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Thank you guys so much for coming out and thank you so much for hosting me.

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I have gained many grey hairs in the course of writing this book.

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So let me just say a little bit of background at myself.

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I'm not a political scientist, so I'm always nervous when I actually hang out with people who have real degrees.

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So my Ph.D. is in the humanities. So I the questions that I'm interested in are questions I think political scientists are broadly interested in.

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But the methods and the data that I use are typically different from however I do cooperate and clearly very closely with political scientists.

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So towards the end of my talk, I'm going to bring in some of the quantitative work that I've done.

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I'm kind of an oddball for being a humanities person. I also want to thank Sara Waseem, who is the fabulous artist who who did the cover.

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It's kind of an interesting back side story to this is that the Pakistan army was so upset about

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the cover that up Pakistan in their version could not run it with this cover which I think

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tells you quite a bit that even Oxford University Press in Pakistan has to cater to the

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Pakistan's army preferences apparently was very offensive that Musharraf is in tiger flip flop.

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Okay. So here's my question. Why is Pakistan persistently revisionist and what do I mean by revisionist?

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I really mean it in two ways. One, there is the territorial revisionism with respect to Kashmir.

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India is a status quo state. It more or less wants to have the ELO, KB International border,

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and Pakistan obviously wants to force India to acquiesce and give some concessions on the on the Kashmir issue.

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But it's also revisionist. Pakistan is in a in a wider sense,

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and that is that Pakistan sees as itself the only state that can and therefore should resist India's rise in the international system.

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And so what I think is kind of puzzling is that Pakistan has fought several wars over Kashmir,

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and it 71 was not fought over Kashmir, but it was fought with India.

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It's lost every war. And yet Pakistan persists in this revisionism.

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And its revisionism, as I said, has even widened in scope even more problematically, is that the tools that it's used to pursue,

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this revisionism, heavily reliant upon jihad under its expanding nuclear umbrella, is actually in peril the state itself.

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So what I mean by that, what's called by shorthand, the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP,

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it wouldn't exist if there hadn't been previously an Afghan Taliban, a Cathal Ansar, a Harvard of Jihad Islami,

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and the whole zoo of Deobandi militants that the Pakistan intelligence and agency,

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the ISI and the army is created to pursue their objectives in India, but also in Afghanistan.

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So we expect states to abandon or revise policies that don't work even modestly,

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and we certainly expect them to revise or abandon policies that undermine the very viability of the state.

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Yet this is not what we're seeing with Pakistan. The conventional wisdom that animates certainly U.S. government policies towards Pakistan.

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And from what I have seen,

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the UK policy is that Pakistan is a security seeking state and this means that there's something in our toolbox of national power that we

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can do to securitise Pakistan to make Pakistan a secure state that will allow it to stop relying upon jihadi proxies in Kashmir and then,

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by extension, Afghanistan. This gives rise to every time there's a new presidential candidate.

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Barack Obama did this when he was a candidate. They revisit this idea of Kashmir that we need to have some grand bargain, that the United States,

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working with our allies, can can put pressure on India to make some concession.

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Once this issue is resolved, Afghanistan can become peaceful.

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This happens all the time, every eight years or so.

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Most recently, Ahmed Rashid and Barnett Rubin argued this in a piece called basically was advocating for this notion of a grand bargain.

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We fix Kashmir and then Afghanistan becomes okay.

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And of course, Barnett Rubin is important because he was very close adviser to the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,

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I argue in the book. This is very pernicious because, one, it assumes that all of Afghanistan,

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Pakistan issues resolve or can be reduced to the India-Pakistan security competition.

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But most importantly, it legitimises Pakistan's claims that Kashmir and I'm going to say very categorically,

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Pakistan has no legitimate claims to Kashmir. Now, I want you to be very clear that I'm not absolving India of its malfeasance in Kashmir,

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but what I am doing is that I'm uncoupling the Kashmir issue from an international dispute between Rob Kennedy slash Islamabad and Delhi.

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And I'm instead reframing it as a dispute between Delhi and Nagar, taking Pakistan out of the puzzle because it has no legitimate claims.

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So not only. Do what we do politically, but also in terms of our assistance.

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We treat Pakistan as a security seeking state.

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And and I'm going to argue that it's not a security seeking state, that instead it is a greedy state, the or an ideological state.

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And so I'm relying here upon the work of Charles Glazer, and you can read it.

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But let me for those you can't I'm also very near-sighted, so I have difficulty reading it.

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But he defines a purely ideological or greedy state as one which is fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo,

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desiring additional territory, even when it's not required for security.

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What's funny about Pakistan, when it talks about Kashmir, it could if if one of us were writing an article,

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why Pakistan might care about Kashmir, we might want to phrase it in terms of water security.

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Actually, Pakistan doesn't do that. And when I talk about the evidence that I use in the study,

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it's surprising how when Pakistan military talks about Kashmir, it's almost always ideological.

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So when a friend of mine suggested that I read Glaser, I had this huge aha moment.

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I think that's exactly what this is.

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And the implications are pretty profound because if you treat an ideological or a greedy state like a security seeking state,

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you actually incentivise worse behaviour. So in other words, the United States government over the last 13 years with its 30 plus billion dollars,

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rather than making investments in a better Pakistan,

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we've actually been incentivising it to continue doing what I would actually say is pernicious to our interests,

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which is expanding their nuclear umbrella, both by pursuing tactical nuclear weapons or battlefield nuclear weapons,

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and ever more investing in their zoo of militant groups.

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So in other words, we've made it worse, not better. All the while,

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our Congress has been told by our policymakers that they're doing things they're supposed to help Pakistan and help us pursue our interests.

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So let me just very briefly talk a little about the methods. So I'm very interested, obviously, in this notion of revisionism.

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And when I talk about this in the States, if we made a game called India and Pakistan and we set up here's the rules of the game,

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here's what your national assets are, your instruments of power, and here's your objectives.

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Your average 14 year old who got stuck with the Pakistan hand would give up.

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Right. Your average rating if we just had the, you know, playing the game rationality.

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Your average 14 year old would make some concession to India because any concession tomorrow is any closer than a concession today.

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Now, Pakistan's not irrational. So clearly something else is going on.

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And what I argue in the book is that it's the strategic culture that is flavouring,

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the cost benefit calculus that what Pakistan is bringing to its cost benefit calculus is not, strictly speaking, game rationality.

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It's bringing the weight of its history with India,

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the weight of the way in which it interprets its relationships with the world to inform the payoff matrix for its actions.

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When I did look at the political science literature,

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one thing I also found that was kind of lacking was that political scientists seem to assume the state is revisionist or is not,

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and then these behaviours fall out of those assumed categories.

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I think very little discussion about why a state stays revisionist when the very viability of the state itself is imperilled.

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And I found very few people that talked about changing state,

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like becoming revisionist from status quo and vice versa with with one exception this fellow Zions type you a brief about my data.

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So for some of you know me I had for many years gone to Pakistan actually since 1991 and had interacted closely with the military.

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My argument always was that they should at least be able to present their point of view.

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The problem with their point of view is it is not it doesn't frequently align with empiricism, with with empirical history.

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I can put that less delicately. They make stuff up quite a bit, quite a bit, in fact, often all the time.

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And so, you know, I do rely upon in moments salient conversations with specific individuals.

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But one for all of you that have gone to Pakistan or interacted with Pakistan, the military in particular, the.

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No, they're brief. They I can't speak to you all, but I can certainly speak to Americans.

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The average American interlocutor engaging with a Pakistani counterpart does not know the history

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of U.S. Pakistan relations and what the Pakistanis will do briefly in terms of the military,

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I'm not talking about Pakistanis in general,

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although many other ordinary Pakistanis have taken on this history because of the diffusion into Pakistan's textbooks.

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It's all very stylised version of history. One of my favourites is We Were Your Ally and you didn't defend us in the 65 war.

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Well, okay, the treaty was against communist aggression and he started the war.

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And oh, by the way, under Cedo, you were supposed to go to Vietnam in Korea, and you did it right.

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So they don't expect to. That kind of response. They get it for me.

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But the average American both because we like to be liked, we want we won't be so nasty or more generally because we're ignorant.

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Another one that they'll do with the F-16 drama. Oh, he worked aside for the F-16.

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This isn't actually the truth. But even George Bush fell for the F-16 drama and he made his opening gambit to Musharraf.

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We we're going to fix that F-16 situation. So they have a very effective way of Stylising history.

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And what essentially does is it is it creates this expanding,

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ossified sense of obligation that the Americans are so unreliable and we have to constantly do more to win them over.

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So it means that the cost of every next engagement is ever more expensive because they have this false history of how we've let them down.

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And by the way, I'm not executing Americans by any means.

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If you read the book, I'm incredibly critical and scathing of how my country has enabled many aspects of the military.

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We didn't bring about the coups, but we've enabled them every time, albeit for strategic reasons.

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And so we've actually stifled this process of democratisation by virtue of always allying with the military.

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So I don't rely is my principal source of data upon these interviews, which makes us both different from, say,

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some of the books of my peers who are flown out by the Pakistan army and go hunting with them in the guise of doing research.

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So instead the primary and I'm not joking, that's how it happens.

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So my primary evidence is really these publications, these are not meant for me or you.

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They're really conversations amongst themselves. These are not doctrine.

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Now, what's interesting was the Pakistan army knew that researchers were beginning to use these resources.

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They've now become part of their CIA. So if you start reading halal magazines, they now know that people are on to this.

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You'll see stories that are meant for us.

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There was an interesting fictitious news report about the Green Books about a year and a half ago where they were misrepresented.

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His doctrine and Pakistan is changing the way it sees things from a conventional army to a counterinsurgent army, blah, blah, blah nonsense.

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But I am relying primarily upon these text and I think collecting them since about 1999.

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So thousands, thousands and thousands of pages I scanned.

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And as my when necessary, I also rely upon some of this other qualitative data that I've collected.

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I do a lot of survey work in Pakistan,

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so my work is definitely mixed methods and I rely upon some of this Lashkar stuff that I've collected as well appropriately in the book.

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All right. So let me just go through Zion's framework and explain its appeal, but also why it was inadequate.

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So as I was trying to explain why some states are what he calls unreasonably revisionist and reasonably reverse now,

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so an unreasonably revisionist say it would be Nazi Germany.

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Right. He just persisted with this revisionism until it was destroyed.

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Iran in the Iraq war is another example. He goes of unreasonable revisionism.

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In contrast, Iraq in the Iran Iraq war, was he, per his classification, a reasonably revisionist state?

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It gave up when it realises, when it realised that the marginal cost wasn't compensating,

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the marginal benefit of the policy wasn't compensating for the marginal cost.

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And so he his structure that he lays out is sort of obvious.

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But you talking about domestic structures and when you have an autocratic regime, if mediated through this thing that he calls elite ideology,

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he doesn't problematise elite ideology, which I think for me becomes a focus of my work.

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If it's a pragmatic elite in theology, you get reason, revisionism, if it's ideological, unreasonable, it's the names.

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And if you have a democratic regime, it goes through domestic politics that the public opposes the policy.

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You get reasonable revisionism, no public opposition, unreasonable revisionism.

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So at first blush, this thing of the peeling, but obviously he's looking at single plays,

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you looking at you look at particular conflicts with a very limited duration in time.

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He's not looking at any case of revisionism that last 60 plus years.

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And of course, Pakistan is a mixed regime type. So I noodled it and sort of rethought it.

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And this is why I came up for Pakistan. So I think we can agree that Pakistan's never been truly democratic.

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Even in the fifties after independence, it was really a military bureaucratic condominium.

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And Ayesha Siddiqa is sitting in it, sitting in the audience.

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And her book, I think, really speaks to these different kinds of regime types, how they've evolved with it.

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With the exception of the early years of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto period,

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we really haven't seen a Democratic leader running the show and he didn't run the show for that long.

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So we generally have either an army controlled democracy like we have right now,

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which is that the army can use different constitutional arrangements where when when they don't have this thing called 58 to be,

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they use the street politics like they're doing right now or working with the.

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Supreme Court to keep the brake on democracy or we have direct Army role and when we can army control democracy.

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In theory, they should go through domestic politics. And this is where we have an observational problem.

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The civilians, when they're in power, they almost always align with the preferences of the army.

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So we can't see if they want a different world.

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There might be some memoirs that they write after the fact, but was that really what they were thinking?

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So we really can't see. The only thing that we can see is did they do things that were different from the army?

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And with very few exceptions. The answer is no.

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And basically the civilians do what the army wants them to do, and we could do the experiment.

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Well, what if the army wasn't constantly, you know, tapping them on the shoulder, reminding them of who's in charge?

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Well, where that has happened and there's been a few periods when that's happened, the army intervenes and we go right back here to direct Army.

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And then I'm going to argue this gets mediated through the strategic culture of the army,

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which, by the way, does inform considerably domestic politics.

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There's been a lot of diffusion. Why is that?

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Because when the army is in charge, they have a lot of say over the Ministry of Education, the ministry, information, media and so forth.

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So the curriculum that Pakistanis read in school align very much with the fictions that the Pakistan

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army believes in or wants us to believe that they believe not going to argue is a result of my study,

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that this is an ideological, strategic culture, and we get this revisionism.

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It's not a pragmatic strategic culture.

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What's really interesting is that of all the things that I read will be an example of a pragmatic, strategic culture of the Pakistan army.

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Pragmatism would say we should have some kind of normalisation with India because some kind of normalisation with India will be good for our economy,

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which means we can continue to invest in our military expenditures while not blowing the cap

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on the percent military investments and the percentage of GDP spent on military investments.

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On never seen an article in an official Pakistani military publication that argues for any kind of normalisation with India.

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And I mean, never I mean, not one, not two, I mean zero zero.

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Literally the number zero. That's why I have is X here.

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And it's absolutely gobsmacking that of all the stuff I've read from these guys,

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thousands of pages over six plus decades, the answer is zero and not a single one.

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It's I don't I don't even know how to emphasise the word zero enough zero.

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Okay. So I'm aware that there is this debate in strategic culture.

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Some people don't think it's valuable. Some people think it is valuable.

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Proponents say it's how do we explain when states don't behave per game rationality,

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opponents will say, well, you can't isolate the divi from the ivy.

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That's true. But I do a lot of quantitative work. Indigeneity happens.

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This is kind of it's a nice goal to aspire to that you can have a completely independent deviant.

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I've but you know what? The world is infested with indigenous and all kinds of studies that we do.

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So I don't want to I'm not interested in resolving this debate because I'm not a political scientist.

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And, you know, there's nothing to be had by pissing off a bunch of smart people.

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And I don't have tenure.

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So I basically use Alistair Johnson's concept, and I call him Alistair because I'm not on the first name basis, I don't call and Ian never met him.

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So I use his concept of strategic culture as a heuristic.

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This is not a formal hypothesis testing for me, it's a heuristic.

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And what I like about it is that he tries to be as rigorous as possible.

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He, he, he thinks that you should be able to observe strategic from non strategic variables.

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That seems very reasonable.

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He argues that there should be a uniquely ordered set of of choices that comes out of this strategic culture that seems pretty reasonable to.

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And he says that we should be able to observe the strategic culture in cultural objects and we should be able to observe its transmission.

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So this is actually somewhat easy to do for a project like this. We're looking at the Pakistan army.

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Now, why can I justify this reduction?

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And I'm oh, what the heck happened there? So why can I justify reducing the strategic culture of Pakistan to that of the army?

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I couldn't do this exercise in India. Right, because the military has no seat at the table.

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So if I were to look at the strategic culture of the army, that would in no way have predictive power about what the Army does.

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And I would argue there might be more value in a country like the United States where the Army is so effective.

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We have, because of our military industrial complex, the army is very good at lobbying our Congress and because we tend to be a fairly pro army.

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All the Army senior leadership just has to leak a report like Stan.

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That's Daniel McChrystal. And the next thing we know, he's leading our president to a policy that even our president doesn't want.

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So there there's a range. But you certainly couldn't just say the strategic culture of an.

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Army predicts with any certainty what a country does in most places.

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But Pakistan is exception to this with respect to the levers of policy that most of us care about.

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The Army controls that portfolio. Pakistanis can be angry that the parliament doesn't control defence policies.

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The decision to go to war, the Prime Minister doesn't have this either.

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But the reality is the Pakistan army does this.

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Whether or not our policies have contributed to this. No doubt that that's the case.

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But the reality is the army controls it. There have been a couple of exceptions when the politicians have opposed the military.

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So, for example, Grenada in 98, excuse me, in 1988 signed the Geneva Accords without specifying an Islamist to be in power in Afghanistan.

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That didn't last long. Zia was personally brought down the government as soon as he got the last tranche of U.S. monies.

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Sharif in 1989 with Kargil, we know what happened there and I think we could also put an asterisk or a question mark.

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Sharif in 2014. All right.

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So I think most of you all know about military is I'm just going to pass through them unless you have questions about it in the Q&A.

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Okay. So let me just go through some of the takeaways.

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So actually, my husband peace, the opponent we were on what is a monty Python on a cold winter day and outfoxed to the scene from the black knight.

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And my husband says, oh, my God, that's Pakistan, right?

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1971 was just a flesh wound.

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Anyway, so I owe this to my husband,

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without whom my life would be so much more difficult because my husband is truly a saint and he just enables I have like a stay at home husband,

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so I'm really, really lucky to have that. So he's alive for the prop to the spouse.

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So let me just walk through some of the some of the takeaways.

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And admittedly, these things, they overlap considerably.

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But I think it's impossible to understate or overstate the degree to which the

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legacy of partition animates the way Pakistan's military has come to think.

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And in actually, this is this is a very fair critique that Pakistan has of its history.

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When people talk about Pakistan being a failed state,

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I actually get kind of annoyed with that because it's not it's kind of like that symbiotic twin that got cut off at the shoulder,

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tossed in the waistband and it crawls out. I'm alive because in fact, it got very little from the Raj, right?

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India kept almost all of the apparatus of state,

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all of the bureaucratic and military training infrastructure in Pakistan had to recreate these ministries from scratch in the Muslim League,

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unlike the Indian National Congress was not a grassroots party.

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It had to leave its base in North India, and it had a choice between building the party or building the state.

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So it's actually miraculous that Pakistan managed to limp along as it did.

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And even in Indian historians will [INAUDIBLE],

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concede that India did not want to give Pakistan's transfer of the wealth and it didn't want to proceed with the transfer of movable assets.

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Now, the Indians would say, well, that's because the first thing the Pakistanis did was support a war with us.

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So be it. As it may,

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this does inform Pakistan's view towards India and of course the sanguinary nature of partition and the complete lack of security and the bloodshed,

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particularly in the Punjab. These are all the things that I think are very real.

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When I look at militant recruitment, it's not a coincidence that so much military militant recruitment is coming out of the Punjab,

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and particularly those districts that are really that were very affected by partition and in the memories thereof.

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This gives rise to another set of related issues pertaining to Pakistan's apprehensions about Afghanistan and strategic depth.

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So as you know, the security architecture of the Raj was meant to contend with two competing empires, right?

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The Russians and the Chinese. But from Pakistan's point of view,

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they received what most would agree to be the most active threat frontier Afghanistan and fearing

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north towards Russia with a fraction of the Raj with or with a fraction of the Rogers assets.

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And very quickly, because of alliance relationships, the fear that came from Afghanistan via Afghanistan, from Russia also became infused with India.

256
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Right, because Pakistan became allied with the United States, Iran and Turkey.

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And because of that, the United States did not support or did not give a lot of aid to Afghanistan with them with a very limited period of time.

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So Afghanistan becomes aligned with the Soviet Union, who was, of course, close to India.

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So Afghanistan then becomes a secondary flank where its concerns about India are exposed.

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But I don't want you to think that the Indo Afghan, the pack Afghanistan relationship is reducible to India.

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It's not. As you know, Afghanistan first objected to Pakistan's admission to the U.N. It rejects the Durand Line.

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It sort of it has irredentist claims on large.

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Swathes of Pakistani territory on ever. It wants to make a scene.

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It supports Baluch separatism in Baluchistan and by the way, part of the pristine lands that it claims are actually in Baluchistan.

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And of course, that rabble rousers with respect to Pakistan's Pashtun population.

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So this idea of strategic depth, it's not new, actually was inherited from the British.

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I get very irritated when I see people ascribing it to Zia.

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That's just not true. And you see them talking about these different tools in some of the very first issues of the Pakistan Army Journal, for example.

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And of course, the entire architecture of governing, that huge portion of Pakistan that abuts the West was just completely continued from the British.

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It was called the North-West Frontier Province until just a few years ago.

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It still uses a colonial era architecture to manage FATA.

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Curiously, India also inherited this notion of strategic depth with respect to Meetha right, the northeast frontier area with respect to China,

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but for whatever reason, and there's this one, one tantalising line in a piece that John Garver wrote, neighbour who jettisoned it.

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He doesn't provide a source and I'm very clear you work on NIF.

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I'd be very curious to sort of do a compare and contrast because everyone thinks that

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Pakistan is the exception in pursuing this strategic depth that we now kind of deride.

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And actually, maybe Pakistan isn't the exception,

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maybe India was the exception that it basically jettisoned this entire colonial architecture that was built anyway.

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So that's something I'm noodling around with with respect to my next project related to this concept of partition.

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You cannot escape from the fact that the Pakistan army arrogate to itself the defence of the country's ideology as well as geography.

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Some people again want to say that this only goes back to Zia is just not true.

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I encourage you to read a piece that I you can wrote in 1954 in Foreign Affairs about the ideology of Pakistan and the role of the army in defending.

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So this is the idea here is that Pakistan is formed in the basis of the two nation theory.

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At first blush, this seems kind of innocent. Nation theory says as Pakistanis learn, there's actually much more complexity to it.

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Talk about this in the Q&A.

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But basically, Muslims are equal nations to that of Hindus, and they cannot live under a Hindu the tyranny of a Hindu majority.

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And then that was used as the argumentation for a separate state.

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So this means that Pakistan does not exist without this ideology and for a number of reasons related to Pakistan's internal politics.

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Every army chief has had a different way of instrumental izing this two nation theory,

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and I want to think that they're using it in exactly the same way.

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When I Yukon wanted to instrumentalize Islam, he basically engaged the Sufis, the the the shrines.

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So he would have shrines distribute Western medicine as a way of undermining and controlling their claim to deal with healing,

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like through giving amulets and so forth. Zia He was much more interested in working with Deobandi and Jemmott.

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And of course, Musharraf had his own idea of sort of enlightened moderation.

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But all of these fellows were basically trying to retain in their portfolio control of defining what is Islam and the role of Islam to the state.

296
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Because of course, there always are concern was this is something that obviously the Islamists would want.

297
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So they're always trying to keep the Islamists on a leash or in their pocket through cooptation or whatever means necessary.

298
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But the other reason why this is so important is that there is no legal claim that Pakistan has to Kashmir.

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There was an instrument of a session. So if they want to make a grouse about that kind of clock, we can problematise his agreement to join Pakistan.

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By the way, these arguments also undercut India's claim because India also did not accept junagadh as

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instrument of a session to Pakistan or the desire of the Hyderabadi design to remain independent.

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So these notions of a session instruments cut both arguments both ways.

303
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It's a double edged knife for both of those countries. But the two nation theory is the ideological claim that Pakistan makes to Kashmir.

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That and this is why they'll say Pakistan's a the premise of partition was unfair and it was incomplete because they didn't get Kashmir.

305
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Now, you can also at this point make not only a strategic culture argument, but also a materialist argument or even institutionalist argument.

306
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And that is they're all they're aqua finite.

307
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They all come to the same place, which is the Army has a huge interest in maintaining what is essentially a civilizational conflict with India.

308
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Right. Because if this conflict were to ever go away, how would they justify this enormous conventional footprint?

309
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How would they justify being able to run the country whenever they want?

310
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How would they justify basically taking whatever piece of the budget pie, letting the country fend for itself with the rest?

311
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So.

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You know, you multiple arguments sort of converge to the same place that the Pakistan army is heavily invested in conflict with India in perpetuity.

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And I think we have enough evidence that whenever the civilians have tried to have some sort of rapprochement, the Army does something stupid.

314
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You know, with all the shelling that's going on right now, that's got a couple of purposes.

315
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One, heat up the jihad again to take some of the pressure off of the jihadis that are killing Pakistanis.

316
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After all, the butter to kill Indians and Pakistanis make Nawaz Sharif live a complete fool

317
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by by sort of spoiling any appetite for negotiations on the Indian end of things.

318
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So this serves you know, the shelling serves multiple purposes, not to mention testing Modi, which is another confounding event,

319
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event that the next finding that sort of comes out of all of these readings and this was I have to say, I was kind of surprised.

320
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Everyone I think everyone sees this in their later musings, the Pakistan army.

321
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But when I how early I saw this, I was surprised right after the 1971 war,

322
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where even going back to the to the 14 year olds playing the game of India and Pakistan, everyone would concede that Pakistan lost.

323
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But after that 71 war and of course, many Pakistanis will see it as a loss.

324
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You know, they tried to throw Yahya Khan under the army. Different parts of Pakistan try to deal with that loss in different ways.

325
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But the military basically dealt with it by saying Yaya Khan was a drunken lout and we got he's gone, so let's rebuild ourselves.

326
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But what you see in their literature is really puzzling.

327
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Right after the loss and before India's nuclear tests of 74, you see articles that say, we're the only country that can resist India's rise.

328
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Yes, it's true. We lost East Pakistan, but quite frankly, we were taking on a much bigger neighbour.

329
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How could we defend two parts of our country that was separated by the expanse of India?

330
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This is actually a really remarkable argument that right after they've lost half their country,

331
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their responses were the only one that can challenge India.

332
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And then, of course, as you know, it was after the 71 war actually clarify something.

333
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Well, I'll get there in a second, but not under the nuclear umbrella. So this is this is just really kind of extraordinary.

334
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Know the ageing myself, but remember those weevils when we were kids?

335
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Weevils wobble, but they don't fall down. It wobbled, but it got right back up and that's how it saw itself.

336
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And this sort of reminds me, I'm not sort of this exactly was something that a former Army chief told me several years ago in the gravity of it.

337
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I don't think hit me until I continued seeing versions of this argument in these texts.

338
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But I said, you know, why did you do Cargill? Then going back, you know, did you not gain this out and you gain this out even cursorily?

339
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You should have been able to predict the disaster that it was and therefore roll back the decision making.

340
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And people made institutional arguments. It was very stovepiped.

341
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It was just Musharraf and his and his commander of CNN.

342
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It didn't involve ISI.

343
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And then the traditional arguments notwithstanding, even the army chief, Musharraf, should have been able to figure out the cargo was a fiasco.

344
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But this freed this other army chief that I was talking to. He says, you don't get it.

345
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We will always, when a window presents itself, take a calculated risk because to do nothing is to accept India's hegemony.

346
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So we have to take a calculated risk, even if we know we're going to lose.

347
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Just by virtue of doing nothing, we are defeated and by doing something, we're not defeated.

348
00:33:35,870 --> 00:33:41,509
So in some sense, Pakistan is like an international insurgent, right?

349
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The insurgent doesn't have to defeat the counterinsurgent.

350
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It doesn't have to wield complete hegemony of force. It only has the present prevent the counterinsurgent from doing that.

351
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So another words why Pakistan keeps engaging in these things despite enormous

352
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cost is that it doesn't see defeat in the way that most people think of defeat.

353
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Right. They have a just a very different definition of defeat.

354
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And so this is this the unique definition that facilitates Pakistan constantly engaging in this brinkmanship.

355
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Now, this is worrisome on its own on its own terms,

356
00:34:19,490 --> 00:34:29,360
but especially worrisome given that the primary tools that Pakistan has developed is what I call jihad under an ever expanding umbrella.

357
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I'm going to talk about this extensively at Ruthie's tomorrow.

358
00:34:32,480 --> 00:34:36,170
So but let me just sort of point out a couple of things about this.

359
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This exercise, at least for me, revealed, I think,

360
00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:47,060
a number of understandings that are not typical in the field of scholars that work on this, the nuclearization of South Asia.

361
00:34:47,570 --> 00:34:54,920
So first there is, I think, this conventional wisdom that Pakistan got into the jihad business when the Americans did in the eighties.

362
00:34:55,190 --> 00:34:58,720
Not true. They obviously began 47, 48. And that was.

363
00:34:58,790 --> 00:35:02,240
Very much. A state led state law isn't the right word.

364
00:35:02,270 --> 00:35:04,910
It had state support. That's where this stuff began.

365
00:35:05,660 --> 00:35:12,880
Anyone who doesn't believe that should read Shuja Nawaz his piece on the First Kashmir War published in India Review in 28.

366
00:35:12,890 --> 00:35:16,840
He was the brother of a former army chief, very pro army.

367
00:35:16,850 --> 00:35:19,840
So the fact that this dude would write this is actually pretty surprising.

368
00:35:19,850 --> 00:35:25,350
And the details with which he describes both provincial and eventually federal support for the first war.

369
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It's really eye opening.

370
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And the reason he could do this was he had access to archives because of his relationship to his his deceased brother in the fifties,

371
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because of their training with Americans. We were training them to to be counter insurgents with us.

372
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That's why they were members of Cedo and Central. That's why we had the mutual defence pact.

373
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Well, and so while we're hanging out with them at the National Defence College or training them in Quetta,

374
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we're training them in American institutions. They're actually learning how to wage an insurgency.

375
00:35:57,080 --> 00:36:03,170
So you get these articles they have like these checklists. Here's what we need to wage an insurgency on a mountainous jungle terrain.

376
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And they don't necessarily say Kashmir, but you have to be an adult and not know that jungly, mountainous terrain is.

377
00:36:09,290 --> 00:36:13,030
And so infiltration in the fifties and sixties is a huge concept.

378
00:36:13,040 --> 00:36:18,560
There's so much so much page space is dedicated to this idea of infiltration.

379
00:36:18,890 --> 00:36:27,140
Not a surprise that one of the authors who wrote this piece on infiltration was a leading officer in the 1965 war,

380
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which was, of course, an exercise in infiltration itself.

381
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They talk a lot about peoples armies in this period, recognising this conventional on balance.

382
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So is early as the fifties and sixties you see the Pakistanis innovating at this low end of the

383
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conflict spectrum in complete acknowledgement that it can't deal with India's conventional superiority.

384
00:36:46,190 --> 00:36:49,430
Now we can have a debate about the conventional superiority.

385
00:36:49,610 --> 00:36:53,990
Is it was it really conventionally superior, particularly on the the international border?

386
00:36:54,330 --> 00:36:56,690
Doesn't matter, because that's how they viewed it as such.

387
00:36:57,410 --> 00:37:04,550
By the time you get to the seventies, this is and you would see episodically even through the 4748 war in the 65 war,

388
00:37:04,580 --> 00:37:10,790
they would call the intruders jihadis. They would have religious leaders past fatwas to call them jihadis.

389
00:37:11,480 --> 00:37:16,280
But by the time you get to the seventies, you're more or less seeing this term jihad use.

390
00:37:16,640 --> 00:37:23,560
And contrary to what Pakistanis say in their efforts to sort of make Americans feel guilty and pull out the chequebook,

391
00:37:24,170 --> 00:37:27,200
and we didn't suffer men to our jihad. Far from it.

392
00:37:27,200 --> 00:37:38,059
That's just really bad history. When King Zahir Shah was ousted by Daoud in 73 and began imposing Soviet backed Islamization,

393
00:37:38,060 --> 00:37:44,750
the Islamists began fleeing into Iran and Pakistan respectively. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto actually, who set up the ISI cell in 1974.

394
00:37:45,260 --> 00:37:49,520
So they were actually running their own Soviet jihad policy on their own dime.

395
00:37:49,910 --> 00:38:00,319
And there was a brief period after Zia took over when there was some optimism that Daoud Resort would would acquiesce to accepting the Durand Line.

396
00:38:00,320 --> 00:38:09,200
And Zia let go, and then Daoud got assassinated. And then Zia resumed once again that the full on ISI ran jihad policy in Afghanistan.

397
00:38:10,370 --> 00:38:16,879
They wanted Carter to back it. Carter said, No. Some of you may or may not know that we first sanctioned Pakistan in April of 79.

398
00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:23,780
I want to hang on to that day because that's very important. So clearly we weren't planning on sucking them into a jihad if we're sanctioning them in

399
00:38:23,780 --> 00:38:29,299
April 79 because of sanctions and we sent in them for nuclear proliferation on the sanctions,

400
00:38:29,300 --> 00:38:36,650
made it illegal for us to give them security assistance so we're not able to actually give them overt security assistance.

401
00:38:36,650 --> 00:38:44,809
And so 1982, after Reagan comes into power and gets a waiver, okay, so Pakistan begins this policy long.

402
00:38:44,810 --> 00:38:50,600
But this by policy, I mean the use of non-state actors masquerading as Islamists.

403
00:38:50,600 --> 00:38:54,280
But they're not only using people acting as Islamists in the 1980s.

404
00:38:54,290 --> 00:39:00,769
Well, it's thoroughly involved in Afghanistan. It's also thoroughly involved in supporting the sick insurgency in India and Pakistan.

405
00:39:00,770 --> 00:39:02,720
Nearly got a war in this period over it.

406
00:39:03,050 --> 00:39:09,470
And they're also continue to interfere in Kashmir, although that's not the full fledged insurgency that it will be by 1989.

407
00:39:09,890 --> 00:39:18,500
And they're still messing around in the northeast of India. So it's a very impressive suite of non-state actors that Pakistan is running in the 1980s.

408
00:39:18,500 --> 00:39:24,290
I mean, it really is impressive that they're that they're able to do this. So that's the sort of timeline for non-state actors.

409
00:39:24,680 --> 00:39:28,580
Let's talk about the the nuclear umbrella timeline.

410
00:39:29,180 --> 00:39:35,870
If you read how Kapoor's work on the stability instability slash instability, instability paradox, I generally quite like that word.

411
00:39:35,870 --> 00:39:40,760
But he gets one thing very wrong. He thinks Pakistan's nuclear period begins in 1990.

412
00:39:40,940 --> 00:39:44,149
It doesn't begins much, much earlier than 1990.

413
00:39:44,150 --> 00:39:50,570
And that's why he can't in his work explain for a lot of the behaviours I just talked about the northeast of Punjab insurgency,

414
00:39:50,570 --> 00:39:58,640
what's happening in Kashmir. He can't explain that until 1990 because he didn't understand that our sanctions of Pakistan did not begin in 1990.

415
00:39:59,000 --> 00:40:05,440
What the prisoner amendment was from 1985 is also this has been largely misunderstood in much of the writings.

416
00:40:05,990 --> 00:40:14,270
The press or amendment passed in June of 85 was meant to resolve this growing concern in America,

417
00:40:14,270 --> 00:40:18,560
in the American interagency process about Pakistan's continued acquisition of nuclear weapons.

418
00:40:18,590 --> 00:40:23,050
CIA knew this from the beginning. We knew about A.Q. Khan long before 2002.

419
00:40:23,060 --> 00:40:29,950
You all know about AQ. So you had part of the CIA that was very concerned about this going back to the seventies.

420
00:40:29,960 --> 00:40:33,020
Carter first wanted to sanction Pakistan in 77.

421
00:40:34,730 --> 00:40:41,050
And then you had these proliferation proponent opponents in Congress that also wanted to cut Pakistan off.

422
00:40:41,060 --> 00:40:48,140
But the Reagan administration and the the the Russia folks at CIA obviously want to keep the money going.

423
00:40:48,530 --> 00:40:50,360
So you have this interagency problem.

424
00:40:50,750 --> 00:40:56,660
And Congress, of course, didn't want to continue the waiver, and that was required to continue arming Pakistan with his waiver.

425
00:40:57,080 --> 00:41:02,900
So the press for amendment was actually a compromise that involved the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

426
00:41:03,920 --> 00:41:08,420
It involved the Reagan administration in Congress to say we basically move the red

427
00:41:08,420 --> 00:41:11,870
line because the sanctions in April 79 were about enrichment and reprocessing.

428
00:41:12,170 --> 00:41:16,640
What priceless then was the president just has to say Pakistan doesn't have a bomb.

429
00:41:17,000 --> 00:41:21,920
So we move this red line from processing, reprocessing and enrichment to doesn't have a bomb.

430
00:41:22,280 --> 00:41:28,489
And then this becomes basically threading the difference between an outright lie and exploiting

431
00:41:28,490 --> 00:41:33,590
the small differences that existed amongst different and within the interagency process.

432
00:41:34,100 --> 00:41:37,489
So many analysts believe, and they will say straight up that Reagan lied,

433
00:41:37,490 --> 00:41:40,520
that when he said with the first certification, Pakistan didn't have the bomb.

434
00:41:41,150 --> 00:41:45,470
We knew they had the bomb, but they were exploiting technical differences in the area, to be precise.

435
00:41:46,160 --> 00:41:49,390
By the time 1990 comes along, we no longer need to arm them.

436
00:41:49,640 --> 00:41:56,420
And we're no longer we're no longer willing to have our president apparently plagiarised or whether or not he lied before Congress.

437
00:41:57,260 --> 00:42:02,089
We now know, based upon Pakistani forces and other declassified stuff, that, in fact,

438
00:42:02,090 --> 00:42:08,510
Pakistan had the bomb, a crude bomb that could be delivered from a C-130 as early as 1980.

439
00:42:08,750 --> 00:42:15,079
Right. So what you see when I see Pakistan's behaviour with respect to its use of non-state

440
00:42:15,080 --> 00:42:20,090
actors and Pakistanis talk about this in their literature is like a nuclear overhang.

441
00:42:20,090 --> 00:42:24,550
As early as the seventies, writers were saying, it doesn't matter what we have the matter of,

442
00:42:24,560 --> 00:42:30,020
the Indians think we may have, it doesn't matter what we'll do in matters of the Indians think we may or may not do.

443
00:42:30,020 --> 00:42:37,570
And so this sort. So it's interesting, if Kapoor had only read this stuff before he wrote his book, his arguments would be strengthened.

444
00:42:37,580 --> 00:42:41,600
But he didn't read this stuff, and I would have been great to have collaborated on it,

445
00:42:41,720 --> 00:42:47,150
collaborated with him on this, because his argument would have been so much more robust.

446
00:42:47,660 --> 00:42:53,600
So I actually see Pakistan exploiting its its nuclear umbrella as early as circa 1980.

447
00:42:53,600 --> 00:42:59,540
And I in in the book, I present some of the quantitative analysis that sort of looks at that argument,

448
00:42:59,540 --> 00:43:08,899
looking at the various nuclear and various nuclear rising versus non-nuclear periods and the rate of conflict dividing conflict,

449
00:43:08,900 --> 00:43:12,530
money and peace months per all months in that period.

450
00:43:13,160 --> 00:43:21,440
So look, so do how do we end this this sort of we don't want to think.

451
00:43:21,440 --> 00:43:24,950
I mean, gee, ickiness, is it always going to be like this?

452
00:43:25,400 --> 00:43:32,000
Can it get better or can it possibly be worse? I'm not the most creative person, so this is not an exhaustive list.

453
00:43:32,000 --> 00:43:35,569
But these are the things that seem most obvious to me. Sort of anxiety is game changers.

454
00:43:35,570 --> 00:43:39,980
In other words, things that the Pakistan army can't directly influence.

455
00:43:40,010 --> 00:43:46,130
Well, the first is some major confrontation with the United States from a proxy that's not entirely on their leash.

456
00:43:46,730 --> 00:43:50,000
Right. It's not exactly exotic, just given their relationship.

457
00:43:50,930 --> 00:43:59,270
It's possible. But boy, I don't know how much more majorly confrontational things should have gotten when Osama bin Laden was caught in Abbottabad.

458
00:44:00,440 --> 00:44:07,130
I mean, I haven't seen it get any worse. Oh, yeah. Killing our troops in Afghanistan with their Taliban proxies in Lashkar e Taiba.

459
00:44:07,320 --> 00:44:10,940
Hmm. We just seem our response is, I'm going to bend over and write another check for you.

460
00:44:11,750 --> 00:44:18,430
I don't know what would at what would the pocket what would have to happen before we say enough is enough is enough?

461
00:44:18,440 --> 00:44:24,560
I just don't know. Natural disasters. Actually, Pakistan is more resilient and is not.

462
00:44:24,590 --> 00:44:32,330
The Anatol even argument of bribery and bribery that makes Pakistan so resilient is actually at a very grassroots level.

463
00:44:33,380 --> 00:44:38,710
Pakistanis are able to very quickly immobile, mobilise resources to it.

464
00:44:38,900 --> 00:44:42,230
Sometimes the organisations are not terribly civil, right?

465
00:44:42,440 --> 00:44:46,909
Jamaat e Islami not terribly civil, but the the relief,

466
00:44:46,910 --> 00:44:51,940
the analogy that I use is like we have a really nasty battlefield wound and you don't have a medic around.

467
00:44:51,950 --> 00:44:55,069
You put the clotting agent in your thigh to kind of your biting bleed.

468
00:44:55,070 --> 00:45:00,470
You're not going to survive that if you don't get to a hospital. But you're not going to bleed to death right there.

469
00:45:00,800 --> 00:45:07,280
And so what these local CSO civil society organisations do, they're basically the clotting agent, while the big aid helps.

470
00:45:07,610 --> 00:45:11,540
So if you just take a look at the timelines it takes for big aid to get there,

471
00:45:11,540 --> 00:45:15,409
if it weren't for these CSOs getting in there, this would have been much worse.

472
00:45:15,410 --> 00:45:22,610
If you compare the actual damage of the Pakistani floods of 2010 to the Haiti earthquake.

473
00:45:22,940 --> 00:45:30,860
Pakistan was by far worse hit and it had about 1/100 of the aid because the International Committee of Aid Fatigue

474
00:45:30,860 --> 00:45:35,840
with Pakistan remember the earthquake in 2005 plus there's all this whole terrorism saying Lashkar e Taiba,

475
00:45:36,650 --> 00:45:41,300
people just didn't want to open up their pockets from Pakistan, whereas Haiti was just aghast with aid.

476
00:45:42,200 --> 00:45:45,220
Several years out, you don't see the scars of this flood.

477
00:45:45,230 --> 00:45:50,720
There was no secondary death, wave of death, there was no famine targeting, had a bumper crop.

478
00:45:51,380 --> 00:45:54,680
You look at Haiti, Haiti still looks like it's been hit by an earthquake yesterday.

479
00:45:55,070 --> 00:46:01,630
So, again, natural disasters with an embargo with the Pakistani army, this is where the U.S. is kind of culpable.

480
00:46:01,640 --> 00:46:08,720
We let the Pakistan army look great. Right. International helicopters were doing the sorties, but we let the Pakistani military be the face of that.

481
00:46:08,730 --> 00:46:13,250
So the military always comes out smelling really nice after these disasters.

482
00:46:13,250 --> 00:46:16,730
So that's not going to be something that's going to undermine their position in society.

483
00:46:17,690 --> 00:46:21,590
International partners forging a consensus because it's not going to happen.

484
00:46:21,920 --> 00:46:25,730
When has there been an international consensus to punish Pakistan? Never.

485
00:46:27,050 --> 00:46:32,700
All right. So let's think about some of these and dodges game changers, this democratic transition.

486
00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:40,580
I have been a cynic about this because the Army has such they're the biggest losers in true democratisation.

487
00:46:40,970 --> 00:46:44,300
And, you know, look at this. These idiots on the street demand dimmer.

488
00:46:44,660 --> 00:46:52,910
Qadri and Imran Khan. I mean, what an ISI funded farce that he has followers that take that they have followers who take them seriously.

489
00:46:52,910 --> 00:46:56,410
It just makes me wonder. They have no clue about the fact that they believe this.

490
00:46:57,090 --> 00:47:02,270
So the idea of a democratic transition, I'm not optimistic about that.

491
00:47:02,540 --> 00:47:07,309
And even if there was a democratic transition, we would have to for us to see real change.

492
00:47:07,310 --> 00:47:11,870
We'd have to have civilian leaders want something different. I don't see evidence of that,

493
00:47:11,870 --> 00:47:16,549
although I will say this is a necessary but insufficient condition to get a different outcome in

494
00:47:16,550 --> 00:47:22,310
Pakistan at least were at least were rolling the dice with numbers other than one president.

495
00:47:22,310 --> 00:47:25,910
All six sides of the dice. Right, with the army. We got to sleep. We're rolling the dice.

496
00:47:25,910 --> 00:47:29,540
But it's always the same thing that's coming up. Civil and civil.

497
00:47:29,540 --> 00:47:31,850
And what I call on civil society gets a lot of press.

498
00:47:32,810 --> 00:47:38,270
I'm not impressed with this because some of the most effective civil society in Pakistan are really, really uncivil.

499
00:47:38,630 --> 00:47:44,850
Jama'atu Dala, Jamaat e Islami name any of the major Islamist organisations.

500
00:47:44,870 --> 00:47:49,850
They're not civil, and yet they're also the ones that are most effective in mobilising social media.

501
00:47:50,030 --> 00:47:53,120
Much more effective than than what I would call liberal.

502
00:47:53,570 --> 00:47:59,750
And I don't mean liberal as an American or British values. I mean respect for fundamental human rights, letting girls go to education.

503
00:47:59,750 --> 00:48:03,559
I'm not saying run around in bikinis on mall in Lahore.

504
00:48:03,560 --> 00:48:05,090
I want to be very clear what I'm talking about.

505
00:48:05,090 --> 00:48:13,700
I talk about liberal society, basically respecting the commitments that Pakistan has made under various U.N. conventions.

506
00:48:13,700 --> 00:48:16,850
I think they've they've signed on to those conventions of the treatment of women and children.

507
00:48:16,890 --> 00:48:28,580
This seems reasonable, signed up to it, honour it, dudes. And even the younger generation, the so-called Imran Paras, they call themselves burgers.

508
00:48:29,240 --> 00:48:36,410
If you if you look at surveys on the on this particular segment of Pakistani society, they're very much a deep state constituent.

509
00:48:36,440 --> 00:48:41,570
These are these are not folks that they think the Army is the problem.

510
00:48:41,970 --> 00:48:45,230
They're not people who even think the Pakistan Taliban is a problem.

511
00:48:45,230 --> 00:48:49,930
They think the United States must and cause a problem because we're actually funding the TTP.

512
00:48:49,940 --> 00:48:53,540
So do I see hope there in this generation of folk? Not a chance.

513
00:48:53,540 --> 00:49:04,150
Economic shocks again, because we are so afraid of Pakistan failing, we never allow Pakistan to bear the full consequences of its behaviour.

514
00:49:04,160 --> 00:49:10,910
So this is like methadone, right? We know that Pakistan is a crack addict, but we're too afraid of what happens when Pakistan get sober.

515
00:49:11,240 --> 00:49:13,370
So we're just happy to keep the methadone drip.

516
00:49:14,480 --> 00:49:19,879
We can have a pretty elaborate argument that if we actually took Pakistan off of all international aid,

517
00:49:19,880 --> 00:49:28,130
especially the multilateral IMF, World Bank DVD, that the Pakistan army would be more vulnerable to criticism from Pakistanis.

518
00:49:28,400 --> 00:49:33,500
Right. Because Pakistanis would then have to start asking, why do you get to have all the resources when we get nothing?

519
00:49:33,800 --> 00:49:37,879
But right now, the Pakistan army can be pretty reliant on that.

520
00:49:37,880 --> 00:49:41,209
It can take whatever resources at once and that the international community

521
00:49:41,210 --> 00:49:45,050
won't let Pakistan fail through various international bailouts like the IMF.

522
00:49:45,470 --> 00:49:51,200
So we have a very pernicious system whereby we are all enabling and we're insulating

523
00:49:51,200 --> 00:49:56,690
Pakistan from the kind of outrage that ordinarily these kinds of policies would engender.

524
00:49:57,380 --> 00:50:03,550
Well, there is. One thing that I found that I thought is really curious now, I'm not Panglossian.

525
00:50:03,570 --> 00:50:08,280
I'm not I want to think I'm going to leave here on a happy note. But there is something really interesting.

526
00:50:09,300 --> 00:50:13,080
There is. So there's this idea that the Pakistan army is aslam izing.

527
00:50:13,080 --> 00:50:18,930
And we see we see that there's been a lot of infiltration and not just in them, in the Army, but in the Navy, in the Air Force.

528
00:50:18,940 --> 00:50:23,130
Look at any major attack on Pakistan's ISI or military infrastructure.

529
00:50:23,590 --> 00:50:27,520
Then you see this is there's serious infiltration.

530
00:50:27,540 --> 00:50:36,360
How much of this doesn't is questionable. But there's also this really interesting sort of accidental countervailing thing happening.

531
00:50:36,930 --> 00:50:43,409
So what you have here and I'll never get more data, so don't ask me about 25 now because I'm never going to get it again.

532
00:50:43,410 --> 00:50:48,959
This is a one time deal. What you have here is district level officer production data.

533
00:50:48,960 --> 00:50:54,840
So this is not officer level data, but it's how many officers each district produce in any given year.

534
00:50:56,210 --> 00:51:06,330
Next 32. And the darker the colours like brown and red show you that because the heat map shows you more intensively officer producing districts.

535
00:51:06,840 --> 00:51:10,380
And you can see the vast majority of Pakistan is not producing any district.

536
00:51:10,410 --> 00:51:17,190
This is mostly coming from the Punjab, parts of what they call Azad Kashmir and parts of what's now KPK.

537
00:51:17,730 --> 00:51:22,050
This is 80 to 90 to 2000 to 25.

538
00:51:22,440 --> 00:51:29,610
And what you can see is that now almost every district is producing an officer, at least one officer.

539
00:51:30,000 --> 00:51:35,940
And you can actually see some of them are producing quite a bit of officers, particularly in Sind where nothing.

540
00:51:36,090 --> 00:51:41,700
And look at look at all the heat that's coming up here. Same thing here. Why is the Pakistan army doing this?

541
00:51:42,090 --> 00:51:49,919
Well, so in the United States, we have this happening from the grassroots up, minorities, women, gay folk.

542
00:51:49,920 --> 00:51:54,540
They use their service in the military to leverage for more access to rights.

543
00:51:54,720 --> 00:51:58,550
Right. I did my time. I got shot at. I'm a gay.

544
00:51:58,560 --> 00:52:06,690
You take please get married. Right. I was just as worthy of a bullet as a straight dude or a woman who is who has served in combat.

545
00:52:07,170 --> 00:52:12,990
Why is it that I only get 70% of what a dude makes when I go into the civilian occupation?

546
00:52:13,290 --> 00:52:21,900
So they're using their time in service to leverage with African-Americans or in the civil rights era with the POC army is doing is just the opposite,

547
00:52:22,590 --> 00:52:27,570
rather than folks using their service to agitate for rights.

548
00:52:27,600 --> 00:52:33,929
They are hoping that by extending their reach into these previous districts and by the way,

549
00:52:33,930 --> 00:52:37,800
send in below just under problematic districts for the Pakistani army,

550
00:52:38,250 --> 00:52:44,520
because they tend to view the army as a blue or if it is a Pashtun, Punjabi, kind of many of them looting and ruining the country.

551
00:52:44,880 --> 00:52:55,920
So if they can make these folks partners in this corporation of running and ruining the country, they will be less antagonistic towards the project.

552
00:52:56,250 --> 00:53:02,010
So in other words, they're doing what armies do, which is using the army, as is a great sausage maker for the nation.

553
00:53:02,520 --> 00:53:07,680
Now, you can ask the question because they're not really what they were just in jobs in Baluchistan that they're recruiting.

554
00:53:08,430 --> 00:53:12,750
Okay. Well, I've got evidence that that's not the case. Let's just hold that thought and say that they are.

555
00:53:13,350 --> 00:53:19,110
Let's just say it turns out I've got data, too. This is a national experiment thing.

556
00:53:19,980 --> 00:53:24,720
So these questions, I just I'm going to walk you through them.

557
00:53:24,930 --> 00:53:30,990
By the way, this is also on my website. This is a big survey I did with my colleague Jacob SHAPIRO and Neil Malhotra.

558
00:53:31,590 --> 00:53:33,540
We asked them their opinions about jihad.

559
00:53:33,570 --> 00:53:40,950
Is it, you know, blown up stuff or is it making yourself better on how much you think Pakistan is governed according to Sharia?

560
00:53:42,450 --> 00:53:47,700
If there were more Sharia, would it be better or worse? Do you want more or less Sharia?

561
00:53:49,110 --> 00:53:53,340
Do you think Pakistan is governed by a lack of representatives elected by the people?

562
00:53:54,480 --> 00:53:59,280
Civilians should control the military per the Constitution went to the army be able to take over.

563
00:53:59,850 --> 00:54:02,880
Think of the political preferences of Muslims in occupied Kashmir.

564
00:54:03,120 --> 00:54:07,859
So these are these are just a handful of questions that are illustrative that

565
00:54:07,860 --> 00:54:11,790
there is a free rider problem associated with going into these new districts.

566
00:54:12,480 --> 00:54:21,540
So the first thing that I have as let's let's take a look at Punjabis versus Punjabis in the Punjab versus Punjabis everywhere else.

567
00:54:21,540 --> 00:54:26,249
Because when we put this paper through review, people would say they're just recruiting Punjabis in Baluchistan.

568
00:54:26,250 --> 00:54:31,320
Don't they think the same? Or I'm not sure why you thought that, but it turns out I've got evidence that says that's just not the case.

569
00:54:31,920 --> 00:54:35,610
So let's take this issue that jihad is a military struggle.

570
00:54:37,230 --> 00:54:42,930
Punjab, even the Punjab, 28% of them think that that's the case compared to 12% of Punjab, even elsewhere.

571
00:54:43,230 --> 00:54:51,930
So in other words, a Punjabi living somewhere else in the country is less than half as likely as a Punjabi in the Punjab to have this view.

572
00:54:51,930 --> 00:54:55,590
And by the way, the more stars it means, it's more significant. These numbers are quite large.

573
00:54:56,100 --> 00:54:59,979
So not. Not. This number, these numbers are quite large.

574
00:54:59,980 --> 00:55:04,150
So when you have 100, 100, you're increasing the likelihood of something being significant.

575
00:55:04,150 --> 00:55:12,370
So the stars tell you how significant it is. So for the most part, jihad is a personal struggle for righteousness.

576
00:55:12,570 --> 00:55:17,770
You know, that's sort of the the great jihad versus the lesser God, Punjabis in the continent.

577
00:55:17,770 --> 00:55:23,650
Only 15% of them think that Punjabis elsewhere, 47% of them think that way.

578
00:55:24,010 --> 00:55:26,229
And I can just I can go through all of these metrics.

579
00:55:26,230 --> 00:55:32,650
And what you see, just by virtue of being a Panjabi anywhere else but the Punjab, you're not likely to hold the same view.

580
00:55:33,160 --> 00:55:36,840
And I shouldn't be surprising, but the reviewer was astonished that that was the case.

581
00:55:36,850 --> 00:55:46,240
But I can't control the reviewer. Now, what is interesting is that Punjab is a non Punjabis in the Punjab look much more alike.

582
00:55:46,690 --> 00:55:51,399
There is only one metric where they're substantively different and that is the

583
00:55:51,400 --> 00:55:55,060
belief that their government is governed completely by elected representatives.

584
00:55:55,070 --> 00:55:58,510
41% of Punjabis think that compared to 26 non Punjabis.

585
00:55:59,020 --> 00:56:06,790
But on the other metrics that we look at, even if the differences are significant because the numbers are large, the differences are small.

586
00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:13,209
So already we're seeing that. And I do I have an explanatory mechanism for why this is the case.

587
00:56:13,210 --> 00:56:16,800
No, I don't. And then let's take this other case.

588
00:56:16,810 --> 00:56:20,080
Let's take a look at Punjabis versus Cindy's in Sind.

589
00:56:20,090 --> 00:56:28,360
So again, going back to that recruiter, the reviewer saying, well, maybe they're just recruiting Punjabis resent the same thing falls in many cases.

590
00:56:28,870 --> 00:56:37,570
So jihad is a military struggle. Punjabis in the thin 5% think that compared to Sindhis innocent 18%.

591
00:56:37,840 --> 00:56:42,820
So just comparing these fellows to their how ethnics in the Punjab you see a huge difference.

592
00:56:42,840 --> 00:56:48,410
And and the other chart I have is looking at Baluchistan very similarly.

593
00:56:48,430 --> 00:56:55,780
So depending on which chart you look at, sometimes one population is better on the jihad metric.

594
00:56:56,350 --> 00:57:03,970
But my point is this the army, this is the unintended consequences of them expanding their reach to these new districts.

595
00:57:04,300 --> 00:57:07,360
Now, armies are very good at playing Whac-A-Mole. Right.

596
00:57:07,360 --> 00:57:12,009
So if you don't play along with the army once, you think they've got a couple of options, right?

597
00:57:12,010 --> 00:57:16,210
They don't promote you and you get kicked out. Maybe you've maybe you of your own.

598
00:57:16,360 --> 00:57:19,690
Like, I don't really dig this and you don't and you don't retain as well.

599
00:57:20,140 --> 00:57:26,920
If someone else who fits them all are maybe because the benefits are so great, you just keep your mouth shut and you go along.

600
00:57:27,370 --> 00:57:35,950
So we can't say right now whether or not the army is by virtue of the Army going to squish these differences,

601
00:57:36,670 --> 00:57:40,990
or if we're going to see some really different kind of officers popping up.

602
00:57:41,650 --> 00:57:48,040
And the other thing that makes something out of this whole issue of their their proximity to these jihadi groups,

603
00:57:48,430 --> 00:57:54,790
but we also this other problem that most Pakistani unit deaths now are going to be due to Pakistanis, not due to Indians.

604
00:57:55,300 --> 00:58:00,730
So there's a lot of countervailing pressures and events are taking place in the officer corps.

605
00:58:01,060 --> 00:58:08,950
But I think this is really kind of interesting, and I'm not going to end with this idea that, gee, everything is going better because of this.

606
00:58:09,490 --> 00:58:15,550
But this is, for me, the only source smile, though it is that we might have pressure for positive change.

607
00:58:16,030 --> 00:58:16,980
Thank you very.