Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Oxford Martin School.
My name's Charles Godfrey, the director. Uh, I'm going to hand over in a moment to our master of ceremonies this afternoon, Ricardo Suarez.
Uh, Ricardo runs, uh, program in African governance.
But just before doing that, I'd like to add, um, my. Welcome to the minister.
Um, the Right Honourable Andrew Andrew Mitchell, who's managed to find time to come up today on Budget day, which we are very grateful for.
And actually, I think it's, uh, Andrew's second visit here.
We had a wonderful program in which Andrew and Margaret Hodge, uh, discussed issues around, uh, uh, money flow and, uh, development.
And I would also very much like to welcome the ambassador of Portugal to the United Kingdom, who's in the audience this afternoon.
So with no more do let me hand over to Ricardo. Thank you, Charles, and, uh, welcome, everyone.
Um, in November 2023, the foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office launched an international development white paper
setting out areas for action across a broad range of development themes and policy areas.
The White Paper does not include new spending commitments, but it is the first UK White paper in 14 years.
It marks a turning point after the turmoil created by the 2021 aid cuts and the
earlier Foreign Office Department for International Development merger two,
we still call it a merger, is that the technical expression,
in particular the papers, provides a meticulous diagnostic of current challenges,
especially in regard to climate change and the way in which geopolitical rivalry threatens to prevent coordination.
To address this and other pressing agendas,
the White Paper recognises the increasingly contested world we face with a more complicated and fractured environment,
as well as the imperative of learning to navigate these challenges.
Today's discussion will consider how to mobilise additional resources for impact when
fiscal and political conditions in the UK and traditional donor partners are unfavourable,
how to work with new and emerging donors and balance the need for more funds against the UK's commitment to its values.
We will also discuss how to manoeuvre in the context of the wide choices of finance now available to most recipient countries,
often with very different terms and conditions than those put forward by the UK.
And finally, we will look at how to balance a focus on climate mitigation,
which is primarily concerned for middle income countries with finance to tackle extreme poverty and climate adaptation,
which is primarily the focus of the least developed countries.
Uh, in order to do so, we are delighted to welcome Andrew Mitchell, the Minister for Saint for Development in Africa,
to the Oxford Martin School to discuss the best way to address these challenges as well as seizing new opportunities.
Andrew Mitchell was appointed to his present role in October 2022.
He was previously Secretary of State for International Development from 2010 to 2012.
He was elected conservative MP for Sutton Coldfield in 2001, and had a long and distinguished career in Parliament and government.
Before that. He is joined on the panel by two distinguished Oxford academics, both of whom have vast experience in the development policy arena.
Emily Jones is associate professor of public policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and the director of Global Economic Governance Programme.
Her research examines the political economy of global trade and finance, and she's currently leading a research project on digital trade.
She is a co-founder and co-director of the Trade and Public Policy Network,
which seeks to foster engagement between academics and UK policymakers on trade,
and recently served as a special of the specialist adviser to the Trade Select Committee in the UK Parliament.
And further to the right, Stefan Derrick is co-director of the Oxford Martin Programme on African Governance,
as well as of the Oxford Martin Programme on Systemic Resilience.
He is Professor of Economic Policy at the School of Government and Economics Department,
and director of the centre for African for the Study of African Economies.
Between 2011 and 2017 he was Chief Economist at the Department of International Development.
He has also served as Development Advisor to the Foreign Secretary.
So without further ado, I would ask the Minister to come to the lecture to deliver his remarks.
Well, thank you very much indeed.
And that's, uh, wonderful to be back, uh, at this great school, uh, in the heart of the second greatest university in the world.
Um, I, I love. Coming to Oxford and I've been I've spoken in this hall before and I've spoken with Stephen and his hall.
I helped launch his brilliant book, which, if any of you haven't read it,
it tells you that the most important single ingredient in development is leadership.
Um, and it's a great, uh, read. Uh, also a great read is the white paper, um, and I, I can ask,
can I ask how many people in this room put up your hand if you have seen the white paper or read it.
Not not bad, not bad.
I mean, I'm obviously very biased, but I think that the 143 pages of the white paper, uh, a real page turner, I think it's impossible to put down.
But for those who do find it possible to put down, there's a Richard Curtis inspired, uh, 17 page which sets it all out.
And the great thing about the white paper, it's been unbelievably well received.
We never in our wildest expectations, as we were flat out for four months, um, to try and put it together.
We never in our wildest dreams believed that it would get the reception.
It got nearly 500 people in church House for the launch in London, and also the strong endorsement by 20 heads of government and heads of agencies,
and also very considerable endorsement by the sector and and those of you who are part of who know the sector well,
we know that that of itself is pretty unprecedented.
Not an easy group to please. Um, and the strength of the white paper I submit to you is that it is all party.
It has got the endorsement of the, uh, Labour Party and indeed of the SNP and of most of the liberals.
Uh, not there are very many liberals, but it's got the endorsement of at least some of that people on the, on the front bench.
Um, so, so it's all party. And of course that really matters because if it hadn't been an all party paper,
firstly, these brilliant officials across Whitehall would not have engaged with us.
Um, and secondly, it wouldn't have endured. So I think this is a, this is a, a paper that takes us to the to 2030.
It will, at least in theory, survive the unlikely event of a change of government when the general election comes.
Um, and, and, uh, I think that, uh, it's very helpful to get a bit of stability because as everyone in this room knows, development is long term.
And the problem with the merger and the, uh, cuts in finance, um,
is that those are short term measures which lead to short term effects and means that the taxpayer actually does not get value for money for,
uh, development in the white Paper. Um, there is the, uh, at its heart, it's how do you get the SDGs back on track?
Uh, at this halfway point, they're way off track to 2030.
And secondly, the subject of this, uh, meeting, which is basically how you ramp up very significantly the amount of finance,
uh, going into, uh, climate change addressing climate change and in particular, adaptation.
Uh, and it talks very much, very easy to do mitigation projects in India.
You can get the finance for that. It is the adaptation in poor countries which is really required.
And, uh, Britain has taken up the co-chair of the Green Climate Fund,
our prime Minister announced a $2 billion replenishment for the Green Climate Fund.
And part of that is we want to support the new executive director, and we want to make sure,
as I as I told her when I first met her, that, uh, we see adaptation projects going ahead in Somalia because that is the acid test.
How do we do that? And also it launches the white paper has a strong section on humanitarianism.
Where next financial year we will spend £1 billion, but also a new fund,
the Resilience and Adaptation Fund, which I very much hope will be, uh, copied by others,
which says this when you are dealing with a disaster, whether it's, uh, an earthquake or drought or famine,
um, you want to try and make sure that these awful events next time they hit,
which sadly they will, that there there's more resilience built into the system so that if you're moving water to an area by lorry,
by water, but the next time you want to ensure that there's,
uh, more irrigation, there's more, uh, water retention, more reservoir capacity, um, and of course, when humanitarians deploy, they won't do that.
They will seek to use whatever funds and support they've got to ensure that, uh, they meet the need.
The Resilience and Adaptation Fund is 15% of anything that is spent in a humanitarian disaster.
Um, and, uh, allows for that separate process of resilience and adaptation to be built in.
No, to the key points of this afternoon's, uh, discussion.
I think, um, we we are trying to, uh,
find the holy grail of the holy grail of climate finance turning billions and trillions is
this you need to take the statist money that is the Multilateral development bank money,
the, uh, DFI, uh, in Britain's case, by undoubtedly now the leading, uh, DFI in the world.
You take the statist money and you link it with the private sector money,
and in particular the $60 trillion of pension fund money, which, uh, if it understood the.
Risk. If the risk could be alleviated or quantified very clearly.
If they can see that they're going to get a return, many of the people whose pensions are managed want them to spend money, uh,
in this area of climate finance, but they want to ensure that they don't lose their money and that they get a reasonable return.
And that is why the marriage of the status money, which could do this to the private sector pension fund money is so very important.
And we've been working closely through the brilliant team at the world Bank that we have the young and very dedicated who,
um, who the president of the world Bank uses, I think, quite a lot as, uh,
as sort of cabinet and a think tank using through them to try and find devices, which means that the, uh,
financial engineering and knowledge which exists across the multilateral banks
is brought together to maximise what they can do with their own balance sheets.
Uh, my favourite example is that if you cut the capital adequacy for the ibid, uh, balance sheet,
if you cut the capital adequacy from 20 to 19, that means they can lend an extra $4 billion, uh, every year.
And if you take it down to 18, that's $8 billion.
You can't obviously continue that process all the way or it would work.
The ratings agencies wouldn't be happy. But but there are lots of things they could do.
And we are seeking to make them do it.
And once they've done it, the Prime Minister made clear at the Indian, uh, G20 that we would be happy to, uh, be part of a capital increase.
We want to see hybrid capital deploy. We want to see more guarantees used.
Um, and we want to see disaster risk finance, uh, used.
All of these things will help the MDB scale up.
And, uh, if you look at, uh, before to move on to the DFI, VII of course, investing, uh, risk capital, no loan involved.
Our risk capital last year, £750 million in, uh, Africa.
We want them to do more in the least, uh, the least developed states.
Um, so they are charts in the white paper to go up from 37% to 50% investment in the least well-off countries.
Um, and the Foreign Office is deploying, uh, through, um, a whole range of different mechanisms.
My favourite is FSD Africa, which is helping to build, uh, core capital market infrastructure in Africa.
There's Excel, there's, uh, mobile assets, which is producing a listed, uh, pipeline, which Stefan will remember, uh, very well.
We're trying to find ways of lowering the cost of the exchange risk, deepening local capital markets and mobilising domestic savings.
Um, and if you look at the flow of remittances across Africa, which dwarfs the flow of, uh,
of aid and also, uh, direct financial investment, you can, I hope, uh, see what I mean?
So that is I think my contribution, my only contribution is about my time is about up, I think now, um, uh, but just let me add a couple of things.
We are very clear in the white paper about the need to, uh, address debt issues in the aftermath of, uh,
Gleneagles and, um, hepatic, uh, we don't want, um, we don't want to add moral jeopardy and all of that.
So we're very keen to make sure that the G20 mechanisms and other mechanisms are enhanced to address debt issues.
Britain has, uh, pioneered and marketed, uh, these, uh, special debt clauses, um, uh, debt resilient,
uh, resilient to climate resilient debt clauses, which we launched in Paris last year,
which give people a two year break when there's one of these awful events in terms of repaying,
uh, capital and interest, they need to use their liquidity for their own, uh, people.
And we need also to attack, uh, the flows of illicit finance, which, uh, alas,
London and the overseas territories and Crown dependencies are all too often complicit in and to champion the Lusaka agenda,
um, and the agenda on, uh, localism, which my colleague Samantha Powers and USAID has said, uh, so many wise things about.
We understand that for development to work really well partnership, uh, localism, the Lusaka Accord principles are vital to get effect.
Thank you very much indeed. Thank you for your opening remarks, Minister.
Uh, Emily, thank you very much. And it's lovely to be with you all today.
Um, my background's very much in trade, in economics, so I'm going to speak to that. But I'm also going to speak mainly about the ways of working.
Um, and I wanted to focus on, uh,
the phrase that you use in the white paper of patron and mutually respectful partnerships, which is absolutely vital.
And I really fully underscore that. Um, and actually, I started my first job.
Um, was actually in it in the early 2000, working on partnerships in Brazil.
Um, with the whole notion that actually partnerships and genuine partnership needed to underpin development.
Um, and it's, it's it's hard.
It's hard when you're in a donor recipient relationship to actually have relationships create those partnerships that are genuinely,
long term, uh, genuinely respectful. Um, so I had a few few comments.
I wanted to actually take us into some terrain I think is not always the most comfortable,
but actually is where we need to think about working collaboratively together.
And here I really commend your cross-party, um,
initiatives to really think about how do we situate the UK 20 years out so that actually these long term,
mutually respectful partnerships are absolutely, um, the foundation.
And I think, paradoxically, here, what we see globally is a huge shift in global economic power, in the global order, in much more contested terrain.
We see the rise of China. New development partners have come up.
Um, so, you know, if you're a developing country, you're looking out for development partners.
There's a there's a there's a will, um, choice to, um, a much more choice, which means that then for us, we do need to have a really good offer.
We need to be there to make sure that we are, um, you know, go to a go to partner, um, which actually creates,
I think, some nimble ness and creativity and some opportunity, um, for us, what might that look like?
Um,
I think there's a few things I think on the and here I want to just think about where are there opportunities for mutual interest and actually really,
genuinely working in a collaborative way with developing country governments because the UK and those governments have got a shared interest.
And here I think at this particular juncture in the global system, when multilateralism is really under threat, really building that system,
and I think to some extent we're re envisaging that system for a multipolar world with a lot of disparate tensions, um, is a really important one.
So I commend very much leaning into that multilateralism and helping to bring and make sure that the larger players in the global economy are also,
um, you know, doing that their part. So I think absolutely leading in the, um, perhaps the, the,
the bit that's been a bit of a pinch point for us in the UK is making sure that then we're upholding that commitment,
international law and sort of principled base approach right across the piece.
And I think here, um, we can perhaps open up the discussion, but it's it's making sure that that cuts right across in all that we do,
whether that sort of respect for international law, human rights, etc.
So again, making sure we're making the case, I think domestically for that values based, principle based international engagement.
Um, which is the second thing I wanted to mention, um, within this, I was thinking about those pinch points.
So I know any partnership, it's making sure that both partners are prepared to adjust, um, where there are frictions and tensions.
Um, and here I think we've done it. We've done a huge amount.
Um, historically, I think some of the points you made just been about illicit financial flows and
acknowledging London's role there and actually being prepared to then act.
I really commend you on raising that right across the board, because again,
it's thinking about what can we do at home that actually is not always easy,
but really, again, shows that we're prepared to be in a genuine partnership, um,
in the trade space, I think again, which is the portfolio I follow most closely at the moment, there's quite a disconnect between,
uh, our trade portfolio, which tends to be a little bit more thinking about short term opportunities.
And actually some of the very important conversations that are happening in Fcdo about diversifying that,
that trading relationship that we've got and building it for the long term.
So again, joining up and I think the trade offer and the development offer um becomes quite important.
So making sure we're making the case across the piece for um development.
Um, the third point I want to make is around the respect.
Um, and here I think it's really interesting question about how do we build respectful partnerships.
Um, the huge value that we have in the UK of having a large number of people from developing country, the diaspora here living and working in the UK.
And as you've said, it's they're the ones sending all the remittance flows that actually massively then outnumber and outweigh our,
um, Oda spend or our foreign direct investment.
So they are the de facto ambassadors of the UK, if you like, that the channel and the mechanism through which that support flows.
Um, so what can we and we've got a huge amount of expertise in long term relationships, not least in this room as well.
So how do we capitalise on that? Not not only within government to making sure those people are really in, um, Fcdo but.
Celebrating those those day today and again here.
I think making the case for the contribution of migrant workers and remittances, um, within the UK, um, domestically as well.
I think it's not again, in the easy moment to do that,
but I think we're making that case and showing that respect again, super important again, that cross-party, um, area.
And finally was just the patient the long time.
And here I really wanted to commend the cross-party nature of the White Paper and all the work that you've done.
Um, because I think the the risk is the sort of short term politics driving the day
and undercutting some of that long term planning and that long term focus.
The more that we can embed a longer term planning within Parliament and across parties and sort of embed that,
I think we're then able to look to the long term and have those relationships
that span and the projects that span to 20 years and aren't sort of hijacked,
um, vulnerable, if you like, to the political moment.
Um, and changes that, that brings. Thank you. Emily. Minister, would you like to address some of those points or would you want to?
I think we should have Stefan first. Okay. He's an expert on this stuff.
Are you sure? Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Well, okay. Well. Thank you.
First and foremost, um, I, um, having left and CEO, uh, before the minister came back, um, I very much welcome,
you know, all the work that's been put in and the idea of trying to bring a vision around development back together,
you know, it's maybe very appropriate that it's Richard Curtis who writes the summary because,
you know, maybe when it comes to development in the UK, it is love Actually, after all.
Um, and an attempt to actually do a bit of that, um,
because it was difficult times and a real concern that people that were working in the development sector,
but not least inside your organisation, working through the merger, the cuts, I mean, these were difficult times.
So, so and I do know and I will want to compliment the minister definitely for it is that,
you know, it is a change of mood inside the organisation relative to us.
It was before that actually there is a sense of, okay, there is a there's a role for the UK in development and to play,
you know, and there's lots of other things still there. And of course budgets are, are tied, but there is at least somehow.
And I definitely know from my former colleagues that there is a bit of a motivation, again, of trying to actually build this.
There are challenges.
And so let me put, put a couple of things about, well, where I think the proof will be in the pudding about the, the, the white paper.
And a lot to do with how it will be implemented rather than what the ambition is.
Okay. And so and of course, it's going to be over time and it's going to take time to put it on and, and just to, just to make sure.
And I and my comments are very much to be seen in the context of the, the time, for example,
that I worked in different and afterwards in nphcda over definitely the different time.
And I will go back say maybe even to to 2000. So even in the 1990s, there were rather benign times for development.
Okay. So there was a relatively simple world order.
There is not a big multiple parity. There is clearly, uh, a beginnings of progress in the world, but also, you know,
things like MDGs and then as the GS, a kind of a commitment to do things.
Um, and actually, we should just recognise it that a lot of the time, the last few decades have seen this quite dramatic progress in,
in, in, in extreme poverty and the reductions of deprivation of its health deprivations or extreme poverty since 1990.
It's two thirds time down and it's combined with actually,
for the first time in history since the I think it's the 17th century where developing countries are beginning to in their economies back,
converging to living standards very still, slowly, but on average, converging back, growing faster than Western economies.
So call it a benign period. And a lot was achieved.
So we now getting here now and I would say, you know, some people say 2015 now this would say 2020,
but definitely in that latter part of the 20 tens, a change in the world structures.
Okay, first of all, you know, um, we have multiple priority emerging different forces playing.
And of course the battlegrounds are these typically or geopolitical forces this in the developing world.
And it's definitely in lots of poor places.
Uh, we can scramble for natural resources again, and not just from one party that used to be called by the last minister.
I had to serve malign forces.
But, um, uh, but there is an element of, you know, there is something there going on and, and but arguably we need terrorist materials as well.
We need the materials for climate change. We need to pay attention to, to natural resources in a way that maybe in different ways, we didn't have.
Um, so there's a. Altered polarity there is. That's part of it.
And of course, there's the climate crisis that actually in a lot of the progress in development somehow or another, that was not a big part.
And I would say these two things, and I want to just for a moment on on make three points down substantively in terms of,
you know, where will the proof be in the pudding, so to speak, for the for the things.
There's many more areas that I'm sure some of you will want to talk about.
So the first of all this, let's speak for a moment up on the climate crisis.
Okay. So clearly, you know, we know the developing world hasn't caused it,
but we need to therefore be part of the movement that tries to help them for the transition and make it make it very just.
But of course, one of the problems is I'm sorry, and I should have added the need for finance that the ministry is alluding to in a big way.
Uh, of course, comes also on the back of this, you know,
the massive finance that will be needed for the transition and to putting countries on a path that is sustainable.
Now, it has one problem, and the problem is as follows that if you think of the urgency of where we need to work on,
this is in the fastest growing economies, because if basically, as Nick stern tends to say, uh, you know, it's in Asia,
that the future of the planet will be determined, they're growing very fast.
And if we don't get the right infrastructure with its energy infrastructure or other infrastructure, they're in place.
And it's fun. Find a way of partnering with them on doing this. And indeed, finance will play a big role in it.
It needs to happen that.
Of course, I'm somewhat and I will fully admit to it, that comes entirely out of work around poverty and as a poverty economist.
The concentration of extreme poverty in Africa.
And so the geographical challenge of where the focus has to be is very different now because the multiple objective we have, which is, you know,
partnering with Asia so that at least we can use and find the way that they go fast enough in the transition
relative to where the extreme poverty is and where I need to work is definitely going to be there.
And so we need to have an answer of how are we going to handle this?
And I don't believe, as some people have said, I think that Mr. Banga has set it as the world Bank.
You know, there are no trade offs between poverty and climate.
No, this is the one that I describe. The concentration of poverty is not in the first place,
is where we need to make sure that the climate, where the climate is not going to destroy the planet.
Of course we can do adaptation, but then we may have to move resources away from mitigation.
And so they are trade offs. You know, I'm an economist. They're all trade offs.
We can't deny it. And we'll need to think through it.
And I just wonder and it's I think the white paper needs to find a way and its implementation in that sense.
The second thing is very quickly is that what does it look like, a white paper like this from a poor developing country?
Okay. I typically have, say maybe African countries in mind, but it could be Bangladesh.
It could be Nepal as well. What does it look like when you see this?
Okay. And now the main thing is that it looks quite all right.
But if I'm sitting in Lusaka or in Accra or in Addis Ababa,
I actually it's a different situation that many of the ideas that were involved and emerged it than it was 15, 20 years ago.
I have a choice. I don't have to look at you. I can look somewhere else.
So the whole idea of of of something that want to be, you know, an element of value driven, of normative aspects of how you do development.
You're facing a world where there is choice.
And to be honest, if I was a minister in a government in Accra or not, this job, I would welcome the choice I have.
I would welcome that. I have a choice.
And so this is actually in a bit like, okay, how do we make the offer we have beyond finance really attractive enough in terms of what we can offer.
And that does mean something different from what I experienced.
Also working inside the system, where maybe it is the interest of the country maybe has to have a bigger weights and the kinds
of mutual benefits you need to be willing to offer enough that actually it's really beneficial.
And that actually this idea and which I worry about. I was recently in Brussels, for example, language around the global gateway.
I'm not saying the white paper does this, but around the global gateway, it's all about driven by national politics.
In the end, in Europe as well, we are going to do partnerships, but clearly because it's in the interest of, of of firms in Europe and so on.
Now it's possible, but you have to work it through very carefully.
And the balance between I might go into the short term, promoting your own national interest,
whether it's from security or prosperity point of view or from votes in the Security Council,
or am I generally going to offer something is a hard job and you need to work through.
And I have the final point. I'm for the moderates. I'm looking at me. Very stunning.
Um, is is the final thing. Remember where the concentration of poor people is?
Who are the partners there? Okay. Fragile states.
Yes. That's a very euphemistic state. I would say there's a lot of extreme poverty.
Typically in countries where those in power don't really care about poverty.
Where we have elites that actually have very different objectives and largely staying in power.
Look at many West African countries. I don't think it's just in itself benign.
Now, who are the partners and how you do it? If you need to go and partner for natural resources, if you need to go and partner for geopolitics,
or are going to need to partner because of poverty and the and it may contradict.
And I do think there's work to be done by the department to really think in this context.
How do you work in these fragile places where actually maybe the objectives of those in power is not necessarily aligned to it?
How do you partner? How do you work? Are you working around it?
But no, you need partners. You need to have ownership there as well. And how can you encourage the generally the group that actually, you know,
you can support those who want to actually positive change in their places without patronising, without imposing.
And how do you actually do partnership in this kind of maybe not so benign places?
Thank you. Um, and I've counted at least seven very interesting questions that both of you asked the minister.
So you may not be able to address all of them in one go, but I'm sure they'll recur with with this audience as well.
When we open up the conversation. So history but.
Well let me. Can you hear? Can you hear me? All right. Uh, let me have a crack at some of at least some of those those points.
I mean, you know, the the, uh, uh, I commented on the merger.
Uh, of course, I'm now a poacher turned gamekeeper.
Uh, many of the things I said about the merger when it took place are not repeatable in a family audience, but the the the, um, uh, my job.
The Prime Minister said to me, can you see if you can make things work?
And what what we've been trying to do is to have a, uh, within the Foreign Office, an entity which can deliver global public goods into the 2030.
That's a sort of, ehm, to see if you can build something which which has the strengths of deferred and also gains in the Foreign Office.
And of course, I remember very well it differed. There were issues we wanted to do, and I had to go and see the Foreign Secretary and say,
you know, will you allow your brilliant network all around the world to champion this?
And one of the things that the Foreign Office really has internalised, very impressive, is the importance of girls and women in development policy.
I've always argued that you cannot understand international development unless you see it through the eyes of girls and women.
Everyone here will know what I what I mean by the Foreign Office really have internalised that point.
But equally, you know, when I got back there, I discovered, uh,
two things in particular, one of which was I may have said this when I was here before,
but it was like meeting people who had coming out from the rubble of a nuclear explosion and who was very,
very disenchanted indeed, and who, you know, remembered that it had been able to make the weather, you know, when David,
it was had such good connections all around the world we could really do things and that the merger had damaged that very, very gravely.
Um, and of course, there's no such thing as a merger. One side always wins and one side always loses.
I learnt that many years ago as a young banker in the city.
So. So, you know, there are real issues that I tried to address.
A lot of them in the Chatham House speech I made, uh, in April last year, where I sort of tried to deal with the structural stuff.
And the white paper seeks to deal with the policy side and of course,
the white the process of the white paper was very beneficial because the development of people who I mean,
some of the key there were 13 people who wrote the white paper with me.
And a lot of us, you know, we worked for 7 or 8 weekends on the trot to try and get it right.
So it lifted the spirits of the development, uh, silo within the Foreign Office.
But it also intellectually engaged these Foreign Office officials and officials across
Whitehall who saw what the development people could do and engaged with it intellectually.
So that itself was a very good, uh, process.
But we've seen a very stark diminution in capacity, uh, within development, wherever you look, whether that was a humanitarian,
where there were enormous number of vacancies, I mean, about half a team of 80 were down to below 40 in that.
And then, you know, the results which we championed so strongly in the earlier phase of this government,
you know, there was no one at all doing results for no one at all.
So the key thing you have to show the British people, if you want them to support a big development program, is that they're getting value for money.
If you haven't got people doing results, you simply can't do that.
Then the whole thing is compounded by the point that you made, uh, which was that for the first time in my lifetime,
the international system is short the rules based system because the Russians,
a member of one of the P5 at the UN, invaded, uh, its neighbour, um, bombed and.
Destroyed its infrastructure. Slaughtered its citizens. This is a P5 member doing something which we thought we could assign to the history books.
It is the era of narrow nationalism now, and it's the era where you badly need all the sinews of the international system,
whether you're dealing with pandemics or protectionism or terrorism or climate change.
Um, as another one, I've missed out. Uh, but but, you know, these are things which really need to have the international system pulling together.
And, you know, whether you look at Trump or Modi or Ji or Putin or Boris Johnson or whatever you've got,
you've got you've got the era of narrow nationalism.
This is the very thing that the our forefathers after the war,
who'd seen the slaughter on the Western Front in the First World War and the carnage of the Second World War.
They wanted an international system, Bretton Woods and all these other things to bind people in.
And and so that that was the next point I wanted to make. I thought you made a very interesting point indeed about, um, development and trade.
Of course, they go absolutely hand in hand this, uh, developing countries trading scheme, which is the best in the world now.
It's better than anything but arms or a, um, very, very strong, better than the EPAs.
Is Britain saying to poor countries, we want to make it easy for you to sell what you can to our country,
and we want you to have the value added in your country.
And we're prepared to, uh, forget about, uh, rules of origin, which in other areas have been very, uh, damaging.
And, um, it's fermented mentioned the importance of the poverty focus.
I thought the big battle in the Foreign Office would be getting poverty into the title of the White Paper.
Very anyone who's operating in the developed world knows that unless you
understand that that is the purpose of British international development policy,
you're completely missing the point. And actually, it's quite easy. There weren't that many people who resist the word, people who resisted it.
And, uh, but there weren't that, uh, that many.
Um, and also, you made the point about not being too pessimistic because we have decreased the levels of,
of, uh, egregious poverty as defined by two thirds.
I thought that was a very good point. Um, on the, um, climate crisis and the anger in the developing world.
Um, and the concern, um, for example, about loss and damage in the, in the developed world.
Um, I would say we put £60 million into loss damage.
Um, we did it because the, uh, you looking at me in a second, a while.
We did it, we did it, we did it.
Uh, I don't over overuse, but, um, we did it because, um, the UAE put in $100 million, um, alongside Germany, I think.
Um, uh, but our point about loss and damage.
I don't particularly like the finger pointing nature of the title,
but that's a that's a minor point is that it has to, uh, bring in non-traditional donors.
You can't just rely upon the classic OECD DAC.
You've got to have the Saudis in that other countries, in the UAE, the Gulf,
you've got to have Russia, China, you've got to have these other countries in there.
If it's to work, um, and you've got to find different sources of finance.
Otherwise it's just Peter robbing Paul. Uh, we put in Oda money, but you've got to find other mechanisms for funding and other people to fund.
So, you know, maybe it's some sort of maritime fuel levy or something like that.
But but that is, that is obviously very much work in, uh, progress.
And finally, how do you work in difficult places? I mean, there's a matrix, isn't there?
Ideally, you want to do as much as possible with the government, but you can't countenance corruption.
You must have a zero tolerance of of corruption because it's a cancer of development, poisons everything.
So so ideally you do as much as possible with a government.
If you can't, you do it with local NGOs. If you can't do that, you do with international NGOs.
Um, and uh, remembering always that we work with people and countries, leaderships like Britain, British Foreign Office recognition.
We don't recognise leaders because otherwise we get into a mess when there are coups.
That's when we recognise countries and, uh, is an important part of development that we,
that we work, uh, on issues which affect the poor people in those countries, of the people whose,
whose standard of living and whose, um, appreciation of the importance of economic development and prosperity,
whose fear of conflict, we are on their side in tapping and driving forward the answers to those things.
Thank you. Minister. Um, we have about 35 minutes left to our event.
And because of, um, very interesting, um, audience we have here with lots of accumulated experience,
I will somewhat abbreviate our our conversation here, but I have just two very brief questions for you.
One of them is, uh, concerns domestic politics.
And I thank you for being so candid about, um, you know, differed and relationship with the Foreign Office in the recent years.
Uh, we much appreciated. Uh, the point is, something seems to have changed in the last two years.
Um, you brought a lot of, uh, you brought a strong tradition of bipartisanship.
Um, Charles already mentioned your, uh, remarkable work with Margaret Hodge, uh, on illicit finance over the years.
Um, and this seems to have affected the way the conversation about the white paper wind.
You consulted very extensively. You involved?
Um, not just Margaret, but people like, uh, David Davis, Liam Byrne, a lot of individuals across the bench who are who were part of the conversation.
Can you tell us a little bit about how that went, that process of, uh, de politicising the development conversation and your hopes for the future?
Do you think that this this is the new normal and we're not going to go back to the way development was,
was politicised, that became so polarising over last 7 or 8 years in the UK.
So. So um, yes, I can I mean, the, the what I always used to say when we were in opposition before 2010 excuse to antagonise,
uh, my then opposition, my good friend Douglas Alexander was I to says is the Labour policy or Tory policy.
It's a British policy and I believe that, if you will.
And we were working very well until Boris came along to embed into Britain the sense that it wasn't charity.
And people continue to say to me, Charity begins at home. To which I always say, but it doesn't stop there.
Um, but it wasn't charity. It was about British interests.
I would argue every penny that we spend on international development is in Britain's interests that we do,
because these egregious, uh, uh, huge differences of wealth and opportunity disfigure our world.
And, and they, they create very unhappy people who are often prey to the terrorist recruiter.
So, so, you know, I would argue that and it's a British policy and we I, I don't I took out all the word leadership in the white paper.
I think, um, along with the word tool, which appeared so often, I thought we should say that.
But the, the, the point is that the more that it is a British approach, the more likely it is to be successful.
And, uh, I hope very much that is the case.
I mean, I talk often to, uh, David Lammy and Lisa Nandy, um, you know, and David very helpfully said that the view on the structure of David,
Foreign Office, they were going to look and see how far I quote, how far Andrew got.
So, you know, that's quite that's quite old to me in trying to negotiate change ahead of the Chatham House speech.
Also, the whole thing is, to be blunt with you, the whole thing is much easier now that David Cameron is back as a foreign secretary,
cause, I mean, I've worked with him and before him for the last 20 years.
And, you know, and on any subject that comes before the Foreign Office,
his views often surprise Foreign Office officials, and they mean they make for change.
I know, and exactly what he's got to think about these days,
because I've worked with him for so long and he's, uh, having him there, particularly as a foreign secretary.
Being a prime minister gives the position of foreign secretary an enormous heft and power.
And I know point about, um, Margaret Hodge and what what happened there is quite instructive because we were both on the backbenches.
She was running the pack and she followed David Davis.
And none of our politics are the same, of course.
But, um, uh, you know, and so she was after dirty money because she was off people evading tax and businesses evading tax.
I didn't come at it from that angle. I think the revenue has as much power as they need.
Probably. But but, uh, I came at the point of view that I wanted to stop, uh, bent, uh, warlords, politicians and corrupt businessmen,
ministers, um, in Africa from corrupt police stealing wealth, which belonged to those, uh, those countries.
And, uh, I wanted to support things like the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative,
which and in our time, Britain joined to try and make sure that the stuff was more difficult.
And of course, what Margaret and I joined up on that basis and we we once paid state visit stage to the three Crown dependencies.
And I don't think till at this point today they recovered from Margaret Hodge's visit.
As we as we as we you know, we. To tell them that their perception of themselves was not shared outside of those Crown dependencies.
They needed to make change, and they needed open registers of beneficial ownership, which, in spite of clear commitments given to Margaret and me,
and the threat of the threat of defeating the government as well on the issue, because we had the people to do so.
Um, in spite of all of that, they still haven't fully signed up to any of this, and they've got to do so.
Um, so, so I think it's an example of quite a good cross-party initiative.
It didn't start from let's do something together, which I don't think is a good basis for all party initiatives.
It starts from the basis. Well, I want to achieve this. You want to achieve that.
So we join forces and that that's that's really, uh, how, um, how we tried to, uh, to do it.
Thank you. And my final question before opening the floor, uh, you mentioned, uh, when we're talking about green transition and,
uh, hybrid financing, I think it was in that context, you you mentioned and I quote, the Saudis should be in there.
Um, and this opens up the question of values versus interests, because what you describe in the white paper is clearly an expansion, uh,
not away from the traditional OECD states, but as you made the point just just a little while ago,
that if it's just the usual suspects, it's no longer enough. Right?
The other hand, there are there are serious issues on which all the UK is not like minded in regard to these states.
And I'll just give you, uh, you don't necessarily have to comment on that in particular,
but I'll give you an example recently from the illicit finance front, the United Arab Emirates,
which is an ally of the UK in many respects,
has just been removed from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force after having been on that green list for under two years.
It is broadly agreed between experts that the UAE didn't do much in order to get out of that grey list.
Uh, but geopolitically, the imperative is that states such as the UK have a strong relationship with that Middle Eastern state.
So where do values meet interests in practice?
That's my my question.
Well, I off the top of my head, I think it was slightly unfairly characterising the Fatf and the way Britain works with with Fatf.
I think you see we, we, we do try and get our friends of the greatest.
We do try to we work with them to satisfy the authorities so that they can come up further.
But equally, there are others who who go on to it where, where reasons of national interest would dictate.
We might try and stop it. We don't do that. We try and work with them to put right the things that that got them underfed often.
And, um, I can't, uh, remember why the UAE cleared the hurdle, but I think you may be putting a pejorative, uh, reflection on it.
I mean, you know, the the. We are working.
When I came back and saw the, uh, the lack of, uh, funding, um, I what I wanted to try and do was to find ways of multiplying the funding.
And so, for example, the use of guarantees, I mean, Britain has produced £6 billion of guarantees,
all of which has meant people the World Bank's got the African Development Bank particularly, which is very inventive in this space.
These guarantees they they are sometimes serious multipliers are multipliers for us because this does not score as Oda.
Uh, so it's way above the Oda limits.
But but uh, what it what it means is that if you give these guarantees, they can lend and sometimes they can lend to multiple of the guarantee.
The reason why we put so much effort into this in these insurance pools,
which are now paying out both in the Caribbean and in East Africa, is because that is a multiplier.
Um, and, uh, you know, the, the stars, the 4 billion stars, which Jeremy agreed could go and fund the two,
uh, anti-poverty funds of the IMF, so worth £5.3 billion, none of that schools out of.
But it's all multipliers getting more money into the international system and
and we're also doing it we're doing joint financing on issues where we agree.
So this is part of the answer to your question. So with with with Gulf states, with with the UAE, with uh, Kate, uh, with uh, Saudi, uh,
we're doing uh, these deal with there are geographies where we both want to do things together,
and there are issues of climate or humanitarian relief or, or, uh, green finance or whatever else we want to do together.
We put our money alongside their money and we pursue a joint objective.
So, you know, it's a sort of bog off arrangement for British taxpayers.
Buy one, get one free. Um, and it's the same thing for the Saudis.
So, you know, I think that's a very good thing to do.
Uh, I am conscious that, uh, um, and I, uh, we all remember Jamal Khashoggi and all these things, but the point is.
Here we are working in a targeted way to do good and to pursue British objectives.
We are working with them on issues where we have a common view, and in geographies where we both want to help.
And, you know, I will be going to China shortly to talk to people and development in China.
We did a lot more of this back in 2010. Uh, 2011, 2012 indeed.
We before the Busan Aid Effectiveness Conference,
we got both China and India into the outer ring of the OECD DAC in the teeth of American opposition to.
But Britain managed to agree that negotiated.
So I'm going there to see what we could do together on China in a very hostile environment politically at the moment.
And, you know, people say, why do we uniquely have an embassy in Tehran when other countries,
when other Western countries don't have the answer to all those questions is the same?
You know, we have to do business with these countries if we refuse it.
Some of my parliamentary colleagues want us to have anything to do with China, you know, how do we negotiate serious climate agreements?
How do we make progress on things that we and they want to progress?
How do we make the international system what's left of it work at all?
And that my answer is, you know, you have to have links and drive forward on issues which,
uh, matter to them and matter to us and where we need to speak.
And, you know, the intelligence services of all these countries always have back channels to each other.
Let's be sensible and pragmatic. Thank you Minister.
And on that note, we're going to open the floor to questions.
I would ask the members of the audience to raise your your arm, uh, your hand, uh, please, uh,
identify yourself and keep your question as brief as you can, uh, so that we can get as many questions as possible.
Larry. Sorry. Someone's coming.
Just a second. All right.
Natalie Woods, thanks a lot. Uh, great. Uh, panel discussion.
Uh, quick question. Um, the emphasis on sweating the balance sheets at the multilateral is terrific.
Expanding the SDGs, etc. Which powerful countries most need persuading of that case?
Who's in the way in the SDGs have still not made their way into the, um, poverty fund at the at the IMF and the the traditionally,
some big shareholders in the bank have resisted the fantastic measures that you were talking about.
So where is it? We should put our efforts in persuading other governments.
Which ones do you think we should be trying to persuade? Okay, so so that's to me, is it?
So yes. Yes yes yes. Good, good.
Nick any question? I thank you, Nick Westcott.
Uh, so now, um, you hinted yourself many that, um, conflict is the one thing that hinders development, increases poverty faster than anything else.
Uh, how much of our aid budget is going to continue to be devoted to conflict prevention?
And how are we going to do it now? As you said, the multilateral system is decaying, and that was the instrument we tended to use in the past.
How are we going to do it now? Thank you, thank you. And we have two questions here Peter Leone.
And then someone there. Oh, that one here. Thanks.
Uh, Peter Leone, question for the minister then a very quick one for Steffen,
which you find very easy, I think, um, to the minister, uh, you talked about the G20.
Uh, and I just want to ask you about Zambia, because that seems to me to epitomise the problems with the G20 debt arrangement,
where China has not really come to the party properly.
Sam has got $13 billion of debt, spending 39% of its budget on debt servicing as a result of what happened under the Lugar administration.
Uh, so my question is, is the model working satisfactorily and where do you see it headed?
Uh, my question, Steffen, is you talk about fragile states in West Africa.
How does one address the issue of Bognor and wants no replace it and Russia.
In the West region. Thank you. And the question of.
Hi, I'm Peter Evans, a freelancer and part of the Brain drain, I guess.
I hope, I hope I can say brain. I just wanted to ask you about the pecking order.
Thank you. The pecking order of issues in the white paper, and the mention of David Cameron and the reassurance of having him working with them again,
and open societies and democratic governance and the sort of the valued,
um focussed offer,
because the kind of compromises that Stefan mentioned about having to work with very difficult partners who don't necessarily share our values,
it does put a strain on on that part of our package.
I just wondered how you how you sort of circle the square or square the circle in terms of all those things and, um, open societies.
Thank you. Emerson. Thank you.
So, um, first of all, to, uh, Larry, who very generously agreed to be part of my, uh, advisory team and the white paper is an awful lot.
Uh, the first meeting of the advisory team, which helped us to frame it, the sort of chapter headings.
A lot of them came out of that. So thank you very much indeed for that.
Um, the, the I had a meeting with the governor of the bank, but the stars, because stars affect different economies in different ways.
So so our use of the stars, I have to be careful.
I get this right. Affects the sort of contingent liability on the national balance sheet for which the Bank of England are responsible.
And so we've asked him and actually, he, you know,
he was kind enough to say that he wasn't on top of this to go and do some more work on it and come back to us.
But we are trying to press for much greater use of the stars.
And Jeremy Hunt has engaged seriously with us on this.
Try and get better, use them. And you know, the the French also the French say that they want to use 40% of their stars, and we've used 20% of ours.
And it would be very good if we could get some more to the African Development Bank and other countries,
uh, and try and do that would be very good for that financing system.
But, you know, I haven't actually done it uh, yet.
Uh, and so there are technical difficulties and we're working to try and, uh, deal with that.
In your question about which countries need to do more.
I mean, I think all countries need to there's a problem with the states, which is their electoral cycle.
And Congress, of course. Um, uh, but but everyone needs to pull together in the international system and play that part.
And it is much more difficult now for the reasons that I, uh, set out, uh,
Nick and so as a conflict, I mean, uh, conflict is development in reverse as a very great,
um, professor at this university once said, um, and so what we're trying to do is to stop and policy is directed at all three of these things.
Stop conflict starting once it started, bring it to a conclusion, and once it's over, try and reconcile people.
Um, and it is unbelievably difficult. There's the white paper.
There are the tools for doing some of this, one of which is the Resilience and Adaptation Fund, which I talked about in my opening remarks.
Uh, Billy is specifically charged to do more in the smaller, poorer countries and conflict affected countries.
It is very, very difficult. And of course, they need a bit of scale in order to wash their face.
So, you know, sometimes there are funds which can be in different countries, one fund, one big fund,
and it can operate in a number of different ways with a local manager with an overall, um, number of projects.
So, you know, they are very inventive and we are looking, um, very carefully at the,
on the, uh, the refusenik from DfID, uh, whose return we are very much one um, uh,
you know, I mean, I was quite, I was in, uh, Zambia and was, uh, you know,
at the time when they were on the cusp and then they sort of got what they needed from the IMF.
Um, and since when, as you rightly say, it's gone backwards. I mean, the problem here is that the debt we are dealing with,
we don't want to get into a position where all the enthusiasm for the debt forgiveness and hyping, which drove big change.
And then, uh, opponents of development cynically say, well, you know, you've done all that now they've all borrowed again and they're indebted again.
And, and we're going back to square one would be very damaging for the aims that all of us in this room share.
Uh, so, so I think it's important to recognise that the debt is different this time.
You know, it's not, uh, debt like it was before. It's debt to China.
It's debt to Middle Eastern countries, particularly. Um, and the G20 is not sufficient.
But I think there are ways of enhancing the, uh, G20, uh, mechanisms.
And we have to do more.
We are fortunately aided by the fact that this is the reason why markets around the world have gone up in the last couple of months.
That it looks as though we got on top of inflation. A channel six check announced today that in the second quarter of this year,
we will be back below 2% inflation and pretty much a very, very significant achievement.
So so that makes the whole business slightly more benign that we're not.
Because we've seen we've seen countries in Africa, uh, paying four times as much in interest and sometimes more than that,
I think, um, in interest um, over recent months, um, as a result, final question about values that you, you, you made.
I mean, you know, it's it's I was in Ethiopia where there is a real danger of a famine 40 years on from,
you know, Live Aid and, uh, Michael Berg and Bob Geldof and so on, there's a real danger.
I managed to go up and see for myself. I've looked through the records and health centres.
I could see what the trend was on the ground. Very, very frightening indeed.
And of course, um, we don't have the ability, which we had back to 40 years ago, to bring relief through Sudan because Sudan is up in flames.
And I will describe the position there as a football has been kicked towards a plate glass window.
It's in flight. We can deflect it if we take the action now.
And we are, I hope, going to take the action. But if we don't take the action, it will smash the plate glass window.
Um, and, and there's an example of, uh, of a country where we need urgently to provide humanitarian help.
Um, we don't agree, uh, with the.
Ethiopia's a good, uh, friend of Britain and, uh, ally Britain.
In some respects, we don't agree with quite a lot of what they do, but we need to keep our eye focussed on the end game.
And, you know, even in a country like Eritrea, with which we have atrocious relations, we just kicked out their ambassador and they won't have ours.
Uh, you know, there is good stuff happening through the multilateral system and Britain's support, sir.
Thank you. Uh, Emily. And then, Stefan, if we could be relatively brief so we can get another round of questions.
So perhaps that minutes when you come back with the second round of answers,
I was wondering what your advice would be for whichever government gets in in terms of just making the case for development and internationalism,
and where actually the pinch points are more, making sure that we can sustain it at home.
What would you, um, sort of top three pieces of advice be, um, to whoever inherits this mantle, our culture.
Okay, so, you know, I was very emphatic, was asked, you know,
we have a minister for International development and for Africa in the room, Minister of the Crown.
And I should answer what we do with thing.
Uh, but I will want to say to very quickly points and that is, you know, um, taking into account all the things the minister was saying.
Um, you know, marketing doesn't come out simply doesn't appear some simply out of nothing.
And it's something that, um, you know, an obsession with stability, for example,
in West Africa and maybe by another geopolitical power or a couple of them,
uh, obsessed with stability is definitely one of the big sources of the instability now,
kind of an obsession to keep the status quo, to keep it as it is,
maybe doing sometimes eight as well as a process, but actually with a bit of an obsession with the status quo in these countries,
gets us to where where the breeding grounds I see from the UK, I don't think, you know,
we are the ones that will be able to contain it, but I do think that I still worry about that.
We're not learning enough from past episodes where it's happening to us in our spaces, in the places where we were very active.
For example, I do regret, uh, maybe it's happening now, but post Afghanistan, there is no serious learning, not just on the conflict side,
but actually also on the development side of how how it is that places where
billions and billions and billions and billions of wind development is into it,
and there is a need for doing that. We need to learn, not least because the world is a very complicated place now.
And I think there is it is an important thing I think needs to happen internally in Fcdo as well to really take these lessons and think, okay,
but what is it that we don't maybe can do so that actually when we come to Wagner we have not a recipe,
but at least some entry points beyond general things, as long as it's development.
Yes, we know development tends to avoid conflict, but that's not where we are now.
How do we rebuild and get, uh, populations to trust, uh, outsiders and governments and whatever?
And so there's work to be done. And definitely learning is central to it.
Thank you, Stefan. And we're going to open the floor for another final round of questions again.
Please introduce yourself, be very brief, and then we'll come back to the minister for a final, uh, set of answers.
Uh, gentleman over there. Thank you.
My queen. I'm a DPhil student here. Um, I have a question about multilateral body governance, which has a narrow part and a broad part so narrowly.
I was wondering if the minister has any thoughts on the proposal by Brad Setser at the Council on Foreign
Relations for the world Bank to be able to issue SDR denominated bonds to really stretch its balance sheet,
which could lead to much bigger flows than the even like 4 billion that he mentioned with reduced capital requirements.
And secondly, and more broadly, I realise that's quite technical.
If he or anyone on the panel has thoughts about governance changes in the governance of these multilateral bodies,
I'm thinking in particular about the head of the world Bank being American and the IMF being European,
and also voting rights, um, in terms of the shareholders thereof. Thanks very much.
Thank you. That's a good question. In the back. Uh oh.
Sorry. Um, hello. My name is George Jones.
I'm a researcher on the Climate Compatible Growth Program, generously funded by the Fcdo.
Um, I have a question about, um, data,
and I suppose the minister mentioned the the most blind funding is obviously a core aim, but it's something that's very,
very hard to do on the ground without good quality data upon, um, risk and, and projects, um, particularly when it comes to adaptation and resilience.
A lot of these are locally deployed projects where it isn't really the infrastructure for, uh, monitoring and evaluation at the moment.
Um, and that's something that I haven't seen much of in terms of financial sector deepening either through FSD Africa or otherwise.
Um, so I'm wondering if that's something the minister could, I could see being a further priority and how that might happen.
Charles, I have a couple of questions from the online audience.
One relates to the question. Just a second, Charles, and not sure if we can hear you.
Thank you. Uh, a couple of questions from the online audience.
One relates to one we've had already about the, um,
what needs to happen to international organisations and extending it to the UN family of organisations.
Uh, what needs to be done about reforming international organisations beyond the
Bretton Woods organisations to the UN family in a complex multipolar world?
That's remark taken. Francis guy asks um, does the, um,
excellent commitments to um climate finance will inevitably come at the expense of money going into poverty alleviation?
Thank you, Charles. And I should add that our online audience following us is roughly double the one that you see in the room.
So, um, is there a final question or two or.
There's a question here. Again if you could introduce yourself.
Thank you. I'm Adam Sparks. I'm a master's student here at Department of International Development.
Mr. I'm grateful for your comments on the dependencies.
I grew up in Guernsey, and at the time that you, Margaret, uh, visited regarding beneficial ownership,
I remember the destitution, um, in the office that I interned at the States of Guernsey.
Um, but you're entirely right, um, that the Crown dependencies have been very slow to implement beneficial ownership registries.
Um, but do you think that Crown dependency example is representative of the UK?
And I'm thinking in particular at the City of London, um, more broadly.
So over the summer I worked with the Indonesian um, taxation Authority, and they have real trouble in doing domestic revenue mobilisation.
Um, when they try to initiate taxation investigations, um, it's particularly difficult to get information from HMRC.
Um, so I'm wondering what sort of cost is that to the city?
Um, if you did pursue a policy that challenges its pre-eminence as a global financial centre?
Thank you. Thank you very much, Minister. So is there anything that you'd like to address before I give the words, the Minister first words.
Right. Um, is this the last row? Yes. So just looking at the time to check, I think you have to leave in six minutes.
So I just about we were told I was worried about, uh, keeping them too long.
So, look, on the last point, uh, you make, um, I'm pleased that, uh, our visit had an impact in Guernsey.
I mean, the the the. The problem with this whole business.
There's a chap called Oliver Bullock who writes very good books on, and they're well worth reading.
I normally find readers like Stefan's book. I pick it up.
You can't put it down. It's so good. But the point is that, uh, the baddies have all the best tunes.
You see, the baddies can employ the best lawyers, the best accountants, um, the best people.
And and and the the government is like the, you know, the CBI, the poor bloody infantry, they're following behind, trying to keep up and catch up.
And the law when we change the laws, we've had a number of, uh, economic, uh, reform and corruption bills.
The, um, you know, the more we try and we're normally closing things and the new loopholes are found by these clever people who advise.
And it's a it's a very difficult situation. And, um, basically, we we are making some progress and, and open registers where we will get there.
There's been a big change in America actually towards there, not open registers.
There's a big change in terms of transparency.
It's transparency we have to go after, because that is how you, you know, sunlight is the best disinfectant.
And the horrific figure is that 40% of all the money laundering goes through London or overseas territories or CDs,
you know, which means we've we've got questions to answer on this and we must get better.
And I've been I've been winding up the Foreign Secretary to to do more on the list because he was the bloke who did the G8 summit, um, which, which,
which imposed open reticence on Britain and haven't worked as well as they should because of the nature of companies House,
which is a library I'm not investigating, ever, but that we've now changed the law on that.
And there will be due investigations and, uh, you know, the, the when these cases happen,
like the one you described from Indonesia, make sure ministers know because,
you know, the HMRC is we have people around the world, uh, uh,
exporting the HMRC skills to show other countries how to run their revenue, uh services.
Um, uh, and uh, uh, you know, so, so I mean making sure we know so we can have a look at it on the Indonesia desk.
The Foreign Office can have a look and see what we can do to help is very important.
Um, the the person who asked a question about whether or not, uh,
climate finance is at the expense of poverty alleviation, I think that was the the question.
Um, I don't believe it is. And I believe like a Venn diagram, there's an enormous middle business.
Um, and, you know, the Prime Minister knows that from 2019 we would increase, uh, um,
the amount of money we were spending, uh, each year, uh, from 500 billion to 1.5 billion on adaptation.
We have the commitment to 11.6 billion on climate, uh, funding by, uh, 2026.
You know, these there's an awful lot of stuff that's in the middle of the Venn diagram,
which I think prevents us from falling into the trap, which you, uh, identified reforming international organisations.
I mean, this is terribly difficult, of course, because the UN is basically built on the post-World War Two settlement.
Um, Britain has made it clear, we think that the Security Council needs to be expanded.
We think that, uh, Brazil and South Africa, Nigeria, Germany, we think it needs to be expanded.
It's incredibly difficult. And of course, it's something which, uh, Secretary-General will only embrace in the second term of office,
because it's going to create a lot of difficulty. And there are people who've made a lifetime career of the UN blocking change.
So so it is very difficult.
And, uh, uh, you know, I when I was in opposition, I wrote a pamphlet called, uh, The Failure to Protect about the responsibility to protect,
which ought to be one of the easiest things to, uh, change, but it hasn't really changed.
Uh, to be honest, data, uh, I completely agree.
I thought it would be cruel to FSD Africa, which is an absolutely brilliant organisation.
I'm doing real work to transform the financial systems in countries doing very well.
But the point about data is absolutely critical in the white paper.
There's good stuff on digital and, uh, research, the science of data and so on, which, um, if you probably already seen it.
But if you haven't, do look, because I think it's quite powerful.
And if you have, um, uh, uh, uh, ideas of how we can drive that forward, please do, uh, let us, uh,
no, um, multilateral governance esta, uh, uh, denominated bonds and the governance of the world Bank.
I mean, I think all these things, we need to try and drive forward. They are more difficult in the current context.
But the powerful lead of the IMF, the fact we've got a chancellor, uh,
in London who's very interested in this stuff, the Bank of England, you know, everyone needs to do more.
And if we could get an SDR dominated, uh, bond. That would be terrific, but there are difficulties in achieving that.
We are we are looking at all these things.
And because we've got this very brilliant team in Washington, which AJ Bagga uses to some extent as a bit of a think tank.
Um, we are able to drive these things forward on the, um, very good point you made about the governance of the world Bank.
I mean, it is ridiculous, really, that it should have be done on on merit.
And back in 2012, uh, when, uh, Bob Zelnick, uh, left, uh, many of us tried very hard to subvert, uh, uh, the current system, but it survived.
And, uh, you know, it's the Americans don't put money in, uh, which, uh, threatening not to at the moment.
I mean, they're not friend is going to get through Congress, you know,
that will undermine the American hegemony in the world Bank and not just in the world Bank,
because, of course, they always run the World Food Program and, uh, Unicef and so on.
So, so, so, um, I disagree with this.
I think it should be done on merit. You've got to find a comprehensive way of, uh, deciding.
And of course, when the Chinese bank, uh, which is which we, uh, we have a vice presidency of it,
that Alexander is one of the the, um, uh, the vice presidents there.
It's doing very well. It started really because of the failures of governance, which you mentioned on the world Bank is doing very well.
The Americans are furious with us when we when we agreed to be a core, uh, shareholder.
Um, but actually, you know, it's a proper multilateral bank and it's governed in all the right sort of ways.
Um, finally, uh, two things on, on, on Virginia and France and values and so on.
I mean, the it's extraordinary that France, you know, France is in a terrible position in Africa.
And, uh, we've seen the good and often it is because of the relationship,
whether they decolonised they keeping having deals which are out of date on access to mineral wealth and,
uh, in particular the nuclear mineral wealth, um, uh, uranium,
um, uh, you know, and so this relationship has gone badly wrong, not in our interest, in my view, to, you know, when I was in DfID,
we worked against the Russians and the French and the Chinese in Africa, we now have with the French much more.
And I think that's the right thing to do. And it's extraordinary, too, because Macron, I think,
is by far the most friendly to Africa and understands a different generation from the older people.
But, but, but a real understanding, um, uh, when he had his summit and um, uh, uh,
with the Indians in Paris last year, I heard him speak, uh, on two occasions.
And really, um, I thought it was real depth of understanding.
And so it's a tragedy in a sense that it's on his watch that this has, uh, has happened, but but in the end, it's values.
It's working together, it's localism.
Uh, it's showing people that our values are superior to the values of the Russians and the Chinese.
Um, and also doing some of the good things.
There are a few tiny good things that, uh, in theory, asserts that it does.
I mean, everything involved in does is terrible. And the record in Africa of human rights abuse of pillage is absolutely appalling.
But, you know, if if other countries who have better values provide some security.
So things that matter in these countries, that is something which we should do more to explore.
And finally, making the case for development, uh, if it's all party, it's easier.
I mean, we came very close to defeating the government of defeating Johnson on the point seven very close.
If the speaker had called the amendment to the bill, the RBA bill would spend Oda money and the the amendment very simple, but I think rather clever.
It said that if government doesn't spend 2.7 anything between what it spends 80.5 and point seven,
it has to spend through this innovation act, which spent Oda money and the speaker very near record it.
Had he called it, it would have been an it would have been an epic moment because it would have been the
House of Commons members of Parliament banding together and stopping the executive,
cutting the point.
Seven um, and it would have, uh, it would have humiliated the government because it would have been a moral point as commercial banking.
Anyway, he didn't call the amendment, and there we are.
But but the point is that that, uh, that would have been a very, very good sign indeed and would have driven it forward.
And and in the end, you know, uh, we have set up this new platform called active,
which is a which is joint between the government and the, uh, civil society and civil society are putting money into it.
Governments putting money into it. There are rules which have to be, uh, carefully kept because you can't have a government campaigning,
you know, in a way that appears to take electoral advantage, for example.
But, uh, the active of this new platform, as we get it going and it's beginning to move now, the new foreign secretary is very enthusiastic about it.
That is that will be very helpful as well.
But in the end, standing up for it, I say to people, you know, when you're at the bus stop or in the pub, uh,
or indeed at the Heathrow security, one day when I heard someone say behind, that's the geezer that gives all our money to India.
And he said, um, you know, you're not arguing the toss.
And when people say, well, charity begins at home. So yes, it does, but it doesn't end there.
You know, I think I think we have to stand up for this.
Um, and the thing I am most proud about in my, uh, government career is being part of a government that,
in spite of the austerity that was then faced by Britain and the fact that budgets were being cut,
uh, everywhere in 2010, George Osborne, David Cameron,
they stood by the promise to the poorest people in the world, and they brought in the point seven.
It wasn't a Labour government that did it. It was the coalition.
And it was the conservative leadership of David Cameron and George Osborne which honoured that pledge,
something that Archbishop Desmond Tutu, uh, said that a pledge to the poorest people in the world is a sacred thing.
You know, they did it, and I honour them for that. And I'm enormously proud to have been a member of an administration that did that.
I'm very ashamed that it was thrown back some years later.
Thank you. Minister. Um, it's been a privilege to welcome you back to the Oxford Martin School.
Um, thank you to the minister and Emily Jones and Steffan Durcan for this really, really great event.
Please join me in thanking the speaker.