I'll see you tomorrow. It gives me great pleasure to introduce Dr. Olivier Schmidt,
who is an associate professor of political science at the Centre for Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.
And addition to that, he also currently serves as vice president and scientific director at the French Association for War and Strategic Studies.
Before joining the University of Southern Denmark in 2015,
he obtained his Ph.D. from the Department for Studies Kings in London and was a postdoctoral
research fellow at the University of Montreal Centre for International Studies.
Dr. Schmidt Holds M.A. is from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva Science for a reserve officer and First Lady.
He has past experience in the French movie and later, and he's also happens to think tanks,
the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Diplomats in London and now across Europe as well.
He conducts research in two broad fields. First, he looks at the role of ideas and norms in world politics,
with research on strategic narratives, influence and propaganda, and also follow ideologies.
The second, he's interested in security and stability studies, in particular multilateral military cooperation,
comparative defence policies, arms control, most transformation, the training Typekit wolf.
He's been like since day. He's going to be speaking on emerging technologies, a new military revolution.
Thank you so much and good afternoon, everyone. For me, it's a great pleasure to be here today.
I mean, it's a great centre. I've admired the work that is being done at the centre for Fossum.
You're very happy to see Rob again. It had been a while, so yeah, thanks for having me.
And I'm very happy to be here. Before we begin, I have to say that it is true that I'm a producer.
Nobody's perfect 18 senior citizen of Denmark, but I'm currently on secondment at the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies,
which is basically the French equivalent to the Royal College of Defence Studies,
which is under the in the French, the Soviets under the Prime Minister's Office.
So I'm only speaking in my personal capacity, and nothing I say will reflect the view of the Prime Minister's Office in any way, shape or form.
So I have to you have to say that.
So we are here to talk about emerging technologies and the potential that they have to trigger a new military revolution.
I am not going to present any conclusions.
What I'm going to do is not presenting you is a full fledged argument or having a kind of top down approach to.
It's what I would like to do this afternoon is really to present some work hypothesis and eventually to stimulate our collective thinking.
And so after I'm done talking, I'll be happy to discuss it and to be congratulated, hopefully.
So again, it will be something full fledged, but it's more sinking in in progress at the moment,
and I really hope that we could have a good discussion afterwards. So to begin, what do we mean by many terrible illusions?
I'm not going to insult you in the sense that I'm sure you're all familiar with the concepts coming from Michael Roberts in the 50s,
Freud's describing a change in the way the European way of war evolved in the 17th century.
That's led to broader political and military consequences.
So it's a core argument goes that the introduction of firearms leads to a new way to trade the armed forces, for example,
through a drill that leads or overall to new types of taxation that states need to implement in order to sustain the armed forces,
which leads to change in the nature of the state because the state has more extraction capacity and so on.
So basically, the change in these fears leads to broader political and social consequences.
There has been a lot of debates about the concept itself, most notably a case, I guess,
between Charlie Black and Parker on the exact content and shape of the MeToo revolution.
There have been debates about whether there had been an Asian MeToo revolution 200 years before the Academy Revolution was.
Our debates about the link that you said has been made between the European
military revolution and the gradual domination of Europe on the world stage.
It's especially true for a factor that makes this argument that the European revolution led
to this increased military potential that led to the rise of Europe into world system.
All this has been debated. On top of that is our.
Is also the confusion that has been made in the 90s between the concept of military revolutions and the term revolution
in military affairs that was promoted or studied by Andrew Marshall in the U.S. at the Office of Net Assessment,
and the core argument behind this concept of revolution is what that structure of war was going through a profound transformation.
And it will be I'm throwing events, but it will be possible to lift the fog of war through network centric technologies.
But the difference between this revolution in military affairs, R-Maine that was studied by Marshall and his crew,
if that does not have the drastic social and political consequences that the a concept of need for a revolution usually entails.
Also, the timeframe is different.
What the historians who have been studying the European revolution look at our processes that go through several gates.
Marshall in the Army were mostly thinking about the twenty twenty five years time span, so the the term revolution has been used widely,
both in academic debate in policy debates, which means that the term meta revolution itself is a bit loaded and a bit complicated to handle.
So all this introduction to to say that I'm aware of the fact that the term meta revolution is not perfect because of course,
this history of how it has been used in different ways.
I use it in as a juristic device, basically to describe the change in the context of warfare,
which itself triggers changes in the functioning of societies and politics.
So political organisations. So just as these broad categories, this is how I use the term for revenge.
So I'm going to give you my core hypothesis upfront. And my question, if that is to investigate whether we are on the brink,
on the brink of a new military revolution due to current technological changes in particular.
I think that there is a convergence of much more emerging and prototyping technologies which will be converging between now and the next 25 years.
And those new technologies, which are primarily but not exclusively meat, are in nature together.
It's really this convergence that together has the potential to alter what I think are our perceptions of time, of space and of self.
And this alteration of our perceptions of time, space and self may have what I think will be unforeseen and therefore understood its consequences,
social and political consequences and the technologies I'm talking about all linked to the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution.
So here I'm borrowing from Charles Schwab. I mean, again, it's not perfect.
The category of Fourth Industrial Revolution is just a catch all term to describe new technology,
the new genomics technologies, A.I., cyber in propulsion sensors, additive manufacturing, energy and energy storage.
So all those different categories are brought together in this catchall term of Fourth Industrial Revolution.
So what I'm talking about? Exactly. Let's begin with perceptions of time.
So time, in my view, is a bit of an afterthought in strategic thinking.
People are looking at tactics. Think about time in terms of tempo or sequence the sequencing of operations, right?
Like, how do we achieve cumulative effect?
So you have to have a sequence of different operations or you need to think about the tempo of your military operations or things.
Think about it in terms of what the Greeks will call the Kangaroos.
So seising the moment. So here's an opportunity you need to seise the moment.
But this is the the main ways classical strategic thinking considers the role of time.
I think so underexplored. There is a new scholarship at the moment which is emerging on how to think about Time and Serdyukov for years.
There is a great article by Andrew Carr into trauma of strategic studies that was published.
I think this year, which I think is is really interesting to try to.
Think about time in a different way. I will be very shameless here, but I will also plug a book that I credited with you colleagues,
which is Cold War time, but I still think there is much to do in that regard.
Why? Because perceptions of time is a heavily social and cultural construct.
I tend to develop in the individual when they used to want, but basically the core argument that we do not experience time.
We do not experience the flow of time in the same way, depending on our social and cultural backgrounds.
And this is a consistent finding from sociology and Baloji for the best 50 years.
So, for example, just to go straight to the point six periods of time in Western countries is often linear.
So basically, we see time as being like New York is that instead of cyclical, that most Asian cultures is.
This is how most Asian cultures understand it.
And at least since the 19th century, we experience time through what we perceive as being speed and acceleration.
Everything seems to be going faster and faster. I argued somewhere else, you know before.
That's our perception of time through the categories of speed and acceleration actually have an impact on our military police making.
But now I would like to come back to the new technologies.
My sense is that emerging technologies have the potential to drastically alter our own perception of time within the next 20 to 25 years old.
Start with cyber technologies. Cyber attacks on his are a bit contradictory because both the foster the sense of immediacy,
but also of man's presence that makes me cyber campaigns have a different temporality from sender to meet certain things.
For example, next, Smeets talks about the transitory nature of cyber weapons.
So when you used the basically disappear, which is kind of different from traditional weapons that don't disappear unless they are being destroyed,
so that changes our idea of sequencing me to operation the sequence that are building RG firms more broadly.
The conclusion of cyber in our datelines through cell phones through virtual reality tomorrow, I think we'll modify our expectations of immediacy.
Can we wait? What is the acceptable delay and what do we consider being slow or fast in our data experiences?
I mean, I think some of you will remember the first generations of connecting to the internet
in the 90s through the modem where you had these weird sounds when you was connecting.
And when I think about that nowadays,
I think all of us will just throw out the computer out of the window because we will experience it as being extremely slow.
But it's a change in our perception of what is a legitimate delay in our interactions and in our experience of life,
which is totally triggered by emerging technologies.
Second, type of technologies that can alter our perception of time, I think, is hypervelocity.
I mean, we do a lot of hype about hyper velocity in a way I don't think it's that much of a break in the structure and environments.
But what is certain is that we perceive it as compressing the decision making windows that policymakers have at their disposal.
So it's compressing the time that's for the window of opportunity that policymakers have to react to or potential aberrations.
So again, changing how we perceive time if we don't have that window of opportunity, do we do we have one?
How how do we need to think about strategic stability? It means that we cannot react.
We need to prioritise. So the perception of time is different.
It's not about reacting to something coming in, it's about presenting something that might happen in the future.
So last, emerging technology that could have an effect on our perception of the time is,
of course, A.I., which makes decisions by definition much faster than any human being.
So all this change again, to to summarise these arguments about our perceptions of fine or all those emerging technologies may have an impact on.
How we perceive time and what we consider to be an acceptable speed and an acceptable play in our daily lives.
And I'm opening, you know, it's an open question.
But what are the consequences for our social interactions, right? How long do we have to wait for friend in a coffee shop?
Some say that with what our consequences for work,
what are the expectations that our bosses are going to have from workers based on what they think is unacceptable delay?
What does it mean for our cognitive capabilities, right?
The way our brain develops from childhood to adulthood?
Almost all of these are potential social and political consequences that may be triggered by emerging technologies.
Most of them being from a military origin.
Second, arguments potential changes in our perceptions of space.
Space is, of course, a very important factor in how we experience the world and how we see our place in the world again.
I mean, the way we experience space is a very social construct by nature.
For example, depending on your social status and your integration of background, and I'm very aware of the fact that I'm not Oxford right now,
it is very likely that you experience space in as a kind of archipelago of different cities.
So you may have family in London and New York.
You may vacation in Paris or Berlin or Singapore.
And with a dash of exoticism here and they are doing your work trip, but you probably have not extensively travelled in any of those countries.
So your your experience of space is actually an archipelago of European environments in several countries.
That is your experience of space. But if you go to Berlin, have you been to read the North Barrens?
I mean, don't go there. It's really puzzling. But that's that's basically the idea.
That's your experience of space is really different and disconnected from the political
authority of the states that he's having having sovereignty over a certain territory,
from caricaturing a bit, you know, in the sense of you and also me experiencing this archipelago of different cities worldwide.
But you see the point that depending on your social background, your social capital and so on, we all have different experiences of space.
You can easily imagine people in France or Germany nowadays whose experience of space is 50 kilometres radius around the city where they were born,
and which is totally different from what most of you are experiencing anyways.
So our perception of space is inherently political.
And again, here we have technologies that may alter the way we experience space we can, starting with cyber cyber capabilities because it's of course,
the most obvious one in the sense that it's always a possibility to leave in different cyber spaces,
which in the end may shape our political and social affiliations and disconnecting our political
and social affiliations from our physical location where we are at a specific moment in time.
I was know when ISIS was still a thing.
I mean, they still are, but still had a territorial incurring.
You know, so what's a cyber conflict,
which I have always found is an interesting term because they were basically hacking and propaganda branch for for ISIS.
But the term cyber conflict is in itself interesting because it signals that you have people who can be anywhere in the world,
physically, anywhere in the world, but still feeling that we belong to a specific political entity, which is which is the caliphate.
So there was a decoupling between the physical space that those people inhabit and the political affiliation, which is facilitated by cyber means.
And I suspect that we will see more and more of those connexions between where we are and what we feel is our political and social affiliations.
Another example of a different nature, but still in this same idea of disconnecting where we are from, what we see and what we experience is.
The fact sets of digitalisation of war removes the distinction between actors, decision makers and bystanders,
basically, because we see images of war all the time, belligerents are competing for our attention.
They are competing for the images that we are going to see, which are also going to shape how we react to certain to certain events.
And again, that is, well, I think this is sort of erasing or not deleting,
but erasing this distinction between being a bystander and being a participant.
But this is part of this trend of disconnecting the political and the physical presence and the political consciousness in a way.
And of course, the last trend in that area is virtual reality, right?
I mean, the project that Facebook revealed or what they were based, totally dystopian in nature,
and Zuckerberg has been totally mocked for and deservedly mocked for presenting
it because he has never as much as a robot as basically as its presentations.
But it's revelatory of a broader trend of engineers,
of technologists that are actually looking forward to disconnecting our physical presence and our social experience.
And I think this is just a first step in what will probably be other attempts to participate in the disconnection between our,
yeah, our body and our consciousness in a sense.
Second, technology that might alter our perception of space is, of course, the competition in extra atmospheric space at the moment.
So, I mean, you are all aware of that. I suppose there is a gradual transition of extra atmospheric space, which is made possible by new technologies,
the satellite technologies to begin with, but also anti-satellite capabilities.
So basically missiles that are now able to shoot to shoot down satellites.
And I think that gives this competition increases that will make people realise that most of our daily lives depend on space assets.
I mean, your cell phones, your TV connexions,
a lot of the way of the things that we use every single day depends on the signal that is coming naturally from space.
So it was interesting when Russia did say our assets test last week because,
you know, there was a lot of fragments that went through the internal space station,
so basically potentially endangering the lives of the astronauts into space station at the moment.
And I think I may be wrong,
but I think it was one of the very first time that the global public realised that what we do in space can
have very concrete consequences for citizens and maybe in the future for what is going to happen on Earth.
You know, most military people for the past five, six years have been very aware of the competition coming up.
You all know the space command that was created in the US, also in France, for example.
So there is even a show on Netflix about Space Command.
So most military people have been aware of that. I don't think the global public has been, you know,
in has realised the strong connexion that exists between the extra atmospheric space and basically what we are doing every single day on Earth.
If the competition continues, we are going to see more and more of those connexions being disrupted,
which will make the public and people realise that Ceres is always a continuum between the two, which will change the way we think about the space.
That is a legitimate concern. How you doing things? That extra atmospheric space is a legitimate concern.
It's not politicised. If you want in national discourses nowadays, it's not.
Maybe it will be in the future. Maybe you will see movements to say, we need to protect our satellites, whatever.
Right? So but I think that's the way we experience excitement for space and.
Will change in the sense that we will gradually realise the strong connexion between what we do and what happens here.
And of course, it's not a military development, but an economic development.
Space tourism is getting cheaper and cheaper, which also means that space will not be the ultimate frontier.
But it will be a new neighbourhood and again,
when it becomes a new neighbourhood salaries and increased potential to politicise the end of the environments and to compete in it.
So all this this convergence of technology trends, I think,
will make us experience the space around us differently and change the way we perceive space overall.
Finally, there is the potential for changing our perception of self where we are again.
What constitutes our identity is a mix of socialisation, of cultural upbringings and of ideas about what is our physical integrity, right?
Who we are as a person, volunteers, but also who we are as bodies in a sense that exist in the world.
And here we have a number of technologies that have the potential to directly affect our bodies.
Think about, you know, all the debates about the augmented soldiers, the so-called augmented soldiers.
So you can have basically two ways to do it. The first one being genomic technologies.
So gene editing, so basically manipulating DNA to remove potential potential flows.
But when you think about it, DNA is in public consciousness seen as being the core of what the human being is supposed to be like.
The most natural of things, in a sense, because it comes from a combination of two of the four genes that are presented from your parents.
So as you start editing this and change people directly through gene editing,
I wonder what it will trigger in terms of how we perceive what is our integrity, our physical integrity and how we're going to react to it.
The second potential change is, of course, all the potential influence to improve the physical capabilities of soldiers that
are being that several military organisations are working on at the moment,
basically creating cyborgs, improving eyesight, improving earrings, improving physical fitness and resistance, so on and so forth.
Again, I personally, I'm a fan of Japanese science fiction.
I'm a fan of Ghost in the Shell. I'm looking forward to it.
But you know, you are lucky because I've also terrible eyesight, so meaningful improvement.
But it changes the way we perceive the human.
What is what is a human in itself? So that's one trend technological trend that can modify our perception of self.
Second trend is and here I am,
relying on the Canada based work on the artificial intelligence and strategy strategies a profoundly human activity, right?
Because it's truly about the use of violence. And it is shaped by two things.
It's shaped by our reasoning.
I mean, we hope that there is a degree of reasoning when we use force, but it's also profoundly shaped by our emotions, right?
I mean, I'm being very close of each and here, but you know that it's one of the elements of the treaty.
That passions are one of the elements of the treaty.
If we start automating some degree of decision making in warfare through artificial intelligence, if pushed too far,
we have the potential to remove these very human elements in warfare for the first time in history.
Removing passion in war from the front for the first time in history.
And I mean, again, it's an open question. But what will be the consequences of this kind of automated war?
Is it still a war if it doesn't include passion?
If so, one element of the Trinity? Or is it just automated murder, right?
If we don't have passion, we don't have. Maybe we remove the connexion with the political motivations for using force.
Again, simple question, but I think it's at least worth thinking about.
So to wrap up, I think it's this combination of technologies which are themselves at different stages
of maturation that could lead to a profound change in our understanding of time,
space and self and with unforeseen political and social consequences.
Individually, any of the changes I just described will probably be easy to integrate in our daily lives.
I mean, our societies change all the time through technological developments.
What I think is interesting right now is that we have a convergence of a lot of different technologies,
which all have an impact on the way we experience the world around us, and they are all converging more or less in the same time frame.
And this is what I think is worth studying at the moment.
So of course, you have a lot of, you know, think tanks, suite organisations,
academics while looking at the impact of this new technologies on warfare itself.
But I think it's also worth going a bit further and ask the question of what will it do cumulatively speaking for our our societies.
So this is being said, I think there is a few. I'm trying to give you a few thoughts on the potential directions for, I don't know, research papers.
These are any students or PSG projects or whatever, but I think a few things that I think will be worth thinking about.
The first thing is, are our strategic concepts fit for this new environment?
The strategic tension in the 20th century is fundamentally deeply influenced by them thinking about nuclear weapons, right?
The concepts that we have developed are a reaction to the nuclear revolution.
It all comes from Brody, 46, and Sherry, 62, basically.
So think about the most important terms in strategic thinking 20th century.
It's coercion, deterrence, compulsions. Well, you know, you know your shaming and you don't have to to summarise it.
But what it is about fundamentally, it's about the signal intentions.
You need to signal in one way or the other.
It's all about signalling credible commitments, communicating red lines, communicating abilities, communicating intentions.
The core idea of strategic thinking in the 20th century is what's signalling, and if done well,
this will lead to some kind of punctuated equilibrium between the adversaries.
Right? So it may fail. We may be is understand the adversary is intentions and vice versa.
It may fail. But the core idea that that's signalling done well will lead to some sort of strategic stability,
and that has deeply shaped our doctrines and the way we think about the use of force.
Now, I think that combined again combined,
some of those new technologies have the potential to create a new strategic drama or at least a new strategic environments,
which is about shaping and manipulating the air of the adversary.
Think about, you know, the eruption. You mean all warfare.
So a stage of warfare, which is before the use of force.
So think about the Chinese who talk about history, warfare so publicly on warfare, legal warfare and psychological warfare.
Recently, France updated its course, operational concepts and the new buzz.
Words from our Joint Chief of Staff is to say that we need to win the war before the war, which I think is a terrible phrasing.
But don't quote me on that. Not yet. But what it's about all those ideas of lethal warfare through warfare.
Winning the war before the war. It's about shaping a strategic audience.
It's not about signalling. It's about shaping what the adversary is doing.
And I think we all feel very uncomfortable with this state of affairs who are very uncomfortable with this environment.
And this is why we have terms such as hybrid warfare, fourth generation warfare, great on warfare, high Cold War and so on and so forth.
All those terms, they say, is a war in between something, right?
It's hybrid. It's graze on whether it's in between some categories.
So we are very uncomfortable with that. And I think it's because we don't have we haven't.
At least we haven't found the versioning for the new strategic environment.
We haven't found the person or persons who give us the vocabulary and the concepts that help us make sense of this new state of affairs.
And I think what? So one of the lines of effort, I think, will be going into that direction, trying to update our concepts in our strategy vocabulary.
I think we'll be also worth looking at the cultural representations of this new strategic environment in movies,
in video games, in series, TV shows and on not only because he can give us ideas on how to do it,
but also mostly because it will tell us something about how our societies are evolving in terms of their expectations of law,
of how war will unfold and what the role of the military will be in this hybrid force.
Fourth generation, whatever you call it in this type of second, think we, I think we need to think about in death,
only to rethink what the arms industry is or at least in a technological and industrial base is.
And I think it's important to distinguish between open and closed innovation.
So to summarise it, very quickly closed you.
Innovation in states led open innovation is private sector myth to 20th century military innovation is closed innovation.
Most of it came from the states directing research in certain areas.
It's very likely that we are now in an era of open innovation, which means that it's led by the private sector,
which also means that the private sector that innovation will spread and diffuse more quickly because the private sector has incentives to do so.
So what is what are the consequences of this state of affairs?
For the defence industrial base, for example, China has long pushed for what they call civil military fusion in the arms industry.
What exactly does that entail, including for Western India, for western countries?
What does it mean for traditional defence companies, which are still focussed on developing advanced platforms of jet fighters, frigates, whatever?
When you have companies such as Amazon, Google, Facebook,
which invest billions in R&D investments that states themselves Muslim most of the time, not much, but apart from the United States.
But the French R&D is less than what Amazon's investing are.
The same goes for. For the UK,
also something which I think is interesting is that most of the technologies I've been talking about rely on one way or the other on data management,
data storage, data use data management doesn't is our 20th century model of a state sponsored platform development appropriate when
what makes actually user platform work is how we are going to handle and all the data what what full states invest in,
what kind of companies will deliver us at the end.
And that was the last thing it said. How do those technologies, which are data driven, are going to fluctuate because data is very easy to exchange?
So I think there is a number of issues here in terms of what our defence industrial base is going to look like.
What is the shape of it? What are the borders or the limitations of the defence industry?
And we need to have a much more open thinking about what we are going to include in in our definition of defence industrial base.
Third issue very quickly. What does that mean for arms control when most of the technologies are going to develop rely on software,
which is by definition difficult to observe and analyse because you cannot do bean counting,
you cannot count the number of tanks or frigates or whatever.
Right? How do you do arms control with cyber weapons when it's a line of code?
But if the one of the main tools we had to do or to develop strategic stability,
which is arms control, is becoming obsolete because we cannot actually control the arms.
What does that mean for strategic stability in the future? And how do we standardise strategic competition?
I think it's it's a very important issue to to to to deploy force.
And lastly, something interesting to look at is how do the armed forces shape those changes?
Because the agency in it, but also at the adapt to those changes, I think we need more empirical research in that area.
I think an interesting issue will be to look at the future of interoperability in an alliance such as Neato.
It's not a new issue, but it's I mean, you talked about it's basically the story of Ningo.
But I mean, it has taken a new shape now that not only do we need to coordinate our doctorates, but we also need to do much better,
integrate our systems so that we can communicate with each other much more than just with June 16 and lacks the technologies we have.
We have at the moment, also an issue of recruitment.
How do we recruit and train soldiers in the future?
How do we train cyber soldiers? Do we need to send them to bootcamp? Do they need to have haircuts regulations?
Do they need to wear a uniform? I don't know.
But I think it's a legitimate debate if we are going to start changing the bodies of our soldiers.
How do we motivate them? Do we need to campaign in such a way?
That's OK. You have poor eyesight from the military. You will have, you know, when you knew it was OK to become a cyborg.
And so, you know, basically from the military to improve your physical conditions.
I don't know totally changes the way we think about the people we want to have in the armed forces or very few, if that's OK.
How do those new technologies change from this threat to social status within the armed forces?
I mean, we all know that historically speaking, there are armies, of course,
that are more prestigious than others, and they have a vested interest in resisting change.
Well, history of cavalry resisting the introduction of tanks because cavalry was so prestigious arms in most European countries.
Jet fighter pilots are resisting the introduction of drones because it challenges their prestige as they have in the air forces.
So who will the apex predators if you want?
Beams the future and what are the prestige positions going to be?
I think we need to think about that because the introduction of this new technologies is going to change the social status within the armed forces.
And that's the issue is how do we educate our military leaders in the in this environment?
We have a system of professional military dictation that basically followed this incredible complex ification of warfare with
the initial training or school for officers going through initial training being developed in the 18th early 19th century.
So basically,
when you had to train your students to come and command a battalion from the mid-19th century onwards with incredible complex information warfare,
warfare and the need to command units that were set were much larger,
the system of the war college developed so inspired from the Second Army in Germany.
But it basically spread throughout the world in the 19th century because the size of the armed forces led to the development of stuff.
So and we had, we felt the need to train officers to work in a tough environment.
And there's a third layer, which will be the Royal College of Defence Studies,
was created at the early 20th century to better integrate civilian and military leadership because the scale of warfare now involved,
the entire political leadership and war will not be removed from the broader conduct of political affairs anymore.
Therefore, if you serve me your professional military vocation to bring together civilian and military leadership,
is it still appropriate this three level education in a context where new technologies change social relations?
And what do we need to teach to our military officers?
Again, it's an open question. I think we need empirical work on this topic.
I'm going to stop here.
I think there is a lot of exciting projects, too, to think about in these broad frameworks of changes in the perceptions of time and space himself,
which outlines and it's likely that the changes in our political and social
orders will not be as drastic as what I exposed here or just outlined here,
because in the end, technology is what we make of it. Right?
But to make sure that decisions about the use of technologies are not made for us, I think we should at least think about it.
So thank you for your attention and we were happy to try to answer your questions.