1 00:00:00,540 --> 00:00:12,690 So the book is called Six Faces of Globalisation and it goes back to 2016, it's relatively of relatively recent vintage our thinking on this issue. 2 00:00:12,690 --> 00:00:19,980 And for both Anthony and myself. 2016 marked a turning point because we had the election of Donald Trump. 3 00:00:19,980 --> 00:00:25,530 We had the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and both A. and I international economic lawyers. 4 00:00:25,530 --> 00:00:29,370 In my case, it's mostly trade law, and this case must investment law. 5 00:00:29,370 --> 00:00:37,710 And these events really shook the foundation of what we had coming to think about the international economic order you saw. 6 00:00:37,710 --> 00:00:46,230 Suddenly you saw ideas and and views on the international order come to prominence in a way that had never happened before. 7 00:00:46,230 --> 00:00:52,230 You could only find this issue before and the fringes. Maybe you had the protests in Seattle against globalisation. 8 00:00:52,230 --> 00:00:54,510 You had Ross Perot in the United States, 9 00:00:54,510 --> 00:01:02,340 but they were really regarded as fringe views and suddenly you found them at the centre of the political discussion. 10 00:01:02,340 --> 00:01:07,320 But but what spurred us to start working on this project was not only the fact 11 00:01:07,320 --> 00:01:13,310 that we suddenly had these these outsiders coming into the into power centres. 12 00:01:13,310 --> 00:01:21,450 It was also the reaction by the economic establishment, and we felt that some of that reaction was incredibly fast, 13 00:01:21,450 --> 00:01:29,040 very defensive and was very dismissive of these challenges and didn't really address some of the concerns that were raised. 14 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:37,620 And [INAUDIBLE] want to address a methodological choice that we make in the book and in our engagement with these issues, 15 00:01:37,620 --> 00:01:41,220 which is to focus on narratives about economic globalisation. 16 00:01:41,220 --> 00:01:45,780 And in order to understand why we made that choices, you have to keep in mind that we are not economists, 17 00:01:45,780 --> 00:01:56,670 so we are not really equipped to engage with with the some of the empirical claims that that are made by these challenges to globalisation. 18 00:01:56,670 --> 00:02:06,960 So we we didn't want to talk to weigh in on whether Trump and Brexit was the Brexit supporters were offering accounts that were empirically correct. 19 00:02:06,960 --> 00:02:10,500 Our focus was on understanding where they were coming from. 20 00:02:10,500 --> 00:02:17,220 What are the stories that they're telling? What are the values that they don't see represented and protected in the current order? 21 00:02:17,220 --> 00:02:23,610 And so by focussing on on narratives that gave us a little bit of freedom to talk about these stories that that these 22 00:02:23,610 --> 00:02:30,930 opponents of globalisation tell without necessarily passing judgement on the veracity of the claims right away. 23 00:02:30,930 --> 00:02:34,290 So in a way, it allowed us to bracket the question of whether every, 24 00:02:34,290 --> 00:02:40,620 every story that they tell is empirically correct and focussed more on the values that they were trying to bring to the forefront. 25 00:02:40,620 --> 00:02:49,020 And we have one way of thinking about this mess that we we confronted was was like like in a Rubik's Cube with which is a scramble. 26 00:02:49,020 --> 00:02:50,970 So you have all these different colours. 27 00:02:50,970 --> 00:02:56,970 And the question that one way of framing the question that we asked was could be unscramble this Rubik's Cube, 28 00:02:56,970 --> 00:03:01,320 take all these different arguments and create coherent faces. 29 00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:05,670 And we ended up coming up with six such faces. 30 00:03:05,670 --> 00:03:08,730 The starting point was, of course, what we call the establishment narrative, 31 00:03:08,730 --> 00:03:15,810 and this is the kind of narrative that you would hear from if you got a bunch of trade lawyers and trade economists together and put them on a panel. 32 00:03:15,810 --> 00:03:19,410 And those are the kind of views that they would all agree on. Right. 33 00:03:19,410 --> 00:03:27,840 It's what what Paul Krugman described at the various as the very serious people in the field like they would, they would hold these kinds of views. 34 00:03:27,840 --> 00:03:33,660 And the gist of the establishment narrative is essentially that that everybody ultimately wins from globalisation. 35 00:03:33,660 --> 00:03:40,800 And so we've tried to represent this in this graphic. You see at the top, you can't see it like the owners of capital the rich. 36 00:03:40,800 --> 00:03:46,800 Yes, they went a bit more than those at the bottom. The workers in both developed and developing countries. 37 00:03:46,800 --> 00:03:48,750 But ultimately, everybody wins. 38 00:03:48,750 --> 00:03:56,520 And the key message of the establishment narrative is that the gains from trade can be redistributed so that everybody becomes better off. 39 00:03:56,520 --> 00:04:01,350 So even though those at the top may be winning more initially from globalisation, 40 00:04:01,350 --> 00:04:08,010 you can take the gains from trade that those at the top bribed and redistributed to them, 41 00:04:08,010 --> 00:04:17,730 to those at the top or even those who have, like, maybe temporarily lost from. 42 00:04:17,730 --> 00:04:24,150 The message that comes out of annexation, such as a trade organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 43 00:04:24,150 --> 00:04:35,710 if you look at some of the reports that these organisations published. The election, it was a message that trade works for all and all. 44 00:04:35,710 --> 00:04:39,610 Adjustment by those who have temporarily lost out. 45 00:04:39,610 --> 00:04:47,170 Perhaps the most striking graph that the narrative uses is this so-called hockey stick of global prosperity, 46 00:04:47,170 --> 00:04:56,560 which shows where GDP over the last two millennia, and we see that we're basically at subsistence level for for thousands of years. 47 00:04:56,560 --> 00:05:05,500 And then it shoots up once the word and phrases embraces technological change and an international free trade. 48 00:05:05,500 --> 00:05:12,700 Because at that point, you create use technology to create huge markets, allowing people to specialise become way more productive. 49 00:05:12,700 --> 00:05:18,700 And as a result, we have this hockey stick of global prosperity. But it's not just in the developed world. 50 00:05:18,700 --> 00:05:27,910 The other fact that proponents of this narrative always point to is that globalisation has helped lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. 51 00:05:27,910 --> 00:05:32,470 So we have that. The striking fall in the share of people living in absolute poverty, 52 00:05:32,470 --> 00:05:42,520 which is mostly due to to the to the development of China and India, of course, which embraced globalisation. 53 00:05:42,520 --> 00:05:47,560 Well, what about all those in the developed world who have lost their job? 54 00:05:47,560 --> 00:05:53,200 Are two messages that we hear from this narrative. The first one is that it's mostly about technological change. 55 00:05:53,200 --> 00:06:00,400 So agree. A number that's often cited by proponents of the narrative is that probably about 80 percent 56 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:05,500 of dislocation and job losses in manufacturing are due to technological change and innovation, 57 00:06:05,500 --> 00:06:10,570 the adoption of new machines and so forth, rather than at two to international trade. 58 00:06:10,570 --> 00:06:14,830 And so this graph helps to make that argument because it shows that even if you had 59 00:06:14,830 --> 00:06:19,720 this massive fall in manufacturing employment in the United States around 2000, 60 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:23,320 you see that manufacturing output was still going up. 61 00:06:23,320 --> 00:06:32,230 So it's really the the argument is, you know, it's not because stops have jobs have been stolen and moved in move to China and Mexico. 62 00:06:32,230 --> 00:06:37,030 It's because manufacturers are able to produce more with fewer people. 63 00:06:37,030 --> 00:06:41,020 That's why we see massive job losses in manufacturing. 64 00:06:41,020 --> 00:06:47,710 And the message that comes from this as well is that yes, while the way to deal with that is to retrain those workers, 65 00:06:47,710 --> 00:06:55,680 make them move into the cities that are prospering and make sure that they that they are thriving as well. 66 00:06:55,680 --> 00:06:57,810 A final comment I wanted to make about the establishment narrative, 67 00:06:57,810 --> 00:07:03,810 it's it's probably not an accident that it is promoted and embraced by international 68 00:07:03,810 --> 00:07:11,380 economic organisations because it's almost a and allows him to take an apolitical posture. 69 00:07:11,380 --> 00:07:16,770 It can say, Well, we may be in the business of making everybody richer or removing barriers to trade, 70 00:07:16,770 --> 00:07:20,550 and it's therefore domestic politics to deal with the distributive issues. 71 00:07:20,550 --> 00:07:28,850 And so so that allows these organisations to get kind of pretend that they're staying out of distributive questions. 72 00:07:28,850 --> 00:07:36,890 Of course, the challenge, how is it how does the picture painted by Trump and the Brexit proponents differ? 73 00:07:36,890 --> 00:07:42,230 Well, it's essentially saying, well, we don't necessarily agree about the numbers about the absolute gains, 74 00:07:42,230 --> 00:07:51,710 but but they point to this relative shift that you see in this graphic from workers in developed countries to workers in developing countries. 75 00:07:51,710 --> 00:07:56,570 And you probably all remember the rhetoric of Trump and Peter Navarro, 76 00:07:56,570 --> 00:08:04,760 his his trade guy as he described himself that China and Mexico are stealing are stealing US jobs. 77 00:08:04,760 --> 00:08:12,530 So the idea here is that that is not really about comparative advantage and who does things more efficiently. 78 00:08:12,530 --> 00:08:16,130 It's it's what is at the heart of this redistribution. 79 00:08:16,130 --> 00:08:23,330 And the International Division of Labour is as cheating on the on the side of of Mexico and China, 80 00:08:23,330 --> 00:08:30,170 which has allowed them to steal the jobs which you see here on this boat being shipped to China. 81 00:08:30,170 --> 00:08:36,230 So this is a screenshot from a movie by Peter Navarro called Death by China. 82 00:08:36,230 --> 00:08:44,150 And what what struck me when I first saw this picture is that he sees jobs as as as billiard balls, 83 00:08:44,150 --> 00:08:48,920 like as something that you can that has like a physical manifestation. 84 00:08:48,920 --> 00:08:51,890 And that's a that's a huge difference to the establishment narrative for the different narrative. 85 00:08:51,890 --> 00:08:54,860 Jobs are simply just an economic activity that you engage in. 86 00:08:54,860 --> 00:09:01,040 And then if somebody else becomes more productive in that or better, then you just move on to do another activity. 87 00:09:01,040 --> 00:09:03,980 Whereas for the for the this right wing populist narrative, 88 00:09:03,980 --> 00:09:10,940 they see jobs as something that has this is almost like something that you can own and it's like your property. 89 00:09:10,940 --> 00:09:16,130 And that can be stolen from you and shipped away. And why might this conception of jobs resonate? 90 00:09:16,130 --> 00:09:23,930 Well, it might resonate because for for people who have worked in a particular job for four decades, maybe even for generations, 91 00:09:23,930 --> 00:09:30,100 their fathers and grandfathers has already had already had that job and for whom it's central to their livelihood, 92 00:09:30,100 --> 00:09:33,590 central to their status in the community, central to their identity. 93 00:09:33,590 --> 00:09:39,470 And I'm thinking here, particularly of the steelworkers or the manufacturing workers of mining workers in the United States, 94 00:09:39,470 --> 00:09:45,170 which this narrative focuses on. For them, losing that job may actually feel like they've been robbed. 95 00:09:45,170 --> 00:09:49,310 It may be. It may actually feel like they've been deprived of something that was their property. 96 00:09:49,310 --> 00:09:54,950 And so this rhetoric that the right wing populist used about stolen jobs might 97 00:09:54,950 --> 00:09:59,840 capture something about this reality that this government narrative misses. 98 00:09:59,840 --> 00:10:08,180 And so this is was and a sense that you should be shouldn't be asked to trade off. 99 00:10:08,180 --> 00:10:17,280 The benefits of globalisation are cheaper products and so forth for for these jobs, which are so important to our our identity. 100 00:10:17,280 --> 00:10:24,660 Another key difference between the establishment narrative and the right wing populist narrative is the level of analysis that they focus on. 101 00:10:24,660 --> 00:10:29,040 And you see, for example, if you look at the change in furniture employment in the United States, 102 00:10:29,040 --> 00:10:33,000 which is one of the industries, was most affected by competition from China. 103 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:40,170 If you look at the United States as a whole, the loss in furniture, employment and it's minuscule, it's hardly perceptible. 104 00:10:40,170 --> 00:10:44,670 And that's the typical perspective that the establishment out of takes it looks at the U.S. economy is that while this doesn't matter, 105 00:10:44,670 --> 00:10:48,360 look at the same time who created this many jobs in another area. 106 00:10:48,360 --> 00:10:53,280 But if you then if you look at the impact in North Carolina and even more in Hickory, 107 00:10:53,280 --> 00:10:59,820 one of the manufacturing towns in North Carolina, you see that has a massive, massive impact. 108 00:10:59,820 --> 00:11:08,790 And so what the right wing populist narrative does, it leads us to focus on particular locations and show how the how globalisation has had this 109 00:11:08,790 --> 00:11:15,570 disproportionate impact on particular locations and really hollowed out manufacturing communities. 110 00:11:15,570 --> 00:11:21,540 And another point about these manufacturing jobs that are lost is that they are often what economists describe as multiple. 111 00:11:21,540 --> 00:11:22,710 They have high multiplier. 112 00:11:22,710 --> 00:11:30,780 So when you lose manufacturing jobs, you typically lose four to five service sector jobs as well, which are supported by that manufacturing income. 113 00:11:30,780 --> 00:11:34,920 So when the factory goes and the factory leaves town or shuts down, 114 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:42,060 it's not just the manufacturing workers who lose their job is also that the movies, the the the restaurants in the area that also suffer. 115 00:11:42,060 --> 00:11:46,860 So you see the entire community being sucked into this black hole. 116 00:11:46,860 --> 00:11:48,450 And particularly in the United States, 117 00:11:48,450 --> 00:11:56,820 we have the striking effects of a graphic which shows which is potentially an effect of this of this development, 118 00:11:56,820 --> 00:12:03,390 which is the rise in so-called deaths of despair, which and deaths by drugs, alcohol or suicide. 119 00:12:03,390 --> 00:12:11,670 And you see, it's particularly affecting white non-Hispanics in the United States in a way that you don't see in other developed countries. 120 00:12:11,670 --> 00:12:19,020 So it's a quite different story about globalisation that this might bring, populist perspective tells. 121 00:12:19,020 --> 00:12:27,150 But of course, we also had people like on the left who had quite different critique of of globalisation. 122 00:12:27,150 --> 00:12:28,290 They, in their view, 123 00:12:28,290 --> 00:12:35,680 it wasn't so much the case that that the workers in other developing countries were in developing countries were gaining at the expense of workers. 124 00:12:35,680 --> 00:12:43,200 And it was the rich, the elite that was gaining at the expense of workers in all these countries. 125 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:48,900 And partly that argument was that the key to that argument was that, yes, 126 00:12:48,900 --> 00:12:56,490 we have productivity gains facilitated by technological change and and specialisation in international trade. 127 00:12:56,490 --> 00:13:04,560 But the gains these gains are appropriated by by the elite and not kind of trickling through to the workers. 128 00:13:04,560 --> 00:13:11,280 And the most important graph of this narrative is this one which shows that around 1970, in the mid-1970s, 129 00:13:11,280 --> 00:13:19,380 we have this decoupling of productivity growth and wages so that at that point, yes, productivity keeps rising. 130 00:13:19,380 --> 00:13:28,890 But it this is not reflected in compensation of of workers, and there are lots of parts of why that is one of the crackdown on unions. 131 00:13:28,890 --> 00:13:32,670 The decrease in unionisation is often identified as a key factor, 132 00:13:32,670 --> 00:13:41,130 but also all kinds of ways in which the elite rigged the market in order to benefit the richest. 133 00:13:41,130 --> 00:13:46,320 As a result, we have this develop this striking development in the United States that the top one 134 00:13:46,320 --> 00:13:53,580 percent now owns more a greater share of the national income than the bottom 50 percent. 135 00:13:53,580 --> 00:14:01,680 And this view was, of course, most prominently advanced by by Bernie Sanders and people like Ocasio-Cortez in the United States. 136 00:14:01,680 --> 00:14:15,180 But you also see it in many other developed countries. In the last couple of years, we all in a yet entirely different perspective come up, 137 00:14:15,180 --> 00:14:20,100 which is somewhat related to the right wing populist view, but it's still different. 138 00:14:20,100 --> 00:14:24,450 This one doesn't focus so much on workers in the U.S., 139 00:14:24,450 --> 00:14:30,390 in particular communities losing out its focus more on the United States as a country losing 140 00:14:30,390 --> 00:14:35,850 out to its China in this process of great power competition and the emblematic firm. 141 00:14:35,850 --> 00:14:39,840 And that's that's it stands for that, for that development, probably Huawei. Huawei, 142 00:14:39,840 --> 00:14:46,860 which has become the that that was on track to become the largest telecommunications company 143 00:14:46,860 --> 00:14:56,600 and had in many ways overtaken U.S. companies in terms of technological sophistication. 144 00:14:56,600 --> 00:15:05,030 This is the focus he has not so much. The concern is not so much that we losing Steve Jobs or auto manufacturing jobs is that the US, 145 00:15:05,030 --> 00:15:11,660 as the U.S., is losing its status as the supreme technological and economic power. 146 00:15:11,660 --> 00:15:20,450 We see that China has, at least in purchasing power terms, has overtaken the United States in terms of its share of world GDP. 147 00:15:20,450 --> 00:15:27,950 And this comes comes hand in hand with a with whole range of change in attitudes towards globalisation. 148 00:15:27,950 --> 00:15:34,160 And just to give you one example, foreign direct investment was seen on the establishment narrative as something positive. 149 00:15:34,160 --> 00:15:39,140 I did something you're bringing money into the country, you're creating employment. 150 00:15:39,140 --> 00:15:50,510 But if you're starting to see your your economic rival through a security lens, as someone who is who is probably going to overtake you and might, 151 00:15:50,510 --> 00:15:57,440 might really put you into your spot, you become more sceptical, you become more worried about about the implications of that foreign investment. 152 00:15:57,440 --> 00:16:06,020 And so the suffuse is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which which scrutinises investment that comes to the United States. 153 00:16:06,020 --> 00:16:12,410 And we see a huge uptick investigation in investigations of incoming foreign investment around 2008, 154 00:16:12,410 --> 00:16:16,430 which is when this narrative really starts taking off. 155 00:16:16,430 --> 00:16:21,650 And so the concern with investment is that that the foreign competitor in this case, 156 00:16:21,650 --> 00:16:29,720 China is getting ever more control of the United States companies is giving it a more potential to to sabotage and spy on the United States. 157 00:16:29,720 --> 00:16:38,420 And so this infusion of security concerns into into the trade debate is really what what makes this geoeconomic narrative? 158 00:16:38,420 --> 00:16:42,830 It's not solely about jobs, it's also about security. 159 00:16:42,830 --> 00:16:49,670 We also see with the Trump administration and increasing concerns about the resilience of supply chains right there. 160 00:16:49,670 --> 00:16:55,550 The Peter Navarro was one someone who was obsessed with dependence of the United States on supplies from China. 161 00:16:55,550 --> 00:16:58,400 He would always point out that, for example, medicine, 162 00:16:58,400 --> 00:17:06,050 so many of us medicines are imported from China and and he was really worried about what that would mean if there 163 00:17:06,050 --> 00:17:12,610 was a conflict between the United States and China and all the leverage that China was gaining as a result. 164 00:17:12,610 --> 00:17:20,410 We have a fifth one where we're almost we're almost done here, which is really the narrative that you see most prominently, 165 00:17:20,410 --> 00:17:25,840 both on the European left and also in amongst the labour units in the United States. 166 00:17:25,840 --> 00:17:31,870 And we often criticised that this is actually very similar to the left wing populist view that I described earlier. 167 00:17:31,870 --> 00:17:36,730 But we still see a difference because this particular narrative takes a transnational perspective. 168 00:17:36,730 --> 00:17:37,990 And it says that labour, 169 00:17:37,990 --> 00:17:44,800 if you want the best perspective to look at who wins in the midst of globalisation is to look at labour and workers collectively. 170 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:54,970 If you look at them collectively and show how they are losing out against the elite and particularly here, international multinational corporations. 171 00:17:54,970 --> 00:18:02,110 One striking example of this narrative is the protests that you saw in 2015 2016 in the European Union. 172 00:18:02,110 --> 00:18:09,880 And these protests were directed against the TTIP agreement, the Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership between the United States and Europe. 173 00:18:09,880 --> 00:18:13,930 And also this agreement an agreement between the European Union and Canada. 174 00:18:13,930 --> 00:18:20,590 And you might wonder, well, why are people protesting these agreements given that Europe and particularly Germany, 175 00:18:20,590 --> 00:18:24,730 where these protests were the most forceful, has a huge trade surplus? 176 00:18:24,730 --> 00:18:31,570 So we don't have these manufacturing job losses to the same degree or they don't have the same impact as in the United States. 177 00:18:31,570 --> 00:18:37,210 And the explanation is that what they were protesting about the agreements was not any trade liberalisation. 178 00:18:37,210 --> 00:18:38,810 They were not concerned about trade liberalisation. 179 00:18:38,810 --> 00:18:44,620 They were concerned about elements of these agreements, which they thought would increase the power of corporations. 180 00:18:44,620 --> 00:18:48,640 And their two particular examples of that one is investor state dispute settlement. 181 00:18:48,640 --> 00:18:55,990 So the concern that U.S. corporations would gain the right to sue European governments over regulatory measures that decrease their profits, 182 00:18:55,990 --> 00:18:59,860 but also regulatory cooperation, which seems sounds innocuous. 183 00:18:59,860 --> 00:19:05,800 But the concern here was that U.S. corporations would use these agreements to soften 184 00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:09,940 and undermine regulatory standards in the UK and European Union that protect, 185 00:19:09,940 --> 00:19:21,490 for example, that that prohibit hormone treated beef or chlorinated chicken or genetically modified organisms organisms. 186 00:19:21,490 --> 00:19:25,300 So how is this perspective different from the left and populist view? 187 00:19:25,300 --> 00:19:32,140 It doesn't focus so much on on the share of national income that goes to the top and the bottom in individual countries. 188 00:19:32,140 --> 00:19:38,230 It looks at how the labour share of income has been decreasing in many different countries, 189 00:19:38,230 --> 00:19:43,480 whereas the share of corporate profit has been has been going up. 190 00:19:43,480 --> 00:19:52,300 And one explanation for this for this development is essentially that international trade facilitates a race to the bottom right. 191 00:19:52,300 --> 00:19:58,030 For me, this narrative became most prominent in the context of the negotiations around a new NAFTA, 192 00:19:58,030 --> 00:20:06,370 which I'm going to talk about later here in North America, where where the Canadian unions and the US unions friends were saying that the 193 00:20:06,370 --> 00:20:11,020 problem with these trade agreements and NAFTA is not so much that Mexicans and 194 00:20:11,020 --> 00:20:14,530 Chinese workers have been able to steer our jobs is that the corporations have 195 00:20:14,530 --> 00:20:19,870 been able to take the good jobs with benefits and high wages in North America, 196 00:20:19,870 --> 00:20:24,940 in the US and Canada, and take them to Mexico and make them into bad jobs. 197 00:20:24,940 --> 00:20:29,530 So it's not so much that the Mexican workers are benefiting because they are not getting paid good wages. 198 00:20:29,530 --> 00:20:34,630 They are being paid poverty wages, they're not even able to buy the cost that they produce. 199 00:20:34,630 --> 00:20:38,350 And it's the corporations that are reaping all the benefits. 200 00:20:38,350 --> 00:20:44,150 The area where you actually see the most striking evidence of this race to the bottom is the area of corporate taxation. 201 00:20:44,150 --> 00:20:54,010 So this graph shows you the decrease in corporate tax rates in all major developed countries over the past couple of decades. 202 00:20:54,010 --> 00:21:01,900 In recent years, this narrative has also taken aim, particularly at the large tech companies. 203 00:21:01,900 --> 00:21:09,910 So there's a focus on how globalisation has allowed these companies to to to attain dominant positions in their respective fields, 204 00:21:09,910 --> 00:21:16,270 and how globalisation also frustrates attempts to to take effective action against tech companies. 205 00:21:16,270 --> 00:21:24,550 And we see some attempts now by the opinion in the United States, in the Trade and Tech Council to try to address these concerns. 206 00:21:24,550 --> 00:21:31,450 Finally, there's a finite perspective which doesn't focus so much on in on on relative winners and losers, 207 00:21:31,450 --> 00:21:37,120 but rather says that if we go on on our current path, we are all bound to lose. 208 00:21:37,120 --> 00:21:43,000 So yes, some people are going to lose more, and the poor and developing countries are going to be the worst off. 209 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:50,980 But if we if we change our metric and don't just look at our GDP figures, but look at overall well-being and life chances, 210 00:21:50,980 --> 00:21:56,680 then we see that on elkhorn par three, always going, we are all going to lose. 211 00:21:56,680 --> 00:22:06,340 The prime example of that is, of course, the climate crisis and which has also become to new prominence in the last couple of years, 212 00:22:06,340 --> 00:22:11,080 mostly thanks to the work and Fridays for Future. Probably. 213 00:22:11,080 --> 00:22:14,680 And what it points out is that this hockey stick of global prosperity that I 214 00:22:14,680 --> 00:22:19,210 showed you earlier is also reflected in a hockey stick of global emissions. 215 00:22:19,210 --> 00:22:24,640 So the very dynamics that allow us to become ever richer and enjoy the Senate of living are 216 00:22:24,640 --> 00:22:30,850 also the ones that are driving us towards the twisty abyss and why we were working on the book. 217 00:22:30,850 --> 00:22:40,720 There was, of course, another development the COVID 19 pandemic, which which has this had had some similar dynamics. 218 00:22:40,720 --> 00:22:47,470 On the one hand, you have much more severe impacts on the on the on the poor parts of the population. 219 00:22:47,470 --> 00:22:53,860 But there's also a a part of this threat, which means that nobody is safe until everyone is safe. 220 00:22:53,860 --> 00:23:02,200 So there is the same collective prospect of collective loss that we see with risk with climate change. 221 00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:08,280 And so the two narratives that be grouped together in this global threats. 222 00:23:08,280 --> 00:23:12,760 Now it is a. 223 00:23:12,760 --> 00:23:23,050 It's not just getting sustained and that focus on resilience that we have to be resilient to shocks such as those that are being caused by the. 224 00:23:23,050 --> 00:23:29,140 One author who has written very eloquently about this is a caterer both. 225 00:23:29,140 --> 00:23:35,560 That was this what we have to make sure that we don't overshoot our logical ceilings. 226 00:23:35,560 --> 00:23:43,480 We have to somehow constrain, restrain ourselves to it so that we stay in the safe and just space for humanity. 227 00:23:43,480 --> 00:23:48,400 But at the same time, you also make sure that we have to make sure that we supply the social foundations. 228 00:23:48,400 --> 00:23:52,510 We have to make sure that everybody has housing and adequate health care and so forth. 229 00:23:52,510 --> 00:24:01,720 And these are arguments that have come out in the in in response to the pandemic very strongly way the resents narratives, that's what we have. 230 00:24:01,720 --> 00:24:05,080 In order to be resilient, we have to make sure that everybody has a paid leave, 231 00:24:05,080 --> 00:24:12,440 has health care in order to make sure that we can deal with these threats. 232 00:24:12,440 --> 00:24:19,280 OK, so if we take these six narratives together, we can see that they're broadly fall into these three categories, 233 00:24:19,280 --> 00:24:24,260 we have the win win narrative that I began with the establishment narrative at the top. 234 00:24:24,260 --> 00:24:29,450 We have different types of win lose narrative, focussing on different groups of winners and losers. 235 00:24:29,450 --> 00:24:37,550 And finally, we have this lose lose perspective that we're all going to lose out if we don't change our ways. 236 00:24:37,550 --> 00:24:39,500 We also see these narratives reflected in the news. 237 00:24:39,500 --> 00:24:44,660 These are just a couple of economist covers, so we have the positive view of the establishment narrative, 238 00:24:44,660 --> 00:24:50,000 the idea that there's this increasing divide between the rich and the rest, 239 00:24:50,000 --> 00:24:57,860 the concept that people are left behind by globalisation, which as it gets to the right wing populist view. 240 00:24:57,860 --> 00:25:04,910 Although I want to say that when we looked at these narratives and I spent a lot of time looking at interviews 241 00:25:04,910 --> 00:25:13,340 with supporters of the AfD in Germany or Brexit supporters and in the U.K. and Trump supporters in the US, 242 00:25:13,340 --> 00:25:16,460 you see that they would actually reject this idea that they've been left behind. 243 00:25:16,460 --> 00:25:19,910 It's not so much that they've been left behind and not want to catch up. 244 00:25:19,910 --> 00:25:22,730 It's more that they mourn what has been left behind. 245 00:25:22,730 --> 00:25:28,910 They don't want to go back to the way things were, or at least don't want things to change further. 246 00:25:28,910 --> 00:25:39,440 So, so this describing these people as left behind is actually adopting the establishment's perspective of what the problem is. 247 00:25:39,440 --> 00:25:46,430 We have, of course, increasing attention to the China and to the competition between the United States and China, 248 00:25:46,430 --> 00:25:50,780 and that is particularly prominent in the United States, it's almost inescapable these days. 249 00:25:50,780 --> 00:25:57,350 The diskette does any trade issues in the United States without running into this private rivalry. 250 00:25:57,350 --> 00:26:05,150 And finally, the the idea that corporations are the ones who are taking taking all at the expense 251 00:26:05,150 --> 00:26:10,490 of everyone else and the sustainability of global threats narrative at the end. 252 00:26:10,490 --> 00:26:16,510 So we see these all reflected all over the media. 253 00:26:16,510 --> 00:26:24,700 One interesting aspect of looking at these narratives is that you could see how how actors were taking the same facts and giving them interpretations. 254 00:26:24,700 --> 00:26:30,010 So this is the famous elephant grass created by Branko Milanovic and spoke of global inequality, 255 00:26:30,010 --> 00:26:33,460 and it shows the relative rise in income over the past two decades. 256 00:26:33,460 --> 00:26:41,380 So at the bottom, you see essentially where people fall in the global income distribution from the world's poorest to the world's richest. 257 00:26:41,380 --> 00:26:50,350 And then you see how their income has changed over these two decades of globalisation from 88 to 2008. 258 00:26:50,350 --> 00:26:56,020 And at point one, you have the middle classes in the developing world and China and India. 259 00:26:56,020 --> 00:27:01,930 At point two, you have middle class and working classes in in the developed world in the West, 260 00:27:01,930 --> 00:27:05,980 and at point three, you have the richest people in the world. 261 00:27:05,980 --> 00:27:13,180 And so the right wing populist you focus is on the movement from or essentially the redistribution 262 00:27:13,180 --> 00:27:18,820 of gains from the working classes and in the in the West and the loving countries, 263 00:27:18,820 --> 00:27:23,950 according to to the working class middle class in the rising middle class in Asia. 264 00:27:23,950 --> 00:27:29,200 Whereas the left wing populist takes the same picture but draws attention to a different movement, 265 00:27:29,200 --> 00:27:38,320 namely from from the middle classes and working classes in the developed world towards the the richest one percent. 266 00:27:38,320 --> 00:27:48,010 On how what can we do with these narratives? And of course, as we as international lawyers, we were interested to see, well, 267 00:27:48,010 --> 00:27:54,040 what can we actually how can these narratives actually help illuminate what's happening in international law? 268 00:27:54,040 --> 00:27:58,150 And so in the second part of the book, which is called Working with Globalisation Narratives, 269 00:27:58,150 --> 00:28:03,940 we try to use these narratives to illuminate debates and international, not just international, 270 00:28:03,940 --> 00:28:10,300 but in international relations more generally and are our preferred tool for that purpose is 271 00:28:10,300 --> 00:28:16,750 then diagrams because they help us to map the overlaps and differences between the narratives. 272 00:28:16,750 --> 00:28:19,240 And I just given that my background is in trade, 273 00:28:19,240 --> 00:28:27,310 I did want to take a an example from the trade field to to show how these narratives can show us and can help us understand what has happened. 274 00:28:27,310 --> 00:28:33,340 And the example that I'm going to use today is the renegotiation of NAFTA. 275 00:28:33,340 --> 00:28:39,730 So Trump came to power with as a huge opponent of NAFTA as what was one of his favourite arguments 276 00:28:39,730 --> 00:28:47,020 against Clinton that her husband had had been the one who had overseen the the conclusion of NAFTA. 277 00:28:47,020 --> 00:28:52,240 And so he it was clear that he wanted to reopen NAFTA. 278 00:28:52,240 --> 00:28:57,400 And when when he said that when it was clear that there would be a new NAFED of some sort. 279 00:28:57,400 --> 00:29:03,160 The proponents of the establishment narrative, which was essentially the business community most of us Republicans, 280 00:29:03,160 --> 00:29:08,110 but also parts of Canadian and Mexican government, essentially wanted to continue on the old path. 281 00:29:08,110 --> 00:29:16,930 They wanted to do more of the same, which is to to keep the existing levels of liberalisation to modernise the agreement, 282 00:29:16,930 --> 00:29:23,800 but also especially in the US to to increase further increase protection for intellectual property rights, 283 00:29:23,800 --> 00:29:29,830 address digital trade, expand free movement and have stronger dispute settlement. 284 00:29:29,830 --> 00:29:36,760 So there was there was a real push to go further on the old establishment path of further liberalisation, 285 00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:45,880 further international legalisation, essentially an opportunity to modernise and fix the old agreement against that. 286 00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:49,060 The Trump administration had very different ideas. 287 00:29:49,060 --> 00:29:54,520 They agreed that there was some need for modernisation when it came to digital trade, particularly particularly. 288 00:29:54,520 --> 00:30:00,880 And they also were happy with the additional IP protection because it was mostly down to the benefit of U.S. corporations. 289 00:30:00,880 --> 00:30:05,650 But the primary objective of the Trump administration was not to have further liberalisation, 290 00:30:05,650 --> 00:30:10,060 but to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States. 291 00:30:10,060 --> 00:30:19,860 And they tried to do that in the most heavy-handed fashion initially by saying, Well, we want to have a. 292 00:30:19,860 --> 00:30:25,050 And often after so I said, for those of you are not try trade lawyers rules of origins, 293 00:30:25,050 --> 00:30:31,980 of the rules that govern when a good has access to a true market under a free trade agreement. 294 00:30:31,980 --> 00:30:39,170 Right. So for example, in the United States, in the if a 50 percent domestic content requirement would. 295 00:30:39,170 --> 00:30:42,950 A good would only be able to be imported in the United States duty free under 296 00:30:42,950 --> 00:30:49,580 NAFTA if 50 percent of the value of the good had been added in the United States. 297 00:30:49,580 --> 00:30:53,300 The Trump administration also wanted to have a short sunset period. 298 00:30:53,300 --> 00:30:59,120 It wanted to make sure that the agreement was not going to be in time for in place for a long time. 299 00:30:59,120 --> 00:31:01,220 And really, the aim here was to create uncertainty. 300 00:31:01,220 --> 00:31:06,830 It wanted to create uncertainty that businesses wouldn't feel confident that they could move the objection 301 00:31:06,830 --> 00:31:13,490 to United States and still be able to to export to the United States to buy it by creating that uncertainty. 302 00:31:13,490 --> 00:31:17,720 The hope was that businesses would decide manufacturers would decide to produce in the 303 00:31:17,720 --> 00:31:22,970 United States so that they could be sure to have market access in the United States. 304 00:31:22,970 --> 00:31:30,980 Interestingly, the Trump ministration wanted also wanted to abolish investor state dispute settlement for the same reason, it said, Well, 305 00:31:30,980 --> 00:31:35,540 if we give U.S. investors the ability to sue Mexico's government, 306 00:31:35,540 --> 00:31:44,630 if the investment is somehow somehow infringed or diminished in value, that makes them more confident about investing in Mexico. 307 00:31:44,630 --> 00:31:51,150 And we don't want them to be confident about investing in Mexico like we want them to invest in the United States. 308 00:31:51,150 --> 00:31:55,560 There was also a third perspective, which at the beginning of the negotiations wasn't all that strong. 309 00:31:55,560 --> 00:32:04,230 It's partly held by by the Canadian and Mexican governments, but also particularly by organised labour and the Democratic Party in the United States, 310 00:32:04,230 --> 00:32:08,070 and it has made agrees with some of the aspects of the narrative. 311 00:32:08,070 --> 00:32:11,100 It also likes stronger dispute settlement, 312 00:32:11,100 --> 00:32:16,470 but the primary reason it likes stronger dispute settlement is because he wants to be able to enforce labour rights. 313 00:32:16,470 --> 00:32:22,050 In Mexico, it wants to hold the Mexican government to account if the Mexican government does not protect labour rights. 314 00:32:22,050 --> 00:32:26,070 The this corporate power narrative also agrees that abolishing investor state dispute settlement, 315 00:32:26,070 --> 00:32:30,330 but not because it wants to create uncertainty necessarily for U.S. corporations in Mexico. 316 00:32:30,330 --> 00:32:38,880 It's because it's generally concerned about the power of corporations to sue governments, including the U.S. and Canadian government governments. 317 00:32:38,880 --> 00:32:43,860 And in a similar vein, it opposes the additional protections of property rights. 318 00:32:43,860 --> 00:32:50,430 And this was a particularly strong point for Democrats in the United States who wanted to reduce the price of medication. 319 00:32:50,430 --> 00:32:56,400 And one way to do that was to actually dismantle some intellectual property protection for medicines. 320 00:32:56,400 --> 00:33:02,910 So what's interesting is to see how these how these different priorities came together in in different versions of the agreement. 321 00:33:02,910 --> 00:33:08,820 Because the first version of the agreement, the so-called USMCA, US Mexico Canada Agreement, you see, 322 00:33:08,820 --> 00:33:16,320 the free trade has been removed from the title was signed in November on November 30th, 2018. 323 00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:20,970 And it shows that it was very much dominated by the protectionist narrative of 324 00:33:20,970 --> 00:33:25,200 the Trump administration and has the elements that defined in the agreement. 325 00:33:25,200 --> 00:33:30,240 Additionally, IP protection modernisation rules are in the areas of overlap with the other ones, 326 00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:34,710 but we don't find any elements which are not within this protectionist circle. 327 00:33:34,710 --> 00:33:36,870 And the most interesting aspect, I think, 328 00:33:36,870 --> 00:33:43,950 from the perspective of the narratives is what happened to that U.S. domestic content requirement that was unpalatable for Mexico and Canada. 329 00:33:43,950 --> 00:33:50,430 Obviously, they wouldn't accept that the US would get this priority status in the agreement, 330 00:33:50,430 --> 00:33:54,270 but the negotiators found a way to reformulate this requirement in a way that made 331 00:33:54,270 --> 00:33:58,890 it palatable to those in who will subscribe to the corporate power narrative. 332 00:33:58,890 --> 00:34:04,950 And so what they did instead was to create something called a labour content requirement. 333 00:34:04,950 --> 00:34:08,430 And what this requirement says is that up to 40 40, 334 00:34:08,430 --> 00:34:18,150 at least 40 percent of the value of the of the car has to be made by workers making at least six dollars an hour. 335 00:34:18,150 --> 00:34:22,770 And you can see why this compromise would appeal to both proponents of these protections. 336 00:34:22,770 --> 00:34:29,220 Narrative and the corporate power narrative for the protection side of it could say, well, wages in Mexico are around $4 an hour. 337 00:34:29,220 --> 00:34:32,490 So if 40 percent of the car has to be manufactured by workers, 338 00:34:32,490 --> 00:34:38,520 making $16 now is that means the production is going to come back to the United States and Canada. 339 00:34:38,520 --> 00:34:41,730 Whereas for proponents of the corporate power narrative, you could say well, well, 340 00:34:41,730 --> 00:34:46,500 that at least holds the promise that companies are going to increase the wages of at 341 00:34:46,500 --> 00:34:50,160 least some of the workers in Mexico in order to meet that 40 percent requirement. 342 00:34:50,160 --> 00:35:00,240 So the corporate power narrative saw a potential here to boost worker power vis-a-vis corporations, and that allowed this compromise to happen. 343 00:35:00,240 --> 00:35:03,900 Interestingly, in that very month and when this agreement was signed, 344 00:35:03,900 --> 00:35:09,270 the Republicans lost majority in the House of Representatives in the United States and the Democrats, 345 00:35:09,270 --> 00:35:14,970 once the Democrats took that took their seats, they demanded changes to the agreement. 346 00:35:14,970 --> 00:35:20,010 And those changes really decisively shifted the balance of the game and towards the corporate power narrative. 347 00:35:20,010 --> 00:35:25,260 So about one year later, we had a amended version of the USMCA. 348 00:35:25,260 --> 00:35:30,900 And just let's look at the changes that happened to the agreement. Well, the additional IP protections were gone. 349 00:35:30,900 --> 00:35:37,170 And this is the first U.S. trade agreement in decades, which does not further increase intellectual property protections. 350 00:35:37,170 --> 00:35:41,310 Instead, we have no additional protections for intellectual property rights. 351 00:35:41,310 --> 00:35:45,150 We also have a strengthened labour standards and labour rights enforcement in Mexico. 352 00:35:45,150 --> 00:35:53,460 They've even created so-called Rapid Response Mechanism, which allows allows the US government and the Canadian government to block imports from 353 00:35:53,460 --> 00:36:00,240 specific from specific factories in Mexico if they are labour rights violations there. 354 00:36:00,240 --> 00:36:10,380 And it also beefed up dispute settlement again with the same goal of strengthening labour rights enforcement in vis-a-vis vis a vis Mexico. 355 00:36:10,380 --> 00:36:15,510 So the narratives help us understand how shifting power between different proponents 356 00:36:15,510 --> 00:36:23,520 of the narrative changed the content on centre of gravity of the agreement. 357 00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:28,170 Another example where the narratives help us make sense of what's happening is the semiconductor shortage, 358 00:36:28,170 --> 00:36:32,580 as you probably all have seen headlines about the chips crisis, 359 00:36:32,580 --> 00:36:39,420 the fact that car comment car manufacturers had to close factories because they didn't have sufficient semiconductors. 360 00:36:39,420 --> 00:36:46,090 And I'm just going to check on the time here. 361 00:36:46,090 --> 00:36:52,860 OK. And. And these different policies, 362 00:36:52,860 --> 00:37:02,160 we can always make sense of all these different policies that are that are influencing this crisis through the narratives. 363 00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:11,490 One of the first actions on ships that we saw was was the Trump administration's tariffs on all things Chinese, including on Chinese semiconductor. 364 00:37:11,490 --> 00:37:14,670 So a contributor to the top guys in the United States was actually the fact that the United 365 00:37:14,670 --> 00:37:22,950 States put tariffs on Chinese semiconductors in order to bring jobs back to the United States. 366 00:37:22,950 --> 00:37:26,880 And that led to a fall in imports of chips from China. 367 00:37:26,880 --> 00:37:34,860 And this can only really be explained from the perspective of the protectionist narrative that was that Trump was trying to do at the same time, 368 00:37:34,860 --> 00:37:45,120 also still during the Trump administration. We also had the imposition of export restrictions on export restrictions on semiconductors, 369 00:37:45,120 --> 00:37:52,500 and the attention here was to hobble strategic competitors of the United States and particularly the Trump administration, 370 00:37:52,500 --> 00:37:58,230 want to make sure that Huawei and other Chinese companies didn't get hold of most advanced semiconductors. 371 00:37:58,230 --> 00:37:59,400 And for the Trump generation, 372 00:37:59,400 --> 00:38:12,210 that was not simply a national security issue is also a concern of Huawei obtaining being able to become the most advanced American company. 373 00:38:12,210 --> 00:38:23,970 It's a very radical company to just. To just make changes to to destroy your competitors company is a very radical policy. 374 00:38:23,970 --> 00:38:27,840 We also saw export restrictions due in pandemic, of course. 375 00:38:27,840 --> 00:38:34,830 So just just to highlight the contrast between these two policies, this action to impose export restriction, of course, 376 00:38:34,830 --> 00:38:41,360 didn't make sense from the protections narrative because the protectionist narrative is about creating good jobs for your people. 377 00:38:41,360 --> 00:38:49,890 Right. If you if you restrict exports from your company, you're eliminating employment and your you, you, you destroy jobs. 378 00:38:49,890 --> 00:38:54,510 In fact, so we can't really make sense of these two different policies without ActionScript, 379 00:38:54,510 --> 00:38:58,700 without understanding in the context of that particular narrative. 380 00:38:58,700 --> 00:39:07,340 Of course, during the pandemic, we also saw export restrictions imposed on stuff like personal protective equipment and vaccines. 381 00:39:07,340 --> 00:39:13,280 But there's a real difference between the export restrictions that imposed on resilience grounds 382 00:39:13,280 --> 00:39:17,390 and on geoeconomic grounds because when you impose export restrictions on resilience grounds, 383 00:39:17,390 --> 00:39:26,300 what you're trying to do is to make sure that you have enough domestic supply and that's different from trying to destroy your competitors a company. 384 00:39:26,300 --> 00:39:34,860 And that also explains why many of the export restrictions imposed in the course of the pandemic were temporary restrictions. 385 00:39:34,860 --> 00:39:38,710 What's interesting when you look at these three narratives that were playing the chips have been obtained 386 00:39:38,710 --> 00:39:44,560 just by that they all can agree for different reasons on the need to invest in domestic manufacture. 387 00:39:44,560 --> 00:39:52,740 And that's why we have seen a big push towards industrial policies that create manufacturing capacity at home for the protectionists. 388 00:39:52,740 --> 00:39:58,920 It's about jobs. You want to have high quality manufacturing jobs for the geoeconomic narrative. 389 00:39:58,920 --> 00:40:03,240 It's about making sure that you're not dependent on a strategic competitor. 390 00:40:03,240 --> 00:40:11,910 And for the United States, that has been particularly acute because 90 percent of advanced semiconductors are manufactured in Taiwan. 391 00:40:11,910 --> 00:40:18,270 And there's a real concern that China will actually invade Taiwan in the next couple of years, 392 00:40:18,270 --> 00:40:24,390 and that the US will thereby lose access to the two most advanced semiconductor manufacturing. 393 00:40:24,390 --> 00:40:29,310 So there's a real geo economic imperative here to invest in manufacturing. 394 00:40:29,310 --> 00:40:36,180 From the perspective of the president's narrative, it's simply a question of being able to withstand shocks in supply and demand. 395 00:40:36,180 --> 00:40:40,950 So the union just can't tolerate that. 396 00:40:40,950 --> 00:40:49,080 Car manufacturers are not able to produce because they don't have access to these chips, so they all overlap in this area. 397 00:40:49,080 --> 00:40:56,040 But again, in other areas, we see we see differences. So for example, if our perspective is primarily concerned about resilience, 398 00:40:56,040 --> 00:41:03,810 our ability to withstand with withstand shocks, then our imperative is to diversify sources of supply. 399 00:41:03,810 --> 00:41:08,280 But that could be include strategic competitors, right? 400 00:41:08,280 --> 00:41:14,850 So it might make sense to do so as not just amongst Chinese companies, but from different Chinese companies and also companies from other countries. 401 00:41:14,850 --> 00:41:19,980 If we primarily take a geo economic perspective where we don't want to be dependent on a strategic competitor, 402 00:41:19,980 --> 00:41:25,210 then diversification has to happen amongst allies and sometimes referred to as allies shoring. 403 00:41:25,210 --> 00:41:37,510 Right. So bringing Chinese companies into these supply chains that we're trying to to build would not make sense from that perspective. 404 00:41:37,510 --> 00:41:42,960 In other policy that that we see as investments in stockpiling for, so for example, 405 00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:48,190 a Toyota was able to withstand the crisis for a long time because it had learnt its lesson from 406 00:41:48,190 --> 00:41:55,970 from the earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan and make sure that it had an adequate supply and. 407 00:41:55,970 --> 00:42:04,520 In final contrast between them, the two narratives is that in the case of a Djukanovic perspective, you are sceptical of inbound fund act investment, 408 00:42:04,520 --> 00:42:11,420 and I showed you earlier the stock price in investigations of inbound foreign investment and the surface in the United States. 409 00:42:11,420 --> 00:42:17,050 Whereas in the from the perspective of the protectionist narrative, what you're really concerned about is outbound investment. 410 00:42:17,050 --> 00:42:23,960 You want to make sure that companies invest at home rather than abroad. 411 00:42:23,960 --> 00:42:27,440 What's common to the protectionist and the economic narrative, 412 00:42:27,440 --> 00:42:35,210 and that's really unites these different factions in the United States is a zero-sum conception of international trade. 413 00:42:35,210 --> 00:42:44,720 It's a China spin is the US is lost. Whether you care about advanced manufacturing or whether you care about, like old style manufacturing jobs. 414 00:42:44,720 --> 00:42:51,350 Whereas what's common about the protectionist and the resilience narratives is this concern about the well-being of the domestic worker workforce. 415 00:42:51,350 --> 00:42:53,360 So that's a real difference between the two narratives. 416 00:42:53,360 --> 00:43:00,470 If you listen to Trump, you'll see that he mostly talks about white men, mostly talks about autoworkers miners. 417 00:43:00,470 --> 00:43:08,750 He never talks about like the textile industry where you have primarily women and minorities are primarily employed. 418 00:43:08,750 --> 00:43:12,860 And he, of course, also never talks about there the service sector. 419 00:43:12,860 --> 00:43:18,470 Whereas for the resilience narrative that emerged in response to the pandemic, 420 00:43:18,470 --> 00:43:22,880 the focus was very much on the on the plight of service workers like the 421 00:43:22,880 --> 00:43:26,660 essential workers who had precarious jobs and were doing incredibly dangerous, 422 00:43:26,660 --> 00:43:34,250 important work. So the left wing and right wing populist there there's there's there's a concern about the domestic workforce, 423 00:43:34,250 --> 00:43:38,000 but there's a deep focus on different parts of that workforce. 424 00:43:38,000 --> 00:43:45,380 So this gives us a picture of how all the different policies that are in play in the chips crisis. 425 00:43:45,380 --> 00:43:49,640 So we we we don't stop in the book. We don't stop at the van. 426 00:43:49,640 --> 00:43:58,330 We actually go further and apply this metaphor of of a kaleidoscope because when we look. 427 00:43:58,330 --> 00:44:01,850 Draw lessons from our analysis for policy making. 428 00:44:01,850 --> 00:44:09,220 What really struck us is the need to to see the kaleidoscopic complexity of these issues and what do we mean by that? 429 00:44:09,220 --> 00:44:13,540 It's really an ability to not just see the different narratives and what they say, 430 00:44:13,540 --> 00:44:17,980 but try to integrate insets insights from these different narratives. 431 00:44:17,980 --> 00:44:22,060 So Sudfeld has this concept of integrated complexity, which has two steps. 432 00:44:22,060 --> 00:44:28,750 The first step is to differentiate the different perspectives, but then to somehow integrate them. 433 00:44:28,750 --> 00:44:35,530 Consider the sea where the trade offs are between them, where there are commonalities, where their income answerable, 434 00:44:35,530 --> 00:44:41,140 and then try to work out how we can design policies that take into account all of these different perspectives. 435 00:44:41,140 --> 00:44:54,040 And one example that I wanted to give where that wasn't done was was McCall's diesel taxes tax on on diesel, which prompted the yellow vest protests. 436 00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:58,870 If you look at that policy from the perspective of the establishment narrative or the sustainability narrative, 437 00:44:58,870 --> 00:45:03,440 it makes perfect sense, like the establishment narratives like Market-Based solution. 438 00:45:03,440 --> 00:45:07,510 These two sustainability narrative wants to combat climate change. 439 00:45:07,510 --> 00:45:14,800 But what Macron ignored was how this same policy that this policy looked from the perspective of other narratives, 440 00:45:14,800 --> 00:45:19,780 such as the right wing populist or left wing populist narrative one right for the right wing populist narrative. 441 00:45:19,780 --> 00:45:24,790 What the diesel tax was doing was just punishing people living in the countryside people, 442 00:45:24,790 --> 00:45:31,120 whereas it wasn't doing anything about the elites, the city dwelling elites who were taking flights to their vacation, right? 443 00:45:31,120 --> 00:45:39,520 So it was burdening a particular part of the population that is particularly in rural and conservative areas. 444 00:45:39,520 --> 00:45:48,670 From the perspective of the left wing populist narrative, it was also further promoting the inequality that we're already seeing in French society. 445 00:45:48,670 --> 00:45:57,340 So essentially, if you the message here is that if you don't try to see policies from perspective of all these narratives, 446 00:45:57,340 --> 00:46:01,960 you're bound to risk that your policies are going to go up in flames because they are going to 447 00:46:01,960 --> 00:46:08,510 people who are going to see these policies in completely different ways than than you are doing. 448 00:46:08,510 --> 00:46:14,780 Adopting all these different perspectives, so trying to integrate them also helps us to make better predictions about the future. 449 00:46:14,780 --> 00:46:22,210 So Philip Tetlock has has this metaphor of dragonfly eyes that if you look at these the eyes of the Dragonfly, 450 00:46:22,210 --> 00:46:29,990 you see that it has thousands of lenses that essentially give it a 360 degree vision of the world. 451 00:46:29,990 --> 00:46:36,050 And what he has found and touched on in his research is that if people adopt this driving fight thinking, 452 00:46:36,050 --> 00:46:44,890 they may be able to make much better predictions about the future than if they just focus on one one perspective. 453 00:46:44,890 --> 00:46:51,160 Well, of course, it's difficult as an individual to always do that to be able to integrate all these perspectives. 454 00:46:51,160 --> 00:46:56,350 The one way of achieving that goal is to build diverse teams. 455 00:46:56,350 --> 00:47:04,340 And we have that. I got that idea from side. If it shows that even if you have lots of intelligent people, so we have like David, 456 00:47:04,340 --> 00:47:10,010 yet intelligent guy and then but but then we get a whole bunch of other intelligent people, 457 00:47:10,010 --> 00:47:14,660 but they are intelligent the same way as if they have the same perspective of saving and put them together. 458 00:47:14,660 --> 00:47:22,550 Then we actually may have a a team that is composed of smart people, but it's collectively stupid because it doesn't. 459 00:47:22,550 --> 00:47:30,080 It reinforces people in this group. They reinforce each other's biases and they don't don't come at the issue from different perspectives. 460 00:47:30,080 --> 00:47:38,060 So what we need really is is diverse teams. And to just give you an example again from international law, where that may have been a problem. 461 00:47:38,060 --> 00:47:44,420 Before I joined Queens, I used to work at the World Trade Trade Organisation, at the WTO, at the body. 462 00:47:44,420 --> 00:47:48,110 And you may have heard that the head of the body is defunct. 463 00:47:48,110 --> 00:47:54,360 That is no longer working because the United States has been blocking appointments to the appellate body. 464 00:47:54,360 --> 00:47:56,750 So obviously, having worked in the Secretariat, 465 00:47:56,750 --> 00:48:06,440 I I've been thinking about that a lot and I've been wondering whether one problem of the of the team that was supporting the upper body, 466 00:48:06,440 --> 00:48:11,510 but also the upper body itself was a lack of diversity. 467 00:48:11,510 --> 00:48:15,620 And what do I mean by that? Obviously at that, at that until we were, we were incredibly diverse. 468 00:48:15,620 --> 00:48:22,730 We came all came from different countries. We spoke different languages, different cultural backgrounds. 469 00:48:22,730 --> 00:48:29,840 But none of us was really in a position to fully understand the US perspective 470 00:48:29,840 --> 00:48:37,830 because none of us came from the from the trade remedy side in the United States. 471 00:48:37,830 --> 00:48:41,990 So I don't want to get too deep into the matters entered into the issue here. 472 00:48:41,990 --> 00:48:47,090 But the reason why the US is so upset about the appellate body is because the appellate bodies, 473 00:48:47,090 --> 00:48:52,370 because of the appellate bodies jurisprudence on trade remedies. So we had to you as American and the other party secretary. 474 00:48:52,370 --> 00:48:55,610 But he came from the State Department, not the Department of Commerce. 475 00:48:55,610 --> 00:49:07,040 And so maybe it was because of we didn't have someone who who really represented that U.S. perspective, that protectionist perspective amongst us, 476 00:49:07,040 --> 00:49:14,030 that we couldn't really fully grasp the US concerns about what the arbiter of what it was doing and what was 477 00:49:14,030 --> 00:49:20,630 interesting is that the US always had an appellate body member itself and always had an upper body member itself. 478 00:49:20,630 --> 00:49:28,850 And us could would know that whenever nominated appellate body members and the membership would choose at least one U.S. Apple Party members. 479 00:49:28,850 --> 00:49:32,930 But what the US did in order to be nice to them plus of the membership, 480 00:49:32,930 --> 00:49:37,820 it would typically nominate one appellate body member who was very controversial. 481 00:49:37,820 --> 00:49:46,730 Well, we held very strong critical views of the appellate body and then one who was a bit more mellow and a bit more mainstream. 482 00:49:46,730 --> 00:49:51,090 And on each of these occasions when the membership had the choice between these two, a different matter. 483 00:49:51,090 --> 00:49:55,520 But remember, it shows the momentum one more mainstream one. 484 00:49:55,520 --> 00:49:58,010 And I'm just wondering, I think that that was a mistake. 485 00:49:58,010 --> 00:50:09,200 I think if there the membership had chosen the after party member who was more critical of the of the party, a bit like Lincoln's team of rivals, 486 00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:17,600 it would have potentially protected the everybody because that member could have told the court his colleagues it was. 487 00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:25,820 All men could have told his colleagues that what really the US concerns with the appellate body 488 00:50:25,820 --> 00:50:30,830 were and the danger that the party was running in in pursuing the course that it pursued. 489 00:50:30,830 --> 00:50:35,570 So this this these diverse perspectives that we're talking about here, 490 00:50:35,570 --> 00:50:40,310 the importance of having diverse teams is something that's acutely relevant for international law. 491 00:50:40,310 --> 00:50:45,590 I would say. So I don't know how I'm doing for time. 492 00:50:45,590 --> 00:50:49,930 Let me just. I think I've run over. 493 00:50:49,930 --> 00:50:55,370 It's absolutely fine, because if you if you could sort of pull things, get a little moved some questions, but it's so fascinating. 494 00:50:55,370 --> 00:51:03,080 So please do. One I just want to mention one limitation of the book, 495 00:51:03,080 --> 00:51:07,370 which is that as you may have noticed that I've noticed is I've been speaking 496 00:51:07,370 --> 00:51:11,030 primarily from the from the Western perspectives about debates in the West. 497 00:51:11,030 --> 00:51:20,210 And we we are very conscious of the fact that we are not giving the same in-depth treatment to narratives from outside the West. 498 00:51:20,210 --> 00:51:24,920 We have a chapter in the book where we talk about blind spots of narrative and blind spots and 499 00:51:24,920 --> 00:51:29,450 biases in the Western narratives where we try to address some of the non-Western perspectives. 500 00:51:29,450 --> 00:51:38,096 But I think I'll stop here and I'm happy to get back to these two to the non-Western narratives in the debate and the discussion.