1 00:00:00,540 --> 00:00:07,670 Lovely spring day. I come from Norway. We had -12 and -15 for the last few weeks. 2 00:00:07,680 --> 00:00:10,950 We have an old house where the ceiling is high. 3 00:00:10,950 --> 00:00:20,939 So to to heat it is almost impossible. So I carry sacks of wood from the cellar up on the fourth floor, so every every second day. 4 00:00:20,940 --> 00:00:25,260 So this is the exercise me to go to a studio. 5 00:00:26,670 --> 00:00:37,469 I've been here before several times. I was at a character of war program some years ago where I started on on a 6 00:00:37,470 --> 00:00:42,300 book that will be published in May by Poudre Cold called Power in Hard Times. 7 00:00:42,840 --> 00:00:46,979 While the title I think, can Europe Act Strategically? 8 00:00:46,980 --> 00:00:51,840 So I have this keen interest in sort of rational policymaking. 9 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:59,879 Is it possible for governments in this sort of very confused age to act strategically? 10 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:07,020 So that's a interest of mine. I worked, as you noticed from the introduction, on various European issues. 11 00:01:07,500 --> 00:01:12,930 My first job was with the Ministry of Oil and Energy, which is an important one in Norway. 12 00:01:13,770 --> 00:01:22,620 So I did research on the non-existent EU energy policy too for my doctorate as I was getting more and more interested in the EU. 13 00:01:22,620 --> 00:01:26,549 Not so much in energy. So there's a tip for you. If you haven't finished, you're not. 14 00:01:26,550 --> 00:01:32,640 Just find the topic which interests you and twist it so that you can get to the of it. 15 00:01:33,510 --> 00:01:40,290 And then European politics with activity in politics as deputy foreign minister, 16 00:01:41,340 --> 00:01:47,460 although the the little presentation you had up here was a sort of bizarre Belarus policy, 17 00:01:48,090 --> 00:01:58,319 etc., 12 states, states, states in the system that are quite, quite abnormal, so to speak. 18 00:01:58,320 --> 00:01:58,860 Both of them. 19 00:02:00,060 --> 00:02:13,350 I would like to present to you my thinking about defence cooperation, integration, what are the driving forces, what is happening in Europe today? 20 00:02:14,550 --> 00:02:16,140 Because there are some paradoxes here. 21 00:02:16,290 --> 00:02:27,150 On the one hand there is Russia prodding, testing, being sort of this speech by Putin last week was like saying Dr. Strangelove again, 22 00:02:28,920 --> 00:02:38,790 sort of really odd for being in 2018, in rather peaceful Europe or having had having been peaceful for so long. 23 00:02:39,510 --> 00:02:48,120 So this is the sort of the situation of hard power being on display China, Russia, North Korea, 24 00:02:49,500 --> 00:02:55,230 something we haven't been used to for a long time in Europe 1990 until, 25 00:02:55,770 --> 00:03:04,860 let's say, 2010, 15, 20 tens, this long 20 years of almost unprecedented peace. 26 00:03:05,520 --> 00:03:11,190 One has this this recurrence of our policy and the use of military force in a 27 00:03:11,190 --> 00:03:20,430 traditional way of enhancing state interests of of which which calls for deterrence, 28 00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:25,980 maybe coercion, certainly not appeasement of classical strategic choices. 29 00:03:26,880 --> 00:03:30,060 So this is happening in and around Europe. 30 00:03:30,540 --> 00:03:36,569 Russia is neighbour, Norway's neighbour, neighbour, neighbours. 31 00:03:36,570 --> 00:03:46,050 I speak, this is happening in Europe, while Europeans seem to be in a way in another completely different mindset. 32 00:03:46,200 --> 00:03:50,400 This is a puzzle, this is a paradox. This is highly interesting. 33 00:03:51,630 --> 00:03:56,010 My colleague and friend Christopher Coker writes about this as a cultural problem. 34 00:03:56,370 --> 00:03:59,580 So this is a he says the real problem is cultural. 35 00:03:59,850 --> 00:04:04,290 It is not the lack of money or the lack of ability to think strategically. 36 00:04:04,290 --> 00:04:13,670 It is something that has happened to the European citizen and politician over these last 20 years, having to do with globalisation, 37 00:04:13,680 --> 00:04:22,350 perhaps European integration so hard power with the military use of military force in the traditional way, 38 00:04:22,560 --> 00:04:29,040 state by state, state versus state seems to be unknown territory. 39 00:04:29,160 --> 00:04:35,670 So this is the background to my analysis and, and what comes subsequently. 40 00:04:37,110 --> 00:04:41,940 So there is a need to do something about defence so to speak. 41 00:04:42,270 --> 00:04:45,059 In Europe perspective here is, 42 00:04:45,060 --> 00:04:56,010 is European because there are some areas of economics that work in the defence sector and you're all familiar with them I presume, 43 00:04:56,010 --> 00:05:04,430 particularly those who are officers in the audience. There is always, not surprisingly, a lack of money for defence. 44 00:05:04,460 --> 00:05:15,350 This is an age old, centuries old problem, but it is compounded today by the the cost of this new technology, 45 00:05:15,830 --> 00:05:25,670 technology that is so costly that a states medium sized state cannot afford to keep up its capabilities. 46 00:05:25,700 --> 00:05:36,650 Let's say we have about 30, 35 capabilities for land, sea and air plus space, plus cyber space. 47 00:05:37,910 --> 00:05:48,170 There isn't the or the cost of renewing the force, so to speak, of keeping up with the competition is much higher than in the civilian sector. 48 00:05:48,410 --> 00:05:54,890 So there is a cost problem that hits everybody. It's every country, but it hits the smaller countries first. 49 00:05:55,280 --> 00:05:59,000 And the critical mass problem is where you see it. 50 00:05:59,150 --> 00:06:03,200 If you can't afford more than two submarines, you probably should have none. 51 00:06:03,950 --> 00:06:10,070 So this, as you're familiar with this leads to a change of the inventory. 52 00:06:10,490 --> 00:06:15,770 Denmark has scrapped having submarines altogether sailing on that. 53 00:06:16,370 --> 00:06:21,920 Yet Norway couldn't do that. So we are buying new ones, not from Germany and Cork. 54 00:06:22,610 --> 00:06:27,380 But this is a general sort of iron law of defence economics. 55 00:06:28,490 --> 00:06:39,770 One cannot afford the number of items that one needs, and therefore countries have to work together in new in a new way, in a way. 56 00:06:39,770 --> 00:06:43,190 So new there's a new need for defence integration. 57 00:06:43,910 --> 00:06:51,710 Then there is the political mindset. Liberal democracies are not set up to spend on defence. 58 00:06:52,130 --> 00:06:57,140 There are a few NGOs, pressure groups that say we must have more for defence. 59 00:06:57,590 --> 00:07:05,479 Few demonstrators outside Parliament are calling for more defence spending and the politicians 60 00:07:05,480 --> 00:07:12,220 are basically uninterested in this field because it isn't something you get re-elected by. 61 00:07:12,230 --> 00:07:15,500 It's not something popular, it's something very unpleasant. 62 00:07:16,130 --> 00:07:23,510 It's an unpleasant topic. It's frightening. It is not something where you see results. 63 00:07:23,750 --> 00:07:27,260 It is best. Defence is best when not used, of course. 64 00:07:27,710 --> 00:07:30,830 So it is the age of problem the Kings had. 65 00:07:31,160 --> 00:07:34,400 They could raise taxes. Dictators can spend. 66 00:07:35,390 --> 00:07:44,150 Russia can. China can. But liberal democracies have great difficulty justifying spending on defence. 67 00:07:44,150 --> 00:07:49,160 And we see that in the empirical reality of things. 68 00:07:49,160 --> 00:07:56,479 By the debate about the 2% GDP defence spending where President Trump has intensified, 69 00:07:56,480 --> 00:08:02,880 the demand put on the Europeans and the Europeans themselves have agreed on this 2%. 70 00:08:02,900 --> 00:08:06,020 It's not an American administration directly. 71 00:08:06,320 --> 00:08:20,180 It is European governments that Cardiff agreed to to reach 2% by 2024, and this goal is being abandoned almost as we speak. 72 00:08:21,200 --> 00:08:26,250 The Germans are not going to go go towards 2% anyway. 73 00:08:27,290 --> 00:08:29,780 The as per the Social Democrats, 74 00:08:30,230 --> 00:08:43,610 both Steinmeier and and Schultz and now Goglia and the prime minister they state this publicly that the Social Democrats will not go for 2%, 75 00:08:43,610 --> 00:08:52,670 which is a remarkable thing for a governing party in a centre, a real important European country to two states publicly. 76 00:08:53,000 --> 00:08:56,390 Most of us don't take it. They say we will. 77 00:08:57,020 --> 00:09:04,250 In time, we will reach 2%. The Norwegian government has just changed the text. 78 00:09:04,490 --> 00:09:09,170 Before the election it was 2% quickly and certainly by 2024. 79 00:09:09,170 --> 00:09:12,440 Now it is sometime in the future. 80 00:09:12,920 --> 00:09:24,620 In 2024 has been taken out of the government declaration and this is a country with Russia as a neighbour with a definite need for a strong nature. 81 00:09:25,280 --> 00:09:32,030 So there is something here that maybe can be explained by the competition for comes. 82 00:09:33,470 --> 00:09:37,980 But my mind shouldn't give you the conclusion. 83 00:09:37,980 --> 00:09:48,620 But my thinking about this is that it must be much more cultural or mindset oriented than than rational, 84 00:09:48,770 --> 00:09:59,270 because one can say there are the external risks, if not threats, there is the need for more money because of the procurement cost. 85 00:09:59,900 --> 00:10:08,270 There is the sovereignty consideration that every government must, must discuss and think about. 86 00:10:08,720 --> 00:10:14,180 How much do you want to integrate with other countries if you want to remain a sovereign country? 87 00:10:14,720 --> 00:10:18,200 And this is a country this is a debate that isn't very explicit. 88 00:10:18,200 --> 00:10:23,900 I don't think it really exists. Now, let's look at what we have presently in Europe. 89 00:10:25,460 --> 00:10:32,690 And this is we could say at least most of this on this slide is bottom up. 90 00:10:33,020 --> 00:10:45,870 It is driven by the need for hope, for force, saving money, not death is the Nordic Defence Cooperation Scheme. 91 00:10:45,890 --> 00:10:50,660 It is definitely intended to save money among the. 92 00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:55,790 Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden. 93 00:10:57,590 --> 00:11:02,780 Denmark joined also this. But they fear that it could be something the Americans wouldn't like. 94 00:11:02,780 --> 00:11:11,540 So they weren't sure at the beginning. But this is a typical example of cooperation to to save money, on exercises, 95 00:11:11,540 --> 00:11:16,430 on training, on maybe buying, having having the same equipment to some extent. 96 00:11:17,240 --> 00:11:22,129 And of course, the boats are getting more into this now. 97 00:11:22,130 --> 00:11:32,990 So this this makes sense. And it is vitally important to find ways of cooperating to save money and maybe to exercise and train and so on. 98 00:11:33,980 --> 00:11:44,780 The Swedes have have downsized their army and their general military apparatus tremendously, and it has basically very little left, 99 00:11:44,780 --> 00:11:50,540 and they've just reintroduced conscription after having abandoned it two or three years ago. 100 00:11:51,140 --> 00:11:55,820 So Sweden, they're sort of trying to turn the ship quickly because of Russia. 101 00:11:56,810 --> 00:12:06,830 Finland has a cheap defence model based on sometimes we say they have a new bicycle, new bicycle for the army once, once in a while. 102 00:12:07,220 --> 00:12:09,620 But the fans are very good fighters. 103 00:12:09,740 --> 00:12:18,770 I believe in the traditional mobility concept and believe that this is what deters Russia with a certain winter war experience. 104 00:12:20,090 --> 00:12:25,219 The Baltics are eager to co-operators but not get knocked back or will, of course, 105 00:12:25,220 --> 00:12:34,550 never go beyond a certain sort of low level of cooperation because of the nature of membership of some of the countries. 106 00:12:35,240 --> 00:12:40,070 So this is this is not a strategic type of defence cooperation. 107 00:12:41,060 --> 00:12:47,120 The same goes for EU initiatives and I'll say more about the EU later reasons 108 00:12:47,120 --> 00:12:52,520 initiatives that have been presented with much fanfare in Brussels and beyond Brussels, 109 00:12:52,850 --> 00:12:57,350 as I call sometimes an EU defence union. 110 00:12:58,760 --> 00:13:00,980 And the EU now has a strategy. 111 00:13:02,180 --> 00:13:12,470 The EU has a common defence solidarity clause already in the Lisbon Treaty, but the reality is that this is also to save money bottom up, 112 00:13:13,700 --> 00:13:21,740 although there and there is now fresh sort of joint joint funding money for this European Defence Fund, 113 00:13:23,180 --> 00:13:28,130 and I'll say so about it, PESCO, 26 EU countries. 114 00:13:28,430 --> 00:13:33,350 So it's bottom up. Where could we do something more rationally, so to speak? 115 00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:43,550 Germany, which is the richest country in Europe, has one of the lowest defence spending percentages. 116 00:13:43,730 --> 00:13:51,860 1.3 I think it is, or even less. Germany has has decided to be a framework nation. 117 00:13:51,980 --> 00:14:02,840 They to get others to cooperate in the military industrial in a way integration schemes framework nation. 118 00:14:02,840 --> 00:14:15,739 This is also planning and processing and trying to reach rational cooperation, so to speak, which is important, but it's also the bottom up. 119 00:14:15,740 --> 00:14:20,030 It's a lot of politics as usual. Now we need to say now we need to cooperate. 120 00:14:20,750 --> 00:14:27,020 French British cooperation has elements of this, but it is also a strategic type of cooperation. 121 00:14:28,460 --> 00:14:35,180 Now, Russia. Now, I want to try to probe how what are the drivers here? 122 00:14:35,180 --> 00:14:46,160 What what's happening beyond this? This is a book I was a co-editor of this last year on the and the long list due to the algorithms. 123 00:14:46,340 --> 00:14:50,899 Ladies and gentlemen, this is how the editors these days, the publishing houses, 124 00:14:50,900 --> 00:14:57,650 they want titles where if you write Ukraine probably not beyond Ukraine. 125 00:14:57,710 --> 00:15:06,390 Russia strategy secure. Europe. Either of these terms, you get the title on the screen so they can sell more. 126 00:15:06,390 --> 00:15:11,790 And this goes hand in hand with the abandonment of royalties, which is what they do these days. 127 00:15:12,690 --> 00:15:19,500 And I shouldn't say this perhaps, but one of the contributors to this book is either Satyajit Ray from Russi, 128 00:15:20,220 --> 00:15:29,580 who was one of the spies alleged spy swap in 2010, along with this unfortunate kernel of yesterday. 129 00:15:30,060 --> 00:15:32,040 So when I saw the news, I thought, Oh my God, 130 00:15:32,040 --> 00:15:40,620 I hope the FSB is not too interested in our book because Sutyagin got in there because we needed somebody who knew Russian strategy, 131 00:15:40,950 --> 00:15:44,909 and I didn't have any connections in that direction. 132 00:15:44,910 --> 00:15:48,690 So it was just a piece of advice from somebody, another British scholar. 133 00:15:49,470 --> 00:15:53,370 So so this is maybe it's a selling point for Palgrave. 134 00:15:53,940 --> 00:16:02,069 We shall see. We should then expect if a strategy is of any interest to European politicians, 135 00:16:02,070 --> 00:16:07,530 we should expect that to be a major effect from Russia's activities since Crimea. 136 00:16:09,840 --> 00:16:17,160 And what we see is that there is an effect in Northern Europe, but not in the south, not in southern Europe. 137 00:16:17,470 --> 00:16:26,340 Francis interests are not in any kind of confrontation with Russia, but in as much partnership as possible, 138 00:16:27,150 --> 00:16:33,180 which is a historical interest, of course, and has worked well for France in the past. 139 00:16:33,450 --> 00:16:37,620 France is a very able strategic actor. 140 00:16:37,710 --> 00:16:45,930 I'll get to play more about France later. But in the south of Europe, its strategic interests are definitely not in the north, 141 00:16:46,140 --> 00:16:51,270 not in confronting or deterring Russia, for that matter, but in the south. 142 00:16:52,590 --> 00:17:01,590 But we see Russia's human, say, forward leaning activities that are really political, 143 00:17:03,690 --> 00:17:08,610 sort of very tough political rhetoric combined with military probing. 144 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:16,830 For instance, when Finland joined the host nation support scheme of NATO in 2015 or 16, 145 00:17:17,550 --> 00:17:21,959 can't remember the dates, there was a strong Russian reaction verbally. 146 00:17:21,960 --> 00:17:28,110 And then for six days thereafter, every second day there was a violation of Finnish airspace. 147 00:17:28,530 --> 00:17:34,830 So this is the political signalling of flying, of airspace violation. 148 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:47,250 So and we know that Britain plays now the key role in sort of deterring Russia in in developing strategy on what to do. 149 00:17:48,180 --> 00:18:00,450 And we see the Northern Group which is a diplomatic started underlying Fox the diplomatic suggestion to get countries like minded countries together. 150 00:18:01,050 --> 00:18:09,750 The northern group now has about every country in northern Europe as members also sweets and friends. 151 00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:22,530 And the much more interesting military joint expeditionary force led by Britain, now also has Swedes and Finns thus as contributing members. 152 00:18:23,100 --> 00:18:33,510 And this gives, of course, these countries a certain security, I would say guarantee, but it's it's who trades together, can fight together, etc. 153 00:18:34,680 --> 00:18:36,780 So this is very interesting. 154 00:18:36,780 --> 00:18:47,430 All of this defence integration, so to speak, that is not primarily happening because of economic motives but strategic common interest. 155 00:18:49,070 --> 00:19:01,890 And this is indeed one of the major theme of a of a book that Rob and I will publish later this year on coalitions, partnerships as a, 156 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:09,900 as a mode of cooperation that the multi lateral organisations themselves EU 157 00:19:10,230 --> 00:19:15,570 Naoto you ask about that matter you of the UN is basically the mandate provider, 158 00:19:16,200 --> 00:19:20,249 the enabler of legitimacy for NATO. 159 00:19:20,250 --> 00:19:30,930 We see that NATO's a large 29 coalition of states, a military alliance bound by Article five, which is a very strong bond. 160 00:19:30,930 --> 00:19:33,480 It's a very strong obligation. 161 00:19:34,920 --> 00:19:43,680 These 29 states are nonetheless extremely diverse in terms of security assessment interests, strategic interests and so on. 162 00:19:44,430 --> 00:19:51,090 So NATO has for some time clearly become a platform for coalitions, 163 00:19:51,360 --> 00:19:59,160 platform for coalitions of like minded states where the Northern Group, or rather, Jeff, is the foremost example today. 164 00:20:00,810 --> 00:20:13,660 And the EU. Also 2028 member states is also extremely diversified and it's well known that one has these different memberships. 165 00:20:13,710 --> 00:20:26,640 Shannon PESCO Now CFP, the euro, the EU is like a sort of landscape of circles that overlaps to some extent, 166 00:20:27,360 --> 00:20:30,600 although there is something that they all participate in. 167 00:20:31,020 --> 00:20:34,050 Like Article five, NATO, namely the internal market. 168 00:20:34,680 --> 00:20:44,130 As you Brits now experience how sacrosanct the internal market is as the set of ideas and rules. 169 00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:54,840 So I would suggest that we should think about and analyse defence what happens in terms of countries cooperation and integration with each other, 170 00:20:55,560 --> 00:21:09,150 either as the bottom up, sort of a pragmatic cost based activity, or armed or as something else, 171 00:21:09,340 --> 00:21:17,190 something strategic, where you start by saying, do we have common strategic interests? 172 00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:24,780 Then we have a basis for serious military cooperation in terms of war fighting. 173 00:21:25,530 --> 00:21:28,080 So these are the risk willing and able. The risk. 174 00:21:28,560 --> 00:21:36,330 So so the willing and able category of states where you have an ability militarily, you have a culture of risk, 175 00:21:36,330 --> 00:21:47,070 willingness of military culture, strategic culture, and you have the the common interests that motivates such integration. 176 00:21:48,390 --> 00:21:53,340 And these two modes of cooperation do not necessarily overlap at all. 177 00:21:55,470 --> 00:22:02,070 The bottom up, economically motivated one is much less serious, much less important. 178 00:22:02,970 --> 00:22:06,510 So this is the book where we've just finished a manuscript. 179 00:22:06,720 --> 00:22:16,379 The last chapter will be in next week, and it has this provisional title of this and it should be spelled properly, 180 00:22:16,380 --> 00:22:22,410 I guess, I believe publish it and it has coalitions and partnerships. 181 00:22:23,130 --> 00:22:34,830 And we found it very interesting because clearly in the role of of these sector organisations that are really the result after World War Two, 182 00:22:34,830 --> 00:22:47,520 when all these international organisations were familiar with EU, NATO, the European Council of Europe always said the nature of the UN, 183 00:22:47,610 --> 00:22:53,640 how do you at public all this conversation solve this signed largely by the Americans all the West 184 00:22:54,330 --> 00:23:01,770 after World War two and multilateral diplomacy become sort of a place where there is predictability, 185 00:23:01,770 --> 00:23:05,580 where one follows the rules, where process matters more than results. 186 00:23:06,180 --> 00:23:15,060 And now we are in a situation where this is no longer true. There is much more emphasis on what's in it for me, what you bring to the table. 187 00:23:15,780 --> 00:23:21,239 Do we have common interests? Shall we use the EU format? 188 00:23:21,240 --> 00:23:28,650 Shall we use the NATO's platform, so to speak, to launch our cooperation to do what we want to do? 189 00:23:29,490 --> 00:23:32,819 And Trump's diplomacy, America. 190 00:23:32,820 --> 00:23:37,440 The Americans have always been much more upfront about this, of course. 191 00:23:37,650 --> 00:23:41,870 What do you bring to the table? That's the story from NATO. 192 00:23:42,720 --> 00:23:52,590 My friend, who was like Ambassador Ada, tells the story of the sitting between the American and British ambassadors at the nice Mackinac meeting, 193 00:23:52,950 --> 00:23:59,549 and the Belgian ambassador took the floor constantly pronouncing on every other, every issue it was. 194 00:23:59,550 --> 00:24:07,240 Belgium had this adopted convention and then the American leans in front of the Norwegian, talking to the voice that makes. 195 00:24:07,980 --> 00:24:11,280 So what do they contribute? That is the Belgians. 196 00:24:11,910 --> 00:24:16,920 So in a way, it's it's more much more now with Trump. 197 00:24:16,920 --> 00:24:20,979 It's much more what's, you know, what's in it for you and what's in it for me. 198 00:24:20,980 --> 00:24:30,390 And that's cooperate. But I think in security and defence, there's always been this element of if you're not up to it, you're not. 199 00:24:30,690 --> 00:24:33,840 We don't need you. Maybe your flag, but that's all. 200 00:24:34,740 --> 00:24:45,780 So what we do in this book is to have expert authors write a Frenchman writing on how the French think about the British nowadays, 201 00:24:45,960 --> 00:24:56,790 the French British cooperation and American writing about the special relationship and rock writing about specially about Britain as such. 202 00:24:58,230 --> 00:25:04,890 And we look. The Partnerships and the Northern Group Coalition. 203 00:25:05,160 --> 00:25:14,640 I think we find it is attractive that the willing and able that this is becoming much more important. 204 00:25:14,700 --> 00:25:24,390 But those affected by Russian revisionism get together and find a way of working on this together. 205 00:25:24,400 --> 00:25:36,240 And of course the Jeff will, as the one sort of tactical level chapter in the book, will show written by to Marine officers. 206 00:25:37,140 --> 00:25:46,110 They show that there is a strategic advantage possibly to having this military integration also that you get you get more room for manoeuvre. 207 00:25:46,890 --> 00:25:59,310 But the point is to really look in detail at the sort of the growing importance of partnerships, coalitions, something that isn't new in nature, 208 00:25:59,310 --> 00:26:13,180 but it's more pronounced now and how this doesn't really affect or isn't really affected by Brexit, because Brexit how? 209 00:26:13,320 --> 00:26:25,830 However, whatever one says about Brexit politically, it remains a fact that the EU needs reform in security defence more so than vice versa. 210 00:26:26,490 --> 00:26:34,260 So there is sort of this is a call for sort of being honest about the facts in this relationship. 211 00:26:35,370 --> 00:26:40,480 Now, this is the hard power in hard times. Gloomy, gloomy picture. 212 00:26:40,500 --> 00:26:52,550 I think we saw we saw in, I think what they call in English to stop times from invading must be some somewhere in the middle of open public. 213 00:26:53,040 --> 00:26:56,070 This is coming out in May. 214 00:26:57,270 --> 00:27:02,129 And this is related to the general topic here because in in my book on Hard Power, 215 00:27:02,130 --> 00:27:13,680 I tried to and what I study tried to study was that it is this factor of military strategic culture in actors, 216 00:27:13,680 --> 00:27:17,160 in European actors who are the willing and able. 217 00:27:17,970 --> 00:27:24,570 And I edited that for a previous book on May two where we studied the NATO's willing and able. 218 00:27:26,070 --> 00:27:28,770 Who are they in Europe? The European members. 219 00:27:29,130 --> 00:27:36,070 And we said, well, we concluded we saw this weakness France, Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. 220 00:27:36,510 --> 00:27:43,550 I don't know whether either of us presented who would contest that, but that was the general conclusion. 221 00:27:43,560 --> 00:27:49,350 These are the countries that are fighting together often and in places. 222 00:27:49,650 --> 00:27:55,620 Libya, we have great in France, Denmark, Norway, very, 223 00:27:55,620 --> 00:28:06,660 very active with our air forces to such an extent that Robert Gates was very critical of Poland for not having contributed and Poland 224 00:28:06,810 --> 00:28:15,180 sort of made a mistake about contributed because they didn't think the Americans would be would have a major role in that operation. 225 00:28:15,420 --> 00:28:18,270 It would be led by the French, as it looks in the beginning. 226 00:28:18,840 --> 00:28:26,490 Now, that wasn't the case because leading from behind what the Americans called it was very much an indispensable activity. 227 00:28:27,300 --> 00:28:38,490 But you know very, very well, these are countries that are recurring in NATO's operations and also operations that are non-NATO operations. 228 00:28:38,490 --> 00:28:42,820 Iraq, for instance, had Denmark being very active. 229 00:28:42,840 --> 00:28:48,600 Norway didn't show up because of domestic political disagreements in the government, 230 00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:54,660 but would normally have been the Enduring Freedom Afghanistan 2001. 231 00:28:56,490 --> 00:29:00,870 Most of these countries had special forces going and so on. 232 00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:12,060 So there is a rather big literature on strategic military culture that one can draw on to sort of certain whether this is true or not, 233 00:29:12,390 --> 00:29:19,140 these conclusions. And it's very clear that Germany lacks this kind of culture. 234 00:29:19,590 --> 00:29:27,930 One could say Germany had too much of its two world wars, and now it is still under sort of this pacifism. 235 00:29:27,930 --> 00:29:40,409 And in domestic politics, although there are changes in Germany, is a sort of movement in this direction of being able to leave militarily. 236 00:29:40,410 --> 00:29:48,750 We are hard from that situation. One is far from from a political, should one say, willingness maturity to do so. 237 00:29:49,650 --> 00:29:55,550 And this is this illustrates the importance of this factor. 238 00:29:55,560 --> 00:29:59,220 I think this the single most important factors of domestic politics of these. 239 00:29:59,300 --> 00:30:14,960 Countries in terms of being willing to take risk, have losses, use military force as a deterrent, maybe also as a coercive tool of states. 240 00:30:15,740 --> 00:30:24,770 And this is the Clausewitz sort of dictum that when one achieves political ends through the use of force in these ways, 241 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:34,100 usually deterrence is the most sort of useful and the most desirable way of using military force. 242 00:30:34,700 --> 00:30:46,280 But this is a whole tradition of statecraft that is rather unknown in many countries today in Europe, but exists it persists, I should say, in some. 243 00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:55,530 And what countries get together, PESCO or whatever format to save money? 244 00:30:55,550 --> 00:31:02,510 This is an entirely different matter, really. One will not move from PESCO to Defence Union. 245 00:31:03,890 --> 00:31:12,200 So what we find and what I find is that the sort of old fashioned strategic partnerships that the 246 00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:22,220 logic of external threats and risk moves you to act together and like minded countries act together. 247 00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:26,610 That remains, of course, it's it's a fact of life. 248 00:31:26,610 --> 00:31:30,050 This is how it works in this system. And therefore, 249 00:31:31,280 --> 00:31:45,989 that's a very sort of misplaced emphasis on this current EU defence union policy sort of that is presented as if the EU is replacing NATO's. 250 00:31:45,990 --> 00:31:53,060 We're competing with myself because there simply isn't the substance behind there isn't any substance behind it. 251 00:31:53,420 --> 00:31:58,460 It is very much sort of just wishful thinking, I believe. 252 00:31:59,420 --> 00:32:05,570 And this has implications for how things will go in the future in the larger picture of transatlantic relations. 253 00:32:06,230 --> 00:32:16,580 There is, in a way, an axis Washington, London, Poland, Norway, the northern countries, those that are in the willing and able category. 254 00:32:18,500 --> 00:32:25,130 We like to think from Norway's side. We like to think we have an alliance in the alliance, a special relationship. 255 00:32:25,670 --> 00:32:32,690 You have at least you like to think very much that you have a very special relationship and you do compare to everybody else. 256 00:32:33,410 --> 00:32:41,420 And there's nothing to suggest that that will be diminished. I think for the Americans, it is sort of what do you bring to the table? 257 00:32:41,600 --> 00:32:44,690 How useful are you? Do we have common interests? 258 00:32:45,410 --> 00:32:56,960 What how can we sort of the intelligence close very close intelligence relationship that you have with Washington, that we have with Washington. 259 00:32:57,710 --> 00:33:08,120 In that sense, we say Norway's NATO's in the north, meaning Norway provides the US with exceptional intelligence on Russia in the north. 260 00:33:09,230 --> 00:33:17,180 So it is these facts that matter and they have to do with trust between governments and services. 261 00:33:18,140 --> 00:33:25,100 And that is something entirely different from an open ended political process of 28 or 29 countries. 262 00:33:26,330 --> 00:33:35,180 So depending on what sort of which needs we will have in security depends in the time ahead. 263 00:33:37,160 --> 00:33:49,110 This will become, I think the this the C London Northern Europe dimension will become increasingly important and one 264 00:33:49,110 --> 00:33:54,970 could say Sweden and Finland trying to insert themselves as much as they ever come in Washington, 265 00:33:54,980 --> 00:34:06,350 London and with us in Norway, because we're NATO's testifies to this, because if Sweden and Finland believed in the Lisbon Treaty, they should. 266 00:34:06,680 --> 00:34:13,820 You know, when you read this Article 42, six or 42 seven, I keep forgetting which what it what it was. 267 00:34:14,050 --> 00:34:27,590 So I think if you read the text, it is much more obliging, it's much more serious, it's much more sort of clear than Article five or later. 268 00:34:28,040 --> 00:34:34,280 It's actually says that all EU countries will assist each other militarily if one is threatened. 269 00:34:35,660 --> 00:34:38,780 So it's sort of it's a wonderful text, 270 00:34:39,980 --> 00:34:53,660 but the text Cosmo substantial although backing by anyone and France invoke that text after Friday Friday the 13th 2015. 271 00:34:53,660 --> 00:34:59,210 On the when there was terror attack at Bataclan France in. 272 00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:06,090 Volk But to Germany and other EU members say, now we need your solidarity. 273 00:35:06,120 --> 00:35:12,420 What are you doing to sort of support us with. And the Germans were quite taken aback by this. 274 00:35:13,050 --> 00:35:29,790 So clearly what is stated, what's even written into a treaty doesn't really matter very much unless there is this culture of saying, 275 00:35:29,790 --> 00:35:37,050 yes, perhaps this is substantially important to us and we will honour these commitments. 276 00:35:38,190 --> 00:35:44,910 And I'm reminded of that very much when I read EU documents on the Defence Union. 277 00:35:45,420 --> 00:35:48,420 On how the EU now has a strategy. 278 00:35:48,720 --> 00:35:54,390 There's a new global strategy for the EU that was adopted in June 2016. 279 00:35:54,690 --> 00:35:58,920 You should read that because it says absolutely nothing strategic. 280 00:35:59,130 --> 00:36:07,080 There's no strategy at all in the text. It's very much like a pep talk to to journalists. 281 00:36:07,590 --> 00:36:14,140 The EU will be a world leader in this. The EU will do that, will promote these values. 282 00:36:14,160 --> 00:36:20,340 It's a sort of litany of good intentions, but there is no strategic interaction with anybody. 283 00:36:20,340 --> 00:36:23,880 There is no specification of which military needs. 284 00:36:24,690 --> 00:36:33,120 Does the EU then have? How will it prioritise its strategic interests at this time? 285 00:36:33,120 --> 00:36:39,210 With all the talk about the Defence Union. What does that require a defence union? 286 00:36:39,930 --> 00:36:43,110 How do you specify the army needs for the Defence Union? 287 00:36:43,410 --> 00:36:49,680 What will be the doctrines? And so on? The EU to EU strategy strategy documents. 288 00:36:50,130 --> 00:36:52,650 They have a span of 13 years between them. 289 00:36:52,830 --> 00:37:04,650 The one was first was in 2003 called it EU strategy was 16 pages a very big print in a way very airy documents that speak in that sense also. 290 00:37:05,400 --> 00:37:09,240 And that was spurred by 2001 and Manhattan. 291 00:37:10,050 --> 00:37:16,290 So it looked in the risk and threat assessment like the American security strategy at the time. 292 00:37:17,220 --> 00:37:23,760 And then 13 years passes the pass and you get a new global strategy. 293 00:37:24,450 --> 00:37:31,500 So this is the sort of the only really important question about the EU security and defence ambition 294 00:37:31,920 --> 00:37:42,500 I think is the and the role of France with France in a way in all what would France prefer, 295 00:37:42,510 --> 00:37:48,300 what are, what is the French thinking? And to provide you with an answer to that. 296 00:37:49,830 --> 00:37:56,130 I looked at the review stratégique July, the France from November 2017. 297 00:37:56,640 --> 00:37:59,850 It's maybe in English now on the Web page. 298 00:38:00,900 --> 00:38:04,440 It's a very, very I would say it's a beautiful document. 299 00:38:04,890 --> 00:38:16,050 I mean, it's beautiful in the logical sense of how it is structure, because it is it says these these are the requirements of sovereignty for us. 300 00:38:16,140 --> 00:38:25,200 France is sovereign to the extent that it doesn't need anybody else, which is an interesting way of putting it. 301 00:38:25,500 --> 00:38:28,740 We are we have the nuclear deterrence. 302 00:38:30,090 --> 00:38:35,040 Therefore, we are able to be sovereign. We are not depending on anybody. 303 00:38:35,580 --> 00:38:43,920 So this is very different from a German statement, which would probably be something like we are integrated in the EU, therefore we are sovereign. 304 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:50,130 Therefore we have thought of this. We couldn't be anything outside of the multilateral setting. 305 00:38:50,970 --> 00:39:01,920 Now, this document is not very different from the from the level of law from 13 2013, which is familiar to you probably. 306 00:39:02,430 --> 00:39:03,840 So this is a shorter piece. 307 00:39:05,430 --> 00:39:17,490 But most important, I think, is that it says what what matters to us is the risk winning relevant military partners, the willing and able category. 308 00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:24,300 We can only cooperate with countries that are able to fight professionally, 309 00:39:24,330 --> 00:39:30,810 take risks, take losses, and with whom we with which we share interests, of course. 310 00:39:31,380 --> 00:39:36,420 So it has a long path on Britain's importance on the US importance. 311 00:39:36,900 --> 00:39:46,800 And then it says about the EU that the EU should also have autonomous military capability. 312 00:39:47,220 --> 00:39:50,820 That is of course not defined really by anybody. 313 00:39:51,150 --> 00:39:59,130 But the thinking in France from de Gaulle onwards, has always been that Europe should be upholding the multipolar. 314 00:39:59,190 --> 00:40:05,970 Our system being able to deter, coerce militarily as well as economically. 315 00:40:06,180 --> 00:40:11,210 So there is a I think that's a continuity in this way of thinking. 316 00:40:11,220 --> 00:40:24,110 But France was reportedly very dismayed that this PESCO, which was supposed to get more money out of the spending, make it more rational, 317 00:40:24,120 --> 00:40:35,340 more R&D that would do away with all these various weapons systems of Europe that 26 countries signed up to that. 318 00:40:35,460 --> 00:40:40,530 Because the moment you have such a large group, it is a slow kind of process. 319 00:40:42,360 --> 00:40:53,640 So I would say this very specific shows the the difference between the sort of bottom up money saving and the strategic cooperation. 320 00:40:54,030 --> 00:41:01,290 And in this document, that's a very, very interesting figure on page 69, 321 00:41:01,710 --> 00:41:12,600 which details what kind of cooperation can France enter into with countries where it has no sort of alliance obligations? 322 00:41:12,870 --> 00:41:16,290 What are that? What does sovereignty require? 323 00:41:17,010 --> 00:41:19,800 Which is the key question, of course, for every country. 324 00:41:20,010 --> 00:41:28,290 What does sovereignty require in terms of how far you can go in the in various types of cooperation, integration? 325 00:41:28,950 --> 00:41:35,579 And that is the sort of famous elephant, infamous elephant in the room, the debate that few politicians, 326 00:41:35,580 --> 00:41:41,700 I think, are able to or willing to bear, neither able or willing to have that debate. 327 00:41:41,910 --> 00:41:47,130 It's a very difficult debate, of course, because one come up again as I started, 328 00:41:47,610 --> 00:41:55,740 by saying one cannot afford what one should afford in order to have traditional sovereignty anymore. 329 00:41:56,190 --> 00:42:02,250 And here in Britain, you have a tortuous debate about course defence cuts for the time being. 330 00:42:04,110 --> 00:42:10,080 So to to conclude the EU. 331 00:42:10,420 --> 00:42:15,870 What's really most disconcerting about the EU is statements you'll get, 332 00:42:16,380 --> 00:42:23,970 you'll get who always talks about the sort of uniqueness of the humanitarian act of the EU, that it's a soft power actor. 333 00:42:24,300 --> 00:42:27,780 He even stated Soft power is not enough. 334 00:42:27,780 --> 00:42:39,240 We need military power, which is sort of how will you square that with the sort of humanitarian image of the soft power actor, the normative actor. 335 00:42:39,840 --> 00:42:50,940 But what's disconcerting is that the talk about these things union strategy, autonomous military capacity, it's so easy. 336 00:42:50,940 --> 00:42:55,020 It's so superficial. There's no specification. 337 00:42:55,440 --> 00:43:05,550 It's as if those who talk about smuggling, you name you don't get even tusk do not realise the seriousness of this, what this requires. 338 00:43:06,300 --> 00:43:12,240 Which tells us something about sort of EU policy making it possible to make 339 00:43:12,240 --> 00:43:18,810 statements to this effect without serious planning for what the implications are. 340 00:43:19,350 --> 00:43:28,030 And that's is a problem because the Americans listen to this and they are quite irritated, to say the least. 341 00:43:28,050 --> 00:43:35,700 Mattis and Munich demanded a clarification from the EU that it wouldn't duplicate NATO's in any way. 342 00:43:37,050 --> 00:43:41,760 And it was at Munich. The Security Council conference was now in February. 343 00:43:42,600 --> 00:43:52,920 There was so much hype about these EU plans and of course there's a lot of anti-American sentiment among European politicians due to Trump, 344 00:43:53,820 --> 00:44:02,340 which lends itself to sort of wishful dreaming about an alternative EU defence capability. 345 00:44:04,560 --> 00:44:09,900 And I think that but I think that the key actor in all of this is and remains France. 346 00:44:10,410 --> 00:44:19,709 It's not Germany so much because Germany doesn't really think much work much on on the strategy. 347 00:44:19,710 --> 00:44:25,080 At least it does. It has a formidable military industry, but that's something else. 348 00:44:26,190 --> 00:44:32,550 And to end to conclude on the more even more disconcerting note, 349 00:44:34,500 --> 00:44:45,600 all of the governments that are in the unwilling and unable category, those for whom strategy makes is unnecessary. 350 00:44:45,930 --> 00:44:57,360 If it doesn't make sense that this unpleasantness of Russia particularly is something one can maybe just disregard. 351 00:44:57,810 --> 00:45:12,080 It's much better. Had to be in denial that you have to think seriously about deterrence, about defence, national defence, about spending on defence. 352 00:45:14,930 --> 00:45:17,930 And most NATO member states are in this category. 353 00:45:18,650 --> 00:45:26,420 They are not very interested in this. It's nice to have Article five, but we don't have to think much about it. 354 00:45:26,990 --> 00:45:34,700 And of course, the fact the modern change in character war today is of course, that Article five is the least likely to happen to you. 355 00:45:35,330 --> 00:45:40,220 What's likely is a hit rate. It is strategic attack, a testing. 356 00:45:40,550 --> 00:45:46,370 It is whatever Clausewitz could have taught us about how to use military force 357 00:45:47,270 --> 00:45:52,510 without too much risk of escalation to Article five and then achieve your assaults. 358 00:45:53,510 --> 00:46:03,290 And there are some very interesting articles analysing the enhanced forward presence in the Baltics along these lines, 359 00:46:03,290 --> 00:46:15,199 saying that Russia could easily maybe get a situation of conflicts on the ground, 360 00:46:15,200 --> 00:46:22,939 sort of conflict among civilians in the Baltic states imply involving some NATO's personnel that 361 00:46:22,940 --> 00:46:31,370 could that that would be possible for the to to have this kind of a subversive performance. 362 00:46:32,180 --> 00:46:46,490 Russia could also test Article five by a quick in and out and would then the 29 NATO members get together in Brussels and declare Article five? 363 00:46:46,940 --> 00:46:51,620 The answer, of course, is no. When Ukraine happened, Crimea happened. 364 00:46:51,620 --> 00:46:57,229 There was great confusion in the NSC and we think in similar terms. 365 00:46:57,230 --> 00:47:05,390 What about Svalbard or Spitsbergen could have balance both where there are 800 Russian workers. 366 00:47:05,810 --> 00:47:16,430 Maybe they needed a little protection for some days by Russian soldiers and this non-military, demilitarised archipelago. 367 00:47:16,910 --> 00:47:21,890 What would happen in Brussels then? Would that be sort of an instant Article five declaration? 368 00:47:22,400 --> 00:47:35,090 No, no. So if one wanted to sort of test this Article five business, there are there are legion ways of doing so. 369 00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:49,010 And to sort of detect what happens, to be prepared to act on national security is a national national obligation. 370 00:47:49,040 --> 00:47:58,669 It's not something the Americans will fly in to do for you. So I think this is there's a lot of sort of sleepwalking in Europe for the time being. 371 00:47:58,670 --> 00:48:03,620 One hopes that all of this isn't really so serious won't happen. 372 00:48:04,460 --> 00:48:13,850 And so because the the whole idea of Article five is that large scale, clear war situation, a high end scenario. 373 00:48:15,320 --> 00:48:25,690 And of course, if I were an adversary of wanting to effect political influence in Europe various ways, I would use all other means. 374 00:48:25,700 --> 00:48:30,950 But that and the Russians are very clever strategically, tactically. 375 00:48:31,970 --> 00:48:46,700 So they undoubtedly have thought about this. So and just to remind ourselves in this article, this 2%, 2% spending is an imperial, 376 00:48:46,700 --> 00:48:51,590 is an empirical indicator of how uninterested European governments are. 377 00:48:52,430 --> 00:48:54,620 It's not the money that is not the 2%. 378 00:48:54,620 --> 00:49:07,400 That is the magical number, but it is is just you solemnly declare at Wales you will reach this goal by 2024 and that well doesn't really matter. 379 00:49:08,870 --> 00:49:16,010 And we should also remember that looking back at Crimea, the case 2014. 380 00:49:16,340 --> 00:49:25,129 The two things that happened as a political reaction to Crimea, to the annexation of Crimea and the war fighting in Luhansk, 381 00:49:25,130 --> 00:49:36,920 Donetsk is sanctions US the US made the sanctions, the US decided on the sanctions and imposed them on the EU. 382 00:49:37,250 --> 00:49:42,140 The EU Europeans themselves did not make up the sanctions. 383 00:49:42,440 --> 00:49:45,710 So it is that the policy leadership was American. 384 00:49:46,280 --> 00:49:56,750 The same for the deterrence of with military conventional military force in Europe that currently is in place. 385 00:49:56,760 --> 00:50:07,460 It was an American decision. Related one, but an American decision to spend and deploy, redeploy to Poland and rotate in East Central Europe. 386 00:50:07,700 --> 00:50:16,190 And then the Europeans came along after that decision at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. 387 00:50:16,760 --> 00:50:20,450 With these three battalions in the Baltic states. 388 00:50:21,050 --> 00:50:30,140 So it is also disconcerting that it is U.S. leadership again and again and again for Europe. 389 00:50:30,710 --> 00:50:42,590 Even if one were to it tremendously, this is where there isn't this sort of it's as if what doesn't fly now if they mean it. 390 00:50:42,740 --> 00:50:47,750 We rarely criticise Trump and all of us. Let's be serious ourselves. 391 00:50:48,560 --> 00:50:52,960 Thank you so much. And now we will have thoughts which the probability.