1 00:00:01,200 --> 00:00:08,610 Delighted to be speaking today about the topic that I was actually thinking about for quite some time, 2 00:00:09,480 --> 00:00:14,640 very intensively for since April this year or maybe March even. 3 00:00:17,280 --> 00:00:22,919 And also, I'm very happy that I'm going to spend the entire year at Oxford Law faculty and hopefully we 4 00:00:22,920 --> 00:00:29,680 get to spend time together and similar events organised by Public International Law Group. 5 00:00:30,480 --> 00:00:39,570 So the topic of today's discussion I hope is going to be discussion since I intend to deliver a quite simple presentation. 6 00:00:39,960 --> 00:00:49,770 So have more time for Q&A. But I'm afraid that my argument is both quite opposite of simple, and it's actually very difficult and complex. 7 00:00:50,370 --> 00:00:55,140 So please feel free to interrupt me in between if you have any. 8 00:00:57,000 --> 00:00:59,549 In clarifications that you think I can I can do. 9 00:00:59,550 --> 00:01:06,510 And in between of my arguments, actually, I'm going to make a few arguments in order to sort of outline, 10 00:01:06,510 --> 00:01:13,440 as I said in the abstract to this lecture, I'll try to outline the conceptual foundations for complexity, for crime of aggression. 11 00:01:15,270 --> 00:01:21,410 So I am actually I published an article for the American Journal of International Law, which is coming out. 12 00:01:22,470 --> 00:01:24,660 It's going to be published very soon, actually. 13 00:01:24,660 --> 00:01:36,720 But also, I've been dealing with this topic somewhat in my thesis, so I'm going to speak about the leadership standard of the crime of aggression. 14 00:01:37,860 --> 00:01:41,070 So I will share a screen in a moment. 15 00:01:42,540 --> 00:01:46,980 Just to point out where he's actually located. 16 00:01:48,090 --> 00:01:58,919 So it's it makes the crime of aggression somewhat unique in that sort of led to believe that the crime of aggression is a leadership crime, 17 00:01:58,920 --> 00:02:07,320 which is true, as we will see. But also that is reserved to top leadership of a state, which I don't think it's true. 18 00:02:08,370 --> 00:02:13,920 So there's also confusion with those of you who know anything about international criminal law. 19 00:02:14,310 --> 00:02:20,640 So many of you. There's this control theory of the International Criminal Court. 20 00:02:22,950 --> 00:02:37,060 So before. After actually India leadership standard was adopted, the control theory emerged and sort of like made everything more confusing. 21 00:02:37,420 --> 00:02:43,600 So this just introduce the topic for discussion. I'll try to be more structured in my lecture presentation. 22 00:02:43,930 --> 00:02:51,780 So let me just for a moment share my screen. Right. 23 00:02:52,050 --> 00:02:55,340 Does it work? First, right. Great. 24 00:02:55,760 --> 00:03:00,950 So this is the crime of aggression. This is the current definition, as we have in the Rome Statute. 25 00:03:01,730 --> 00:03:10,400 So it's articulated this. So this is the part actually that that refers to the leadership clause. 26 00:03:10,410 --> 00:03:14,750 It says for the purpose of the statute, crime progression means conduct verbs, planning, 27 00:03:14,750 --> 00:03:22,280 preparation and support by a person in a position to exercise, control or direct the political and military action of the state. 28 00:03:25,370 --> 00:03:31,730 Also we have mortal liability in the Rome Statute, which are found which are to be found in Article 25. 29 00:03:32,090 --> 00:03:38,150 So we have here a perpetration forms of complicity in Article 25 three. 30 00:03:38,160 --> 00:03:43,160 Right. And then we have a new Article 25 three based. It says, in respect of the crimes of aggression, 31 00:03:43,170 --> 00:03:47,569 that's the provision of this article is to apply only to persons in a position 32 00:03:47,570 --> 00:03:52,250 effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political and military actions. 33 00:03:52,600 --> 00:03:56,450 It's a is the only crime actually that is practised by this. 34 00:03:56,450 --> 00:04:03,230 We call its leadership clause, which essentially was the control over a direct political mutual military action of the state. 35 00:04:05,700 --> 00:04:10,930 Okay. Let me just quit this. 36 00:04:14,060 --> 00:04:21,400 Now back. So the crimes aggression is one of the four core crimes. 37 00:04:21,400 --> 00:04:24,430 And as I said, it's the only one left together with genocide, 38 00:04:24,430 --> 00:04:29,770 crimes against humanity and war crimes and is the only crime that is the premise of this leadership clause. 39 00:04:30,490 --> 00:04:37,290 It was actually adopted a it was in jurisdiction of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ever since the beginning. 40 00:04:37,290 --> 00:04:46,180 It took from 1998 and 2002. And however, the definition was adopted in 2007 and became fully operational in 2017. 41 00:04:47,350 --> 00:04:51,760 So apart from the leadership clause, there's also one more particularity, very important. 42 00:04:52,060 --> 00:04:58,450 So states conduct elements. So again, is the only crime that requires direct action of a state. 43 00:04:59,950 --> 00:05:10,510 So if the state does not commit an act of aggression, so manifestly more than the international law definition, 44 00:05:10,900 --> 00:05:15,640 customary definition of an act of aggression, then there is no criminal responsibility. 45 00:05:16,240 --> 00:05:24,069 So the reasons why we have this leadership clause is actually the main reason is to prevent overcriminalization. 46 00:05:24,070 --> 00:05:27,310 So as you know, like the war is, which involves many. 47 00:05:28,740 --> 00:05:31,020 Dozens of thousands of hundreds of thousands of people. 48 00:05:31,020 --> 00:05:38,070 So it's never been go beyond point of possibility if we consider everyone responsible to sort of contribute to an act of aggression. 49 00:05:38,340 --> 00:05:43,560 So that's why we have some leadership clause. So this is the introduction. 50 00:05:44,010 --> 00:05:52,220 So today I'll try to make I'll make five points, which will be carried out in five steps. 51 00:05:52,260 --> 00:05:56,880 So the first point I'll make concerns the genealogy of the leadership clause. 52 00:05:57,300 --> 00:06:07,590 So I will explain how the customary international law actually suggests that private individuals are able to meet 53 00:06:07,590 --> 00:06:14,500 this leadership standard and henceforth therefore be responsible for complicity in the crime of aggression. 54 00:06:14,520 --> 00:06:24,270 So this is contested actually in literature. And in step two, I will explain the critique of the current theory of control of direct. 55 00:06:25,590 --> 00:06:34,290 In the step three, I will explain my argument on the definition of what is an actual need to control their state action. 56 00:06:35,910 --> 00:06:43,860 In step four, I will explain how control from control or direct or control from the leadership 57 00:06:43,860 --> 00:06:49,020 clause relates to the control theory of the International Criminal Court. 58 00:06:49,230 --> 00:06:55,740 And in step five, very briefly, I will set out the conditions for the for complicity. 59 00:06:55,740 --> 00:07:05,610 So as you know, complicity has many forms in the criminal law, and there are different particularities there. 60 00:07:05,610 --> 00:07:07,860 But I will not speak about it today, 61 00:07:07,860 --> 00:07:18,570 so I will just see how my proposed interpretation of the leadership clause reflects on theories of complicity in general international criminal law. 62 00:07:19,560 --> 00:07:22,950 Okay, any questions? Nope. Great. 63 00:07:23,340 --> 00:07:31,140 So let's start with step one. So say something about the the nature of the leadership nature of your crime, of aggression. 64 00:07:31,150 --> 00:07:39,060 So ever since the first trials in Nuremberg, in Tokyo, we considered aggression to be a leadership crime. 65 00:07:39,070 --> 00:07:46,180 So if you see the Nuremberg Charter or Tokyo chapter, there is nothing about the leadership. 66 00:07:46,200 --> 00:07:49,440 However, if you see the reasoning of the courts, 67 00:07:49,810 --> 00:08:01,920 you will discern how the reflected on the leadership positions of the persons who were found responsible for crimes against those crimes aggression. 68 00:08:02,220 --> 00:08:08,970 So even Justice Robert Jackson, which I'm sure many of you know who he is, he was the chief prosecutor for the US at Nuremberg. 69 00:08:09,300 --> 00:08:17,370 So he actually reflected on the the trials some years after and after the trials were finished. 70 00:08:17,370 --> 00:08:28,950 He said that it never occurred to me and I'm sure it occurred to no one else at the London conference were actually Nuremberg Charter was adopted 71 00:08:29,220 --> 00:08:38,150 to speak of anyone waging a war of aggression except the topmost leaders who had some degree of control over its precipitation and policy. 72 00:08:38,690 --> 00:08:45,400 And that was like saying that from the beginning the crime of aggression was sort of reserved, quote unquote, for the policy makers. 73 00:08:47,670 --> 00:08:56,730 There are in in the subsequent, as I recall, subsequent trials of the trials in the occupied zones that followed a number of getting Tokyo trials. 74 00:08:57,570 --> 00:09:03,690 There are two important cases that addressed the leadership problem of the crime of aggression. 75 00:09:03,690 --> 00:09:07,950 So the first one is Farben case Farben. 76 00:09:08,400 --> 00:09:13,950 So that was the case brought by the United States against 24 high level officials. 77 00:09:14,180 --> 00:09:19,980 Time actually five. It was huge company, the largest industrial corporation in Europe. 78 00:09:20,910 --> 00:09:32,820 So they were its officials were accused of essentially complicity in international crimes and one of them was a crime of aggression. 79 00:09:33,060 --> 00:09:38,910 So interestingly, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, which was the tribunal where they were prosecuted, 80 00:09:39,450 --> 00:09:43,260 said that the leadership standard already existed from the beginning. 81 00:09:43,710 --> 00:09:54,450 So they considered that the crime of aggression is that leaders and they they also importantly said that industrialists as civil society leaders, 82 00:09:54,460 --> 00:09:55,410 that's termed it, 83 00:09:55,410 --> 00:10:09,780 and that's the matter of industrialists or any any other private individuals are actually able to be considered as leaders of a state. 84 00:10:09,810 --> 00:10:20,220 So that was back in the forties. And there is another case, very important, one of high command, where 14 high ranking officers in German military, 85 00:10:20,640 --> 00:10:27,360 just to say that four or five defendants, they were acquitted, but not for the reasons that they did not meet the leadership standard. 86 00:10:27,360 --> 00:10:35,760 They were acquitted because mainly because of the so that it was considered they did not have enough knowledge of the aggressive war. 87 00:10:37,250 --> 00:10:43,730 There's a little bit more sophistication, if you're will, but that's essentially when the court said in high command case, 88 00:10:44,420 --> 00:10:51,590 which followed, 14 ranking officers in the German military were prosecuted for aggression. 89 00:10:52,400 --> 00:10:56,030 So that's that's a very important case because that the Nuremberg military 90 00:10:56,030 --> 00:11:02,660 tribunal unequivocally said that crime of aggression is there only for policy. 91 00:11:03,620 --> 00:11:11,630 Actually said that leaders are those individuals with actual power to shape or influence the policy of their state. 92 00:11:12,530 --> 00:11:17,270 So that was the standard or is it time to influence or just control a directive today? 93 00:11:18,110 --> 00:11:27,259 So however important thing here, the important message is that the courts always considered the crime of aggression, 94 00:11:27,260 --> 00:11:33,860 only to be reserved for the policymakers. So this is pretty much uncontested in the in the literature. 95 00:11:34,400 --> 00:11:38,990 But it's important just to know that industrialists, for instance, 96 00:11:38,990 --> 00:11:48,170 are always considered to be capable to meet this leadership standard shape of influence at the time. 97 00:11:49,160 --> 00:11:51,170 But we'll see how it plays out in control in Iraq. 98 00:11:52,040 --> 00:12:03,439 So the first time the leadership clause was adopted in In International Law Document was actually 1996 99 00:12:03,440 --> 00:12:10,400 when the International Law Commission issued draft codes of crimes against peace and security of mankind. 100 00:12:10,700 --> 00:12:21,800 So if you see Article 16, there defines a crime of aggression and prescribes responsibility to individuals who as leaders or organisers, 101 00:12:22,100 --> 00:12:27,260 actively participate in the ground for aggression. So there was no leadership clause. 102 00:12:27,290 --> 00:12:30,889 It didn't say anything about the super influence, but they say it's only for leaders. 103 00:12:30,890 --> 00:12:37,310 The organisers write the commentaries and for actual law commission said that 104 00:12:38,180 --> 00:12:43,880 those are the individuals who are able to decide to inform the formulation, 105 00:12:43,890 --> 00:12:47,000 the creation of the policy of a state, including its policy. 106 00:12:47,300 --> 00:12:51,200 It's always there from the beginning policy makers, parties policy, 107 00:12:51,200 --> 00:12:55,850 international law commissions that those are in leadership of the state are individuals 108 00:12:55,910 --> 00:13:01,130 who are able to decisively influence the formulation of their aggressive policy. 109 00:13:01,910 --> 00:13:06,620 And they said that this also applies quoting Nuremberg cases. 110 00:13:06,770 --> 00:13:12,920 This also applies to individuals from the civil society sector and industry. 111 00:13:14,190 --> 00:13:20,000 In 1997 during the negotiation, prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute, 1998. 112 00:13:20,270 --> 00:13:30,140 The German delegation. Proposed that instead of leaders or organisers use the term control or direct. 113 00:13:31,770 --> 00:13:40,410 So if you remember when I showed article business control in the state government and from 1997 it 114 00:13:40,560 --> 00:13:46,800 was suggested by German delegation as a more apt criteria to capture the modern state dynamics. 115 00:13:50,150 --> 00:13:57,590 So it is now in Article 25, an article about this, as you've seen, and also in the amounts of responsibility in Article 23, this. 116 00:14:00,850 --> 00:14:07,060 As I said, the crime of aggression was within the purview of the Rome Statute from the very beginning. 117 00:14:07,330 --> 00:14:16,060 However, in the semester it was not adopted until 2007 review conference of the Rome Statute. 118 00:14:16,270 --> 00:14:20,120 So from 2003 to 2009, even before that. 119 00:14:20,120 --> 00:14:25,450 But this is an important period presently. And since I was in a special working group for a crime of aggression, 120 00:14:25,870 --> 00:14:31,930 I met several times and in 2000, and it proposed a definition which was eventually adopted. 121 00:14:32,590 --> 00:14:39,070 So there were many issues that were contested, mainly relating to jurisdiction, 122 00:14:41,530 --> 00:14:45,190 and they were sort of resolved in a satisfactory manner to some extent. 123 00:14:45,630 --> 00:14:56,860 Myself? No. The there was some discussion about individual convicting force, but about the scope of the leadership responsibility. 124 00:14:57,040 --> 00:15:01,510 Opinions have been raised, however. However, there was no clear stance or so. 125 00:15:03,500 --> 00:15:07,910 The control their wrecked. Was a new standards. 126 00:15:08,240 --> 00:15:11,900 So replacing the sheep or implements someone from the Second World War. 127 00:15:12,200 --> 00:15:18,790 And some delegations assumed and they suggested it's too narrow a standard. 128 00:15:19,380 --> 00:15:25,910 Definitely will infringe the customary international law and the Nuremberg precedents and 129 00:15:27,170 --> 00:15:32,360 meaning that individuals from private sector would be excluded from criminal responsibility. 130 00:15:32,450 --> 00:15:43,190 Then you have 2007 where my friend of mine, Kevin John Heller, published an article, sort of inspired me to write these 12 articles. 131 00:15:43,880 --> 00:15:53,180 So he argued that the standard completely retreats from Nuremberg Legacy and actually suggested that we should go back to shape, for instance, 132 00:15:53,180 --> 00:16:05,720 because if we keep control and direct or direct standards never to turn states complicit nor private individuals could meet the standards. 133 00:16:05,760 --> 00:16:11,350 So I'll come back to his argument in a moment. But this is what he said in 2007 and sort of as a response to that. 134 00:16:11,360 --> 00:16:14,480 And since I was in that, not in nine, it's very important. 135 00:16:14,750 --> 00:16:18,830 So the special working group for Crime of Aggression concluded the following. 136 00:16:19,780 --> 00:16:24,909 The view during the negotiation was also expressed in the language of the provision. 137 00:16:24,910 --> 00:16:31,870 Control is sufficiently broad to include persons with effective control over the political interaction of the state, 138 00:16:32,380 --> 00:16:36,370 but who are not formally part of the relevant government such as industrial. 139 00:16:37,950 --> 00:16:40,959 So I think this is, from my analysis, the most important sentence. 140 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:43,310 So it doesn't say much, does it say that? 141 00:16:43,320 --> 00:16:50,070 Okay, we are definitely going to include within the scope of criminal responsibility leaders from the private sector. 142 00:16:50,670 --> 00:16:58,230 What is does not also say very importantly is that they could never be prosecuted. 143 00:16:59,490 --> 00:17:04,770 So the conclusion here is that my argument is that the customary status of the 144 00:17:04,770 --> 00:17:08,999 leadership clause arguments about a customary status of the leadership laws in 145 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:12,899 different places confirms that the crimes progression has always considered both 146 00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:17,010 formal and civil sector leaders have within the purview of chromosome stability. 147 00:17:17,010 --> 00:17:23,370 And crucially, there is nothing in the documents nor other sources of international law suggesting guidelines. 148 00:17:23,950 --> 00:17:28,140 If someone suggests a new interpretation of the controller directives, 149 00:17:28,890 --> 00:17:40,380 arguing for a more narrow approach that will only be focussed on the formal political leadership of the state, that's all right. 150 00:17:40,650 --> 00:17:46,450 But if they say that this is what the documents suggest, I don't think that's correct. 151 00:17:46,480 --> 00:17:48,090 They didn't find anything in the documents. 152 00:17:48,090 --> 00:17:53,010 And I actually have been studying this growth while I did actually talk with many people who were present during 153 00:17:53,010 --> 00:17:58,829 the conference and they were doing during the special the work on the special working group Crime of Aggression. 154 00:17:58,830 --> 00:18:09,330 And they're very reluctant to say that the civil society leaders are able to meet the standards and able to be prosecuted for complicity. 155 00:18:09,330 --> 00:18:13,379 But their reasoning was mainly the sentiment during the conference. 156 00:18:13,380 --> 00:18:19,880 That's how they felt when they were there. Again, the focus was on jurisdictional issues, right? 157 00:18:20,730 --> 00:18:28,469 But their feeling with most of them, with whom I spoke, was that civil society leaders could not be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. 158 00:18:28,470 --> 00:18:36,000 So my based on my conversations with them is that they did not spend enough time pondering about this issue. 159 00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:43,000 And there was this very influential article of Kevin John Heller. Imagine 2007. 160 00:18:43,000 --> 00:18:50,050 It's sort of the opinion state that civil society leaders could not be prosecuted for complicity in a war of aggression. 161 00:18:50,680 --> 00:18:54,520 Again, if you look at the documents, look at the law. 162 00:18:55,120 --> 00:19:01,480 There's nothing suggesting that. So that that's very important. That's the big part of what I'm arguing in my. 163 00:19:03,230 --> 00:19:06,920 In my theory of complexity. Okay. So that's that's step number one. 164 00:19:06,920 --> 00:19:10,460 So we know something about the the leadership responsibility. 165 00:19:10,970 --> 00:19:14,530 So now we turn to critique of controller direct. 166 00:19:14,540 --> 00:19:23,809 So there are a few scholars who were arguing in their articles and commentaries that the standard is too narrow, 167 00:19:23,810 --> 00:19:31,340 but little just like mention two of them, Kevin John Halloran, Karen McDougal, because they think they spend a lot more time than others. 168 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:41,840 Kevin Durant devoted an hour and a day article in 2007, and also he repeated this position in private emails, of course, but correspondence. 169 00:19:41,840 --> 00:19:49,110 But also in his latest article, which dates back to years ago, he said that nothing changed and she still thinks that. 170 00:19:49,160 --> 00:19:59,780 That's partially why he said that a control like direct could not encompass leaders outside of the formal state leadership. 171 00:20:01,700 --> 00:20:05,510 I like his argument very much. I would disagree. 172 00:20:06,260 --> 00:20:09,649 I think that he's reading of the case. 173 00:20:09,650 --> 00:20:19,879 Law is very, very good. So he said that in five been the case that I just mentioned where industrialists were prosecuted. 174 00:20:19,880 --> 00:20:27,140 The reasoning was the following The court considered their contribution to be bad for communities, 175 00:20:27,140 --> 00:20:30,920 and it goes on towards the formulation of the state policy or decisively. 176 00:20:31,370 --> 00:20:36,380 The Court considered their contribution to decisively influence the formulation of state policy, 177 00:20:37,850 --> 00:20:45,710 and the Court said the contribution of industrialists was indispensable to the realisation of the aggressive policy. 178 00:20:45,860 --> 00:20:52,760 However, since the normative appreciation of the five and defendants was minus aiding and abetting, 179 00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:59,000 Heller argues that they could never satisfied the new control or direct grey theory. 180 00:20:59,750 --> 00:21:04,969 So Heller says that during the Second World War, 181 00:21:04,970 --> 00:21:11,390 industrialists were prosecuted based on shape or influence and they cannot control controlled, direct. 182 00:21:11,390 --> 00:21:21,470 And his reasoning is, while a cheaper influence means decisive influence towards the formulation of state policy. 183 00:21:23,910 --> 00:21:32,970 But control and direct is a higher standard. If she doesn't say why is it higher and how it actually can be higher than decisive influence? 184 00:21:33,330 --> 00:21:39,180 He only says that because industrialists such as descendants of IBM. 185 00:21:41,630 --> 00:21:44,300 Their role was one of aiding and abetting. 186 00:21:44,690 --> 00:21:55,040 And because it's by nature complicity in a war of aggression, they could never meet the control order extant. 187 00:21:55,580 --> 00:22:00,930 That's his reason. Karen McDougal said something very similar. 188 00:22:00,950 --> 00:22:10,760 Lisa she in according to her and she published that in both volumes of the book of the Crime of aggression. 189 00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:19,100 So she under something very similar and she says that the crime of aggression should be reserved only to what she calls deciders. 190 00:22:19,100 --> 00:22:22,520 So those who decide actually about the use of armed force. 191 00:22:24,830 --> 00:22:31,910 So in short, Harold Heller McDougal and another scenario can find control criteria is a lower threshold of the leadership. 192 00:22:32,070 --> 00:22:38,640 I was there argue that there were considerable aiding and abetting. 193 00:22:38,720 --> 00:22:42,110 So do think if someone aids in a bed cannot control. 194 00:22:42,770 --> 00:22:48,839 That's the essence. The central. I, however, disagree with that. 195 00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:55,320 So I think that a person who hates it about gun control, that's simple as that. 196 00:22:56,080 --> 00:23:04,860 So this is this is my view. I defined the the definition of of control their right in the following matter. 197 00:23:05,580 --> 00:23:11,850 So if you look at it in definition, it says a controller directly relates to the state action. 198 00:23:12,070 --> 00:23:16,650 So the person in a position to control or direct the state action. 199 00:23:18,090 --> 00:23:22,630 So here is a little bit tricky. So I actually have an entire article and book chapter about this. 200 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:26,310 So the state action, if you look at the definition of the crime of aggression. 201 00:23:27,430 --> 00:23:32,400 It could mean two things to me. The use of armed force and this elements. 202 00:23:35,030 --> 00:23:41,870 From a criminal law perspective, this is extremely important because when we attribute criminal responsibility, 203 00:23:41,870 --> 00:23:48,210 we need to decide what is the consequence of the crime. Murder means causing a death. 204 00:23:48,540 --> 00:23:53,490 Causing is the action of perpetration. Death is a consequence. 205 00:23:53,760 --> 00:23:59,490 So is wandering was the consequence of the crime of aggression and identifying anything actually in literature. 206 00:23:59,850 --> 00:24:09,710 So I as I said then. I have a bookshop on this and also an article arguing how state action is to be 207 00:24:10,250 --> 00:24:17,770 understood as the act of use amounts force and also as the state's kind of talismans, 208 00:24:17,780 --> 00:24:23,780 which is the particularly great use of force, was particularly great violation of the UN charter. 209 00:24:24,350 --> 00:24:30,590 So we essentially blame individuals for causing the use of foreign force. 210 00:24:31,990 --> 00:24:37,990 And. Also being aware of the overarching state act of aggression. 211 00:24:37,990 --> 00:24:47,320 So that's my argument. Short But maybe this is controversial to some of you and I'm very happy to discuss that in the Q&A afterwards. 212 00:24:47,560 --> 00:24:51,070 And this is what I conclude. So we have to look at the definition. 213 00:24:51,070 --> 00:24:58,030 We have to use amount of force. It's always every act of aggression is based on a series of instances of the use of armed force. 214 00:24:58,210 --> 00:25:02,620 Every single one of them represents the consequence of the crime. 215 00:25:02,950 --> 00:25:03,850 So ultimately, 216 00:25:04,060 --> 00:25:13,629 we blame individuals for causing this single instance of the use of armed force while being aware of the overarching state conduct element, 217 00:25:13,630 --> 00:25:16,530 which is the manifest violation of the UN Charter. 218 00:25:17,410 --> 00:25:26,830 So if we accept that, and I'm arguing for that in my in my book, then we can reach the following conclusion. 219 00:25:26,830 --> 00:25:32,920 So state action is always an instance of the use of force. 220 00:25:32,920 --> 00:25:36,670 It forms a basis for interpretation, for the appreciation of the state conflict element. 221 00:25:37,420 --> 00:25:41,380 Therefore, control of their rights relates to use of armed force. 222 00:25:42,960 --> 00:25:51,450 Based on the analysis of customer international law as they tried to show the leadership clause restricts criminal responsibility to policy makers. 223 00:25:51,660 --> 00:25:53,130 It's always about policy. 224 00:25:53,550 --> 00:26:00,000 If you look at the documents, if you look at the case law, it was always something about policy being or persons being the policy of a state. 225 00:26:00,860 --> 00:26:04,200 But therefore, in this context, I argue controller, 226 00:26:04,200 --> 00:26:09,960 I suggest controller direct relates to the formulation of the state policy on the use of armed force. 227 00:26:12,630 --> 00:26:19,420 Control means decisive influence or but fought over the formulation of the state policy utterances. 228 00:26:20,550 --> 00:26:21,090 Iraq. 229 00:26:21,300 --> 00:26:32,550 This is very shortly is substantially a higher level of high degree of control, requiring some proactive behaviour on the part of the perpetrator. 230 00:26:32,560 --> 00:26:38,070 So I would use this analogy from the state responsibility. So they also have control their reconstruction. 231 00:26:38,070 --> 00:26:45,900 What is the means of this discussion? So that was focussed on control and that's what I'm doing in my article in my book. 232 00:26:46,230 --> 00:26:57,180 So importantly, control means decisive influence or battle for contribution towards the formulation of the state policy to use our force. 233 00:26:57,660 --> 00:27:07,790 I would say that having John Taylor agrees with this as well, he mentions that shape or influence mean well, 234 00:27:07,840 --> 00:27:11,280 he read that five minute and he said this is what shape or influence means, 235 00:27:11,280 --> 00:27:14,570 indispensable contribution towards the formulation of policy, 236 00:27:14,580 --> 00:27:20,700 but that this is what I see about control also from the from the from the new leadership class. 237 00:27:22,970 --> 00:27:26,450 Okay. So if we accept that, then we can work. 238 00:27:27,620 --> 00:27:35,510 We can apply this to the theory of complicity in international criminal law and show how we see how it is possible 239 00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:46,340 for individual or is contribution was severe aiding and abetting how he's able to also control state policy. 240 00:27:46,340 --> 00:27:53,530 So I'm coming back to that in a moment. But first, I just want to say something about the control theory of the International Criminal Court. 241 00:27:53,540 --> 00:27:59,750 So if you look at the control theory of the International Criminal Court, which sort of emerged, I believe, in 2007. 242 00:28:03,100 --> 00:28:15,459 It suggests it has a normative purpose to ascribe perpetration to individuals who are not directly committing international crimes. 243 00:28:15,460 --> 00:28:24,220 So those would be the leaders of states or non-state actors to sort of set in motion the atrocities that eventually occur. 244 00:28:24,550 --> 00:28:33,310 If they if their control theory argues that their contribution contribution was essential towards the commission of international crimes, 245 00:28:33,310 --> 00:28:38,470 then there's a plausible way to argue that they are perpetrators of crimes. 246 00:28:38,830 --> 00:28:42,160 They should take this reasoning to control in a crime of aggression. 247 00:28:42,610 --> 00:28:49,899 Then you will look at only individuals who are essentially deciding what the act of aggression is. 248 00:28:49,900 --> 00:28:50,810 You're saying that, okay, 249 00:28:50,880 --> 00:29:03,340 we should apply the interpretation from the International Criminal Courts Control Theory to control from in the leadership clause. 250 00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:08,499 Then you will reach a conclusion that only perpetration is possible for the crime of aggression, 251 00:29:08,500 --> 00:29:15,130 and only the top level of individuals could meet the standard because they are the ones who are deciding. 252 00:29:15,400 --> 00:29:26,050 They are the ones who are providing indispensable financial contribution towards the instant different instances of the use of armed force. 253 00:29:27,820 --> 00:29:34,149 However, I think that the normative purpose of control from the leadership clause and 254 00:29:34,150 --> 00:29:39,370 control from control theory are two different paradigms and they don't coincide. 255 00:29:39,370 --> 00:29:44,380 So one person could meet one standard without meaning the other, and vice versa. 256 00:29:45,220 --> 00:29:53,050 So according to the control theory, control means that the perpetrators conduct is constituent the commission of the crime, 257 00:29:53,530 --> 00:29:59,079 whereas controlling the leadership clause denotes decisive influence and in responsible 258 00:29:59,080 --> 00:30:03,880 but for contribution on the formulation of the state policy or decision to use force. 259 00:30:04,770 --> 00:30:16,190 So control theory means if a conductor is constituent to the commission of crime, then this person should be labelled as a perpetrator. 260 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:23,759 Right? Control from the leadership clause means if a person decisively or expansively 261 00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:27,690 contributes to the formulation of a policy to use of force and disperse, 262 00:30:27,690 --> 00:30:33,720 it should be regarded as a. Just to take this through an example. 263 00:30:35,100 --> 00:30:40,760 So, for instance, a pilot may be in control of a particular act of commission, of the use of force. 264 00:30:40,800 --> 00:30:44,880 That's a bombardment, but not the stated policy to use armed force. 265 00:30:45,980 --> 00:30:52,560 Conversely, and industrialists may satisfy the leadership flaws, specially if he has monopoly proposal. 266 00:30:52,610 --> 00:30:56,870 If he holds monopoly on the market by being in a position to decisively influence 267 00:30:56,870 --> 00:31:00,590 the formulation of the state policy to carry out the use of foreign force, 268 00:31:00,980 --> 00:31:11,060 even though his conduct actually helped or influence aiding and abetting, it is not constituents to the commission of the active use of force itself. 269 00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:19,040 Or the editor in chief. My favourite example of a mainstream newspaper or media creates a necessary consensus amongst 270 00:31:19,040 --> 00:31:24,560 the population that proved to be indispensable for the state to resort to armed force. 271 00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:29,520 But media influence may have decisively helped the state to resort to violence. 272 00:31:29,530 --> 00:31:33,490 But the actual decision to use armed force was made by someone else. 273 00:31:34,180 --> 00:31:41,490 So you can add the chief of the poor media, for example, that I'm going to go into it if you want. 274 00:31:41,500 --> 00:31:49,299 Merrill Lynch. Really? They their contribution towards the formulation of policies that is decisive. 275 00:31:49,300 --> 00:31:56,620 It's very important. They could have potentially a huge influence, especially my own, my country, where I come from, Serbia, 276 00:31:57,220 --> 00:32:04,810 they can they could have a huge influence over the state policy and particular policy towards the use of foreign force. 277 00:32:05,110 --> 00:32:11,470 However, if you look at the actual action of the going out to use a foreign force. 278 00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:19,270 Can't say that their contribution was constituent TOLBERT Was that that's something 279 00:32:19,270 --> 00:32:23,680 else that's a control theory that defines what perpetration what's not okay. 280 00:32:26,440 --> 00:32:35,860 And the last point I'm going to make concerns, complicity. And if we sort of accept what I tried to explain so far, then we can argue that. 281 00:32:37,670 --> 00:32:45,830 Someone like this cellist may have decisive influence towards the formulation of the state policy in a way that isn't inscribed. 282 00:32:49,230 --> 00:33:00,450 The important factor for assessing this complicity liability is to look at whether he had substantial or just contribution 283 00:33:00,450 --> 00:33:06,120 towards the active use of force was not just enough to sort of be in a position of control over the state policy. 284 00:33:06,120 --> 00:33:11,280 But also you need to contribute over the actual act of commission, of use of armed force. 285 00:33:11,580 --> 00:33:18,420 And this person has to have requirements, which is a different topic of discussion. 286 00:33:18,420 --> 00:33:23,550 So he has to be aware of his leadership position and has to be aware of this element is to be. 287 00:33:26,510 --> 00:33:35,570 Aware that this contribution will result in the court in the act of use of armed force. 288 00:33:37,460 --> 00:33:41,300 Okay. So that's everything I have in my notes. 289 00:33:41,300 --> 00:33:52,400 So as I said, I apologise. It's a very like I don't I don't like giving lectures before lectures or so, but this is how it is. 290 00:33:52,400 --> 00:33:54,800 I'm for something. I'm stuck in Stockholm at the moment. 291 00:33:55,190 --> 00:34:07,310 I'm coming to Oxford very soon, so I should try to be more structured and clear in my, my, my, my scholarship. 292 00:34:07,730 --> 00:34:13,820 So if you are interested, as I said, I can be articles coming out very soon. 293 00:34:13,820 --> 00:34:23,200 But also I. I have some documents that some text from my book that sort of contributed to my arguments. 294 00:34:24,340 --> 00:34:28,030 But yeah, so that's it. So maybe we can start with a Q&A session.