150 How does this work? Is there an ongoing conversation trying to sort of already evaluate Mali? 236 00:25:16,180 --> 00:25:20,700 Are there signs that the UN is trying to reform based on that kind of experience? 237 00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:25,750 I think Molly was a chronicle of a death foretold for many in the U.N. 238 00:25:26,350 --> 00:25:30,490 It was one of the most contentious missions to set up. 239 00:25:30,580 --> 00:25:34,270 It was highly divisive inside the U.N. system. 240 00:25:35,020 --> 00:25:43,690 And the debates were at the time exactly around the issues that have continued to plague the operation and plagued the situation, 241 00:25:43,690 --> 00:25:51,909 which is, is there a peace to keep or are the peacekeeping operations there for purpose of facilitating, 242 00:25:51,910 --> 00:26:03,940 enabling and supporting an agreement between warring parties, or are we there to assist a legitimately elected state defeat militarily threat? 243 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:12,160 There were many who felt that even if the latter was the case, that the Malian state faced an existential threat. 244 00:26:12,160 --> 00:26:19,240 And you must remember, of course, in 2012, it really was a pure crisis situation in Timbuktu with significant human impact. 245 00:26:19,420 --> 00:26:27,570 The sense was that the instrument to fly was not a peacekeeping operation, but rather a special political mission, 246 00:26:27,640 --> 00:26:35,410 political effort to try to explore what the scope for some sort of politically negotiated solution was possible. 247 00:26:35,650 --> 00:26:42,020 And of course, you had a long, long standing tension between the Tuareg communities and populations in the north. 248 00:26:42,020 --> 00:26:46,389 So you had an ethnic tension that you had groups of people feeling that the central state 249 00:26:46,390 --> 00:26:52,900 had failed and wanting alternatives to a Bamako led regime and system of governance. 250 00:26:53,230 --> 00:26:59,620 That debate was really bitter inside the U.N. and some of it was intra bureaucratic concerns 251 00:26:59,890 --> 00:27:04,510 with which department leads political missions and which department leads peacekeeping. 252 00:27:04,960 --> 00:27:11,410 But I think it really stemmed from a fundamental concern that U.N. peacekeepers were 253 00:27:11,410 --> 00:27:16,480 being deployed in a context to an environment for which the instrument was not designed. 254 00:27:16,570 --> 00:27:20,559 As a consequence of that tension, it never amassed. 255 00:27:20,560 --> 00:27:26,860 I would say the full support of perhaps the for all hands joining together of the mission. 256 00:27:27,220 --> 00:27:35,140 I think there were some humanitarian entities that had some concerns about how close they wanted to be to the U.N. peacekeepers. 257 00:27:35,620 --> 00:27:41,620 The U.N. peacekeeping operation was a vehicle for human rights presence and office and engagement, 258 00:27:41,890 --> 00:27:49,870 but that human rights tension often came into conflict with the military and police sort of perception of themselves trying 259 00:27:49,870 --> 00:27:58,120 to help the states under threat from various armed groups in independence seeking and or with more criminal agendas. 260 00:27:58,360 --> 00:28:01,120 And the blurring of those agendas was very difficult. 261 00:28:01,690 --> 00:28:09,759 So I would say that Mali was an example of a place where there was a lot of I told you so, I told you so all the time. 262 00:28:09,760 --> 00:28:17,200 And we found it extremely difficult. I say that as needing a headquarters team, an integrated team of military police, civilian, 263 00:28:17,590 --> 00:28:23,440 just to really sort of get that sense of buy in and support across the House at various points, 264 00:28:23,440 --> 00:28:26,320 including amongst member states as well as different departments. 265 00:28:27,220 --> 00:28:34,090 How have U.N. peacekeeping operations in practice depended on coordinating with other actors, other organisations? 266 00:28:34,090 --> 00:28:38,620 And might that be sort of one way of thinking about better understanding crises? 267 00:28:39,830 --> 00:28:47,960 Mm hmm. I just caution ASEAN from thinking that the challenges that peacekeeping faces is simply an information problem. 268 00:28:48,680 --> 00:28:56,930 I mean, the assumption is that if we had a true understanding of what's really driving a conflict in country X or Y or Region Z, 269 00:28:57,080 --> 00:29:01,100 we could then design the tools to come back to that. And I don't think that's the case. 270 00:29:01,400 --> 00:29:10,480 But you are seeing a proliferation of crisis management actors and that has been taking place effectively since the end of the Cold War. 271 00:29:10,490 --> 00:29:14,360 And if you think about the EU and the its early days in the Balkans, 272 00:29:14,360 --> 00:29:20,329 the African Union in 2005, you have obviously across many subregional organisations. 273 00:29:20,330 --> 00:29:26,600 In some respects the plurality is good because it potentially gives you a more range of options, right? 274 00:29:26,810 --> 00:29:32,810 The problem is understanding and coordinating the plurality of initiatives. 275 00:29:32,810 --> 00:29:40,700 And I think for example, if you see today in the case of Sudan or if you look at Ukraine or even if you think about Libya, 276 00:29:41,030 --> 00:29:45,140 where you have a plurality of mediation initiatives, different people coming in, 277 00:29:45,740 --> 00:29:50,240 all of them declaring that they're bringing with them a peace proposal. The jury is out. 278 00:29:50,240 --> 00:29:58,040 But so far, I'm thinking that if you look at the case of mediation, if you think that take the Horn of Africa, if you take Libya to some extent, 279 00:29:58,040 --> 00:29:58,939 if you take Ukraine, 280 00:29:58,940 --> 00:30:07,790 even the plurality of mediating offers initiatives and actors has not helped any of those conflicts in the resolution of anything. 281 00:30:07,790 --> 00:30:10,850 It's just led to reinforcement of the protracted sides. 282 00:30:10,880 --> 00:30:18,920 The second dimension is even when you have agreement that coordination is challenging sometimes because the same party, 283 00:30:18,920 --> 00:30:23,070 the same government state will take different positions in each and each organisation. 284 00:30:23,090 --> 00:30:29,450 So in Libya, again, we saw even the African Union taking a different stand than the League of Arab States, 285 00:30:29,450 --> 00:30:32,750 of which many of the state parties members were the same. 286 00:30:33,290 --> 00:30:39,259 So I think it can lead to quite a difficult coordination and huge amount of effort get spent on coordination. 287 00:30:39,260 --> 00:30:41,329 And if I think about my time in Afghanistan, 288 00:30:41,330 --> 00:30:47,360 I think a huge part of that fault was we spent so much time negotiating with all the international actors on the ground there 289 00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:54,500 that there was very little time spent talking and thinking and engaging with Afghans in some of the forces and actors. 290 00:30:55,450 --> 00:31:04,090 How can peacekeeping operations learn from past experiences, past shocks, past crises to improve preparedness for the future? 291 00:31:04,330 --> 00:31:12,580 I think collectively we need to have a response to crisis management where the drivers are not necessarily a political agenda. 292 00:31:12,850 --> 00:31:19,900 And here I'm thinking, how do most people die today outside of significant large wars like Ethiopia recently, Ukraine today? 293 00:31:20,260 --> 00:31:24,690 Most people die in countries like Mexico and in Venezuela. 294 00:31:24,700 --> 00:31:31,060 If you look at violent deaths, I'm talking about violent deaths now and they're in non war scenarios, 295 00:31:31,300 --> 00:31:36,640 but scenarios that look and feel a lot like war in terms of violence and in terms of threats to civilians. 296 00:31:37,270 --> 00:31:42,150 We have very little tools to even think about that. Very little tools to even think about addressing it. 297 00:31:42,160 --> 00:31:48,160 So it gets back to the question of how do we understand and even in Mali or Central African Republic, 298 00:31:48,160 --> 00:31:52,059 why do we understand when the assumptions we've been making about peacemaking 299 00:31:52,060 --> 00:31:57,460 and peacebuilding have centred around political agendas and power sharing, 300 00:31:57,670 --> 00:32:02,880 where that may not even be the agenda, where the agenda might be a difference of economics, but greed. 301 00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:06,700 We've had the greed and grievance debate for many years. It would behove this, I think, 302 00:32:06,700 --> 00:32:11,139 to think a little bit about some of the instruments that we we might need to think 303 00:32:11,140 --> 00:32:15,550 about responding to why conflicts are twice as protracted as they are today. 304 00:32:16,060 --> 00:32:21,690 Thank you so much. You've been very, very generous with your time and it's been a wonderful conversation. 305 00:32:21,700 --> 00:32:32,420 Thank you. Thank you. Yeah. You've been listening to Global Shots, the podcast of the Oxford Modern Programme on Changing global Borders. 306 00:32:33,050 --> 00:32:38,060 My name is Young Haiti. I'm a postdoctoral research fellow in international relations. 307 00:32:38,210 --> 00:32:45,890 And I'm the host and producer of this podcast. If you enjoyed this episode, make sure to follow us and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. 308 00:32:46,130 --> 00:32:52,100 Do have a look at the show notes for further reading on today's topic, as well as links to our website and social media channel.