1 00:00:00,780 --> 00:00:09,000 Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for coming the savings, the 2020 annual lecture for CCW, 2 00:00:09,000 --> 00:00:16,470 the changing control centre for those who don't know CCW has been existence since the very end of 2003, 3 00:00:16,470 --> 00:00:24,420 bringing together scholars with practitioners both military and political and obviously as tight suggests. 4 00:00:24,420 --> 00:00:30,570 We've been studying this what's changing in the character of armed conflicts? 5 00:00:30,570 --> 00:00:36,300 And if you think back to just sort of the 1990s, the late 1990s, the big concern was about peace, 6 00:00:36,300 --> 00:00:41,520 enforcement of stabilisation, but it shifted very dramatically. 7 00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:48,030 Shortly before, CCW stood up as an organisation with the dramatic events of nine 11, 8 00:00:48,030 --> 00:00:54,450 and our focus was on terrorism, of course, from then through the early 2000s. 9 00:00:54,450 --> 00:01:01,620 The big focus then was on insurgency in the United States, stabilisation but against insurgency, particularly the Middle East. 10 00:01:01,620 --> 00:01:06,090 And now we find ourselves discussing much more often hostile state actors. 11 00:01:06,090 --> 00:01:16,950 So you don't change alone. Just a broad handful shows you just how busy we've been, and our focus isn't just on these dramatic geopolitical shifts. 12 00:01:16,950 --> 00:01:24,720 It's also about the human condition, how ethically we respond to this problem of armed conflicts. 13 00:01:24,720 --> 00:01:29,490 And it's been about some of the new technologies that have arrived that have made things very disruptive. 14 00:01:29,490 --> 00:01:32,850 Just recently, we're all pretty concerned at the moment by artificial intelligence, 15 00:01:32,850 --> 00:01:37,470 for example, what difference that's going to make to the future of armed conflict. 16 00:01:37,470 --> 00:01:46,020 And we shouldn't ignore the fact that even outer space is not part of our concern around the world. 17 00:01:46,020 --> 00:01:50,130 But certainly since CCW was formed, 18 00:01:50,130 --> 00:01:54,930 we've been very fortunate to have an annual lecture where we have asked someone who is 19 00:01:54,930 --> 00:02:02,100 prominent in academic or in public life to come and share their reflections on war, 20 00:02:02,100 --> 00:02:11,700 on strategy and perhaps in statecraft, and gives me great pleasure this evening to introduce you to our annual lecturer of Twenty Twenty One. 21 00:02:11,700 --> 00:02:18,250 Peter Wilkins is currently the associate fellow for Chatham House and has been there since June 2019. 22 00:02:18,250 --> 00:02:27,870 But he's had a very distinguished career. He was from 2014 to 2018, the director general in the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 23 00:02:27,870 --> 00:02:36,720 responsible for strategic defence policy, including multilateral and bilateral relationships. 24 00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:43,380 And obviously, Naito was part of that. He was responsible for Britain's nuclear debate. 25 00:02:43,380 --> 00:02:51,570 If you like cyber, of course, Nigeria's emerging space and indeed the prosperity agenda, as it was known, 26 00:02:51,570 --> 00:02:57,550 that post I should point out, you know, it's known as director general strategy and international something. 27 00:02:57,550 --> 00:03:02,310 We're not going to have space agency to that as well as another thing to think about. 28 00:03:02,310 --> 00:03:06,870 Previously, he served as director general of the Defence Academy down the road. 29 00:03:06,870 --> 00:03:12,360 From here, the director of operational policy, the director response from the United Kingdom, 30 00:03:12,360 --> 00:03:20,210 share of the Typhoon Combat Aircraft Programme and as defence counsel to the UK Embassy in Berlin. 31 00:03:20,210 --> 00:03:26,670 I was wondering my way this evening whether you were upholding that great British tradition of keeping the Russians out, 32 00:03:26,670 --> 00:03:34,230 the Americans and the Germans somewhere else. He's obviously a frequent participant in debates on defence and security. 33 00:03:34,230 --> 00:03:45,600 Not just the chancellor has, of course, but elsewhere. And he was awarded CBE in 2019 and CBE before that in 2004 for services to defence. 34 00:03:45,600 --> 00:03:48,210 He's got an email from Cambridge. 35 00:03:48,210 --> 00:03:55,650 He was an undergraduate at Peterson, and I should also point out he's had experience in lecturing at the associate courts level, 36 00:03:55,650 --> 00:04:02,700 rather at the Noto Defence College, which we're very fond of here and in 2006 was a fellow of the Weatherhead Centre in Harvard, 37 00:04:02,700 --> 00:04:06,480 another connexion that we have as well in international affairs. 38 00:04:06,480 --> 00:04:16,520 Peter, thank you very much indeed for being on. Annual lecture 2021. Thank you. 39 00:04:16,520 --> 00:04:27,830 Thank you very much for those kind words. I suppose if I were so happy my American colleagues, I'd call you Director Johnson anyway. 40 00:04:27,830 --> 00:04:34,130 OK, I'll go straight into it and then we'll have some discussion afterwards. 41 00:04:34,130 --> 00:04:38,890 I'm sorry, Master Dr. Johnson Distinguished learnt guests. 42 00:04:38,890 --> 00:04:48,980 And ladies and gentlemen, it's an honour to have been invited to give this year's changing character of war and your lecture. 43 00:04:48,980 --> 00:04:54,590 My only qualification for this podium is sort of what Rob's been saying, 44 00:04:54,590 --> 00:05:02,000 which is that I was a senior official in the UK Ministry of Defence for quite a long time. 45 00:05:02,000 --> 00:05:13,040 I joined in 1980, so and I left in 2018, so this centre was founded just over halfway through my stint. 46 00:05:13,040 --> 00:05:19,940 But during that period, I worked mainly on policy strategy, acquisition and resource management. 47 00:05:19,940 --> 00:05:25,790 And as Rob said, from 2011 to 2014, I ran the defence academy, 48 00:05:25,790 --> 00:05:35,120 serving about 20 miles away from here and we had a good relationship with the Centre and with Oxford University more widely. 49 00:05:35,120 --> 00:05:43,550 And I now have other roles and affiliations. You alluded to one of them, which is a board member of the steering board, member of the space agency. 50 00:05:43,550 --> 00:05:49,550 And obviously, whatever I say, I say in a strictly personal capacity. 51 00:05:49,550 --> 00:05:56,330 So I was asked this evening to reflect upon past defence reviews and how they might 52 00:05:56,330 --> 00:06:03,050 help us better understand the current direction of UK foreign and security policy, 53 00:06:03,050 --> 00:06:09,500 hence the title UK defence policy reviews and redirections. 54 00:06:09,500 --> 00:06:15,080 As I said, I was with the Minister Defence from 1980 to 2018, 55 00:06:15,080 --> 00:06:22,220 and during that period there were five sort of set piece reviews as generally understood. 56 00:06:22,220 --> 00:06:29,540 So in nineteen eighty one 1990, 97, 98, 2010 and 2015, 57 00:06:29,540 --> 00:06:39,230 and I brought the first and I'm not quite the last to start the 1991 review and this one was the 2010 review. 58 00:06:39,230 --> 00:06:47,870 The obvious, I'm afraid I only have one soft copy. I'm sort of gradually becoming less attached to paper as we all are. 59 00:06:47,870 --> 00:06:52,850 So the last two reviews, the 2010 one and the 2015 review were obviously broader in scope. 60 00:06:52,850 --> 00:07:00,350 They were strategic defence and security reviews, but defence was at the core of both of them. 61 00:07:00,350 --> 00:07:09,980 And since then, of course, there's been the integrated review of 2020 21, which was given advance billing by the current defence secretary as quote, 62 00:07:09,980 --> 00:07:19,580 the deepest and most radical unquote review of UK foreign security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War. 63 00:07:19,580 --> 00:07:23,900 So as an official, I had limited involvement with the 1981 review. 64 00:07:23,900 --> 00:07:31,040 I was a very junior official, then often known as Command two eight eight quite unusual letters, 65 00:07:31,040 --> 00:07:36,680 pretty much the only document which is still known generally by its command paper. 66 00:07:36,680 --> 00:07:44,150 No. I have some involvement in the 1990 review, which was named as options for Change. 67 00:07:44,150 --> 00:07:50,990 More with the 1997 98 Strategic Defence Review and the 2010 review, 68 00:07:50,990 --> 00:07:59,960 and I was the director general responsible for the defence element of the 2015 review and as an ex official, 69 00:07:59,960 --> 00:08:06,260 I tracked the Integrated Review pretty closely and have written some short commentary pieces on it, 70 00:08:06,260 --> 00:08:12,110 including some analysis that I undertook with two former colleagues, John McCain, 71 00:08:12,110 --> 00:08:17,900 and will dress it on which I will draw for part of this presentation this evening. 72 00:08:17,900 --> 00:08:23,180 I am conscious that this is pretty well-trodden ground, so in my remarks today, 73 00:08:23,180 --> 00:08:30,800 I'll not consider reviews of their wider context earlier than the period in which I served at the Ministry of Defence. 74 00:08:30,800 --> 00:08:35,210 Now you might think that's a bit self-indulgent, but actually listen to what Rob said. 75 00:08:35,210 --> 00:08:43,760 I don't feel it's quite so self-indulgent because although my being in the Ministry of Defence for those 38, 76 00:08:43,760 --> 00:08:48,500 that particular thirty eight years was just an accident of my personal history. 77 00:08:48,500 --> 00:08:53,960 One could argue that it was a period that saw some pretty transformational change, 78 00:08:53,960 --> 00:09:00,920 so geopolitically shifting from one of the coldest periods of spells of the Cold War. 79 00:09:00,920 --> 00:09:09,410 Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, through the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the apparent triumph of the West, 80 00:09:09,410 --> 00:09:13,110 then through a period of large scale stabilisation operations of. 81 00:09:13,110 --> 00:09:22,590 Rob alluded to and then to the re-emergence of state on state of great power competition in the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic areas. 82 00:09:22,590 --> 00:09:31,980 And then technologically, with huge advances in military and commercial electronics, the arrival of the internet and so on. 83 00:09:31,980 --> 00:09:34,800 And then institutionally, with the British governments, 84 00:09:34,800 --> 00:09:44,550 at least under prime ministers of both main parties striving to be more businesslike with working practises transformed by mobile phones, 85 00:09:44,550 --> 00:09:55,530 email and the 24 hour news cycle. When I started in the Ministry of Defence in 1980, there was no such thing as email or mobile phones. 86 00:09:55,530 --> 00:10:07,360 If you wrote a paper, you wrote it out in longhand on a full full set know not even a full, and it was posted to an office in Glasgow to be typed up. 87 00:10:07,360 --> 00:10:13,140 So I suppose it was quite a long time, but it's a huge change in working practises, 88 00:10:13,140 --> 00:10:19,320 and the period began with events that were harbingers of the end of the old order. 89 00:10:19,320 --> 00:10:27,750 So the death of Tito and the condensed agreement in 1990 and ended with developments that precedes the new set of challenges. 90 00:10:27,750 --> 00:10:35,730 An increasingly confident China. An increasingly distracted United States and accelerating climate change. 91 00:10:35,730 --> 00:10:41,290 So following those introductory points, I'll structure my remarks this evening into roughly four parts. 92 00:10:41,290 --> 00:10:48,930 I realise I'm breaking the rule very much it those two things in three parts, but I'm not French, so I've got nothing against. 93 00:10:48,930 --> 00:10:55,440 But I'll outline the review's pulling out their continuing features and patterns. 94 00:10:55,440 --> 00:11:01,230 Then I'll sketch out the wider context of the UK defence policy during those years and offer some thoughts 95 00:11:01,230 --> 00:11:08,790 on the recent integrated review and asked whether and to what extent it breaks with the mould of the past. 96 00:11:08,790 --> 00:11:17,940 And finally, all of us have thoughts on future challenges. So first of all, the reviews I've listed, the five that took place, 97 00:11:17,940 --> 00:11:25,830 they have all to a greater or lesser extent contained the following elements a risk and threat assessment, 98 00:11:25,830 --> 00:11:33,360 namely, what are the main risks and threats facing the UK and where do they come from a policy baseline? 99 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:37,470 What is the best general policy response to those risks and threats? 100 00:11:37,470 --> 00:11:45,060 And what specific national security and defence policies and planning priorities should be pursued? 101 00:11:45,060 --> 00:11:49,050 An analysis of capability and force structure requirements. 102 00:11:49,050 --> 00:11:56,220 What new capabilities are required to meet the threats and or changes in the balance of those capabilities? 103 00:11:56,220 --> 00:12:06,360 In practical terms, how many ships, tanks, aircraft, etc. and how many personnel, military and civilian are needed a financial settlement? 104 00:12:06,360 --> 00:12:12,000 What resources are required to sustain the policy capabilities and full structures? 105 00:12:12,000 --> 00:12:21,060 And then we'll come back to this. What steps should be taken to ensure a sustainable balance between commitments and resources? 106 00:12:21,060 --> 00:12:26,370 And then the Fifth Element? An analysis of organisation and processes. 107 00:12:26,370 --> 00:12:33,990 What organisational arrangements will best support the policy and planning responses outlined and what changes need to be made 108 00:12:33,990 --> 00:12:44,280 to existing arrangements and reviews have taken place for the following sometimes overlapping reasons economic and financial. 109 00:12:44,280 --> 00:12:50,040 Two of the review's commanding two eight eight and the 2010 CSO, 110 00:12:50,040 --> 00:12:58,110 which I brought with me, were explicit that they were responding to economic pressures. 111 00:12:58,110 --> 00:13:08,340 The existing defence effort was frankly no longer affordable. This was partly but unstated the case with options for change in 1990 as well. 112 00:13:08,340 --> 00:13:15,870 Strategic change. Another reason two of the past reviews options for change as I mentioned, and to a lesser extent, 113 00:13:15,870 --> 00:13:22,590 the 1997 98 SDR were responding more to changes in the strategic context, 114 00:13:22,590 --> 00:13:28,710 as, of course, was the integrated review, namely to the UK's changed position in the world post-Brexit. 115 00:13:28,710 --> 00:13:37,320 Change of government, which was the main reason, frankly, for the 97 98 SDR and rather prosaically, 116 00:13:37,320 --> 00:13:43,230 compliance with the schedule, which was the main reason for the 2015 review. 117 00:13:43,230 --> 00:13:48,930 The coalition government had set out a commitment to conduct these reviews every five years. 118 00:13:48,930 --> 00:14:00,270 The new Conservative government in 2015 respected this, even though David Cameron was publicly quite publicly unenthusiastic. 119 00:14:00,270 --> 00:14:00,660 And of course, 120 00:14:00,660 --> 00:14:11,340 the 2015 review was also partly a response to the changed security environment in the Euro Atlantic area following Russian misbehaviour in Ukraine, 121 00:14:11,340 --> 00:14:13,160 the fear that will come back to haunt. 122 00:14:13,160 --> 00:14:22,280 Perhaps and looking at the main elements of the past reviews of these past reviews, and as I said, I'll cover the integrated review separately. 123 00:14:22,280 --> 00:14:30,020 One can pick out some patterns, so to avoid repetition, I'll take together the first two elements the risk and threat assessment, 124 00:14:30,020 --> 00:14:39,800 plus the policy baseline, because they tend to overlap a bit. So Command eight eight eight did not seek to overhaul UK defence policy. 125 00:14:39,800 --> 00:14:45,380 Like previous reviews, it saw the primary threat as being from the Soviet bloc, 126 00:14:45,380 --> 00:14:52,220 but given the financial pressures, it decided to take risks against the UK's maritime capabilities. 127 00:14:52,220 --> 00:14:58,670 This was undermined less than a year later by the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands. 128 00:14:58,670 --> 00:15:04,490 Options for change was cautious about whether the threat from the Soviet Union actually gone, 129 00:15:04,490 --> 00:15:12,950 but just that it was prudent to reduce defence spending from about four percent of GDP to 2.5 percent of GDP. 130 00:15:12,950 --> 00:15:18,530 I mean, it's now, by comparison, about 2.1 percent over the subsequent decade. 131 00:15:18,530 --> 00:15:28,790 And actually, it was appropriate to do that over the threat of major conflict in Europe receded during the 1990s and beyond by the late nineties. 132 00:15:28,790 --> 00:15:34,940 Risks to our national security appear to come more from fragile and failing states. 133 00:15:34,940 --> 00:15:48,740 The 97 98 SDR response to manage these risks range seemed to work quite well at first in Sierra Leone, Macedonia and initially in Afghanistan. 134 00:15:48,740 --> 00:15:55,670 But the SDR did not foresee that such interventions would turn into Typekit stabilisation campaigns. 135 00:15:55,670 --> 00:16:08,870 As in southern Iraq and southern Afghanistan Post 2006, SDR Signal 2010 stated confidently quote No state currently has both the intent and 136 00:16:08,870 --> 00:16:12,740 the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the United Kingdom, 137 00:16:12,740 --> 00:16:24,740 unquote. That said, only 11 years ago, it saw the risks and threats coming more as before from within fragile and failing states. 138 00:16:24,740 --> 00:16:31,310 And given the fiscal situation and the then government's limited ambitions in terms of a limited appetite, 139 00:16:31,310 --> 00:16:41,450 sorry for further heavy stabilisation operations. It deliberately S.T.A.R. 2010 deliberately limited defence ambitions defence's 140 00:16:41,450 --> 00:16:46,550 ambitions in terms of the scale of operations of the armed forces could undertake, 141 00:16:46,550 --> 00:16:51,650 and it took risks against certain capabilities, such as maritime patrol aircraft. 142 00:16:51,650 --> 00:16:55,250 The resulting gaps were managed for several years thereafter, 143 00:16:55,250 --> 00:17:06,770 albeit with increasing strain on these SDF 15 close these gaps and Re-orientate said defence planning on state based threats, 144 00:17:06,770 --> 00:17:14,690 particularly from Russia. It also deepened the investment in the new domains of conflict, namely cyber space. 145 00:17:14,690 --> 00:17:18,770 So after a pretty shaky start with command eight two eight eight, 146 00:17:18,770 --> 00:17:28,190 I think the reviews were about right on the trajectory of risks and threats and set the appropriate baseline policies in response. 147 00:17:28,190 --> 00:17:37,820 But the later ones seriously underestimated the pace of change in the strategic environment and how quickly the character of conflict would evolve, 148 00:17:37,820 --> 00:17:44,510 particularly with the innovative exploitation by adversaries of commercial technologies. 149 00:17:44,510 --> 00:17:53,000 So the third element of each of every review was capabilities and force structures looked at individually. 150 00:17:53,000 --> 00:17:58,250 At least two of the reviews took some bold decisions to reduce capabilities. 151 00:17:58,250 --> 00:18:06,680 Command eight to 88 plan to cut one fifth of the Royal Navy's destroyers and frigates, two amphibious ships and an aircraft carrier. 152 00:18:06,680 --> 00:18:12,410 The 2010 Edsel brought forward the withdrawal from service of the three small carriers that we 153 00:18:12,410 --> 00:18:19,940 used to have and the Harrier force and cancelled the then Maritime Patrol Aircraft Programme. 154 00:18:19,940 --> 00:18:27,380 The intervening 97 98 review SVR decided to replace the three small carriers with two bigger ones and 155 00:18:27,380 --> 00:18:33,860 created a number of joint formations such as Joint Force Harrier and the Joint Helicopter Command. 156 00:18:33,860 --> 00:18:39,860 But taking a slightly wider view, one gets a different picture. 157 00:18:39,860 --> 00:18:48,410 Although the size of the UK Armed Forces has reduced significantly since the early 1980s in terms of the number of platforms, 158 00:18:48,410 --> 00:18:53,390 war stocks and personnel, their shape has changed very little. 159 00:18:53,390 --> 00:19:00,080 For relatively little, the changes instituted by the main reviews have been mainly incremental, 160 00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:06,500 reflecting political and institutional pressures to maintain a broad spectrum of capabilities, 161 00:19:06,500 --> 00:19:11,720 including as a hedge against uncertainty in the entire period. 162 00:19:11,720 --> 00:19:16,510 Only two significant. Capabilities have been deleted permanently. 163 00:19:16,510 --> 00:19:21,670 Conventional submarines and ground based medium range surface to air missiles 164 00:19:21,670 --> 00:19:27,730 and both outside the main reviews given the pace of technological change. 165 00:19:27,730 --> 00:19:37,660 It's hard not to conclude that these changes to capabilities and force structures made in these reviews were too cautious and conservative. 166 00:19:37,660 --> 00:19:44,050 The fourth element of past reviews was the financial settlement arguably command eight to eight 167 00:19:44,050 --> 00:19:50,590 did what it was set out to do in terms of reducing the programme to match available resources. 168 00:19:50,590 --> 00:19:55,300 But following the Falklands campaign, many of the proposed cuts had to be reversed, 169 00:19:55,300 --> 00:20:00,040 and the government announced in December 1992 that quote We shall now be devoting 170 00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:05,260 substantially more resources to defence than had previously been planned, 171 00:20:05,260 --> 00:20:13,030 unquote. The budgetary dimension of the decisions made in the 1990 review was not spelt out until the following year. 172 00:20:13,030 --> 00:20:19,720 Statement on the defence estimates, which was the first of many indications that either defence expenditure was not 173 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:24,850 reducing as expected and or that the defence budget was being squeezed by the Treasury. 174 00:20:24,850 --> 00:20:36,940 And as a result, the mod then had to launch in 93 94. The so-called defence cost studies to find significant savings by the time of the SDR in 97 98. 175 00:20:36,940 --> 00:20:45,500 The defence budget was at a low point in real terms, with little hope of an uplift given the then government's ambitious social goals. 176 00:20:45,500 --> 00:20:54,490 SDR much lauded these days, but it concluded with a residual gap between the associated financial settlements and the 177 00:20:54,490 --> 00:21:00,040 estimated cost to the defence programme to be closed by ambitious efficiency measures. 178 00:21:00,040 --> 00:21:05,080 And the result was that the Americans struggled financially throughout the next decade. 179 00:21:05,080 --> 00:21:12,310 The 2010 review cut the defence programme by 10 percent, but it soon became clear that this wasn't enough. 180 00:21:12,310 --> 00:21:21,280 Hence, the so-called three month exercise in 2011, which included a previously rejected reduction in the size of the army. 181 00:21:21,280 --> 00:21:29,290 The 2015 season began with an announcement that the UK would meet the next target of spending two per cent of GDP on defence. 182 00:21:29,290 --> 00:21:31,900 Thus basically fixing the budget. 183 00:21:31,900 --> 00:21:41,500 But this envelope was soon strained by new additions to the defence programme, with the gap to be closed as before by ambitious efficiency targets. 184 00:21:41,500 --> 00:21:48,430 Some additional funding was found was provided in 2010 2018 and a big uplift in 2020. 185 00:21:48,430 --> 00:21:56,470 I don't have the detail, but it is widely understood. I'm choosing my words carefully here that a significant proportion of that funding has had 186 00:21:56,470 --> 00:22:03,370 to be allocated to fill what is technically known as holes in the existing programme. 187 00:22:03,370 --> 00:22:11,650 In short, none of the reviews of the command eight two eight eight has managed to create a sustainable balance between commitments and resources, 188 00:22:11,650 --> 00:22:15,340 and they were all followed by further measures. 189 00:22:15,340 --> 00:22:21,910 The Fifth Element was organisation and processes when all the reviews have had something to say on this dimension. 190 00:22:21,910 --> 00:22:26,710 It was actually only a big part of the 97 98 review, 191 00:22:26,710 --> 00:22:36,250 which created a number of joint organisations which I won't go through to share to spare you from the Minister of Defence Alphabet Soup. 192 00:22:36,250 --> 00:22:36,970 Otherwise, 193 00:22:36,970 --> 00:22:45,310 the studies and reports that led to the most significant organisational changes to the Ministry of Defence took place outside the main reviews. 194 00:22:45,310 --> 00:22:51,040 These included the so-called Hessel Time review of the Central Ministry of Defence in 1984. 195 00:22:51,040 --> 00:22:57,820 Michael has some time, of course, an alumnus of this college, the new management strategy and the related prospect review. 196 00:22:57,820 --> 00:23:05,500 In the early nineties, the Enabling Acquisition Change study, which led to the merger of the entities, 197 00:23:05,500 --> 00:23:12,760 main acquisition organisations and, of course, the Liberal Review in 2010 11 12. 198 00:23:12,760 --> 00:23:18,610 So from an organisational perspective, the main reviews have rarely been decisive. 199 00:23:18,610 --> 00:23:25,030 So having sketched out what the reviews did or didn't do. I'll now turn or return to the my second theme. 200 00:23:25,030 --> 00:23:30,460 The wider context of UK defence over those years, and it will be a personal perspective, 201 00:23:30,460 --> 00:23:35,230 reflecting my standpoints at various moments and former colleagues of my approximate 202 00:23:35,230 --> 00:23:41,290 vintage may have different perceptions in terms of the strategic context. 203 00:23:41,290 --> 00:23:48,850 There was obviously a decisive break point in 1990. But certain elements straddle the divide. 204 00:23:48,850 --> 00:23:52,450 One was the relationship with the United States in the 1980s. 205 00:23:52,450 --> 00:24:01,390 This turned around the US contribution to NATO's deterrence posture in Europe, both nuclear and conventional in the 90s and 2000s. 206 00:24:01,390 --> 00:24:08,890 It was more operational cooperation, whether in the Gulf War or the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 207 00:24:08,890 --> 00:24:18,430 but was the sense of peace and cooperation on nuclear and intelligence matters continued throughout, largely following their own rhythm rhythms. 208 00:24:18,430 --> 00:24:28,600 Another one was the Middle East and particularly the Gulf. UK forces had officially withdrawn from east of Suez in the 1970s, 209 00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:35,880 but with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the Royal Navy's Miller Patrol was established, which can. 210 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:44,280 You need for many years and eventually evolved into a renewed, renewed permanent naval presence in the Gulf. 211 00:24:44,280 --> 00:24:53,700 Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council states were a continuing priority to ministers throughout with regular visits to the Gulf. 212 00:24:53,700 --> 00:24:58,800 What we would now call the prosperity dimension was a big factor. 213 00:24:58,800 --> 00:25:05,370 The defence industrial relationship with Saudi Arabia stepped up significantly after 1995, 214 00:25:05,370 --> 00:25:11,670 and defence exports on a much lesser scale were also pursued in the other states, 215 00:25:11,670 --> 00:25:19,260 including the most recent export sale of Typhoon to Qatar, which was signed in 2017. 216 00:25:19,260 --> 00:25:25,650 And of course, the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath was a major preoccupation. 217 00:25:25,650 --> 00:25:34,950 In the early and again in the late 1990s, to be followed by the searing experience of operations in Iraq from early 2003, 218 00:25:34,950 --> 00:25:41,100 even as these receded concern was growing about Iran's nuclear programme, 219 00:25:41,100 --> 00:25:49,350 and I can't think of any other part of the world outside Europe that had such an impact on defence during those years. 220 00:25:49,350 --> 00:25:58,740 Turning to Europe for the Middle East, seen mainly through the prism of nature and key bilateral programmes, including key bilateral relationships, 221 00:25:58,740 --> 00:26:02,700 including cooperation on major equipment programmes, 222 00:26:02,700 --> 00:26:13,170 successive reviews and documents have described NATO as quote vital or as the quote cornerstone of the UK's defence. 223 00:26:13,170 --> 00:26:21,240 But the day to day relationship has been more nuanced given the UK's continued continuing interest beyond the Nexo area. 224 00:26:21,240 --> 00:26:30,540 Nature has not given defence planning in the UK to the same degree as it has in other European states. 225 00:26:30,540 --> 00:26:38,490 The two key bilateral relations relationships during the period well with Germany and France with the former. 226 00:26:38,490 --> 00:26:46,680 The British military presence in Germany steadily reduced up the early nineties and the centrepiece of the relationship between equipment cooperation. 227 00:26:46,680 --> 00:26:55,920 So tornado, typhoon, etc. With France, there was more of a shared strategic culture as fellow nuclear powers with global interests. 228 00:26:55,920 --> 00:27:00,540 But equipment cooperation was much less developed during that period. 229 00:27:00,540 --> 00:27:12,960 And tellingly, the St Malo agreement with France on European defence was signed some months after the 97 98 SDR was published and was not prepared. 230 00:27:12,960 --> 00:27:16,500 And it at all as far as I can make out. 231 00:27:16,500 --> 00:27:28,350 Looking inwards, UK defence was subject to budgetary pressures throughout the period and remains so today despite the budget uplift of a year ago. 232 00:27:28,350 --> 00:27:37,620 This reflected relentless growth in costs above the generic rates of inflation in equipment and, to a lesser extent, personnel. 233 00:27:37,620 --> 00:27:44,760 It's often assumed and and asserted that the defence budget has been in steady decline since the late 1980s. 234 00:27:44,760 --> 00:27:53,520 This is not entirely correct. Defence expenditure, which admittedly is technically not quite the same thing, was pretty steady in real terms. 235 00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:59,760 Across my almost 40 year period, that's around 40 billion pounds a year. 236 00:27:59,760 --> 00:28:08,250 Apart from a significant dip in the mid to late 1990s, the peace dividend was relatively short lived. 237 00:28:08,250 --> 00:28:13,410 Successive reviews and umpteen internal exercises between reviews failed to achieve 238 00:28:13,410 --> 00:28:18,360 a sustainable balance between the cost of commitments and available resources. 239 00:28:18,360 --> 00:28:25,770 Some degree of tension between those things is desirable, as it can help drive if an efficiency and innovation. 240 00:28:25,770 --> 00:28:31,500 But the enduring extent of the imbalance was, in my observation, personal view, 241 00:28:31,500 --> 00:28:39,090 a preoccupation of the NATO leadership throughout with a huge amount of senior time and staff effort absorbed by what one might 242 00:28:39,090 --> 00:28:50,210 call managing the gap time effort that perhaps might have been more game for the use of allies on a slides on other things. 243 00:28:50,210 --> 00:28:57,410 So while there is a natural tendency for academic and other commentators to focus on the cadence of the main set piece reviews, 244 00:28:57,410 --> 00:29:02,030 the reality was one of almost constant reviews, 245 00:29:02,030 --> 00:29:07,460 perhaps because of the slightly artificial way in which the main piece of the main reviews were conducted. 246 00:29:07,460 --> 00:29:09,830 They didn't seem to settle that much. 247 00:29:09,830 --> 00:29:19,760 Whether carried out over a long period like the 97 98 one which lasted over a year or a short one like we saw in 2010, 248 00:29:19,760 --> 00:29:26,300 which lasted less than six months, many big decisions were taken between reviews. 249 00:29:26,300 --> 00:29:31,520 These decisions may not have set directions, but they significantly constrained choices. 250 00:29:31,520 --> 00:29:41,420 So let's give an example from my personal history. The UK's number of Eurofighter typhoons, the number that we were buying was set in 1996, 251 00:29:41,420 --> 00:29:46,700 and the SDR of the following year consciously did not reopen that number, 252 00:29:46,700 --> 00:29:51,650 given the risk to ongoing negotiations for industrial work shares with Germany. 253 00:29:51,650 --> 00:30:02,480 And, of course, key decisions on the nuclear programme, but also taken outside the set piece reviews in nineteen eighty two thousand six and 2016, 254 00:30:02,480 --> 00:30:08,360 finally starting in the early 1980s and initially reflecting a broader government agenda. 255 00:30:08,360 --> 00:30:16,010 These years saw successive efforts to run defence more like a business and reform acquisition processes. 256 00:30:16,010 --> 00:30:25,520 On the first, the beginnings were quite modest with aspirations and this document nine two eight eight eight two eight eight but quote 257 00:30:25,520 --> 00:30:31,520 more accountable management of the documents and quotes to carry out further our partnership with the private sector, 258 00:30:31,520 --> 00:30:43,700 unquote in wider support areas. By the early 1990s, we had competing for quality and market testing, and efforts to outsource activities continued. 259 00:30:43,700 --> 00:30:46,220 Following the change of government in 1970, 260 00:30:46,220 --> 00:30:55,530 notably in the Typekit divestment of test and evaluation work through what is now a company called Kinetic one could characterise this, 261 00:30:55,530 --> 00:31:07,340 and I want to write this up at some point as the Liberals, I think, or possibly not dismantling of the warfare state, 262 00:31:07,340 --> 00:31:13,250 as described by David Edgerton in his seminal book With Acquisition. 263 00:31:13,250 --> 00:31:23,320 The key change was the shift from the mid-1980s to an approach of seeking best value for money through open competition between private contractors. 264 00:31:23,320 --> 00:31:32,000 Ministry of Defence ceased officially at least selecting contractors taking account of broader industrial or social factors. 265 00:31:32,000 --> 00:31:37,160 This was accompanied by a quote hands off approach to the defence industry. 266 00:31:37,160 --> 00:31:40,520 The Minister of Defence expected the prime contractors to manage their supply 267 00:31:40,520 --> 00:31:46,220 chains and gradually collected less and less information about its supply base. 268 00:31:46,220 --> 00:31:50,090 Although the military regularly boasted about how much money this was saving, 269 00:31:50,090 --> 00:32:00,200 there was a growing sense by the mid 1990s that the results were mixed with the costs of major projects rising and time scale slipping. 270 00:32:00,200 --> 00:32:07,880 So we had the launch of smart procurement in 1997, followed by many further acquisition reform initiatives. 271 00:32:07,880 --> 00:32:17,210 These tended to focus on organisation and process, rather than the underlying value for money through open competition policy. 272 00:32:17,210 --> 00:32:25,370 Well, I hope you're concluding from all this is that there's been a high degree of continuity, I might say path dependency over the past four decades, 273 00:32:25,370 --> 00:32:33,350 despite claims by successive reviews that they were, in this case, fresh and radical and others. 274 00:32:33,350 --> 00:32:40,700 But yes, they use that term, you know, all those years ago, phrase all those years ago and others that they were setting a new compass. 275 00:32:40,700 --> 00:32:47,540 Perhaps it would be unfair to say that the broad direction of British defence policy didn't change much in 40 years. 276 00:32:47,540 --> 00:32:55,340 I think actually it was more a case of going round in a big circle. And there's definitely been a lag or latency. 277 00:32:55,340 --> 00:33:02,120 Even a substantial numbers of troops were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of this century. 278 00:33:02,120 --> 00:33:07,760 The UK sought to make its major commitments, exacerbating overstretch. 279 00:33:07,760 --> 00:33:16,970 The campaign in Afghanistan did not become defence's quote main effort, which is a doctrinal term until 2009. 280 00:33:16,970 --> 00:33:21,800 As I noted earlier, the broad shape of the UK armed forces also didn't change much. 281 00:33:21,800 --> 00:33:35,000 This reflected various pressures, as I said, including political desire not to foreclose options and limit physical dependencies on allies. 282 00:33:35,000 --> 00:33:43,400 Some long capability gaps and consequent dependencies were accepted, but generally only when forced by circumstances. 283 00:33:43,400 --> 00:33:49,100 As with the maritime patrol that rocked my sense is that the obsession with efficiencies 284 00:33:49,100 --> 00:33:55,670 from the early 1980s and the constant reviews were mainly about avoiding hard choices. 285 00:33:55,670 --> 00:34:02,840 And I suppose I'm deliberately attacking Peter Ricketts in saying that it wasn't too difficult to pretend otherwise. 286 00:34:02,840 --> 00:34:08,240 It was pretty obvious to anybody that parts of UK defence were not very efficient. 287 00:34:08,240 --> 00:34:18,890 But the quantum of the savings to be made was often based on a rather cursory analysis and was therefore rarely realised in the practise. 288 00:34:18,890 --> 00:34:26,060 Successive efficiency exercises or initiatives to use the modes favoured descriptors. 289 00:34:26,060 --> 00:34:32,480 I'm disappointed and I think the use of those words actually is quite indicative in itself. 290 00:34:32,480 --> 00:34:39,560 One could argue nonetheless, that this multi-year effort was successful, unlike in some other countries. 291 00:34:39,560 --> 00:34:46,700 UK defence did avoid having to narrow its horizons or lose key capabilities as a price 292 00:34:46,700 --> 00:34:53,090 was paid in the disproportionate intellectual effort put into managing the gap. 293 00:34:53,090 --> 00:35:01,250 I suppose the big question, which I wasn't planning to go into in the main part of this is whether there is a link between 294 00:35:01,250 --> 00:35:08,900 this and what is starting to look like a litany of strategic failures since the mid 1990s. 295 00:35:08,900 --> 00:35:16,670 The interventions in the Balkans were at least a partial success, but I don't need to dwell on Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. 296 00:35:16,670 --> 00:35:22,110 The errors in each case were different, but it seems to me at least arguable that the Ministry of Defence, 297 00:35:22,110 --> 00:35:28,520 less preoccupied with its perennial balancing act, might have handled matters differently. 298 00:35:28,520 --> 00:35:35,300 Against this background and turning to my third theme, how can one assess the integrated review? 299 00:35:35,300 --> 00:35:39,170 Glibly, I could take refuge in the time honoured civil service phrase. 300 00:35:39,170 --> 00:35:43,550 It's too early to say, but I'll think of it more than that. 301 00:35:43,550 --> 00:35:47,510 The outgoing chief of the Defence Staff has said that from a defence perspective, 302 00:35:47,510 --> 00:35:55,790 the Integrated Review reflected a properly strategic approach with an evaluation of ends, ways and means. 303 00:35:55,790 --> 00:36:02,390 I wouldn't dispute this. Apart from to note that they do not appear to have been addressed in the right order publicly, 304 00:36:02,390 --> 00:36:08,120 at least the ways in the form of the integrated operating concept and the means. 305 00:36:08,120 --> 00:36:16,550 The defence budget settlement appeared before the ends, as set out in the white paper of mid-March of this year. 306 00:36:16,550 --> 00:36:24,800 I mean, there were, as you know, three documents that finally appeared the main white paper of the 16th of March, the Defence Command paper, 307 00:36:24,800 --> 00:36:33,680 the 22nd of March, and the Defence Industrial Defence and Defence and Security Industrial Strategy of the 23rd of March. 308 00:36:33,680 --> 00:36:38,930 Between them, they covered the same elements as previous reviews and so briefly and using 309 00:36:38,930 --> 00:36:45,890 the same constituent elements as before my sort of off the cuff assessment. 310 00:36:45,890 --> 00:36:53,120 First of all, the assessment of risks and threats. This appears to me to be thoughtful and comprehensive with a clear and, in my view, 311 00:36:53,120 --> 00:37:00,020 correct restatement of the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic area to the UK security. 312 00:37:00,020 --> 00:37:06,350 But it already feels a little overtaken by events with respect to the security challenge from China. 313 00:37:06,350 --> 00:37:13,340 Taiwan has barely mentioned and the disruptive impact of accelerating climate change. 314 00:37:13,340 --> 00:37:16,340 Second, the policy and planning response. 315 00:37:16,340 --> 00:37:24,050 The integrated review, given its name, puts much weight on integration across domains within governments and even internationally. 316 00:37:24,050 --> 00:37:30,500 This looks right. It posits a tilt to the Indo-Pacific again, given the growing challenges from that area. 317 00:37:30,500 --> 00:37:37,400 This also looks right, but it doesn't address whether the UK can make a meaningful contribution to security 318 00:37:37,400 --> 00:37:42,950 in the Indo-Pacific without detriment to its contribution in the Euro-Atlantic. 319 00:37:42,950 --> 00:37:50,480 However, in my view, one of the most significant shifts in policy is set out in the last but by no means least paper in the trilogy. 320 00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:53,930 The Defence and Security Industrial Strategy for the first time. 321 00:37:53,930 --> 00:38:04,160 This recognises the defence industry as a quote strategic asset unquote, and promises to move away from the previous policy of competition by default. 322 00:38:04,160 --> 00:38:09,950 Third capabilities in force structures The AI R promises increased investment in digital, 323 00:38:09,950 --> 00:38:16,400 cyber and space at the expense of the accelerated retirement of some older capabilities, 324 00:38:16,400 --> 00:38:25,590 which has caused a lot of emotion, as you well know, and it moves off the unattainable previous target of 82000 personnel to the army again. 325 00:38:25,590 --> 00:38:36,410 In my view, the budget settlement. Fourth Element the budget increase announced last November, was greater than any external observer had expected. 326 00:38:36,410 --> 00:38:42,770 It means that, unlike nearly all the previous reviews, this one has not been hobbled from the outset. 327 00:38:42,770 --> 00:38:52,580 But there's still a question whether once existing budget holes have been filled, there will be enough headroom for investments in new technologies, 328 00:38:52,580 --> 00:38:57,710 and it's difficult work with a company at the chancellor's recent budget statement showed. 329 00:38:57,710 --> 00:39:09,140 While the capital budget for the Mod is going up very impressively, the resource of day to day budget is quite constrained, 330 00:39:09,140 --> 00:39:13,400 so there is a risk, I think, that we could be back before too long. 331 00:39:13,400 --> 00:39:22,190 So managing the gap and then fifth organisation and process the biggest step, such as the AFL-CIO and defeat merger, 332 00:39:22,190 --> 00:39:26,900 were outside defence and in this case preceded the completion of the review. 333 00:39:26,900 --> 00:39:33,530 But in the new Space Command should provide a useful focus for an increasingly important domain. 334 00:39:33,530 --> 00:39:40,100 So with its self-consciously radical approach and the welcome rejection, welcome injection of significant capital. 335 00:39:40,100 --> 00:39:45,850 Will the integrated review break the mould that I've outlined so far? 336 00:39:45,850 --> 00:39:52,340 I don't think it's clear that it will. Indeed, the tilts the Indo-Pacific may increase the strain. 337 00:39:52,340 --> 00:39:58,640 The text indicates that the tilt is actually intended to be more economic and diplomatic the military. 338 00:39:58,640 --> 00:40:03,410 But the coincidence with the aircraft carrier deployment has focussed attention 339 00:40:03,410 --> 00:40:07,190 on the military dimension and may have raised expectations in the region, 340 00:40:07,190 --> 00:40:16,320 but will have to be managed. So finally, some closing thoughts on where we now seem to be heading in the weeks after the pandemic struck. 341 00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:19,040 I'm sure many people here will remember this. 342 00:40:19,040 --> 00:40:27,980 There was a welter of webinars about the strategic significance and the consensus that was emerge that it wasn't a great turning point, 343 00:40:27,980 --> 00:40:33,770 but it was accelerating and deepening trends that were already apparent, 344 00:40:33,770 --> 00:40:41,600 not least the shift in economic and political power to the Indo-Pacific that still feels right to me. 345 00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:48,410 So the context for UK defence policy is now both rather familiar and also different. 346 00:40:48,410 --> 00:40:56,540 I see the main challenges still as Russia, China, the US, Europe and climate change. 347 00:40:56,540 --> 00:41:03,800 Russia remains, as we've been reminded over recent days, a disruptive power in the Euro-Atlantic area. 348 00:41:03,800 --> 00:41:09,530 Up until the last few days, it's been attracting less attention from five or six years ago. 349 00:41:09,530 --> 00:41:17,480 But the fundamentals haven't changed. Russia continues to exploit fault lines and other developments in eastern and central Europe, 350 00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:24,650 and we cannot exclude the possibility that it could do so in a way that would be destabilising and could lead to conflict. 351 00:41:24,650 --> 00:41:29,960 So we must continue to invest in credible deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic area. 352 00:41:29,960 --> 00:41:38,300 China is not yet a military threat, so the international order in the Indo-Pacific or more widely in the same way as Russia in the Euro-Atlantic. 353 00:41:38,300 --> 00:41:49,220 But there is a deepening pattern of coercive and or disruptive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region and increasingly beyond intimidation, 354 00:41:49,220 --> 00:41:56,960 cyber attacks, etc, etc. and, of course, Taiwan intimidation of Taiwan. 355 00:41:56,960 --> 00:42:02,660 The US will continue to have more equities at stake in the Indo-Pacific than any European country. 356 00:42:02,660 --> 00:42:09,080 It appears to be moving towards a more explicit deterrence posture and it will towards China, 357 00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:15,770 and it will continue to provide most of the forces required. In my view, the UK should be considering how it can best conclude. 358 00:42:15,770 --> 00:42:23,840 Abuse of this posture, taking into account the views of the US and key regional partners such as Japan and Australia. 359 00:42:23,840 --> 00:42:25,160 It may be. 360 00:42:25,160 --> 00:42:33,740 And Lloyd Austin, in one of his speeches in the American defence secretary and one of his speeches in Singapore back in the summer, hinted at this. 361 00:42:33,740 --> 00:42:42,260 The UK might better help. It might be better off helping alleviate the pressures on the US by carrying more of the burden in Europe and the Gulf, 362 00:42:42,260 --> 00:42:47,090 facilitating the redeployment of U.S. forces to the Indo-Pacific. 363 00:42:47,090 --> 00:42:52,550 In the meantime, the core of the competition between China and the West is technological. 364 00:42:52,550 --> 00:42:59,450 China has made no secret of its intent to master the game changing technologies such as A.I. and quantum. 365 00:42:59,450 --> 00:43:07,760 The UK and other key European powers should work with the US and key regional partners to better protect our technological x where it still exists, 366 00:43:07,760 --> 00:43:10,220 uphold international rules and standards, 367 00:43:10,220 --> 00:43:19,190 and ensure that we do not become dependent on China for future critical technologies in the way that happened with wildlife and fight trade. 368 00:43:19,190 --> 00:43:26,210 It might seem a bit odd now to switch to the US and Europe. Surely, they are not strategic competitors in the same way as Russia and China. 369 00:43:26,210 --> 00:43:36,410 True, but in a more fragmented world, one has to pay more attention to what one's allies and partners are up to, as well as potential adversaries. 370 00:43:36,410 --> 00:43:46,010 There was much relief a year ago when Joe Biden was elected president and and and undertook to work constructively with allies. 371 00:43:46,010 --> 00:43:54,560 But we knew that the underlying trend apparent for a decade of increasing US focus on the Indo-Pacific would continue, 372 00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:58,460 and many of us were worried about the trajectory of U.S. domestic politics, 373 00:43:58,460 --> 00:44:05,810 particularly the implosion of the traditional Republican Party and the implications that could have for the US's future international, 374 00:44:05,810 --> 00:44:15,380 wrote US, whose approach to Afghanistan this summer showed that even the current administration to take an America First type 375 00:44:15,380 --> 00:44:24,740 approach and the increasing influence of the increasing evidence of the continuing influence of Donald Trump, 376 00:44:24,740 --> 00:44:30,170 perhaps gives pause for thought on the pause, for thought on the domestic trajectory. 377 00:44:30,170 --> 00:44:35,630 So the UK should, in my view, be thinking hard about becoming less dependent on the US, 378 00:44:35,630 --> 00:44:42,560 and I believe that this could be done in a way that the current administration would not find threatening would actually welcome. 379 00:44:42,560 --> 00:44:49,910 It would, of course, involve almost inevitably working more closely with European partners. 380 00:44:49,910 --> 00:44:57,470 Which brings me to Europe. The idea of quote European strategic autonomy remains a contested one, 381 00:44:57,470 --> 00:45:03,440 and the European Union has a lot less money to spend on defence than was envisaged a few years ago. 382 00:45:03,440 --> 00:45:09,710 UK should not, in my view, automatically assume that European strategic autonomy is a bad thing. 383 00:45:09,710 --> 00:45:16,970 It depends on what form it takes and how open the EU is or becomes the third party engagement. 384 00:45:16,970 --> 00:45:24,170 If Emmanuel Macron is re-elected next year, I would expect to see this concept gain much more impetus. 385 00:45:24,170 --> 00:45:29,120 And those EU countries that are currently a bit ambivalent about it, 386 00:45:29,120 --> 00:45:36,350 including some close industrial partners of the UK, may start falling more into line. 387 00:45:36,350 --> 00:45:43,580 That would create the risk of a growing gap between the UK and its continental European partners. 388 00:45:43,580 --> 00:45:53,150 The Integrated Review had warm words about cooperation with European partners, if not the EU itself, but very few new concrete proposals, if any. 389 00:45:53,150 --> 00:45:55,130 And I think that needs attention. 390 00:45:55,130 --> 00:46:04,010 And finally, climate change in the past climate change climate, the climate was relatively unchanging climatic conditions, 391 00:46:04,010 --> 00:46:11,300 and the seasons always needed to be taken into account in military planning, but not the possibility of them changing in the way that we are now. 392 00:46:11,300 --> 00:46:18,890 Seeing the role of climate change and exacerbating conflict in, say, the Sahel is well documented. 393 00:46:18,890 --> 00:46:29,570 The climate change could now have a strategic impact. Much closer to home parts of the Mediterranean basin will have a climate in 10 to 20 years time 394 00:46:29,570 --> 00:46:36,590 that could create economic and social pressures that might be destabilising for team-mates allies. 395 00:46:36,590 --> 00:46:42,770 I'm not sure this is receiving sufficient attention, and there is another dimension. 396 00:46:42,770 --> 00:46:49,070 The energy published its sustainability strategy back in March, and it contains some very worthy goals, 397 00:46:49,070 --> 00:46:54,650 except that I do think the objective of net zero by 2050 is not ambitious enough. 398 00:46:54,650 --> 00:46:59,840 But it seems to rest on the premise that adaptation to climate change should not have any 399 00:46:59,840 --> 00:47:06,320 detriment in terms of the operational capability of weapon systems against military threats. 400 00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:16,260 I wonder. Climate change is becoming such a big issue that the Minister of Defence may have to accept this in future sustainability considerations. 401 00:47:16,260 --> 00:47:24,000 May have to take precedence over operational performance in major decisions on procurement and infrastructure. 402 00:47:24,000 --> 00:47:31,980 So to conclude, despite all the cynic might say, because of multiple reviews, 403 00:47:31,980 --> 00:47:38,850 British defence policy has shown much continuity over the past four decades. 404 00:47:38,850 --> 00:47:41,730 But we are now entering uncharted waters. 405 00:47:41,730 --> 00:47:52,320 Geopolitically, with the ascendancy of China and the growing introspection of the US and even geographically and environmentally. 406 00:47:52,320 --> 00:47:59,190 I would wager that the reviews of the future are likely to look very different from those of the past. 407 00:47:59,190 --> 00:48:07,666 Thank you very much.