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Almost ten years before that.

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Two other universities we see that each one quite a few of those.

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Love technology.

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He's quite a writer and he's written about many different topics that most currently writing on the project called The Politics of Crime.

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Just concerned, I think he mentions that the relationship between crime, control and Democratic policy.

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So his research and his teaching exposed the crime to the justice and the political framework within which that takes place.

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His presentation today is called Promiscuous Government Nature Space in Search of the Public Interest.

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Okay. Thank you very much.

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Let me first just echo the thanks to my colleagues for so for the invitation and for your own very kind and generous hospitality.

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It's been a long cherished ambition of mine to come to India. So this fall gives an opportunity to to time's up.

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Before I start, I should also just correct a couple of potentially misleading impressions.

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And Carolyn, in her introduction this morning said, I was the only member of our party who could claim to be a lawyer.

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And I kind of feel a complete confession is required at this point.

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The complete confession is that I have a 28 year old law degree, and as I discovered in life,

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there's few things more useless than a neglected old law degree. So I was once taught law does so.

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So that gave the impression I was rather closer to your concerns that I in fact, of all the other.

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The other misimpression I want to clear up is I appear to have the title and the paper,

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which is the most remote from the stated objectives of this conference.

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As was alluded to at the outset. So the impression,

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the misleading impression I want to clear up here just by way of self thing is to

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suggest a number of reasons why it's not as remote as it might at first seem.

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And I think there are three. Firstly, it seems to me and a number of other people who work on criminal justice in policing these days,

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that you really don't do adequacy to the world in which we live. If you just study the processes of state ordering and justice and the words in many,

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many jurisdictions across the world of which mine is one, and I would rather that yours is another.

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Policing protection, security, justice is not just a conservative state institutions,

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but is increasingly a concern of actors who services are purchased through through mechanisms of market exchange.

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And I think that it's incumbent on us, therefore, to think not only about the relationship, not only about state and non-state justice,

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but also increasingly about the meshing of public and private policing and justice systems.

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And the second. The second reason to think this is closer than you might you might first imagine to the concerns of the conference,

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is that the particularly the way I want to think about it, the private security system.

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He raises a series of issues to do with regulation,

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to do with legal reform of a similar kind to those that one would engage in a form of thinking about

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how you go about rectifying questions of failure and wrongdoing inside state criminal justice system.

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And thirdly, it strikes me that what private security does is raised very explicitly,

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at least we think about it properly and raised very explicitly a set of questions that are sometimes buried in discussions of state criminal justice.

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And these are a set of questions basically about distributional justice,

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about the idea and the problem of how the benefits and burdens of ordering and policing and justice systems actually get distributed as between us,

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between individuals and groups. And in what kind of relationship to the risk that different individuals and groups differentially face?

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And the other thing I just want to say by way of a prefatory remark, and I'm not I'm not the respondent, I'm going to be my own respondent.

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That's that's that's just not the easy thing to do.

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But it does say this time, sensing that the one the one thing that we are all illustrating is different stages of the empirical research process.

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And so Carolyn is someone who is deep in the middle of it, and Alpha is someone who is trying to get a project off the ground.

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I'm about to give you a paper which is in the sense of to some extent about a

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project that I've just completed on the market for security products and services,

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but also an attempt to kind of use that research to kind of revisit an old debate and to think about it, hopefully in some new ways.

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And that old debate is a debate about the regulation of the private security industry.

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So that's what I want to talk to you about today.

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It doesn't make sense to me to labour the point that the private security in all its various guises from guilty

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Geordie labouring through to and through to technology through to its involvement in various forms of security.

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Policing is a fast growing industry. I tried to do a little bit of background research on private security in India.

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In India, to which I'll just give a few things. And one that has almost nothing written about private security in India.

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In India. So if anybody is searching around for research projects in the room, come and talk to me afterwards.

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I also mentioned something to the best estimate is there are 5 million people

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in this country working in the private security industry in various guises.

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And private security brings to its customers a number of state advantages in terms of expertise,

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in terms of dedicated service, in terms of accountability to customers.

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But also, my judgement raises a series of what you might call public interest considerations.

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In other words, the more that the market for policing becomes a market,

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the more that there is a risk that resources are distributed in inverse relationship to people's actual vulnerability to victimisation.

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The more there is a risk that the market, private markets and security chip away at the kind of collective commitments to collectively,

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as it were, funding and providing security as a public good.

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I mean, the more you think about private security in these ways, the more it acquires.

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And what John Dewey, fantastically called a public capacity, was it becomes a legitimate interest of all citizens,

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not merely those who engage in the buying and selling of goods inside that industry.

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So the question that we've been forced to revisit and the basis the research that I mentioned it briefly,

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is how can you better rely on the assumption that it's not going to go away and there may

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be no good normative reasons why you would entirely want private security to go away.

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Given that, it's hard to say, how can you better align the private security industry with considerations of the public interest?

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And the reason for the thinking about this is a kind of regulatory question was all dissatisfaction

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with the way in which private security regulation actually gets discussed in the existing literature.

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Now, in that literature, we think you can find two, two dominant models for the sake of simplicity,

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one of which we call the idea of cleansing markets, the other one which seeks to communalism markets.

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And we'll say more about these in a small while for our point of view,

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what these two in many ways very different models share in common is a kind of a set of standard neoclassical assumptions about how markets for

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security work and in which they assume that people who are buying and selling security goods all as they would for any other markets rational,

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calculating, egoistic, obsequious off to their own interests were somehow lifted from any kind of moral or political or social or cultural context,

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which may in some way shape the ways in which they behave in those markets and

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indeed their inclination to enter or not into those markets in the first place.

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All research in the hour. Here is myself and my co-author.

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We work for the University of York. All respective research,

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different projects of recent years has led us to challenge this view because both of our studies of

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private security in the UK have demonstrated that this in fact is a market in all kinds of ways,

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is shot through with moral and political considerations of various kinds.

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In other words, when people think about whether or not to buy security,

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they are not solely thinking about Can I afford this, will offer me protection.

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But in some way their minds are also full of a series of considerations to do

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with the relationship between the potential purchase of this particular product,

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say G.P.S. Chocolate or a hired guard, and a series of other things about which they care what you do with relationships and mutual trust of privacy,

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of solidarity, of conceptions, of community and so forth, so forth.

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And trying to put my glasses on because I can't read the thing I wrote about 10 minutes ago. And that was is it?

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The security markets are a market in which a market and not market consideration considerations are always in some

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sense colliding and where the decisions to purchase products are always in some sense shaped by no market values.

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Furthermore, specifically in relation to the security industry,

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we are talking about a market in which the players involved or in some sense deeply themselves,

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deeply embedded in longstanding processes of state building,

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in which the idea that the security is delivered equally to all the what we call the modern probably the modern democratic promise

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of security is somehow also imbued in people who are trying to seek to sell or buy additional alternative forms of provision.

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Now, thinking about that security in those terms, as it were, as a moral economy,

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as leaders to approach the question of regulation in a slightly different way,

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and just try and find ways of thinking about how to harness those no market values in the way in which security,

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the private security industry is regulated.

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No, it's how can we how can we regulate security in ways that honours these plurality of understandings that shape the market,

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a factor which seems to me to lead you to towards a form of regulation, which isn't about just trying to control for market failure,

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but producing efficiency to dealing with just the quality of goods, but also trying to protect,

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preserve and give expression to and protect the range of non-market, otherwise political and social values that the security industry impinges on.

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Furthermore, just by way of introduction,

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it seems to me that the other thing we've been trying to do is to try and connect the debate that currently takes place about private security

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regulation to a much wider and I've discovered huge and sometimes rather tedious literature on regulation more more broadly conceived.

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But from that literature, we've taken three things which we want to build into the model that we're trying to develop.

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Firstly, the now close to being axiomatic, saying that regulation is dissented.

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In other words,

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the model of regulation which just assumes that the state is a regulator and exists in the kind of command and control relationship with the the

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industry or the companies they're trying to regulate has long since been jettisoned in favour of a much broader notion of regulatory space,

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which one encompasses a whole range of different state and non-state actors in the regulatory process

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and doesn't think the regulatory relationship just goes one way from the state to to the market.

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Secondly, we've taken on board the idea that there is no single regulatory template which you can start

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to carry around with you and just plonk down on any market activity you want to regulate.

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But you need to tailor regulatory strategies and tools to the peculiarities of the market you're trying to understand and control.

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And secondly, that any regulatory activity requires some clarity.

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Thirdly, sorry,

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requires some clarity as to the goals and values of regulation and what you one needs to provide a kind of clear and cogent answer to the question,

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Why are you trying to regulate this industry and for what purpose?

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Now it's it's with that in mind that I want to both talk about two existing models of regulation as a kind of ground theory exercise,

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as a prelude to trying to introduce and kind of articulate the merits of, shall I say, of the third preferred alternative.

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Now, the reason I don't have a PowerPoint is for all the reasons to do with technological failure that you just had illustrate it to you.

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And because we've achieved a remarkable feat of reducing a 10,000 word paper to one one table, which you can all find on page 94.

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So I'm just going to spend the next 10 minutes basically elaborating on that table.

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And if you prefer to have some notes to follow and that's the place to look, right?

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The default model in the in the in the discussion of private security regulation,

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we have we described I should make it clear that these are all terms,

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not the terms of the the people associated with these models described as trying.

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You cleanse markets. This is very much the default position in the literature.

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As I've stated already, it rests upon a series of neoclassical assumptions to do with the fact the buyers and sellers voluntarily enter markets,

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have information available, take rational, calculating decisions,

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and so on and so forth, and that the problems and as it were,

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the public interest issues that arise in relation to markets occur insofar as the security market doesn't operate in those ways.

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And three particular problems of articulated within this model which a system of regulation has to deal with.

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Firstly, the wide the widespread recognition that security is a grudge purchase, but which I mean,

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we've we've found this in all research as well and tried to deepen our understanding of

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it that that that people don't don't buy security in the way that they buy clothes.

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The security is the security is is a form of consumption that people are in

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some sense dragged to sometimes by the stipulations of insurance companies,

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sometimes by health and safety regulation, sometimes by the experience of victimisation, which they don't want to be repeated.

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And that that, that that grudging nature of purchase creates an industry.

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This is particularly acute in the guarded the the guarded security sector in which there's a deep reluctance

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to believe that you can purchase pay more for more quality and a market which is extremely price sensitive,

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which makes it for the people who are selling those goods extremely cutthroat and competitive.

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This the argument runs tends to generate an industry with fairly low standards, with fairly poor staff,

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with recruitment, with low pay, with a great deal of churn and so on and so forth.

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And this leaves the market open to what the British call the mark button called deviant influences.

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In other words, a whole series of recurring problems to do with malpractice fraud, corruption, false arrest,

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poor training and so on and so forth, which have now become recurrent findings of anyone who does work on private security.

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Now, the solution to this problem inside the cleansing model is firstly, it's interesting to note focussed on sellers, not buyers.

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The point to which I'm concerned and does cleave to that assumption about regulation,

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which I previously just indicated, was somehow now considered rather antiquated.

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In other words, this is a kind of this is a kind of state centred solution.

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And the cleansing model continues to operate on the idea that the state is the principal regulator.

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And through a series of command and control, basically through the issuing of rules that it can bring the industry into line.

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And the particular form this is taken across increasing parts of the world in recent decades has been the introduction of state licensing systems.

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In other words, it says if you as an individual or you as a company want to operate as a private security industry,

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you need to obtain a license from the state and therefore you need to meet certain minimum requirements in terms of training of staff,

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in terms of criminal record background checks and so on and so forth.

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And through these means the industry can be cleansed, hence all title of its deviant operators.

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Now with that in mind, what those working in the in the cleansing tradition, if you like, have done in recent years is two things ready.

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One, to kind of do a kind of collation job, to look around the world and just compare and contrast different kinds of licensing regimes.

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And as I note in the paper, there's a recent UN document which is kind of brought all this stuff together.

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And secondly, to kind of to go through those existing regimes and try to identify what you might call forms

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of best practice and then become then try and generate models of regulation on that basis.

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But that regulate that regulatory model is always takes the similar kind of form, in other words,

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to try and regulate just enough to cleanse the industry of its deviant influences, but not so much that it becomes an excessive regulatory burden.

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Now, in all kinds of ways, this is a valuable way of thinking about the regulation,

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that the industry is no part of our case to say that somehow this somehow licensing is no, it doesn't have its place and needs to be jettisoned.

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There's also some evidence it does work. It does it does exercise a kind of cleansing function if you get effective state licensing systems in place.

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But nonetheless, there are some limits and I'll briefly just mention three. Firstly, within the cleansing model,

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there is there's almost no attention paid to the kind of distributional issues involved in the in the emergence of private security,

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nor of the kind of nor of the kind of relationship that you might want to in any attention

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to the relationship between private security and the practices and values of democracy.

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Nobody's regulation here. It's about correcting for market failure and nothing else.

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Secondly, as I mentioned, it's all very centred on rule based know.

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So if you think about regulation as a kind of space involving a number of actors,

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then the cleansing model doesn't mobilise many of those actors in the regulatory process.

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And so it is very conservative. I suppose it depends on your point of view with. Do you think this is a good thing or a less good thing?

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By which I mean, it's kind of stated reform agenda is to find the kind of best,

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the best that's currently happening somewhere in the world and to try and spread it as if the best that we can

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hope for in social and political life is the best that we can come to identify in some place in the world.

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Right. Secondly, we're now in the middle of the table,

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and what we call the communal housing model also rests on a series of neoclassical assumptions about how market works.

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But in almost every other respect differs from the cleansing model.

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It differs in the following way. Firstly, it is focussed on problems of distribution.

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It's secondly, it seeks to empower buyers rather than kerbing sellers.

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Thirdly, it's dissented radically, dissented in the way of demonstrate shortly.

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And thirdly, it brings questions of democracy, and in particular,

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the attempt to involve local communities in deliberative democratic practice around how security is delivered.

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Makes that central to the business of regulating security.

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Fifthly, when you start saying the list to get into law anyway, this never nearly finished.

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It's not conservative. Far from it, but is engaged in that practice of trying to radically realign the relationship between states and markets.

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And finally, a mere form is part of a much wider conceptual framework, which has become known as nodal governance,

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through which you need to understand the particular regulatory strategy which emerges here.

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This requires me to spend 2 minutes on local governance,

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and nodal governance is is a body of work in the security literature associated principally with clyfford sharing of the

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University of Cape Town and many of his other colleagues who in the 1990 and 2000 really made the following claims.

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Firstly, they made an empirical claim to the fact that if you're studying policing and security,

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you should no longer assume that the state is the major player in the game, and in particular either in providing security or regulating it.

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And certainly you should no longer treat that somehow as a starting assumption

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for doing research or thinking about any kind of policing the security issue,

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but instead treat that as an empirical question of whether any particular jurisdiction should

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just damn well find out who all the major players and providers in any particular nexus.

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And in this context, sharing these colleagues become particularly interested in what they call nodes, by which they mean quite small locations.

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They could be shopping malls or leisure complexes or gated communities or universities, all of which are,

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in some sense now in the business of sourcing or providing or regulating their own forms of security, hence the term nodal governance.

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Now, on top of that principally descriptive claim about how the world is,

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it rests a kind of normative claim that no forms of nodal security or in some sense better

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for the denizens of particular nodes then old fashioned forms of state centred security.

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And this all rests on a kind of a kind of borrowing of the kind of hierarchy and that it's

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not so familiar to the critique made by the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek of states,

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as opposed to markets and high exclaimed was that remote state official was lack the knowledge and the ability

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to to discover the knowledge to be able to respond effectively to the needs of individuals and communities.

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And this can be done much better through the mechanism of markets and prices and so on and so forth.

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And the extension of this nodal governance serious make is that those operating within particular nodes are much better able to to articulate

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and understand and source their own forms of security than than simply relying upon remote bureaucratic organisations of the state.

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And the problem that arises in this context is that that form of nodal kind of dissent and security,

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as sharing and failure points out, actually generate a whole series of unequal distributions.

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In other words, the well-financed, well-to-do nodes with large amounts of social and political capital are able in

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this world to generate for themselves much greater forms of protection than,

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for example, poor communities. Now, the solution that one finds within this this form of regulation is not, as neoliberals would have it,

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to treat this as just a natural order of things, or as many liberals and Social Democrats would try to do,

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is to try and reasserts the authority of the state over the world of policing and security, but instead to empower buyers, in other words,

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to try and find a way of community izing security markets so that they can meet the needs of poor as well as rich communities.

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And particular mechanism that sharing and Bailly found to doing this is to try and is through a system what they call block grants.

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And it was, in other words, involving local, often local,

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state actors and giving local communities a kind of security port which they can decide how to spend as they see fit.

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Now, it's safe to say. I think this model has various kinds of advantages in terms of involving a whole series of new matches in regulatory

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space and involving in the kind of encouragement of democratic participation in how that block grant can spend,

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for example, but continues to do well. It's two features.

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One, it's entirely focussed on buyers and not seller.

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So there's a kind of unstated assumption that under this community, those market sellers will kind of come to the ball,

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if you like, and it continues to rest on a whole series of assumptions of a neoclassical kind about how markets work.

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How long ago? I told you, I'm unlikely to need all seven.

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Okay. Right. Finally. And we should be clear, though, in making this this third proposal.

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We have no ambition to somehow kind of wipe the field clean so that we can

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entirely occupy it with this kind of new model of regulating private security.

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In many ways, what we propose is an attempt to kind of keep in place and build upon some of the insights and regulatory

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regimes that have been generated on the back of what we're calling the cleansing and criminalising approach.

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But nonetheless, we want to endeavour to provide a model of regulation, private security,

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which is in some sense a genuine alternative and which has its ambition,

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as we put it, to civilise markets, but which we made an attempt to try and reap the benefits that private security can bring.

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As described at the outset.

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But to try and situate private security in a regulatory space in such a way that it doesn't threaten the egalitarian project of providing

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equal protection for all and in some way exists in a greater degree of alignment with the various kinds of non-market values trust,

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solidarity, human rights, which in various occasions private security can threaten.

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So the question is how can you realign regulatory space in order to try and do that?

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And I'll just say a few words about that.

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Now, the first thing to say, and this is where my thinking on this is really been a product of this research project,

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which I'm going to just treat in the place, in the background for the moment,

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which is going to change the way in which I think we we should think about how our security markets work and has developed,

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in my mind, the idea that they are forms of moral economies. And I think this is true both among both among buyers.

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And we met various forms of evidence about the ways in which very, as I said at the outset,

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various kinds of non-market considerations to do with, well, what effect will buying a GPS tracker have on my relationship to my children?

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Or what does living in a gated community say about the relationship,

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about the kind of country I live in, about the kind of neighbourhood it is, and so on and so forth.

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I could go on and chapter verse on that. Perhaps more surprisingly, we also found that more ambivalence about security among those who sell security.

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And so if you sit down and if you read the trade press in the U.K.,

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when you sit down and talk to security sellers, those two things become very apparent.

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Firstly is they will go on endlessly about how the industry is full of people who are sullying its reputation,

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about selling bad products, about not properly regulating their charging.

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They're not charging a high enough price. And in other words, this is kind of widespread recognition that, of course,

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it's never the person you're speaking to who is making this claim, but the other people in the industry are somehow tainting it.

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And so it's a slight stretch to say that this is an industry marked by self-loathing,

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but it is an industry marked by a remarkable degree of kind of ongoing critique of the of the other players in the industry, damaging its reputation.

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The other striking thing you find when you talk to people who sell the security industry is how often

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or how infrequently they use what you might call market based legitimation to describe what they do.

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In other words, they rarely say we're generating wealth, we're providing jobs,

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are doing with the kind of things that the private, private industry does. Instead, they borrow from other kinds of non-market, legitimate actions,

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one of which there's many of which which we should be describing in a recent paper,

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and one of which is to try and borrow the symbolic authority of the police.

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And in other words, in terms of the uniforms, in terms of in terms of making marketing use of police credentials,

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in terms of trying to improve their relationships and so on and so forth.

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All of which suggests that in all kinds ways that that moral ambivalence about the idea that security can be something that

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can be sold and finds its way into the dispositions and sentiments and practices of the people who are engaged in selling it.

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Now, the lesson we draw from from that that finding is twofold.

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Firstly, that we shouldn't create security markets and therefore the private security industry as just a form of standard consensual market exchange,

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but instead is a form of social ordering in which a practice of governance that is deeply

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implicated within modern forms of security and in some sense an ever present threat.

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Great to a greater or lesser extent to security, modern democratic promise, the idea of equal protection for all.

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And then secondly, if you think about the security industry as a form of moral economy,

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the idea of regulation is no longer just about trying to impose something on that market from the outside,

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but trying to harness a series of sentiments that are already present among the buyers and sellers of these goods.

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In other words, you can address the private security state not simply as economic actors.

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I'm trying to say they're not economic actors, but also as moral actors.

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Now what we draw from this is a model of what we describe as democratic guardianship,

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which is a model which seeks to somehow protect the is the idea of equal equal of equal protection

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under conditions where security and policing is going to be provided by multiple providers.

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And I don't I don't want to give you chapter and verse on what this might look like, but you say a few things just to to to finish off.

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Firstly, that our model is a model is one which is tries to involve both buyers and sellers, not just buyers or sellers in the other two.

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And secondly, there is no model principally organised around groups.

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In other words, with largely a move beyond that kind of command and control, conception of regulation towards one which isn't, which is,

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makes much more room for four principles for trying to find appropriate principles through which regulatory space can be structured.

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And now there's a long discussion in the regulation literature about the effective worth of rules and principles,

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which I don't need to bore you with now.

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There is a there's a time and a place and a space, the rules, but rules that also have a number of well-known disadvantages.

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They create perverse incentives. They encourage people who are subject to rule, regimes they don't believe in, to engage in forms of gaming.

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They the appearance of rules being followed.

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It varies of manufacturer in certain forms that there's a this throw is a sociological wheel out of this point to demonstrate that point.

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And in that context, it seems to me to be space.

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How do you regulate private securities for trying to articulate, trying to use principles as one of your regulatory tools?

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Now, the point about principle, as John Braithwaite points out,

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is it stipulates a goal without telling those who are being regulated how they how to go about meeting that goal.

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And by so doing, invites them to become participants in articulating how it is that that particular goal should actually be met.

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And that's essentially what principles do within regulatory space.

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They actually make those being regulated, not simply the subject of regulatory control,

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but they try and those of them as partners in a regulatory conversation.

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Now, in that context, we could have a long discussion and no doubt disagreement about the appropriate

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principles that might one use for trying to civilise securities markets.

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The suggestion we make in the paper is you might want to reorient regulatory space around to firstly a principle of public

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deliberation in which the idea that the regulatory actors are involved in trying to to foster and sustain an ongoing public dialogue,

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not only about how this industry and how it's working,

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but about its appropriate reach and limits and about the about the kind of meanings and sources of security where

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the legitimate participants in that discussion and not just the people who buy and sell these goods and services,

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but all of us as citizens.

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And secondly, a principle of solidarity, which is basically a way of saying that we need to find a kind of regulatory regime,

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which it tends to make central to what it does,

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the kinds of distributional effects of markets in security devices and which treats the tracking and monitoring and,

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if necessary, the repair of those distribution injustices, a part of what regulation is about.

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Now, there's a final part of the paper for those of you who read it in which we just try and sketch.

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And it's very much a rough guide of how you might reconstitute a series of

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relationships inside regulatory space between the securities industry and regulators,

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between the industry and place, involving the role of trade associations about how we might mobilise civil society in which we're going to sketch,

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how you might kind of reorient regulatory space in order to give effect to this principle of democratic guardianship, as we so call it.

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But if you want to talk about that, we'll do it in discussion and I'll stop there. So thank you.

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I was asked to find this response, which I'm more than happy to do, but I don't know what it means.

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Very much so I'm going to take.