1 00:00:00,300 --> 00:00:09,300 Yeah. So I'll talk about a project that was started in 2016 by Brendan Simmons, Michael Axworthy and myself, 2 00:00:10,200 --> 00:00:16,529 a West Valley Families and About a book which we recently published, 3 00:00:16,530 --> 00:00:22,080 which is in many ways the product of this workshop that we've been running so far. 4 00:00:23,220 --> 00:00:25,740 And so basically, in a nutshell, we're asking the question, 5 00:00:25,740 --> 00:00:36,060 what can one learn from the historical knowledge of the 30 Years War and the Peace of West failure in order to promote peace in the Middle East today? 6 00:00:37,470 --> 00:00:43,830 I think it's perhaps quite fitting that I'm speaking at the seminar series, which examines the changing character of war, 7 00:00:43,830 --> 00:00:50,010 because one of the analytical starting points of our project is the notion 8 00:00:50,010 --> 00:00:56,549 that the nature of warfare and conflict that existed in early modern Europe, 9 00:00:56,550 --> 00:00:59,879 especially during the 30 years war and before that, 10 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:07,890 is remarkably similar to the kind of conflicts that existed in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Sahel region today. 11 00:01:08,640 --> 00:01:12,930 So, of course, we're not saying that the character voted in favour of colons. 12 00:01:12,930 --> 00:01:18,930 They were arguing basically in a simplified form that the nature of warfare changed 13 00:01:18,930 --> 00:01:25,020 after about the mid-17th century and has now reverted to this earlier mode, 14 00:01:25,410 --> 00:01:33,240 this earlier constellation and typology that existed in the 16th and 17th centuries. 15 00:01:34,740 --> 00:01:38,280 But I'll come back to this point a bit later, 16 00:01:41,570 --> 00:01:47,580 but basically these parallels and analogies that form the the premise of the Endeavour 17 00:01:47,580 --> 00:01:54,160 to apply peacemaking lessons to the Middle East from the knowledge of West Haven. 18 00:01:54,180 --> 00:02:02,730 Another reason, apart from these these parallels, I think, is the the remarkably ambitious nature of the Peace of Westphalia. 19 00:02:03,570 --> 00:02:12,149 It was convened as a universal Congress in order to achieve a universal peace between all Christian powers in Europe. 20 00:02:12,150 --> 00:02:20,400 At that time, it didn't quite achieve this war continue between France and Spain for another 11 years, 21 00:02:21,240 --> 00:02:31,890 but it did successfully solve a complex nexus of conflicts in Central Europe and the main theatre of the 30 Years War. 22 00:02:32,890 --> 00:02:38,250 Many of these complex were very deep rooted, which at times seemed insurmountable, 23 00:02:38,520 --> 00:02:44,280 perhaps as unsurmountable as the obstacles to general peace in the contemporary Middle East. 24 00:02:47,130 --> 00:02:52,590 For example, some of the negotiating parties never even recognised the status of their counterparts, 25 00:02:53,790 --> 00:02:59,669 yet peace was achieved, despite the fact that not all warring parties had reached a state of exhaustion, 26 00:02:59,670 --> 00:03:08,070 and despite the fact that it became clear during the negotiations that the hope for all encompassing peace would not be attained because two, 27 00:03:08,160 --> 00:03:10,110 that the parties continued fighting. 28 00:03:10,620 --> 00:03:18,510 And also, despite the fact that there was never even a cease fire in place during the entire duration of the negotiations, 29 00:03:18,930 --> 00:03:29,489 which lasted for about five years. And this ambitious character of the Peace Congress makes its destructive potential all the more valuable, 30 00:03:29,490 --> 00:03:32,520 especially in light of those similarities that I just mentioned. 31 00:03:33,840 --> 00:03:40,460 The success of Westphalia, derived from a recalibrated and optimised setup, 32 00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:49,140 which it established for the polity about which the war was was essentially fought the Holy Roman Empire. 33 00:03:49,830 --> 00:03:58,140 It was a negotiated compromise settlement which established a functioning power sharing arrangements between the Emperor and the princes, 34 00:03:58,800 --> 00:04:12,540 between the different confessional groups, and established a sort of a system of limited conditional rights of governmental rule within the Empire, 35 00:04:12,780 --> 00:04:18,450 while placing the whole settlement under a general guarantee, a mutual guarantee. 36 00:04:19,470 --> 00:04:22,570 Um, and also it crucially decoupled the, 37 00:04:22,570 --> 00:04:31,649 the Central European and the German or imperial problems relating to the Holy Roman Empire from ongoing geopolitical conflict elsewhere. 38 00:04:31,650 --> 00:04:41,220 So it set up the Holy Roman Empire as a shared space as opposed to a contested space which had been before. 39 00:04:42,990 --> 00:04:49,799 So what I'll do now is I'll tell you first a little bit about the the project that we've been running and its events before. 40 00:04:49,800 --> 00:04:59,910 Then giving you an outline of the conceptual work that we've been doing, which is mainly relates to this analogy that we're positing between the. 41 00:04:59,990 --> 00:05:10,729 30 year war on the Middle East today. And then I'll look at I'll explain to you some of this more explicitly prescriptive elements of the project, 42 00:05:10,730 --> 00:05:19,219 the sort of practical lessons that we're proposing, which we derive from what, failure and 30 years war. 43 00:05:19,220 --> 00:05:30,080 And I'd hoped to be seen as as a source of inspiration for a new regional peace settlement or even a new regional order in the Middle East. 44 00:05:32,660 --> 00:05:37,100 So the project, as I mentioned, was launched at the beginning of 2016. 45 00:05:37,670 --> 00:05:48,920 We wrote this inaugural article for The New Statesman, and I conducted a series of seminars in London and Cambridge over the course of that year. 46 00:05:48,920 --> 00:05:56,150 And then we wrote another article for Foreign Affairs, which summed up the results of those early seminars. 47 00:05:58,340 --> 00:06:05,060 We then teamed up with the Cover Foundation, which is a political think tank foundation based in Germany, 48 00:06:06,050 --> 00:06:14,090 and organised a series of a further series of workshops in late 2016 and very 2017, 49 00:06:14,630 --> 00:06:23,720 including this one here at with the then Foreign Minister of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, attended, who's now the president. 50 00:06:23,720 --> 00:06:26,990 You can see him on the top left corner. 51 00:06:26,990 --> 00:06:27,920 That was the White House. 52 00:06:28,280 --> 00:06:37,970 And incidentally, opposite him here, I think it's one of these guys was with him is Jamal Khashoggi, who was recently murdered, of course. 53 00:06:40,970 --> 00:06:51,860 And yes, so the foreign ministry has been another who was a collaborator and partner during the the the tenure of Steinmeier as foreign minister. 54 00:06:52,430 --> 00:06:59,280 And one of the things that he often would would explain during speeches was that this well, 55 00:06:59,640 --> 00:07:06,500 the German foreign ministry's involvement, at least in the project, derived from an explicit call from the region. 56 00:07:07,010 --> 00:07:17,600 He used to tell the story of attending a conference in Jeddah and being told by a young Saudi that what this region needs is its own westphalia. 57 00:07:18,980 --> 00:07:26,330 So the Germans sort of like to emphasise that in order to underline the fact that it's not some sort of external imposition, 58 00:07:26,330 --> 00:07:30,530 but rather a reaction to a call from the region itself. 59 00:07:32,360 --> 00:07:41,600 One of the workshops that we held took place in Amman, where the chief of the Jordanian court, as well, as well as the king's brother took place. 60 00:07:41,930 --> 00:07:52,340 That took part and it was also a small was fairly for the Middle East event on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference of 2017, 61 00:07:54,110 --> 00:08:00,230 where the panel included the UN Special Envoy for Syria and also the Secretary General for the Arab League. 62 00:08:02,000 --> 00:08:13,250 So most of these participants were politicians, diplomats, academics and journalists from across the Middle East, but also Europe and North America. 63 00:08:14,780 --> 00:08:20,480 It is as a result of these discussions that we wrote our book. 64 00:08:21,170 --> 00:08:25,370 This was not something that was sort of chiefly designed by us in February, 65 00:08:25,370 --> 00:08:29,600 but this is something that arose as a result of these workshop discussions. 66 00:08:31,040 --> 00:08:38,989 Looking ahead, what we want to do is to sort of continue the intellectual conceptual work with a new series of workshops, 67 00:08:38,990 --> 00:08:43,940 but also we want to try and enhance the practical application for the Middle East. 68 00:08:43,950 --> 00:08:53,929 We want to ideally see one or more states endorse the concept as an official foreign policy objective, 69 00:08:53,930 --> 00:08:59,810 which will then hopefully result in the sort of Congress that we that we envisage. 70 00:09:02,150 --> 00:09:13,400 So moving on to the the parallels and analogies which, as I mentioned, formed the sort of analytical starting point of the concept. 71 00:09:13,400 --> 00:09:16,580 In other words, this is why we believe these similarities. 72 00:09:16,580 --> 00:09:23,870 These these parallels are why it makes sense to look at the historical experience of the 30 73 00:09:23,870 --> 00:09:30,710 Years War in order to open up new avenues for policymaking towards or within the Middle East. 74 00:09:32,510 --> 00:09:43,490 Of course, we're aware of differences that exist over time and space, and the historical analogies are often very imprecise and rather abstract. 75 00:09:46,430 --> 00:09:56,990 But one of the biggest differences, perhaps, was that in Central Europe, the the the Piece of Westphalia was dealing with the Holy Roman Empire, 76 00:09:57,080 --> 00:10:09,230 which was a normative unity, which had an uncredited head and which had an order of peaceful legality that existed since the 15th century. 77 00:10:09,590 --> 00:10:15,430 And all Germans accepted in principle that this was an order that needed to be re-established. 78 00:10:16,180 --> 00:10:21,770 And this degree of normative cohesion and consensus is probably lacking in the Middle East, 79 00:10:22,430 --> 00:10:26,810 which makes the idea of having a westphalia for the Middle East more more challenging. 80 00:10:27,590 --> 00:10:34,999 But a lot of the participants noted that the Middle East should not really be seen as some sort of blank slate either, 81 00:10:35,000 --> 00:10:43,540 and that there are normative sort of unit, the unifying normative elements that can be drawn upon traditions such as, you know, 82 00:10:43,550 --> 00:10:48,300 of course, the factor of Islam, the awareness of being part of a post Ottoman space. 83 00:10:48,950 --> 00:10:59,419 And in a recent book, Malik Dashlane has argued that the key drivers of region of western Saudi Arabia might serve as some kind of internationalised, 84 00:10:59,420 --> 00:11:08,390 integrative space, which, he writes, might facilitate a reordering of the region according to Westphalian lines. 85 00:11:13,330 --> 00:11:20,820 So the analogy consists mainly of two areas. 86 00:11:20,830 --> 00:11:21,459 So first of all, 87 00:11:21,460 --> 00:11:30,280 we have structural parallels and then the role of religion as well as a few others that can't really be ordered into into either of those. 88 00:11:30,790 --> 00:11:32,800 So for us, for the structural parallels, 89 00:11:34,720 --> 00:11:45,370 one of the most striking similarities between now and then is that there was a concurrent or merging of multiple typologies of conflicts, 90 00:11:45,820 --> 00:11:51,610 and this has recently been argued in a new book by a political scientist have the perfect metaphor. 91 00:11:52,510 --> 00:11:58,450 So you have a combination of state and state laws, internal rebellions, civil wars, 92 00:11:58,450 --> 00:12:03,970 proxy wars, external interventions in civil wars, state building wars, 93 00:12:04,540 --> 00:12:07,450 struggles for greater political participation and freedom, 94 00:12:08,380 --> 00:12:16,270 religiously infused wars as well as geopolitical conflicts driven by a real political another similarity similarities. 95 00:12:16,270 --> 00:12:24,549 The complexity of these conflicts with numerous actors of varying statuses factions, state actors, non-state actors, 96 00:12:24,550 --> 00:12:30,760 substate factors, fighting asymmetrical power conflicts in a multi-polar international environment. 97 00:12:32,140 --> 00:12:42,250 So the classic state of the state wars of the 19th and 20th centuries saw centrally organised, unified states fighting each other. 98 00:12:42,370 --> 00:12:46,480 These are the conflicts that we're seeing now, especially in the Middle East and parts of Africa, 99 00:12:46,810 --> 00:12:52,090 are seemingly reverting to the earlier modes of the 17th century, 100 00:12:52,090 --> 00:12:56,799 whereby there is fighting for within states, 101 00:12:56,800 --> 00:13:02,500 for the religious and constitutional setup of those states that already we quote 102 00:13:02,500 --> 00:13:07,780 today be termed failed states fighting beginning with internal rebellions, 103 00:13:09,010 --> 00:13:18,579 struggles for greater political participation, which then escalates into civil wars, followed by proxy wars, 104 00:13:18,580 --> 00:13:26,020 followed by external interventions, which then draw in the regional powers and create a more widespread conflict. 105 00:13:26,860 --> 00:13:30,700 So this was the case with the unrest rebellions in the Hapsburg lands, 106 00:13:30,940 --> 00:13:40,150 which then turned into the 30 Years War as well as the Arab Spring rebellions, which then morphed into the wars that we're seeing today. 107 00:13:41,530 --> 00:13:47,030 Another parallel is the sort of the way in which these conflicts escalate. 108 00:13:47,530 --> 00:13:55,030 So it was the case in Bohemia, as well as in the Dutch rebellion, but also in Yemen, in Syria, 109 00:13:55,030 --> 00:14:04,240 that they they start with civil wars involving struggles for what is perceived as against tyrannical rule, 110 00:14:04,420 --> 00:14:12,340 which then draw in outside powers and as I mentioned, create these these bigger sort of escalations through intervention. 111 00:14:14,980 --> 00:14:18,309 And this has been the case in both cases. 112 00:14:18,310 --> 00:14:28,120 So you have a situation whereby X instability is exported while intervention is imported into these conflict zones and for these contested spaces. 113 00:14:28,900 --> 00:14:37,810 2015, of course, marked a major internationalisation of escalation with the Russian intervention in Syria and the Saudi intervention in Yemen. 114 00:14:40,390 --> 00:14:48,070 Both, in both cases, conflicts which were originally concerned with local matters then tended to fold into broader, 115 00:14:48,070 --> 00:14:59,620 overarching geopolitical rivalries and contacts between the great powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia today, perhaps both in France in the 17th century. 116 00:15:02,320 --> 00:15:09,370 One historian, Yohannes Boychuk, has described many of the early modern conflicts as state building wars. 117 00:15:09,640 --> 00:15:13,959 And I think the early stage of the 30 Years War is a good example, 118 00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:24,610 as it can be interpreted as a failed attempt by the Noble Estates of Bohemia to erect a new Protestant state free of of Hapsburg control. 119 00:15:26,440 --> 00:15:31,929 And similarly, the ISIS phenomenon in Syria and Iraq was not just an exercise in terrorism, 120 00:15:31,930 --> 00:15:39,700 but also in many ways a failed state building exercise, which was not very similar to that of the Bohemian states. 121 00:15:40,930 --> 00:15:47,200 In both cases, the the attempt at setting up a new state was defeated after about four years. 122 00:15:49,060 --> 00:15:54,190 But of course, there are differences and in a sense that ISIS is quite unique and unparalleled, 123 00:15:54,190 --> 00:16:04,030 even in comparison to the brutality of the 30 years war, in the sense that it elevated violence and murder as a sort of final symbolic goal. 124 00:16:06,280 --> 00:16:11,650 Another similarities alliance fluidity with rapidly shifting allegiances, for example. 125 00:16:11,720 --> 00:16:17,530 Olfaction during the first year will help to the process suppress the Bohemian rebellion at the beginning. 126 00:16:18,480 --> 00:16:21,380 Then, with the state in a state of armed neutrality, 127 00:16:21,390 --> 00:16:26,850 then fought together with Sweden against the Emperor before switching sides again and in the Middle East. 128 00:16:27,210 --> 00:16:36,340 There's a similar sort of profusion of shifting loyalties, and it's an assigned conflict, especially in Yemen and Syria. 129 00:16:36,360 --> 00:16:40,590 So the enemy of your enemy might very well still be your enemy. 130 00:16:41,400 --> 00:16:45,660 Another example is the absence of declarations of war. 131 00:16:46,440 --> 00:16:54,030 So the piece of what failure was actually a peace treaty among powers that had largely never declared war against each other. 132 00:16:54,780 --> 00:17:01,350 Apart from the French and the Spanish, that was the only conflict that was failed that they could not resolve. 133 00:17:02,190 --> 00:17:04,259 And the situation in the Middle East is, I think, 134 00:17:04,260 --> 00:17:10,650 quite similar in the sense that there's a high intensity of violence and conflicts without any declarations of war. 135 00:17:12,120 --> 00:17:18,120 So the second main parallel that I mentioned is the role of religion and sectarian animosity. 136 00:17:19,170 --> 00:17:21,630 Until about the 1970s, 137 00:17:22,470 --> 00:17:31,460 it was the general view that wars related to religion were a pre-modern thing of the past and no longer exists and no longer existed. 138 00:17:31,470 --> 00:17:33,420 But this has recently been rectified, 139 00:17:34,860 --> 00:17:44,250 and this is another area in which the nature of conflict has seemingly reverted to this pre-modern mode of the 16th and 17th century. 140 00:17:45,510 --> 00:17:56,339 In both cases, religion is apparently returned after a period of relative absence after the second half of the 16th century in Germany, 141 00:17:56,340 --> 00:18:04,800 where religious conflict was not as widespread as subsequently, and also in the Middle East around the turn of the millennium. 142 00:18:05,560 --> 00:18:14,310 This is perhaps related to a reduction of the unifying effect of shared hostility towards a common enemy. 143 00:18:14,880 --> 00:18:22,650 So in Germany, this was the Ottoman Turks after a long war in the 1590s. 144 00:18:24,090 --> 00:18:35,520 This sort of unifying effect fell away. And also in the Middle East is the hostility towards Israel is now much less central as it was before. 145 00:18:37,140 --> 00:18:51,990 Notwithstanding certain sort of temporary for us again, such as when the Americans accepted these the step of the Israeli capital for the first years, 146 00:18:51,990 --> 00:18:57,690 war, as has been argued by Peter Wilson so convincingly, 147 00:18:57,690 --> 00:19:04,080 was not really a simple religious war in the sense that there was no full confessional solidarity among the 148 00:19:04,470 --> 00:19:13,290 fighting parties and because of the centrality throughout the conflict in political and constitutional matters. 149 00:19:13,680 --> 00:19:16,800 But religion was undeniably an important element. 150 00:19:17,610 --> 00:19:22,050 So very crudely speaking, it was Protestants versus Catholics. 151 00:19:22,410 --> 00:19:27,570 While in the Middle East, conflict exists between sectarian animosity, between the Shias and the Sunnis. 152 00:19:28,380 --> 00:19:35,220 But in both cases, this animosity, which is not necessarily central to conflicts, 153 00:19:35,670 --> 00:19:43,920 is always instrumentalized by certain powers that that wish to see it instrumentalized in order to further their own geopolitical aims, 154 00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:52,440 and thereby it merges with other factors. But this then often runs out of control, goes out of control because it develops its own self dynamics. 155 00:19:54,090 --> 00:20:01,080 The great power rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, of course, does much more to sectarianism. 156 00:20:01,140 --> 00:20:06,450 Local conflicts, including conflicts that were not really sectarian to begin with, 157 00:20:06,450 --> 00:20:14,310 such as tribal conflicts in Yemen, and struggles for greater political freedom of participation in Syria. 158 00:20:15,270 --> 00:20:18,690 And this and it does more to confessionals, these conflicts, 159 00:20:18,690 --> 00:20:25,560 than the Franco Hapsburg rivalry did in Europe, because, of course, both of those powers were conflict. 160 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:32,790 But it still played a part in the 30 Years War, because this animosity existed at the level of the empire, 161 00:20:32,790 --> 00:20:38,040 where a civil war of the Holy War and within the Holy Roman Empire continued concurrently 162 00:20:38,040 --> 00:20:44,580 with a broader geopolitical contest of outside powers in a way that's similar to the, 163 00:20:44,750 --> 00:20:54,900 to the Middle East now. Um, and also as in the Middle East, in the Holy Roman Empire disputes which were largely political and concerned, 164 00:20:55,350 --> 00:21:05,370 competing corporate and political rights assumed a more debilitating sectarian dimension in the years preceding and during the 30 years war. 165 00:21:07,950 --> 00:21:11,570 So in addition to these two main groups of. 166 00:21:11,620 --> 00:21:23,560 Parallels. We've identified a number of other ones, such as the fact that in both cases, war have in some ways become self-sustaining, 167 00:21:24,580 --> 00:21:29,980 which has largely occurred logically through the influx of foreign funds into the war zone, 168 00:21:30,760 --> 00:21:41,140 which accounts for the longevity of conflicts, and also because there is a tendency of the water to somewhat feed off itself. 169 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:44,709 So in the 30 Years War that the Swedes, for example, 170 00:21:44,710 --> 00:21:52,600 were existentially dependent upon allowing their commanders and soldiers to continue occupying parts of Germany, 171 00:21:52,600 --> 00:21:58,270 to continue fighting because they needed to continue to live off the land in Germany, 172 00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:05,880 because the central authorities in Sweden could no longer afford to pay the arrears of the salaries. 173 00:22:05,890 --> 00:22:12,070 And so this incentivises the continuation of conflict whereby the continued conflict 174 00:22:12,070 --> 00:22:16,810 was actually less costly than pulling out without an indemnity being paid. 175 00:22:17,650 --> 00:22:24,760 And so many militias active in Syria are possibly disinclined to let to lay down their arms, but for similar reasons. 176 00:22:26,530 --> 00:22:32,380 Another important similarity the role of exiles in driving conflict. 177 00:22:33,130 --> 00:22:40,750 The those in both cases provide a cause around which to rally for the Bohemian and Hapsburg exiles in the 17th century, 178 00:22:41,860 --> 00:22:48,820 as well as the Syrian exiles now with the Yemeni government in exile, as well as Palestinian refugees and the right of return. 179 00:22:48,850 --> 00:22:54,009 This is something that keeps the cause alive and and continues to drive conflict. 180 00:22:54,010 --> 00:23:04,390 It also provides the intervening powers with agents who can facilitate the intervention that they wish to plan. 181 00:23:05,530 --> 00:23:09,850 Another example is the tenuous nature of civil military relations. 182 00:23:10,120 --> 00:23:18,519 In both cases, I think, for example, in with the coups or attempted coup in Egypt and Turkey as well as in the 30 Years War, 183 00:23:18,520 --> 00:23:22,450 the emperor's suspension of his top, Colonel Valentine, 184 00:23:23,710 --> 00:23:30,100 who was eventually killed because it was suspected that he would turn over the army to the enemy of the emperor, 185 00:23:30,790 --> 00:23:34,870 to the enemies of the emperor because of because he was dissatisfied with his treatment. 186 00:23:36,130 --> 00:23:42,100 Most similarity is the existence of hereditary monarchical dynasties in both cases. 187 00:23:43,060 --> 00:23:53,500 And a certain parallel, I think, can be seen between the importance of the Emperor as the head of the hierarchy in Germany and the 188 00:23:53,500 --> 00:23:59,170 analogous importance of the of the King of Saudi Arabia as the custodian of the two holy mosques, 189 00:24:00,460 --> 00:24:05,170 of the similarities or the role of refugee crises in both cases. 190 00:24:06,520 --> 00:24:11,020 And just the general fact, although this might be a kind of a structural parallel, 191 00:24:11,290 --> 00:24:18,489 that the region which is contested is so is considered to be so vital to outside 192 00:24:18,490 --> 00:24:25,380 powers as a result of the importance attached to the resources that exist. 193 00:24:25,570 --> 00:24:30,280 For example, the the soldier trade, the manpower reserves of Central Europe, 194 00:24:31,900 --> 00:24:36,610 the oil reserves of the Middle East, and the implication being that the Middle East now, 195 00:24:36,610 --> 00:24:43,330 just as Germany then, cannot really be ignored by outside powers, and that if there is conflict, they will want to get involved. 196 00:24:45,520 --> 00:24:50,080 We also talked about a number of atmospheric parallels. 197 00:24:51,490 --> 00:24:58,900 In both cases, there's rapid population growth in mainly agrarian societies, but also in cities. 198 00:24:59,710 --> 00:25:03,580 And there is there is even a parallel in terms of climate change. 199 00:25:03,820 --> 00:25:12,880 There was a small ice age around the decades, around 1570, which resulted in a lowered agricultural output and later of hunger crises, 200 00:25:13,270 --> 00:25:19,270 and also a general sort of sense of economic and social malaise and divisions, 201 00:25:19,690 --> 00:25:26,710 which manifested itself in, for example, witchcraft, persecutions and pogroms. 202 00:25:29,740 --> 00:25:37,150 So those were the sort of general parallels that we identified over the course of our project. 203 00:25:40,030 --> 00:25:43,239 And those analogies in many ways lead to the application part. 204 00:25:43,240 --> 00:25:54,730 And in other words, how can this how can the knowledge of these parallels help us to find possible solutions towards peace in the Middle East? 205 00:25:55,870 --> 00:26:01,329 And one thing that we always have to stress over the course of the project is that 206 00:26:01,330 --> 00:26:06,910 this is not supposed to be some kind of blueprint that's imposed from outside. 207 00:26:07,270 --> 00:26:14,739 And also that we have not simply made up these these lessons, but that these have, I mean, in terms of the authors of the book. 208 00:26:14,740 --> 00:26:19,630 But these have been these have all been discussed by people in the workshop and the workshops that we've held. 209 00:26:20,620 --> 00:26:24,489 So we've identified two main kinds of lessons. 210 00:26:24,490 --> 00:26:29,260 Firstly, peacemaking tools, in other words, diplomatic techniques, 211 00:26:30,130 --> 00:26:43,180 methods of negotiation and mediation which facilitate and help produce an eventual peace treaty, whatever the terms might be. 212 00:26:44,050 --> 00:26:50,470 And this also includes, crucially, methods of securing the success and longevity of the peace once it is achieved. 213 00:26:51,280 --> 00:26:56,769 So those are the main sort of lessons that we derived and did not really contain 214 00:26:56,770 --> 00:27:02,680 any normative confidence about what sort of treaty content should exist. 215 00:27:03,730 --> 00:27:13,270 But we did also consider the fact of peace terms, which were, you know, the treaty terms themselves. 216 00:27:14,980 --> 00:27:20,799 Of course, they're not as useful in terms of lessons because it doesn't it's not as helpful or viable to 217 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:28,450 simply transfer creative treaty content wholesale from a different epoch and a different region. 218 00:27:28,960 --> 00:27:38,950 But given those basic similarities, there are some basic sort of lessons that can be useful simply because they're are potentially transferable. 219 00:27:41,780 --> 00:27:53,480 So turning to those lessons, the as I mentioned, the most important ones were the diplomatic techniques and peacemaking mechanisms. 220 00:27:55,190 --> 00:28:00,580 One of the striking features of the piece, The West failure, was, as I mentioned, 221 00:28:00,590 --> 00:28:06,620 it's a sort of ambitious nature, but also its innovative character in many areas of international law. 222 00:28:08,360 --> 00:28:19,400 While these features were innovative, then of course would no longer be innovative now they still could potentially be applied 223 00:28:19,700 --> 00:28:27,139 with profit because because of the similarities that I mentioned and the innovative nature, 224 00:28:27,140 --> 00:28:33,920 it was essentially the fact that a multi-lateral Congress was convening for the first 225 00:28:33,920 --> 00:28:41,300 time ever in history and that it aimed to simultaneously solve all conflicts at once. 226 00:28:43,370 --> 00:28:47,809 Another sort of innovation was the fact that it was convened at two different 227 00:28:47,810 --> 00:28:54,560 locations in order to mitigate against confessional and precedent disputes. 228 00:28:55,430 --> 00:28:59,750 And also the mutual guarantee was also an innovation in the law of nations. 229 00:29:01,730 --> 00:29:10,970 So one overarching lesson from this innovative nature was that is that it is very important simply to be 230 00:29:11,390 --> 00:29:19,760 willing to adopt and discover innovative means of diplomacy in pursuance of peace and more generally. 231 00:29:21,500 --> 00:29:28,579 In addition to that general point, more specifically, the experience shows, given the interlocked nature of these of these conflicts, 232 00:29:28,580 --> 00:29:35,240 both during the 30 Years War and now basically the lesson was that the complexity, 233 00:29:36,080 --> 00:29:44,990 the interlocked nature, the multilayered aspects of these conflicts meant that solving individual parts of them, 234 00:29:45,530 --> 00:29:50,359 individual parts of them by themselves, would fail. So during the 30th war, 235 00:29:50,360 --> 00:29:54,649 there was an attempt to bring about peace only among the Catholic powers that 236 00:29:54,650 --> 00:29:58,729 were fighting each other France and the Habsburgs for the Congress in Cologne. 237 00:29:58,730 --> 00:30:04,340 But this didn't work because it didn't take into account the idea of the imperial civil war aspect 238 00:30:04,340 --> 00:30:11,450 with which it was tied into or a settlement based only on the Civil War itself in Germany. 239 00:30:12,170 --> 00:30:20,209 So there was a preliminary peace in Prague in 1635 whereby all of the actors within Germany, 240 00:30:20,210 --> 00:30:24,290 within the Civil War managed to achieve a peace that was acceptable for all of them and 241 00:30:24,290 --> 00:30:29,390 would have been sufficient had it not already escalated into an international war. 242 00:30:29,540 --> 00:30:33,739 But the international intervening powers were would be satisfied by the settlement. 243 00:30:33,740 --> 00:30:36,950 And so their intervention continued and the war could not be ended. 244 00:30:37,910 --> 00:30:44,569 So one of the chief lessons is that, as was the case in the 17th century, probably now, 245 00:30:44,570 --> 00:30:51,950 the range of conflicts and grievances in the Middle East is simply too complex and interwoven to be successfully 246 00:30:51,950 --> 00:31:01,190 solved with piecemeal negotiations aimed at addressing individual territorial parts of the broader regional crisis. 247 00:31:02,300 --> 00:31:10,010 So while it might be useful to start negotiations on Syria in the context of separate formats such as the Astana and Geneva format, 248 00:31:10,310 --> 00:31:15,320 they should in the end merge with a comprehensive peace Congress. 249 00:31:16,790 --> 00:31:22,730 Otherwise, it would not be possible to satisfy multiple other involved state and non-state actors. 250 00:31:24,680 --> 00:31:32,959 An inclusive peace Congress that draws in all powers is therefore essential because it 251 00:31:32,960 --> 00:31:39,410 can help to negotiate a new security order for the region under international guarantee, 252 00:31:39,410 --> 00:31:43,070 which is exactly what happened, but was failure after five years of negotiation. 253 00:31:44,090 --> 00:31:52,069 And so what we discussed is that it should be as inclusive as possible, as all inclusive as possible. 254 00:31:52,070 --> 00:32:04,700 That's one of the main lessons as well. Although certain completely irreconcilable or unpalatable actors could potentially be excluded, 255 00:32:05,240 --> 00:32:13,819 although this wouldn't be ideal and this was the case with failure with the Hapsburg rebels 256 00:32:13,820 --> 00:32:19,160 within the hereditary lands and could possibly be the case with the Islamic State now. 257 00:32:19,370 --> 00:32:24,190 And what makes that more possible or more acceptable, from a practical point of view, 258 00:32:24,200 --> 00:32:34,490 is if those unpalatable groups have already been eliminated for the power factors, otherwise they'd need to be engaged. 259 00:32:36,680 --> 00:32:40,850 So the French had wanted a universal Congress to achieve a universal peace. 260 00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:49,940 But rather than a particular instead of a sort of a particular settlement just for Germany, which had been attempted and failed. 261 00:32:51,500 --> 00:32:58,100 But what resulted in the end was was neither a universal peace nor just a settlement for the Civil War, 262 00:32:58,370 --> 00:33:01,940 but was a sort of an intermediary Westphalian solution. 263 00:33:04,850 --> 00:33:08,959 And so one could also aim for a similarly neutralised Middle East, 264 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:18,020 which has taken out of ongoing great power competition, while international rivalry, of course, continues elsewhere. 265 00:33:18,440 --> 00:33:26,240 And this is precisely what happened with with Central Europe. The whole Roman Empire became a Fed space, was no longer a war zone for a while. 266 00:33:26,270 --> 00:33:33,080 Whereas the 30 Years War or one element of the third will continue elsewhere in Western Europe between France and Spain. 267 00:33:35,300 --> 00:33:42,950 So another parallel I think that leads to a further lesson is the more or less 268 00:33:42,950 --> 00:33:49,040 justified security fears about the opponent's suspected hegemonic goals. 269 00:33:49,940 --> 00:33:55,610 There's this fear that the other side would exploit one's own weakness in order to establish regional dominance. 270 00:33:56,090 --> 00:33:58,130 What was the birth of a monarchy then? 271 00:33:59,510 --> 00:34:07,130 Was just as important between France and the Habsburgs in the 17th century as it is between Iran and Saudi Arabia now. 272 00:34:09,110 --> 00:34:14,360 And this the lesson is that it requires more effective perception management. 273 00:34:16,160 --> 00:34:22,910 And this is important because changing hostile assumptions might be more difficult than actually changing facts on the ground. 274 00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:27,620 So for a mutually acceptable regional settlement to be reached, 275 00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:35,510 the negotiating parties need to openly and transparently set out their core security interests at the outset, 276 00:34:36,050 --> 00:34:42,590 tied in to what each side considers to be its legitimate zones of influence. 277 00:34:44,150 --> 00:34:47,930 So if we consider what these might be for the states and the region, 278 00:34:49,910 --> 00:34:59,990 what's probably less important than actual territorial expansion is the maintenance of one's own perceived zones of informal influence. 279 00:35:00,740 --> 00:35:05,840 So Turkey has a special interest in preventing the emergence of a Kurdish state. 280 00:35:06,350 --> 00:35:17,900 For Saudi Arabia, it is important to limit Iran's influence and to maintain effective leadership of the PCC. 281 00:35:18,660 --> 00:35:27,260 And Iran, in turn, seeks to defend its critical interests by continuing to support to assert its influence in key countries, 282 00:35:27,740 --> 00:35:32,030 primarily Syria and Lebanon. So in the Middle East, 283 00:35:32,360 --> 00:35:40,429 there's this widespread lack of trust on the part of the main regional adversaries 284 00:35:40,430 --> 00:35:46,410 mirrors the lack of trust that existed in Europe at the outset of the negotiations. 285 00:35:46,460 --> 00:35:52,190 Even so, there was actually little or no mutual trust at the beginning of the Westphalian Congress. 286 00:35:53,150 --> 00:35:59,300 But it was the major powers signalling the beginning of their willingness to place the whole settlement 287 00:35:59,840 --> 00:36:06,080 on the guarantee that encouraged a degree of confidence in the viability of the negotiations. 288 00:36:07,570 --> 00:36:17,000 So and following the conclusion of the peace, it took about two generations or so for trust to be re-established between Catholics and Protestants. 289 00:36:17,600 --> 00:36:23,840 And this was largely fostered through simply living under peaceful coexistence. 290 00:36:25,340 --> 00:36:32,600 And so this is also an important lesson, I think, that the absence of trust should not prevent negotiations from getting started in the first place. 291 00:36:33,560 --> 00:36:39,730 The peace process itself has to generate trust as opposed to vice versa. 292 00:36:42,830 --> 00:36:52,819 And the experience of this failure also demonstrates that the results can be achieved through the exploring 293 00:36:52,820 --> 00:36:59,270 of unknown diplomatic terrain and the willingness of parties to be daring in their choice of interlocutors. 294 00:37:00,290 --> 00:37:06,050 So during their failure, the informal modes of communication are often as important as formal ones. 295 00:37:08,270 --> 00:37:16,280 Over the years that the diplomats were essentially locked away among themselves in order to thrash out a peace, 296 00:37:16,280 --> 00:37:23,000 they started to develop a shared kind of sense of identity and a community of faith which 297 00:37:23,240 --> 00:37:30,920 enhanced the desire to make progress and to sort of push their masters towards an accommodation. 298 00:37:33,380 --> 00:37:39,020 This was related to the fact that these were often high aristocrats who were living in much less comfortable 299 00:37:39,650 --> 00:37:44,690 conditions than they were used to and were not allowed to leave until they came to the peace settlement, 300 00:37:44,690 --> 00:37:50,420 which in the end, five years. And so perhaps something similar could be tried for the Middle East. 301 00:37:50,930 --> 00:37:57,200 Negotiators could simply stay at one Congress location until they thrashed out a settlement. 302 00:37:58,250 --> 00:38:08,600 Even if this takes years and so even if there is no kind of end state which which one aspires to, 303 00:38:08,630 --> 00:38:13,010 negotiations could still stop because this is what occurred at West failure. 304 00:38:13,010 --> 00:38:16,040 It was not clear what the end state was supposed to be. 305 00:38:16,850 --> 00:38:20,220 They didn't share a clear vision of the kind of peace that they wanted. 306 00:38:20,240 --> 00:38:24,170 They just knew that they wanted to achieve a peace. 307 00:38:26,980 --> 00:38:36,580 So I'm another lesson is that flexibility was important and that mediation, for example, need not be neutral. 308 00:38:37,300 --> 00:38:44,050 One of the lessons was that the mediator that was allied to one of the negotiating parties was actually much 309 00:38:44,050 --> 00:38:50,110 more effective at applying pressure onto its ally in order to come to an accommodation than a neutral mediator. 310 00:38:50,110 --> 00:38:54,070 Despite this being something that was completely unprecedented at this time. 311 00:38:55,780 --> 00:39:01,060 Contrary to what is often believed was failure was not really a peace of exhaustion. 312 00:39:02,860 --> 00:39:07,239 Some of the smaller actors within the German empire were exhausted. 313 00:39:07,240 --> 00:39:15,160 That's true. But the larger powers could have continued fighting for a long time and in some cases actually did in the west front of the ten years. 314 00:39:15,940 --> 00:39:22,780 So the situation in the Middle East is perhaps similar to the states in the Middle East have reached a state of exhaustion, 315 00:39:23,140 --> 00:39:31,990 but conflict could continue almost perpetually with a potentially endless inflow of Marshall Resources from outside. 316 00:39:32,410 --> 00:39:40,990 And so the lesson to be drawn is that diplomacy works and the steps towards a universal settlement should be undertaken sooner rather than later, 317 00:39:41,710 --> 00:39:49,150 even if there's not yet a kind of catalogue of principles upon which everyone can agree on. 318 00:39:49,150 --> 00:39:53,889 Another lesson is that although a cease fire is desirable, 319 00:39:53,890 --> 00:40:03,270 it should not necessarily be seen as a major stumbling block in the way of commencement of negotiations if the war continues during negotiations. 320 00:40:03,280 --> 00:40:07,660 So throughout the whole Congress of what failure the fighting continued throughout. 321 00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:22,640 Another lesson is the phenomenon of the so-called third party, which in Westphalia was a grouping of weaker states of smaller German princes, 322 00:40:23,240 --> 00:40:27,200 who, when it became clear that the Congress was about to fall apart. 323 00:40:27,680 --> 00:40:33,560 Because it became clear that the French and the Spanish would not be able to reach an accommodation. 324 00:40:33,950 --> 00:40:38,600 And when it became clear that the Emperor was about to recall his main ambassador, 325 00:40:39,350 --> 00:40:47,600 these smaller groupings sort of unified in a cross confessional manner because it was them that were most at risk of continue fighting, 326 00:40:47,600 --> 00:40:55,159 because they had reached a state of exhaustion. They set themselves up as this sort of group that was willing to compromise, 327 00:40:55,160 --> 00:40:59,900 whereas before many of them had been hardliners and essentially forced their larger 328 00:41:00,560 --> 00:41:05,390 partners back to the negotiating table in order to drive the peace process forward, 329 00:41:06,080 --> 00:41:09,800 which which worked in the act, which was quite remarkable. 330 00:41:10,580 --> 00:41:17,420 And during the workshops we talked about the possible equivalent of a third party and a middle Eastern peace. 331 00:41:17,420 --> 00:41:22,760 And there was some talk about the EU, possibly EU states possibly taking off such a role. 332 00:41:23,090 --> 00:41:31,460 But in the end, it became clear that it would have to be the Middle Eastern actors themselves because they are most at risk of continued conflict. 333 00:41:32,960 --> 00:41:40,940 So perhaps the most crucial aspect of the piece was, as I mentioned at the beginning, its mutual guarantee. 334 00:41:42,140 --> 00:41:52,700 And this was the provision that all terms of the Peace of Westphalia, even those which did not affect individual actors, 335 00:41:53,060 --> 00:42:01,250 would have to be guaranteed mutually by every signatory, by armed force, if necessary. 336 00:42:01,760 --> 00:42:07,669 And so this amounted essentially to a collective security system for Central Europe, 337 00:42:07,670 --> 00:42:11,060 not for the whole of Europe, but only for the Central European space. 338 00:42:13,700 --> 00:42:18,680 And this contributed to the successful conclusion of the peace in 1648. 339 00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:28,339 But it was also crucial in maintaining the peace in the longer term and securing it because it was an effective deterrent against obvious 340 00:42:28,340 --> 00:42:36,290 breaches of the peace afterwards and against the clear and authentic deterrent against clear violations of rights that were enshrined. 341 00:42:39,470 --> 00:42:47,510 And it was effective precisely because the guarantors themselves had a geopolitical self-interest in ensuring that the terms were upheld. 342 00:42:49,100 --> 00:42:52,639 And so for a settlement in the Middle East or so it was agreed, 343 00:42:52,640 --> 00:43:01,790 or this was the sort of main consensus in the workshops that local and regional actors need to themselves sort out their own peace settlement, 344 00:43:01,790 --> 00:43:04,849 guarantee themselves, and then drawing outside powers to guarantee it. 345 00:43:04,850 --> 00:43:11,540 And those outside houses would also, of course, have to sign off on the final content of the treaty terms. 346 00:43:14,630 --> 00:43:19,310 They would sort of be tasked with negotiate with with securing the peace, 347 00:43:19,310 --> 00:43:24,380 especially in the light in light of the anticipated continued existence of numerous militias, 348 00:43:25,100 --> 00:43:33,740 insuring the integrity of existing borders, providing assistance for the rebuilding of more inclusive regimes and the protection of minorities. 349 00:43:37,370 --> 00:43:46,849 So, yes, the regional actors would determine their own peace terms. International powers would then guarantee and it is also it was often discussed 350 00:43:46,850 --> 00:43:53,179 why outside powers would have this would be willing to sign up to this duty, 351 00:43:53,180 --> 00:44:03,739 this potential burden. And the Westphalian example shows that countries like France and Sweden were 352 00:44:03,740 --> 00:44:07,220 also aware of the critical importance of the Holy Roman Empire and would so, 353 00:44:07,550 --> 00:44:15,020 so were willing to intervene if necessary, because it furthered their own self-interest. 354 00:44:15,380 --> 00:44:20,330 And the US has actually already proposed and in a limited capacity to be a guarantor. 355 00:44:20,330 --> 00:44:29,600 So they've already thought through this language. On two occasions in 2015 for the Russia UFC Ceasefire Focus negotiations in Geneva and 356 00:44:29,600 --> 00:44:37,220 also for the 2017 to 18 attempts to set up a rough U.S. thought and trilateral guarantee. 357 00:44:39,230 --> 00:44:43,730 And these terms are obviously the most controversial atmosphere because they entailed 358 00:44:44,510 --> 00:44:52,370 a right of intervention by on the part of the guarantees and part of the guarantors. 359 00:44:52,790 --> 00:44:57,290 So this is something that's is often discussed quite controversially. 360 00:44:58,370 --> 00:45:01,999 I don't really have much time to talk about the sort of treaty content itself, 361 00:45:02,000 --> 00:45:08,720 but I'll sort of quickly summarise it one of the factors that made Westphalia so successful. 362 00:45:08,810 --> 00:45:16,520 Was that it sort of introduced a shared form of sort of a limited form of toleration within the Holy Roman Empire. 363 00:45:16,520 --> 00:45:19,700 And something similar would have to be established for the Middle East. 364 00:45:19,700 --> 00:45:25,939 It would have to not only ensure that there's a harmonisation of interests between states, 365 00:45:25,940 --> 00:45:30,710 but also within states, the rights within states and behaviour within states, 366 00:45:31,340 --> 00:45:39,260 behaviour by governments towards that their people would have to be governed by a certain catalogue of 367 00:45:39,260 --> 00:45:44,989 norms or certain certain rights which would need to be enshrined and also placed under this guarantee, 368 00:45:44,990 --> 00:45:50,809 because as we've seen in Syria and other places, but also in the 30 Years War, 369 00:45:50,810 --> 00:45:56,780 it's internal unrest which results from the mistreatment of people of subject populations, 370 00:45:56,780 --> 00:46:01,040 which results in civil war, which would inevitably cause regional instability. 371 00:46:01,040 --> 00:46:09,470 So that would also need to be drawn into an international treaty conditions within states as well as governing relations between them. 372 00:46:10,460 --> 00:46:10,820 Thank you.